LATANE (JOHN H.)

Our Relations With China and Japan.

Illustrations and sketch map of the Pacific area.

Pages numbered 36 to 48.
permanent addition. It requires something like 1600 years for the metal to lose one half of its potency. Then, after a second period of 1600 years, we still have one quarter of the radium energy we started with. At the end of about 20,000 years the original volume of radium will have ceased giving off emanations, and will have changed into common lead. If we could find a way to get a gram of radium to discharge in one minute all the energy it will eventually discharge in 20,000 years, there would be sufficient power in this one gram to raise out of the water all of the dreadnaughts in all of the navies of the world. A half-dozen grams of radium carried in a glass tube in a man's pocket would kill this individual in less than twenty-four hours by destroying his tissues and bones.

TREMENDOUS POWER AND VALUE

In one year, a unit weight of radium evolves about 150 times as much energy as would be evolved in the complete combustion of the same weight of coal. The great potentiality of the situation lies in the possibility that someone will discover how to extract the energy which now oozes out so slowly from radioactive materials, in as short a time as he pleases. When we find a way to make radium expend its energy at any predetermined rate of speed, it means that we will be able to do the same thing with other elements. As one authority points out, if a gram of iron could be made to discharge the energy of its atoms in one minute, the power obtained would be equal to fifty tons of dynamite. A gram of radium in completely disintegrating into a small mass of lead actually yields 300,000 times as much heat energy as does the burning of a gram of coal. Of course, at the present time, we are compelled to be content with the spontaneous liberation of energy from the small amount of radium we have, and this energy or power is released so slowly that it is of no practical use to us except in medicine, where it is employed to bombard diseased tissues in the human body.

Although the three ounces of radium now available in the world are worth more than three million dollars because of the curative properties of the element, the real value of the mysterious metal lies rather in its use as a rare and promising material for experiment. Radium is the key to the unknown in science. Nothing man can conceive or imagine would be of greater importance to humanity than the discovery of a practical method to liberate the energy contained within atoms of the elements. The first step will be artificially to disintegrate heavier elements into higher ones. There is already strong evidence that it is possible to produce hydrogen through breaking down several heavier elements. One experimenter secured hydrogen and helium from an aluminum electrode by using a high potential electrical discharge in a vacuum tube.

SOURCES OF NEW ENERGY

At present we know of but three possible sources of new energy—solar energy, the internal heat of the earth, and atomic disintegration. The last mentioned source of energy is just now attracting greatest attention. We know that the atoms of radium are in constant process of breaking up. We know that this disintegration liberates energy, for it has been proved that the temperature of the air surrounding a piece of radium is about three degrees higher than the temperature beyond its vicinity. However, scientists have been unable to increase the flow of energy from radium by heating the metal to a temperature as high as that of the electric arc. Nor have investigators been able to slow down the disintegration of radium atoms by placing the metal in a temperature as low as that of liquid air. In other words, we are easily able to observe all of the phenomena of radioactivity and yet we cannot control this activity. That is the problem science is attempting to solve, and one day when the answer is written, the whole course of human life will be so changed through the utilization of the new knowledge that past revolutions will appear of small consequence in comparison.

When we have discovered the secret of the atom and can control its force, it is likely all nations will be ready and willing to lay down their arms and abolish their armies and navies. Statesmen will be glad to sit around a table and compromise their differences without any talk of force, for a power will be available in the world so mighty in its potentialities that no person would dare consider its use except for some constructive purpose.
OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND JAPAN

The Last of Three Articles on the Bases of American Foreign Policy

BY JOHN H. LATANÉ

Prior to the so-called Opium War of 1840 foreign trade with China was limited to Canton. By the treaty of Nanking signed at the conclusion of that war, August 29, 1842, China agreed to open to British trade, on the same conditions as Canton, the ports of Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai. This was the origin of the five treaty ports. Notwithstanding the strong expressions of public opinion in other countries against the morality of the British insistence on the opium trade, all the great commercial nations profited by the war, and were quick to send envoys to China for the purpose of negotiating trade agreements. One of the first nations to take advantage of the situation was the United States. In fact, before the treaty of Nanking was signed, Commodore Kearny, who had been sent to Chinese waters with a squadron to protect American interests, addressed a formal communication to the governor of Canton in which he said that the United States would expect its citizens to "be placed upon the same footing as the merchants of the nation most favored." The governor promised to memorialize the Emperor to this effect.

