MANCHURIAN EMERGENCY

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MANCHURIAN EMERGENCY
FOREWORD

Having brought forth pamphlets dealing with various historical aspects of the Manchurian crisis, it has been considered advisable to print for purposes of reference an English version of the statement given out by the War Office about the origin and progress of the unfortunate military clash. What is stated as to the origin of the trouble confirms and supplements the argument advanced on the same subject in the other publications of the present series.

MOTOSADA ZUMOTO

Tokyo, November, 1931.
FOREWORD

Having recourse to their previous searches with extreme difficulty and difficulty in the existing libraries, a number of notable people were able to bring to light a number of records which had otherwise been lost in the annals of time. These records, when studied in detail, reveal a wealth of information about the events and individuals that were otherwise unknown to the general public. The purpose of this book is to bring to light a number of these records and to shed new light on the history of the area.

July 1st, 1937
One of the inspired posters plastered on a wall in the military barracks at Peitaiying, near Mukden. It reads: “Keep a watch at the railway to the west of our barracks.”
Some of the anti-Japanese posters put on the streets. The left cut gives a chronological record of "Chinese Political History of Japanese Invasion." The picture on the right hand side shows Chinese "sweeping national humiliations" out of their house.
A pair of inflammatory posters put up on the street. The picture on the left side shows a Korean entering Chinese territory at the point of the Japanese bayonet. The drawing on the right shows the massacre of Chinese people by both Japanese and Koreans.
MANCHURIAN EMERGENCY
(Unofficial Translation of Statement Issued by the War Office)

I. EVENTS LEADING UP TO IT

The Chinese policy toward Japan is best to be seen in the light of a series of more than 300 cases or incidents that have featured the intercourse between the two nations during the past few years. Of the more recent incidents, mention may be made of the question of agrément concerning the appointment of Japanese minister to China, the maltreatment of Korean farmers in the region of Wanpaoshan, mob assaults upon Japanese population at Tsin-tau, and the killing of Captain Nakamura by Chinese soldiers, all of which are still fresh in our minds. In Manchuria alone no less than a dozen of such incidents have been noted within a period of but three months after July of this year. Among these may be noted such cases as the wanton detention of Japanese patrol soldiers by 50 Chinese police officers; Chinese soldiers firing upon Japanese guards causing the loss of a life; Chinese bandits attacking 5 Japanese patrol soldiers, killing one of them. In more than a dozen other cases the Japanese civilian population were subjected to persecution or humiliation of one sort or another. Minor cases of open contempt or provocation in which not only civilians but soldiers of Japan have figured are almost numberless.
Such attitude of Chinese mind is to be traced to the fundamental idea of the "recovery of national rights," which has been the keynote of China's foreign policy. The Three People's Principles of the late Sun Yat-sen, the abrogation of unequal treaties as expounded by the Kuomintang and the general anti-Imperialistic sentiment form the basis upon which the whole Chinese mentality, official and individual, has in recent years been shaped.

All institutions of learning, from colleges down to elementary schools, employ text-books carrying expressions of contempt or hostility to Japan, or verses of the same tenor which young scholars are taught to sing. Military institutions overlook no opportunity to spread the same feeling in the ranks. An extreme instance in the case was seen when the soldiers at drill, ordered to number off, gave an expression for "Down with Japan!" instead of numbers. This is certainly a form of military training with Japan as China's national enemy.

In the field of civil administration, likewise, the National Government has been responsible for a number of legislative and other acts plainly aimed against Japan. Existing treaty commitments have often been ignored. Attempts have been made to nullify existing agreements with Japan, by purposely evading the issues on the pretext of internal troubles. To the end of nullifying the agreement as to the question of land lease in Manchuria, the Chinese authorities have issued laws whereby any one leasing land to a Japanese may be declared punishable by death, and no mortgage held by a Japanese subject is to receive official recognition. Orders have also been issued to cancel all contracts with
Japanese people for lease of houses. A special Commission has been organized on the professed ground of guarding against "unpatriotic sales of land." In open violation of the treaties, the governors of provinces have been ordered to stop trading in Japanese goods. Japanese subjects have been refused official permits for inland travels. No opportunity has been suffered to pass without being turned to the furtherance of the anti-Japanese cause. This sentiment of hostility is now reflected even in the address which common Chinese people adopt in daily conversations with Japanese. Where a Japanese was once addressed with all respect due to a person of social respectability is now often addressed in the low jargon of the street.

