CONVOCATION ISSUE

The most outstanding event on Campus this year was the 1960 Convocation whose subject was “The New World Ahead: Interpretation and Prophecy.”

Your editorial board felt that the proceedings would provide material for an interesting Alumni Magazine. Class Notes and Campus News, therefore, have been limited to the most important events since the last issue.

We are happy to present to you this special issue which will be the last one covering the events of the 1959-1960 academic year. Volume II, Number 1 will be published early in the fall. —Ed.

Trinity College and the Trinity College Associates are pleased to present the proceedings of the 1960 Convocation, “The New World Ahead: Interpretation and Prophecy.”

Our decision to publish the text of the day-long session has been taken because of the demand from many sides, not only from those unable to join the several thousand who attended but also from those present who wished to review an extraordinarily worthwhile intellectual event.

To gather on a single platform seven learned men, authorities in religion, philosophy, economics and world affairs, who could discuss “Society in the New World Ahead” and “Man in the New World Ahead,” was no small achievement. These men, each dedicated in his own field, but capable of ranging widely, imparted to us their enthusiasm, their concern, their fears, their hopes for the decade ahead. We are deeply indebted to each of them for the splendid presentation of a subject of fundamental importance to us all.

The day’s success confirms our initial conviction of the value of such a convocation and leads us to hope that at some future time we may again convene with learned men for consultation.

This publication has been made possible by the continuing generosity of the Associates. It is a further indication of what can be done in the way of cooperative public service to the Greater Hartford Community.

OSTROM ENDELS, General Chairman
1960 Convocation

ALBERT C. JACOBS, President
Trinity College
THE 1960 CONVOCATION
SPONSORED BY
TRINITY COLLEGE AND
THE TRINITY COLLEGE ASSOCIATES

Theme – The New World Ahead: Interpretation and Prophecy

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The Rt. Rev. Walter H. Gray, D.D.
Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Connecticut

Introductory Remarks:
Ostrom Enders, General Chairman 1960 Convocation
President, Hartford National Bank and Trust Company

Participants:
Denis William Brogan
Professor of Political Science, Cambridge University
McGeorge Bundy
Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences
Harvard University
Walt Whitman Rostow
Professor of Economic History
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Dr. Albert Charles Jacobs
President, Trinity College

Participants:
Johannes Lilje
Bishop of the Church of Hannover, West Germany
Evangelical Lutheran Church
Charles Habib Malik
Former President, U.N. General Assembly
Professor of Christian Philosophy
American University, Lebanon, and
E. K. Hall Visiting Professor
Dartmouth College (1960)
F. S. C. Northrop
Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law
Yale University and
Elizabeth Morse Genius Professor,
Rollins College (1960)

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Moderator:
James Reston
Chief of the Washington Bureau
The New York Times

Participants:
Morning and afternoon speakers

Presiding Officer for all sessions
George Brinton Cooper, Professor of History
Trinity College
OSTROM ENDERS

Distinguished speakers, guests, ladies and gentlemen—Good Morning. And welcome to the first part of what we expect will be a full and especially meaningful day here at Trinity.

To begin these proceedings, we shall now have a short invocation by the Right Reverend Walter H. Gray, Bishop of The Episcopal Diocese of Connecticut.

THE RT. REV. WALTER H. GRAY, D.D.

Almighty God, creator of heaven and earth, may we seek in all things to be Thy servants in the creation of the new world ahead. Grant us the insight to hold most dear the vision of Thy kingdom Thou sayest to us by Thy son in the Sermon on the Mount. Make us vigilant, diligent, and courageous in preserving liberty of mind and spirit that we may transmit it unshorn to the generations following after us. Give us the strength of will to enable us to face eagerly the call for sacrifice that may come. Grant us that serenity of spirit which is the result of devotion to honor, to duty, and to Thee, that with steadfastness of faith and singleness of purpose, we may endure hardship as good soldiers of Christ and win with Him the victories which are eternal. In His name we ask it. Amen.

OSTROM ENDERS

It is perhaps something of a phenomenon to find this Field House so well-attended at what is still an early hour on a Saturday morning in spring. But, on the other hand, the stated theme of this convocation is “The New World Ahead: Interpretation and Prophecy,” and one could hardly ask for a more provocative or challenging subject at any time or in any season.

It is my function, privilege and pleasure as General Chairman of the Convocation to welcome you here on behalf of Trinity College and Trinity College Associates and to open this first meeting. But before I turn this platform over to the presiding officer, I want to tell you briefly about this group called Trinity College Associates, because it is unique and because you may not have heard very much about us.

Trinity College Associates is a group of 19 industrial and business firms in Connecticut formed to provide an avenue of communication between the College and the community, and to make the great resources of Trinity more available to the corporate interests of our area. Since this association was created five years ago, we feel we can point to a number of distinct achievements. Business has gained from the wisdom and insight available on this campus. The College has gained a better understanding of the business,
industrial and educational needs of the community in which it lives. Specifically, we have initiated special lectures, we have established certain courses for employees of the Associate companies, and we have added to and expanded the availability of the Trinity Library—in itself a priceless community resource.

Today, with this convocation, we present further evidence of our joint efforts. We offer it to you proudly, we are gratified by your evident interest, and we are most appreciative of the participation on the part of our distinguished speakers. We hope you will find this day a memorable one.

At this point, I will introduce to you the man who will be the Convocation’s presiding officer, George Brinton Cooper is Professor of History at Trinity, and has been with Trinity since 1941—with time out during World War II to serve with Naval Intelligence and later as American Consul in the London Embassy. His academic accomplishments are numerous and impressive. In addition to his role at Trinity, Professor Cooper is an active and respected member of the community at large, having been recently elected to the Hartford Board of Education. He brings to his difficult role today an acute sense of history, past and in the making, together with the practiced skills of diplomacy. The latter may prove to be especially useful before the day is through.

It is now my pleasure to place this first session—on the subject of “Society in the New World Ahead”—in the capable guiding hands of Professor Cooper.

GEORGE BRINTON COOPER

On behalf of Trinity College, I welcome you to the first session of the 1960 Convocation. We all look forward to a day of rigorous discussion and argument. It is very fitting that Trinity College, dedicated as it must be, to the definition and transmission of our cultural heritage, should bring together thinkers and scholars who represent the best in the Western tradition. They have come here today to turn the searchlight of scrutiny on some of the problems which face our society as it enters the sixth decade of this century. They are all men who have gained eminence, not so much because they have proposed brilliant answers to many of our questions, but because they have been able to formulate new questions as well. They are all men who have transcended their particular academic specialties. I might say they are “jacks-of-all-trades” and masters of many. In the program this morning the speakers are listed in the order of the alphabet. They will speak, however, in reverse order.

Professor Walt Whitman Rostow has brought to the field of economic history the advantage of a penetrating and broad knowledge of universal history. His works on British economy in the nineteenth century, on Soviet society, on China, and on American foreign policy are classic works in their fields. A graduate of Yale and of Oxford (where he was a Rhodes scholar), Professor Rostow has served with the Department of State and with the Economic Commission for Europe. Two years ago he lectured widely in Europe in London, Paris, Moscow and Geneva, Rome and Warsaw, and attracted wide attention for what was called his non-Communist manifesto. The British weekly, The Economist, said of these lectures, and I quote, “They provide the most stimulating contribution to political and economic discussion made by any academic economist since the War.” His last book, The United States in The World Arena, will be reviewed in tomorrow’s New York Times.

I take great pleasure in presenting to you Professor Rostow.

WALT WHITMAN ROSTOW

As we all know, prediction is a tricky business; and for an historian it is likely to result not merely in error, but in loss of professional status. I have led a sufficiently adventurous academic life so that, by itself, this latter consideration does not greatly deter me. But I am impressed by the fundamental scientific difficulty with prophesy, which comes to this: prediction is dangerous because the large number of forces at work in historical circumstances permit many outcomes consistent with their existence. The number of unknowns is always greater than the number of equations. After the event history is always, in a sense, inevitable; that is, we can find good reasons for explaining why what happened was bound to happen. But before the event, history is never inevitable, among other reasons because of the magical—and sometimes satanic—role of the individual. History appears tolerant of the individual if he avoids the larger illusions of grandeur; and this generous dispensation both imparts to history its fascination and sets a limit on its predictive possibilities.

I shall, therefore, conduct this exercise in prediction at a reasonably modest level. I shall try to identify three great forces at work which will, I believe, set the terms within which we Americans must make our choices from the present forward over the next several generations at least. The future for Americans will depend on the contrapuntal interplay of these three forces and on what we do or fail to do in response to them.

The three problems are these: the accelerated process of modernization going forward in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America; the diffusion of military, economic, and political power; and the challenges at home posed by our achievement of the levels of welfare we now enjoy.

Before examining how they relate to each other and to our future, I shall say something about each.

I

Our seers and statesmen have told us so often that the “revolution of rising expectations” is the greatest phenomenon of our time that we are now, perhaps, somewhat anesthetized. We all know that Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—embracing more than a billion human beings within the Free World—are in an active state of modernization. We all know that the outcome of
this process will radically alter the setting in which future American generations will live. And yet, it is somewhat unreal, for our horizons are normally short, and what presses in on us from day to day are the confusions, conflicts, and difficulties in the underdeveloped areas, not their accumulating steps towards modernization. The prospect becomes real to me, I know, only when I once calculated that when my seven-year-old son comes to maturity, if he is granted the life span of an average American, he will live in a world where India and China, with at least two billion souls between them, will command all the tricks of then powerful; and compound interest has taken hold in those places made by the aging Communist veterans of the Long March who still run China a quarter century after the uprooting of the traditional society and the beginning of regular growth has been passed—a transition which took a full century of trouble in the case of China and which yielded the compulsive, inhumane regime which is now installed in Peking.

Moreover, China and India are not alone. Momentum has taken hold in the Philippines; perhaps on Taiwan; certainly in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Perhaps, even, in Egypt.

In many areas, of course, there is stagnation or very slow progress: Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Iran, Iraq. And despite the tremendous human and political turmoil, the road ahead in Africa south of the desert will be long.

Nevertheless, pressures from within and from without are inexorably pressing these peoples and nations to repeat, in one way or another, some version of the experience through which virtually the whole of the northern half of the world has already passed: the experience of transforming their societies in such ways as to bring to bear all that modern science and technology may offer.

Those of us who live in the northern half of the globe stand in a position somewhat like that of the British in 1815; we know that about to end a technological monopoly we now hold will slip away, and that all the values and attitudes and policies which are rooted in this northern monopoly will have to be transformed, or given new expression in a new setting.

It is for this revolutionary transformation in world environment that we must prepare ourselves, our children, our society and its public policy.

But, of course, we must do more than that. While modernization will certainly occur in these southern continents, the forms modernization will take are not preordained. We did not initiate the process of modernization. We cannot wholly determine the outcome. But what the United States does or fails to do from the present forward will have a significant marginal effect. And our effect on the history of these new modern societies is likely to be greater in the 1960's and 1970's than in the generation beyond. We should recall that passage in Tocqueville near the beginning of his great essay on America where, anticipating Freud, he said:

"... we must watch the infant in his mother's arms; we must see the first images which the external world casts upon the dark mirror of his mind, the first occurrences that he witnesses; we must hear the the first words which awaken the sleeping powers of thought, and stand by his earliest efforts if we would understand the prejudices, the habits, and the passions which will rule his life. The entire man is, so to speak, to be seen in the cradle of the child.

"The growth of nations presents something analogous to this; they all bear some marks of their origin. The circumstances that accompanied their birth and contributed to their development affected the whole term of their being."

For better or worse—and often for worse—the shape of these new nations has, in many cases, already been partially determined. We cannot wholly undo their origins in a reaction against the high expectations for rapid progress that are stimulated by the intensity of international communications; it is apparent that, if progress does not become a palpable reality soon, a reality that every citizen can see and feel around him, some of the new nations may well accept communist or other totalitarian forms of organization in order to achieve the unity, discipline, and high investment rates that growth demands.

On the other hand, all of these non-Western cultures—and one might add the cultures of China and Russia as well—have deeply embedded within them values which set a high premium on the worth of the individual and which react against the claims of an all-powerful state. All of these cultures have the capacity within them, I believe, to create under the right circumstances, their own versions of democratic societies. More than that, the resistance to communism and the commitment to democratic aspiration goes deeper in many of these nations than we often credit, deeper than the relatively low estate of democratic practice would suggest. Finally, the technical problems of the transition are by no means insoluble if the local governments and leadership groups focus their minds on the job and if the United States and the West provide them with adequate and sustained assistance in capital and technique. This we have not yet done.

Now we know enough about this set of problems to say this much: The cause of democracy may well fail in the underdeveloped areas; but there is nothing in the modernization process and nothing in the situation as it now stands in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America that makes such failure inevitable. That is as far as prediction can go, for the possibility of choice still lies in the hands of those who live in the free world, and in part the outcome depends on what we Americans do or fail to do.
fusion will result in part from the gathering of the momentum in the underdeveloped areas as they move into modernization and expand their influence, military, political, and economic, in the world arena. But equally dramatic is the emergence to full technological maturity of Russia and parts of Eastern Europe. And above all, there is the widespread, if not yet fully correct perception among Western Europe and Japan which have entered in the past decade into the kind of growth which characterized the United States in the 1920's.

This is evidently not going to be a century which is dominated in any unilateral way by the United States; nor in my view is it going to be dominated by Russia or by any other one nation. If the world doesn't blow itself up by failing to discipline modern weapons of mass destruction, this is a world which will be made up of many middling powers.

The diffusion of power has been given a kind of premature reality due to the fact that the weapons of mass destruction are not rationally usable so long as the nuclear stalemate is maintained. The Soviet Union — in seeking to expand its influence — and the United States — in seeking to maintain the truce lines that resulted from the Second World War are, therefore, forced to deal with the world from day to day not with military force but by means of economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments which afford to even weak powers a remarkably substantial bargaining leverage. Tito began this game but many countries — from China itself and its relations with the Soviet Union through India and the Middle East — have learned, as it were, without major industrial potential, and with no serious military force, how to bring quite a lot of bargaining weight to bear against the major powers. A kind of cosmic joke accompanied the creation of nuclear weapons; for they definitively violated the proportionality between industrial potential and usable military force. And so we see the heads of state of the two great nuclear powers — two tired gentlemen in their late sixties — flying around the world trying to break or to mend fences, like a pair of candidates in a global primary. To this homely process of international politicking the existence of the Russian and American nuclear arsenals back home are not wholly irrelevant; but they are very nearly so.

The reality of the diffusion of power, violating as it does the powerful image of the two nuclear giants, will be difficult for us all to absorb. For Western Europe and Japan it means that, while their old empires cannot be re-established, roles of dignity and responsibility on the world scene await them, if they are ready to play a part. For the United States, it means that we must urgently reorganize the Free World on the basis of more equal partnership, setting aside the images and the habits and the formulae that were built up in the latter days of the Second World War and in the first creative surge of the post-war, from 1947-1950, when we dominated the scene. Our leadership is still desperately needed. The free world is clearly incapable of pulling itself together and coping with its agenda without American leadership; and it will be needed as far ahead as one can peer. But it must be leadership on new, more equal terms.

But the most profound effect — and the one most difficult to absorb — will be the effect of the diffusion of power on Communist Russia. For the diffusion of power means that the Russian vision of world empire cannot succeed. To accept this fact means that the word will require in time not merely a change in Communist rhetoric and theology, not merely a change in the external policy of Russia; it will also bring about, in time, revolutionary change in the internal organization of Soviet society. The need for those profound changes in the face of the diffusion of power is one of the things that will give to the whole era ahead a very precarious character. If Russia is not to be the base from which an endless struggle for world power is mounted, if it is to accept its historic status as one great nation among many, the case for a political economy of austerity, for a single party rule, and for the police state is weakened if not altogether removed.

The diffusion of nuclear power has implications not merely for our own position on the world scene; not merely for our relations with the underdeveloped areas; not merely for our relations with Western Europe where our alliances must be restructured on the basis of a more equal partnership; it goes to the heart of the dialogue and negotiations we must endlessly pursue with the Russians. And we must view their position not with arrogance and moralism, but with patient strength and a kind of historical compassion for the dilemma they confront, which only they can solve.

III

Now the third projection, which takes the form of the progressive readjustment of our domestic life to the wealth and welfare and leisure which the United States has now achieved and which will be increasingly afforded to American citizens.

When I briefly visited the Soviet Union last year, I teased my Soviet colleagues a little by saying that the United States was, at the margin, already a communist country, and that this was so in the quite technical sense that for many Americans — and for increasing numbers of Americans — the problems of scarcity were no longer central to our life. We were actively at grips with the situation which Marx had placed under the rubric of communism; for in Marxist doctrine, communism is that stage in a society's development where the pursuit of economic advantage is no longer the dominating human motive in society. It is the stage when, in Marx' romantic nineteenth century view, scarcity would be lifted and man's better nature would flower.

We can observe in American society in many dimensions this loss of primacy for the pursuit of material gain. It lies, for example, behind the dramatic rise in the American birth rate. For whatever reasons, post-war Americans have chosen larger families rather than the expansion of income along their usual paths. Our novelists systematically reflect this shift, when they focus almost obsessively on the problem of the individual in relation to bureaucratic forms of organization, displaying in their heroes a tendency to withdraw from the pursuit of power and money to private areas of expression. Phenomena as various as the rising sale of pocketbooks, long-playing records, and motorboats reflect this stage as well, perhaps, as the enormous increase in dog racing and our acute problems of juvenile delinquency and mental health.

While many Americans are still relatively poor and many still have every reason to press upward for money, recognition, and power; still, at the margin, we can observe some of the choices that arise, then the expansion of real income in material terms — begins to lose its appeal, and where the central issue becomes the quality of our society rather than its physical scale or its material level.

We already know enough about this stage in a society's history to understand that it is more complicated than Marx' benign conclusion to his historical sequence suggested. When the burdens of scarcity are lifted, men may turn to the cultivation of inner human frontiers; but they also can be bored or simply irritated with one another; and the devil may make work for idle hands.

In the more immediate future — let us say for the 1960's — our problem transcends the question of the society's quality. While for some substantial segments of society — not, incidentally, for women — the use of leisure is already a real...
problem, our society as a whole is not in a position to behave as if its economic problems no longer deserved attention. We are challenged not merely by the enormous gap in social overhead capital, that is, in education, urban reconstruction, construction of roads, etc.; not merely by the requirements for providing for the expanding populations we have willed; and we are also caught up in a world where an extraordinarily expensive arms race is a reality; where our international competitive position has weakened; where increased resources are required for the underdeveloped areas. We already face, then, some of the choices and problems of affluence; but we are not truly an affluent society. It is too soon for the four-day week and the three-day weekend.

We can now bring together the three dimensions of this projection and pose the following question: can this society of ours, brought out of its own dynamics towards a state of bland comfort, increasingly concerned with the uses and problems of leisure, turning inward to the private world of enlarged families - can such a rich society enter vicariously and effectively into the problems of the underdeveloped world, sharing the ardent adventures of modernization and helping marginally to shape its course; can such a society deal effectively with a world of diffusing power, understanding the changing potentialities and limitations of our power and influence, helping make the transition from a world held in precarious stability by an arms race to one where the instruments of force are brought under effective international control; can we fashion new creative relations with our increasingly confident and assertive allies in Western Europe and Japan, who are entering the age of the mass automobile as we, taking all that for granted, probe at the problems and choices beyond; can we, above all, mobilize the mixture of strength, will, and imagination to persuade Moscow by our deeds and our words that the only realistic course open to it is to join with us, in this brief interval of our joint primacy, to create a framework of military order within which power will inevitably be diffused away from us both?

It is easy to be pessimistic. It is easy to take the view that, in some sense, we have gone soft with wealth and comfort and leisure. But the vital roots of a society and a culture are much deeper than these stages of growth. I was a student in Britain in the period 1936–38 and I recall vividly the widely held view that this old society, having suffered terrible war losses in 1914–18, having stagnated and experienced grave social conflicts between the wars, led by men still hankering for a nineteenth century world that would never return, men incapable of facing the brute challenge of Hitler even of Mussolini - that this old society had gone over the hill of history. Yet Britain turned and dealt with six years of war and a further half-decade of acute austerity to find again the poise and momentum and the continuity with its long past it now enjoys.

I do not believe that our society has lost its capacity for effort and adventure; nor is our old sense of democratic mission gone. What we require is a political leadership that defines the tasks, asks of us what is required, including the taxes that are required, and opens the way for our participation as citizens in these adventures of our time. In the end, the United States remains - to itself and to the world - the favored child of the Enlightenment, our nationhood still deeply linked to the faith and judgment that responsible free men can solve their problems. In the underdeveloped areas, in the Communist bloc, and even at home this faith is directly challenged. It is the peculiar task of this campaign year to churn up the issues; to define the challenges; and to set us on courses of action in the 1960's which would demonstrate - as our country has often demonstrated in the past - that the faith of the many peoples who have suffused the adventure of American democracy that this faith was not misplaced.
GEORGE BRINTON COOPER

Thank you very much Professor Rostow.

