"The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."
—Honorable John Hay, Secretary of State, 1900.

"It therefore will be necessary for the United States to decide whether it will actively move to compel a satisfactory solution, or will permit American interests to continue to drift on the current of events; whether it will formulate its own policy, or have one thrust upon it; whether it will lead or follow. That the United States must have an Asiatic policy cannot be doubtful."
—Thomas F. Millard.
HISTORICAL OUTLINE

1784—First American ship in Canton Harbor.
1844—First treaty between the United States and China. Americans to trade at five new ports; definite statement of principle of extraterritoriality; 5% tariff.
1859—Treaty between the United States and China, subsequent to treaty of Tientsin between China and France and Great Britain. Eight new ports opened; reduction of tariff; toleration of Christianity; establishment of American Ministry at Peking.
1863—Municipal Council at Shanghai elected by Americans and British.
1867—Chinese Mission to foreign countries; Burlingame, American Minister, a member.
1868—First American Immigration Law.
1880—Limitation of Chinese immigration, and American undertaking to refrain from opium traffic.
1883—Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Korea.
1885—Excess portion of Taiping Indemnity remitted.
1894—Service of the United States to Japan and China, in attempting to avert war between them, and as custodian of their interests during the war.
1899—The Open Door Policy.
1900—The Boxer Uprising. Terms of the protocol of 1901 applying to the United States: Permission to maintain military force in Peking Legation; to contribute to joint guard at Tientsin, and along Peking-Tientsin Railway; $25,000,000 indemnity.
1903—Commercial treaty between United States and China, providing for: Raising of Chinese import and export tariffs to an effective 5%; abolition of likin.
1904—Request of United States that Russia and Japan respect Chinese neutrality during the war.
1905—Agreement on the part of the United States to a Japanese protectorate for Korea. Mediation of United States between Japan and Russia, bringing war to close.
1908—Remission of $11,000,000 of Boxer Indemnity, the amount over actual loss.
1909—Rejection by Russia and Japan of Secretary Knox's proposal to neutralize the Manchurian railways.
1911—The Chinese Revolution. No formal support from United States; assistance of individual Americans—Homer Lea, Paul Linebarger, etc.; tradition of Admiral Mark Bristol's friendliness and tact towards revolutionary leaders.
1913—Recognition by United States of Chinese Republic.
1915—United States' protest to Japan and China over the “Twenty-one Demands.”
1917—The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, recognizing Japan's “special interests” in China. United States' successful attempt to enroll China in the war against Germany.
1918—Efforts of United States to secure the restoration of Shantung to China at the Versailles Conference, unsuccessful.
1920—Conference of International Consortium of Bankers, headed by American group. Negative result, due to exclusion of Chinese bankers from their plans.
1921-22—Washington Disarmament Conference.
1924—Remission of final portion of Boxer Indemnity to China.*
1925—Tariff Conference.
1926—Report from Extraterritoriality Commission.
1927—Porter Resolution passed by Congress, recommending revision of unilateral treaties. Statement of independent American policy by Secretary Kellogg. Proposal by Secretary Kellogg to contesting Chinese factions to eliminate Shanghai from the war area, rejected. Presentation of identical notes to Eugene Chen by the five major powers, demanding reparations for the violence and destruction at Nanking.
1928—Failure of Morgan project to loan $30,000,000 to the South Manchurian Railway. United States' support of Japanese stand to retain central customs administration at Peking, as tending to emphasize unity of China. Temporary status of marines in China altered March 1st to permanent status. Adjustment between Nanking Government and United States of demands for reparation following the Nanking trouble last year.

*This sum, about $3,000,000, is secured by the maritime customs. It is being used, at our recommendation, for educational purposes, through the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture. This Foundation maintains the China Institute in New York, supports the Metropolitan Library at Peking, and distributes prizes for scientific achievements, and grants to educational institutions in China.
There are two sources from which one may acquire a conception as to the nature of the policy of this country towards China: State documents, and the course of events. The purpose of this report is to examine both sources, to note consistencies and inconsistencies, and in the light of what has happened, to summarize the present American policy.

