115 Vernon Journal

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A Note from the Editors

When setting out to make selections for 115 Vernon, we found ourselves drawn, more than in past years, away from creative pieces towards essays, trying to fulfill the Writing Center’s role as a center for interdisciplinary writing. *Interdisciplinary* does not only consist of work from a broad variety of fields—it must also embody elements that consistently define writing throughout all fields. Our efforts have resulted in a melding of Trinity writers, from various fields, majors, interests, and class years. In respect to Editor submissions, the submitting Editor was not present for the discussion of his/her own work, and the selection of that work was undertaken with the tacit understanding that Editors should not receive any preferential reading.

Information Regarding 115 Vernon and the Allan K. Smith Center for Writing and Rhetoric

The Allan K. Smith Center for Writing and Rhetoric hires Writing Associates and Head Tutors to demonstrate engaging and intellectual characteristics of passionate tutors. These Associates collaborate in an editorial board—comprised of, for this edition, one Associate and two Head Tutors—to establish the literary journal 115 Vernon. The journal aims to demonstrate the intellectual curiosity, academic diversity, and written finesse present on Trinity’s campus. The College boasts a liberal arts education, and 115 Vernon strives to exemplify that interdisciplinary characteristic unique to Trinity.

The Allan K. Smith Center for Writing and Rhetoric is open Monday – Thursday, 1:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. and 6:30 – 9:30 p.m. Information is available online at http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/wrftoc/ or via e-mail at writing-center@trincoll.edu.
Editors' Reflections

"Greek Interpretation of Secondary Miltonic Heroes," Alexander Champoux
A veteran writing associate, Alex Champoux wields clarity of analysis in "Greek Interpretation of Secondary Miltonic Heroes". We were attracted to this piece as it put forward a novel perspective on a mainstay of the literary cannon, recasting the conflict between Heaven and Hell in terms of Greek heroics, and was written in a language not restricted to classical scholars. LRS

"To Whistle," Alessandra Siraco
"To Whistle" incites memories of childhood growing up among family but also reminds us that even when we grow up, family remains family. Of several creative non-fiction submissions from Alessandra Siraco, we felt as is this captures the true beauty and elements of that genre, authenticity, art, truthfulness, and elegance. LRS

"Face Masks and Fear: Impact of the H1N1 Pandemic Influenza on Asia," Lorenzo Sewanan
One of our new batch of Writing Associates, Lorenzo Sewanan ('12) brings with him a fresh wave of scientific (as well as creative) writing. Looking over the submissions that we received from Lorenzo, we were struck by the accessibility of his paper about the effects of the H1N1 pandemic on the Asian continent—and how well it synthesized personal narrative and scientific reportage. -A.J.C.

"Working for the Boss and Towards Power in Chinese Special Economic Zones," Katherine Fawcett
Out of several submissions that we received from Katherine Fawcett ('11), her essay on the Dagongmei—a newly formed class of marginalized workers in China—stood out the most. It deals with new and interesting information on a global scale—much broader than the typical college paper—and, reading over it, we were struck by both the newness of the topic and the quality of the writing. -A.J.C.

"Springtime for Clarissa?," Cristina Conti
"Springtime for Clarissa?" by Cristina Conti '11, was one of the shorter pieces of her multiple submissions, but certainly the most commendable in its concise and compact argument. Conti, '11, renders the intricacies between Northrop Frye's literary theory and Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway. Exploring the reaches of character and narrative, Conti employs sophisticated writing in a clearly passionate manner to illustrate her arguments in a work that exemplifies the expanses of her analytical scope. A.E.S.

"Ours If We Make It," James Gilland
Our only poem of the journal, "Ours If We Make It" by James Gilland ('11) maintains a wonderful balance of prosaic clarity and poetic aestheticism. The poem reads with a clarity lacking in most modern poetry, utilizing a clear and linear narrative, and still, with a sense of assonance and alliteration, maintains the lyrical beauty that we have come to value. -A.J.C.