Our next speaker is a rather prodigious young man. Mr. McGeorge Bundy brings to the Convocation the benefits of his wide experience as a student of foreign affairs and as a spokesman for a liberal arts education. I first knew the name of McGeorge Bundy when I was a graduate student at Yale and when Mr. Bundy was one of the most prominent members of the senior class. I was particularly intrigued by the fact that his first name, "McGeorge," was a very happy solution to the burden of bearing the name of "George." Since 1953 he has been Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard. He is the co-author of Henry Stimson's memoirs, and is the editor of a collection of papers of Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State. Mr. Bundy gave the Lowell Lectures in 1948 on "The Conservative Tradition," and if my chronology serves me correctly, that was eight years after his graduation from Yale. Like Mr. Rostow, Dean Bundy has carried into the active world of affairs the benefit of his reflections in the Academy. It is with great pleasure that I present Dean McGeorge Bundy of Harvard.

McGEORGE BUNDY

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I ought to disillusion anyone who thinks there is an escape from the difficulties of bearing the name "George." By the time you have passed through life as "George McBundy," "McGregor Bundy," and on one memorable occasion, "McGlory Bundy," you would be glad to be "George."

I want to talk about the connection between knowledge and power in the next generation; really, I suppose, about the relation of science and technology and political action. But I use the wider framework, knowledge and power, in part to cover up my own lack of qualification to talk about the subject. I am not a scientist.

One of the difficulties of this topic is that so few people have the right to talk across the connection between science and politics. I do live among scientists, and working in a university is, in a way, today, necessarily a way of finding one's self between the world of what is known and coming to be known, and the world of power and action. I should be inclined myself to say that this problem of connection, this shape of the meaning of the future, or element of it, is at least as important as any other.

To put it another way, let me suggest that the explosion of knowledge which is characteristic of the last fifty years, and which will be clearly characteristic of the next fifty years if the world goes on, is the most distinctive and powerful single fact of our age. I am not one to underestimate the meaning and importance of the Soviet power, the rising Chinese power, and the still more complex and perhaps more searching questions which are posed by the diffusion of power, as Mr. Rostow has been explaining, but I think he would agree that underneath all of this modernization, diffusion, and expansion of power is the explosion of knowledge.

It is important, I think, to understand how wide this is. We see it almost too evidently in the expanding technology of weapons, in the serenity with which men say that they can now destroy the world several times over. We see it in the remarkable developments of biology and chemistry outward into medicine and applications for public health. We see it in the proliferation of new materials to do different things, and of new sources of power. We see it in the way in which the world grows at once larger and smaller, so that we can now begin to look with some degree of clarity at the universe beyond the solar system just as we begin to wonder, as Richard Feynman has been wondering in a most perceptive and imaginative speech reprinted last week in the *Saturday Review*, about the small world, the world in which atoms can be counted in tens rather than tens of tens of millions, and in which an encyclopedia can be placed upon the head of a pin and used. We begin to learn something of the nature of life, and we stand even at the edges of the question, in scientific terms, of the nature of mind.

Now this is not only a wide and rapid explosion; it is an explosion which proceeds at a constantly accelerating rate. Robert Oppenheimer estimates that the fund of human knowledge doubles, perhaps, in every fifteen years. In very extraordinarily rapid areas of advance it happens even faster than that. My impression, as a layman against, is that computer technology is proceeding so fast that these calculating machines raise their powers by a factor of ten every three or four years. It is not altogether clear whether these machines are ten times brighter, or merely ten times busier, as this rate expands, but there is power, nevertheless, as Mr. Rostow in economist's terms has said, in com-
really remake man in some new image of himself. We are not yet Divine. Still and all, it is fast enough, and as you think in terms of the boundaries of learning as they were in 1860, the year of Darwin, or the year after Darwin, as they were in 1900, in 1930, 1950, 1960, you have a tightening spiral of speed in the process, and you have also a growing uneasiness as to where it may go. I think, on the whole, I would be one of those who think that it is wiser not to suppose that any of the problems we have traditionally regarded as outside the range of science will necessarily stay there.

Now the center of my concern this morning, and what I think states really the general point of the morning's discussion, is the relation of this explosion to political power, to political purpose, and to the shape especially of a free society. But let me make two comments first that may help to shape this area of concern.

First, it seems to me quite fundamental that there is no answer to this problem of the explosion of scientific understanding, in rejecting it, or mistrusting it, or some-how believing that it ought not to happen. Very large parts of the rather sterile debate which seems to come up sporadically between scientists and humanists have, at least in part, this flavor in which the non-scientist feels that somehow the scientist is wrong. It is an old human instinct that the man who tries to learn what is not known is a dangerous man. So be it, but there is no escape from it. There is no escape from it whether one thinks in terms of survival of free societies, or in terms of the nature of man, or in terms of one's hope of what may be accomplished.

I think for myself that the most compelling of these is the second, that this is the way that men are. Percy Bridgman, in a very remarkable article a year or so ago, made this point. Talking about learning the way the mind works, he said, "We have advanced to the point where we can put our hand on the hem of the curtain that separates us from an understanding of the nature of our minds. Is it conceivable that, in timidity or in laziness, we should turn back?" Surely not. These things are here. Their stress, their speed will be someone's speed, and there is no getting away from it.

The second marginal comment which, it seems to me, is worth making is one I shall come back to at the end, but it seems to me we might get it out. This revolution implies many things, but most immediately it implies an equally revolutionary modification in our sense of what education is, because we must now do a number of things which we did not have to do forty or fifty years ago. First, all, we are forced to the point where we can put our hand on the hem of the curtain that separates us from an understanding of the nature of our minds. Is it conceivable that, in timidity or in laziness, we should turn back? Surely not. These things are here. Their stress, their speed will be someone's speed, and there is no getting away from it.

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The same thing may be true in many other areas. I believe it is. I believe, indeed, that measured as a form of capital investment, the application of basic science, basic research, and then of applied science, and finally of technology, and a systematic use of this way of thinking and acting, is much more potent than the allocation of resources as we have traditionally conceived it, as much more potent than this traditional method, as that method itself is more potent than the process of subsistence from generation to generation which preceded the age of economic "take-off."

It may then be that we are at the edge of a time in which authoritarian societies, controlling and using this new investment, the human mind, will be able to produce revolutions in power and in growth as remarkable to us as our own revolution, the industrial and technological revolution of the last one hundred and fifty years, is remarkable today to the people who inhabit the world of rising expectations. To this I think we must be prepared to respond.

But let me turn to the problem of politics. In its simplest form it can be put this way: there is a real question, it seems to me, whether in the next generation freedom and knowledge can stay there. This is the standard assumption, you know, that the free society and widely diffused and advanced education go hand in hand, that the great advances of science are possible only in an atmosphere of freedom, that somehow there is a beneficent, mutually reinforcing relation between knowledge and freedom. But is it clear that this is so?

Look, for example, at the advantages which the authoritarian society does have in these matters. One, and a simple one, is simply the advantage of maintaining its control. A small group of men in charge of a large society have at their disposal today means of control, technological and also psychological, which were not readily available a hundred years ago. This is not really the most important part of the matter. It is still more significant that the interlocking of power and controlled science can have great strength.

It is not simply that the Soviet Union trains very many more engineers than we do. One can get arguments as to whether these engineers are really very well trained, whether in the high sense most of them can be called engineers at all. What is almost more significant is that this Soviet society can engineer the allocation of engineers, and even scientifically assign the basic scientists. Where this centralized, rigorously controlled society has chosen to throw its effort in basic science and in technology, its results have been extraordinary. There is reason to wonder whether societies less closely organized can make full use of this new weapon of power.

To put it another way, it is a relatively new but extremely potent form of capital investment. If you decide that you wish to reach the moon, and if you make the appropriate investment, you can do it a lot faster than the natural process of inquiry or any accidental allocation of resources would lead you to suppose.

In many other areas, I believe it is. I believe, indeed, that measured as a form of capital investment, the application of basic science, basic research, and then of applied science, and finally of technology, and a systematic use of this way of thinking and acting, is much more potent than the allocation of resources as we have traditionally conceived it, as much more potent than this traditional method, as that method itself is more potent than the process of subsistence from generation to generation which preceded the age of economic "take-off."

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give up any real expectation of understanding the nature of whole systems of weapons.

If we take, for example, the urgent contemporary question of the proper political posture of the nation with respect to tests of atomic weapons, it seems to me that the more one knows about it, the less it is likely that one can put one’s faith in a nakedly democratic decision on this point. The matter has to be entrusted, and entrusted through a number of levels of trust, to political men who themselves must make an act of trust in technical men. This process is neither easy nor entirely comfortable to think about. Yet in weapons technology we have the tradition that military matters, in very large measure, have been beyond direct democratic control. Perhaps the question takes a still sharper shape when it appears in other areas. What happens if we have to make a similar act of abandonment in the control and use of the atmosphere, for example, decisions about the weather, in the use of the oceans for food or for the disposal of dangerous wastes, or for the quality of our civilization as a place in which a man can still be alone and face danger? What happens when the land itself becomes necessarily the object of control and use by the rational mind for purposes for which only a limited number of rational minds can clearly understand? So, as we think of what technology may mean to men who wish to be free in an active and not merely a passive sense, there is reason for fear.

Yet before we try to deal with these dangers, even briefly, let me sketch the hopes, for the terrors of the managed technological society are surely matched by its hopes and offering of opportunity. If we think of this instrument as one of long-term, high-powered investment, we are entitled, I think, to count not simply its military meaning but its civil hope.

Properly used, the instruments of this and coming decades will help us in all sorts of ways of which we have only begun to glimpse the meaning. Most of our investment in the application of science in this country today is conditioned in two broad areas, arising out of our concern with defense on the one hand, and health on the other. What we have done in these areas without, so far, an essential destruction of our freedoms is surely remarkable.

What would happen if a similar effort of applied intelligence were made in the field of transportation which is one field in which organized chaos and dominance of the advertising mind have prevented the use of reason in recent years? What would happen if we began to think as well in modern terms about food and nourishment as we used to in the days of an earlier technology?

In the largest sense we have not begun to apply our science, our best organized minds of inquiry, to transportation, to the feeding of the world, to the planning of resources, to this remarkable problem of learning about learning (whether one takes this last one, learning about learning, at the level of its application, which is education, or at the level of scientific inquiry – of what is a mind, and how does it work?).

I do not mean that individuals are not thinking about these things. I mean that if you compare levels of investment of men and facilities, what we have so far done in these and in other areas is the smallest fraction of what we do routinely in the areas of defense and physical health. I think it is plain that this opportunity and this hope is real. I think it poses obvious questions for a society organized
as ours is in the hypothesis that, beyond a very limited sphere which is the public sector, these things will take care of themselves. The hope is here. The challenge is one of organization and management so that the premises of its limited power and of plural diffusion on which our society has been based, can somehow be connected to the organized use of what we know and have it in us to know, in such a way as to attack these problems, and not merely say to one another, here they are.

Now here, it seems to me, there is a special kind of hope which we can have for the free society. In these relatively unexplored areas our problem is not simply to mobilize technology or to apply what is known. Our problem is not even to send task forces to attack known unknowns. Our problem is to be steadily alert to the fact that we do not even know yet what we want to know. It is here at the real edge of inquiry, in the identification of the unrecognized question, in the attack which does not have an authoritarian direction behind it, that we have as a society a great natural advantage. We have built up a tradition of the practice of free inquiry, politically and technically, as individuals who are and are not scientists, which can be of the greatest value to us, as against societies in which, by their nature, the pressures of the power of the state press against this kind of freedom of thought.

Our problem is to maintain the freedom of the inquiry of individuals in all sorts of places while connecting it naturally, and without constraint, to the organized attack by society itself upon large problems for which the means are there if we only organize the search. Now this has in it elements of paradox, elements of self-contradiction, and yet I do not think in this age of complementarity in all sorts of spheres of science, we should be disturbed by that. We have a challenge of connecting social purpose with the individual. What I think we cannot do is to assume any longer that this is natural, self-sustaining, somehow independent of what we do as a political society.

I do not think anyone can predict with any certainty, and certainly I would not try, whether a society which puts the maintenance of its own plurality, of its own concern for individuals ahead of what it might gain by surrendering, whether such a society is, in fact, likely to be able to sustain itself in the future. The odds are, surely, sufficiently good so that we ought not yet to give up, and it is in this context of an acceptance of any given plural purpose and a recognition of the nature of our technological future that I would venture to suggest, in closing, a few of the things we might do as a people and a polity for each other.

All of these suggestions, all of the elements in this modern agenda turn upon the process of making and sustaining connections, working connections between science and political power in the context of a democratic process. We have operating in Washington today a small organization called the President's Science Advisory Committee. This is a place in which the highest political authority in the country has accessible to him a quite remarkable, if small, pool of the very best scientific minds in the country. These scientific minds were chosen not simply because of their character as double-domed laboratory types, but because the men on this committee, by and large, have tended to combine a high awareness of the nature of modern science in one or more of its special fields with a responsible sense of what science and public purpose can do for each other.

This beginning, which is already more mature than what we had on an ad hoc basis during the Second World War, and entirely different in character from anything we had before that time, deserves, it seems to me, to be multiplied in many ways. We need more and more varied science advisory committees. We need a much multiplied pool of men whose technological understanding is matched by an awareness of its place in society as a whole. These wise men are alarmingly few, and they are badly needed, not just for decisions about missiles or about space, but across the much wider range of activity which I have ventured to suggest.

In a larger sense, we need to intensify our adult education, - I know, of course, that we need to intensify and, I have suggested, revolutionize education for the young as well, but we have not very much time, and this is not a problem which can be left to those who are now ten or twelve or fourteen. All of us need to accept, and not simply to accept, but to walk toward the fact that we live in a technological world, and a world in which we cannot shut the box of widening knowledge.

We need, and I think this is perhaps a way of dramatizing my first two points, to choose some things to do as a society beyond the immediate questions of the survival of a military organization, or the survival, physically, of the individual. I think that as a society we need to attack and to make targets for this kind of investment over a very wide area - such problems as that of economic, agricultural, and industrial development. This is, incidentally, an illustration of the way that science is not merely physical science; for we do, or the economists do (if I may say this for Mr. Rostow and his colleagues) know more now than they did about how you understand the structure of economic growth. It is time now for us as a society, having come so much further than others, to make this an object of investment, not in the crude sense of appropriations shipped abroad, but in the much more subtle, and, I think, much more powerful sense of scientific investment, in that we seek with a real deployment of men and resources to understand what it is in both theory and in application.

We should do this, I believe, with the oceans. I think that the waters of the world have so much in them that we do not know. Oceanography as a topic, - and here I borrow from others who have said this earlier, as I do throughout in what I am saying as a layman - oceanography deserves, this kind of national attack, not simply because we need to know where Polaris missiles can be safely stationed, but because we need to know for the whole of our future what the waters are like upon which the land is set.

And then I would pick as a third area, and here you will see my professional bias, education. We need to study
learning in its highest reaches of scientific inquiry and in its most practical application at the school. We need as a society to invest. We need as a public matter to make this our business.

Finally, as we begin to do these things, or others like them, we need, I think, to remember that this whole out-pouring of learning, this whole expedition into the unknown is really started by men. It is not something alien to man and his purpose. It is a part of him, a part of his purpose, and it is a matter of logic, and not simply an act of hope, that this widening field of what is not known, this chain of doubling and re-doubling of quantities of knowledge, this qualitative change of living in a world which moves so fast this way that all of these things come out of man and what he is, and therefore are not alien to him or his vision of a free society.

GEORGE BRINTON COOPER

Thank you very much Dean Bundy.

The last speaker this morning, Professor Denis W. Brogan of Cambridge University, is one of those men who defies any attempt to place him in a category. Brogan on French politics, Brogan on America, and numerous other works are standard books in every literate man's library, and this month which marks the centennial of Fort Sumter, Mr. Brogan has given to Americans a new and penetrating reappraisal of our Civil War in the current issue of Harper's magazine. He invites controversy on this, by the way. If you have read the article, you will recall that at the beginning he said that he would come to America in the spring for the first shot at Fort Brogan. I understand that as a boy D. W. Brogan, born in Scotland, by the way, began reading American newspapers at the age of eight, and this started an interest in American affairs which has made Mr. Brogan the foremost foreign expert on the American scene. His knowledge and feeling for the nuances of both American and French life is an extraordinary tribute to his prodigious reading and his great understanding. I take great pleasure in presenting Denis W. Brogan of Cambridge University.

DENIS WILLIAM BROGAN

I suffer under two disabilities coming after Professor Rostow and Dean Bundy. The first is that my contribution is much less epic than theirs. It will be devoted to a narrower field of professional speculation. The second is that I am not an American, and a great part of my remarks will be devoted again to criticizing certain American attitudes and certain policies that flow from these attitudes.

I agree with everything that the two previous speakers have said. I am struck both by the size of our problem and by the speed of our problem. When I came here this morning I was told that the Prime Minister of South Africa had been shot. I had not heard that, and it was not known then whether he was alive or dead. This is a very dramatic sign of the acceleration with which the whole world is faced, and for which our political institutions, all political institutions, I think, are ill-adapted in the present day.

Secondly, I am very conscious of the difficulties presented by the technological revolution to which Dean Bundy referred and expounded so admirably. We are in the dark. Even the great scientists are in the dark about their colleagues. The non-scientists are in the dark about everything. This, of course, produces clashes in universities. I live in Cambridge, England, surrounded by scientists, and I know some of the clashes among themselves and between them and the rest of us which mark university life. The battle, a great one, an important one, is not entirely or always a victory for the scientists. I can remember a recent case of a very distinguished astronomer, indeed, who published a book on economics, on international investment, exactly in Professor Rostow's field. Then a senior professor of political economy was asked what he thought of it. He said, "It hasn't changed my economic views in the least, it has merely destroyed my faith in astronomical physics." Nevertheless, these are the two great forces of our time, the accelerating political problem, and the technological explosion, and the two, of course, are closely linked.

Now the United States of America, necessarily the leader of the free world, as Professor Rostow pointed out, suffers from disadvantages in facing both of these problems, disadvantages arising out of what has been up to now an extremely successful history. The United States is one of the great success stories of history, and it has grown to this immense strength and power and imposing position of leadership under institutions designed in the eighteenth century, and which served, with one great failure of the Civil War, admirably until quite recent times.

It is quite natural that the American people, living under these institutions, flourishing under them with a whole compass of ideas and sentiments, prejudices, superstitions, if you like, associated with them, should be reluctant to consider (a) whether these institutions are adequate for the United States and (b) whether they are exportable.

I want to make one or two suggestions: first, that they are adequate, but may cease to be so and will cease to be so unless some adjustments in attitude rather than in formal law are made, and, secondly, that it is unlikely that in their present form they are exportable except to a comparatively small part of the world. Now this is a truth that is very hard to accept. It is a hard saying. The Americans have been right in saying with the Romans sic fortis Etruria crevit, so the United States grew great.

Contemplating the world in 1914, it was not foolish in Woodrow Wilson's case, for example, it was quite sensible to expect the rapid extension of what we call free institutions of the American or British type all over the world. An historical movement seemed to be that way. I am a believer not only in historical movement, but in historical accident, and in a sense I believe the Bolshevik revolution was an accident, although the Russian revolution was not. A slightly different turn of events, the cessation of the war in 1917, and it really did cease in 1917, would have given Lenin no opportunity, and he would have died in exile as he feared in 1914 that he would do.

This is an element of accident, and we must remember that in Communist power, there is this element of accident of origin. We must not assume, as the Communists assume, that history gave us Communist rule in Russia inevitably, without any possibility of failure on one side, or resistance
on the other. We must, therefore, not only accept this element of accident, but the fact and kind of accident that occurred, and why the United States is not only faced with these great technical problems, but a much narrower, very important political problem. If the progress of 1914 had gone on, the technological world would be about as advanced as it is today, Russia might be just as advanced a scientific society as it is today, because Russian economic "take-off," (I dare not to use the word because Professor Rostow is present) because the preliminaries to the "take-off" were well under way before the Russian revolution. However, because of the success in taking over one of the great land masses of the world, the easy promise of inevitable victory for our democratic way of life has proved false or, at any rate, highly misleading.

The next thing to notice, and it is a very important thing to notice, is that the special character of Russian society is not economic, but political. The special character of the Bolshevik revolution was not that a body of people imregnated with Marxian doctrine took over society, took over the state and remolded it according to the recipes of Karl Marx. It is how it was done. The recipes of Karl Marx for future society, as anyone knows who has tried to read him, are very meager. Where he predicts anything, he predicts not very plausible idealistic Utopian solutions. Lenin is even worse. There can be few less prophetic works than State and Revolution which he published in the year 1922 when he took power.

The great Bolshevik find, the great Bolshevik device, was the one monolithic authoritarian absolutist party. What we are mostly concerned about in Russia today is not the fact that Russia is a great technological power, but that that technological power is wielded, as both of our speakers have reminded us, by small, dedicated, and in this generation of old Bolshevik leaders, probably convinced authoritarian ideologues, to use Napoleon's contemptuous phrase.

I should like to suggest that this is what we ought to keep our eyes on in China too, because what the world is looking at is not so much a competition in economic methods. The economic methods of large scale production are very much alike in all countries, and Professor Rostow was quite right in saying that in some ways the United States is a more communist society than Russia is. What is different is this control of the whole state by a handful of people using a small minority party as the instrument of power. It seems quite easy to us, quite natural to us, to regard with horror and to some extent with contempt, the submission of a thousand million people to rule of this type. All our Western instincts and all our Western educated biases are against it, but we must remember that there is no real reason to believe that the outside world, the millions, the tens of millions, the hundreds of millions uncommitted, the parts of Asia which are not under Communist rule, the whole of Latin America, India, Africa, you must not assume that we are on a seller's market now as we were in 1914, or that these countries will necessarily turn to us for leadership, and will necessarily be on our side when the chips are down, if they ever are down. I used not to believe this myself.