**NATURE OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN CHINA**

The nature of the policy of the United States towards China has been logically determined by the character of our interests in China. These have been confined almost entirely to trade and cultural activities. During the 19th century, while European and Japanese colonial expansion was progressing at so rapid a rate in China, the United States was occupied with the vast task of expansion on the North American continent. If we had been an established nation at that time, perhaps we, too, would have acquired a vast indignation at the murder of missionaries and soothed ourselves with territorial grants. As it is, the United States has no leased territories, possessions, nor concessions in China. Our total investment, missionary and commercial, amounts to a little more than half of our trade with China during 1926, which totaled $253,363,129.

Because we have not alienated Chinese territory, we have been spared bloodshed and the reputation of foreign aggressor, which has applied to every other major power represented in China. We have relied instead upon friendship and persuasion, and this course has created for our country much genuine good-will among the Chinese. Our material investment being smaller, we have been more free to pursue a progressive and liberal course. And yet, because we are in a sense a graft onto the original stock of rooted foreign interests in China, we must ever seek to conciliate Japan in the north, and England and France in central and south China. These powers will modify our policy as long as they maintain their holdings in China.

**INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA**

Long before diplomatic relations were established between the United States and China, trade flourished between Canton and the New England ports. By 1810 thirty-seven American ships were anchored in Canton harbor. Our first treaties with China (1844 and 1859) followed up the advantages won by Great Britain and France in their wars with China. By invoking the most-favored-nation clause, we were enabled to trade on equal terms with Europeans at all the treaty ports, although we had fought no battles and made no enemies. Our first minister was appointed to Peking by the terms of the treaty of 1859.

Our early contacts with China had been determined by trade expediency. Closer associations, the development of California, and the expansion of trade, made these more frequent and complex. The "friendship policy" began to emerge. In 1868 the first American Immigration Act was passed, granting to Chinese the right of citizenship and free residence in the United States, and affirming "the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance and also the mutual advantage of free immigration and emigration." In 1880 we agreed not to engage in the opium trade. A few years
later, Congress returned to China almost half of the Taiping indemnity of 500,000 taels, the amount above actual loss sustained by American interests during the Taiping Rebellion.

The war between Japan and China (1894-95) accelerated the impending break-up of China. Formosa was ceded to Japan. Russia demanded the lease of Darien and Port Arthur. Kwanchowwan was leased to France, and Great Britain demanded the lease of Kowloon and Wei-hai-wei. The future was not promising either for Chinese independence or American trade. Accordingly John Hay proposed his famous “Open Door” policy, which was accepted by all of the powers. Its three stipulations were:

(1) Treaty ports or vested interests shall be free from all interference on the part of the power within whose “sphere of influence” such ports or interests are located.

(2) The Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said “sphere of interest,” and the duties shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

(3) Discriminatory dues and charges shall not be levied against merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of powers other than the power dominating said “sphere”.

This policy was designed to regulate the administrations of the powers in their several “spheres” of influence. It protected them from each other, and prevented the partition of China. And it permitted American trade to develop in a country where we had no territorial foothold.

In 1901, during the proceedings which followed the Boxer Uprising, the United States secured from the powers involved formal agreement to the principle of China’s territorial and administrative sovereignty. In 1908 Congress remitted to China nearly half of our $25,000,000 share of the Boxer Indemnity, or the amount in excess of our losses. And when in 1915 Japan presented her famous “Twenty-one Demands,” we protested against certain features—to be explicit, against those which constituted an invasion of Great Britain’s sphere of influence, and those which required Japanese supervision of a large share of China’s domestic administration.*

In 1917, China at the instigation of the United States, severed relations with Germany, and later declared war. Our Government believed that as an ally at the Peace Conference, China could more effectively ask for the restoration of Shantung. Our attempt to secure the return of Shantung to China at Versailles was unsuccessful, due to the secret treaties which Japan had made with Great Britain and France in which they agreed to uphold her claims to Shantung. The Chinese delegates refused to sign the treaty.