"Child Development: Object Permanence," Milan Moore
Milan Moore's "Child Development: Object Permanence" details an experiment that is followed by many psychology students every semester yet yield interesting insights into the development of the human mind. In her lab report, she shows us that humans are not necessarily born with the ability to believe the reality in terms of permanence of that which is not directly in front of them. We were drawn to this as it details the beautiful discovery of psychology in a manner which is easily accessible to the general public. LRS

"An Era of Partisanship and Anti-Intellectualism," Zachary Sonenshine
Upon reading "An Era of Partisanship and Anti-Intellectualism" by Zachary Sonenshine '11, we felt it was the ideal supplement to a compilation of academic and creative pieces. Sonenshine's essay argues the interaction and scope of intellectualism and partisanship, in light of John Paul Stevens' retirement from the Supreme Court. With a zealot writing style, Sonenshine compels his reader to a piece laden with information. A.E.S.

"Abby," an excerpt from Songs From The Other Side, Kristen Droesch
When perusing creative submissions, "Abby," by Kristen Droesch '12, was foremost in our attention. The work highlights a night out with character Abby, a woman undergoing gender reassignment. The piece is standout in its unique subject matter; its overwhelming merit, however, is its honest and bold approach to a distinctive story. Using astounding narrative voice, Droesch compels the reader to understand these characters beyond the social perceptions and to empathize with them in all of their sincere and relatable emotions. A.E.S.

"Alternative to a Human-Centered View of Nature," William Buchanan
William Buchanan's "Alternative to a Human-Centered View of Nature" examines the ethical theories about our moral responsibilities within the context of different kinds of biocentrism and psychocentrism. We considered the style, approach, and conclusions to be unique among our submissions, especially pertinent now when we are realizing mankind's success cannot come at the price of the biosphere. LRS

"A Survey of Thrones," Daniel Morgan
The author of this piece, Daniel Morgan ('13), is a prized commodity in the world of medieval scholarship, and, when we were given the opportunity to choose between two of his pieces, we fell unhesitatingly on this one. Daniel's specialty—the study of thrones—is niche-y, yet, simultaneously fascinating, and that, combined with Daniel's facility with writing makes for an incredibly edifying read. -A.J.C.
Donations and Sponsorship
In past semesters, the 115 Vernon Writing Associates’ Journal has been completely funded by the Allan K. Smith Writing Center with the funds allocated to it by the school. This year, hoping to expand our publication and to raise interdepartmental awareness of the Journal, we sent out a request for donations from other departments. We, the Editorial Board, would like to extend our deepest appreciation to the departments that cut into their own funds in support of the Journal and interdisciplinary writing at the college—their donations have made it possible for us, for the first time ever, to put out two Journals this year and to expand our publication. It is to the following departments that we owe this privilege:

