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CHINESE POLITICS AND FOREIGN POWERS

BY

HAROLD S. QUIGLEY

SYLLABUS ON RECENT CHINESE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY

FEBRUARY, 1927

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PREFACE

A review of the complex situation that exists in China, especially as it relates to foreign affairs, is most welcome while the Report of the Commission on Extraterritoriality is still being discussed and when every day brings news of military conflict in China. To present such a review, Professor Harold S. Quigley, of the University of Minnesota, has kindly consented to extend for publication in its present form the following admirable article, already published in part both in the United States and in England. He has also provided a Syllabus on Recent Chinese Politics and Diplomacy which will be found at the end of this document. Further references have also been given as to sources of information on Chinese affairs. Professor Quigley speaks with authority as a student of Far Eastern Politics and as a former member of the faculty of the Tsing Hua College at Peking. It is believed that this document will prove to be both interesting and informing and also serve as a permanent source of reference.

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

New York, January 5, 1927.
By Harold S. Quigley
Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota

What has not been true since Taou Kuang is true today—that the most important factor in the Far Eastern situation is China. In spite of her continued weakness as a military power, of her disunity and her lack of political morale, China today is exhibiting a foreign policy of her own and her policy is receiving attention on its merits. That does not mean necessarily that her policy will succeed in part or entire, any more than it would mean such a result for any other country which exhibited a policy. But it is an important step for China that her policies should be receiving equal consideration with those of other countries.

The question of what influences have been effective in bringing about this changed status is one of the highest interest. Perhaps it is merely a commonplace to give the most prominent position to the spread of education and the consequent growth of national consciousness and national feeling. This development has had two results: it has provided trained diplomats and it has stimulated a public opinion to support their moves. Not that China did not have trained diplomats in earlier days; but she required men who knew foreign countries and foreign languages. Such men she obtained and to them she owes a heavy debt for their suave presentation of facts, near-facts and plausibilities. With disorder verging upon anarchy at home these men have so conducted themselves as to win the goodwill of foreign peoples and have so presented the issues affecting their country as to magnify China’s efforts at reform and minimize the work of her agents of destruction. Wherein they have simply followed precedent, for it has ever been a poor diplomat who would expose his country to the laughter of other peoples. And, force aside, what an enviable position as fencers they have enjoyed and what satisfaction they must have felt while delicately referring to this, that, and the other depredation and indignity that the government and countrymen of their hosts had put upon them. In most

1Printed in part in Current History, September, 1926 and in the Contemporary Review (London), November, 1926.
cases of the sort the retort courteous might have been in order, but in China's case the impositions have been unilateral.

Some would say that there is no such thing as public opinion in China. But what is public opinion in any country? It is not like a system of water-mains or electricity, out of which water or light may be obtained by turning a spigot or a button. Public opinion is not always sentient on current issues, because it is never fully informed and because it is never sufficiently interested. It is more like an old-fashioned automobile that has to be cranked, possibly primed, to be gotten to work. The leaders of opinion must do the cranking in America and in Europe as well as in China. And it may be doubted whether the Western populace is better prepared to react sanely to propaganda than the Chinese. But granted that its superior education is a better basis for judgment than Chinese traditions, the fact remains that popular judgments are worked up in the West quite as obviously as they are in the East.

The other of the principal influences working in China's favor has been the development of economic imperialism. The open door and the integrity of China policies embody this development and they have been effective just so far as they have expressed the interests of their exponents. Where they have not functioned properly it has been because other policies have overcome them in the presence of interests amounting to necessities both in their opponents and their supporters. Time has worked in China's favor in the application of these policies since with the passage of time the accumulation of capital and the growth of industrialism have become more and more remarkable and more and more widespread. A century ago one country could dominate the attitude of foreign states toward China; that is no longer true and in the competition of great states for her favors lies China's new diplomatic strength.

China is in a strong position. Will she be able to take advantage of her position? Will she, in the first place, be able to reconcile her foreign colleagues to turning over to her the administration of her customs service, upon the integrity of which the happiness of so many bondholders and the smooth, impartial conduct of trade depend? Will she be able to convince the extraterritoriality commission that the reforms of which so much has been said and written

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1 The report of this commission has now been issued and may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., at 25 cents per copy.
are genuine and that administration, though militarized for the Chinese, will be civil to the foreigner? No administrators ever had a harder task nor a less grateful one. Yet with foreign needs and rivalries working for them they may overcome the handicaps of their own domestic difficulties.

These difficulties date from the republican revolution of 1911, when that familiar anomaly of a fundamental change in the established order of things being brought about by a comparatively few leaders was repeated. Some of the leaders were opponents of the old régime on grounds of provincial jealousy, others were converts and missionaries in the cause of democracy. Since that date the struggle has continued, on the one hand between those who, for various reasons, desire the rule of a parliament and those who are seeking to restore a strong executive to Peking, and on the other between rival groups in both the civilian and military camps, which are likely to form alliances with enemy factions in order to defeat the purposes of their own proper allies. China is passing through a confused period in which the power of government has become dispersed. The problem is one of gathering the elements of authority together once more. In such a period it is doubly remarkable that China not only has not broken apart into fragments but has risen considerably in the scale of international values.

To say that the republican revolution was due to the introduction of western ideas and western capital into China is not to impute blame to the West for the revolution or its early unfortunate results. China was entitled to fair treatment but not to insurance against the inroads of ideas. On the other hand, it is apparent that Western interests are called upon to accept all the results of their enterprise in China. The lean years come as well as the fat. It is just as ridiculous for the foreigner to storm against the corruption and militarism now rampant in Chinese political life as it is for the Chinese to curse the day that Andrade dropped anchor at Shangchuen.

With the success of the republican revolution Yuan Shih-k'ai, a former viceroy and the creator of China's modern army, was elected President. Yuan was in no sense a liberal in politics and his election by the newly-assembled parliament was not in accordance with their desires. Yuan, however, had the effective northern army at his back, he had a faction of northern senators and representatives in the national assembly and he was favored by the great powers and
their bankers. Sun Yat-sen, the chosen leader of the liberals, had no personal military following and no unified provincial sentiment to rely upon. It was hoped that constitutionalism would develop gradually.

In a sense that hope has been fulfilled. Two attempts to restore the monarchy have been thwarted and the movement for a well-conceived national constitution has been paralleled by movements in a number of provinces with the object of supplying themselves with constitutions of the Western type. A very considerable body of legislation has been drafted in the form of codes and laws, which have been applied where possible by the courts though not actually passed as yet by a national legislature. The opposition of the military leaders to a formal constitution embodying liberal principles has been dropped.

