FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS

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FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS
The volume now presented to the public is an attempt to chronicle briefly and accurately the course of military operations in Manchuria subsequently to what happened immediately after the outbreak of September 18, 1931, (vide the Herald of Asia Library of Contemporary History, No. 4), to which is added a short reference to the minor trouble at Tientsin. The narrative is brought down to the first week of February, 1932, it being based on official data given out so far.

In some remote corners of Manchuria small parties of troops led by the adherents of the dispossessed warlords are still at large and give some trouble. But it is generally believed that the entry of the Japanese army into Harbin marks the termination of the military stage in the history of Manchurian rebirth.

The epoch just ushered in is marked by the birth of a new and independent state. This seems the logical outcome of the peculiar situation resulting from China's miserable failure to function as an efficient and responsible political entity. To let Chang Hsueh-liang return to Mukden would be to repeat the same disastrous experience. And there is no leader who could be trusted to avoid Chang's mistakes. The emergence of the independent Republic of Manchuria, therefore, comes very
opportune. It may or may not prove a success, but it is at least an experiment worth trying.

In the meantime, it may be worthwhile to make it clear that Japan, in so far as it lies in her power, will not countenance any policy on the part of the new Republic of Manchuria contrary to her traditional policy of the open door and equal opportunity, and there is every reason to believe that the Chinese and Manchurian leaders in the new Government of Manchuria will remain true to that policy. Time, however, is not yet ripe for further reference to the new Manchurian state. It is only just born, and it will be some time yet before it will actually begin to function.

What is most satisfactory in connection with the present situation, is the splendid unanimity of purpose with which the whole nation has responded to the call for service and sacrifice in the interest of the country. Indeed, our people of all classes have never been more thoroughly united than they are now. This is the result in part of the traditional spirit of loyalty and patriotism, but it is also the result of a strong and widespread recognition by our people of the enormous importance of the stake Japan has in Manchuria. Practically every body in Japan realizes how closely and vitally our welfare and strength is bound up with the assurance of stable peace in Manchuria.

How strongly the nation has rallied round the Army in connection with the Manchurian affair, may be guaged by the amount of voluntary
contributions sent in to the War Office for consoling the men at the front. It had amounted by February 10, 1932, to ¥2,100,000, while the consolation bags received by the same date had totalled 1,300,000. At the time of our war with Russia, the respective figures were ¥1,260,000 and 590,000. These contributions came from all parts of the country and all sorts of people. The same spirit has also found expression in prayers offered at shrines and temples for the prosperity of the Imperial House. The same observation applies also to the public enthusiasm in sending off troops to the front or in paying respects to the ashes of the officers and men killed in action, when they are sent home. The enthusiasm now shown in these respects compare favourably with what was noticed during the Russian war.

MOTOSADA ZUMOTO

Tokyo, March, 1932.
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I. BATTLE OF THE NONNI

1. Up to Outbreak of Hostilities

The first important conflict between the Japanese and Chinese forces in Manchuria after the fightings immediately following the now historic outbreak on the night of September 18, 1931, took place on the Nonni in North Manchuria at the beginning of November. It was occasioned by an act of treachery on the part of a detachment of the Heilungkiang army stationed on the northern side of the river, which, contrary to previous understanding, suddenly opened fire upon a small party of Japanese troops that had been sent there for the protection of the repairs then proceeding on the bridges.

It may be recalled that shortly after the Mukden incident there began a trouble between the Heilungkiang army under General Ma Chan-shan and the army at Taonan under General Chang Hai-peng. Consequently much apprehension was generally entertained as to the safety of the Taonan-Angangchi railway. General Chang was then making preparations for proceeding to Tsitsiihar by that railway at the head of his army, with a view to seizing the provincial government of Heilungkiang. On the other hand General Ma, by order of General Wan Pu-lin, concentrated his troops at Tsitsiihar to
frustrate General Chang's northward expedition. There is reason to believe that the Heilungkiang army was in secret communication with the Soviet army over the border, trying to secure assistance in the form of arms and ammunition.

By the middle of October, General Chang's army had commenced its northward march by the Taonan-Angangchi railway. With its main body stationed at Wumiaotze (north of Tailai), a part of the army advanced to the neighbourhood of the Nonni, when its further progress was stopped by the advance guard of the Heilungkiang army stationed on the opposite bank of the river with some field pieces. Moreover, the railway bridges had been damaged by General Ma's army on the 15th or 16th of October. Under the circumstances General Chang had for the moment to give up any hope of immediate march upon Tsitsihar, and so he retreated with the main body of his army to the neighbourhood of Taoan.

To make the story clear, it must be noted that the Taonan-Angangchi railway was built by the South Manchuria Railway under contract with the Mukden Government. Starting work in March, 1925, it was turned over to that Government in December, 1926, it being opened to public traffic in March, 1927. The amount of money advanced by the South Manchuria Railway Company was ¥17,000,000, of which ¥13,000,000 was the cost of construction and ¥4,000,000 the price of the rolling stock and other forms of equipment. As for the repayment of this money, it was arranged
(1) That the money required for the construction of the railway and its equipment should be paid by the Mukden Government immediately upon the delivery of the railway, and

(2) That in case such payment is not effected within six months after the delivery of the railway, a special agreement shall be made in the form of a loan contract at 9 percent annual interest.

But the Mukden Government failed to carry out any of these terms, even refusing to implement its obligation as originally agreed upon. Its indebtedness to the South Manchuria Railway Company on this score amounted by the end of June, 1931, to ¥26,000,000, principal and interest together. Under the circumstances, this railway may justly be regarded as property of the South Manchuria Railway Company, forming one of its feeder lines. In any case it forms a sufficiently valuable Japanese interest to be protected against damage by any body, Chinese or otherwise. Moreover, the present stoppage of traffic over this railway happened to be at a season when the farm products of North Manchuria were being shipped southward, thus causing no small loss to the railways concerned and also to the farmers in the wide range of territory tapped by those lines.

The Taonan-Angangchi railway authorities and the South Manchuria Railway Company, consequently, made combined efforts, through our diplomatic and military channels, to get the damage to the railway bridges over the Nonni repaired by some
responsible Chinese authorities. These efforts, however, failed to bear any fruit, so it only remained for us to undertake ourselves the necessary repairs under the protection of our troops.

It may be interesting to recapitulate some of the facts connected with the fruitless attempts made to get the repairs made by some Chinese authorities:

(1) On October 12, a Japanese member of the staff of the Taonan-Angangchi railway, together with three Chinese colleagues, went to the Nonni bridges to make an inspection of the damage, but they were not permitted to carry out their mission, as a detachment of some 80 Heilungkiang troops brushed aside their identification papers and forced them to turn back at the point of their machine guns. Their train was actually fired upon with field pieces.

(2) On October 21, a Japanese plane reconnoitred along the Taonan-Angangchi railway as far as the Nonni bridges, where it was fired upon by the Heilungkiang troops stationed on the north side of the river. The matter was at once taken up by our military authorities with the Heilungkiang Government through Consul Shimizu at Tsitsihar.

(3) On October 23, Consul Shimizu opened negotiations with the local Chinese authorities concerning the repairs to the damaged railway bridges. The Chinese authorities replied that, as they would undertake the necessary repairs, the Japanese should never interfere with the railway. They, however, refused to say when the repairs would be made.
They further declared that, in case the Japanese attempted to undertake repairs, the Heilungkiang army would prevent it by force.

(4) After repeated negotiations, General Ma Chanshan finally set October 30 as the date for starting repair work. But as a matter of fact, he tried not only to postpone the work but to intimidate us by saying that behind him there was a Soviet army of 50,000 men.

Being now thoroughly assured that the Chinese authorities had no intention of undertaking the required repair work on the bridges over the Nonni, the Directors of the Taonan-Angangchi railway and the South Manchuria Railway Company decided to start the repair work themselves on November 4, and applied to the headquarters of the Kwantung Army for adequate military protection. This decision on their part was necessary in view of the fact that the river was due to be frozen very soon, in which case proper repairs would be impossible. As for the military protection, its necessity was obvious from the proved temper and past conduct of the Heilungkiang army and the bandits who infested the neighbourhood.