In February, 1844, Caleb Cushing arrived in China at the head of an imposing mission for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of friendship and commerce. There was no direct intercourse with Peking in those days, all communications having to go through Canton. After tedious delays an imperial commissioner finally met Mr. Cushing at Macao and on July 3, 1844, our first treaty with China was signed. Mr. Cushing was an able lawyer and proved to be a shrewd negotiator. He secured for Americans admission to the five treaty ports, most-favored-nation treatment, and, under the principle of extraterritoriality, exemption from the jurisdiction of Chinese courts and laws. During the next half century whatever concessions were extorted from China by England or France were immediately granted to us under the most-favored-nation clause.

In a few years Chinese laborers began coming to the United States, and under the Burlingame treaty of 1866 they were given as full rights and privileges as were enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. Large numbers of them were at that time employed on the construction of the Union Pacific Railroad. But public opinion, which had at first been entirely favorable to Chinese immigration, soon underwent a change, and there came a demand from California for the abrogation of the Burlingame treaty. In 1878, after a long investigation by a committee of Congress, an act was passed limiting Chinese immigration, but President Hayes vetoed it as being in violation of treaty obligations. A commission, headed by President Angell of the University of Michigan, was then sent to Peking, and persuaded the Chinese Government to sign a treaty prohibiting the immigration of Chinese laborers, but expressly safeguarding the right of teachers, students, merchants, and travelers to come to the United States. These treaty restrictions have been renewed from time to time, but there have been frequent disputes with China over the rigid interpretation placed by our officials on these restrictions and the harsh methods employed in enforcing them. Upon several occasions we have wantonly ignored our treaty obligations.

For about two centuries Japan had pursued a policy of exclusion to an even greater degree than China. In 1854 the United States forced an entrance into Japan at the muzzle of the cannon. There were, it is true, certain definite grievances to redress, but the main reason for
WHERE THE UNITED STATES COMES INTO CONTACT WITH CHINA AND JAPAN

Until the United States acquired possessions in the Pacific there was practically no friction with the Asiatic countries. And at the time of the Russo-Japanese War the relations of the United States and Japan were exceptionally friendly, but the change in feeling that came at its close has become more and more marked as questions have arisen on which the two countries fail to agree. Japanese emigration to the United States and the dispute of the two countries over the former German cables centring on the Island of Yap are the two outstanding difficulties at present.

Commodore Perry's famous expedition was that Japan refused to recognize her obligations as a member of the family of nations and closed her ports to all intercourse with the outside world. American sailors who had been shipwrecked on the coasts of Japan had failed to receive the treatment usually accorded by civilized nations. Finally, the United States decided to send a naval force to Japan and to compel that country to abandon its policy of exclusion and to open its ports to intercourse with other countries. Perry's expedition was quite a radical departure from the general policy of minding our own business, but in the Orient, American diplomacy has had a freer hand than in Europe. Japan yielded only under the threat of superior force. The conduct of the expedition as well as of our subsequent diplomatic negotiations with Japan, was highly creditable to the United States and the Japanese people later erected a monument to the memory of Perry on the spot where he first landed. For some years Japan remained unreconciled to the concessions she had been forced to make. But intercourse with the outer world soon led to a complete transformation of Japanese civilization, and the Japanese people entered upon one of the most remarkable careers of national development that history records. Until 1905 our relations with Japan were almost ideal. The Russo-Japanese War brought about changes that will be noted later.
The Chino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, caused by conflicting interests in Korea, revealed the inherent weakness of China and established the military prestige of Japan. It was followed, however, by a diplomatic defeat. China had agreed to cede Formosa to Japan, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liao-tung Peninsula, when Russia, backed by Germany and France, made what was termed "a friendly representation" to Japan and informed her, practically under a threat of war, that she would not be permitted to retain the Liao-tung Peninsula. Japan was thus deprived of the full fruits of her victory. Russia's motives were soon apparent. In less than three years she took possession of Port Arthur, and under concession from China soon extended her influence throughout the whole of the Liao-tung Peninsula. The seeds of the Russo-Japanese War were thus sown. The war with China was followed by the complete enfranchisement of Japan. The powers agreed to release her from all restrictions imposed by the early treaties. Since 1899 she has had full control over her tariffs and has had the same jurisdiction over resident aliens that other civilized nations exercise.