I was optimistic even as late as 1945 about the automatically expanding powers of the free society. Today, fifteen years later, I am both wiser and sadder. I don’t think we are automatically going to win the cold war. I think it is going to continue, and I don’t think we are automatically going to export all, or perhaps even most of our political and social institutions to the new world which, to use the brilliant Rostow metaphor, is now in a state of "take-off."

Why is this so? We underestimate — and here the historian has something to contribute — we underestimate the
degree to which the success of British institutions, of American institutions, is due to strict, formal, political doctrines, and to sticking to formal political writing, to laws, to constitutions, to amendments. The seamless web of custom, of practice, of bias, of the mores, the folkways, has an historical origin which makes it easy to think this way, to act this way, in Western Europe and in North America, which makes it easy to forget that it is not the only way effectively of doing things, and to forget what is most serious, that the countries to which we export the institutions have, in many cases, none of the assets, historical or psychological, or cultural, which we have which make our institutions work, although, of course, it is a reciprocal effect and institutions alter very much, and on the whole for the better, the way our society works in general.

The first counsel I would like to give to Americans in their role as leaders of the free world, a role which must be theirs, as Professor Rostow has pointed out, is to acquire the very un-American virtue of patience. One of the most acute of American political philosophers, the late Mr. Dooley, said that ‘Americans are short-distance crusaders.’ I believe that there is some truth in this, and I believe there is some important new insight for us to get from the fact that, as far as I know, no American has ever won a race at the Olympic games of half a mile or over.

The United States in the next generation, when the people of ten and twelve that Dr. Bundy was talking about are adults, will have to learn to run the five-mile, or even the marathon, and that will be hard. It will be still harder if they run heavily encumbered in their outer aspects, when they go abroad, either spiritually or physically, if encumbered by a number of pre-conceptions about what they can expect and should expect from the nations they want to help and want to lead. To have the policy effective, they must want to help more than they want to lead. In fact, they must want to lead only in order to be able to help. I think the American generosity of temper is such that they will, in fact, find that attitude easy to develop. In fact, they have it already.

What you will find harder to develop is patience. Take, for example, the new rising African states. In all of them, whether they inherited English traditions of political liberty, or French, in all of them the tendency towards a one-party state is visible. It is not only in Guinea, it is not only in Ghana; it is likely, or at any rate is a present danger, in all of the new states of all former British and French empires.

I see no reason to doubt that it is the same kind of problem that is going to arise rapidly in the Belgian Congo if it remains united, and if it doesn’t remain united, you have one party of states broken out of the great imperial complex. Now this is unfortunate, and may be disastrous, but we must be content with the fact that perhaps to all these people a central authoritarian, doctrinally united party, – I don’t say Communist party, but a Nationalist party, such as Dr. Nkrumah’s party in Ghana – may be a necessity with which we have to deal. You have to remember, for example, that in these cases we are dealing with people, many of whom fifty years ago in their societies did not know the wheel, in none of which was there a written vernacular literature until ten or twenty years ago, and in which all the operative ideas that they used for their “take-off” into modern society came to them from their imperial conquerors, in English or in French.

It is no use preaching simply the merits of free enterprise, the merits of the American constitution, the role of the Supreme Court, the merits of county government in Connecticut, or other political panaceas to that kind of people who are politically almost as primitive now as they were in 1900, although they not only now have the wheel, but have airlines, and many of them have now the beginnings of an elite class trained in all the aspects of Western civilization, including nuclear physics. That is the first counsel I think the American people must give itself.

Many of these people will fall, will run before they can walk, will fall and stumble and will behave in bad and intolerable ways, but the bad ways will have to be put up with, and intolerable ruder, ingratitude, and folly submitted to. That is the first thing I should like to say, and this applies, of course, in part to India. Anyone can go to India and give a recipe for what India needs – kill all the cows, kill all the monkeys, break all the taboos, abolish the caste system – in fact, turn the Indians into Connecticut Yankees, and every time I hear programs of that kind advanced, and they are advanced, I say the great remarks of Sir Thomas More, “This will not come until the world be made perfect, and that will not be this long while.”

I may hasten to say that many Americans know very much better. For example, Mr. Chester Bowles, with whom I spent a great part of Monday, has much more acute ideas of what we can do for these societies than that.

There are a great many people in the United States, it seems to me, who are content with the fact that perhaps to all these people a central authoritarian, doctrinally united party, – I don’t say Communist party, but a Nationalist party, such as Dr. Nkrumah’s party in Ghana – may be a necessity with which we have to deal. You have to remember, for example, that in these cases we are dealing with people, many of whom fifty years ago in their societies did not know the wheel, in none of which was there a written vernacular literature until ten or twenty years ago, and in which all the operative ideas that they used for their “take-off” into modern society came to them from their imperial conquerors, in English or in French.

The India that now has a chance of developing in a new society in a free government owes that chance to the good sides of British rule. Nevertheless, with the speed of events today, the American people will have to content with a great deal less than success, will have to be content with imitations of the American way, with bad imitations, and, worse, will be still worse, with Societies which are not only not imitating the American way, but openly scorning it. Now it is a basic psychological attitude which Congress must acquire, which the White House must acquire, which the Pentagon must acquire.

This will require also another difficult thing, a careful assessment of where American aid can work. It can’t work everywhere. There are a great many reasons for that – geographical reasons and financial reasons. The United States can’t spend all its capital abroad. It can’t spend the same amount of capital everywhere, and, therefore, certain areas will have to be left, if you like, to be penetrated by the Communist bloc because the United States can do nothing about it. Another thing which you must accept is that some of these areas which are not under Communist rule cannot be defended in the present conditions by military means. A great deal of American foreign aid, I think, has been wasted in propping up, or in creating necessarily inefficient armies in countries which need good wells and good seed much more.

I argued this point two years ago in Washington with a number of American officials, and one very important Canadian official, and I used Laos as an example. I said I could not imagine the Laotian armies of any value to anybody, and if Laos needed help, as perhaps it did, it ought to get it on strict economic terms. I had not, I must say, allowed for American ingenuity, but, thanks to the public spirit of one of the administrators of the program, a great deal of the money never got nearer Laos than Miami Beach. This was, of course, an example of moral turpitude on the part of the administrator, but I wasn’t really convinced that he had not done a great public service by saving the Laotians from getting some more Sherman tanks.

But the second limitation is that American power cannot be applied equally in depth everywhere, choices will have
to be made, which means that areas will have to be let, if
you like, "slide." This will produce indignation from Time
magazine, but I am afraid we shall have to put up with that.

Now, I want to turn, because time is marching on, to use
that old slogan, to some internal problems of the American
way of life. It is not only American power which is admired
abroad. It is American abundance. It is still a good deal of
the American way of life. This is, of course, very true in
Europe, which for reasons of time I cannot develop –
mainly the great immigrant tradition of the "Uncle from
America," as they say in Germany. Even in Asia and Africa
there are aspects of American life which are very much ad-
mired and coveted. The Americans, as I say, are partly on
a seller's market, and a keenly competitive market, but they
have some extremely valuable traditions, and extremely
valuable outside attitudes towards them to utilize. There
are, however, a number of things upon which the United
States can no longer rely, the first being the automatic ac-
cceptance of an inevitable victory of what we call the demo-
cratic way of life. Another is the automatic acceptance of
certain defects, inhibitions, impediments in American life
inside America. There is a most notable one, the one upon
which it would be extremely uncandid not to insist as
damaging to American prestige abroad, and the American
possibility of leading as the senior friendly partner this ter-
rific explosion, the rush of the whole world into the new
technological society. The chief blot, of course, as seen
from the outside is race relations in America, and it will be
quite impossible for the most ingenious Secretary of State
of the new administration, whoever he may be, through the
most ingenious propaganda, to explain to people outside
the United States why it is necessary for colored people to
stand at a Woolworth counter when white people sit. If
any good explanation can be given me, I will use it when
I go home. That is a serious matter which I want to call
to your attention. It doesn't compare for a moment in in-
tensity with the horrors of South Africa, but it is one of the
problems.

Another is, and this is a human weakness with which I
want to end, nevertheless a real weakness, namely, that
American political institutions were carefully designed by
the founders to prevent unified rapid action. There was a
real balance of power, a real division of authority. It was
intended to be so. The Constitution has worked much more
harmoniously, and in a much more unified fashion than the
framers, I think, intended or expected, or at least some of
them intended or expected.

Nevertheless, the powers of built-in inertia in the Ameri-
can system are very great. It seems to me – I must be brief
and dogmatic here – it seems to me that in the American
system not everything that accentuates and accelerates
Presidential power is good, but everything that increases
the mere braking power, the negative power of Congress, is
dangerous. Congress has a great deal to do, some of which
it does much better than the cynical citizen believes, but
again, there are many things, and this is one of Dr. Bundy's
points, in which the executive must decide. Only the execu-

cative has the information about our weapons, only the execu-
tive has the real idea of the dangers, only the executive
the real idea of the possibilities.

This is the reason for taking care in the election of a
President. It is not a reason for putting the Presidency into
commission. It is not a reason for hampering the President
where his decision must be final, and must in many cases
be rapid, and yet common language, common verbiage, talk
of state's rights when it is irrelevant, talk of town's rights,
talk of the rights of the Senate, talk of the right to filibuster,
the sovereign way of life – all of these things are harmless
in many cases, some of them have been harmless for a long
time. At the present moment some of them are sources of
potential danger when we take into consideration the speed
with which things are moving. I am shaken by the news
from South Africa this morning – it is just a symptom, and
it is a very dangerous one.

In the next four years any new administration will be
faced again and again with decisions which must be made

Participants were luncheon guests of fraternities. Here Dean Bundy
listens intently to remarks of Pi Kappa Alpha member.
at once to have any meaning, and this cannot simply be denounced as Presidential usurpation. It is the necessity of the times that whatever has to be done has to be done quickly, and only one man, or group of men, the executive, can do it.

And yet, the traditions of the American political system are against such a concentration except in an emergency and wartime, and there are many good traditional reasons for being suspicious of every executive claim to powers not rigorously laid down in the Constitution or the statute law. The outside world, looking at America, will not understand excessive delay or hesitation, or divided authority. Perhaps they should, but they won't. They will understand the use, generously and boldly, of American economic power, of American military power, to extend and protect, to expand and protect and defend, and will be tolerant of a great many defects in the application of the policy if the policy seems to be directed in the right direction and vigorously and competently pursued in general.

I think I will end on a slightly more comforting note, namely, that American institutions are in fact, still being copied. The presidential system as against the parliamentary system is probably gaining ground. You can see it in France. You can see it in the African nations. You can see it in the Islamic countries where it was destroyed for a very feeble form of parliamentary government, and the American Presidency will be, or could be, the great exemplar of a central, effective, far-seeing, prudent and courageous method of government, as contrasted with the secret, collegial, and often obviously fanatical, in the strict sense of the term, government of the Soviet Union or of China. No one would expect to see in any President of the United States a ruler of the type of Mao or the type of Khrushchev. He will hope to see in any President of the United States a ruler of foresight and courage supported by his country, and supported by free institutions of criticism in his country, but not by institutions capable of impeding any effective action.

To go back to the very beginning, whereas in 1914 the United States could look forward to a way in which the American way of life, or if you like, the Western political way of life, had spread all over the world, today you can only look forward to a long contest taking part against the background of this scientific revolution for speed which, I entirely agree with Dr. Bundy, is going to be vastly increased. An immense social upheaval, an immense social expansion of demand and expectation is accelerating with dangerous rapidity. She can expect to be regarded in that contest in terms not only of her past, but of her present and future promise and the degree to which American society, seen from the outside, looks attractive and looks possible.

An American policy looks generous, is manifested in intelligent generosity, or if you like, in enlightened self-wisdom, and enlightened self-interest, a quality in which the world is very deficient, I regret to say. This American policy has very great chances of success in saving a great part of the world from the Communist empire, and, perhaps over a period of time, of even having some exemplary value inside the Communist empire. I agree with Dr. Rostow that the chances of an evolution of that type in the Soviet Union — I know nothing of China — are not to be despised.

What the Americans have to do now is to hold fast to that which is good, and that, basically, is the spirit of American institutions, the denial of the infallibility of government, not of the authority of government, the willing obedience of the citizen who is skeptical about the virtues of his rulers, but not skeptical about his duty to obey them if they are the really constituted rulers of his country.

The last and most dangerous illusion of the American people would be to use the Constitution, to use the great Constitutional text, the Federalist, the great Constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court, even the great expressions of democratic faith like the Second Inaugural and the Gettysburg Address, to use these in a Talmudic fashion, looking for exact phrases and applying them to new situations. Nothing, I am sure, would have surprised or shocked Madison, or Hamilton, or Jefferson more than to think that people today would still be quoting them, their exact words, applying them to situations which none of these great men foresaw, but which we may be sure today they would assess and propose to deal with in a very different spirit from that which rightly animated them in 1789.

GEORGE BRINTON COOPER

I know that you feel with us the great sense of appreciation and indebtedness to these gentlemen who have given us these mind-stretching experiences this morning. With a verbal precision which is almost unacademic, the gentlemen have led us to the precise minute at which this first session of the Convocation is supposed to adjourn. The second session, the afternoon session, will resume at 2:30 o'clock. Thank you.
AFTERNOON SESSION

Man in the New World Ahead

GEORGE BRINTON COOPER

Good afternoon.

Those of you who heard the morning speeches join me, I am sure, in gratitude for the stimulating intellectual fare we were served. Some important questions were raised and some brilliant hypotheses submitted which have already been, as I discovered during the lunch hour, the source of much ferment and talk on this campus. I am particularly happy that Trinity College has been able to help create this ferment in the community.

The subject of our second session is "Man in the New World Ahead." The panel consists of three men who in their several ways have been deeply involved in the problem before us; Our first speaker is a distinguished spiritual leader from West Germany.

Bishop Johannes Lilje of the Church of Hannover is presently serving as Harry Emerson Fosdick Visiting Professor at Union Theological Seminary in New York. In 1952 Bishop Lilje became president of the Lutheran World Federation, and is an active leader in the World Council of Churches and in the Protestant Ecumenical Movement. He is no stranger to the problems confronting man as an individual against vicious ideological and political systems, and if I may, I would like to take just a few more seconds than I have allowed myself to tell you that Bishop Lilje came into conflict with the Hitler regime as early as 1933. He was suspended for six months as General Secretary of the German Student Christian Movement. His traveling and speaking privileges were restricted and he was finally arrested by the Gestapo in August of 1944. He was charged with high treason for giving expression to his Christian convictions and remained in prison under sentence of death until happily, as we know, the liberation by the American forces in April of 1945. It is a great pleasure, indeed, for me to present to you Bishop Johannes Lilje of the Church of Hannover.

BISHOP JOHANNES LILJE

Mr. President, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. The first speaker of this morning’s meeting was wise enough to warn his audience that trying to be a prophet might prove to be a tricky business sometimes. While he was afraid that it might even lead to losing his job, I must be even more afraid of not doing justice to the expectations which usually go with a prophet.

Still it is our duty this afternoon to face the problem of man in the new world ahead, and this includes some definite attempt to try to look into the future. But if we want to do this in a realistic way, we have to be careful not to go into ways which cannot be based upon past experiences.

So I would like to begin with a reminder of one situation in European history in the late 20’s when H. G. Wells published his famous book Brave New World, and at that time tried to oppose a wide-spread pessimistic tendency in European thought. Pessimism is always bound to impress people immensely, because there seems to be a sort of sinister depth of thought included in every pessimistic utterance. In that sense I, myself, may not be able to live up to all the
expectations, because I will not be prepared to go in for pessimistic prognosis only, but there is again this realistic element which may give us the task to look not only at the right type of analysis of our situation, and what possibilities may be included in it. But prophecy is primarily a Biblical term, and is senseless if people do not ask for the will and guidance of God, and as far as men can do so, this shall be one of the presuppositions of the things I try to say this afternoon.

The analysis first: that is to say, we must start with a clear, precise, and realistic picture of the situation of man in the world today, and all thinkers are agreed upon the main problem which I can formulate as simply as this. It is the tremendous danger of de-humanization and de-personalization of man's existence in this world. The question at hand is very simple in this respect, will it be possible for man in the time which lies ahead to preserve or to regain, or even to augment the human qualities of his existence, or will he not be able to do so?

Let us try to find out first which may be the main reasons for this process of de-humanization and de-personalization. They have to do, of course, with the spreading of technological civilization, of the tremendous power of the technical civilization around us. These proceedings have changed man's situation to a very large extent.

Now I would like to invite us not to repeat in a too thoughtless way the statement that technological civilization of necessity endangers men's existence in this world, for we have to try to separate the different reasons which may lead to this. This de-humanization is not a necessary consequence of the development of man's technical faculties and possibilities. Let us be clear about the creative process which is going on in this tremendous work of man's conquering the world and the universe. There are always two aspects to it. One is an entirely personal one, and that is what the technical genius does. The man who invents, who is at work in his laboratory and tries to find new possibilities — even if in our day this sort of thing is only possible in a teamwork of more than one scientist — still this is a very private, very human, very individual work they do, and the moment when one of these great genii discovers something new, it is an extremely personal victory of a gifted person of this world.

The problem of de-humanization begins only after this new invention takes shape in the midst of technical civilization, and then, no doubt, a process of trans-personal development begins. It is part of every new, real creative step in the field of technology. It is true that these steps are bound to influence the social life and community life of people more than any other ideas or creative processes in other spheres. Here we meet the problem of what becomes of modern man in the midst of all his inventions. The world he created seems to make it impossible for him to lead a personal life, and we know about all these great, tremendous, partly fearsome processes of the technical world which seem to threaten man's individualistic existence to the very extreme.

I would like to point to one specific danger in this context. If man is exposed, so to speak, to his own inventions, threatened by what he created by his mind, by his hands, and by his efficiency, there is a more subtle danger which we have to realize in our analysis of the situation too, and that is the lack of balance between men's scientific possibilities and the personal values which guide his life.

This is a very remarkable, and, I suggest, a very dangerous phenomenon. Let me try to explain it, too. The most characteristic formative inference in the whole mentality of modern man seems to me to be what we usually call the scientific mind, and now I must disappoint all of those who are ready for some easy criticism on the part of a bishop. I shall first of all pay my highest respects to this phenomenon of this scientific mind of today, and I am full of admiration for several of the main points which we notice in connection with it — the precision, the accuracy of thought and work, also the realism that nothing will be accepted which cannot be proved by the experiment. I shall include also that certain victorious attitude of man conquering the universe, or doing away with some of the great burdens of mankind like disease, poverty, and other phenomena of that sort by the power of his organization. All that is tremendous, and we pay our high respect to the achievement of the scientific mind.

We must inform everybody, however, that this is not the only and not the total picture of modern mentality. This is one of the problems we have to see clearly and to face bravely, that there seems to be a lack of balance between all
the things which go into this scientific mind and the other things which make for the personal life of man, including religion, philosophy, culture, and literature. Is that just nothing?

One of the most aggressive writers of this country who had his origin in my country is a witness whom I can quote without hesitation because he does not consider himself a typically Christian thinker. Ludwig Marcuse wrote a few very aggressive statements concerning this tendency of thinking of the scientific mind and scientific methods in a somewhat absolute way, as if the scholarly way, the learned approach to life, the real intellectual approach to life, were confined to the methods of modern science. He rightly points out that there are very important spheres in man's life which could not be covered by this approach only. They include our religious life, our philosophical judgment, what we do in terms of culture, literature, etc.

The great danger which goes with the one-sided development is this, that man is in danger, and now I am slightly approaching the sphere of prophecy, that man is in danger of losing more and more the capacity to deal with personal problems and personal values in the proper sense of the word. Let me give an illustration again. One is that man may one day lose entirely the capacity to answer the question, the simple elementary question, what all this is for. Why does he go on conquering nature and the universe? Why is it going on, and what is the ultimate goal of all this? There seems to be a danger that man loses the capacity of taking this sort of question seriously.

If I try to express this in some of the terms which our philosophers at home use, I would put it this way. Man is in danger of losing the dimensions of depth in the way he forms his judgment. He may be unable to answer the question of the ultimate meaning of life and all life's processes because he is filled with a sense of "lostness," verlorenheit, as our philosopher Heidegger puts it, verlorenheit, forlornness, in the sense that this vast universe, growing so tremendously in man's view, loses any meaning for him personally at all, and so I think this first statement must lead our consideration as to man's way into the future.

What about this dissociation between man's intellect and man's personal life? Scholars tell us that it is an interesting phenomenon in the pursuit of scientific methods that man's intellect grows faster and has passed the limits of our imagination; that we have to deal in this scientific process of today with, for instance, figures which we can write, which we can tell our electrical machines to count for us, but which our imagination no longer can imagine. And I am speaking about this descensus with man's innermost life. So it is no surprise at all when I state as one of man's tremendous needs in the present situation that there seems to be another disproportion between man's scientific possibilities, which have grown so fast, and his religious possibilities.