The Hall of Enlightenment- $100+
The Department of Political Science

The Patron’s Circle- $100
The Department of Psychology

The Scriptorium- $50
The Department of Public Policy

The Parlor- $25
The Department of Sociology

Greek Interpretation of Secondary Miltonic Heroes
Alexander J. Champoux

In John Milton’s “Paradise Lost,” Milton sets out to write the great Christian epic, cataloguing the war in Heaven, the Fall, and the temptation and expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. Following the conventions of epic poetry, it would seem that Satan is the hero (or anti-hero) of “Paradise Lost”—yet, even then, the Son seems to have easily overcome Satan in the war, gaining him a heroic status as well. As both exemplify different heroic traits, it is difficult to select one clear “hero” of the story. In the secondary heroes of the poem—the angels that follow the Son and the demons that follow Satan—the reader may find more distinct differences that correspond to their primary and to an already-decided Greek heroic argument. Early Greek heroes (like Hercules) exhibit superior strength and prowess in battle, whereas later Greek heroes (like Odysseus) show skill not just on the battlefield, but also in cunning and in trickery. These distinct heroic types are often addressed in later Greek plays and poems, and value judgments are made on each type of hero; in Sophocles’ “Philoctetes” Odysseus debates the merits of “tricks and stratagems” over direct military conflict (Sophocles 198), in Vergil’s “Aeneid” Aeneas defeats the warrior Turnus by sneaking around him and distracting him by making it seem as if Latinum is burning down (Vergil 284), and in Homer’s “Odyssey” Odysseus finds out the weaknesses of the Trojans by disguising himself, sneaking into Troy, and tricking the Trojans into giving up their secrets (Homer 132). In these stories Odysseus and Aeneas exemplify the Greek heroic concept of “metis” (cunning), and it is this characteristic that helps them to overcome older heroes that rely on nothing but brute strength. Considering the impact of the epic poems, “The Odyssey” and “The Aeneid,” on Milton in writing “Paradise Lost,” it is important to apply these concepts to the heroes in the poem. By looking at the secondary heroes of the poem, characters like Michael, Gabriel, Beelzebub, and Mammon, and applying Greek heroic values to them we can get a clearer image of which primary hero (Satan or the Son) is the “most heroic.”

In the fifth and sixth books of Paradise Lost, Raphael gives an account of the war in Heaven and singles out key angels. The first of the angels on the side of God and the Son to be mentioned is the Archangel Michael. Michael is the leader of the first army of God’s angels to face Satan, and is seen as “next Gabriel” amongst the angels in “military prowess” (Milton 6:45-46). His skill in fighting is further enhanced by a flaming sword “from the armory of God...that [nothing] might resist” (Milton 6:321-323), and it is using this sword that Michael injures Satan, cutting deep into his side. This episode closely mirrors a similar battle scene in the twelfth book of the Aeneid where Aeneas is wounded in the side during a battle with Turnus (also known for his military prowess). In both Paradise Lost and the Aeneid, the wounded hero (Satan and Aeneas) is healed magically, regroups, and develops a winning strategy based on metis. After wounding Satan, Michael finds himself outmatched the next day when Satan uses his metis to develop a more effective (and less taxing) way of fighting the war (through the invention of cannons). Ultimately, Michael is unable to defeat Satan’s army because of his inability to out-innovate “the atheist crew” (Milton 6:370). In book six Michael is like one of the old style Greek heroes; he has military strength but, in the words of Odysseus in “Philoctetes,” he is too “scrupulous” in observing the old rules of warfare to conceive the very “mischief[you]...tricks” (Sophocles, 198) that would help him to win the war against Satan.

The fallen angels or demons spend most of the first and second books of Paradise Lost discussing what to do about their fallen situation. One of the more common sentiments held by the fallen angels is put forth by the cunning orator Mammon...
when he suggests at "the great consultation" in Pandemonium that they live to themselves, though in this vast recess [hELL] (Milton 2:254). Mammon further argues that by establishing Pandemonium and by avoiding the ire of God, the demons could be "free, and to none accountable" (Milton 2:255)—meaning that they could govern themselves and build their own version of Heaven separate from the laws of God. For Mammon, there is a greater focus on freedom and coexistence than there is on fighting, an ideal exemplified by Aeneas in the twelfth book of the Aeneid; Aeneas offers a similar solution before his battle with Turnus when he offers for both nations to coexist "on equal terms...[he, king of the Latins] can reign and keep his army, while the Trojans build my town" (Virgil 2:373-374). For a hero exemplifying the characteristics of metis, the solution is more than military conquest and imposition of unwanted government. Mammon's speech seems to be the most positively received of the "consultation" speeches, and this seems to be because Mammon uses his cunning to couch their "loss" as a blessing in disguise—in Hell, Mammon argues, nobody need "stand in [God's] presence humble, and receive strict laws imposed, [or be made to sing] forced hallelujahs" (Milton 2:240-243). This placating argument is similar to that in Sophocles' "Ajax" when Odysseus convinces Agamemnon to give Ajax (seen as an enemy) a proper burial. Agamemnon, honoring the axle of Aeneas and Aeneas's defeat, but Odysseus uses his metis to convince him that acknowledging his enemy's military prowess and avoiding aggressive action (decreasing the dead body) is the best solution (Sophocles 58-59). For a metis hero there is no shame in acknowledging the strength of an opponent and no shame in avoiding an all out fight.