Nor does the same spirit fail to display itself among Chinese officials. Dr. Wang Chen-ting, Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking before Kuomintang members at Nanking in February of this year, was reported to have openly expressed himself to the effect that, should Japan oppose Chinese recovery of national rights, all that China had to do would be to settle the matter by the grim methods of war. Again, on another public occasion last August, the same Chinese statesman boldly discussed possibilities of driving Japanese population out of Manchuria by warlike methods. Chinese officials, military and others, have of late spoken much about the superiority of their soldiers, pointing out the actual training and abundant experience they have acquired on the field of battle. They have always referred in a contemptuous vein to the Japanese soldiers as men without experience of actual warfare. Such remarks, because
often heard not only in military but also other official quarters, gained wide currency. The anti-Japanese attitude of a negative character was thus gradually turned into one of open contempt and defiance. When such a spirit was openly encouraged and was so widely at work, it was unavoidable that a dangerous situation should be precipitated.

Several days before the hostilities broke out in Manchuria, General Wang I-che, Commander of the Chinese Brigade at Peitaiying, which was to become the centre of military operations in the present Mukden campaign, was quoted as having said in the course of a speech on the Manchurian situation, that he would be proud to follow the example of General Han Kwang-yung, who was the author of the Sino-Soviet hostilities of 1930, dying on the field of battle. There were current at the time among the Chinese population rumours of "an imminent expulsion of the Japanese influence" and frequent talks of the "approach of hostilities to be launched by Chinese troops in South Manchuria."

All this by way of showing the attitude of provocative hostility that the Chinese people had been showing in China in general, and in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in particular, wherever they came in touch with Japanese interests. It was inevitable, under the circumstances, that both the Chinese and Japanese people should come to confront one another with a sharpened sense of antagonism. Fear of an outbreak of some sort had been fast growing in many quarters, when the attack of Chinese soldiers on the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden at last threw fat into the long smouldering fire.
Col. Doihara, who was for a time in charge of civil administration in Mukden, organized a medical clinic to administer help to the native civilians abandoned in their sick-beds.
Almost at the first shot fired, Chinese physicians fled deserting their patients in hospital. These civilian patients were removed to the Japan Red Cross Hospital at the first opportunity.
And a Japanese travelling clinic went about like good Samaritans.
The scarcity of foodstuffs became one of the first pressing questions after hostilities ceased in Mukden. Col. Doihara arranged with religious organizations for free distribution of foodstuffs among the poorer classes of Chinese.
II. OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

What gave rise to hostilities near Mukden, was an incident in itself very simple. On the night of September 18 about 10:30 p.m., two or three companies of Chinese soldiers, under direction of a Chinese officer, destroyed the track of the South Manchuria Railway at a point to the southwest of the Chinese military barracks at Peitaiying where some 7,000 of soldiers were quartered under command of General Wang, Commander of the Brigade. These soldiers, having opened fire upon the Japanese soldiers who happened to be patrolling the railway, proceeded toward Liutianghu where a Japanese detachment was stationed. Upon the report of this, a company of Japanese railway guards at the Hushihtai hastened to the aid, following the railway line to the south. The Chinese soldiers retired into the barracks at Peitaiying from the southwest side. The Japanese soldiers in pursuit pushed their way to get into the barracks from the same direction until they were brought to a sharp stop by a strong fire directed from inside the barracks. The Japanese company, having occupied a corner on the barracks grounds, opposed the Chinese soldiers who were soon reinforced by machine guns, infantry and artillery. Consequently, the Japanese found themselves in difficulty, Lieutenant Noda falling in the action, until a reinforcement from the Second Battalion of Railway Guards at Mukden arrived under command of Lieut.-Colonel Shimamoto. These combined forces drove the Chinese soldiers out of Peitaiying toward the daybreak. Inside the barracks large quantities of cartridges and hand grenades
were discovered lying about almost everywhere. This is a significant circumstance, because it is a rule in the Chinese army never to supply men with these things except at time of war.

The 29th Regiment of Japanese Infantry under command of Colonel Hirata stationed in the railway zone near Mukden, and in proximity with the Chinese troops stationed thereabout to the number of some 14,000 men, was naturally apprised of the above incident with little delay. The Regiment was at once put into action against the Chinese troops within the walled city of Mukden.

Lieut.-General Tamon, Commander of the Second Division stationed at Liaoyang, issued an order at 1 a.m. for a concentration of the main force near Mukden.