In 1921 came the Washington Conference, where, at the insistence of the British and American delegates, the relations of the foreign powers with

*The original “Demands” included: (1) Transfer of German privileges in Shantung to Japan and exclusive rights in Shantung. (2) Absolute freedom of residence and occupation for Japanese in South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia; Japanese subjects to be permitted to open mines in this region; Japanese Government consent to be obtained on loans from a third Power for building railways in this region; political, financial, and military advisers in this region to be Japanese; leases of Port Arthur, Dalny, the South Manchurian Railway, and the Antung-Mukden Railway to be extended to 99 years. (3) The Hanyehping Company (in the Yangtse valley) to be a joint concern of Japan and China; no other mines in the neighborhood of those owned by said Company to be worked by persons outside of the Company without its consent, and no undertaking directly or indirectly affecting its interests to be carried out without its consent. (4) The Chinese Government not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbor or bay or island along the coast of China. (5) The Chinese Government to employ Japanese advisers in political, financial, and military affairs; Chinese and Japanese to administer jointly police departments in important places; China to purchase a fixed amount of munitions from Japan; Japanese approval required on foreign loans for the development of Fukien province.
China were reconsidered. Upon the treaties there drawn up are based the present formal relations between China and the powers.

Out of the history of our intercourse with China have emerged three traditions: Pursuit of trade; defense of China's interests; and co-operation with the other powers. By these principles our diplomatic course has been guided; and because they sometimes conflict rather badly, the history of our relations with China is not the uninterrupted stream of benefits conferred and received that some have conceived it to be.

In the interests of trade, our nationals exist in China on the same basis as other foreigners, whereby they receive privileges which we would never freely grant to foreigners in our country. American goods may enter China at rates from 5% to 10%, whereas Chinese goods entering our country must be taxed at rates varying from 30% to 90%. The effects of our first friendly immigration treaty were arbitrarily annulled by exclusion in 1904, and the way in which the law has been applied at ports of entry has been most unfortunate.* Our attempts to prevent the war with Japan in 1894, and to spare invasion of Chinese territory in 1904, were unsuccessful. We agreed to sixteen of the twenty-one demands, the date of whose acceptance the Chinese observe with national mourning. Our proposal that Chinese territorial and administrative sovereignty be respected is violated by the treaties in force, and by the unauthorized measures which the powers, including the United States, have chosen to consider necessary.

What good has our policy brought China? We have kept bad from going to worse. We have not kept money that did not belong to us. And we have made an effort to bring about moderate reforms in the general foreign policy of the powers.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

At the Washington Conference summoned by President Harding in 1921, various treaties were drawn up between the nine powers represented, towards the adoption of "a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other powers on the basis of equality of opportunity." The main agreements outlined in the treaties were:

(1) Respect of China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity.

(2) China to receive the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

(3) Armed forces maintained by the powers in China without treaty sanction were to be withdrawn whenever China should assure the protection of the lives and property of foreigners in China.

(4) A Tariff Commission representing those countries participating in the treaties, and others trading with China on the old treaty basis, was to meet in conference for the consideration of the best means of effecting revisions in the scale of tariff duties, and of

*By the Act of 1924, American citizens of Chinese race may not even bring their wives to this country from China. Because there are fewer Chinese women than men in this country, many thousands of American citizens must either give up their residence here, or remain single. A bill to remedy this situation, sponsored by Congressman Dyer, has been pending before Congress for two years.
reforming the administration of the customs with a view to granting China ultimate tariff autonomy.

(5) Another Commission similarly formed, was to be appointed for the investigation of China's claims that Extraterritoriality should be abolished.

(6) Foreign postal agencies were to be replaced by a Chinese system.

(7) Japan was to relinquish her political control of Shantung, and to give the Chinese an opportunity to redeem the Shantung railway.

(8) Great Britain was to restore Wei-hai-wei to China. (The lease expired in 1923.)

The psychological effect of the Washington Conference Treaties was very great, but the first force of their promises was weakened by the three years' delay in ratifying them, occasioned by the insistence of the French Government that payment still due on her share of the Boxer Indemnity be in gold francs of the standard of 1901.