Of the angels fighting for God and the Son, Gabriel is the most skilled in the art of warfare. In book six his victory over the demon Moloch almost parallels Achilles' victory over Hector (in which Achilles drags Hector's dead body around Troy behind a chariot): "...Gabriel fought/And with fierce Ensigns pierced the deep array/Of Hell, where Typhon [Moloch] did fight/And with fierce Ensigns pierced the deep array/Of Hell, where Typhon [Moloch] did fight/Of Moloch furious king, who him defied/And at his chariot wheels to drag him bound/Threatened..." (Milton 6:355-359).

Achilles is seen as archetypal of the "old hero" that lives for honorable face to face battle, and his distaste for tricks ultimately suspends him from fighting Homer's "the Iliad." In "Philoctetes" Odysseus attempts to explain the merits of metis to Achilles' son Neoptolemos—it is the final realization by Neoptolemos that his father's form of heroism is archaic that allows him to succeed. Gabriel does not have this same realization and consequently only receives the one mention in book six—one in reference to a battle with the one non-metis-heroic member of Satan's generals (Moloch). Moloch, like Gog and Magog of Revelation, Ajax, and Achilles, is only capable of cunning metis solutions, and, consequently, Gabriel's victory over him is exactly like that of Achilles over Hector (both old-style heroes). Gabriel, though not mentioned, is ultimately a member of the angels that are forced to retreat in the face of Satan's cannons, and, thus, he is another metis-hero when he suggests that they might attempt some sort of action against Man "where their weaknesses [lie]...by force or subtlety" (Milton 2:357-358).

The rule of Heaven under God and the Son certainly deserves the appellation of "tyranny of Heav'n" insofar as it is a government legitimized by the use of absolute physical power. Like the angels Michael and Gabriel, God and the Son (as one entity) are symbolic of one "whom thunder hath made greater" (Milton 1:258)—their authority and victory derives from a purely physical and military dominance of their enemy. When traditional physical combat could not suffice, the secondary heroes under the Son were forced to retreat and wait for a stronger hero (the Son and God). Satan and his companions, though defeated and cast down, are emblematic of the new age of Greek heroes who use cunning alongside military might in order to get what they want. Continuing to exemplify the characteristics of a metis-hero Satan does succeed in sneaking past the guards of Eden and corrupting the "favored" humans. Rather than allowing the battle between Heaven and Hell to be fought along traditional rules of war, Satan and his team of secondary heroes develop new strategies and bring the war to a new battlefield. In this, the secondary heroes prove invaluable in highlighting the Greek heroic values that their primary hero exemplifies, and show that, in the estimations of Homer, Virgil, and Sophocles, the demons would represent the ideal heroes of this epic poem.

Works Cited

Brief acknowledgement: this concept of new heroes (those that exemplify metis) versus old heroes (those that rely solely on brawn) was explicated for me by Professor Caldwell of the Classic Civilizations department in his class "Mythology." Philoctetes has the clearest explanation of the divide between the heroic types, and I would recommend that for clarifying reading. Other interesting examples that show metis-heroes versus old-heroes would include the story of Medea and Jason (Medea uses metis), the story of Odysseus and Polyphemus, and the story of Perseus versus Medusa or Circe/Calypso could be used as examples of metis/metis interactions.
To Whistle
Alessandra Siraco

For one week every summer, I have no friends.

For one week, I am just my family, and I may text friends or call them sometimes, but for that one week the only people around are my brother and cousins and the only thing that's important is whether Ben knows the way back to the rented Cape house from the miniature golf place.