The Kwantung Army, thereupon, decided to accept the application for protection, and issued orders for the despatch of a detachment to the Nonni on November 2. At the same time an identical communication was sent to both the Heilungkiang army and General Chang Hai-peng's army, calling their attention to the following points:
(1) That the Japanese army observes strict neutrality as to the civil strife between the two Chinese armies.

(2) That, in order to prevent unforeseen complications, both the Chinese armies should retire to a distance of 10 kilometres from the nearest bridge.

(3) That for the time being the bridges may not be used by either army for military purposes.

(4) In case of any interference with the actions of the Japanese army or any hostile action against it, necessary and efficient measures of self-protection will be taken against the offending army, whichever it may be.

It should be stated that the Nonni at this point has a wide river-bed, measuring about 8 kilometres from one side to the other. It is spanned by five separate bridges, of which the three nearest the southern (i.e. the right) bank were damaged. The railway station at the southern bank is called Kiangchiao, and that on the north bank Tahsing. In order to afford efficient protection to the repair party, it was evident that our detachment should occupy Tahsing on the north side. But a body of Heilungkiang troops was in occupation of that neighbourhood. So the Japanese army requested it to move 10 kilometres further north.

The Japanese detachment detailed for the protection of the repair party consisted of a battalion of infantry (three companies), with a battalion of artillery (two companies) and a company of engineers, under the command of Colonel Hamamoto.
It was called the Nonni Detachment, and its transportation was commenced on November 2. The troops under General Chang, in compliance with our request, retreated to the south of Wumiaotze. But the Heilungkiang forces, so far from retreating from their positions, were busily engaged in warlike preparations, showing a provokingly hostile attitude toward our detachment. For instance, when a scouting party proceeded on November 2 as far as the second bridge to inspect the actual state of the damage done, it was heavily fired upon by the Heilungkiang troops. Again on the morning of November 3 our scouting party despatched on a similar errand found the third bridge in occupation of Heilungkiang troops with three machine guns which at once opened fire upon it, so that it had to retreat without accomplishing its object.

The disposition of the Heilungkiang army in the neighbourhood of Angangchi on the night of November 4, is shown on Chart 1.

2. Progress of Hostilities

1. November 4.

In compliance with an earnest request of the Heilungkiang army, a party of Japanese authorities, including Consul Shimizu and Major Hayashi, came down to the Nonni from Tsitsihar, arriving at Kiangchao at 8.30 a.m. They were accompanied
by General Shih, Chief of Staff to the Heilungkiang army, and a few other Chinese officials. From there General Shih notified the commander of the Japanese Nonni detachment to the effect that the Heilungkiang army had no hostile intention toward the Japanese forces. He left there almost immediately afterward. Thereupon, the Japanese detachment sent a small party (a company) to Tahsing with two national flags, one large and the other small. When it reached a point about 1,000 metres south of Tahsing at about 1.30 in the afternoon, it was suddenly and unexpectedly subjected to a heavy fire from the Heilungkiang troops stationed on the north side of the Nonni, sustaining 15 casualties. It had to fall back to the bridge-head, where it joined the engineer company and waited for the arrival of the main body of the detachment.

It was shortly after two that the detachment joined the advance party at the bridge-head, where it found in front a wide stretch of marshy land very difficult of negotiation. To add to its worry, our artillery fire did not reach the enemy’s position. A frontal attack being under the circumstances out of the question, the advance party was ordered to outflank the enemy on his left side. It was thus decided to wait for developments.

In the meantime our airplanes bombed the enemy’s position, doing considerable amount of damage. But the enemy still continued to bombard our position. By 4.30, however, one of our mountain pieces was with great difficulty brought up to the
back of our first line. It at once went into action and succeeded in silencing the enemy’s artillery. All this while, the advance party under a heavy fire from the enemy struggled through the marshy land and succeeded in occupying an elevated position about 3 kilometres north-east of Tahsing. But the battle had not shown noticeable development when night descended upon the scene.

The Commander of the Kwantung Army, acting upon the report submitted by a staff officer who had been sent to observe the operations, issued an order tonight for the despatch of another battalion of infantry to reinforce the Nonni detachment.

2. November 5.

The main body of our detachment commenced operations at four in the morning, opened artillery fire at six and started a forward offensive movement shortly after seven. The Chinese occupying a strong position offered a stout resistance, and owing also to the topographical disadvantage, the progress of the engagement was slow. Our troops, however, succeeded in wresting from the enemy an important point about one and a half kilometres east of Tahsing Station at about half past eight. At ten our detachment occupied the enemy’s first line of defence. The enemy retreated seven or eight hundred metres back to his second line of defence where he continued to offer a strong resistance. Our artillery experienced great difficulty
in moving the guns, so that only three field and three mountain pieces were brought into action by ten o'clock. The result was that it degenerated into a drawn engagement. Not only that, at about three in the afternoon a superior force of the enemy assumed an offensive against the right back of our detachment, inflicting a heavy damage upon it. In consequence, our detachment was forced to reform part of its fighting line, and darkness fell upon it still engaged in a difficult fight.

In the morning the staff officer despatched from the headquarters had reported to the Commander that the Heilungkiang army did not seem inclined to retire, but that it seemed intent upon making a determined resistance. So the Commander ordered two more infantry battalions and three artillery companies to hasten to the support of the detachment. At 7.30 the first reinforcement, Nagura battalion, arrived and at once took up position. But it hardly sufficed to turn the scale decisively in our favour, so that the detachment passed a most anxious night impatiently waiting for the arrival of the rest of the reinforcements.


Today the command of the detachment was taken over by Major-General Hasebe who had come with the reinforcements. With the arrival of successive units of the reinforcements, the fight assumed a favourable turn. The enemy's units in the rear
began to retire northward from about eight in the morning, while a party of cavalry which had been harassing us from early morning withdrew in a northerly and north-easterly direction. The enemy's first line still continued to put up a stout fight, and it was only when an important position was captured by Nagura battalion under artillery support that the enemy began to falter, so that our detachment succeeded in occupying the enemy's position a little after ten o'clock.

At noon our detachment concentrated its strength to the east of Tahsing and took up a suitable position for the protection of the party engaged in repairing the bridges.

The enemy's infantry which fought in the vicinity of Tahsing was not less than 2,000 strong. In addition, a large body of cavalry also took part in the fight. The main body of the retreating enemy halted in the neighbourhood of Angangchi, while a small portion continued the retreat to Tsitsihar.


I. On our side:
Killed—1 officer; 35 n.c.o. and men
Wounded—7 officers; 15 n.c.o. and 122 men
Total casualties—180
Aeroplanes damaged—3

II. The enemy left 200 dead, of whom two were Russians.
II. BATTLE OF ANGANGCHI

1. Ma’s Diplomatic Manoeuvring

When the Heilungkiang army was defeated at the Nonni on November 6, our detachment which had been joined by the second reinforcements and which was about to be joined by a third party of reinforcements, could have easily launched a strong attack upon the retreating enemy, thereby inflicting such a damage upon him as would probably have fatally crippled him. And our men in the first line were eager to take such a course. But their commander wisely refrained from it for fear lest it might lead to an undesirable complication of the situation contrary to the principle of peace underlying the national policy of Japan.

But unfortunately the praiseworthy forbearance shown by our commander was interpreted by General Ma Chan-shan as a sign of weakness. He accordingly halted his retreating army at a point south of Angangchi only a few kilometres from the Nonni, and constructed a strong position there. Moreover, he summoned there reinforcements from Heiho, Harbin and Manchuli. At the same time he received telegraphic instructions from Chang Hsueh-liang at Peiping, ordering him to utilize convenient opportunity for exterminating the Japanese army.
He was also idolized by his fellow countrymen as a national hero. The result was that General Ma's men were highly elated and longed for further opportunity for distinguishing themselves. They intrigued to create disturbances in the rear of our detachment and also to injure again the bridges over the Nonni. It was thus increasingly evident that another collision between the Japanese and Chinese forces was inevitable in that part of Manchuria.