The Tariff Conference met in the fall of 1925. Its sessions were suspended after several months, due to unsettled conditions in north China, which, however, were not so serious as to prevent the Chinese Government from paying the costs of the Conference. As a result of the deliberations, tariff autonomy was deferred for three years (until January, 1929); the customs rates in the meantime were adjusted to an effective 5% with surtaxes from 2½% to 5% on luxuries; while the eventual going into effect of the Chinese national tariff law was to be dependent upon the abolition of likin.

In 1926, the Extraterritoriality Commission presented its report, in which it approved relinquishment of extraterritorial privileges after the Chinese judicial and prison systems should have been modernized to the degree deemed necessary by the Commission. It advocated the application of Chinese laws wherever possible in consular courts, payment of authorized Chinese taxes by foreigners, reforms in the administration of foreign courts, etc. It was not empowered to put into effect any of its recommendations.

The foreign postal agencies were replaced by a Chinese system.

Japan relinquished her political hold on Shantung. She however retained all the German mines and property rights she had seized during the war.

Wei-hai-wei has not yet been restored by the British, on the ground that a responsible recipient has not yet been found. The lease expired five years ago.

How effective has our "friendship policy" been since 1925, when the Conference Treaties were ratified?

The Chinese have been collecting the duties and surtaxes approved by the Customs Conference.

The British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang were turned over early in 1927 to joint Chinese and British control, not as a result of the dignified grinding of Conference wheels, but because excited Chinese crowds demanded it, and the British thought best not to "shoot their customers" but to pacify them.
The Shanghai Municipal Council, supposedly at the insistence of the home governments, grant the Chinese three places on the main board, and six places on sub-committees, and admit the Chinese to the public parks at last.

The Porter Resolution, requesting that new treaties be drawn up between the United States and China, to effect a revision of the unilateral status existing, was passed in Congress over a year ago, and has been gathering dust ever since.

As for the guarantee of China's "territorial and administrative sovereignty," and the promises to "provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to establish," etc., and to withdraw unauthorized troops upon assurance that foreigners will be protected—these pledges have been violated whenever the powers have conceived China's interests as opposed to their own.

**OUR PRESENT POLICY**

The main points of our present Chinese policy as summed up by Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, Director of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, are:

1. Assurance of equality of opportunity.
2. Respect for China's sovereignty.
4. Non-aggression.
5. Insistence that China perform the obligations of a sovereign state in protection of foreign citizens.
6. Co-operation with foreign powers.

He adds: "It should be obvious, however, that there may at any time arise a situation in which it will not be possible to act in conformity with all of the implications of each and all of these principles in every respect at one and the same time." And with regard to the pledge of co-operation he says: "The theory of the co-operative policy does not require that in whatsoever direction one or more powers may wish to proceed the others must go; and the express commitments with regard to co-operation are commitments individually and collectively to refrain from aggression. The principle of independent action may be applied properly where such unanimity has not been or cannot be achieved, or where the issue is one in which rights and interests peculiar to one or several powers only are involved."

Inasmuch as Japan has just been illustrating in Shantung, with the approval of all the powers, that when "rights and interests peculiar to one power are involved" that power is not bound to "refrain from aggression," even this last principle is not binding.

How do we stand on the question of treaty revision? On January 27th, 1927, Secretary Kellogg made this statement:

"The Government of the United States is ready now to continue the negotiations on the entire subject of the tariff and extraterritorially, or to take up negotiations on behalf of the United States alone. The only question is with whom it shall negotiate. If China can agree upon the appointment of delegates representing the authorities or the people of the country, we are prepared to negotiate such a treaty. However, existing treaties which were ratified by the Senate cannot be abrogated by the President, but must
be superseded by new treaties negotiated by somebody representing China."

Unfortunately this was only a statement to the press. If it had also been handed to the Chinese minister, it would have indicated more clearly our serious intention to negotiate. Both northern and southern factions had acted through Dr. Sze on occasion, and such responsible students of Oriental politics as Grover Clark of the Peking Leader, the Right Reverend Alfred A. Gilman of Wuchang, China, Congressman Stephen Porter and Thomas Mil­lard believed negotiation to be possible. A nation that plunges so hopefully into disarmament conferences should not be afraid to "lose face" in China.