A friend once told me that different people act different in certain contexts. He got a tattoo that says "you are my home," and says that people can be your home, in their own contexts.

I know my cousins from when we grew up.

When we were little, my cousins were my world, my "home," and my grandfather's backyard was its landscape. I played tag every weekend, freeze tag, with my cousins Ben and Anna, and my brother Mark. When we played, Mark was always "it" because he was the fastest and everybody knew it.

As soon as we got to my grandfather's house, our parents would go inside and we would stand on the street, in the first part of the double cul de sac, getting ready to play. We wouldn't even discuss it—Mark was "it" and he would chase us; we split off and ran behind the house, up on the hill near the house, in the front yard, wherever we could before he counted to twenty and started after us. Ben would immediately run in front of Anna and me, and we would lose him within the first few minutes, somewhere behind the trees, flowers, and peapods in the gardens that dotted the backyard.

We all knew where each of us was going to go, and we took comfort in the pattern, in knowing each other well enough to know our motions.

We usually started in the afternoon, when it was hot, sooroching, and the pavement hurt my feet but we didn't wear shoes because that would give away our location with sound. Anna and I moved in a pair, never far from the back porch and its chipped white paint, weathered from years of New England summer storms and winter snow. We slipped in between trees and behind lawn furniture, looking out for Mark's Red Sox hat that was always slightly tilted off of his head, watching out for Ben's tall build and hoping we wouldn't get caught and need him to come save us. Anna's brown hair would be pulled back in a ponytail, frizzles flying out like my own hair was, and our hair only got worse as we ran faster and the wind took more of it out ot our ponytail holders.

When Mark would chase me, I would scream, but Anna didn't usually; she and Ben would just run, fast, and when Mark tagged them they would stand completely still as though if they moved the world would come crashing down.

Anna's an artist, and she's set in her opinions. She slid over at Anna last time he went to the Sonic that just opened in Massachusetts. But that's where Anna and I stayed. We'd create lines of human safety ropes, rooting each other in from the base of the stairs—they were safe, Mark couldn't tag us there—until all of us made it back, out of Benger, out of "freezing." We were a unit, Mark, Ben, Anna, and I, working in synchronized motions. Ben would always be at the end of the line, reaching out and straining to un-tag the one of us who was frozen, the person on his other side gripping the rial of the porch so hard that sometimes we got splinters from the wood. But we never interrupted the pattern of saving each other.

Everything and everyone was familiar, playing freeze tag of my grandfather's backyard, in the long nights of summer in Massachusetts, feet darkening from pavement dirt and knees becoming green from grass stains, hearts pounding from running through grass and bushes, trying to catch and save each other, like we knew we always would.

Now we are grown up, and for one week every summer, I am just my family, and the only thing that matters is if Ben knows how to get back to the rented Cape house from the miniature golf place.

Last summer, Anna was twenty, I was nineteen, Ben eighteen, Mark seventeen—a steady line of ages—and the windows of the car were pulled up because Anna was cold. I don't think we could have smelled the ocean anyways, because we were on a residential street in the middle of a random town down the Cape, and had been driving for 27 minutes in a random direction with no sense of how we got there.

Ben drove and Mark sat in the front seat, putting a System of a Down CD into the car player. The rock music blared out, louder than I wanted it to, louder than I thought Ben would have played it, but then again I'd never driven with him before.

"Mark," Anna said, "Turn it down a little."

"You sound like my sister," he said, and turned the dial a bit. I am his sister, and I was sitting right there, but I didn't say anything for the fear that we were all on edge and one comment would make us tumble.

It was sad, for a minute, because I had grown up with these three people but at that second I didn't know what to say to fill the void, because I only knew them as younger, as chasing through my grandfather's backyard, as growing up. Not as grown up.