(Note: The Chinese troops under Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang numbered 330,000, consisting of 250,000 regulars and 80,000 irregulars. Of these men 110,000 were away on an expedition beyond Shanhaikwan. The remaining force of 220,000, equipped with some 216 pieces of artillery, was stationed in Manchuria, the regions about the city of Mukden being guarded by some 14,000 men with about 40 pieces of artillery. At ordinary times the Chinese garrison within the walled city of Mukden is 3,000 strong.)

Against this force, the Japanese troops in Manchuria were in all not more than 10,400 in number. This force consisted of one division of about 5,400 strong, 16 pieces of artillery, and the Independent Railway Garrison of about 5,000, whereas the number of Japanese troops sanctioned by treaty is about 17,000. The duty of the Japanese military force in Manchuria is to guard the
leased Province of Kwantung and the South Manchuria Railway, extending over a distance of 1,100 kilometres. In performing their duties, they have the right to resort to military action in case of necessity. The safeguarding of some 200,000 Japanese subjects and 800,000 Koreans also must by necessity receive their attention.

Although the Japanese force on such a basis is quite adequate to deal with the bandits for whom Manchuria is notorious, they had quite a different proposition in taking action against the regular Chinese troops of decided numerical superiority. The situation of so precarious and perplexing a nature perforce demanded prompt action all along the line. No longer left in doubt as to the situation as regards the hostilities between the two sides, the Japanese military promptly rose to the occasion by concentrating the scattered troops at strategic points and by launching counter attacks wherever possible. Far outnumbered, it was tactical necessity for the Japanese force first to sweep off the Chinese troops in close proximity and next to station themselves at such points as to secure an open field for free manoeuvres. It is natural that the Japanese military, well alive to their own situation, should always have on hand plans carefully worked out on such principle.

The main force of the 2nd Division at Liaoyang, largely consisting of the 16th Regiment of Infantry, was immediately set in motion and arrived at Mukden early in the morning of the 19th. They proceeded at once to the district on the east side of the walls. By 8 a.m. or thereabout the Chinese troops had completely been swept off that part of the town. Later joined by the Regiment
of Artillery (4 companies with 16 pieces of ordnance) from Haicheng, the main force of the 2nd Division turned upon the Chinese soldiers at Tungtaiying (about 2 miles to the northwest of Mukden), completely driving them off by 2.30 p.m.

Lieutenant-General Honjo, Commander of the Kwantung Military Force, in view of incoming reports, decided to send forth his main force to Mukden to assist in the campaign there. At 3 a.m. on October 19, he set out from Port Arthur for Mukden, requesting at the same time the Second Squadron of the Imperial Navy in port there to dispatch a part of its force to Yingkow for the protection of the Japanese there, and also sending a call to Korea for dispatch of reinforcements.

Lieutenant-General Honjyo, arriving at Mukden at noon on the 19th, placed a section of the guard force at Tungtaiying, while the gendarmerie, with the support of an infantry contingent, were put on guard within the walled city. The main force was then concentrated within the railway zone near by.

In the meantime in the direction of Changchun, the 4th Regiment of Japanese infantry under Colonel Nagashima, found itself placed within a line of Chinese military force about 10,000 strong, armed with about 40 pieces of artillery. This Japanese force, as a step in self-defence, began to direct its action against the Chinese contingent at Nanling with the object of clearing out their base at Kwanchengtze. The Japanese met with strong resistance in that direction, but with the assistance of the First Battalion of the Independent Railway Garrison, they were able to drive off the Chinese from
Kwanchengtze after a long action, at about 11 a.m. and from Nanling about 3 p.m. With these points secured, the northern approach to the South Manchuria Railway line was practically closed to attack.

**Chinese Treachery at Nanling**

In the course of engagement at Nanling, the Chinese treacherously hoisted several white flags and drew the unsuspecting Japanese within 40 or 50 metres, when they opened fire, causing heavy damage to the advancing party.

The casualties on the Japanese side in the fights at the above mentioned places were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KILLED</th>
<th>WOUNDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-com. Officers</td>
<td>Non-com. Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers &amp; privates</td>
<td>officers &amp; privates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukden &amp; vicinity ...</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changchun &amp; vicinity.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ..................</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**III. SITUATION AFTER SEPTEMBER 20**

On September 20 the main portion of the 30th Regiment of Infantry and a battalion of field artillery arrived at Changchun from Port Arthur and Haicheng respectively. The Commander of the 2nd Division also moved his headquarters to Changchun the same day to reinforce the line in that direction.