These developments, however, are little more than appearances. The actual governing has been done by executives in no sense representative of the people. President Yuan Shih-k'ai quarreled with the Assembly over the nature of the constitution to be drafted, expelled the members of the party that opposed him and finally dissolved both the national and the provincial assemblies. He failed, however, to make himself emperor. His successor, Li Yuan-hung, made an effort to respect the reassembled parliament but was thrown out by one militarist effort to restore the Manchus and kept out by another clique of generals, while a large part of the dissolved Assembly migrated to a more cordial environment in South China. In Canton this remnant elected a new President, Sun Yat-sen, while at Peking a new assembly, pitch-forked into existence, chose Hsü Shih-chang, a well-intentioned tool of its paymasters, to the presidency. Thus China had two parliaments and two presidents—but no genuine government. Hsü was displaced upon the rise of a hostile faction to power and Li Yuan-hung was allowed to stop the gap until the political wheel had turned far enough to permit of ousting him in favor of a full-fledged militarist, T'sao K'un. T'sao was caught in turn and compelled to spend many months in a palace prison while Tuan Ch'i-jui, the puppet of another military faction, assumed the pretence of office. Tuan left his post to seek safety upon the return of T'sao's friends to power. At present the presidential chair is unfilled but the "Old Parliament" is trying to convene and it may be anticipated that its members, out of the
ripeness—not to use a stronger simile—of their many years of experience, will be able to name another figurehead.

In the provinces also civil headship has quite disappeared with the destruction of the marvelous influence of monarchy and the clash of factions for power which could be obtained only with the help of armed forces. The governing system of the provinces, however, remains unchanged. Two features of the provincial situation are responsible for the evil effects of rule by militarists—the prevalence of factions and consequent revolts and the waste of the whole country’s funds. If each tuchūn, as the Chinese entitle the governors, were safe in his own province from attack either from the outside or from within, no doubt his unified authority would be a desirable influence in maintaining order. He might also, in that case, be more inclined to remit taxes, duties and other revenues to the central government. But the tendency has been to form cliques, and cliques within cliques, in an apparently unending series.

It is important to remember how brief a period, hardly a decade, has elapsed since the death of Yuan Shih-k’ai. Ten years is a very brief period in the life of a nation, however significantly it may effect the fortunes of individuals. It is so brief that one hardly dares venture to suggest whether the tendencies in provincial politics are toward unification or toward still greater separatism. It would seem, however, that the number of factions is increasing and that with this increase the number of combinations of factions also is greater, with a correspondingly increased list of military leaders who possess strength outside their own provinces. Any single leader ambitious to control all China is, therefore, likely to find it increasingly more difficult to satisfy the ambitions of those whose support he will have to win. On the other hand, he may find it easier to compel acquiescence by many minor adventurers than by a few very powerful rivals.

In the face of the omnipresence of civil strife, it is perhaps futile to speak of the evolution of political ideas and institutions. It is important, however, to keep constantly in mind the fact that the item of internecine warfare is not characteristic of China, that it is hated most bitterly by the respectable classes—the scholar, the farmer, the merchant and even by the despairing coolie who never knows when he may be caught by a conscription squad and hustled into a uniform. That these classes do not revolt is due to their inacquaint—
ance with political responsibility. China under the empire was
governed not by men but by the spirit of loyalty to an idea. The
emperors did not rule but reigned—grandly, universally, mystically.
Officials were the tangible evidences of that unimagined power.
But the life of the people was family life, the precepts for their action
were social precepts. There was no responsibility for the individual
beyond the locality. There is today no confusion in the localities,
the villages and the districts move in the ancient grooves. What is
lacking is the understanding of representative government which
would transfer the effectiveness of local administration to the pro-
vincial and the national capitals.
Where so much must be learned before China may expect to have
a genuine republic it seems logical to begin learning by experimenta-
tion in provincial rather than in national institutions. There is some
evidence that this idea has made headway in China. There appears
to be a tendency in certain provinces for the civilian lamb and the
militarist lion to lie down together. The movement for federalism
is growing stronger each year. Unfortunately it is felt to involve a
great sacrifice for a tuchün to drop out of national politics while a
man like Governor Yen of Shansi who is anxious to do so is subject
to constant interference by those who desire his support or resent his
indifference. Peking is a fatal lure to take a provincial governor
away from his own proper business. Were it not for the impossi-
bility of foreign states conducting relations with China deprived of
a national capital it might be better to dispense with Peking. The
national government is impotent and the provinces would be less
subject to civil factionalism if the incentive to obtain control of
Peking were absent.
Would such a development result in the break-up of China? No
doubt it would contribute to that misfortune if foreign powers took
advantage of the situation. If the Chinese were left to themselves
it is probable that no such effects would be felt. In place of a na-
tional political organization China has a universal system of social
and moral ideas which provides a cultural nationalism of great
unifying power. In spite of intellectual imports from the West the
respect for Confucian traditions is intact and it appears to be under-
going a revival of influence among the so-called "Western returned
students." The Chinese comprehend nationalism in this sense and
would be opposed to any movement to foster the prosperity of a
single section or province at the expense of the whole nation. Declara-
tions of independence have been made from time to time by
certain provinces or groups of provinces but have aimed rather at
temporary administrative autonomy than at actual and final sever-
ance of national bonds.

Although there is little reason to anticipate the withdrawal of
recognition of the passing Peking juntas by the Powers, the facts
of the situation appear to indicate the desirability of emphasizing
and encouraging the development of orderly and prosperous govern-
ments in the provinces rather than of insisting upon something that
is apparently impossible to obtain at present—a strong central govern-
ment. It is probable that what may appear to be the longer way
round will prove the shorter way home. As for the national govern-
ment it is not essential that it exercise all the powers that it might
desirably possess. The development of orderly civil government in
the provinces will gradually conduce to the strengthening of the
national government.

In the interim between no government and strong government at
Peking what may be expected to happen? It would be fortunate if
there might be arranged a conciliar executive, representative of the
real leadership of the country. The alternatives to such a govern-
ment at Peking are two—the "strong man" and the continuance of
the present situation. After so many failures on the part of what
appeared to be "strong men" one loses confidence in that remedy.
On the other hand, it seems very doubtful that the control of the
capital, especially when that capital is Peking and when the difficul-
ties of handling loan and other negotiations anywhere else are so
great, ever will cease to be a desideratum of the highest importance.
If these things be true either Chinese militarists and politicians must
get together or the civil warfare must continue to accompany politi-
cal development until such a time as the civilian forces of the state
have overthrown the military and taken the leadership of affairs
into their own hands. Perhaps this latter alternative is, after all,
the only logical one to anticipate.

Two powerful forces are at work to destroy each other in the con-
temporary international relations of China; the older diplomacy of
the powers that fought the World War and made the Peace of Ver-
sailles together and the new diplomacy of the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics. The outcome is still in question. On her side China,
although she has not lost but rather has gained standing in the inter­
national community during the Republican period, is faced by diffi­
cult problems in her relations with a number of powers as she seeks to obtain a position of equality with them. The powers with which she is particularly engaged today are Japan, Russia, Great Britain and the United States. France is inclined to maintain her position and to act as an individual in the Far East. Germany is slowly re­
gaining trade and influence. The relations of the first-named powers with China dominate the present scene.

**JAPAN**

Japan at the present juncture wears the smooth vestments of con­
ciliation. Deprived of her Shantung acquisitions, her Manchurian "Demands" reduced or denationalized, her amour propre outraged by the immigration act, Japan has given the world an amazing proof of civilization in her temperate conduct. She has turned the other cheek when she might have been expected to indulge in a frantic but futile program of revenge. Her view today is the long view; she is willing to wait. And while waiting she is improving her time making friends; not as a respector of persons either but wherever she finds a welcome. Beyond doubt this friendly attitude has suc­ceeded. No state today calls Japan enemy, not even China. With Russia she is back on terms of tolerance. And she maintains her place among her allies and associates of the War period with un­
diminished influence.