Our Government should make every effort to utilize the present visit of the Nationalist Delegation to Washington as a means toward effecting re­vision of our treaties with China. The Nationalist Government has been for more than a year the most effective and far-reaching administrative body in China. We have recognized it sufficiently to negotiate with it towards a settlement of the losses suffered by Americans at Nanking last year. If a government is responsible enough to pay an indemnity, it is responsible enough to be recognized. In all probability the Nationalists will succeed in breaking up the northern dictatorship. Their next great problem will be to maintain control over the factions within their own ranks. If the United States recognizes the Nanking administration as the legal government of China, their task of maintaining the solidarity of their party will be much simpler.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

A recent dispatch from Washington says that when the Nationalist Government controls China south of the Great Wall the United States Gov­ernment

(1) Will agree to recognize it, provided that foreign treaties will be respected until changed by orderly process.

(2) Troops and gunboats in the interior will be withdrawn when a stable, central government demonstrates its ability to protect American property interests and American citizens.

(4) This Government is willing to begin negotiations immediately upon recognition.

(5) Active American support is promised against any move to divide China into foreign spheres of influence, or to take possession of Chinese territory.

One would like to believe that this policy will be put into effect as it stands, and as simple people read it, but there is no reason to believe that it will be any less subject to de-vitalization than were the Washington Con­ference Treaties. Only a few months ago a few of the larger American firms in Shanghai formed a committee to raise a fund of $1,000,000 for publicity in favor of intervention in China. Foreigners abroad do not want to pay higher tariffs, nor are they willing, the majority of them, to relinquish a system whereby they enjoy privileges they could not have at home.

All of the powers have agreed that Japan has special privileges in Manchuria and eastern Mongolia, which constitute at least a "foreign sphere of influence," if not actual alienation of Chinese territory. The gen­eral opinion is that a separate state will be made out of Manchuria, and that
Chang Tso-lin will be retained as governor, under a virtual Japanese protectorate. Or if Chang Tso-lin proves too refractory, the young Manchu Emperor may be restored to the throne of his hereditary kingdom. The 15,000-000 Chinese in Manchuria are not at all reconciled to the domination of the 125,000 odd Japanese who have settled there. Eventually the United States must take sides, or else back out of Number 5 as gracefully as we can.*

If the outlawry of war treaties now pending between the United States, Japan, and the European powers go into effect, and no definite safeguard be taken of Chinese interests, Japan can carve out a kingdom for herself comprising not only Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, but Shantung and Chihli, and we can offer only a verbal protest. Great Britain can take Tibet—if she wishes. An incontrovertible recognition of Chinese sovereignty throughout Chinese territory is the only way in which the “Open Door Policy” can be preserved if these joint agreements to refrain from offensive warfare be ratified, and taken seriously.

And in the meantime Europe watches us apprehensively, and, we may be assured, does not confine herself to watching. Why? Because, to quote Lloyd George:

“If the Chinese get it in their heads that some nations are their friends and others their enemies, the trade will be captured by those who are believed to be friends.”

This is why “Senator Borah’s suggestion that the State Department mediate between Japan and China during the present crisis has not created a favorable reaction among European governments with Asiatic interests. America’s Oriental influence is as great as is consistent with the welfare of other Occidental nations.” (From the Geneva correspondent to the N. Y. Herald-Tribune, 5/14/28.)

Has the United States a Chinese policy? Not if by policy is meant a consistent and effective course of action. We have a few traditions: The development of trade, reluctance to commit aggressions, the desire to “play safe,” the desire to befriend when this is not too hazardous. We have committed ourselves on paper to the doing of courageous and honorable things: To the fulfillment of treaties, to the renunciation of unjust privileges, to the recognition that human rights are the same in all countries, and at that point our diplomatic clock ran down. One of two things will happen. Either our democracy will prove its effectiveness and the desire of the people to express their genuine friendliness through these pledges will be felt; or we shall continue to make amiable promises, and wait until the Chinese are able to force us to put them into effect.