But the Kwantung army headquarters did not give up the hope of arriving at an amicable understanding with General Ma. So it caused its representative at Tsitsihar, Major Hayashi, to take the matter up with General Ma at that town. Several interviews took place between them on November 3 and thereafter, when the treacherous conduct on the part of Ma at the Nonni and Tahsing was pointed out to him, and he was urged to call his troops back to Tsitsihar, at the same time guaranteeing the safety of the Taonan-Angangchi railway. But General Ma did not respond to these overtures in a favourable manner or in a spirit of sincerity. On the contrary he seemed to be only anxious to push forward his hostile preparations.

Under these circumstances it was clear that, unless something was done to ease the situation, a dangerous clash would become unavoidable between the Japanese and Chinese armies. So the Kwantung army headquarters, with a view to placing the Heilungkiang army and our Nonni detachment at a safe distance from each other, made the following
fair and moderate proposal to the Chinese side on November 14:

(1) Ma Chan-shan should withdraw to Tsitsihar and north of it, at the same time causing the troops concentrated at Tsitsihar and the neighbourhood of Angangchi in connection with the present complication to return to their original positions.

(2) Ma Chan-shan should not send his troops south of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

(3) The Taonan-Angangchi railway will be operated by the administrative bureau of that line, and Ma Chan-shan should in no way interfere with its operation. In case of such interference, the Imperial army will at once take necessary and efficient measures.

(4) Ma Chan-shan should carry out the conditions mentioned above within ten days from November 15.

(5) The Nonni detachment of the Japanese army, after satisfying itself as to the carrying out of the aforementioned conditions, will at once retire to the south of Taoan or Chengchiatun.

Ma Chan-shan was told that his reply to the above communication was expected by noon on November 16. But nothing was heard from him within the required time limit. Not only that, his troops surrounded the Japanese Consulate at Tsitsihar on the pretext of guarding it, and set up military works in the neighbourhood with ordnances trained at the front gate. The Consulate was entirely isolated, all communication with the outside
being prevented. Even Chinese servants were not allowed freely to go out and get provisions. So Consul Shimizu and Major Hayashi were obliged to leave Tsitsihar for Harbin on the morning of November 14.

On November 16, at about 10 p.m., a telephone message was received from Ma Chan-shan through Chang Ching-hui, Director of the Harbin Special District, to the effect that he was ready to accept the whole of the conditions proposed by Japan, but that he would formally reply by letter. This was ten hours after the time limit set by our proposal, and instead of being delivered, as it should have been, through a responsible representative of the Heilung-kiang Provincial Government, it came through an irresponsible third party. These and other circumstances apparently roused suspicions as to the sincerity of General Ma. It looked as if he was watching the possible change of atmosphere at the Council of the League of Nations, and that his idea in forwarding this belated message through an irregular medium was simply to provide a diplomatic excuse in view of future negotiations, a customary Chinese procedure. Accordingly instructions were sent to the Japanese officers at Harbin to exercise circumspect judgment in connection with this matter.

The promised written answer did not come to the hands of these officers up to 1 p.m. on November 17. So they made inquiries of General Liu, Civil Administrator and Representative of the Heilung-
kiang Government. It, then, transpired that a telephone message had been received at his office from General Ma to the following effect:

(1) That the Japanese detachment should retire simultaneously with the Heilungkiang army.

(2) That activities of bandits and other circumstances might necessitate the despatch of troops south of the Chinese Eastern Railway for the purpose of preserving peace and order.

(3) That the acceptance of the Japanese proposal would be impossible except on condition that the Japanese army would not permit General Chang Hai-peng’s troops to enter Heilungkiang Province.

On the same afternoon Consul-General Ohashi at Harbin also received an answer which was no more reassuring as to the sincerity of General Ma than that addressed to the military mission already referred to.

While thus dilly-dallying with the Japanese army on the spot, General Ma reported to General Chang Hsueh-liang and General Wang Pu-lin at Peiping that he had peremptorily rejected the Japanese proposal. At the same time he caused foreigners at Harbin to send out telegrams saying that he had accepted the Japanese overtures. He evidently intended to play up to the League of Nations Council with a view to turning the scale of diplomacy in favour of his country.

As a matter of fact the Chinese troops on the spot, numerically much stronger than the Japanese, began to show increasing activities from about
November 11, assuming a provocative attitude. Forestalling the arrival of the relief party from the 8th Division, the Chinese forces started offensive movements on November 17. The challenge was accepted by our detachment which at once began action. Even then the Chinese did not give up their game of diplomatic manoeuvring. At one o'clock on the afternoon of November 18, that is to say two days after the lapse of the time limit for reply, Generals Liu and Chang, speaking for General Ma, forwarded another reply to this effect:

(1) That the forces concentrated in the neighbourhood of Angangchi in connection with the present trouble would be evacuated within ten days.

(2) That as soon as the present trouble was settled no troops would be sent south of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

(3) That the Taonan-Angangchi line being a Chinese railway, it was China’s responsibility to protect it, and that it would be operated upon the settlement of the present trouble, Chinese agreeing to the condition that she should offer no interference with its operation.

2. Strength and Disposition of Ma’s Army

As already stated General Ma, while indulging in prevaricatory manoeuvres in regard to the repeated overtures of the Commander of the Kwantung Army for peace, was actually engaged in military preparations. He concentrated in the neighbourhood
of Tsitsihar the greater part of the Heilungkiang army and of the military guards of the Chinese Eastern Railway, consisting altogether of between 20,000 and 30,000 infantry and cavalry, 30 pieces of artillery, over 10 pieces of trench mortars, and 2 anti-aircraft guns. Of these, the forces concentrated in the neighbourhood of Angangchi comprised approximately 7,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 20 pieces of artillery. They were encamped along a line which, starting from Tahsingtun, extended through Hsiaohsintun and Sanchienfang to the west of the last mentioned place, with the cavalry placed in front of the left wing. A separate position was prepared facing west at a place to the south-west of Fulaerhchi. The disposition of General Ma’s forces on or about November 8 is shown in the accompanying sketch on page 19.

It appears that General Ma completed the final disposition of his troops on November 11, when their activities became particularly noticeable. The following morning his cavalry was sent to the right of the Nonni detachment. Its vanguard now and then appeared in front of our line, thereby occasioning minor conflicts. The situation steadily became serious.

On the night of November 13, a portion of General Ma’s army ventured forth to Changhuayuan and Alihsintun, thereby threatening to envelop our detachment.

The relative positions of the two opposing forces on November 14, were as given in the accompanying sketch map on page 20.
General Line-up of Gen. Ma's Forces South of Angangchi
(November 8, 1931)

NOTES
- enemy's positions
- under construction
- improved old positions

Telimu

Hsiaosanchuatze

Yinglaoyehfen

Marsh

Sanchiefang

Hsiaoshin-tun

Tahsing-tun

Motor-truck Station

Touchan

2 pieces

About 4 Kilometres

5 or 6
The Confronting Fronts near Angangchi
(Nov. 14)

To Tsitsihar

Fulaerhchi

Angangchi

Telimu

Sanchienfang

Hsiaosintun

Telangtun

Tangchih

Angangchi (Station)

Wunotoutun

Tsienkuanti

Changhuayuan

Kiangchiao

Howlipa

K.K.

Nonni Detachment

- Enemy Force
- Enemy Position
- Nonni Detachment
According to the subsequent information brought in by our scouting planes, the Heilungkiang army's line to the east and west of Sanchienfang was steadily extended, its right wing reaching to a point some 1,000 metres south of Telimu. The different positions were connected by deploying trenches. The enemy apparently worked hard at night. His positions at Tahsingtun, Hsiaohsintun and Sanchienfang were soon surrounded with earth works with protected rifle holes, covered spaces, machine gun emplacements, and other appointments, which clearly indicated that this section was his central position. There were altogether four lines up to Tsitsihar. They were as follows:

(1) The line stretching east and west of Sanchienfang, with about 5,000 to 6,000 infantry, about 2,000 cavalry, and about 20 pieces of artillery.