FOREIGN INVASION OF CHINA

CHINA now lay at the mercy of the Great Powers, and they were quick to avail themselves of the opportunity. Russia, as we have seen, secured a lease of Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula as her "sphere of interest;" Germany established herself on Kiao-chau Bay and secured extensive concessions in Shantung; while England, in self-defense, leased Wei-hai-wei "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia;" and France and Italy secured less important leases. The partition of China was well under way when we went to war with Spain. What attitude was the United States to assume? Our commerce with China, which was second to that of England alone, was seriously threatened by the establishment of these "spheres of influence," which were in utter disregard of the most-favored-nation clauses in our treaties with China, but China was helpless and it was useless to protest to her. Under these circumstances President McKinley determined to keep the Philippines, which would serve as a naval base from which we might still afford some protection to our interests in China.

In September, 1899, John Hay sent to the principal powers of Europe and to Japan his famous note on the subject of the open door in China. He requested each of the Powers addressed to make a declaration to the following effect: (1) that it would not interfere with any treaty port or vested interests in its so-called sphere of influence; (2) that it would permit the Chinese tariff to continue in force and to be collected by Chinese officials; and (3) that it would not discriminate against other foreigners in the matter of port dues or railroad rates. Great Britain alone expressed her willingness to sign such a declaration. The other powers, while professing general accord with Mr. Hay's proposals, were somewhat evasive in their replies. The Russian reply was the least satisfactory, and in fact contained serious reservations. Mr. Hay made a skillful move, however, to clinch matters by informing each of the powers addressed that in view of the favorable replies received from the others, its acceptance of the proposals of the United States was accepted "as final and definitive."

Americans generally are under the impression that John Hay originated the open-door policy and that it was successfully upheld by the United States. Neither of these impressions is correct. A few months before John Hay formulated his famous note, Lord Charles Beresford came through America on his return from China and addressed the leading Chambers of Commerce from San Francisco to New York, telling Americans what was actually taking place in China, and urging this country to unite with England and Japan in an effort to maintain the open door. Like the Monroe Doctrine, the open door policy was thus Anglo-American in origin. There is little doubt that England and Japan were willing to form an alliance with the United States for the purpose of maintaining the open door in China, but our traditional policy of isolation prevented our committing ourselves to the employment of force. President McKinley, following the example of President Monroe, preferred announcing our policy independently and requesting the other powers to consent to it. Had John Hay been able to carry out the plan which he favored of an alliance with England and Japan, the mere announcement of the fact would have been sufficient to check the aggressions of the powers in China. Instead of such an alliance, however, we let it be known that
while we favored the open door we would not fight for it under any conditions.

The exploitation of China which continued at a rapid rate naturally aroused an intense anti-foreign sentiment and led to the Boxer Uprising. Events moved with startling rapidity and United States troops took a prominent part with those of England, France, Russia, and Japan in the march to Peking for the relief of the legations. In a note to the Powers July 3, 1900, Secretary Hay, in defining the attitude of the United States on the Chinese question, said: "The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." Mr. Hay's notes were skillfully worded and had some influence in helping to formulate public opinion on the Chinese question both in this country and abroad, but we know now from his private letters, which have been made public since his death, that he realized only too fully the utter futility of his efforts to stay the course of events.