Just in order to be precise, I want to quote one of the great religious spirits of our time, who one day stated that in the field of science not only the great scientists of our age, but also the man in the street, seem to have absorbed very much, indeed, of the new world view while his religious experience may be rather immature, and may not even approach the normal state of a grown-up person. Whether this statement is overdoing the case or not is not up to me to decide. It certainly helps to show the great problem we have to face.

One thing more, if it comes to this analysis I would like to insist that what I said is not only a problem for the Christian, but for everybody alive today. This is not a form of apologetics, so to speak, to sneak in from the back door and suddenly have the fellow of today facing the religious question. Everybody who insists upon a complete philosophy of life must be aware of this descensus in man's modern situation. I would go on, however, to state there is no reason for resignation. This development does not necessarily mean that man's individuality must be lost, in spite of the fact that he sometimes seems to be enslaved by all of the discoveries in the field of technology. Man still has a tremendous chance, but it cannot be found by just dividing life up, let's say, into different spheres of culture. There must be an answer to the question of how far we can combine this process and progress in the scientific field with the possibility of going on and leading a personal life.

Now, since my time is limited, I think I serve the purpose of what I have to say best if I leave out all the Christian friendly asides in between, and speak, if I may, in a slightly aggressive way. My suggestion is that man will be lost in that general "lostness" of the philosopher if he does not learn to rediscover, amidst all the relativism of our day, some approach to absolute values. Is it necessary, and is it possible? Is it necessary? I have no doubt in saying "yes." Let me choose as a very simple, somewhat abbreviated illustration, the tremendous problem of dictatorship in the modern world. We are speaking about the twentieth century. We are speaking about the embarrassing fact that, in spite of two or three hundred years of enlightenment, our century is the theater of powerful dictatorships. How is that possible? My answer is simply this — it is the natural end of a way of thought which takes man as the absolute and only standard of values. Dictatorship is just completing this process.

Legislation, and I am speaking out of experience, as you realize, is then in the hands of one person who decides what is law and what is not law, who decides who is the enemy of the state and must be liquidated, as the term goes. Now this is an abbreviated way of speaking, but it is, at least to my judgment, and I am not the only one to say and think so, the natural outcome of a philosophy which knows only man as the standard of all values. Is there a chance for rediscovery of absolute values as over against this type of thought? The question in this situation amounts to the other question. Is there any future for the Christian faith in man's existence in time to come?
I would remind every one of the seriousness of that problem. We do live, for all practical purposes, in a time which must be termed an atheistic epoch of history. I take the term in its verbal meaning. I am not saying anti-theistic, I say atheistic, in this sense that apparently in man's thinking today there is no longer room for God, or to say the least, there apparently is no longer need for God. If you try to recapitulate the most outstanding phenomena of man's mentality in the modern world, you come across this fact that apparently there is no need for introducing the concept of God. That is what I mean. I am speaking about this sort of atheism that creates an atmosphere in which the Christian faith and the Christian church may be considered as a sort of Victorian remnant in our intellectual life, without any visible reason why there should be a church and a Christian faith, and with even less probability that in the time to come there would ever be a need for that.

Christianity has to face this fact very squarely, and then we start asking whether it will be possible to present man in the time to come with some concept of the Christian faith. In answering that question I start with that region of thought which usually is considered to be the most difficult one, the one which I, for my part, would consider, one that still exists at all. That is what I might call the "thinkability" of the Christian faith. If I go in for strange words now and then, it is just to prove how I love the English language. I try to do a lot of things with it. Maybe it is something original now and then. Don't be embarrassed by this, but I think this is a possible formulation.

The "thinkability" of the Christian faith, I mean by that, the problem whether, over against the scientific mind of modern man we still can claim that Christianity, the Christian doctrine, in some way makes sense — whether we still can go on proclaiming the faith in Christ, speaking about eternity, about forgiveness, about mercy, about life eternal, and all these fundamental concepts of the Christian faith in an ultra-modern age. Can we, or can we not?

History teaches that this is not the first time in which Christianity had to face this problem. There is an opinion among historians that these spiritual struggles for the church may have been more dangerous than all the persecutions of church history, and it is a telling fact that this sort of struggle started right away in the first Christian century. Even in the time of the New Testament you discover traces of the tremendous struggle between Christianity and Hellenistic thought as represented by the gnosia which filled centuries. In the Middle Ages you have the tremendous, powerful, manifest struggle between some of the greatest Christian thinkers and the heritage of Islam and the Hellenistic antiquity which led to that powerful structure of scholastic theology which is proof of a powerful process of thinking.

Christianity, the Christian church, has survived the challenge of these epochs, and there is no reason why it shouldn't survive today if man stretches out for the universe in our day. This may include a shock to a certain traditional piety which considers itself Christian. It may be there is a shock, I say again, not only for the Christians, but for everybody who claims he can think. Everybody has to face the problems involved in this fact that man is reaching out for the universe today. But there is a possibility of re-orientation and of overcoming — I am speaking very briefly now — of overcoming that naive charge that when we start looking around the universe the way we do today, there apparently is no longer a throne of God. There apparently is no longer a place for God. I say apparently because I am powerless and stopping short if we think that way instead of, for instance, seeking guidance in that great Biblical concept of the inescapability of God which we find so wonderfully expressed in the 139th Psalm where it says even if man takes the wings of the morning and tries to hide at the uttermost part of the sea, he cannot escape God. The "wings of the morning," if he tries to escape God at the speed of light; if he goes to the extreme of the known universe, he never will come across a place where he can escape God's majesty.

The other type of rethinking of man's situation in the world is this: does man's existence really change by our enlarged concept of the universe, or does it not? And the answer must be definitely no! Man's fears, man's hopes, man's predicaments, will be the same. He will not be in a position to escape his life's task by just getting off to another planet, which may be possible within the near future. I can imagine a man who would like to go off to the moon because he has made a mess at home, and this seems to be the simplest way to get out. I, for my part, am not too desirous to participate in a journey of that sort, but if I can speak about it in this simple way, it shows that we face a real problem here — one of those elementary decisions of man. The place where man has to win or to lose the battle of his life is right now here, and nowhere else — here where he lives, where he works, where he has his family, his son, the people for whom he is responsible. That is the existentialist interpretation of the Christian faith, which will not at all change in times to come.

What then will change? I have a few more minutes, I hope. What then will change? We must learn to apply Christianity in that "rethought way," if that is English. We must try to apply it in a new sense of obligation to the community. This is no simple fact that the most powerful ideology which faces the Western world has, whether we like it or not, developed a new sense of community and responsibility to community. I hope I won't be charged for again trying to introduce Communism into the Christian church by trying to speak fairly about this ideology. It is a new fact that large masses of the world today see a new type of life in this new concept of community life.

Christianity, the Christian church, will have to learn to get out of the individualistic concept and try to live out Christianity, maybe in completely new forms of thought and worship. We must bear in mind the tremendous impact of the revolutionary changes in Asia and Africa, this explosive continent, and must realize that the younger churches out there cannot live by imitation of the Western tradition, but will have to deliver their own witness of Christ in a new and changed situation.

I would like to speak about some other aspects which I cannot touch now. This has a lot to do with our concept of the political world, with what we mean by democracy. We must learn that a secularized democracy will simply be helpless as over against powerful dictatorial movements unless we rediscover the metaphysical basis of freedom and responsibility, and that no philosophy, political philosophy, will be sufficient if unable to answer these problems.

To the Christian a very simple challenge comes finally, namely, we must try to learn anew what Christianity means, to translate it into terms of life and love. I confine myself to these indications of a Christian's interpretation of man's role in the world ahead. In concluding all I can say is there is no reason why man should be afraid of that future if he is prepared to see the possibility of glorifying God even under changing circumstances. If he rediscover these ultimate meaning of his existence in the world, then he may go on without fear.

GEORGE BRINTON COOPER, Presiding Officer

I know that you will be happy to learn that you will have another opportunity to hear Bishop Lilje. He will be the preacher tomorrow at the eleven o'clock service in the Trinity College Chapel.

Now I think it is in one of the best traditions of our Western culture that men of thought have become and can
become men of action. The Honorable Charles H. Malik is a philosopher and a world statesman who rather dramatically epitomizes that fact. Born in Lebanon, he was graduated from the American University in Beirut, and took his doctorate at Harvard. He has been a real human connecting link between the civilization of the Middle East and America, which, of course, is the traditional role of his country, but he himself, his education under American auspices and in an American university, has been a living and vibrant link between our two countries. He left the Philosophy faculty at the American University in Lebanon in 1945 to become Lebanon’s first envoy to the United States. In 1948 he became president of the Council of the United Nations, and in 1958 he was named president of the General Assembly.

Dr. Malik brings to us an extraordinary blend of experience as world statesman and leader of the intelligentsia of the Middle East. About Dr. Malik I was very tempted to use the moderator’s cliché of saying that he needs no introduction, and he certainly doesn’t, but I feel that Dr. Malik, who is such a world figure, has perhaps for that reason never gotten a proper introduction. It is a great pleasure indeed to present to you the Honorable Charles H. Malik, presently E. K. Hall Visiting Professor at Dartmouth College.

CHARLES HABIB MALIK

I thought first I would tell a story which was suggested to me by some of the things that Bishop Lilje has just said. This is a true story about how much we can, or cannot, escape God, even if we fly with the velocity of light, and it was told to me by the very person to whom the story occurred. He is a Russian Orthodox bishop who works in Moscow, and he told me the following story not long ago. This is interesting for your repertoire of stories in connection with what you were saying.

He said a young Communist came to him one day in Moscow and told him, “Look here, you religious people, we have penetrated the heavens, we have reached the moon, and we have reached way beyond the moon, some of our rockets are revolving around the sun now, and in all this we haven’t found any trace of God. So where is your God that you talk about?” And this very kindly bishop told me that he turned to this young Communist and said, “My son, if you haven’t found God on earth, you will never find him in Heaven.”

Now many of the things that we are talking about presuppose a great deal and, indeed, one speaking about these great themes must take lots of things for granted, and must leave lots of things to the ordinary workings of the human intelligence. Consequently, I beg you to keep in mind that if at any point I make certain dogmatic statements, it isn’t because I love dogmatism. You will see in a moment that I don’t, but it is because sometimes one is compelled to speak of things strongly, as I was glad to hear the Bishop did toward the end of his statement. Speaking them strongly in a dogmatic statement only represents the conclusion of a long argument that one would be prepared to make. If I therefore share with you at times only my conclusions, don’t please think that I slight your intelligence, or do not take your reasoning faculties seriously. Any one of these dogmatic statements I can give time — the right atmosphere, the right preparation, and the right friendly associations — I can fully demonstrate.

The subject of my remarks this afternoon is “The Place of Man.”

Man appears to have lost his place and the way back to it. The loss of place is not disastrous if only one knew how to return; but when the way back home is also lost, then things are pretty serious indeed. Two phenomena impress me most: the strident anti-intellectualism of this age and the breaking up of mankind into endless collectivisms, whether in the form of socialism or of nationalism. Both phenomena, anti-intellectualism and collectivism, conspire to destroy man, because they destroy the genuine universal in man, and as a result they disrupt his unity with all men.

Consider first anti-intellectualism. I am not thinking of the man in the street or of the lady in the drawing room or of the peasant in the farm. These are not given much to intellectual pursuits, and yet there is a certain unspoiled healthiness about them which makes them quite responsive to reason if they are trusted and approached aright. I am thinking of the intellectuals themselves, and indeed of the highest among them, the philosophers. When those whose very principle of existence is reason and thought nevertheless employ all the powers of their reason to prove, in effect, precisely that reason in the end is nonsense, then the culture which allows and, in fact, delights in this phenomenon is in a very sick state indeed. If the very principle of reason is rejected or compromised or diluted or subordinated to something else, in the very citadel of reason, namely, in philosophy, is it any wonder that man has lost his place and the way back to it? Something must therefore happen, a war, a revolution, a cataclysm, a personal tragedy, or a terrible judgment from above, to shake these philosophers out of their daydreams and to bring them back literally to their senses. Something must happen to awaken their sense of humor about themselves.

Whether it is the philosophy of adjustment or success or interest; or the outlook which glorifies instinct or emotion or feeling or sense; or the theory which reduces everything in the end to what is called “intuition;” or the methodology of conditioning or manipulating poor human nature; or the worship of the unconscious and of dreams, and of the darkest forces and impulses in man; whether it is the vogue of materialism, be it dialectical or old-fashioned and artless; or the reduction of man to what is called “the economic man,” with all his boundless concupiscence for a higher and ever higher standard of living; or the view that in human affairs force is the only final arbiter; whether it is the dark notion of creativity whereby the Creator is denied and everybody and everything becomes its own creator; or the doctrine that everything flows and changes, and that flux is the last word; or the strange habit of deriving things from their primitive origins in time, the perfect from...
philosophy in which, not sophistry and cleverness, but presenting their distinct selves. This means the strongest possible departments of less you restore to mon? Is it all a matter of interest? reason? Exclusive collectivism kills man also because it ringing to you that there

reason, namely, the universities, rediscover reason them­ responsible arguing, debating, airing their grievances, pre­ but that a dozen distinct cultures, each a law to itself, each a distinct to do this, and at the same time to take an active part m this ful certainty and power of reason, and what is man without

destroys his freedom as an individual person, and what is man in the new world ahead? I answer: man has no place unless you restore to him his reason and his freedom.

Reason can be restored to man only if the temples of reason, namely, the universities, rediscover reason them­ themselves. This means the strongest possible departments of philosophy in which, not sophistry and cleverness, but reason and truth are enthroned. If the anti-intellectual sophistry of this age is not going to destroy the life of the mind, the mightiest attempt must be made by the universities to reassert the intellectual principle. This calls for the conscious cultivation, not the accidental cultivation, of the philosophies which embody and proclaim the original potency of mind, reason, theory, thought, ideas; for the return to the great tradition, without which there would have been no science, no university, no history and no West; for the red-blooded refutation of the fourteen dark philoso­ phies and outlooks to which I referred; for the patient, cooperative and detailed proof that there is an objective solid truth which man can know, from the simplest truth of the multiplication table to the highest truth of theology; for the affirmation that the vision and apprehension of the truth is an end in itself, and that the ideal of the wise man is far superior to that of the clever or contented or success­ful or dominating man; for the demonstration that although the vision of the truth is an end in itself, yet from this vision endless practical benefits flow; and for the development, both among the students and among the fac­ulty, of the wonderful art of discussion, debate, argument, conversation, in which the whole spirit and principle is, not to score a point or to win a victory, but to discover the truth to which, once disclosed, all will assent.

You ask: what is the place of man in the new world ahead? I answer: blame the university if he has no place. Is it any wonder that the modern soul is so profoundly restless and unhappy, with the university failing to pro­vide it, in the intellectual order, with any form or structure or order or law or being in which it can rest? Let the uni­versities, then, assume full responsibility for this matter: it is they who have failed man. It is no use shifting re­sponsibility, as some do, onto somebody else; it is no use
blaming this scandal on so-called social or financial or administrative or historical or cosmological forces, or on what is escapistly called "the temper of the age." Be courageous and assume full personal responsibility yourself. Say, at least to yourself in private: I have wanted in stature and vision and conviction, and if man is lost, I am partly the cause. You can have no idea how, from a simple confession like this, something could follow that might turn the whole tide. The salvation of man depends in part upon the conversion of the university.

Exclusive collectivism endangers the personal freedom of man as man. He is then shut up within the coziness and warmth of his own collectivity. But man cries from the depths for something to unite him with all mankind; or else he will never be free. Now mankind breaks up, as I said, into these 100 peoples or nations to which I referred, and these in turn group themselves into the dozen cultures that there are. There is an unprecedented revival of the study of history all over the world today, because each nation and each culture, in asserting its identity and existence, wants to mark itself off as sharply as possible from other nations and cultures; and the dimension of time is a natural ground for differentiation. The African peoples are discovering vast African empires that have been submerged in history, and nations all over the world now are proudly claiming that they made this or that "contribution" to what is ambiguously called "world civilization." At the very moment in history when something universal has to be affirmed about man if man is to survive, we find mankind frantically engaged in atomizing itself. For only in the discovery of the genuine and concrete universal, namely, of our common human nature, before and above and behind and beyond every collectivism and every differentiation, be it racial or cultural or national or political or any other demarcation, can man breathe freely and be himself.

In the face of the hundred nations, the dozen cultures, the score or so of civilizations that Toynbee says appeared on earth in recorded history, the conflicting ideologies of this age, and the sheer multiplicity of interests attendant upon the phenomenal sharpening of subjective desire all over, and with all these pressing upon the soul ever more closely and more insistently, is it any wonder that life often loses any fixed center around which it can revolve? Man then plunges into the sheerest relativity: valuations, standards, points of view, appear entirely relative, and there is no criterion to cut across them or to determine the degree of their truth.

A vast task thus begins to beckon, namely, to save man from the snare of moral relativity by showing that, despite his many forms, he is nevertheless concretely one in them all. With this in mind I suggest: (a) That bewildering as the variety of cultures and morals is, it is not an infinite variety; and this fact is of the utmost philosophical importance. (b) That a sustained and grounded research, not a journalistic research, into this finite array of cultures, both in space and in time, will reveal that they have not a little in common. (c) That this common area of morals or valuations belongs to what may be rightly termed the natural law or the law of nature. (d) That this common objective area establishes the possibility of a fruitful dialogue between the diverse cultures. (e) That there is a first urgent task not only from the point of view of world peace, but of restoring to man his sanity, his unity and therefore his freedom, which is the scientific demonstration of this basic core of natural law and the responsible detailed discovery of it, or of traces of it, among all cultures
and all peoples. (f) That in addition to this common area, there is the second urgent task of elaborating the full content of what can be discovered by reason about the nature of man. (g) That in addition to the natural moral law, the West, including the United States, cannot divest itself of its distinctive heritage, with all the wonderful strains that have poured into it for 4,000 years. (h) And that therefore a third urgent task, challenging statesmen, philosophers, educators and men of religion alike, is to re-establish faith in this tremendous Western heritage.

Anti-intellectualism attacks what is unique and distinctive in man by subordinating his reason to some other principle. Exclusive collectivism confines his fullness to a particular culture or to a narrow loyalty and in this way impairs his radiant freedom. What is common to both is a certain disorder whereby the stature of man is inverted or reduced. You ask: what is the place of man in the new world ahead? I answer: establish first the natural order of things and man will be redeemed. Reason, freedom and right order: these are the keys to the place of man.

All order depends in the end on the recognition of something above man. By "above" I do not mean something on which man just depends, for man depends on matter, on the body, on food, on air, on society, on the government. I mean something which is morally and ontologically "above" man; something with more and not less reason; something beside whose freedom our freedom is but bondage; in short, something which is more and not less of a man, or of the best man. All disorder arises because the "above" has not lifted up its countenance upon us, or because it turned away its face from us, or because we have failed to behold it.

Now, my friends, the "above" is God. Thus the placement of man is inseparable from the placement of God. When God is placed, or better, when God places Himself, then everything else falls in place. Give me a genuine recognition of the genuine God — not, as Pascal would say "the God of the philosophers, but the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob" — and man forthwith will find his place: namely, a creature made a little lower than the angels, a creature made in the image and likeness of God, a creature in whom God is infinitely interested. Let the Word of God be heard and understood, and right order at once will pervades; then knows who is love him and who is below him; glorying in his reason, which is the very image of God, man certainly also appreciates its limitations; there are real objective laws in all fields, because everything is created by God and subject to His law; man can glimpse these laws because his reason is a reflection of the divine reason; there is real justice because God executes judgment and justice in the earth; there is a real moral law because of the consistency of man's nature with reference to its Creator; there is real equality among men before God and therefore there is a real possibility of peace; and the concrete totality of God's meaning in history is so rich and so wonderful that there is something to live for, to defend, and, therefore, to die for.

I repeat the words of Pascal: I am not speaking of "the God of the philosophers, but of the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob."

Believe me, my friends, hopeless then is man's endeavor to place and order himself by himself. All those who seek to order and place man without God are doomed to failure. They are exactly like the blind leading the blind, and they only move from one arbitrary position to another, from one mess to another. So far as the salvation of the West and the world is concerned, everything depends on the renewal of faith and the rediscovery of the dimension of God.

You ask: what is the place of man in the new world ahead? I answer: that place depends, not on technology and how it is going to develop, nor on security and how it is going to be assured, nor on education and how it is going to be reformed, nor on government and how it is going to govern, nor on Europe and America adjusting themselves to Communism and to the rising East, although all these things are most important, but on how much man is going to forget God, or, more precisely, on how much God is going to forsake man. Since we know that God has not forsaken man but has in fact come down to his place, I am full of hope for man in the future. All hope is hopeless without the certainty of the intervention of God.

GEORGE BRIGHTON COOPER

Thank you, Dr. Malik. I know that the members of the audience will echo my feeling of optimism that in the United Nations in the clash of nationalities and of international politics that it was possible for a man of Dr. Malik's depth to become president of the General Assembly, and president of the Security Council.

When a group of students were talking last week about the program for the Convocation, I overheard one referring to the fact that Professor F. S. C. Northrop was going to be here, and that he was in "paperback." This seems to be one of the more elegant designations, and rightly so, because it is certainly evidence of a profusion of great books. Mr. Northrop's book, The Meeting of East and West, has appeared in paperback, and I think that students were as overwhelmed by the fact that such a person was coming here as they could be by anything.