COMMITTEE ON PUBLICATIONS.

*As a matter of fact, the United States has for many years recognized Japan’s “peculiar interest” in Manchuria. During his administration President Roosevelt expressed this very definitely: “The vital interest of the United States is to keep Japan out of our country, and at the same time to preserve the good will of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese, on the other hand, is in Manchuria and Korea. It is therefore peculiarly our interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them, or a menace in however slight a degree to their interests.”

Last year, our Government once more sanctioned Japanese domination in Manchuria and Mongolia by acquiescing to the Tanaka “positive” policy. In November, it even appeared that the Japanese South Manchurian Railway was to receive a $30,000,000 loan from the firm of J. P. Morgan and Company. Resolute public opposition to the loan, both in China and this country, prevented its ultimate approval by the State Department.
THE TSINANFU INCIDENT

During the last thirty years, Shantung Province has been the scene of foreign and Chinese invasions, and the subject of much public and diplomatic discussion.

In 1898 Germany demanded from China as reparation for the murder of two missionaries, the district in Shantung known as Kiaochow, which included the port of Tsingtao, an ideal site for a naval base. She also acquired the right to build a railway to Tsingtao, the capital, 225 miles inland, to a given strip of land on either side of the railway, and to coal and salt mines as well as certain telegraph and cable privileges. In 1914, when Japan entered the war, she saw an excellent opportunity to get rid of a dangerous rival and seized the German interests in Shantung on the pretext that she was acting only as temporary guardian and would turn them over to China. She extended her control not only over the German interests, but over Tsingtao and Chinese towns along the railroad. The German property she had appropriated she sold to Japanese. “Twenty-one Demands” gave Japan exclusive control of Shantung. When, at the Washington Conference, she relinquished her political privileges in Shantung, she retained the German mines and properties which she had confiscated. The Chinese were given permission to redeem the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad, but not by immediate payment in full as they proposed at the time. Instead, Japan required a gradual redemption through a period of from five to fifteen years, thus retaining a mortgage on the road.*

Geographically, Shantung is a strategic province. If the Nationalists are to control Peking, they must control Shantung. Otherwise the northern capital will be between two hostile forces: Japan in Manchuria and the northern war-lords and Japan in Shantung. The railroad from Shanghai to Tientsin and also the disputed railway to Tsingtao pass through Tsingtao, the capital. Here also is situated the great railroad bridge across the Yellow River. The force that holds this city can control movements of troops and supplies north, south and east.

When the Nationalist Army started north in April of this year, unexpected complications arose which resulted in serious conflict between the advancing Chinese and the Japanese troops stationed at Tsingtao. Early in the disturbance the Chinese wireless station was destroyed by the Japanese, with the result that Chinese communications were disorganized and the world received the Japanese version through Tokio, London, Peking and the Shanghai foreign settlement. Later reports, coming from Thomas Millard, the Foreign Policy Association, our representative in China, and other dependable and conservative sources give a more balanced account.

On April 30th the Nationalist Army reached Tsingtao. A force of 3,000 Japanese soldiers was quartered there. Until May 3rd, everything was peaceful. Then fighting broke out for a cause which seems still undetermined. The Japanese used armored cars and field artillery to clear the settlement. Orders were given on both sides to stop firing, but word could not be gotten through to isolated units for some time. Meanwhile, the Chinese Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Tsai Kung Tsi, was murdered with his staff of ten by the Japanese. On May 5th, everything was quiet, and the main part of the army prepared to continue northward, leaving local adjustments to the Foreign Ministry. At this time, Chiang Kai-shih sent the following circular telegram to his generals:

“At the outset of the northern expedition we proclaimed to the peoples of all friendly nations that our object was to reach the goal of the revolution, and also at the same time announced that wherever our soldiers went they must protect both native and foreign lives and property. Unexpectedly occupying Tsingtao caused a misunderstanding between the Japanese and ourselves. The military must resume the northern advance and entrust the Foreign Ministry to make a settlement with Japan. All should instruct the soldiers to protect the consulates, nationals, and property of friendly powers, and suppress propaganda slogans which are injurious to international friendship. Do not allow your indignation to disrupt these projects.”