During the long negotiations leading to the Protocol of 1901 the United States urged a policy of moderation, declaring that the only hope for the future lay in a strong, independent, responsible Chinese Government. The powers, nevertheless, imposed a very heavy indemnity on China, the amount assigned to the United States being over $24,000,000. This was greatly in excess of the losses sustained by American citizens during the Boxer disturbances and the cost of the expeditionary force, which together amounted to about $11,000,000. Upon recommendation of President Roosevelt, Congress authorized the return of the indemnity in excess of what we were actually entitled to, and China set this sum aside as an educational fund to be used in sending Chinese students to American universities.

In violation of the terms of the Protocol Russia retained in Manchuria the troops concentrated there during the Boxer movement with the intention of exacting further concessions from China. The open door policy was again ignored. The seriousness of the situation led England and Japan to sign a defensive alliance January 30, 1902, recognizing England's interest in China and Japan's interest in Korea, and providing that if either party should be attacked in its sphere by a single power the other would remain neutral, but if attacked by several powers, the other would come immediately to its assistance.

With this assurance of fair play in case of war, Japan determined to use force where Secretary Hay's diplomacy had failed. The presence of Russian troops on the soil she had conquered in 1895 and returned to China was a thorn in her side. After a series of futile negotiations the Japanese Government finally presented an ultimatum to Russia, January 16, 1904, in which it was stipulated: (1) that Japan would recognize Manchuria as being outside her sphere of interest, provided Russia would respect the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria; (2) that Russia would not impede Japan or other powers in the enjoyment of rights and privileges acquired by them in Manchuria under existing treaties with China; and (3) that Russia would recognize Korea as being outside her sphere of interest. Not receiving a reply within the time specified, Japan withdrew her minister from St. Petersburg and a few days later formally declared war.

RESULTS OF THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH

AFTER a series of notable victories on land and sea Japan was fast approaching the end of her resources when President Roosevelt intervened diplomatically and paved the way for peace. It is now known that he acted in response to a personal letter from the Emperor of Japan. The Russian and Japanese commissioners met at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in August, 1905. During the war public sentiment in the United States had been strongly pro-Japanese. But during the peace negotiations it veered to the side of Russia, largely as a result of the very striking personality of Count Witte, who gave out interesting interviews, while the Japanese commissioners kept themselves in seclusion and rarely gave anything to the press. The result of the negotiations was a keen disappointment to the Japanese. Their commissioners had been instructed among other things to demand an indemnity of $600,000,000. This they had to forego. The most important provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth were those relating to Manchuria. The Russian leases of Port Arthur, Talienwan, and adjacent territories and territorial waters were transferred to Japan; the South Manchuria
Railway was also transferred to Japan, while the Eastern Railway in northern Manchuria was retained by Russia. So great was the disappointment of the Japanese people at not getting an indemnity that the treaty of Portsmouth was received with denunciations and the commissioners tried to shift the blame to President Roosevelt, who had kept in close touch with the negotiations, and who had advised them to abandon the claim to indemnity. This advice was probably sound, for the opinion was expressed by many of the foreign military observers that if the war had continued six weeks longer the tide would have turned in favor of Russia. Japan was getting farther and farther away from her base of supplies every day and Russia was drawing nearer to hers. The Japanese authorities knew that they were nearing the end of their resources, but they did not care to admit it. To the Japanese people it appeared that a great military triumph had again, as in 1895, been followed by a diplomatic defeat and for this defeat they held President Roosevelt responsible.