Professor Northrop defies a category. Indeed, like all of our speakers, his books have explored widely and with real ease the field of political science, philosophy, and foreign policy. Let me read the titles of some of these books. The Meeting of East and West which appeared in 1946, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities which appeared in 1947, Ideological Differences and World Order which appeared in 1949, The Taming of the Nations, a study of the cultural bases of international policy which appeared in 1952, and then last year, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience. Professor Northrop is Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law at Yale University, and for the current semester Elizabeth Morse Genius Professor at Rollins College. It is, indeed, a great pleasure to present to you Professor F. S. C. Northrop.

F. S. C. NORTHOFP

The people who have organized this Convocation, which up to this point has been so interesting and worthwhile, have asked me to direct your attention to the kind of men and women we are likely to have in tomorrow's world from the standpoint of the contemporary world's ideological differences. Now this part of my assignment did not bother me particularly, because ideological differences happen to be my particular "cup of tea," but then they brought me up with a jolt by adding a little kind of footnote that all the speakers would be requested to restrict their remarks to twenty-five minutes, with a possible thirty-five minutes, and like my Chinese colleague formerly in the Yale Law School, Mr. Liu, this little comment caused me to reflect. And reflection is very painful business. Somebody has remarked that there is no practice so low but that men will stoop to it in order to avoid the hard labor of thinking.

Now when I began to think about this frightfully complex topic to which I previously paid so little attention when he noted the different cultures in the world, and the different nations in the world, and the inclination of each one of them to see the whole world from his particular standpoint, I put to myself this question — if you had to pick the two ideological conflicts around which you believe
the kind of people tomorrow's world is going to contain, what two would you pick? Well, the first one is obvious. Is tomorrow's world, in its attempt at democratization and modernization, going to be composed of men and women, the majority of whom order their social lives and their own personal philosophy by the philosophy of Karl Marx or that, to make it concrete, of John Locke and Thomas Jefferson?

But there is a second ideological conflict which isn't as obvious. I am inclined more and more to think that what tomorrow's world will be, turns more around this second conflict than even around the first. In fact, whether or not the answer to that first question is going to revolve around whether the followers of Karl Marx succeed in resolving the second ideological conflict better than we do, or whether we succeed better than they.

Now the easiest way to point up this second conflict is, if you will pardon me, to give two personal experiences. In the middle of the last war I was sitting one day in the Master's office of Silliman College at Yale and the doorbell rang. When the door was opened and I went out into the hall, there was a tall, dignified Chinese gentleman in a silk robe reaching to his boot-tops, and he said, "You don't know me, but I have come here to see you because I know that you have been working for some twenty years on the basic concepts, philosophy, and method of Western mathematical physics." Now he said, "My name is Chiang Monlin. I happen to be at the present moment the secretary of Chiang Kai-shek's cabinet on the mainland, and I was former chancellor of the greatest university in Chiang Kai-shek's China, Peking National University. I have come here because, as a result of my experience in watching the introduction of Western science and technology into China, I became convinced that we were doing it in the wrong way."

What I am saying now is going to be the basis of where my predictions may vary from those of the first two speakers of the morning. I do not believe that it is at all obvious that the whole world is going to be swept by modern science and technology. "We made the mistake," said Chiang Monlin, "of conceiving of science largely in terms of its applied side. The result was that when we put in these applied courses, and when we put these new technological gadgets in the hands of our own people, they thought with the only ideas they had in their minds to think with, and those ideas are simply inadequate to enable them to understand and use Western technological instruments." What this points up is that there is no more difficult problem on this earth than introducing anything that has come out of one culture into a different culture.

Now the reason for this, I believe our cultural anthropologists have made clear to us. I refer to men like Paul Radin and my good friend, Professor Clyde Kluckhohn of Harvard. These people, the anthropologists, first thought that you could understand foreign people if you went out into the field, were honest, and observed and wrote down and described what you saw. Then some of the best of them - all of them have not learned this yet - but some of the wiser of them gradually woke up to realize that even after they had lived with a foreign people for many years, had observed everything that they did, noticed the way they settled their disputes with one another, noticed their aesthetic objects, and examined their legal codes, even then they would wake up and find that they had not been understanding them at all. The reason for this was that they were looking at the facts they saw in this primitive society, the same as in Professor Kluckhohn's Navajo Indians in our southwestern Arizona. They were looking at those people with the only concepts American anthropologists had to think with, those of the American white man's culture, and maybe even those of a particular school of social science in this culture.

This won't do. This is the same thing in reverse. The most frustrated man that Mrs. Northrop and I met in India in 1950 was the man who was the manager for the whole of India for the sale of farm machinery of one of the major American-Canadian farm machinery manufacturing companies. Why was he frustrated? Because he had been hitting his head against a stone wall of teaching Indian farmers to use that machinery without ruining it. They forget to oil it. They don't bother to put water in the radiator. They think their line of vision, and have proper proportions of Euclid's geometry in the minds of people, has not put it in their art, if you do not realize that even they presuppose a mathematical, theoretical, scientific way of thinking.

My attention was brought to this in another way. I have this story at second-hand, but the story is that there were two American G.I.'s who, in the African land, found themselves billeted with North African natives in a native village. These two American G.I.'s and natives used to drink and discuss for hours plain common-sense objects that they lived with in this village. One of these G.I.'s was
a painter in the classical Western manner in which you put two-dimensional colors on a two-dimensional canvas, and we see a three-dimensional vase of flowers. So he painted one of these common-sense objects in the classical way and gave it to the natives. They hung it upside down so that it looked like a typical modern Western abstractionist or impressionist painting. He told them, "No, that isn't the way to hang it. Hang it this way," and he hung it right side up, and it didn't mean one thing more to them.

Now someone says, what does that mean? It means this, that if they don't bring to two-dimensional colors on a two-dimensional canvas the Euclidian geometrical way of thinking, they don't see that common sense object that they have been drinking beer over for weeks and holding bull sessions around.

Now the problem of putting any kind of Western ways in a non-Western society is the major ideological problem of the contemporary world, and in my judgment, whether the world in the end turns out to modernize with Communist political goal values or with free democratic ones, turns around which group learns how to solve that problem first. My own judgment is that the Communists know better how to solve this problem than we do. I do not believe that the free-world statesmen today, or their economists, or their military men, even see the problem, to say nothing about knowing how to resolve it.

The real danger in tomorrow's world, if I had to predict the most probable thing about men in tomorrow's world, I would say there won't be any men in it, or women either, and the reason is that this atomic bomb is here. Unless we change our foreign policy political habits and learn how to settle disputes by creating an effective world international law, get rid of Democratic and Republican Secretaries of State who don't believe in international law, I think we will blow ourselves to bits. I don't think it is the least bit obvious that there are going to be men and women in tomorrow's world. That is the first point.

But the other side is this. I don't think we have learned how to put modern gadgets into tomorrow's world. Now what Chiang Monlin said to me was this, and he has proved that he was right. He is now on Formosa, and he has been the chairman of the committee on the economic development and reconstruction of Formosa, and if the London Economist can be trusted, he has learned how to solve this problem. The Economist maintains that he has succeeded more effectively on Formosa than Mao has on the Chinese mainland. Now this is what he said, "The mistake we made in National Peking University in bringing Western science and technology into China was that we did not bring in the basic theories and the basic philosophy that underlie this science."

This is the one point that I want to pick up in Dean McGeorge Bundy's talk this morning. The wisest thing he said, it seems to me, was that this explosion in technology is the product of an explosion in knowledge, and originally it is the product of an explosion in the most theoretical and abstract and non-commonsensical kind of knowledge, that is, nobody would have dreamed of the atomic bomb if Einstein had not come up with the theory, the special theory of relativity. When he sat down with this theory after he had reason to believe it was true and applied some formal logic or pure mathematical calculation to it, he deduced an equation called the "mass energy equation." This revealed to people the possibility of releasing atomic energy, and from this came the atomic bomb. Now Einstein was not interested in gadgets. He had no interest in them. He never performed an experiment in his life as a physicist. Einstein was perplexed by a most theoretical problem in the basic assumptions of modern, mathematical, electromagnetic theory, a problem which arose because of the Michelson-Morley experiment made in 1881.

If you don't bring into a society this abstract, formal way of thinking, I believe that all the foreign aid under heaven, all the gadgets, all the farm machinery, all the agricultural chemistry, will tend to be wasted and go down the drain. Certain ways of doing things with your muscles, with gadgets, depend on having the ideas necessary to think about and use those things properly up here in your mind. Chiang Monlin said to me that morning in the middle of the World War—he had flown straight from Chungking—he said, "I believe we have to begin with the basic mentality of Western mathematical physics." For this, contemporary forms of it are too complicated to begin with, We have to begin with it in its most elemental form back in pre-Socratic Greek science and philosophy.

There is another difference. He came to Yale to present a manuscript for a book. I think that everybody in the free world should read this book. It is called Tides from the West. Now in this book he makes it clear that just as a people who haven't the ideas of the Western man, the formal way of thinking underlying Western mathematical physics since its discovery with the ancient Greeks, if they
don't have those ideas in their minds, they won't understand Western science and technology properly.

He makes it equally clear that if they don't have the basic way of thinking of Western legal science — and I believe that discovery was the effect of applying the type of intellectual thinking of Greek mathematical physics to law — if they don't have Christianity in a universal manner, it is characterized by Sir Henry Maine in his classic study of comparative law called "the law of contract," and if you bring a Western, legally constructed, contractual political system into a non-Western culture, they will corrupt that exactly as they will ruin their mechanical procedures.

Chiang Kai-shek got the advice of the ablest legal minds in the Western world to construct a constitution for his China. What does Chiang Kai-shek tell us was the effect of the application of that law-of-contract way of organizing a nation? Not only did it become a farce and a dead letter, but it corrupted the public officials. Now why was this?

I believe that the answer is the key to that question is in Sir Henry Maine's Ancient Law. In that great book he noted that the comparative law of the world was examined over the whole of the earth's surface, and of the variety of the time of civilized man, falls into two kinds of law: the one which he called the "law of status" and the other which he called the "law of contract." Now the plain fact is that ninety-five percent of the people on the surface of the earth today, outside Western civilization, outside those non-Christian, non-Westernized cultures, live in what Sir Henry Maine called "the law of status" society.

I agree completely with the two previous speakers about the importance of religion in this problem, but I am disturbed at the same time, for the plain fact is that the majority of the religions on the surface of the earth today have a concept of God which is that of a "law of contract" society. Furthermore, the Christianity that went into the Old South in our country is the same exact kind. The problem of putting any kind of contractual legal and political system (and here our free democratic type of politics and law is like the Communists — they are both contractually legal political systems), the problem of putting a Western type of legal and political system on Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, at the present moment, is identical with the problem the American people are now confronting in making effective the unanimous decisions of the judges of our Supreme Court on the desegregation cases.

The plain unadulterated fact is that the Christianity of the Old South is a white man's patriarchal type of Christianity. It is the Christianity of a white man's God of what Sir Henry Maine called the "law of status" society, and the bitterness of the Southerners at the present moment (and let nobody suppose that the present civil rights bill that is going to be passed in Congress is changing the Southerners) is the result, again, of the conflict between the ethics, politics, morality, and religion of a "law of status" society and the ethics of a "law of contract" one.

Now what are the ethics of the "law of contract?" In my mind the most underrated philosophers in human history are the Stoic Romans, for they are the people who created Western legal science and the politics in Cicero's dictum. Cicero did not create this philosophy; he learned it from the lawyers, the Scaevolas who were the first main codifiers of Roman law. It is the thesis that moral man and political man, and even religious man, is not "law of status," racial, joint family, tribal man, but universal man, cosmopolitan man. The literal meaning of the word "catholic" in Roman Catholic Christianity is "universal." It is the thesis that the God of the Judaic Christian religion is not the God of the tribe. He isn't the God just of the Jews, nor of the Roman tribes, nor of the African tribes, nor of the Greek tribes. He is the God of any human being whatever.

What is the characteristic of any "law of status" society? It is this, that your ethical obligations, your legal and political obligations, rights and duties are defined by your genealogical table, to put it concretely. They are defined by your biology of birth and breeding, and to ask in such a society whether such and such a person is a good person is equivalent to asking for that person's biological pedigree. Now such societies are characterized all over the world as what is called the "joint family." But a joint family often is the equivalent of fifty of our families. It may be patriarchal, it may be matrarchial in character, and to get political unity in such a society you have to have a privileged first family. The first family founds the tribe, and the political leader in turn, generation in generation, is the eldest son of that first founder of the tribe. Thus genealogy and primogeniture defines all of your moral, political, and religious rights, privileges, and duties.

Now in a significant book, a new edition of Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha, a contemporary English historian and analyze philosopher, Peter Lasslet, has written a very important introduction. Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha is the political and religious ideas of early seventeenth century England, of the theocratic Christian Cam of Old England of Hooker, Elizabeth, and Shakespeare. He shows in this book that in the Virginia Company patriarchal Christianity went through the Virginia Company into Virginia. Lasslet has made a study of the genealogical tables of the first families of Virginia. They are blood cousins, they are blood related. They are the same kinds of families. The result is that again I happen to be interested in this because the "F" in my initials is "Filmer." It doesn't count because my grandmother was a descendent of Sir Robert, and since this Christianity and morality is patriarchal, to have any relation on the matriarchal "grandmotherish" side doesn't matter.

How is this problem going to be solved? How are we going to succeed? What happens when you give free democracy to African tribesmen or to Asian peoples is that those at the top — wealthy, joint families — can command the government. If you hand them economic aid, they will tend to get most of it. They are the only ones who have the money to send their sons to Western universities to learn what "law of contract" politics and law mean, and to learn Western technology so that these gadgets can be used properly instead of misused. The result is that when you pour your aid in, you will find in the end that most of it goes to take a few very wealthy Asian joint families richer and richer and richer.

There is a literal religious and moral conflict in values here between these two types of societies. Now I can only suggest — I have already, I think, gone over my thirty-five minutes so I'll try in two minutes to just suggest for a Buddhist society how this problem, I believe, is to be solved. The suggestion first came to me from Ashoka who, in my judgment, is one of the wisest statesmen in contemporary India, at least intellectually. He is so much of an intellectual that he may not be too practical, in the sense of being able to catch votes. He will be the only person that will be practical in the sense of getting solutions to the practical problems that we have pointed out. He pointed out that in an old culture you have to draw a distinction between basic, underlying, ultimate philosophical conceptions of the person and outmoded applications of those underlying beliefs.

What this means is that effective politics in today's world must use the methods of what, for a better name, I call philosophical anthropology. Our foreign statesmen, our planning boards of our State Departments need to have men in them who study every nation in the world, the way Kluckhohn of Harvard studied the Navajo, and to make explicit the basic philosophical beliefs underlying their "law of status" societies. When you do that with respect to a Buddhist society you find that this Buddhist society is the compound of two different philosophies, one, this "law of
status" philosophy in which one's moral and religious and other rights and duties are determined by loyalty to one's family and loyalty to one's tribe. Then if the society is at the same time Buddhist in its religious beliefs, and this is why I agree with the two previous speakers, you cannot leave religion out of this story. It is just as important for making technology efficient in these countries as it is for making modern contractual, legal, and political systems work. Now it happens to be the case that in the Buddhist belief system Buddha repudiated caste, he really repudiated that patriarchal joint family. But without "law of contract," you cannot get national unity in "law of status" societies without a privileged first family. The Buddhist belief system is basically democratic because its teaching is that when we know our own selves with thoroughness, we find that not only are all individual persons equal, in their ultimate nature they are, in fact, identical. Now what better basis for democracy is there than this?

I believe that the art of reforming old, medieval, and ancient, "law of status," family-focused, and tribally-focused societies, with modern contractual, legal, and political norms, whether those norms be liberal democratic or Marxist Communist, centers in finding in the indigenous belief system and customs of the foreign people, factors and beliefs, which, while not identical with those of the religion of our culture, not identical with the philosophy of Locke and Jefferson, are compatible with it, and then in devising a political policy which has to be tailor-made to every different culture.

The way you solve this problem in an Islamic culture will be radically different from the way you will solve it in a Buddhist, Asian nation. It means devising a tailor-made policy which takes the basic concept of Western legal and political catholic Christian man, catholic Christian man in the sense of the thesis that all human beings are God's children. This is the real meaning. I believe that came from the Stoic Romans into Christianity.

This type of Christianity can go hand in hand with our liberal democratic Lockeian and Jeffersonian philosophy combined with the Buddhist concept in the Buddhist culture of the ultimate nature of human nature which happens to be identical with the divine nature. Then you will be creating something in those countries, something that isn't a second or third-rate imitation of the artificial, tinsel, applied-science side of America. You will be creating in those countries something that is unique in the history of the world, a synthesis that combines the ultimate and deepest and truest in old societies with modern ideas. But in this process the difficulty is that this old, basic belief system of Buddhism, which is compatible with the norms of Jeffersonian and Lockeian democracy is fastened in those countries to this "law of status."

The technique for meeting this problem is what I have termed, in a book I have just written, "the wedge technique." "The wedge technique" consists in objectively studying a particular society with the methods of the cultural anthropologists, getting its basic complex philosophy out into the open, then driving a wedge between those traditional beliefs that are compatible with the modern ideas that the people in these countries are asking for and those that are not, so that as far as possible we carry the old living law of those people with us. Now I believe that, if this technique is followed, the free world can, in a fair competition with perfectly peaceful means, win out over the Communist world. I believe that the Communist belief system with its anti-religious emphasis, and also with its rejection of the primacy of the freedom of the individual, will find it very difficult to locate factors in the old living laws and customs of these people, and in the end may alienate them and drive them away.

Thus, tomorrow's world, in a nutshell, will be the kind of world we make it. There are no forces in history set up that are going to decide what it is going to be. Man can put himself back in control of his life and his society if he faces its problems objectively, using the methods of cultural anthropology and sociological jurisprudence, facing the problems realistically, getting clear in his own mind what in the old has to go, what in the old is compatible with the new, and then putting those two compatibilities where they exist together.

GEORGE BRINTON COOPER

I think you will agree, ladies and gentlemen, that Professor Northrop deserves to be in paperback.

This evening at 8:15 the last session of the Convocation will start. On that occasion all six of the speakers will sit on that side of the platform, and on this side of the platform the dean of Washington correspondents, Mr. James B. Reston, will summarize, interrogate, argue with the speakers. I hope as many as possibly can will attend this evening session. It will be at 8:15 precisely. Thank you.
EVENING SESSION

Discussion and Summary

Mr. Reston and Professor Cooper discuss summation procedure before start of evening session.

OSTROM ENDERS

Distinguished speakers, guests, ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of Trinity and Trinity Associates, welcome to the final session of our Convocation: "The New World Ahead: Interpretation and Prophecy."

I was asked several days ago: "What is a Convocation?" I have since had the opportunity to look it up and have learned that the term originally referred to a calling together of clergy to discuss ecclesiastical affairs. However, although the presence of Bishop Lilje on this platform may recall this earlier meaning, the term is now more broadly and more simply used to designate a gathering of learned men for consultation.

Our meetings here today certainly fit this definition. The men gathered on this platform are indeed learned. And they have spent the day in consultation on matters of the highest interest and concern to every one of us. We are privileged to be able to share their thoughts.

We hear many conflicting things about the new world ahead. The pessimists see little but a gray atomic wasteland. The optimists too often express the future simply in terms of its material promise. We are told that someday (if all goes well) we shall have disposable clothes, that meals may be simply a matter of swallowing a pill, and that we shall take winter vacations on warm neighboring planets rather than in Nassau.

But certainly the citizen of tomorrow will be something more than a person in a one-a-day suit, swallowing his lunch in a gulp as he hurries to catch the last tourist flight to Venus. He will be, as he has always been, a social, political, and mystical being. And he will have problems, just as he has today. His problems may quite possibly be even more acute than they are now. The world is increasingly in a hurry, we are more and more crowded together, and the consequences of our mistakes become ever more severe.

Against this background, convocations such as this become far more than academic exercises. It becomes vitally necessary that our learned men be called into consultation in this fashion, on these subjects. Without the benefit of their thoughtful prognosis we can only remain perplexed and uncertain in the face of the future.

Earlier today, man and his society in the new world ahead were given a careful scrutiny by our distinguished speakers. They are here tonight to present a summary of what has been said, to discuss it further. But before I yield this platform to the convocation's presiding officer—who will introduce our moderator and our speakers—there is one introduction that I have reserved for myself, for purely selfish reasons of personal friendship and respect. I am quite sure that Mr. Newton C. Brainard is known to practically everyone in this audience, and there is no need for me to elaborate at any embarrassing length on the innumerable contributions he has made to the life of our Hartford community. We are privileged to have him with us on this platform, and I introduce him to you simply as one of our most distinguished citizens, Chairman of the Board of Connecticut Printers Incorporated, senior member of the Board of Trustees of Trinity College, and the Honorary Chairman of this Convocation, Mr. Newton C. Brainard.

At this point, it is again my pleasure to turn this platform over to the Convocation's presiding officer: George Brinton Cooper, professor of History at Trinity, Professor Cooper.

GEORGE BRINTON COOPER

I think that I need not dwell on the tremendous intellectual advantages that have already accrued to the campus as a consequence of the collection here today of some of the great thinkers of Western culture. Many of the students have already begun a relevant discussion of many of the important points which have been brought up by our distinguished guests.