In the city of Kirin general conditions began to show signs of restlessness among the Chinese soon after the outbreak of hostilities at Mukden. Stones began to be
thrown upon houses occupied by Japanese. Persistent calls for protection began to come from the Japanese residents there, of whom there were more than 900. There also came the report of the Kirin army moving westward against the Japanese troops. For protection of the South Manchuria Railway on its flank and of the Japanese population in Kirin, therefore, the Commander of the 2nd Division organized a mixed brigade and despatched it to the same city at about 10 a.m. September 21 by the Kirin-Changchun Railway. This manoeuvre removed a considerable portion of the force out of Changchun, but the thinned ranks were strengthened in the following afternoon by the arrival of the 15th Brigade of Infantry from Mukden.

**Situation along the Line**

In Kirin the Chinese soldiers were evidently thrown into panic at the advance of the Japanese troops. As a result of the parleys which General Hsi Ha, chief of the staff, came out to conduct, the Japanese entered the city almost without any hostilities about 6 p.m., while the Chinese troops retreated to a distance of 20 Chinese miles (approximately 8 English miles). The 2nd Division, having secured order in this part, again moved its main body of men back to Changchun to strengthen the force there.

In the region of Chientao (Kanto) near the northern frontier of Korea, reports of the military clash in Mukden at once began to agitate the Chinese element, until an uprising took place on the 20th. At Lungtsingtsun the Chinese rabble went so far as to set fire to the engine-
shed at the railway station. At Yenki a public school was destroyed by fire. Though the socialists are charged with these actions, a state of panic prevails throughout these regions. There are persistent rumours of impending massacre by Chinese. The Japanese and Korean population has been sending out repeated calls to the Commander of the Japanese Army in Korea, though such action has been withheld to date.

The situation in Harbin has been no better, where the Japanese population numbers about 4,000. On the night of September 20 printed sheets were distributed in the city to stir up anti-Japanese propaganda. The next morning the local Japanese organized a volunteer militia for self defence. Urgent calls began to come from these Japanese and from the acting Consul-General there. On the night of September 21 about 9 p.m. bombs were thrown at our Consulate-General, the Bank of Chosen and a daily newspaper office.

Although the Japanese residents not only in Harbin but elsewhere, find themselves under conditions of extreme difficulty and danger, the Japanese Government, desiring to localize the troubles, has decided not to send military force beyond the present line. In other words, the Japanese residents are to be called back in case of necessity.

In the meantime, in the city of Mukden, which was completely deserted by all Chinese authorities soon after the fight, the Japanese military took temporary measures for maintenance of order. However, with the gradual return of peace, the conditions are being restored to what they were before. It is noteworthy that the
Chinese populace, who had always been victimized by Chinese military and other authorities, have found under Japanese guardianship such a peaceful order of things as never seen before. Signs of peaceful restoration began to be seen the second day after the entry of the Japanese. On September 21 many shops and commercial establishments began to open, with the financial market again in operation.

As for the Army in Korea, a mixed brigade of some 2,900 men was organized under Major-General Yoshimura and concentrated at Shingishu on September 19 at 10 a.m., and held in readiness to proceed to places to be garrisoned. At the same time two companies were sent out for advance reconnaissance and other duties.

When the Kwantung Force had advanced to Kirin, the Commander of the forces at Shingishu, in view of the pressing situation, moved his troops, upon his own initiative, across the Yalu on September 21 at 1.20 p.m. to reinforce the Kwantung force. Arriving at Mukden about midnight, it replaced the main force of the 2nd Division, detailing out detachments to Chengtiatun and Shinmin the next day.

IV. DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE TROOPS

As a result of the military action and manoeuvres described above, hostilities practically came to a close. However, disbanded Chinese soldiers and bandits still continue to be active in the zone of the South Manchuria Railway, causing no small casualties on our side. There are indications of growing activity on their part.

As for the interior parts of the country, there is no-
means of obtaining information. However, there is reason to think that considerable numbers of Korean settlers have been massacred.

The disposition of the Japanese troops, as it stood at the beginning of October, is as given below, with little subsequent changes:

**In Mukden regions**
- Headquarters of Kwantung Forces.
- The 39th Mixed Brigade.
- A part of this force is posted on guard at the railway bridge at Liaoho, east of Shinmin.

**In Changchun regions**
- Main force of the 2nd Division.
- A part of this force is dispatched to guard Chengtiatun and neighbouring regions.