The following year the action of the San Francisco school authorities in excluding Japanese subjects from the schools attended by American children and children of European nationality, and assigning them to a special Oriental school, increased the bad feeling in Japan. The school question was adjusted for the time being by the intervention of President Roosevelt, but it proved to be a mere incident in the development of a strong opposition in California and the other Pacific States to further Japanese immigration. Japan declared that it was not the practice of her Government to issue passports to laborers to come to the United States, though passports were issued for Hawaii, Canada, and Mexico, the holders of which in many cases entered this country. Japan expressed her intention of continuing this policy, and relying on this "gentlemen's agreement," Congress inserted in the Immigration Act of 1907 a clause authorizing the President to exclude from the continental territory of the United States holders of passports issued by any foreign government to its citizens to go to any country other than the United States. The Japanese feel that they have made good as a nation and are entitled to full recognition as a civilized people, while the laws of the United States admit to naturalization only white persons and persons of African descent or nativity. The anti-Japanese sentiment in the Coast States is so strong that Congress is not likely to modify our laws in favor of the Japanese. Japanese resentment of the school incident was so great, and President Roosevelt was so annoyed at the attitude of Japan that in the autumn of 1907 he decided to send a great American fleet on a voyage around the world, and to have it visit Japanese waters. The fleet was received with marked courtesy by the Japanese Government and returned to America without any untoward incident.

The treaty of Portsmouth, as we have seen, transferred Russia's lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula and Russia's railway and other rights in southern Manchuria to Japan. By a secret arrangement, of which the United States and other powers were not aware, Russia agreed to hand over to Japan various secret agreements which she had made with China. Relying upon these, Japan later claimed "absolute and exclusive right of administration in the territories attached to the railway," in utter disregard of the open door policy. It was soon apparent that Japan had ambitions in Manchuria which went far beyond the Portsmouth treaty and were in fact in conflict with its provisions. By a treaty signed in December, 1905, China not only agreed to the transfers made by Russia to Japan, but agreed further not to construct any line parallel with the South Manchuria Railway. In 1907 Russia and Japan came to an understanding and agreed to support each other in their respective spheres in Manchuria. All the while Japan was professing to the outside world her adherence to the open door. In order to quiet the apprehensions of the United States, the Root-Takahira agreement was signed in November, 1906, by which Japan confirmed "the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China" and agreed to support the "independence and integrity" of that Empire. The agreement also bound both parties to maintain "the existing status quo." Did this refer to the open door or to the status quo established by the secret arrangements with Russia and China? It could be easily interpreted by Japan to mean the latter.

Under the various agreements China had reserved the right to purchase, after a certain period, the railways in Manchuria. In December, 1909, Secretary Knox came forward with a plan to hasten this prospective purchase
Our Relations With China and Japan

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THE FORMER GERMAN BASE, TSINGTAU, NOW IN THE HANDS OF JAPAN

This port, together with extensive concessions in Shantung were secured by Germany in 1898, and at about the same time Russia, Great Britain, France, and Italy also obtained concessions from China through the means of an international loan to China, the railroads to be administered by a joint commission of the powers advancing the money. This plan to "neutralize" the railroads of Manchuria met with the emphatic opposition of both Russia and Japan and was dropped.

The overthrow of the Chinese monarchy and the Proclamation of a republic in 1911 were viewed with great satisfaction in the United States. It was felt that the awakening of China was due in no small part to American influence. American missionaries and those who supported them were in full sympathy with the political and social revolution that held out such large promises for the future. The new government needed money and American bankers united with British, French, German, Russian, and Japanese bankers in what was known as the Six-Power Consortium. This group was contemplating a loan of $125,000,000 to China when the American bankers withdrew. It appears from the announcement made at the time that the American group had been requested by the Taft Administration to go into the Consortium. When the Wilson Administration came in the bankers declined to go on with the loan unless expressly requested to do so by the new Administration. In a public announcement issued March 18, 1913, President Wilson said: "The Administration has declined to make such request, because it did not approve the conditions of the loan or the implications of responsibility on its own part, which it was plainly told would be involved in the request." American bankers have, however, taken the lead in forming the new consortium, arranged in 1920, with the full backing of the Government. Japan reluctantly came into the arrangement, which may serve to check in some measure her exploitation of China.