This evening, the ground rules are going to be rather simple. Our distinguished guests who are seated at this
The first question in the English catechism is the same question as the first question in your income tax return, namely, "what is your name?" The first question in the Scottish, or shorter, catechism is quite different. It is, "What is the chief end of man?" Now as I understand it, in the morning, Professor Brogan of Cambridge, Dean Bundy of Harvard, and Professor Rostow of M.I.T. were addressing themselves primarily to the first question in the English catechism. They were asking themselves, "What's wrong with our political lives?" "What can we do in our approach to the Soviet Union to win the cold war?" but in the afternoon Dr. Malik and Bishop Lilje were talking about what's wrong with our souls. This, I think, was the essential difference between the two parts of the program.

Now I may try to outline one or two points before we get to the questions. As I understand it, Professor Brogan was disturbed about our impatience, and about the division of powers within our Constitution.

Dean Bundy had a variety of points that he wished to make. I will try to summarize them as follows. He was concerned about the effect of the explosion of knowledge in the world. He did make a rather disturbing parenthetical remark, I thought. As he went along he said, "and this would be true if the world goes on." I am here to assure him on the authority of our correspondent who knows about these things that the world is going to go on. Dean Bundy was afraid that science and freedom may not necessarily be friends in the world of the future. He thought, for example, that science could be used for wicked ends by people like Fidel Castro, the Elvis Presley of the Caribbean.

He was worried about the capacity of the "wolf state," not only to educate engineers, but to direct them into the jobs that the state wished them to do. He reached this conclusion, as I understand it: that a society which takes conscious control of the decision-making process in this field of knowledge and the direction of knowledge, can easily have a decisive advantage over one which does not. This he called the most serious long-term challenge to our power from the Chinese and from the Soviet Union.

Bishop Lilje was concerned with more transcendental things. He was, perhaps, a little more optimistic than Dean Bundy. But as I understand it, he thinks that our sense of values is not what it should be. He believes that only by strong convictions and firmness of faith will the West be able to prevail over and meet the aggressive ideology of the Soviet Union.

Professor Rostow dealt with some of the mysteries with which we as journalists in Washington have to deal. He sounded, I thought, rather lugubrious at the beginning, but insisted at the end that he was really quite optimistic. Nevertheless, he also thought that our sense of values was all wrong, and that we were not putting enough money into the public sector of our economy, that is to say, into defense, into education particularly, and putting too much money into things which nourish private indulgence.

Professor Northrop developed a quite different thesis. As I understand it, what he said is that what we have been doing with the underdeveloped areas of the world is all wrong because we do not understand the cultures of these areas, and that it is quite useless to spend money in aid of that kind unless we really do understand the difference between our universal or contract state and the tribal or more primitive state of those areas in other parts of the world. (I have arranged, incidentally, to keep Professor Northrop out of Washington until the foreign aid bill is passed.)

Dr. Malik, in one of the most moving addresses I have ever heard, closed with the following words: "You ask what is the place of man in the new world ahead? I answer, that place depends not on technology and how it is going to develop, nor on security and how it is going to be assured, nor on education and how it is going to be reformed, nor on government and how it is going to govern, nor on Europe and America adjusting themselves to Communism and to the rising East, although all these things are very important, but on how much man is going to forget God, or more
Professor Cooper

Could I suggest that the members of the panel open up the discussion. You might start with Mr. Rostow, if he cares to comment.

Mr. Reston

Let me ask him a question. Let me read a statement from Dr. Malik, and ask Professor Rostow and Dean Bundy to comment upon it. Dr. Malik said, "You ask what is the place of man in the new world ahead. I answer, blame the university if he has no place," and at the end of that same paragraph he remarks, "The salvation of man depends in part at least upon the conversion of the university." Perhaps it would be more fair to ask Dr. Malik to define what he means by that, and then to get comments from the others.

Professor Malik

Well, I thought I explained what I meant by it in my statement. Man looks for leadership from the universities, and I do not think the universities are providing him with adequate enough leadership. Consequently, he gathers his ideas from newspapers and newspaper correspondents, some of whom are perfectly admirable fellows, but all the same it is not their job to give him fundamental leadership. Therefore, the result is the general state of "lackness" that the good Bishop was talking about this afternoon. I think the universities cannot devise themselves of fundamental responsibility for the intellectual and spiritual tone of the present age, and so long as they continue talking only about techniques and about methods, without providing the fundamental generic ideas that could move the minds and hearts of men to do great things in the future, I think they will be failing man. Therefore, I insist that the future of man depends in part upon the conversion of the university to its right place of giving fundamental intellectual and spiritual leadership to the age.

Mr. Reston

Dean Bundy, would you like to comment upon that?

Dean Bundy

I would naturally share Mr. Malik's view that universities are more important than newspapers. I think he is right also in feeling that in some deep sense the pattern of intellectual and spiritual commitment which appears in universi­ties will be of great importance. Where I think that he is wrong is in his belief that what he recommends to the universities would be a good thing for them to do.

He urges a unified, objective, verifiable truth. My own conviction is that the whole process of what we have begun to learn about man and the world and higher values over this short period of a few thousand years in which we have been learning repudiates and makes impossible any such total uni­fication of knowledge and belief. I did not think that the fourteen errors which Mr. Malik mentioned were so much errors, as fractions of truth, and while I agree that it is extraordinarily difficult for us to live in a world in which there is this diversity, I think it would be pretense for the universities to try to cover it over.

Mr. Reston

Professor Rostow, will you comment on that, please?

Professor Rostow

Mr. Malik's question straddles, as it were, the first question of the English and Scottish catechisms. It partly concerns public life, and it partly concerns the deeper values which make human life worthwhile and meaningful. Straddling as it does, and straddling it in a society like ours, which is not unified as medieval society was unified around the Church which gave its character to the state and to the university, I think what you must say is something like this. Leadership, in its widest sense of setting the directions which human life should take, and the values to which man should aspire, is a highly dispersed quality in our kind of society. Far and away the most important part of leadership, as the most important part of human life, centers around the family and the drama of carrying forward the human race in reasonable continuity and order.

In our society this may be a simple-minded view, but I believe our politicians have a very great role as leaders in setting, in several important dimensions, the directions and the values of society. Our churches have that function, and the universities too. Here I would agree with Dean Bundy that the university, the modern university, is committed to the pursuit of truth and the fearless and well-poised enunciation of those parts of the truth that men feel they have hold of. It is in fulfilling that function that the universities must play an important but rather modest role in this pursuit of leadership.

In short, my reply would be that the problem of giving continuing meaning to both public life and private life in the kind of world setting we have been describing puts some burdens which are eternal burdens - they are no greater for our time than any other - on parents, on religious leaders, I think it puts extraordinary burdens on our political leaders, and extraordinary burdens also on those in the universities who are caught up in the process of establishing new pieces of partial truth, if you like; but the responsibility of the university is in no way unique.

Mr. Reston

Professor Northrop, do you have anything to add to this?

Professor Northrop

I don't think so.

Bishop Lìlje

May I answer?

Mr. Reston

Yes, certainly Bishop.

Bishop Lilje

I would agree with what Dr. Bundy said about the only aim of the university being the pursuit of truth. That implies, of course, a complete objectivity of approach, and a fearlessness, as has been rightly said, to proclaim the find­ings of this. I do feel, however, that the question which Dr. Malik raised was not quite met by that statement, and I would like very briefly to say that the one point where I should like to join hands with Dr. Malik is this - how does it come that such a large part of our intelligentsia has gone...
in for a type of thinking which I would call a non-committal type of thinking? The universities should not too quickly push aside this critical remark, because the capacity for self-criticism is part of the pursuit of truth. At least we in our country, in Germany, had this experience, that when one big political decision was to be made, namely whether to accept dictatorship or not, there were many people of university standing who were not able to come to a clear decision in a situation like that, who went too far in seeing all sides, or both sides of the picture, and whose sense of saying "yes" or "no" apparently was not developed enough.

All I want to say is that this should be a question which the universities as a whole must keep in mind. How can we avoid, in our objective way of striving for the truth, ending in some non-committal attitude which in times of crises may become an opportunistic attitude?

Since I think it impresses any learned audience if one quotes, I would mention at this time Albert Camus' La Chute (The Fall), a tremendous description of a person who lost the capacity to know when to risk one's life. The university should not be burdened with the exclusive responsibility for this, but the whole trend of our academic teaching and training should not be too far away from this.

Mr. Reston

This has apparently inspired Professor Northrop to make some remarks.

Professor Northrop

I always need a little time to reflect. There are two remarks I would like to make. First, with respect to what Dean Bundy has said, and with which I have a great deal of sympathy, I do think that anyone in any culture tends to think that there is less monism, if I may be permitted to use a philosophical word, in his culture than there actually is. In any given culture you are always conscious of the differences, and you never realize the systematic doctrine that you have in common. Now to Latin Americans we look as if we were all right out of the same philosophical mold. I think in the same way to the French Americans all look alike. They think we have a systematic philosophy. Now it happens to be that this has grown out of the British empirical tradition and out of American pragmatism, and this tends to emphasize as a part of its systematic doctrine, religious, political, and individualistic pluralism, but it is none the less systematic on this score.

Now the other point that I want to make has to do with Professor Malik's point, and it has also to do with Mr. Reston's summary of what I had to say this afternoon. Now I think I knew that such an interpretation would be put on it, but it was not the point. I would put the point this way, and here is where I agree both with Professor Malik and with Bishop Lilje. If I wanted to put my finger on the major weakness in our present approach, it is that we do not draw the distinction—and I am going to use British
analytic philosophy now to speak in terms of our own ideology—we have not paid sufficient attention to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values. I believe that if our politics has been weak, it is because we suppose that you can answer intrinsic or goal value questions with instrumental value expertness.

The point of my remarks was not—I did not have time to go into this matter—was not that economic aid is not wise or that there was an overwhelming case for military aid. I was urging that while it is right to give it—or that military aid isn't necessary. If you read my books on Marxism, I think I hold my own with anybody on the importance of that. The point was this: that political questions require political answers, the reason being that politics and law have sentences which contain words like "murder," "guilty," "criminal." Now you don't find such "ought" words in either economic science or military science, and this means that you require expertise in making decisions about alternative goal values or intrinsic values.

The point isn't that economic aid or military aid are not necessary, but political problems require political answers, and politics and law are dealing with normative goal value questions. Every political system and every legal system is not a description of what man is. It is a thesis about what man ought to be; otherwise there is no such thing as guilt, there is no such thing as being a criminal. You have to answer intrinsic goal value questions with goal value answers.

At this point I believe that Professor Malik's thesis is right. If you look at the curricula of our universities and look at the courses in our secondary schools, you will find that there is an overwhelming emphasis on skill in the instrumental value subjects, but very little emphasis on the philosophical norms of our own political and legal systems, on normative goal value philosophy. The plain fact is that the Supreme Court of our own country is divided into two camps over what the philosophical meaning of the American legal system is. I believe this goes back in a major way to our universities where our social scientists have put emphasis on fact-finding which answers "is" questions. Our curricula are short all through the high schools and even into our universities on the methods and the alternative theories for answering "ought" questions.

My thesis this afternoon was not that economic and military aid are not necessary. I will agree with anybody on the necessity for both of them. But they are always relative to a theory about the good man, the man that "ought" to be, and the society that "ought" to be. I believe Professor Malik is right when he says that these questions have been shoved into a secondary place in our educational curricula and that our universities have a grave responsibility for this state of affairs.

Mr. Reston

This morning Professor Brogan made the following comment. He said the Constitution of 1789 and the Constitution of 1960 are alike, but the society to which they applied or apply differ profoundly. He went on to say that in the modern world a predominant executive is a fact which cannot be avoided. If it is avoided, the state that avoids it cannot compete. There must be a concentration of authority in a few hands if the political methods of the West are to compete with the new political methods of the Communist bloc. Professor Brogan, may I make an observation and ask a question?

I have an impression that there has been a great change in this country on this point. Woodrow Wilson went to his grave, it is true, believing that the power of public opinion and the division of this government was so great that we would have a major treaty go through the Senate. And yet when I think back on the last eight or ten years, even though we have had three Democratic Congresses in the presence of a Republican President, I find it hard to think of any major thing that the President really wanted to do, that he did not have the power to do, and to do quickly.

One other point, just to provoke you if I may, I have the impression, and I mean this quite sincerely, that we have become very English, not Scottish, but English, in our reaction to the government in the sense that we are now not second-guessing the government the way we used to, that we are now putting it in and letting it go, to the point that I believe the President now has the power, if he so wishes, to defend Quemoy and Matsu or to abandon them, to run a convoy through Helmsedt into Berlin under provocation or if there are reasons for leaving Berlin. Certainly this impression is either wrong, or your thesis is wrong. Now which would you say was right?

Professor Brogan

Well, I shall begin by a counter-offensive. You have misquoted the shorter catechism, which is a very serious offense. The shorter catechism, which is called the Scottish catechism, was entirely written by Englishmen. This is a plea.

In the evening session audience: left to right, Robert S. Morris '16 and Karl W. Hallden '89, Life Trustees, and Mr. and Mrs. Alfred C. Fuller of West Hartford

Well, what I feel about this is that first of all there has been in the climate of opinion in Washington, in the last nearly eight years, a disposition to avoid decisive action. The question, as I was talking, was of the future. I didn't doubt for a moment that the President, as Commander-in-chief, has the power to defend Quemoy and Matsu. In fact, it was very strange he should have asked for the power to defend them.

What I had in mind was the frame of mind in which, both in the White House and in Congress, the presidential responsibility has been minimized. That resolution seems to me an example of this. It didn't do any harm. It didn't do any good, but it reflected what I thought was a dangerous frame of mind in the President who believes that the division of the powers is either wrong, or to find reasons for leaving Berlin. Certainly this impression is either wrong, or your thesis is wrong. Now which would you say was right?
commentators, in political textbooks, in both houses of Congress, and I say above all in the White House, in which the search for a consensus before anything is done may be dangerous, because it may involve something which has to be done very, very quickly. It is not a question only of legal power. Woodrow Wilson and Warren G. Harding had the same powers, but they had very different concepts of what they did with those powers.

I would like to see a restoration in the executive government of what I would call a high prerogative view of the Presidency, because I believe there are quite often going to be crises in which a president must be prepared to act very quickly, simply because if he does not act very quickly, whatever he does is sure to be wrong. He may be wrong, of course, if he does act very quickly. But quite certainly there will be intense acceleration of technical progress. Dr. Bundy made the point this morning that for many of these questions only half a dozen people know the answers, ever can know the answers, and they are not in Congress. Nobody, I think, who really knows the modern world thinks the system which could produce a certain congressional committee chairman—and Mr. Reston knows that system better than I do—is adequate for 1960, or will be adequate for 1961 when things are much more likely to be worse than better as far as the need for speed is concerned.

I think the year 1961 is going to be speedier than 1960, and I should hope that whoever is elected in November of this year will have what I would call a high prerogative idea of what the Presidency is about, and will take the Lincolnian view that he is especially commissioned to preserve the Republic. If he does that, he is sure to run into conflicts with members of Congress, including important members, who seem to me to have a very natural resentment— I have heard it expressed—at the fact that no longer, for example, can the treaty-making power of the Senate be considered of the first importance because so many things have to be done now. There has not been a peace treaty yet, fifteen years later. I don't think that one of our chief troubles is no peace treaty.

I think the Senate resents a decline in its power of independent action in foreign affairs, which I think is absolutely inevitable for the technological reasons which Dr. Bundy gave. This is regrettable. Practically everything in the modern world is regrettable. Our business is to notice these facts. The Federalist does not say anything about the powers it sends a satellite around the moon without consulting any congressional committee. That is the temper of much political discussion in Washington. It is not the text of the Constitution which worries me, but the feeling that things can wait a long time. I will give you another example. I am not at all certain, and less certain than I was yesterday, that the United States can go on postponing decisions about segregation for another ten years, let us say. An eminent colleague of yours told me that it would take at least ten years for the idea of compliance to enter the minds of everybody in Georgia. I don't think the United States has ten years, even in Georgia.

Mr. Reston

Professor Rostow, would you pick that up? Is the question here whether there is any fatal weakness in the Constitution, or is the question the definition of the use of presidential power?

Professor Rostow

I think it is the use of the whole political machinery rather than the constitutional structure. By the whole political machinery I mean the full engine which moves our society forward. I think the pace of innovation in our society politically does not depend on changes in our political structure, but depends on the use which is put to the whole political machine we have within that structure of which the President is the commander. If you talk about innovation in our society at any level of national policy, the innovator must be the President. The President has enormous powers as an innovator, or an anti-innovator. He can stop change just as well as he can initiate it. If he wants to act, of course, he does not do it all himself.

We are a marvelously complicated society. At every level of every town in the country there are whole sets of voluntary associations with their leaders, who really are the leaders of the community quite outside the formal political structure; and increasingly we are behaving like a continental township. The groups meet together. The Rockefeller Brothers' panel reports were a good example. There are many others—the leaders of the labor groups, the farm groups, the women's groups, the religious groups, know each other—that is another level in our society.

Then there is the level that Mr. Reston and some of his colleagues influence, that is, the thoughtful people throughout this country who have no formal place, but whose yea or nay is terribly important. Then above all there is the Congress. The way the President has to move is to do with the leader that can have a step in the dark. These lonely steps in the dark are the essence of leadership whether it is in a Boy Scout troop or a country. If he steps off in the dark, having done his homework, he will find a tremendous support for him all over this country among others who have watched the issue develop. There will be a majority consensus that will back him. In the framework of that consensus, the President could take a step in the dark. I am not saying he has to do it, but I am saying he has a right to do it. The President could do it. These long steps in the dark are the essence of leadership whether it is in a Boy Scout troop or a country. If he steps off in the dark, having done his homework, he will find a tremendous support for him all over this country among others who have watched the issue develop. There will be a majority consensus that will back him. In the framework of that consensus, the President could take a step in the dark. I am not saying he has to do it, but I am saying he has a right to do it. The President could do it.

Mr. Reston

Professor Brogan, you said a little while ago that the pace of executive action in 1961 was going to be faster than in 1960. Do you have any inside information about this?

Professor Brogan

No, I simply looked into my crystal ball. I think the atmosphere will change in Washington for various reasons, including the change of actual administration. I have that in mind. I also have in mind the fact that it seems to me the number of important decisions is not going to diminish. I am thinking of the psychological shock the first time, for example, that any man goes into outer space. I do not say whether it will be an American or a Russian, and I am not talking of the prestige question. I am just talking of the shock to the world of getting outside this earth for the first time in human history. This may seem remote. I don't think it is remote. In a world of that kind, appeals to what Madison said, and appeals to what Montesquieu said, will not only be irrelevant, but they will look comically irrelevant, alarmingly irrelevant, and the sooner this is accepted the better.

I won't mention the distinguished journalist who spends a great deal of his time and my patience in elaborate arguments about the Constitution and so on. I am all in favor of the Constitution. It is an interesting document. It is a valuable document, but the Constitution isn't simply a division of powers as laid out in the text. It is a whole animating spirit. The Constitution of the United States is not merely the document as this columnist pointed out. It
is a living body and a corpus of amendments. I think one of the amendments the world is adopting is that for certain purposes the President of the United States must be able to act, and what is more, should be prepared to act even without consultation, because he doesn’t get the time.

The fact remains that the number of people who know enough about the real resources of the United States to make a decision is very small, and none of them, so far as I know, is in either house of Congress. Now if I were a Senator, I should resent this. I am not a Senator, I merely observe it. I think the senatorial resentment—you get the same kind of resentment among the back-benchers in the English Parliament—that resentment is very human, but I think it is something that has to come under the conditions which exist in the modern world, that is, a degree of trust. I, for example, am much more willing to give any president the benefit of the doubt than many of my friends are, not only because he knows more, but because he must be given this trust. To go back to what Dr. Bostow said, he must be given the feeling he will be supported, that his good faith and confidence will be taken for granted.

This is a world in which an awful lot of stuff I, myself, have written seems to me now purely of historical interest. It dates from a horse and buggy age, as F.D.R. has said. It is not even that. It is Stone Age, in some ways, compared with the world which, to go back to Dr. Bundy’s point, is changing with a speed which no amount of university sermonizing will change. The world in which we live has been really transformed in startling and daring ways. I am against all this, but I am not asked about it. I just know that it happens.

Mr. Reston

And still, isn’t it true, Dr. Malik, that the Constitution did not in any way limit the speed with which the President, whether rightly or wrongly, landed a division of Marines in your country?

Professor Malik

Well, I see you want to drag me out because I was sitting back quietly, I expected it. It is quite true what you said. I think the President decided on a certain Monday about seven o’clock in the afternoon, or half past six in the afternoon, and the following morning the Marines did arrive in Lebanon. But if I remember correctly, he had talked quite extensively with leaders in Congress in the afternoon of that day. In general, from the little I know about the Constitution of the United States, I would not dare talk much about it before these great distinguished authorities on the subject. I would say, from the little I know, I agree with your thesis that the President can move very fast, and the Constitution is flexible enough, elastic enough, adaptable enough to enable the executive to move if he wants to move. Sometimes he doesn’t want to.

Mr. Reston

I thought until the very end there you were sounding a little wistful for more checks and balances.