(2) The line extending from Angangchi eastward to Yushutun and Taiwangsanchiatze, with about 1,000 infantry, and about 700 cavalry. Besides, in the neighbourhood of Fulaerhchi there were stationed about 2,000 infantry, and about 1,000 cavalry, with 2 guns.

(3) The line extending westward to Ssuchiatze from Shihwulitun, 10 kilometres south of Tsitsihar.

(4) The line extending westward from the South Barracks, south of Tsitsihar.

The last mentioned two lines were not yet actually manned by troops, but for that purpose there were kept in readiness at Tsitsihar a body of reserves consisting of the students of the branch military
academy and the school for non-commissioned officers, the reserve regiments and part of artillery corps.

3. Activities of Japanese Army Prior to Engagement

After the battle on the Nonni, the Nonni detachment (whose main body consisted of 4½ battalions under the command of Major-General Hasebe) remained in the vicinity of Tahsing to protect the repairs of the bridges. By November 10, the repair work had progressed barely sufficient to allow open cars to pass. In the meantime the planes belonging to the detachment were daily engaged in scouting over the enemy’s positions, principally at Angangchi. They were every time exposed to the enemy’s fire, which was particularly severe on November 9, when fliers were wounded by anti-aircraft guns.

It was probably a mere coincidence, but it is noteworthy that on the day (November 11) when it was decided to despatch to Manchuria a contingent from the 8th Division under the command of Major-General Suzuki to relieve the mixed Brigade from Chosen (Korea), General Ma’s army, as already stated, commenced to show increased activities, succeeding in nearly enveloping the Nonni detachment. It being increasingly evident that Ma meant shortly to assume the offensive, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army, in order to be prepared for emergencies, ordered the main body of the 2nd
Division to proceed to Tahsing on November 13, when the temporary repairs on the Nonni bridges were completed and the trial passage of a train was successfully carried out.

In view of a possible offensive by the enemy, the Nonni detachment concentrated its main force in the neighbourhood of Tahsing, sending a contingent (two battalions of infantry and two companies of cavalry) to Tsienilipa to watch for developments and beat back the enemy’s cavalry that had ventured to the back of our right wing. A party of our cavalry today was attacked by a superior body of the enemy’s cavalry in the neighbourhood of Wunotouchan about 10 kilometres north-east of Tahsing, sustaining several casualties. A part of the detachment occupied, after a light engagement, Wunotouchan and an elevated position about 1,500 metres south of Tangti.

The main body of the 2nd Division nearly completed its concentration at Tahsing and the neighbourhood of Kiangchiao. This part of the field passed into the control of the commander of the 2nd Division. The aggregate strength of our forces available for this district was 3,000 men, infantry and cavalry combined, with a little over 20 pieces of artillery.

The Japanese forces were still too small, and as it became evident that Ma’s army intended to turn into the offensive before the arrival of our relief party on its way from the 8th Division, it was decided on November 17, as an emergency measure,
to summon a part of the air forces respectively belonging to the 3rd, 12th and 20th Divisions.

4. Offensive by Japanese

Ma’s army showed a conspicuous activity on November 17, increasing its strength along the whole line, evidently with a view to starting the offensive movement before the arrival of our relief party and the newly summoned air force. Thereupon the 2nd Division decided, as a measure of self-preservation, upon a counter attack. The plan of action was to push the main attack in the direction of Sanchienfang and neighbourhood, and after breaking through the enemy’s line and routing him, to launch the main attack in the eastern and north-eastern directions, thus extending the battle front and endeavouring to crush the enemy in the vicinity of his positions. The Japanese forces were disposed as follows:

(1) The right wing (about 4 battalions of infantry) to deploy east of the railway and attack the enemy in the neighbourhood of Hsiaohsintun.

(2) The left wing (about 4 battalions of infantry) to deploy west of the railway and attack the enemy in the neighbourhood of Sanchienfang.

(3) The artillery, of which the main force to take up position to the north of Tangti, while a smaller contingent to take up position respectively at the back of the right and left wings.
(4) The reserve to keep in readiness south of Tangti.

The respective parties started motion half an hour after midnight on November 17, and by 3 a.m. they took up positions 700-800 metres in front of the enemy, preparatory for the attack. It was pitch dark and intensely cold with the thermometre registering 20 degrees below zero and the wind blowing from the north-west at the rate of 15 metres.

About the same time the enemy's infantry began to fire in the dark, and as the eastern sky began to grow grey at about six, more machine guns and rifles came into play. But the Japanese troops did not reply. At six-thirty, our artillery commenced firing to find the range, and at eight started bombardment which was kept up for about an hour, during which time our air forces, in cooperation with the artillery, bombed the enemy's position. As our artillery range was extended, the first line of our infantry started the attack at about nine. Hand to hand fights took place at several points. Unable to stand our furious onslaught any longer, the enemy began to retire along the whole front at about ten-thirty, fleeing along the Taonan-Angangchi railway on both sides of it. Thereupon the 2nd Division pursued the retreating enemy toward Tsitsihar, its main body marching along the railway on the western side and a portion of it on the eastern side. Hotly pursued, the enemy was unable to make a stand at his second line of defence in the neighbourhood of Angangchi, retreat-
ing from there northward at about two in the afternoon.

The officers and men of the 2nd Division were thoroughly tired as the result of continued and strenuous exertions for the past several days, and they suffered much from increasing cold and wind, which froze their food and water. But nothing daunted, they pursued the retreating enemy and arrived at a point 4 kilometres south of Tsitsihar half an hour after midnight on November 18. But our troops were in some places badly mixed up with the fleeing enemy, so that there was danger of our own men fighting each other. It was, therefore, decided to concentrate the main body in the vicinity of Tamintun, south of Tsitsihar, where they had a long-needed rest.

At noon on November 19, the main body of the 2nd Division formed in two columns, and leaving the line at Tamintun and Shihwulitun, they entered Tsitsihar at three in the afternoon. The bulk of it was quartered at the South Barracks and the remainder at the North Barracks, leaving the duty of keeping order in the town to the Chinese Director of the Bureau of Public Safety.

The main body of Ma's army seemed to have retreated in the direction of Hailun (120 kilometres north of Harbin and on the Hulan-Hailun railway) and Paichuan. By the nightfall on November 19, there was not visible any important body of Ma's troops, except small insignificant parties, within a radius of 30 kilometres of Tsitsihar.
Our casualties consisted of 31 killed, 104 wounded and 13 missing, besides 300 cases of frostbite.

The Chinese casualties must have been very heavy, but no reliable estimate has been forthcoming.

It is hardly necessary to state that during this engagement the Japanese army took care to respect the property of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It also so arranged the plan of operations as to prevent the Chinese troops from retreating along the railway toward Harbin.

In conclusion it may be stated that this engagement was undertaken by the Kwantung Army simply as a measure of self-preservation. Consequently as soon as Ma’s army which menaced our rights and interests had been disposed of, the main body of our troops was withdrawn, without occupying that part of the country.
III. TIENTSIN INCIDENT

After the outbreak of the Manchurian trouble, the sentiment among the Chinese at Tientsin grew steadily more and more unfriendly toward the Japanese. The Anti-Japanese Association’s activities became better organized. The situation was complicated by the fact that the local Chinese, who had never been particularly cordial toward Chang Hsueh-liang, now grew hostile toward him, whose maladministration they held responsible for the Manchurian catastrophe. In order to check the growing popular antagonism toward him, Chang secretly planned to carry out a policy of drastic suppression against the promoters of the hostile movement against him.