While China was struggling with the problems confronting the new republic, Japan eagerly took her place among the Great Powers in the world war. Although outside the European balance and not bound by the alliance with England to aid that country in the European sphere, Japan had reasons of her own for making war on Germany. Japanese statesmen were not hampered by any tradition of isolation. On the contrary, since Japan has attained the rank of a great power, she has not been backward about playing the
part. On August 15, 1914, the Tokio Government addressed an ultimatum to Germany to the effect that she immediately withdraw all German vessels from Chinese and Japanese waters and deliver not later than September 15th "to the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition of compensation the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China."

In a statement issued to the press Count Okuma said: "As Premier of Japan, I have stated and I now again state to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive or desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or any other peoples of anything which they now possess."

The Germans had spent about $100,000,000 in improving Tsing-tau, the principal city of Kiao-chau, and they had no intention of surrendering it. After a siege of two months the city was captured by the Japanese army and navy, assisted by a small force of British troops. This was the first act in the drama. On January 8, 1915, Japan suddenly presented to the Chinese Government the now famous twenty-one demands. They were divided into five groups, dealing respectively with Shantung, Manchuria, the Hanyehping Company, the non-alienation of territory, and the employment by the Chinese Government of Japanese advisers in political, financial, and military affairs. China flatly refused to comply with the fifth group and proposed modifications of the others. While the negotiations with China were going on, Japan deliberately misrepresented to the United States and other powers the nature of the demands she had made.

In the first group Japan demanded not only that China should assent to any agreement in regard to Shantung that Japan and Germany might reach at the conclusion of the war, but that she should also grant to her greater rights and concessions in Shantung than Germany enjoyed. China was finally forced to agree to this and to grant the other demands with modifications. While these negotiations were in progress, the United States sent an identical note to China and Japan informing them that it would not recognize any agreement that impaired its treaty rights in China, the integrity of the Republic of China, or the policy of the open door.

Japan's next step was to secure from the Allies assurances that they would support her claims to Shantung and to the German islands in the Pacific north of the Equator at the conclusion of the war. This she did in secret treaties signed in February and March, 1917, with England, France, Italy, and Russia. England agreed to support Japan's claim on condition that Japan would support her claims to the Pacific islands south of the Equator. France signed on condition that Japan would use her influence on China to break relations with Germany and place at the disposal of the Allies the German ships interned in Chinese ports. The Allies were evidently
DIAMOND HEAD, THE PROTECTION FOR PEARL HARBOR

With Waikiki Beach in the foreground. This extinct volcano has been heavily fortified and ably defends the great American naval base in Hawaii.

A DRYDOCK AT PEARL HARBOR

Pearl Harbor, capable of accommodating with ease our entire fleet, has been transformed into one of the world's greatest naval bases, but its distance from the Philippines handicaps it as a defence for those islands while at the same time Japan sees in it a threat against herself.
At about the time of the Spanish-American War the desire on the part of European nations to secure "spheres of influence" in China seemed to reach its height. As a consequence President McKinley, seeing the desirability of a base near China from which American interests might be protected, decided to retain the Philippines.
A RELIGIOUS PROCESSION ON THE ISLAND OF GUAM
Guam, a halfway stop between Hawaii and the Philippines secured by the United States from Spain at the time of the Spanish-American War

JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA
The opposition of the people of California to the Japanese who have entered that state has created a situation upon which Japan is trading to secure advantages for herself elsewhere
uneasy about Japan and were willing to do anything that was necessary to satisfy her. This uncertainty about Japan may also be the explanation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, signed November 2, 1917, a few months after we entered the war, in which the United States recognized the “special interests” of Japan in China, and Japan again reaffirmed her adherence to the principle of the open door.