Could I ask Bishop Lilje and Dr. Malik a more philosophical question? The Americans on this panel have been dealing to a large extent with the immediate problems of politics, politics in this country, and in its relations with other countries of the world, and with the techniques of achieving political objectives. You, Dr. Malik and Bishop Lilje, have been dealing with these more fundamental problems of the human personality and the ends of our society, and what kind of people we are. Now looking at us from the outside of this country, what is your thought about that? Are we too preoccupied with the day-to-day, with the journalistic view of the world, and not enough with the ends of life?

Bishop Lilje

By invitation of Dr. Malik I start first, though I think he might be better equipped to answer this.

I would say that I would not take it upon me. I would consider it presumptuous, to answer the question straight. I do not know enough about the actual attitude of the American public. I feel, however, that I know a great many, and to my mind a surprisingly great many people who, let me put it this way: realize the important role which the United States has to play in the present international situation. And since you ask me, sir, I may be quite frank and say as one who likes to come to this country, and who has had the privilege to visit it in the decade after the war, that
I feel, really, that you have a group of people who know how much depends upon what way the United States chooses in international politics.

I am not the man to say whether your machinery is working quickly enough in this. I only know the general truth, that it always may be a weakness of a too formalistic democratic system that some people think they have the right to prevent others by parliamentary methods from doing the reasonable thing. That is not a question of whether the President is equipped, but whether the people who are part of the machinery are equipped for the task they have to fulfill.

I would also say that I see a growing sense of responsibility in international affairs, and in a few cases I would say people over here are more aware of the implications of singular cases, political cases, and how they are involved in international politics. Now this may not be a straight answer, but may I add a hearty wish at the end, sir, and say I wish, because this is so important, that the people of the United States might live more and more up to the great task, the great responsibility that includes the expectation of people who may criticize you in other parts of the world, but possibly do so because they do expect so much from the lead which you should take in the present world situation.

Mr. Reston
Dr. Malik.

Professor Malik

Strictly from the point of view of real world responsibilities, it may be fairly said that this country is about fifteen to twenty years old, twenty years old since this country entered the second World War. Now twenty years are not enough in the life of a country, not even under the accelerating speeds of modern development, for the people to mature enough, and therefore to play its role fully enough in world responsibility.

The British were mixed up with the world for hundreds of years, the French for all their history because they lived right there in the Mediterranean. Russians have been a part of the world ever since, well, they have been mixed up with the rest of the world for four hundred years. Muscovite diplomacy is a great by-word in international affairs. They and the Austro-Hungarians were very expert in their diplomacy long before the Revolution. I think it was somebody today, maybe it was Professor Brogan, who mentioned that Russia would have been industrialized anyway whether or not Marx was introduced there.

So all these countries had this tremendous world experience behind them. They fought wars, they were occupied, they occupied other countries, they had agents all over the place, they were mixed up with these other people, they learned the languages. Their own people are made up of people who are racially and culturally continuous with the peoples around them.

Now what can one fairly expect from a great country like the United States that had been isolationist until twenty years ago and felt completely protected by two oceans and two poles and did not need the rest of the world, economically and in other ways, a country whose whole mentality, outlook, background, and attitude is to be sufficient unto itself? I personally think that the degree of maturation which has happened in this country during the last twenty years is nothing short of miraculous. I do not know of any people, be they British or Russian or French or any other people who could have matured as fast as this country has in showing their really great world responsibility during the last few years. That must be kept in mind, in all fairness.

I have watched this group in Washington and elsewhere for the last fifteen years, and I find it most encouraging that the mere fact that the political aspects of the problems of the future were so predominant in the debates this morning and this afternoon in the minds of the great American spokesmen who spoke here. That shows how much the world political responsibilities are on the minds of the thinking and responsible American men and women today.

But I quite agree that there is another aspect to this problem, namely, that much more than that is required. What is needed, I think, is a deep searching into the mind and heart of the American soul as to where it stands in the future. I have the feeling that, despite everything, the fundamental presupposition of much that has been said here today is that America will continue enjoying its isolation in the future. It will only dispense to the rest of the world its techniques, its system, its presidential system, the "wedge method" that Professor Northrop was talking about. All these things are to be done from the outside while America remains completely intact in its own spirit, in its own development and completely protected.

Now I submit to you that that is not good enough. The man in India in the future, or in China, or in the Middle East, or in Africa, is not going to let you get away with that. He is going to weigh you in the balance with other people. He is going to examine what being an American is, not only what comes out of America by way of systems and techniques, in methods and money, and automobiles, and all that sort of thing. He may very well make use of all these things and still hate you, and still not like you. That is the fundamental thing. When he thinks of the Russian, well, he compares him with you. Now I know in any fair comparison you would certainly come out on top, but are you giving yourselves the opportunity to be fairly compared with the Russians?

There are, I am told by Russian leaders, two million young men today in Russia studying foreign languages. How many Americans are studying foreign languages? How many of you care to do this? There is much greater interest in Russia than there is in this country in the cultures that Professor Northrop was talking about this afternoon, in the cultures of Asia and Africa. All that sense of being sufficient unto yourselves spiritually and intellectually is not enough. You are on the spot now as human beings, not only as producers of techniques, money, products, and systems. In the future the American character, the American mind, the American person, the American being is going to be studied and compared with other characters and minds and beings. It is this aspect of the question which should also be kept in mind. I think it would be utterly unfair to expect of a country like this, with its background and with its institutions, a faster rate of development than it has gone through during the last fifteen years, but I completely agree with Mr. Brogan that the future is going to be much harder upon all of us than the past.

Professor Rostow

Scotty, may I add a word to that?

Mr. Reston
Yes, certainly, Walt.

Professor Rostow

I wonder if it is too much to expect of Americans? Our country was founded and projected itself to the world not as the purveyor of new gadgets or of techniques. It was founded and projected itself to the world as the creator of a political system. It "married up" elements from the British and the French traditions, traditions, if you like, of Locke and the Enlightenment, and we built our nation on this piece of handsome real estate, not on a common race or religion, or even continuity of physical location. We built it on this common commitment: to be loyal to a way
of solving problems, a way of dealing with human beings, which in the beginning was recognized by ourselves and by the world as having a meaning beyond our own shores.

That was the old tradition, and in a way it has never left us. It is not only since 1940 that we have been actively in the world. It is now more than a half-century since we had Teddy Roosevelt, and Mr. Root, and then Mr. Wilson who projected another different approach to the world.

In my view it is not sufficient to tell Americans that this is all very new and that we have done rather well. Our fundamental tradition has been an association with the common cause of humanity and the common cause of human freedom, and this is what we built this society around. It is the only thing which truly unites us. It is now at least six decades since we left the umbrella of Washington's Farewell Address.

The reason I say this is not simply to moralize to Americans as to whether we should have done better or worse. It is because every relationship on which our future depends links to our commitment as a nation whether it is a new set of relationships with Western Europe and Japan, which is a relatively easy thing to do, whether it is a new set of relationships with the undeveloped areas, which is more difficult, or that extraordinarily searching relationship that we must have with the Russians, where we must at the same time deal with them at one level as a potential mortal enemy, and in another dimension as fellow inhabitants of this small planet and fellow members of the human race. In all of these dimensions our salvation as a society of human beings depends upon our operating not merely with money and techniques, which we need, but in a newly dedicated loyalty, not to involvement in the world since 1940, but in a rededication to the principles upon which our society was set up.

Mr. Reston

This afternoon Professor Northrop developed what I thought was a fascinating thesis. I can't do justice to it but perhaps I can get him going on it. As I understand his point, it was that unless we go into Asia and Africa and other parts of the world similar to those two continents with a wholly new and more fundamental approach of teaching them certain philosophies and mathematics upon which our society is based, we cannot expect them to use the implements or understand the ideas of the Western world. Now I would ask Professor Northrop if he would correct that probably false definition of what he said and answer one thing for me about it.

How would Japan of a hundred years ago fit into this thesis of yours? Were they not a "status society," and did they not master the use of machinery without those basic philosophical and mathematical skills?

Professor Northrop

That is a very interesting question. India's former ambassador to Communist China, and now to France, pointed out in a book that the Dutch and Westerners to land in the southwest islands of Japan were from Portugal and the Netherlands, and that the Dutchers brought in the basic mathematical and physical treatises of Europe, that there is a continuous tradition in Japan of studying those, and that when the Imperial University of Japan was modernized this basic form theory went into the curriculum. The opposite happened in the University of Peking.

Mr. Reston

Do you regard the Soviet Union as a "status society?"

Was it, forty years ago?

Professor Northrop

The peasants, yes. The vast majority of the people were still living in that type of society.

Mr. Reston

Did they not, though, master the machinery that you talked about rusting in the fields for lack of understanding?

Professor Northrop

Again, what you find in the Soviet Union, from way back in the Czarist regime, is that they had top-notch mathematicians and mathematical physicists and top-notch engineering schools. The Soviet took over all those institutions.

All that Lenin had to do was to fill in that law of contract with Marx's philosophical content. He didn't have to start from scratch as Mao had to start, with respect to law of contract.

This was first called to my attention by Dr. Belaunde, Dr. Malik's successor as the president of the United Nations General Assembly. He said that, in his exchanges with the ambassadors of the Soviet Union to the United Nations, the thing that most surprised him about their behavior was the way that they went out of their way to make everything that they did fall under the letter of the law. There was a legalistic mentality in them that you would not have thought would have been there from their Marxist philosophy.

You would have thought they would have dealt more in materialistic and technological terms, and not taken the verbal positive legalites of the situation as seriously as they did. And he asked, "What do you think is the cultural background for that?" Well, neither of us knew at the time, but I believe that this is the answer -- that law of contract from Justinian, along with Greek Orthodox Christianity, went into the Russian system. If you think about it, some of the top legal theorists of Western law were Russian before the Soviet Revolution, so that they had those materials to work on. I think Lenin simply took over that entire legal and educational system and just filled it in with Marxist philosophical content.

Mr. Reston

Can I find out whether all Yale men agree about this? What about you, Dean Bundy?

Dean Bundy

Well, I don't have the competence to get into a debate with Professor Northrop on this point, but since you asked me for a short answer, I will say, "No, I do not agree with him." I really don't think the notion of progress from status to contract, a great and remarkable notion in comparative law when Sir Henry Maine advanced it, is adequate as a single line of division of the societies of the modern world.

Mr. Reston

You wouldn't argue, however, that it would do us any harm to learn a little more about these areas before we go in there, would you?

Dean Bundy

No, I think precisely that learning more would suggest that these divisions are not quite so simple.

Mr. Reston

Professor Brogan, have you — — —
Professor Brogan

Yes, I agree with Dean Bundy. For example, take the Japanese case. The point I am puzzled by is that the Jesuits and the Portuguese went to China at the same time they went to Japan. Why didn't the Chinese ask for mathematical books? The Japanese asked for these books. Why didn't the Chinese, who had Jesuit mathematicians with them, learn anything from them? Conceit is my answer. I think conceit is a great national force.

A friend of mine has just come back from China, an old China hand. He said the most terrifying thing there now is the combination of old Chinese conceit and the Marxist conceit. This doubles the dose, and this is what frightens him so much. I agree with Dr. Northrop. I have said it myself, only not nearly so well, that the idea that you export techniques without exporting ideas, is nonsense. Quite often if you export the gimmicks or the techniques, the ideas go with them. Otherwise, they don't work.

I am not quite so pessimistic about the people learning to run tractors, although it is a slow business, because Indians have learned to run a lot of things. Also, Indians have far more mathematicians now than the Chinese have. Some of the greatest mathematicians of modern times are Indian. I think there is something more complicated than that, and it is something in tradition.

I think the Japanese gained a great deal from being less conceited than either Chinese or Indians, or, if you like, they are less superior people, less original people. It is a curious point that, so far as I know, until very recently no Asiatic except a Japanese ever received a Nobel Prize. The Japanese instance of picking up independently the Western techniques and keeping a lot of basic Japanese ideas, though not particularly specific Buddhist ones, has fascinated me since I was a child. I talked with some of the people who have gone out from Glasgow, to their first imperial technical college.

This is a very complicated basic idea of Professor Northrop's, the idea, and I have heard this suggested, that you can export the whole of the American system, the PTA, the Four-H Clubs, car washing on Sunday - the great religious rite - and so on. I think that this may be dangerous. My wife, who works in Africa, has strong views about it, but I am a little more optimistic. I think the exporting of the political ideas is more difficult. I think Owen Lattimore made a sensible remark when he said it was easier, this was thirty years ago, to explain to a Chinese an internal combustion engine than the limited liability of a company, and I think that is true.

I think one of the things about India which makes me more hopeful, and is one of the points which Dr. Northrop might have brought out, is that India is the only Asiatic country which has had for a long time a Western legal system. The rulers of India are lawyers, not soldiers (I am not talking of Pakistan). The rulers of India are lawyers who have, I think, assimilated the Western legal tradition after a hundred years of British rule.

I registered my remark that I doubted we could export American political institutions as easily as the United States Information Service thinks, or professors think, but if you send the techniques and they take root, and the people want to master internal combustion engines, as they often do, they ask themselves questions about it.

I remember hearing Averill Harriman say, when he came back from Russia in 1944 where he had been as ambassador, that he had learned much more as Lend-Lease Administrator than as ambassador. Also, he saw results when he used to go up to Archangel to see Lend-Lease convoys coming in. He said to see skilled Russian workers taking an American locomotive and making it run was of immense value because these skilled workers knew that these loco-

motives were not made by wage slaves. They couldn't be. The American locomotive or car or tank represented to the skilled Russian worker, who is not a Marxist necessarily, represented a society which could not be like the picture given it by the government, because it couldn't produce these things if it was.

I think Americans ought to be much less ambitious, send fewer steel mills and more wells, seed, and spades when it comes to that. Every good American tool that goes abroad carries with it the overtones of a different society which interests people. It is not only a question of gimmicks, not only a question of Elvis Presley or color television. A new American tool is a thoughtful toy, arouses curiosity in all the world, and sometimes that curiosity is intelligent. I have known Africans who are very intelligent about this. They know, for example, in Ghana that the plural family is an immense handicap to running a civil service. Every civil servant in Ghana has twenty or thirty dependents.

It seems to me that speed is very important here, and one African I have talked to, particularly one extremely bright Ashanti pupil of my wife's and mine, are very conscious of the two things. Ashanti society must be transformed in more than having cars, and so on. What he teaches these people is not English, but Greek. This is what, I must say, an American reproached me for - the British government leading the Ghanians away by having a professor of Greek. I said they chose him themselves. They send him to Cambridge every year. It is the Ghana government which wants Greek taught in Ghana, not the British government. I think that shows a sense of values in the Ghana government which makes me hopeful that they will take over more than how to run a tractor, that they will take over some of the ideas which are valuable.

One very last point. The opposition to the monopolistic character of Nkrumah comes from the lawyers, it comes from the judges, all of whom are Negroes. I am not going to be so pessimistic as Dr. Northrop, because I think more of our ideas have got into the blood stream than he is willing to allow for.

Mr. Reston

Dr. Malik, did you have something you wanted to say on this?

Professor Malik

I wanted to say something about Dr. Northrop's position, about the difficulty of transferring technological civilization from one culture to another without the antecedent transfer of the scientific theory which created that technological civilization without ripening the mind and the society of the new culture and maturing it with scientific theory, theory in the Greek sense of the term of apprehending the laws of nature and relating the mind in its theoretical aspect to sense experience. I think that thesis of Dr. Northrop is sound.

I believe that you cannot artificially graft upon an alien culture the mere technological products, techniques or machinery, or the culture that produced these techniques, because products express a whole spiritual tradition behind them. An American automobile is not just an automobile that one rides in. An American automobile expresses Pythagoras, Euclid, and Newton. An American automobile is the condensation of hundreds of years of theoretical, scientific experimentation, and how that can be transferred to a new culture is a very difficult matter.

So I think that side of the contention is quite sound, but there is one missing element. I have not yet seen fully stressed, namely, why should the new culture feel at all impelled to learn even the scientific theory, let alone the technological perfections of the other culture. In order to arouse it to intellectual curiosity so as to seek this secret of scien-
tific creation which is theory, research, and science, to arouse it, to seek it and want it, you have to touch its spirit. You have to touch its national purpose. You have to give it an over-all idea. You have to inspire it with something much more profound than either the technique or the theory, and that is why some of the Communists are succeeding more than the Westerners. They give them an ideology. Now I would be very sorry if some of my colleagues here should mean that all the ideology that the West can transport to these other cultures is the legal system, including its scientific theory and technology.

Now the Russians’ goal was much more than that. They have that. But they go with the view of man, why he lives here, why he should work for the future. They go with a theory about matter, about human society, about government, about everything in life. Now this is very important. If you really are seeking to compete with these people on the level on which they are working, which is firing the souls of these masses of Asia and Africa with a national purpose, with a human purpose, and not only with a scientific and technological purpose, then you have to touch their minds, their souls. You have to fire them there. You have to discover the secret that these men are seeking and to fire them with it. It is then that they will begin to seek science and seek the legal system, and perfect it. Otherwise, they have been happy for the last six thousand years, and they will go on for another six thousand years, unless you really touch them at that point.

So it seems to me that over and above the techniques and the systems of government and theory that have been suggested, the heart of Asia and Africa, that is, the national purpose and the human purpose of these people, ought to be touched and fired, and until then, unless that happens, I am afraid that the West will be fighting a relatively losing battle.

Mr. Reston

Gentlemen, I am going to impose my shallow journalistic mind on you at the very end for a simple question. It is the tenth day of November of 1960. The new President of the

Following his TV appearance, Bishop Lilje hurried back to the campus to deliver the 11 o’clock sermon. Here, prior to service, he chats with Trinity Chaplain J. Moulton Thomas.
United States invites you into his room. Let us bring this down to cases. What specifically and practically do you say to him that you would like to see done in this society to bring about the changes and to remove the criticisms which we have made here today. You have just written a book on this, Professor Rostow, why don’t you start?

Professor Rostow

I think I’d say, “Boss, you’ve got a problem! You’ve got to get the federal budget up by about ten billion dollars, and perhaps taxes too.” It depends on what the situation is in terms of the level of employment. I will come back to that if you’d like, but, of course, the things we have been talking about today have a great deal more substance than money. I think we are a society which has been accumulating problems and to a certain degree substituting rhetoric and short-term emotional satisfactions surrounding those problems for action. I think the essence of what any one of the candidates who succeeds will face is something like this.

He knows that at home there are a whole set of directions in which we have been living off capital. We have been living off capital in the centers of our cities, in education, in roads. We have been building jets without building the airfields and the electronic controls. We have been letting the railways and down; we have a lot of capital development and maintenance to do, which comes to rest on budgets. Abroad we have a whole array of things to do, some of which cost money, and some of which don’t. The reason I began with money is because I think that that is the way a number of presidential candidates in both parties think of the operational part of their job. I think without facing up to that we will get only very short-term satisfactions.

Now the other part of what I think the next President must do is to go to the country and very candidly to talk about a whole set of issues at home, in which he says in essence, “Look, we are a rich society, we’ve willed a big expansion in population. We have a whole set of things to do which we can afford to do, which will improve the quality of this society.” Some of those things, notably with respect to education and increased productivity, we have to do. Education is not only the basis of our culture and our democracy, but it is about the most productive form of investment in our society, economists have now concluded they look back over the last fifty years. We are going to get what we get is an extension, if all goes well, of a kind of enterprise you can find actually in the heart of any city in this country, the sort of spirit that you can see in my old home town of New Haven, or in Philadelphia, or in St. Louis, where people have said, “We have a job to do,” and on a local basis they have done it. I think in one sense we are going to see a national barn-raising of the kind we have seen in a lot of our cities.

Abroad the issues are more complicated because they demand, for example, simultaneously reducing some of the risks of the arms race but at the same time beginning to mobilize a much higher proportion of our talent to face up to what an arms control system would really look like. We have been drafting proposals for the control of armaments, but there are a tremendous number of concrete problems, if we are serious about it, on which we haven’t done staff work. We haven’t done anywhere near the staff work on the problem of control of armaments that we have done on armaments itself, and you don’t automatically get results in one field by working in the other. So that on the arms race I think we have to hedge our risks a bit, and that costs money. Then we have to do something that doesn’t cost money, which is to mobilize our best minds in the natural and social sciences, to produce better, more persuasive and more concrete programs of what an arms control system would look like.

In the underdeveloped areas we have all the bases now laid, I think, for putting economic development aid, which is now only about sixteen percent or so of our total aid—most of our aid is military aid—onto an international basis on a 50-50 split with Western Europe and Japan. That would be a great enterprise. It is well within the grasp of diplomacy if the next President wants to do it. And that, for the first time, would give the underdeveloped areas a feeling that foreign exchange isn’t their bottleneck if they are serious about their problems at home. Because only they can do the job in the end; but we do need somewhat enlarged economic development aid.

Then there is a whole array of problems with Western Europe. What I would say is that there are, three great rubrics under which we have to deal with the world in which we need presidential energy and leadership. One, we are going to get our house in order at home. Two, we are going to bring together again, on a unified basis, the free world alliance, uniting this triangular group, ourselves, Western Europe, and the underdeveloped areas, in a new relationship if we can. And from this base, three, we are going to confront the Russians with patience and with concrete proposals, as we have never done before, with the vision of what peace would be like. Roughly, those are the three broad dimensions of the task. And in my view, in addition to rhetoric, vision, talent, and idealism, they are going to take some money.