The anti-Chang leaders got wind of this, and with the object of forestalling the approaching danger, they set about organizing a force of plain clothes soldiers, which they styled The Nation Saving Army. On the night of November 8, men of this organization suddenly created trouble in the Chinese city of Tientsin, attacking the guardians of public order.

The Commander of our garrison there made a public declaration of strict neutrality with regard to the clash between the contending Chinese factions.
Measures were at once taken by him for the maintenance of order in the Japanese settlement and the protection of the lives and property of the Japanese residents. But the Chinese guards stationed in the vicinity of the Japanese settlement fired into a position occupied by our troops, killing two of the latter. Thereupon our troops had to return the fire as a matter of self-defence.

The Commander of our garrison at once communicated with the Chinese authorities, and requested them, with a view to avoid precipitating an unfortunate crisis between Japan and China, to order the contending Chinese factions not to approach within 300 metres of the Japanese settlement. This request was repeated twice or three times, but it was not readily acted upon. As a matter of fact plain clothes soldiers constantly made their appearance, the Chinese troops also firing in the vicinity of the Japanese settlement.

The Chinese authorities continued outwardly friendly, but there is reason to believe that they were secretly fanning the anti-Japanese feeling of their people. In any case the situation became so serious that the other foreign garrisons mounted guard in their respective areas from the 11th or 12th of November.

It transpired shortly afterward that the firing of the Japanese position by Chinese soldiers, which had been alleged to have been directed toward the plain clothes men belonging to the Nation Saving
Army, was really part of a deliberate scheme of harassing the Japanese planned by Chinese officers in high positions.

On this amazing fact becoming known, the Chinese authorities offered a profound apology to the Commander of the Japanese garrison. They also promised to exercise a more effective control over the anti-Japanese propaganda, to remove all military works set up within 300 metres of the Japanese settlement, and not to permit their soldiers to approach within 300 metres of the settlement. But the dangerous practice of firing into the settlement did not cease, and the situation continued to be disquieting. The Japanese garrison, however, remained faithful to its own part of the agreement. It called off part of its guard, restored the traffic in the settlement to its normal condition, and in the afternoon of November 26 it disbanded the volunteer corps.

At eight that evening, the Chinese suddenly opened a stiff firing upon our barracks from a position to the west of it. Our troops did not reply to it, but a remonstrance was at once made to the Chinese authorities against the extraordinary behaviour of their soldiers, demanding the cessation of the firing. They alleged that the firing was directed against the Nation Saving Army and was not meant for the Japanese settlement, but they promised that in any case it would be stopped before half past ten. But the firing did not cease until noon the following day. It was a deliberate act
of hostility, so that our garrison decided upon the only course left to it for the protection of the Japanese life and property in the settlement. In other words, it had to accept the challenge and fight the Chinese.

On the morning of November 29, a representative of the Chinese authorities called at the headquarters of the Japanese garrison, and offered to withdraw all armed people from the neighbourhood of the Japanese settlement and also to remove all defence works set up in the Chinese city. This offer being accepted, the armed Chinese police were withdrawn by the evening of November 29, while the defence works were removed the following day.
IV. CHINCHOW EPISODE

1. Chinchow Government’s Hostile Preparations

After the battle of Angangchi, Ma’s army seemed for a while bent upon an attempt to recover Tsitsihar. But on about December 11 there was concluded a compromise agreement between him and Chang Ching-hui. In the meanwhile matters were steadily improving in the Province of Fengtien. On about December 16 General Tsang Shih-i, former Governor of Liaoning, accepted the post of Governor of Fengtien offered to him by a group of leading inhabitants of the province. It was evident that the movement for reconstruction was growing strong in the three north-earstern provinces with the exception of the south-western corner of Fengtien.

In the neighbourhood of Chinchow, there was stationed a large force of regular troops belonging to Chang Hsueh-liang. Its strength was estimated at about 35,000 men, with a fairly strong artillery equipment. Its main body occupied a strong position on the right bank of the Taling-ho (see Chart IV), while a detachment was stationed in the territory between that river and the Liao-ho. While in this way preparations were being steadily pushed
forward with a view to a clash with Japanese forces, the auxiliary troops and volunteers under the control of the Chingchow Government began to show great activities as soon as the Japanese contingent that had been advancing to the west of the Liao-ho turned back. These irregulars tried hard to cause disturbances along the South Manchuria Railway.

Chang Hsueh-liang at first built high hopes upon the support of the League of Nations. But when he found that, Japan's attitude being determined, much could not be expected from that quarter, he made up his mind to fight Japan with the help and cooperation of Nangking. With this object in view, he concentrated to the east of Chinchow a strong army of regulars, 35,000 strong, made up of 3½ brigades of infantry, a brigade and a regiment of artillery. The first line occupied positions extending along Changwu, Paichipu, Taian and Tienchuangtai, with an advanced detachment in the neighbourhood of Fakumen. Besides, as already stated, the territory along the South Manchuria Railway was infested by a strong body of irregulars under the control of Chang Hsueh-liang. It was made up of about 30,000 auxiliaries and about 5,000 volunteers. In addition to these forces, bandits invited from different parts of Manchuria were being organized into units. This was coincident with a general outbreak of bandit activities along the main line of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden line, causing no small damage to Japanese subjects.
It is estimated by competent authorities that the armed forces, comprising the regulars, the irregulars and all other units under the direct or indirect control of the Chinchow Government, exceeded 80,000. Heterogeneous as were their complexions and formations, they were all united in their hostile attitude toward Japan. So unless Chang Hsueh-liang was prepared to change his policy, it was now clear that a clash was inevitable between them and the Japanese army.

2. Reinforcements from Japan

In view of the increased activities of Chinese troops and bandits in Manchuria and of the serious situation at Tientsin, it was decided on December 17 to despatch a specially constituted brigade, together with a force of heavy artillery and a party of rear service men to Manchuria, while a detachment chiefly composed of two battalions of infantry was sent to Tientsin.

By this time the organization of various irregular contingents by the Chinchow Government had made a great progress, so that disturbances of peace and order by these forces now became more widespread and serious than before. Taking advantage of the freezing of the Liao-ho, they crossed that river to its left bank in large force, and a large body of them, 2,500 strong, took possession of the town of Nieu-chwang on December 26, while the district to its north and west was in the occupation of several
thousand volunteers. These forces, it is needless to say, had penetrated so far eastward with the object of creating diversions in the rear of the Japanese detachment that was operating to the west of the Liao-ho. By recent experience it was well-known that the fighting capacity of these irregulars was much greater than that of ordinary bandits. Their comrades along the Antung-Mukden line also showed no sign of lessened activities.

Under these circumstances, it became evident that the troops available were insufficient for suppressing irregulars and bandits infesting the territory west of the Liao-ho, in addition to dealing with those threatening the various railway lines. So on December 27, at 6 p.m., Imperial sanction was given to the despatch of the headquarters of the 20th Division and its Yoda brigade to Manchuria to be placed under the orders of the Commander of the Kwantung Army. All these forces in due time arrived in Manchuria.

3. Operations in West of Liao-ho

The disturbances caused by the routed soldiers and bandits in the territory west of the Liao-ho, and which threatened to spread to regions nearer the South Manchuria Railway lines, having become very serious, the main body of the Kwantung Army was ordered to suppress these marauding bands of Chinese peace breakers. The Japanese army started on its important expedition on December 28, the
Kamura Brigade proceeding along the Peiping-Mukden Railway and the Tamon division along its branch line. The main part of that division left Tienchuangtai on December 28, and proceeded along the route assigned to it, always taking care to exercise proper pressure upon such Chinese troops and auxiliaries as may happen to be in the neighbourhood. It reached Tawa at dark, and the following day it continued its march. At two in the afternoon its vanguard occupied Panshan after a slight fighting. The Chinese force occupying that place was about 500 strong, made up of regular troops belonging to the 19th brigade (654th regiment) who were in cooperation with auxiliaries. The division reached the neighbourhood of Huchiawupu on December 30.