**In Kirin regions**
- A part of the 2nd Division.

In addition to these, the Independent Railway Garrison attends to the guarding of the South Manchuria Railway, with its headquarters at Ssupingkai.

A glance at the map of Manchuria will show that Kirin is a point of great importance as a northern approach to the South Manchuria Railway, whence much damage might be inflicted. Chengtiatun and Shinmin are points through which the Chinese would have to pass in order to attack the same railway from the western side. The presence of the Japanese troops between these two points, therefore, is a matter of absolute necessity for safeguarding the same railway, and signifies neither military occupation nor permanent disposition of troops.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

From the above review, it may be seen that the present Japanese military action in Manchuria began as an act strictly in self-defence. The general situation there made it necessary for the Japanese to extend such action to points essential for self protection. Promptness of action is the first essential in moving small forces against forces of numerical superiority. Failure to forestall would be fatal to a force fighting against great numerical odds, a fact to which the Japanese had to be fully awake to assure their own success. Especially so when the Japanese had to operate with small troops scattered over regions three times wider than Japan Proper.
Digging for mutilated remains of Korean farmers.
Digging for mutilated remains of Koreans at Kuchiatze, Manchuria.
APPENDIX

Statement by Imperial Government

The Imperial Government, in order to make clear its position as to the Manchurian question, issued on September 24 the following statement:

"(1) The Japanese Government has constantly been exercising honest endeavours, in pursuance of its settled policy, to foster friendly relations between Japan and China and to promote the common prosperity and well-being of the two countries. Unfortunately, the conduct of officials and individuals of China for some years past has been such that our national sentiment has frequently been irritated. In particular, unpleasant incidents have taken place one after another in the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia, in which Japan is interested in an especial degree, until the impression has gained strength in the minds of the Japanese people that Japan's fair and friendly attitude is not being reciprocated by China in a like spirit. Amidst an atmosphere of perturbation and anxiety thus created, a detachment of Chinese troops destroyed the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway in the vicinity of Mukden and attacked our railway guards at midnight on September 18; a clash between the Japanese and Chinese troops then took place.

"(2) The situation became critical, as the number of the Japanese guards stationed along the entire railway did not then exceed 10,400, while there were in juxta-
position some 220,000 Chinese soldiers. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Japanese residents were placed in jeopardy. In order to forestall an imminent disaster, the Japanese army had to act swiftly. Chinese soldiers garrisoned in the neighbouring localities were disarmed and the duty of maintaining peace and order was left in the hands of the local Chinese organizations under the supervision of Japanese troops.

“(3) These measures having been taken, our soldiers were mostly withdrawn within the railway zone. There still remain some detachments in Mukden and Kirin and a small number of men in a few other places, but nowhere does a state of military occupation, as such, exist. The reports that Japanese authorities have seized the customs of the salt gabelle office at Yingkou, or that they have taken control of the Chinese railways between Ssupingkai and Chengchiatun or between Mukden and Shinmintun are entirely untrue, nor has the story of our troops having ever been sent north of Changchun or into Chientao any foundation in fact.

“(4) The Japanese Government, at the special Cabinet meeting of September 19, took the decision that all possible efforts should be made to prevent the aggravation of the situation, and instructions to that effect were given to the Commander of the Manchurian Garrison. It is true that a detachment was despatched from Changchun to Kirin on September 21, but it was not with a view to military occupation but only for the purpose of removing a menace to the South Manchuria Railway on its flank. As soon as that object has been attained, the bulk of our detachment will be withdrawn.
It may be added that while a mixed brigade of 4,000 men was sent from Korea to join the Manchurian garrison, the total number of men in the garrison at present still remains within the limit set by treaty, and that fact cannot therefore be regarded as having in any way added to the seriousness of international situation.

"(5) It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbours no territorial designs in Manchuria. What we desire is that Japanese subjects shall be enabled safely to engage in various peaceful pursuits and be given the opportunity of participating in the development of that land by means of capital and labour. It is the proper duty of a government to protect rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the nation or individuals. The endeavours of the Japanese Government to guard the South Manchuria Railway against wanton attacks should be viewed in no other light. The Japanese Government, true to its established policy, is prepared to co-operate with the Chinese Government in order to prevent the present incident from developing into a disastrous situation between the two countries and to work out such constructive plans as will once for all eradicate cause for future friction. The Japanese Government would be more than gratified if the present difficulty could be brought to a solution which will give a new turn to the mutual relations of the two countries."