Mr. Reston

Professor Northrop.

Professor Northrop

I think we need to get our deepest goal-value ideals which are Judaic-Christian religious, Stoic Roman contractual, modern philosophy, and Greek mathematical physics, and that whole mentality, the whole theory of the good and the beautiful and the true into the forefront of what we are doing, making our instrumental values instruments of those goal values.

At home I think this would mean calling a conference of the top goal-value specialists, of all the different religious denominations and sects, of all the specialists on all moral, ethical, and religious philosophy, and also specialists, I believe, in the philosophy of Western mathematical physics. I think this job has to be done more by laymen, less by officials. The most experienced thing, practically, that I would advise would be that he pick some of our most experienced diplomats of long career experience who know what it means to be assigned to a foreign nation, to learn its value system, and learn objectively what that set of values are. Then I would advise him to create a Planning Board of the State Department, maybe the equivalent of a State Department West Point, with cultural anthropologists. There is no question that the Russians are doing this. These anthropologists would study a foreign nation objectively in the way a career diplomat has to learn it through hard experience. In the light of this, with our own ideals, our ultimate values formulated by this first group and the objective cultural situation formulated, say, by the Planning Board of the State Department, then it would be possible to design a foreign policy.

If there is one phrase I would like to pick out, it is the “wedge technique.” In the first place I was told about that by an
Oriental. I wasn't thinking of it as Americans going into this country and driving this wedge. That is, we have to devise a foreign policy which will interest the native leaders and have them bring forth the support of the people in terms of what they live and value, not what we would like to have them be, but what they are, with those leaders themselves seeing this problem and working them out together.

Mr. Reston
Dr. Malik.

Professor Malik

Very briefly, and apart from touching upon specific areas here and there in the world, just in general, as a general policy, I would stress the following points.

I would give the utmost priority to education at the present moment. This, and I may be wrong here, and there may be people who will completely disagree with me, but I think sooner or later the federal government in this country must take a greater share and a greater interest in the education of the country than it has been doing so far. Now whether it can be done directly both from Washington and from the state, I don't know. I think government in the future is going to be more and more bound to take an active part in the furthering of education in this country. I would therefore say that whatever governmental education expenditure is at the present moment should be multiplied in the near future by a factor of at least five to really measure up to the requirements of the moment.

I would furthermore say that the federal government must promote and support theoretical research by a factor of about ten over what it has been doing so far. This involves both actual sciences and the humanities, and not only one or the other. I think it is most important that the basic theoretical sciences be supported by the Western world much more than they are supported now. If I am not mistaken, people with whom I have talked who have been to Russia are all in one voice reporting that the emphasis upon research, theoretical research, in Russia is absolutely phenomenal. I don't think the Western world can afford to drag behind them.

I would add that greater interest in the cultures of Asia and Africa should be encouraged by the government of the United States. I was talking once to a Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. I forgot his name, but he has about a half dozen of them. I was talking to one of them and it transpired that he is an expert on Chinese classics and has a whole staff of people under him. While he is conducting his own political work he has a whole staff under him helping him translate into Russian the great Chinese classics. Now I don't know how many people in the central government in Washington are now engaged in translating Chinese classics into English, or any other kind of classics. Now that aspect of interest in the outside world ought to be much more appreciated and encouraged by the federal government.

I would add the question of books, talking about paperbound books in connection with our dear friend here. The rest of the world is hungry for books, and I do not yet feel that the English-speaking world understands how much devolves upon them at the present moment because English today is the only lingua franca throughout the world. You have no idea how much people depend upon English throughout the world today. Well, here is a tremendous opportunity that no language in history, not even Latin, had before it so far as helping to disseminate culture, ideas, science, and right attitudes was concerned. The responsibility upon English is immediate for the future, for the indefinite future — so far as I can see — is simply enormous, and I would call the attention of Washington to that fact.

Finally, I think that people in Africa and in Asia certainly want to be told, "Look here, develop yourselves and rule yourselves, and we will give you techniques, money, assistance, forms of government, and all that sort of thing, and will find for you that covert core in your culture which will stimulate you." They want all of that, but they want more than that.

The Communists come to them and tell them all that, but on top of that they give them a universal vision. They make them members of an international fraternity in fellowship. Now, this man in Guinea certainly wants to develop his country and to have a nationality. He doesn't want you to interfere with his nationality, but he craves on top of that to be a member of the human race, to have a universal vision, to be a partner with you, and in fellowship with you. The Russians come and give him Communism, and they make him a member of the great international fraternity of Communism.

What is it that is of a universal character like Communism with which you can appeal to these people? This is a very important point in the present world, because this world is one now. We all hear each other on the radio, we know all about each other's habits, and we all want to enter into communion with each other. The Russians give them the opportunity of entering into spiritual communion with them, not only to be independent, but to raise their standard of living.

All of that is of the essence, but on top of that there is need for a universal message that will make these people see that they are a part of the world, that they are throbbing with the rest of the world, taking responsibility with the rest of the world, putting their shoulders with the rest of the world, and a part of the world fellowship. Does the West have a universal fellowship that it can offer the rest of the world that could compare with and beat the Communist universal fellowship? This is one of the deepest challenges facing the Western world today.

Mr. Reston
Bishop Lilje.
Bishop Lilje

There isn't much more to be said by me. If I may take up the three-fold lead given at the beginning of these remarks by Professor Rostow, I would have to say in the first place that I would not take it upon me to tell the President of the United States anything about the internal situation. I would say, "Boss, it is your job."

Mr. Reston

Well, could you tell him how to free Berlin and unify Germany?

Bishop Lilje

I have it in my point three. I knew that you would say that. If you will permit me, with the permission of the chairman, I might give point two before I give point three. Point two has to do with the problem of the unity of the West. All I could say in this context would be a repetition of what I said a while ago, that I would hope that the President of the United States would accept the leadership, the spiritual, intellectual and political leadership. That would require a great deal of patience, a great deal of firmness, and a great deal of vision.

I had in mind to say a few things that Dr. Malik said. I won't repeat them. To inspire into the Western comity of nations not only the sense of some sort of political expediency or mere defense, but the sense of a certain mission, do we have to stand for something, or don't we? I mentioned earlier that what we mean by freedom should be rethought, and a great deal of all these requirements which have been offered here will come into a complete rediscovery of the vision of freedom and what that means in the modern world, and many other things, including this sense of a universal approach to the world today, a responsibility which all of us share if it comes to the different problems we have.

In this context I might say that I feel this imagination must be a very realistic one, and that at this point depth of conviction and sobriety of realistic judgment must go together. I give an illustration. I had the privilege a few years ago to have a long talk with the Prime Minister and leader of Egypt, Mr. Nasser. It was just at the time he had not received what he had hoped for by way of financial assistance for his famous Aswan Dam. I went over the impression at that time that it would have been far-sighted and helpful, in more than one way, not to speak to the wrong type of principle in this context, but to do something positive and help.

In the whole problem of underdeveloped countries there are so many things which must be considered at the same time, not only the financial aspect, but understanding the people, and then to know and to take the long view in these decisions. All that includes that we really try to learn as much about each other as we can. I will not say whether that includes Greek or not. My Greek would be sufficient for that, but I would not say that other people should do it that way. What I mean is, I am in full agreement with what these gentlemen suggested, namely that there should be as much real knowledge of the other, learning about the innermost motives and the way he would react.

Point three has to do with the Russians, and that leads up to Berlin, of course. I would not think that I would have to tell the President of the United States much about the Russians. If he would ask me, I would say, "Sir, be careful not to give away anything unless you know what you are getting in return. Don't just go in for concessions which have no realistic outcome."

But in the case of Berlin I would admit that it is a very difficult proposition. All I know is that the reaction in Germany would be, very simply, a two-fold one. One is, we are certain, and this may be prejudice or because we are close to this reality, that if the situation in Berlin is changed without any visible step forward, it would be a political loss so far as we can see, not only to Germany but to Europe, and maybe to the political situation of the world.

If you ask me what new things could be done, I don't know. All I can say again is firmness is the only way to show strength. I might add, I hasten to add, that there is no living German in his senses who is not aware of the fact that this can only be done by peaceful means. I can vouchsafe that there is no German to speak of in his senses who recommends going to war for this. Knowing about this is one thing. Right now a tragedy of the first water is going on. In the Soviet zone of Germany with the crushing of the free farmers we have a tragedy of the first water exercised by applying brutal force in a case where simple human dignity should permit these people to do what they think is fit, not to be forced into collectivism.

Also, I would like to see—I am looking for a very modest and humble way of expressing myself—a vision living up to the challenge of Communism. I hope I express myself clearly, even in my limited command of the English language. I do not say anything along the lines of military enterprises. Living up to the challenge of Communism means doing as much for education as was suggested and is being done over there; it means clarity of purpose in that sense of universality. Why is the West so slow when it comes to all that?

Whosoever has traveled in India, Asia, and Africa, feels the ability of the Russians to visualize the possibilities which are in the situation. To take the lead and not only to be pushed by the stress of Soviet politics would be an excellent thing. It takes a lot to take the lead in a historically difficult situation. There are many presuppositions which must be fulfilled, especially as far as the foundations for all that go.

Mr. Reston

Thank you Bishop Lilje. Dean Bundy, the President has a date in a few minutes, but please recite.

Dean Bundy

He has also had a very busy afternoon. I would tell him to listen to Mr. Rostow on the budget and on arms control, to Mr. Malik on education and on the sense in which we are all inter-connected in a smaller world. If he wants more on that, he should certainly listen to Bishop Lilje, but I hope he will have listened with particular closeness to what the Bishop said about Berlin.

If I may anticipate Mr. Brogan, I hope that he will go after the rights of the Negro in this country to get them more quickly and clearly established than leadership has tried to do in recent years. I would say to the President that he should listen to Mr. Northrop as to the ends, but not, if I may speak for a moment as a political scientist, as to the means. The final goal values of this society, I would venture to say to him, would not be established by a commission of leading experts on goal values. I would say to him that that was his job, and that the President of the United States is, by his position, required to be the exponent and symbol of what the society stands for. I would say to him that in my judgment this was the great tradition of the office and not so very difficult for him.

I would say to him that although there is great complexity in the historic and philosophical tradition of this country, and great difference of opinion lurking even beneath the surface in this panel here as to what it came from and what it really is, there is, nevertheless, a high measure of agreement as to what is really meant in working terms today by freedom, by decency, by faith in what the good life for men and for their country is.
I would suggest to him that he has reason to act with hope: that there is still a great reservoir of expectation of what his country can be and do abroad; that our fraternity with many countries can be real; that our shared values can be great; that this has been shown in the past in many and many a case, the resistance to the Nazis, the good neighbor policy in South America, the Marshall Plan, the image of this as a place to which men might come who wish to be free; that there is also a reservoir at home; that the country does not resist government or leadership; that it is not entirely made up of people who are concerned only with their own specialty; that convictions and the will to assert them exist even in universities.

I would say to him finally that if he does some of the things which he has been asked to do by the members of this panel, he will not have a problem about ideals. I would say to him that he might, if he is not an absolutist in his own convictions, take comfort from Justice Holmes who said, "Man is a predestined idealist, for he is born to act. To act is to affirm the worth of an end. Persistently to affirm the worth of an end is to erect an ideal!" I would say to him, "Mr. President, that is your job."

Mr. Reston
Professor Brogan.

Professor Brogan
I would take up very little of the President's time. I would do two things. I would ask him to do something, and I would remind him of something.

The thing I would especially ask him to do is to try to restore to this country the idea of excellence, that certain things are better than others, not cheaper or dearer, not commoner or scarcer. That he can do by example, better than by preaching, and I think it needs to be done.

Secondly, I would remind him of something that Professor Rostow has already reminded him of, and Dean Bundy has just reminded him of, of the immense remaining prestige of the American political ideal in the world, that this nation was, in fact, launched committed to a doctrine. I would remind him that the great seal of the United States bears the Latin inscription "Novus ordo seclorum" (New order of the ages), and if he doesn't have the great seal around, he will find it on the back of every dollar bill.

JAMES BARRETT RESTON

Gentlemen, on behalf of the audience I thank you very kindly for what you have had to say. I would only add one thing on my own behalf. It seems to me that one of the most important things of all is to bring the intellectual community and the political community of this country together. I am all the more sure of that after listening to this panel tonight. Mr. Chairman, that is all from this side.

GEORGE BRINTON COOPER

Thank you very much Mr. Reston and distinguished members of the panel. Those of you who submitted your questions in writing have doubtless recognized that under the skillful hand of Mr. Reston many of them were woven into his cross-examination of the panel, and I hope you will consider them answered.

I would first of all like to thank the distinguished members of the panel and Mr. Reston for their great contribution to the intellectual life of Trinity College today, and to Mr. Brainard and to Mr. Enders and to the Trinity College Associates.

As you can well guess, it was not easy to capture these lions and, particularly, to get them into a cage on the same night. I want to pay particular tribute to the Executive Director of the 1960 Convocation who added to his already distinguished achievement as bibliophile and librarian by acting as the organizer, both mechanical and intellectual, helping to choose the speakers and to assign the topics, and also by acting as a kind of choreographer this evening. I refer to Mr. Donald B. Engley. I now declare the 1960 Convocation adjourned.

Closing session: Mr. Reston at the podium

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Dale W. Hartford
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Dale W. Hartford, all others
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TRINITY COLLEGE NEWS

ALLEN NORTHEY JONES HALL

Trinity’s newest dormitory was named Allen Northey Jones Hall in a simple ceremony Friday, June 10, in memory of the late Allen Northey Jones ‘16, A.B., M.A., LL.D.

In naming the hall President Albert C. Jacobs said in part: “The Trustees took the action (to name the dormitory in memory of Mr. Jones) not only because of Northey’s far-sighted vision in respect to recognizing the essential need for this dormitory if Trinity were effectively to house the splendid young men studying at the College, but also because of the dedicated and successful efforts which he took shortly after its construction to reduce the College’s financial obligations incurred in its erection.

“ ‘Till the end of time the name of Allen Northey Jones will live in the hearts of Trinity men. His life was a living example of the motto of his College, Pro ecclesia et patria.”

TRANSITION TO COLLEGE PLAN

Dr. Robert M. Vogel, Dean of Graduate Studies and Director of the Summer Session, unveiled a unique experiment in summer school studies when he announced the “Transition to College Plan.”

Already acclaimed in the nation’s press as “a significant step forward,” the Plan will allow rising seniors of secondary schools to take freshman courses in Trinity’s Summer Session, receiving college credit.

The program, says Dean Vogel, is designed to offer increasing motivation to the talented secondary school pupil, and to “bridge the gap between senior high school and freshmen college courses.” The experiment is receiving financial support from The Fund for the Advancement of Education. The Plan at Trinity will serve as a model for other colleges throughout the country in future years.

High school students who qualify for the study will be fully integrated into the college community. They will live on campus, and their instructors will not be aware that they are “special” students. Enrollment in selected courses will be carefully controlled to insure that the high school student remains in a strong minority. They will be limited to enrollment in one full-year course or two half-year courses this summer session which opens June 27.

Last summer 16 local high school students were enrolled in a pilot program, and on the basis of their success over 50 will be enrolled this summer. They will be drawn from Connecticut, Rhode Island and Massachusetts.

$500,000 GIFT TOWARDS FINE ARTS CENTER

Trinity College has received an anonymous gift of $500,000 toward the erection of a Fine Arts Center.

“It is a challenge gift,” said Dr. Jacobs-in making the announcement to the Board of Trustees at their June meeting. "In order to qualify for this gift the College must raise the additional $1,000,000 it will cost to erect the Fine Arts Center. This $500,000 will be used for the theater in the Center,” he said.

“We are very grateful to the generous donor for spurring the College to attain one of its long-hoped-for goals. The completion of such a center will make even stronger our bonds with the Greater Hartford community.”

President Jacobs informed alumni, parents, faculty and friends gathered at the Alumni Luncheon Saturday that the College would continue to seek funds for a Mathematics-Physics Building, another of the College’s major goals. “Trinity cannot and will not continue to permit its outstanding departments of Mathematics and Physics to be so inadequately housed. If, in the words of Mr. Newton C. Brainard, Trinity’s Senior Trustee, the College is to be ‘the best college of 1,000 students in the country,’ then we must give concrete expression of our awareness of the importance of mathematics and physics in the world in which we live. Trinity will work determinedly to raise the $1,500,000 needed for these departments.”

He stressed further that the College is not embarking on a $2,500,000 “Program of Progress,” on another general capital campaign. It is planned to raise the money for these two buildings from a very limited number of prospective donors. “We will start immediately,” he concluded, “and hope these buildings will be a reality by 1962.”

HAROLD JOHN LOCKWOOD 1890–1960

It is with deep sorrow that we announce the death of Professor Harold John Lockwood April 15. He was Hallden Professor of Engineering and had served as chairman of the department since he came to Trinity in 1943. A full story of his life and service to the College will be carried in the next issue of the Alumni Magazine.

NECROLOGY

MURRAY HART COGGSHELL, 1896–June 5, 1960
SANFORD IRVING BENTON, 1897–August 16, 1959
WILLIAM CURTIS WHITE, 1897–March 25, 1960
BURDETTE CRANE MAERCKLEIN, 1906–November 21, 1959
CHARLES EUGENE MORROW, 1909–March 9, 1960
ALEXANDER KEITH DAVIS, 1911–September 1, 1958
NAAMAN COHEN, 1913–November 29, 1959
ALBERT HAITHWAITE JR., 1913–March 18, 1960
KENNETH WELLS BOYNTON, 1914–June 5, 1960
THOMAS FRANCIS McCUE, 1915–August 5, 1959
ALBERT WILLIAM DUY JR., 1916–June 5, 1960
ROBERT ALEXANDER BROWN JR., 1916–September 24, 1959
MERLE STEPHENS MYERS, 1922–December 4, 1959
ALLEN AVON WHITE, 1923–October 1, 1959
WALTER PATRICK JENNINGS, 1926–February 5, 1960
WALES SCRIBNER DIXON, 1927–January 14, 1960
PUTNAM HUNTINGTON BROWNE, 1927–April 10, 1960
FREDERICK EMERSON CREAMER, 1928–March 21, 1960
HANS CHRISTIAN OWEN JR., 1930–January 2, 1960
ANDREAHAM HACKMAN, 1930–March 17, 1960
JAMES OAKLEY CARSON JR., 1932–December 6, 1959
LEONARD ANTHONY RUGGIERO, 1937–May 8, 1959
THOMAS NEELY CARRUTHERS, Hon., 12–June 12, 1960
FRANK GARDNER MOORE, Hon. 1921–November, 1955
CHRISTIAN WILLIAM PETERSON, M.A. 40–September 18, 1959
SADIE RICE CHAFFEE, M.A. 1953–September 12, 1959

Alumni and Parents Funds Set Records

Reports as of June 28

ALUMNI FUND

Received $107,428
Goal 105,000

PARENTS FUND

Received $37,254
Goal 30,000
Reunion and Commencement Highlights

**Eigenbrodt Trophy**
- Dr. John B. Barnwell '17

**Board of Fellows Bowl**
- Class of 1910

**Jerome Kohn Award**
- Class of 1910

**Alumni Medals for Excellence**
- Kenneth B. Case '13
- John H. Pratt '17
- Thomas B. Myers '08
- Dr. Robert G. Reynolds '22

**President Alumni Association**
- Glover Johnson '22

**Alumni Trustee**
- Barclay Shaw '35

**Valedictorian**
- Ying-Yeung Yam, Connecticut, B.S.

**Salutatorian**
- William Paterson, Illinois, B.S.

**Class Day Speaker**
- Fred C. Scribner
  - Undersecretary of the Navy

**McCook Trophy**
- William deColigny, Virginia, B.A.

**Class of 1935 Football Award**
- Robert G. Johnson, Connecticut, B.A.

**Honorary Degrees**
  - Presiding Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church
  - in the United States of America
  - Baccalaureate Preacher
- Dr. Leonard Carmichael, Sc.D.
  - Secretary, Smithsonian Institution
  - Commencement Speaker
- John B. Byrne, LL.D.
  - Chairman, Executive Committee
  - The Connecticut Bank & Trust Company
- Glover Johnson '22, LL.D.
  - Member New York law firm, White & Case
- Dr. Rainsford Mowlem, Sc.D.
  - President, International College of Plastic Surgeons
  - London, England
- Stuart T. Saunders, LL.D.
  - President, Norfolk and Western Railway
- Dr. Leslie R. Severinghaus, L.H.D.
  - Headmaster, Haverford School
- The Rev. William J. Wolf '40, S.T.D.
  - Professor, Episcopal Theological School

**Commencement Baseball**
- Friday: Trinity 6 Wesleyan 3
- Saturday: Trinity 8 Wesleyan 3
  (11 innings)

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<th>Football Schedule 1960</th>
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<td>Williams</td>
<td>Home</td>
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<td>St. Lawrence</td>
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<td>Tufts</td>
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<td>Colby</td>
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<td>Franklin &amp; Marshall</td>
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<td>parents Weekend</td>
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<td>Dedication of Student Center</td>
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<td>Coast Guard</td>
<td>Home</td>
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<td>Amherst</td>
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<td>Homecoming</td>
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<td>Wesleyan</td>
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If not, please fill it out and return it today.