The Kamura brigade left Hsinmintun on December 30, and proceeding along the main line of the Peiping-Mukden Railway, reached Tahushan at nightfall. On the way it met and dispersed some parties of marauders.

On December 31, the Kamura brigade reached the neighbourhood of Koupangtze. As for the Tamon division, a part of it reached Koupangtze, while its main force reached a point to the south-east of that place on the same day.

On January 1, the Kamura brigade proceeded in the direction of the Taling-ho and reached Shihshan-chan at noon, while the train that carried its vanguard arrived at the railway bridge over the Taling-ho, at 3 p.m. The Tamon division was
occupied in concentrating its forces in the neighbourhood of Koupangtze.

The Chinese forces that took part in the engagements east of the Taling-ho comprised two regiments of the 19th brigade, nearly the whole of the 20th brigade, a portion of the 3rd cavalry brigade and volunteers. The casualties they sustained are estimated at 2,000.

At daybreak on January 2, the Yoda brigade, now forming part of the Muro division, advanced by the Peiping-Mukden Railway to the rear of the Tamon division. That night the Kamura brigade was quartered in villages between Shuangyangtien (8 kilometres east of Chinchow) and Talinghotien, while the Yoda brigade stayed at villages between Shihshanchan and Koupangtze. The Kamura brigade, which had been restored by the Commander of the Kwantung Army to the Muro division, was charged with the task of occupying Chinchow.

The vanguard of the above mentioned brigade entered Chinchow early on the morning of January 3, while the headquarters of the division arrived there at 10.40 the same afternoon. The commander of the division was welcomed on arrival at the railway station by a large crowd of important people, including the heads of the various Government and municipal offices and leading citizens. The streets were lined by dense crowds of happy looking people, while the houses on both sides were adorned with Japanese flags.

On January 4, it was as a whole quiet and peace-
ful at Chinchow and neighbourhood, but at night a party of our patrols was fired upon by bandits. Lieutenant-General Muro ordered a detachment, whose main body was composed of a battalion commanded by a colonel, to advance west of Chinchow. It proceeded this day as far as Lienshan.

On January 5, the Muro division despatched a detachment each to Ichow and Suichung. A part of the detachment sent to the latter place continued its march southward on the following day to keep order in the region west of Suichung. Its advance party, on reaching Tsienso (about 20 kilometres east of Shanhaikwan), established a definite contact with the Japanese garrison at the latter place.

A troop of cavalry belonging to the above mentioned detachment was sent to Chinsi, and at about noon the next day it put to rout a party of about 80 soldier bandits at a point about 10 kilometres west of Chinchow.

4. Withdrawal of Chinese Army inside the Great Wall

On the night of December 29, that is to say before our army reached the Taling-ho line, the Chinese army in and round Chinchow began to evacuate by the Peiping-Mukden Railway. It appears that a part of the army withdrew in the direction of Jehol. As to the forces that retreated within the Wall, a brigade each seems to have been concentrated at Lanchow, Changli and Tangshan.
The Chinese detachment that had stayed behind at Suichung commenced evacuation on the morning of January 5, while those stationed at Shanhaikwan and in the region east of it also withdrew inside the Wall on the night of January 5.

This was a pitiable ending of the rather grandiose attempt which Chang Hsueh-liang had made for the recovery of Mukden. In view of the powerful pressure which self-styled patriots brought to bear upon him and also of the necessity of saving his face, Chang Hsueh-liang had no alternative but to keep up some show of spirit, although he may not have felt much confidence in the success of further resistance. Under the circumstances, evacuation without resistance was probably the wisest thing for him to do. There is, however, reason to believe that Chang Hsueh-liang's motive in ordering a peaceful evacuation was probably not so simple and harmless as it may at first sight appear. At any rate, the Japanese army had to face an aftermath which proved anything but pleasant or easy to deal with. It is customary with a Chinese army when defeated, to leave behind it troops of inferior quality, so that they may combine with local bandits for the purpose of harassing the enemy's rear. At all events that has been exactly what happened in the present case. The suppression of banditry in the evacuated region has subsequently proved a rather costly affair to the Japanese army.

The extinction of the last vestige of Chang Hsueh-liang's authority in Manchuria undoubtedly
marks an epoch in the history of that country. It was a definite step in the consolidation of the influences in favour of peace and progress in Manchuria. It was undoubtedly in recognition of this fact that the Emperor chose this opportunity for honouring the Japanese army in Manchuria with a Message graciously acknowledging the heroic services which His Majesty's troops had rendered in different parts of Manchuria and exhorting them to continue their valuable exertions with a view to strengthening the foundation of peace in the Far East.
V. HARBIN CAMPAIGN

1. A General Outline

The clash brought about on January 27 between the Kirin troops, commanded by General Hsi Hsia, and the anti-Kirin forces plunged the city of Harbin and neighbouring districts into a state of confusion, which was intensified by a series of atrocities committed by the anti-Kirin troops. They looted a number of Korean dwellings, attacked the office of a Japanese owned newspaper, the "Taihoku Shimpo," killed a Japanese military officer, and kidnapped Japanese civilians. The Japanese population in Harbin, numbering 5,600, was placed in a state of extreme danger. The chairman of the Japanese Residents Committee repeatedly appealed for despatch of military troops. The Commander of the Kwantung Army, in view of the situation, was finally moved to send to Harbin a detachment of troops in order to guard peace and protect the Japanese residents.

In the meanwhile, the anti-Kirin troops continued to conduct themselves with bold insolence, making no secret of their hostile disposition toward the Japanese. Wanton deeds were committed to harm Japanese, and malicious propaganda conducted against them. The second Sungali railway bridge
was destroyed by fire to impede the transportation of our troops. In the vicinity of Shuangchengpu, our advance forces encountered armed resistance. Under the circumstances, our military forces were obliged to take action against them. The enemy forces holding positions to the south of Harbin were consequently routed. Our troops entered the city of Harbin on February 5.

2. Northern Campaign of the Kirin Army

The downfall of Chang Hsueh-liang after the outbreak of the Manchurian trouble ushered in a new era of hope for the thirty million people in that country. The situation has since been fast maturing for the birth of a new state where justice and righteousness should hold domain. In the province of Kirin a new government was set up with Hsi Hsia at its head, with the object of replacing the old corrupt system by a new and better one. The populace has hailed the new regime with enthusiasm, even many of the men who had served under the former military power having sworn allegiance. The only case of defection was a group of military men who were formerly under the command of General Chang Tso-hsiang, head of the Kirin government under the old regime. These men, still receiving directions from Chang Hsueh-liang and Chang Tso-hsiang in Peiping, set up a provincial government at Pinhsien, a point
northeast of Harbin, and refused to take orders from the new administration at Kirin. Repeated invitations having failed to win the allegiance of these men, the Kirin government was at length compelled to use force.

The military forces of the Kirin government, starting their operations on January 5, directed their way northward, meeting with but weak resistances. Having routed the enemy forces along the route, they took possession of Yushu on January 18. Thence they set their eyes in the direction of Harbin, the centre of political and economic activities as well as communication in North Manchuria.

Alarmed over the situation thus precipitated, the anti-Kirin men in Harbin met in council. With the exception of the chairman, Cheng Yun, practically all leaders, such as Li Chen-sheng, Feng Chan-hai, Li Tu, Su Te-chan and others, in consultation with Chin Hsuan-wu, representing Hsi Hsia, adopted a resolution to the effect

(1) That their military forces would surrender themselves to Hsi Hsia, who should provide them with military expenses, and

(2) That the Pinhsien government would be abolished.

General Chang Tso-hsiang in Peiping, hearing of this, sent to Cheng Yun and Chang Tso-chou on January 20 instructions to the effect that the military troops, under the circumstances, should place themselves under the command of General
Chang Ching-hui, Governor of the Heilungkiang Province, while the Pinhsien government should declare itself subject to the Command of the Harbin Special Area, a post which General Chang Ching-hui also held. It was plain beyond question that Chang Tso-hsiang’s intention, in issuing such instructions, was to preserve his former troops in the name of the Heilungkiang governor. All efforts at peaceful settlement having failed, Hsi Hsia decided to settle the matter by armed argument. His troops were again put in motion on January 21, one part advancing on Harbin through Shuangchengpu and the other by way of Acheng.