This happy position she has attained within a decade of the "Twenty-one Demands" and the "Nishihara Loans". And during that decade her political and economic fabric has been pulled and hauled more persistently by reformist elements than at any previous period while her problem of after-war readjustment has been a serious one. Her accomplishment is remarkable and is to be attri­
buted to the astuteness of her statesmen and the reserve strength, physical and mental, of her people.

Toward China Japan's policy is aimed at bringing about a common attitude and a joint program of action in the preservation of the territorial and administrative integrity of the two empires. This policy is complemented by an unofficial movement among the lit-

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2 For text see publication No. 45, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law.
rary people of Japan toward producing a mutual regard among Japanese and Chinese for Oriental culture and mutual action to maintain and intensify it. This phase of the situation resembles the stimulation by certain groups in England and the United States of the mutual recognition of “Anglo-Saxon” customs and ideals. The existence of the policy of conciliation is demonstrated by Japan’s action in restoring Tsingtao and the Shantung railway and other privileges, by her withdrawal of troops from Hankow, her surrender of her control of the “Asiatic Monroe Doctrine”—tacit in her acceptance of the abolition of spheres of influence in China—and her withdrawal of Group V of the Twenty-one Demands, also by a number of less advertised actions, such as her support of Chinese opposition to a foreign railway supervisory, her lukewarm support of the Consortium’s conditions of financial supervision by lending powers, her attitude on certain issues at the Tariff Conference and her failure to take vigorous action in a number of incidents in which Japanese nationals have been killed or injured, the last of which involved an affront to a Japanese warship. All of these circumstances and others that might be cited exhibit an attitude the reverse of that represented in the Twenty-one Demands and one that must, in time, have its effect upon Chinese sentiment.

Unfortunately, a large part of the favorable influence thus being exerted is cancelled in the Chinese mind by Japan’s policy in Manchuria. Just what that policy is it is difficult to summarize in a paragraph. The most important of the Twenty-one Demands that still survive are those which compelled China to extend the leases of Liaotung, with its great ports—Dairen and Port Arthur—and the railways of South Manchuria to 99 years. And with the leases are associated Japan’s monopoly—in fact if not in name—of the Fengtien coal and iron beds. In the Consortium negotiations—the outcome of which was made a part of the record of the Washington Conference—Japan was led to water down her expression of railway ambitions in Manchuria. But she did not surrender them by any means and it is highly significant that the Consortium has not built any railways in Manchuria while the South Manchurian Railway has been engaged recently in laying rails north from Taonanfu for a line which was specifically set down in the negotiations as one to be built by the Consortium. Ostensibly the work has been done on

contract for Chang Tso-lin, the dictator of Manchuria. But to the Chinese it must appear as though the Consortium had made a "grand-stand play" to get Japan to include her spheres within the pooling limits of the associated banks in order to get China's confidence, with the understanding that Japan would be left alone in the actual exploitation of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. Meanwhile South Manchuria fails to attract non-Japanese enterprises and takes on day by day a more Japanese aspect. Is Japan hoping that a policy of supporting China's wishes elsewhere will prove an adequate compensation for South Manchuria? In the development of Chinese sovereignty there will not be room for the obvious political corollaries of the sweeping economic activities which Japan now exercises in that region. Either Japan will have to restrict herself to purely economic enterprises or she will have to annex the region. So long as the Chinese continue to believe, as they do today, that Japan contemplates—given the time and circumstances—the annexation of a portion of Chinese territory, Japan will find it difficult to bring about that cordiality of relations which today she is seeking so consistently.

With Russia Japan is back on a treaty basis and an influential—but not the most influential—section of Japanese opinion is supporting the establishment of a close accord with the Soviets. The success of that group, however, would involve a sacrifice of Japanese ambitions, which are no longer satisfied with a free hand in developing southern Manchuria but contemplate railway building and other enterprises in the northerly portions of that great region which were recognized by Japan previously as Russia's sphere of activity. Russia continues to desire that sphere, is in a position to hold it and cannot be expected to ally with Japan on any other basis than the old one of a division of Manchuria and Mongolia between them. A nice problem, therefore, remains to be worked out between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Undoubtedly Japan places first after the retention of her Manchurian position the maintenance of the most cordial relations with the United States and the British Empire. In this connection the outstanding features are the doctrines of the open door and the integrity of China. Toward making these doctrines effective Japan made by far the greatest contribution at the Washington Conference in surrendering her Shantung conquests, raising no objections to the
operation of the most-favored-nation clause in South Manchuria, agreeing to the abolition of spheres and dropping Group V of the Twenty-one Demands. Through these provisions Japan aligned herself definitely with the powers which have stood most consistently for the open door and China's integrity.

Granting this, Japan's problem is that of maintaining harmonious relations with her two great competitors for the trade and exploitation of China while at the same time seeking to establish a Far Eastern "front" toward the West and to explore the possibilities of her new rapprochement with Russia. She has the great advantages over Great Britain and the United States of position, of cheaper labor and of intimate acquaintance with the civilization of China. If she wished she might raise the slogan of race equality. But so far she has demanded simply equality for her own people, a sign of her difficulty in trying to face both East and West at the same time. What she lacks are capital, mineral resources and food for her people. The two latter she now obtains from South Manchuria and to retain them, on some assured basis, she would probably stake her existence, as would any other people which had received recognition as a great power.

Japan is not inclined today toward any type of cooperation with other powers designed to supervise or control any feature of Chinese administration. In this respect she is, apparently, more solicitous of China's administrative integrity than are the other Consortium powers. That may be true or it may be that she anticipates greater influence for herself if the proposals of international supervision are thwarted. At any rate her opposition to any extension of foreign supervision is an obstacle to smooth relations with the other powers. At the same time it is in accord with China's new nationalism and with the vaunted anti-imperialism of the Soviets. This development, together with the fact of the Russo-Japanese treaty, finally concluded after a prolonged series of negotiations, and the arrival of China and Russia upon a working basis, has promoted the suggestion that a Far Eastern bloc is in process of formation having for its main object the destruction of Western preferential rights in China and the adoption of a unified program toward other powers.

The considerations already dealt with which have a bearing upon such a possibility need not be rehearsed. It is clear that Japan wishes to pursue a policy of friendship toward all nations today and that
she will not willingly join any combination that would bring her into opposition with other countries. She prizes her high place in international society and her very profitable trade with the United States. She has special reasons for seeking the confidence and cooperation of China and Russia but it would be no compliment to Japanese diplomacy to suggest that it would think of weighing China and Russia in the balance as against the British Empire and the United States. Nothing but the desperation of a struggle for self-preservation would lead her to take that course. At present there is no sign in the sky to warn of the approach of such a struggle.