It had been three months since I'd seen them, a long time compared to the visits we used to have every weekend. The car smelled like hot fudge sauce from the Sundaeas we had just finished, and the mini-golf scoreboard sat on the backseat between Anna and me. Mark had won, like he used to when we were little. I looked over at Anna and she was staring straight ahead, like my mom says she used to when she was a kid—staring straight ahead with big brown eyes, so hard that you don't know what she's looking at. I wanted to ask her, wanted her to just say what she was thinking, to just scream it or cry it or, well, something, but she sat in silence.

I didn't grow up with Anna in the backseat and Ben in the driver's seat, and I wished for a moment that we weren't in a car, that we were playing freeze tag, because only then did I know the script, the staged moves, where each of us knew exactly where we were supposed to be and what we were supposed to do. I read a book recently where the character only can relate to his father by talking about coins (Dear John by Nicholas Sparks, not a good book, but that's not the point). I suppose that is how I knew my cousins: through my grandfather's backyard, and freeze tag, and childhood.

Anna's an artist, and she's set in her opinions. She slide over at Anna last time he went to the Sonic that just opened in Massachusetts. But that's where Anna and I stayed. We'd create lines of human safety ropes, rooting each other in from the base of the stairs—they were safe, Mark couldn't tag us there—until all of us made it back, out of Benger, out of "freezing." We were a unit, Mark, Ben, Anna, and I, working in synchronized motions. Ben would always be at the end of the line, reaching out and straining to un-tag the one of us who was frozen, the person on his other side gripping the rial of the porch so hard that sometimes we got splinters from the wood. But we never interrupted the pattern of saving each other.
middle of some creepy-ass Cape town as the clock crept closer to midnight and the car crept closer to dirt roads and forests.

“Do you know where you’re going?” Anna asked Ben, who shook his head. “Do you think you should get a map?”

Ben shook his head again, but I saw part of an eye roll that I’d never noticed Ben do before. Anna stared at the back of his seat. “I was around here with my friends last summer,” Ben said, “Somewhere near here, I think.”

“Near Sunday School?” Mark asked, and Ben shook his head. “I didn’t know that you came here last summer,” I said, and Ben nodded, not taking his eyes off the road.

“Yeah, we came down to fish for a few days, but actually, it might have been closer to Sandwich than to Orleans,” Ben said; Anna squinted her eyes at the back of his seat. “We camped by the beach and fished in the mornings and nights.”

“Was that when I was in New York?” she asked, and Ben nodded.

“I didn’t know you liked to fish—I thought you just liked to hike,” I said, and Mark adjusted his hat a little lower on his head.

“Nah, I like to fish, I have all the equipment and stuff. I’ve been doing it for a year or so,” Ben said.

Every mile became a new indication of something that had changed, something that I hadn’t seen before.

The car sped further into a forest, and I looked to the left, past Anna, to see a cliff. Like in the movies, when a car is teetering over the edge of a cliff and you can’t help but to brace yourself in your seat as you watch, from the safety of your own home—except this cliff was covered in mossy beach remnants and wasn’t dramatic. The road just sort of ended, the edges petering off until it reached the edge, pebbles falling over as the wheels turned.

I glanced at Anna, looking straight ahead, and decided not to say anything to her about where we were driving. Maybe she wouldn’t notice.

“Well, where are we going?” she asked again, and I’d never seen her so uptight before, but then again I guess I always see her at a family cookout or in a family member’s house, never driving in the middle of a winding Cape Cod road with darkness fast approaching.

Ben shrugged his shoulders and kept his hands in the perfect position, driving faster than I thought he would.

Mark looked to the left, then, and I saw his eyes widen a little. “Look,” he said, pointing across Ben, more animately than I usually see him. Anna flinched as Mark’s arm obstructed Ben from driving for a second, but Ben didn’t seem to care, surprisingly.

“We’re on a cliff,” Mark said, leaning out of his seatbelt to get a better view. It was dark and there wasn’t much to see, just branches as they hit against the car windows every now and then, but from growing up with him I knew he would keep looking until he saw everything he could.