On May 7th, after Chiang Kai-shih’s departure, the Japanese commander, General

*Payments on the 40,000,000 yen bond issue whereby the railway was to be redeemed are now due in arrears, due to unsettled conditions.

**The Japanese claim that the Chinese soldiers began to loot Japanese shops. The Chinese official report is that a Chinese general, Ho Yao-tsu, disobeyed orders and tried to billet his troops in Tsingtao City. The Japanese tried to disarm his troops before permitting them to come out, and shooting ensued.
Fukuda, presented a 12-hour ultimatum to the Chinese officer in command, comprising the following demands: (1) The Chinese commander responsible for the disorder to be severely punished. (2) Troops engaged in the anti-Japanese outbreak to be disarmed. (3) All warlike acts against the Japanese to cease. (4) The Nationalist troops to withdraw to seven miles on either side of the Shantung Railway, and beyond the foreign settlement.

The Chinese commander asked for a 24-hour extension on the ultimatum, for he had neither the authority nor sufficient time to accomplish these things, but his request was rejected, and when the time set had elapsed, the Japanese, who in the meantime had received a reinforcement of 2,000, set about forcibly to disarm the Chinese. These naturally resisted. Finally the Japanese on May 9th began a general bombardment of the city, in the course of which the city wall was destroyed in two places. The last of the Chinese soldiers were disarmed and driven out. After their departure the Japanese invited the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to take over the administration of the city and public utilities, but three days later they resumed control. The Chinese population have been leaving the city in large numbers since the Japanese occupation. Japanese forces numbering 28,000 are to be in Shantung by the end of May, supposedly to protect the 17,000 Japanese in Tsinanfu and Tsingtao. The conservative press estimate of casualties is 57 Japanese killed and 184 wounded; 2,200 Chinese killed and wounded.

The immediate results of the Tsinanfu incident are not so important. The Nationalist advance was rather badly weakened by it. Japan claims that her only purpose in interfering was to protect her nationals at Tsinanfu (about 1,500 in all, the majority of whom are small shopkeepers), and the railroad from Tsingtao. There are about 100 additional foreigners in Tsinanfu, 12 of whom are Americans. Foreign opinion in China generally approved Japan's alleged purpose, but felt that she had “blundered” in method. The spontaneous reaction of all the Japanese papers save one was to condemn the Government's action. Public opinion in England was apprehensive, fearing that Japan might have seized this opportunity to retake Shantung. This is the general Chinese belief, too. Whatever Japan's purpose, she has put herself in a position either to defeat the Nationalist campaign or to bring pressure to bear on a victorious Nationalist Government.

The most serious point brought out by the Tsinanfu incident is the inefficacy of international agreements to protect weak nations. The Japanese had no legal right to send troops to Tsinanfu. "Both Shanghai and Tientsin have distinct areas under foreign control provided for by treaties and therefore the use of foreign military forces to protect those areas is legitimate and involves no technical encroachment on China's sovereignty or territorial integrity," writes Thomas Millard in the New York Herald-Tribune, May 15, 1928. "No special foreign residence areas exist anywhere in Shantung, which is purely Chinese and under a solely Chinese administration. Japan's action in sending troops to Shantung was taken without treaty sanction, and when analyzed was done to protect property. All the powers except Japan advised their nationals to withdraw."

The difficulty is that the powers are not prepared to dispute Japan's right to do this. None of them has been too nice in its interpretation of treaties. Furthermore, curtailment of foreign troop movements in China sets an embarrassing precedent. Japan's action will probably precipitate a more or less successful boycott which will divert that much trade to other nations. England wishes to keep on good terms with Japan, as being the logical curb to Russia; while the United States has for many years been friendly to Japan, and has made rather extensive loans to her. And so, when Ambassador Matsu­daira informs the State Department that Japan is respecting the Conference agreement to observe China's sovereignty, etc., etc., we agree that this is so. When the Nanking Government asks the United States to mediate, we consent on condition that Japan will put in a request also, which she will not conceivably do. And when the Nationalist Government Council, invoking Article XI of the League Covenant ("Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the nations."), asks its consideration of these matters, the League declares that it is powerless to act until the matter shall have been laid before it by a recognized member, that is, by Japan or the Peking faction. As matters stand, Japan is slated to make a report on the incident at the regular session in June.