**RUSSIA**

To analyze the contemporary position of Russia in the Far East is a task rendered no easier by the progress of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in obtaining recognition from all the great powers save the United States. If her success in that direction has brought her back into international society it has not increased her respect for its diplomatic usages nor for the world policies of any of its leading members, world policies which she, with doubtful consistency, asperses. Consequently it is necessary to take account of her declared principles of a world proletarian dictatorship and of opposition to imperialism while surveying her activities for evidence on their relationship to her theories of government and international politics.

The Soviet Government won the esteem and confidence of the Chinese people when it surrendered voluntarily those general treaty rights—extraterritoriality, customs control, residential concessions, and legation guards, which the newly-awakened nationalism of China so strongly resents. It is true that the Chinese Government had cancelled a number of Russian rights prior to 1924 so that the treaty of that year between China and the U. S. S. R. was little more than the recognition of *faits accomplis*. And it may be stated with some assurance, in view of the short-sighted encouragement given by allied powers during the war period to Chinese action in the deportation of Germans and the confiscation of their property, that Soviet efforts to retain the treaty rights would have failed to obtain the support of the powers. The Soviet Government hardly can be blamed for resenting the one-sided abrogation of the privileges in-

herited with the Tzarist treaties, since thereby its bargaining power was greatly diminished. But it appears now to be probable that it intended to surrender its rights in order that it might use its new position of "equality" with China as the platform from which to deliver the attack upon the "imperialistic powers" which has appeared as the most striking and consistent feature of its policy in China since May 31, 1924.

Between 1920 and 1926 there has been time for the Chinese to appraise the Russian sacrifices and to discover that they do not include all that had been anticipated from the manifestoes that were published. On the Russian side it has been found that the influence of Chang Tso-lin, in control of Manchuria, must be countered before arrangements made with a less recalcitrant government at Peking can become effective. Relations which seemed to be developing very cordially, culminating in the Sino-Russian agreement of 1924, have not yet produced a definitive treaty and the likelihood of such a treaty being signed is difficult to estimate. In the meantime the Soviet Government has employed itself in public incitement of the Chinese people to a revolt against the "unequal treaties." The significance of the denunciations, the amount of "Soviet gold" distributed and the influence of Russian civil and military advisers, have been exaggerated. The Russian sun and rain have played upon soil well-seeded and fertilized to produce an earlier crop. The seed and fertilizer have been the general contribution of Western ideas, not least of them American. Nor is the crop genuinely Bolshevik, since, as the Russians themselves admit, Chinese conditions are not suited to the development of communism. China has no exploiting class and no great class distinctions, no autocracy in government, landholding or the church. She is, however, educationally, industrially, and politically backward and she has come recently to ascribe her backwardness in large part to the various restrictions placed upon her movements by foreign control of her revenues and foreign exemptions from her laws. Wherefore her ready response when a single foreign nation surrenders rights which preachers and teachers of many foreign institutions in China have taught their students to regard as essential to that vague but universally desirable attribute which western states call sovereignty.

As in the case of Japan progress toward a mutually satisfactory Sino-Russian régime finds obstacles in the obvious intention of the
Soviets to retain the old Tzarist spheres of influence in Outer Mongolia and northern Manchuria. True, Russia recognized in 1924 "that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China" but it is well-understood that the recognition of sovereignty has been in the past and may be in the future the disguise put on by a more powerful government in which the actual administrative control and usufruct of the "protected" territory resides. Russia faces Japan for the control of northeastern Asia just as truly today as ever before and she would hesitate, even if she were inclined to do so, to withdraw her influence from a region bordering her own territory so lengthily when the probability of Japanese influence taking its place is so strong. But in view of her long-standing interest and influence in Mongolia and of the comparative success of her propaganda there Russia is not inclined to do more than pay lip-service to the weak and distracted Chinese Government.

As for northern Manchuria the Soviets have dispossessed the surviving Tzarist influence in that region by the simple device of consenting to declare with China that "the Chinese Eastern Railway is a purely commercial enterprise"—as if it could be made such by the mere statement. Although the administrative usurpations of the old Russian régime in the railway zone have been swept away there is no way by which a great power can operate a railway through the territory of a weaker state without exercising political influence over the area and the government. Northern Manchuria thus continues a sphere of Russian influence just as southern Manchuria remains a Japanese sphere. China hardly will deal confidently with Russia under such conditions. Particularly when the Soviet Government, in its anxiety to get into control of the railway, stooped to make a separate treaty with Chang Tso-lin, who had, two years previously, declared Manchuria independent of the Peking Government.

Russia promises, without date, to withdraw her troops from Outer Mongolia and to permit the Chinese Government to redeem the Chinese Eastern Railway. It would seem that events may render both these promises obsolete. It would seem that there is the gravest possibility of circumstances, among which China's internal confusion would prove the primary factor, promoting a division of the spoils, on either a friendly basis or after another conflict, between the two powers at present in actual control of the vast
northern marches of China. The disadvantages thus suffered by Russia and Japan in their diplomatic relations with China are not unique. Rather do they serve to place those countries, in Chinese eyes, in the same class with the rest of the imperialistic powers and to offset any special advantages of position or similarity of culture.

**Great Britain**

The Chinese people respect and fear but do not love the British. Upon them they place the major portion of responsibility for forcing China to admit western intercourse upon equal terms and they think of England today in terms of territories lost or well-nigh lost, of government services—the customs and salt administrations—managed by aliens, of peremptory demands for strict observance of treaties,—in short to the Chinese Britain stands as the author of their unequal international status and the guide of the Diplomatic Body in maintaining it.

The British reply to this attitude is characteristic: “Let the dead past bury its dead.” To quote a recent writer: “Whether the foreign Powers were justified in breaking down the barriers imposed by Chinese ignorance and arrogance is no longer an issue. It was settled nearly a century ago.” That for the issue of right. And as to the issue of advantage the author’s next statement is typical: “And large and perfectly legitimate commercial interests, from which the Chinese have benefited to an even greater degree than the foreigner, have been developed in consequence.” The first argument overlooks the fact that no issue is settled by force while the possibility of altering the settlement by growth in strength continues to inspirit the weaker party. The second is more substantial. But it also is defective, as many similar situations have proved, in that it rests upon the mistaken assumption that a people will exchange self-government for financial or other economic advantages.

The British have been, from the beginning of trade with China, at the centre of every argument which concerned the treaty rights of foreign states. History repeated itself very recently. The incidents involving bloodshed at Shanghai and Canton in May and June, 1925, have reacted upon the whole foreign community in China but principally upon the British. British trade is suffering a boycott today at Canton while that with other countries is welcomed. It has been the policy of Great Britain to deal firmly with the Chinese,
to take no chances, to rely upon the shrewd business sense of the people rather than their friendship, to assure the safety of the foreign community by intimidation rather than conciliation. Whatever is owed to that policy in the past it has produced a legacy of ill-will to set beside its benefits.

Added to her own sins in the eyes of the Chinese were those of Japan when, in consequence of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Great Britain was practically forced into endorsing the aggressive program of Japan. With the termination of the alliance began a new period in British relations with China, one in which emphasis was to be placed upon cooperation with the United States and the actual application of the Open Door doctrine. The evidences of the new policy on the British side are collaboration with the United States in determining the scope and terms of the loans that might be made by the Consortium and acquiescence in the American policies of holding the tariff revision conference and of carrying on the investigation of extraterritoriality and Chinese legal administration as provided for at the Washington Conference. In all of these projects the British Government has gone counter to the loudly expressed views of the British commercial community in China, though it has had the endorsement of the financial directorates in the City.