3. Conditions in Harbin

The Kirin troops at first found little to impede their progress northward. They ousted the troops under Feng Chan-hai, occupying Lalin, and reached the vicinity of Acheng two days later. Having arrived in the outlying district south of Harbin on January 25, a portion of their forces was set to clearing the regions about Acheng and south of Shuangchengpu, their plan being to enter the city of Harbin the next day.

However, in anticipation of the disturbances that might be caused within the city by military operations, the Kirin troops sent to demand General Ting Chao, in command of the anti-Kirin forces, to remove his troops out of town toward Pinhsien, with which the latter refused to comply. On the
contrary, General Li Tu, Commander of the 24th brigade stationed at Ilan, a point 60 kilometres northeast of Harbin, suddenly entered China Town (Puchiatien) of Harbin in the morning of January 26, at the head of two of his battalions. Falling in with the soldiers under Ting Chao and Hsing Chan-ching, they were soon in control of the Chinese quarters and lost no time in plundering, causing a panic throughout the city. The resident Japanese population, of which 4,000 were Japanese proper and 1,600 Koreans, were at once exposed to serious danger. The Japanese residents quickly rose to the situation organizing volunteer forces to protect the Japanese colony, and aiding their nationals to flee from China Town. One Japanese and three Koreans were killed in flight by soldiers belonging to Ting Chao's army. Several Korean females were kidnapped.

The Kirin troops, who had been withholding themselves, could no longer stay behind, almost in sight of such disturbances in Harbin. They resumed their march to save the city from confusion, only to come into conflict south of China Town with the soldiers under Ting Chao, Li Tu and Chang Tso-chou. It was then that a Japanese scouting aeroplane which had been despatched to survey the conditions in and about Harbin, particularly with regard to the Japanese residents there, was compelled by some mechanical trouble to alight on a farm to the south of Harbin. Captain Shimizu, of artillery, who was aboard the
machine, was killed by cavalry men belonging to Ting Chao's army.

Whereupon our official representatives in Harbin took up the matter with General Ma Chan-shan who had arrived at the same city on January 27 in order to offer his service for mediating between the Kirin and Chang Ching-hui army on the one hand and the anti-Kirin troops on the other. The murder of our scouting officer and residents was reported to General Ma, as cases chargeable against soldiers under Ting Chao and Chang Tso-chou, demanding his serious attention. In the night of the same day, however, the "Taihoku Shimpo," a Japanese owned newspaper, was attacked and looted by Chinese soldiers. Disturbances became worse in the Chinese quarters. On January 28 the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and other Chinese associations jointly petitioned for despatch of Japanese troops.

The Japanese residents in Harbin, on instruction from their Consul General, began on January 28 to gather at prescribed points in the town, and organized volunteer forces for self-protection. The Koreans in Puchiatien, numbering more than 1,500, were brought under protection in the primary school premises near the River Front.

4. Northern Movement of the Kwantung Army

The Kwantung Army, being well aware of the lawless character of Chinese soldiers turning into
marauders after a defeat on the field of battle, decided to despatch for the protection of the Japanese residents a detachment formed of two infantry battalions under Major-General Hasebe.

The first difficulty then experienced was railway traffic. The employees of the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway had practically all of them deserted their posts. What was more, the Kirin authorities had a number of carriages under detention with the object of transporting its own railway guard forces to Harbin. Undue delay was caused through these and other circumstances, so that it was not before the night of January 28 that by recourse to temporary measures three trains were at length formed and sent northward. Their progress was next impeded by a portion of the Chinese 22nd brigade, stationed along the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which, in an attempt to interfere with our military expedition, destroyed the second bridge across the Sungali River on January 28, causing further delay in transit. Temporary repairs being made the next day, the military trains forced their way across the river.

The Kirin army, on the other hand, in consideration of the damage to be caused to the civil population in Harbin by bombardment, retreated some distance from the city, suspending its fire for the time being. The anti-Kirin forces, however, continued to increase their ranks by the enrollment of bandits. Their troops were being steadily concentrated about Harbin, stationing the main force on a
line running from the southwestern end of the city to Old Harbin, while another portion took its position on the east side of Harbin. They openly declared themselves in readiness to meet the Japanese in armed conflict. From their manifest temper and bold movement it was concluded that fighting was in sight and unavoidable. The Commander of the Kwantung Army issued an order on January 29 to Lieutenant-General Tamon, Commander of the 2nd Division, to advance his main force to Harbin and protect the Japanese residents there.

The detachment under Major-General Hasebe, overcoming a series of troubles on the railway, pushed its march northward, until it arrived about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of January 30 at Shuangchengpu where it passed the night. Early in the following morning toward daybreak an enemy force (the main body of the 22nd brigade), some 2,000 of infantry and several pieces of artillery, raided our camp under cover of darkness. They advanced at a time within a distance of only 20 metres from our position, but were finally repulsed, after a sharp engagement, about 10.30 o'clock in the morning, with heavy damage, one of their units being almost completely annihilated. Our casualties were 13 dead and 35 wounded.

In view of the character of resistance to be expected, the Commander of the Kwantung Army ordered the troops in Tsitsihar to reinforce the troops near Harbin.

In the evening of January 31 the Kwantung Army
addressed an ultimatum to Ting Chao, Li Tu, Li Chen-sheng and other leaders of the anti-Kirin army, accusing them of their aggressive operations of the same morning, and demanding them to resign their positions in token of their allegiance. It was also notified that, in the event of their failure to comply therewith, the Kwantung Army would take action against the whole anti-Kirin army as its enemy. The anti-Kirin leaders were informed at the same time that inasmuch as the Soviet authorities had given their agreement to offer no interference with military transportation on the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese would not infringe upon the rights of the same railway, and hoped that the anti-Kirin army would likewise guard themselves against any step likely to cause complication in the same respect.

As for the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway which at first showed an unfavourable attitude as to the transportation of the Hasebe detachment, they were informed that "our army being forwarded for the sole purpose of protecting our nationals in Harbin, they should offer no interference with our military transportation." To this the Soviet representatives gave formal agreement on January 30. Nevertheless, the railway still continued to be destroyed between Harbin and Shuangchengpu and also in the rear of the Hasebe detachment, considerably impeding the northern progress of our troops. The 2nd Division, under the circumstances, managed to do the best it could with a limited
quantity of rolling stock at its disposal, while it began on February 1 to transport soldiers in motor cars that had been concentrated at Changchun. Continuing its progress under such unfavourable conditions, the main force succeeded in concentrating near Shuangchengpu in the morning of February 3.