The Tsinanfu incident is a bad example for a nation "bound" by unwelcome treaties.
AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR FAIR PLAY IN CHINA
1919 Hobart Building
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Phone Kearny 2731

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Sara Bard Field
Lewis S. Gannett
Elizabeth Gilman
Mrs. J. Borden Harriman
Dr. John Haynes Holmes
Harry S. Huntingdon
Freda Kirchway
Mary Leitch
Robert Mors Lovett
Meng Shou-Chun
Pan Ta-Kuei
Nathaniel Pfeffer
Dr. William Pickens
Anna Rochester
Charles Edward Russell
David J. Saposs
Joseph Schlossberg
Dr. Sidney Strong
Tang Chung-Tzu
Wilbur K. Thomas
Dr. Richard C. Tolman
Dr. Charles E. Vermilya
Oswald Garrison Villard
John Brisben Walker
Wang Tso-Yan
William Allen White
Dr. Robert Whitaker

REPRESENTATIVE IN CHINA
Meng Shou-Chun

The American Committee for Fair Play in China was organized in San Francisco in June, 1925, shortly after the demonstration in Shanghai which resulted in the shooting of Chinese students by the foreign police. The purpose of its founders was to create an agency through which uncolored and timely information concerning China might be made available to the people of this country, with the conviction that out of such work will grow a broader sympathy and understanding between the East and the West, and a sure guarantee of peace among nations.

In pursuance of this aim it has sponsored and arranged lectures and public meetings, furnished material for debate and speakers, distributed publicity to periodicals, and published and distributed 42,000 reports on various topics dealing with phases of the situation in China, and the life of her people. It has from the beginning been a volunteer movement, both in matter of support and of service, with the exception of unavoidable cost expenditures.

A few books on China, in the main new, and very good:

Please note our new address—1909 Hobart Building, San Francisco.

The China Famine Relief is trying to raise $10,000,000 to alleviate the sufferings of the Chinese starving in Shantung. It is estimated that 4,000,000 people are facing starvation in this province, while 6,000,000 others are seriously affected. Any help will be gratefully received at the Relief Headquarters, 419 Fourth Avenue, New York City.


We urge our readers to follow the course of events in China, and to use their influence, locally and through communication with the State Department, to encourage an independent American policy in China, based on the effective revision of the unilateral treaties between our two countries.
June Eighteenth 1928

Dear Friend:

Now that China's political future seems a little brighter, we want to emphasize in our bulletins other phases of her national life—social, economic, and educational—which are quite as fundamental issues as the political phase, and even more necessary to understand if the impending treaty reforms are to prove really effective. An enlightened foreign policy can succeed only through the force of enlightened public opinion.

In order that we may continue as an educational and not merely an emergency organization, we must abandon our old plan of financing through voluntary contributions, which has heretofore limited our activity either to times of general prosperity or political crisis. We want to establish the American Committee on a membership basis, and enclose a card on which we hope you will enroll yourself as an active or subscribing member. The dues are not large. We believe that our work entitles us to the consideration of all who have received our bulletins. If a reasonable proportion of them respond, we can carry out our schedule of six bulletins a year and grow healthily. The need of a spiritual rapprochement between the East and the West is not a sensational issue, but it is one of the most fundamental needs of our age, and must be met eventually. We hope you will give our proposal serious and sympathetic consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Camilla Chapin Daniels,
Executive Secretary.

Those who contributed $3.00 or more towards our last budget are automatically members. Others who gave less, may become members by sending us the difference with the enclosed card. Whatever the response to this letter, we shall maintain our existence as a Committee at the above address. But the publication of further bulletins depends entirely upon the degree of support we receive.