British relations with China were rendered more cordial by the statement of intention to restore Wei Hai Wei, the British lease in northern Shantung, but negotiations to that end have not moved rapidly. Opinion among British missionaries in favor of treaty renunciation has been gathering force and has been exerted to affect the action of the Government. Symptomatic of the realization of the issues at stake is the recent action of the Shanghai municipal council in voting to recommend the admission of a limited number of Chinese members. Recently the British parliament voted to return the unpaid portion of the British share of the Boxer indemnity to China. Most significant of all the evidences of the change in the British attitude is the refusal of the Government to compel the opening of the port of Canton, closed by the boycott, to British trade, in spite of the large losses undergone daily by British merchants through its closure.

The question of Tibet remains an issue between China and Britain. That little-known region wishes to continue as in the past an autonomous vassal state of China. No doubt that relationship would
be satisfactory to China if she could feel confident that it would remain permanent. But she fears that advantage will be taken of her slight control over Tibet and desires to bring the area more completely under her government. To Britain the interest in Tibet is two-fold—trade and security. She desires especially to maintain Tibet as a buffer state against Russia and she feels that the present status of Tibet is admirably suited to her purposes. In 1912 she refused to permit China, under the strong government of Yuan Shih-k'ai, to conquer the faction in Tibet that was opposing a closer integration of the territory with China. Not, apparently, wishing Tibet for herself, she will not permit it to become a portion of China proper. The issues involved compose a problem of extreme difficulty and one of which no solution appears to be in sight.

The Chinese realize that the amelioration of their international status depends principally upon the attitude of Great Britain, due to the preponderance of that country's investment in the trade and development of China. What they should also realize is that the British argument of mutual advantage is well-founded. In British governmental circles it appears already to be recognized that the new spirit of China calls for new methods of treatment and that it will be necessary to establish a more equalitarian relationship between China and capitalist nations before the former profitable era of railway and industrial development can be revived. Undoubtedly, British interests, like those of America, will prosper most in an atmosphere of equal opportunity provided that the Chinese are enabled to feel confident that the same equality exists for them as for the nations competing for their trade. The British position is a hard one today because it appears inevitable that in the impending period of restoration of authority the largest foreign interests will suffer the most. It is for China to take account of this fact and to moderate her demands for immediate emancipation. The important consideration is that the movement be forward and that Britain do not appear to be retarding the movement gratuitously.

THE UNITED STATES

Americans have not been mistaken in believing that the Chinese have regarded them as friends. Without smugness, because outsiders admit its truth, Americans may claim to have dealt more fairly with China than has any other important trading and investing
people. That the Chinese of every class and in all parts of the coun-
try know this is evidence of the existence of channels of information
accessible to the illiterate. The resulting good-will today is less
evident. The people of China are tending to place America in a com-
mon category with the "imperialistic powers." It is not difficult
to see why.

America's good name in China was earned during a period when
other western countries were seizing her territories and demanding
extensive spheres of interest. It was John Hay who, while terminat-
ing the movement toward the break-up of China, introduced the
principle of the open door and in so doing placed the United States
on an equality with other states in the economic development of the
country. For two decades the open door policy was destined to lie
in the pigeon-holes of foreign offices, to the disadvantage of the
United States financially but to the preservation of American credit
with the people of China. President Wilson contributed to our
prestige in withdrawing from the first financial consortium in 1913.
The change in America's position came when the President changed
his mind and endorsed our re-entry into the consortium. The
United States then became the dominant voice in a superpowerful
combination of capital which was prepared to shut off the greater
sources of loan funds from China unless that country would authorize
a degree of foreign financial supervision which it considered both
objectionable and dangerous. The life of the new consortium has
been contemporary with a period of almost utter stagnation in
governmental reorganization, railway-building and other construc-
tive enterprises. For this the United States is held mainly respon-
sible. Apparently China would rather take her chances with the
powers separately than with the combination represented in the
Consortium.

A second explanation of China's new attitude toward the United
States lies in the definite establishment of the policy of cooperation
with Great Britain which grew out of the Great War. To China that
development meant a stiffening of American, as well as a relaxa-
tion of British policy. Evidence that this was a well-founded anticipa-
tion is forthcoming in American endorsement of the still-born
plan to place a police force under foreign command over China's
railways, in American participation in the protection of the Canton
customs funds against seizure by Sun Yat-sen and in the recent
threat to take naval action if the Peiho were not opened to traffic, as well as in the absence of criticism of such incidents as occurred last year in Shanghai and Canton. The attitude of the Department of State has not always been imitated by the representatives of Congress nor by private individuals.

The United States has been criticized by the Chinese for its failure to effectuate the open door policy. At present there is serious doubt among them regarding the American Government's attitude on the question of Manchuria. Loans of American banks to Japanese quasi-governmental corporations to be used in stimulating Japanese immigration to and industrial development in Manchuria appear to the Chinese, ignorant of the real attitude of the State Department toward such loans, to be evidence of indifference to the fate of Manchuria. American trade has not been able to meet Japanese competition, the Consortium has made no progress toward railway development and there appears to be, in general, a wait-and-see policy regarding the region. It would appear that the lack of regular relations with Russia is a felt deficiency in the American diplomatic equipment for affecting the progress of Japanese control in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. It is not suggested that the American Government desires to hinder the development of Japan. America's relations with China are conditioned primarily by the universal desire of the American people for peace and friendly relations with Japan. What is desired is to accommodate Japan within the limitations of the open door and integrity of China policies. The record of the Washington Conference contains very little information on the problem of Manchuria but what it contains indicates that the government of the United States still regards Manchuria as a part of China.

In spite of these changes in the American situation it is probable that the United States has not altogether lost its special position in the confidence and good-will of the Chinese people. What was lost at Versailles was regained at Washington. American leadership has been marked in the effort to effectuate the tariff treaty and the resolution on extraterritoriality. The sentiment of American missionaries has offset the views of the associated American chambers of commerce in China. And the absence of such physical evidences of interference as settlements, leases, spheres, and protectorates continues to give to America a margin of advantage in Chinese eyes.
The American position is not an easy one. There is danger of falling between two stools—interest in the strengthening of China and in retaining her friendship on the one hand and cooperation with Great Britain and other powers on the other. To fail in the former desideratum would be to destroy a tradition and to lose an important advantage in the race for trade and investment opportunities, while to be isolated would mean to be compelled to meet vigorous international competition and to lose an opportunity for leadership. It will require the most astute diplomacy to keep the confidence of both sides.

CONCLUSION

The present situation of China points to the close dependence of a country's foreign relations upon domestic conditions. It is in spite of those conditions, not because of them, that China has regained territory and authority which had been in the possession of other states. Were she today a well-knit and orderly community there can be no question of her immediate success in obtaining general recognition of equality.