With regard to the expedition of military troops to Harbin, the Kwantung Army issued on February 1 the following notice:

"The Japanese army has been despatched to Harbin for the sole purpose of protecting our nationals and maintaining the public peace in the same city. Not only common civilians but even men of military affiliations will be left free if they refrain from any hostile action against our army. The general populace are advised to feel themselves secure and follow their peaceful pursuits. As for the Chinese Eastern Railway and all other institutions owned by a third nation, the Japanese army shall offer no interference, taking a strictly neutral attitude. Although the Japanese army will remain true to its aforesaid policy of justice and fairness, it will promptly deal with any act of hostility or any attempt to interfere with its work. Civil as well as military people are hereby advised to repose confidence in the Japanese army and properly shape their conduct in accordance therewith."
5. Anti-Kirin Army in Harbin Well Prepared

The anti-Kirin army stationed in and about Harbin, which had assumed for itself the name of the "Self-Protection Army" under the leadership of General Li Tu, commander of the 24th brigade, issued on January 31 a notice which may be regarded as a sort of ultimatum running in substance as follows:

"Whereas the Japanese acts of aiding and abetting internal troubles, and their seizing of railway trains, even killing and wounding railway employees, show the course they are bent on following with forcible means, defying the dignity of our nation, we have decided to mobilize all available troops for the purpose of a combined armed resistance. Our end being clear, we hold ourselves above thoughts of success or failure. We hereby announce the formation of the Self-Protection Army, praying for the support of all our brethren—"

In the meantime Chang Hsueh-liang had ordered Ting Chao and Ma Chan-shan to hold Harbin in their hands, while he strove to strengthen his own position by enlisting the support of Soviet Russia through Mo Te-hui who was in Moscow in charge of Sino-Soviet negotiations. On the other hand, the Pinhsien government which had been formed by a handful of men, finding its geographical position unsuitable for administrative purposes, set up in Harbin what they called the Kirin Committee of
Peace. Ting Chi as chairman was put in charge of military, administrative and financial affairs, to the end of attaining under one head an internal solidarity against our army. Ting Chi, anticipating the eastward advance of our troops from Tsitsihar, ordered the guards of the western section of the Chinese Eastern Railway to destroy the railway. Consequently, the railway and other means of communication were cut off between Harbin and Tsitsihar on the night of February 2.

In the rear of our line, the railway guard force (1 company of the Independent Railway Guards) at Lalinchia, a point about 25 kilometres south of Shuangchengpu, was assaulted on February 1 by a Chinese force of 1,000 men. The next day our company of railway guards at Changchiawan, about 70 kilometres north of Changchun, was attacked by Chinese soldiers numbering about 400. The assailants were repulsed in each case with heavy damage.

On or about February 3, the anti-Kirin army about Harbin, which had steadily been adding to its ranks, had swelled to a force of some 13,000 to 14,000 soldiers, who were disposed as shown in the sketch on page 53.

The Right Area (about Kuhsiangtun): about 1,000 men; 6 pieces of field artillery.

The Central Area (between Intendantskaya and Hospital Street): about 3,000 men; 2 pieces of artillery; light wire entanglements before the line, and dwelling houses provided with defensive work.
Enemy's Positions near Harbin (Feb. 3)

- Right District: 1,000 with 6 pieces artillery
- Central District: 3,000 with 2 pieces artillery
- Left District: 7,000 with 4 pieces artillery
The Left Area (about Old Harbin): some 7,000 men; 4 pieces of artillery.

The Cavalry Force: Several hundred of cavalry men under the command of Feng Chan-hai.

The above, altogether about 11,000 in number, formed the first line.

The Reserves: Reserve forces numbering 2,000 to 3,000 were stationed at Machiakou on the east of Harbin and near Old Harbin.

6. Entry of the 2nd Division into Harbin

The 2nd Division, which had concentrated its main force near Shuangchengpu in the morning of February 3, lost no time to advance northward. Pressing upon inferior enemy forces along the way, our soldiers arrived in the evening on the line of the Weitangkou-ho, some 50 kilometres north of Shuangchengpu, where they passed the night. Resuming the march northward the following morning, the Division came upon the enemy line about 11 a.m. At 3.30 p.m. our objective was set on Paichiawupeng and Hospital Street, forming the centre of the enemy line. A part of our forces then started operations against the enemy's right wing, advancing within 400 to 500 metres from their position, where they passed the night. On the same night another part of the Division, making a night raid, occupied a sector of the enemy line near the monument standing in honour of two Japanese
heroes in the war with Russia, near the southeast end of Hospital Street.

The 2nd Division resumed the offensive in the morning of February 5. When the enemy line began to show signs of wavering at about 10 a.m., our troops intensified their action until they took possession of the enemy’s position around noon. Toward 3 p.m. the enemy forces, completely routed, were fleeing from Harbin towards Pinhsien and elsewhere.

The city of Harbin had been restored to peace. The Japanese residents had been freed from the grip of terror. They, with Russian and even Chinese population, came forth to receive the entry of our army into Harbin with heartiest ovations.

In this connection it is important to note that our military forces, in conducting their operations in this campaign, took every precaution to prevent disturbances to foreign residents, and directed with scrupulous care their rifle and artillery fire and every other offensive action, so as to avoid the railway and other public institutions in the city.

The Self-Protection Army, having abandoned Harbin, moved its main force in the direction of Pinhsien. A section of their troops have since gone as far as Hulan, north of Harbin, while the other toward Acheng, south of Harbin. An independent detachment (affiliated bandit soldiers) under Kuan Chung-hai directed its course to Acheng. Ting Chao and Li Tu are thought to have fallen back to Hulan,
Chart showing Military Operations near Harbin (Feb. 3-5 1932)

Troops belonging to Harbin Defence Guard:
- 22nd Brigade
- 25th Brigade
- 26th Brigade
- 27th Brigade

Defence Guard

Detachment from 24th Brigade

Japanese Troops
- 2nd Division
- Sanhsingtun
- 27th Infantry Brigade
- Detachments from 25th and 26th Brigades (2,000)

Notes
- Feb. 3 night
- Feb. 4
- Feb. 5
and Feng Chan-hai to Pinhsien, where they are no doubt collecting their routed ranks. Through the military operations near Harbin lasting 5 days from February 4, our casualties were 31 killed and 65 wounded. While the enemy’s casualties are not definitely known, they have beyond doubt suffered considerably heavier damage. The progress of military operations in this campaign is shown in the sketch on page 56.

7. Conclusion

The trouble in Harbin, which called for the above military action, was occasioned by internal disagreement within the Chinese military camp, with its centre at Harbin. The trouble sprang up just when Manchuria, with the support of her military and other influential elements, was paving the way for the creation of a new independent state comprising Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and a part of Mongolia whence the old regime had been driven off. The disturbances caused in this way threatened the lives and property of not only our own people but many other resident nationals there; but they were put an end to by the prompt and timely action of our army. In a way, the above campaign has served to clear North Manchuria of what had still remained of the old military power, thus removing an obstacle that had stood in the way of
bringing the new state into being, materially clearing the atmosphere for the outlook for future. We are pleased to add in conclusion that Soviet Russia and her representatives on the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, properly appreciating the rightful policy of Japan, adopted a fair-minded attitude toward our military operations in and round Harbin.
Japanese Casualties

The Japanese casualties ascertained since the outbreak of the trouble up to February 9, all of the military force, are 353 dead and 761 wounded, the total number being 1,014. These casualties are shown in detail in the list below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grand Total</th>
<th>Garrison</th>
<th>Tiensin Force</th>
<th>Gendarmerie Force</th>
<th>Mixed Brigade</th>
<th>2nd Division</th>
<th>Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers</th>
<th>Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>425</td>
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<tr>
<td>1,114</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>235</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dead (including those who died afterwards)  Wounded in Military Action

Grand Total  Total  Total  Total  Total  Total

47  4  1  152  400  157
714  4  1  162  425  169
761  4  1  235  607  265
1,114  4  3  Total  Total  Total

25  338  353  47  1,114  353  761  1,114  1,014
CHART I.
DISPOSITION OF THE HEILUNGKIANG TROOPS PRIOR TO OUTBREAK
OF HOSTILITIES (NOV. 4, 1931)

Indicates reinforcements from Kirin not included in General Ma Chan-shan's Troops.

Railway guards under General Chan Tien-chiu accounted with General Ma Chan-shan's Army.
CHART II

A MAP OF TAHSING AND VICINITY
CHART III.
REAR POSITIONS OF GENERAL MA'S TROOPS
SOUTH OF TSITSIHRAR
Regular Troops: —
35,000
Artillery 68 pieces: heavy guns 32; field pieces 36

Other troops under the direction of the Chinchow Government were an independent detachment of 30,000, chiefly formed of bandits; 6 battalions of volunteers, about 5,000; 10 squads belonging to cavalry guards of Liaoning and Mongolian frontiers; all of which were daily being augmented in number.
CHART V.
A MAP OF LIAOSI DISTRICTS.