In the Treaty of Versailles Germany renounced, in favor of Japan, all her rights, titles, and privileges in Shantung acquired by the treaty of March 6, 1898. This provision was similar to the article of the treaty of Portsmouth which transferred the Russian rights in Manchuria to Japan. The treaty of Portsmouth, negotiated in our midst, excited little adverse criticism, but the transfer of the German interests in Shantung to Japan raised a storm of indignation. The reason was that President Wilson had in his Fourteen Points set up a new standard of international morality, and public opinion was disposed to hold him strictly to that standard. The secret treaties of the Allies upholding Japanese claims were not revealed until the disposition of the German islands in the Pacific was under discussion at the Peace Conference. When informed by Baron Makino that the islands north of the Equator had been pledged to Japan by treaties signed two years before, President Wilson inquired whether there were other secret agreements, and was informed that the German rights in Shantung had also been promised to Japan. As the other powers were pledged to support Japan’s claims, President Wilson found himself in a very embarrassing situation, especially as he had also to oppose Japan’s

**HONGKONG, THE IMPORTANT BRITISH BASE IN CHINA**

Hongkong was occupied by the British in 1841 and permanently secured by a treaty signed in the following year. It is Great Britain’s most important base in the Far East.
demand that a clause recognizing racial equality be inserted in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This was a moral claim that Japan urged with great strategic effect. In pushing her claims to Shantung she ignored all moral considerations and relied entirely upon her legal status, secured (1) by the secret treaties with the Allies, (2) by the treaty of 1915 with China, and (3) by right of conquest. When charged with having coerced China into signing the treaty of 1915, Japan replied with truth that most of the important treaties with China had been extorted by force. Japan urged her demand for racial equality until her claims to Shantung were recognized. She then dropped a demand which she probably never had much hope of securing, for she must have known that the United States would never consent to have the status of Japanese in California brought within the jurisdiction of the League.

Japan gave an oral promise at the Conference to restore Shantung to China in full sovereignty, retaining only the economic privileges transferred from Germany. China, however, refused to sign the treaty of Versailles, and Japan claims that she cannot discuss with China the conditions on which Shantung is to be restored until China recognizes its present legal status as fixed by the treaty. China signed the treaty of peace with Austria, which also provided for the League of Nations, and in that way became a member of the League and is now represented on the Council.

If Japan continues in possession of Shantung and adheres generally to the policy of the twenty-one demands, as she shows every intention of doing, our future relations with her are likely to be fraught with difficulties. Our Chinese policy is complicated by the situation in California. How much Japan really cares about the immigration question is a matter of doubt, but the discrimination against her subjects in California provides her with a standing grievance, which she continually uses as a diplomatic club to gain her ends elsewhere. This fact makes it doubly important that we treat Japanese subjects in the United States with full justice and see that their treaty rights are enforced. The recent land legislation of California was unnecessarily harsh, even if not in violation of the letter of our treaties with Japan. On the question of Japanese immigration we cannot yield, and the sooner Japan
recognizes that fact and substitutes definite treaty stipulations for the "gentlemen's agreement" the better.

Our relations with Japan are further complicated by the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which comes up for renewal this year. The original purpose of this compact, as we have seen, was to check the Russian advance in Manchuria. It was renewed in revised form in 1905, and again renewed in 1911 for a period of ten years. England's motives for renewing the compact on the latter occasion were quite different from her earlier motives. The situation had completely changed. Russia was no longer a menace. Japan was now the dominant power in the Far East, and if England did not renew the alliance there was danger of Japan forming one with Germany. Now that the German menace has been removed, what reasons has England for renewing the Alliance? A renewal under present conditions would bear too much the semblance of a combination to check the growing power of the United States. Nothing would promote the naval programme of the United States more than the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. For these reasons the discussions already in progress on the subject of the renewal are of great interest. Before a decision is reached, the Council of the League of Nations has to report on the question already submitted as to whether the Alliance is inconsistent with the Covenant of the League, and the matter has to be discussed at the British Imperial Conference, which meets in the early summer, for England dares not proceed in a matter of such vital importance to the Empire without conferring with her overseas dominions.

SHANGHAI, CHINA
One of the five "treaty ports" that were opened to the British as a result of the so-called "Opium War." The treaty of Nanking, signed at the conclusion of that war, opened to British trade the ports of Amoy, Foochoo, Ningpo, Canton, and Shanghai.

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