The Chinese leaders are unwilling to wait upon the advent of internal sobriety to secure the advantages of external sovereignty. The question that arises is one of the possibility of compromise, of each side consenting to give way in part for the sake of a gradual and peaceful deliverance from the deadlock that now exists.

Present tendencies run toward such a development. All of the powers having special privileges in China are showing a cordial attitude toward an improvement in her position. At the same time they are insisting firmly upon the preservation of protections for foreign lives and property. It would seem that a people as eminently reasonable as the Chinese would not deny the justice of that insistence. There is need of greater confidence, however, in the good intentions of their foreign friends. This confidence should develop if the powers continue to show toward China the present attitude of non-interference and patience.

RECENT EVENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL

Since the completion of this article events of considerable, if not of major, importance have occurred in China and in that country's
relations with other states. While it is quite impossible to speak conclusively of anything political in contemporary China interest attaches to the incidents that reveal tendencies in the undoubted progress of that great civilization toward its wonted calm and toward a position of dignity among the nations.

China has been without a president ever since Tuan Ch'í-jui left office in April, 1926, at the demand of Marshal Wu Pei-fu. Shifting cabinets have been kept in being with difficulty. Among the factions contending for supremacy in North China none has been strong enough to control a presidential selection nor conciliatory enough to acquiesce in a coalition choice. Consequently a logical enough development has taken place in that the cabinets have represented the dominant forces and the capital has had a coalition, conciliatory executive made up of the proxies of the more influential tuchūn. Only the militarists who for the time being pretend to be somewhat friendly toward each other have, however, been represented.

Probably love's labor is lost in attempting to determine the constitutional aspects of the current situation in Peking. The so-called permanent constitution, which came into effect on October 10, 1923, was declared suspended by the provisional government of Tuan in 1924. If it be granted—what would be difficult to prove—that the constitution had been constitutionally established there arises the question of the authority of a provisional executive to suspend it. Furthermore, now that Tuan has passed from the scene it may be assumed that his acts of an irregular character have passed with him. Assuming then that the “permanent” constitution is of legal effect, the executive authority rests in the cabinet. Article 76 of the constitution reads: “In the event of the vice-president vacating his post whilst the presidency is vacant, the cabinet shall officiate for the president.” To be sure one may ask how the cabinets are appointed but if one examines credentials too closely business must stop altogether.

Of greater importance at present than the constitutional issue is the actual territorial extent of the authority exercised at the national capital. A success long-sought by Sun Yat-sen, the southern Kuo-mintang (nationalist party) leader, was attained during the summer of 1926 by his followers. By a combined effort of arms and rhetoric the Cantonese forces drove through Hunan into Hupeh and captured the triplet cities Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankow. This remarkable
success has given emphasis to the long-standing ineffectiveness of Peking authority south of the Yangtze river and has raised apprehensions lest the drive be continued to the capital itself. Between the Cantonese and that goal however, lie four substantial armies—that of Wu Pei-fu, centering in Honan, of Sun Chuan-fang, based on Kiangsu, of Chang Tsung-chang, tupan of Shantung and of Chang Tso-lin, now garrisoning Peking and moving toward central China. These four armies are loosely allied to maintain control of China north of the Yangtze and of the provinces immediately south and west of its mouth. Canton has an ally in Feng Yu-hsiang, whose army has not recovered from its recent defeat by Chang Tso-lin and is at present scattered through the far interior regions of Shensi, Kansu and inner Mongolia. Prospects for Cantonese success to the northward appear slight, but it must be remembered that the allegiance of the soldiery is easily swayed. Nothing would be less surprising than a wholesale flocking of the troops of Wu and Chang to the banners of Feng and Canton. A revision of alliances favorable to the southern faction is another possibility. Wu and Chang Tso-lin are not good friends and Sun Chuan-fang is interested principally in holding his place in Kiangsu.

Should the Kuomintang secure the capital the prospects of order and constitutional government would, it seems probable, improve. This party has stood from the beginning for liberal ideas and it is hardly likely that militarist elements could control it once it gained power and international recognition. It is, and has always been, the most nationalistic section of Chinese opinion and it demands the recognition of China’s equality most loudly of all. But foreign powers would have no need of their special treaty position if the Chinese Government were ordered and unified.

Events in Manchuria also have had a direct bearing upon the problem of unification. In the fall of 1925 Feng Yu-hsiang broke the truce with Chang Tso-lin and very nearly succeeded in ousting him from Manchuria. Chang was saved by the action of Japan in forbidding hostilities within the zone of the South Manchurian railway. Since that time he has, in turn, attacked Feng and driven him out of Peking. Perhaps it is not too wide of the mark to suggest that had Feng been successful the Cantonese forces, his allies, would now be in control of the capital. It appears, furthermore, that if the republicans are to control China they must first come to an understanding with Japan regarding Manchuria.
DIPLOMATIC

China has made greater progress toward international equality within recent months than the results of the Tariff Conference and the investigation of the extraterritoriality commission would suggest. It will be recalled that the former was convened in Peking on October 26, 1925, in order to carry out the Washington Conference provisions for a revision of Chinese treaty tariffs. It was adjourned sine die on July 3, 1926, the Chinese delegates having been forced out by the turn of national politics. The lack of unity among the Chinese factions greatly impeded the progress of the Conference and but one significant decision was taken prior to adjournment. By unanimous vote of the delegates it was resolved that China should be recognized as possessing customs autonomy from January 1, 1929, China, on her part agreeing concurrently, but not by way of prior condition, to abolish likin, the internal tax on goods in transport, on the same date. Considerable variation was evidenced in the views of the Chinese and the foreign delegates as to the interim tariffs to be levied, the classification of goods and the use of the revenue. There were also points of difference in the proposals of the foreign delegates. Upon adjournment the latter issued a statement to the effect that they were unanimously desirous of proceeding with the work of the Conference at the earliest moment that the Chinese delegates should find themselves in a position to resume discussion.

The Commission on Extraterritoriality, also set in motion by a Washington Conference agreement, completed its work on September 16, 1926, and presented a fair report of conditions observed, giving much greater attention to the Chinese courts and administration than to the extraterritorial régime. The report does not recommend the immediate abolition of extraterritoriality nor elaborate an interim scheme. It does, however, contribute toward progress by suggesting reforms both in the practice of extraterritorial privileges and in the legal, judicial, and legislative institutions of China and their administration. It looks forward to a progressive relaxation of the extraterritorial régime and refrains from assuming a patronizing attitude. The report of the commission is a very interesting one which deserves reading in full. It was signed by all the delegates, Dr. Wang Chung-hui signing for China with reservations as to certain portions but not as to the recommendations.

In September, 1926, the “mixed court” at Shanghai, which has
been, since 1911, entirely under foreign control, was returned to the Chinese. Hereafter the judges will be designated by the Chinese authorities while the foreign consuls will sit as assessors only.

Since the Great War the Chinese have shown an increasing repugnance toward dealing with the treaty states as a group. In harmony with this attitude was the action taken on November 6, 1926, by Dr. Wellington Koo, acting premier and foreign minister, in abrogating the general treaty with Belgium. Belgium was offered the opportunity to negotiate a new treaty but declined to do so and is insisting that the question of the right of China to abrogate the treaty be brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice for decision. China is a signatory of the optional clause of the Court protocol but claims that the issue involved is political and should be dealt with by the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations. She has asked Japan also for revision of the Sino-Japanese treaty which became subject to revision in October, 1926, and has received a somewhat favorable but indefinite reply.

There are evidences within recent months that the larger powers are giving plenty of thought to the further improvement of their relations with China. It seems to be true, despite such incidents as the intervention at Taku and the shelling, by British gunboats, of a Yangtze town, that the forces of moderation in every country have gained the upper hand in the decision of policies toward China. But what policy should be adopted? That is the real problem, one that is badly complicated by the lack of unity in so vast a country. To relinquish the treaty rights by negotiation with the Peking Government; to arrive at settlements with that government respecting the Chinese debts; to arrange for new loans; what will such decisions mean to Canton, to Shanghai, to Tsinanfu, to Mukden and other regional capitals? Naturally they will all willingly accept relinquishments of restrictions but will they all as readily carry out the engagements entered upon as the basis of a new relationship?

It appears that the powers are recognizing that they must, in some way, obtain the contacts which their essential interests demand with those portions of China that do not recognize the constitutional authority of Peking. Both Mr. MacMurray, the American minister to China and Sir Miles Lampson, newly appointed British minister, have had interviews with the leaders of the southern faction. There are rumors of a recognition of that faction as a belligerent govern-
ment. The termination of the Canton boycott against British trade, which occurred on October 10, 1926, has rendered British-Canton relations much more tolerable. On December 18 the British minister at Peking delivered a memorandum to the ministers of the states represented at the Washington Conference, in which a series of suggestions for a cooperative policy is recommended. For the most part these might have been borrowed from the statesmanlike utterance of Mr. MacMurray upon closing his highly interesting roundtable discussion on China at Williamstown in 1924. Epitomized they amount to: (a) abandonment of foreign tutelage over China's economic and political development; (b) recognition of China's tariff autonomy upon her promulgation of a new tariff act; (c) disclaimer of any intent to force foreign control upon China; (d) declaration of readiness to negotiate on treaty revision and other questions; (e) immediate, unconditional grant of surtaxes agreed to at the Washington Conference; (f) a constructive policy, adapted to present circumstances, pending establishment of a real government. The last item is most significant, indicating as it does that the powers must give up the earlier assumption that all reform, domestic and international, must wait upon the establishment of a strong central government.

What is needed today is a *modus vivendi* by which practical results may be attained without injury to the integrity of China. Formal recognition, attended by the establishment of diplomatic relations, with Hankow, Mukden, or any other Chinese area, is not to be considered. On the other hand the recognition of Peking should not be allowed to interfere with cordial and helpful relations between recalcitrant regions and foreign states. There is little need to fear the break-up of China since the strength of national feeling is likely to offset temptations to pursue a separatist program. The time has arrived for the powers to launch a liberal policy, to reject every suggestion of intervention, to set a course without regard to treaty rights, to recognize that a new nation is being born. China will come her half of the way.
SYLLABUS ON RECENT CHINESE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY

A. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND CHINESE LAW

I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Why established; foreign states exercising extraterritorial rights; attitude of Chinese toward its establishment

Scope of extraterritoriality; taxation; police regulations; land; mines and factories; inland commerce; missions; residence concessions.

Foreign consular courts; judicial capacity of consuls; number of consular courts; variety of law applied; sources of law for American courts in China; treatment of Chinese plaintiffs; appeals; difficulties in obtaining evidence; misuse of rights to protect foreign and Chinese criminals; attitude of Chinese plaintiffs toward consular courts.

The "mixed court" at Shanghai; original basis of establishment; development of foreign control; effects of Revolution of 1911; return to Chinese control; other mixed courts in China.

Relation of extraterritorial rights to protection of foreigners against military interference and banditry.

II. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN CHINA

Essential character of Chinese law under the empire; criminal law; civil law; punishments; prisons.

Legal reform; the new codes; foreign influence in the codes.

The judicial system; extent of application of the reforms; character of the "new" judges; independence of the judiciary; modern prisons.

The Chinese bar.

III. THE QUESTION OF ABOLITION

Earlier proposals regarding modification of the extraterritorial régime; treaties of 1902 and 1903; Versailles Conference; Washington Conference.

Loss of rights by Germans; by Austrians; by Russians; treatment of these nationals in Chinese courts; attitude of their governments; effect upon their trade.

Comparison of situation in China with that in other countries at the date of abolition: Japan; Turkey.

Proposals for a transitional period; present system in Egypt; in Siam.

1 Prepared for the Los Angeles Institute of Public Affairs, by Professor Harold S. Quigley.
Opinions of different foreign groups in China: missionaries; merchants; British opinion; Japanese opinion.

Work of the Washington Conference commission in the investigation of foreign and Chinese legal administration; extent of that commission's authority; its report.

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B. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

I. IMPERIAL POLITICS AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1911
Dominant elements under the empire; monarchy: councils and boards; civil service based upon literary qualifications; “squeeze”; nepotism; lack of separation of powers; excess of officials; actual provincial autonomy; strong local sentiment involved in the family system; light taxation.
Reasons for the Revolution: the Empress Dowager; the radicals; Sun Yat-sen; the moderates; K'ang Yu-wei; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao; foreign concessions and provincial jealousy.

II. EFFECTS OF THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION
Establishment of a “Provisional Constitution”; imperfect attempt at a cabinet system; no provision regarding provincial government.
Destruction of an ancient monarchy; absence of traditional centre of power; civil service on new basis.
Rise of struggle between military and civilian forces—between tuchün and parliament; the constitutionalists; Kuomintang; Chinputang; federalism; the tuchün or tupan.

III. ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI (1914-1916)
Yuan the heir of the greater viceroy; his character and methods; treatment of parliament; possibility of accommodation; influence of foreign loans.
Yuan’s “Constitutional Compact”; his governing machinery; the monarchy movement; death of Yuan.

IV. “NORTH” VS. “SOUTH” (1916-1924)
Restoration of parliament; Li Yuan-hung; Tuan Ch'i-jui; issue of entrance into the Great War; second dissolution of parliament.
Break-up of China into autonomous regions; no united “North” or “South” in fact; peregrinations of parliament; revival of civil war; election of Sun Yat-sen as president of “South” China; Sun vs. Ch'en.
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Alliance of Sun Yat-sen and Chang Tso-lin against the Chihli triumvirate; outbreak of civil war in 1924; treachery of Feng Yu-hsiang and rout of Wu Pei-fu; the "Little Emperor" ousted from the palace; Sun Yat-sen in Peking; his death there; Ts'ao K'un imprisoned and Tuan Ch'i-jui installed as provisional president; the "Reorganization Conference"; the "Senate"; the proposed "Citizens' Conference."

Feng attempts to overthrow Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, but fails; alliance of Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin; Feng driven out of Peking; disappearance of civil government in the capital; Wu and Chang on the teeter-board.

The situation at Canton; charter government; Russian influence; conquest of South.

Possible tendencies toward provincial independence; meaning of independence as used by provincial or regional dictators; importance of Chinese cultural homogeneity; prospects for a "strong man": Is a "strong central government" essential in China?

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C. Economic Conditions and Problems

I. Major Economic Groups

Conditions of the agricultural class; land-holding; effect of new ideas upon village life; influence of country gentry upon political affairs.

Development of a labor movement; guilds and unions; strikes; use of the boycott; situation at Canton; relation of labor conditions to the military situation; child labor.

Position of the merchant class; banking; manufacturing; mining; shipping; influence of commercial clubs; degree of independence shown toward military governors.

II. Foreign Trade and Investment

The Chinese customs service: establishment and importance of the inspectorate-general; British vs. Japanese claims to that office; deposit of customs funds.
The Chinese tariff: limitations involved in the 5 per cent treaty rates as compared with tariffs of other countries.

Development of Chinese commerce: trends; distribution among foreign countries; effort to develop port at Whampoa; possibilities of Tsingtao; effects of civil war upon commerce and internal trade; likin: nature and effects.

Peking tariff conference: Chinese proposals; American and Japanese proposals; autonomy resolution; issue of loan security; likin issue; interim arrangements.

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The Chinese Eastern Railway: original method of financing; interest of France; economic value of road; effect of loss of South Manchurian line upon its profits; status under new Sino-Soviet treaties.

The Consortium: the apparent change of American policy; attitude of Japan; plans for loans; difficulties with the Chinese government and people; question of foreign participation in administration; possibilities of private loans; of cooperation with Chinese bankers; issue of security.

Japan in Manchuria: extent of concessions for minerals; railway-concessions; new railways under construction or contemplated; soya beans; oil manufacture; Chinese immigration.

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III. LOANS

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Plans for funding unsecured obligations; prospects for a reorganization of Chinese finances.

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D. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF CHINA

I. PHASES IN SINO-FOREIGN RELATIONS

Period of conflict: reasons for Chinese opposition to regular intercourse with foreigners.

Period of submission: losses of territory; unilateral treaties; establishment of foreign control over various services.

Period of foreign domination: foreign garrisons; indemnities; leases and spheres; danger of break-up.

Period of nationalism: ideas of democracy; the "renaissance"; demands for treaty revision; boycotts; anti-foreignism; regional demands for recognition.
II. CHINA AND JAPAN

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The Anglo-Japanese alliance; Russo-Japanese war; acquisition of leases of Kwantung, the South Manchurian railway and natural resources of South Manchuria; fate of the open door doctrine in South Manchuria; accommodation with Russia.

Twenty-one Demands; Japan's "Monroe Doctrine for Asia"; the Secret Treaties; Shantung settlement at Versailles; its reversal at Washington. Militarism vs. economic penetration; policy of conciliation; recent Russo-Japanese relations in Manchuria; railways, coal, iron, and beans. Japan at the Tariff Conference; views on abolition of extraterritoriality; favorable attitude toward treaty revision; possibilities of a Far Eastern "bloc."

III. CHINA AND RUSSIA

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Russian territorial gains at China's expense: Siberia; maritime province; Ili; Russian railway concessions in Manchuria; scope of Russian railway designs; administration of railway zones; Russia's application of the open door doctrine.

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China and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics: delay in recognition; Soviet manifestoes surrendering treaty rights; disposition of Russian share of Boxer indemnity; treaties of 1924; Ambassador Karakhan; Soviet tactics vs. the "imperialistic" powers; Chinese friendship for the Soviets; the Chinese Eastern Railway; Mongolia; attitude of Chang Tso-lin.

IV. CHINA AND GREAT BRITAIN

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V. CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

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American missionaries: educational and medical work in China; influence upon American policy of the groups therein represented; the Boxer indemnity.


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VI. CHINA AND FRANCE

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France at the Washington Conference; the "Gold Franc" case; disposition of French share of Boxer indemnity.

France and the "Shanghai" case.

Participation of France in tariff and extraterritoriality investigations.

VII. CHINA AND GERMANY

German policy in Kiao-chao; friendly attitude of the Chinese toward the Germans; deportations forced by the powers; loss of concessions and other treaty rights.

Post-war revival of German trade; basis of present Sino-German relations.

VIII. CHINA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

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The League and the opium traffic: conferences of 1924-5; withdrawal of the Chinese and American delegations; new Indian policy of restriction.
Chinese participation in the International Labor Organization; in the Permanent Court of International Justice.

The proposed plan of League assistance toward Chinese financial reorganization; hostile attitude of the Chinese.

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China Society of America, 19 West 44th Street, New York, N. Y.
Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, 18 East 41st Street, New York, N. Y.
Institute of Pacific Relations, J. Merle Davis, General Secretary, Honolulu, Hawaii. (Described in International Conciliation, No. 218, March, 1926. Issues excellent news letters and bulletins).

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NOTE

The following letter, dated December 22, 1926, has been received from J. Merle Davis, Executive Secretary, Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Hawaii:

I wish to call your attention to a serious error of statement contained in the Preface of the International Conciliation Series pamphlet of March, 1926. On page 5, in the late Judge Thomas Burke's speech describing the Institute of Pacific Relations which met in Honolulu, in July, 1925, the following words appear, "At one time it seemed as if the Chinese representatives had made up their minds to withdraw from the conference, but on more careful consideration they did not do so." The word, "Chinese," in this sentence is an error and should be corrected to read, "Japanese."

Since at your request I read the proof of this pamphlet before going to press, I feel a measure of responsibility for the above-mentioned error and will be grateful if you can give this statement a prominent place in an early issue, in order that justice may be accorded our Chinese Institute members.
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

International Conciliation appeared under the imprint of the American Association for International Conciliation, No. 1, April, 1907 to No. 199, June, 1924. These documents present the views of distinguished leaders of opinion of many countries on vital international problems and reproduce the texts of official treaties, diplomatic correspondence and draft plans for international projects such as the Permanent Court of International Justice. The most recent publications are listed below. A complete list will be sent upon application to International Conciliation, 405 West 117th Street, New York City.

212. European Security: Address by Dr. Edward Beneš, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, at Prague, April 1, 1925; Address by Mr. Austen Chamberlain, British Foreign Minister, at Geneva, March 12, 1925; Reply to Mr. Chamberlain’s Address by Mr. J. Ramsay MacDonald, Former British Prime Minister, April 10, 1925. September, 1925.


215. The Trend of Economic Restoration since the Dawes Reparation Settlement, by E. G. Burland, Member of the Staff of the American Section of the International Chamber of Commerce. December, 1925.


217. Peasant Conditions in Russia, 1925, by Jean Efremoff, Former Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government of Russia. February, 1926.

218. The Institute of Pacific Relations, by J. Merle Davis, General Secretary. March, 1926.

219. The Fourth Year of the Permanent Court of International Justice, by Manley O. Hudson, Bemis Professor of International Law, Harvard Law School. April, 1926.


223. The Political Doctrine of Fascism, by Alfredo Rocco, Minister of Justice in the Government of Italy. Recent Legislation in Italy. October, 1926.


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**Additional Notes:**
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- BY SHAO CHANG, LEE, PROFESSOR OF CHINESE HISTORY AND LANGUAGE, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII
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