“Oh my God, Mark,” Anna said, “Can you please sit back?” Her hands braced herself on the seat and she continued looking straight ahead, and I remembered that she was afraid of heights. When we went to Disney she wouldn’t even go on the Dumbo ride.

At least that was something I knew about her.

Mark sat back and turned the music up a little bit more, and Ben smiled.

“I always tell Ben to slow down,” Anna said to me, sibling rivalry coming through here, too. “But he never listens.”

“Ali is tells me to drive more slowly all the time,” Mark said, opening his window and throwing his arm out it, Bengal it there. “I just ignore her.” He smiled, and I could see it in the side mirror from where I was sitting in the backseat.

His dark brown hair had gotten longer since the last time we had hung out, and I realized how little I saw him. But I still knew him; or at least, I still knew him in relation to Anna and Ben and myself, in relation to what everyone else would do and say.

“Ben,” Anna said again, “You’re going too fast.”

Trees sped by as we got more and more into the depths of a residential neighborhood, houses becoming darker and less populated as the trees became closer and closer to the edge of the road.

Mark flicked his gum out the window and pulled his Red Sox hat down further on his head.

Ben didn’t respond to any of us, sitting stoic in the driver’s seat like he used to when he still played Nintendo 64, on rainy days when it was too gross to play tag outside, his eyes straight ahead and hands gripping the steering wheel like a video game controller, focused.

“Mark,” I said, “Do you know where we’re going?”

“Agh,” Ben said, “Why are you looking?”

“At least that was something,” Anna said again, “but I still knew him in relation to Anna and Ben and myself, in relation to what everyone else would do and say.

Mark shook his head and Anna looked out the window on my side, and her eyes grew bigger as she looked deeper into the trees.

Nobody talked, and we all sat in silence while Mark bobbed his head to the music, his Red Sox hat going up and down over the back of his seat so I could see the top of it sometimes. Ben’s cell phone rang but he didn’t answer it, and the missed call sound echoed with the drums of the rock music. Anna stared ahead, at the back of Ben’s seat, and then glanced over at me and finally out the window, and I saw her eyes carefully focus up and not down at the cliff.

We didn’t know what to say to break the silence, and I wanted to cry from the break that I felt from the human safety chain of freeze tag from years ago.

I adjusted my seatbelt so it didn’t dig into my neck.

Then Ben started to whistle. To rock music—heavy, hard, loud rock music. Just, when you know what you’re going to do.

Ben whistled, and I’d never heard him do that before. Mark looked over and started laughing—a laugh that I’d only heard years ago, not recently—and Anna smiled a little when Mark started laughing, the two building off of each other. Ben smiled through his whistle and kept at it, getting louder as the drums and bass in the rock song grew in volume. His hands were still in the ten-and-two position and his crew cut stayed in place as he bobbed his head to the music. And Anna, Mark, and I just kept laughing.

I remembered their laughs, from when we were kids.

This was day six, hour twenty-one, and in twenty-seven hours that mattered back then was the sun setting low enough so that we could see the top of it sometimes. Ben’s cell phone rang but he didn’t answer it, and the missed call sound echoed with the drums of the rock music. Anna stared ahead, at the back of Ben’s seat, and then glanced over at me and finally out the window, and I saw her eyes carefully focus up and not down at the cliff.

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I remembered their laughs, from when we were kids.

This was day six, hour twenty-one, and in twenty-seven hours I’d have friends again, but for now I was only my family.

I knew Mark and each of my cousins individually, but that day, they didn’t matter separately—that day it didn’t matter that we’d grown up, and grown up as individuals, because all that mattered for that one week, for that one day, for that one moment in the car, was the ridiculous whistle coming from a six-foot-tall, fishable, hiking, stoic cousin, and the laughter resonating throughout the car over the music.

Just like all that mattered back then was the sun setting low enough so that we could hide in the darkness, escape from Mark tagging us, save each other and chase each other and feel nothing except the heat of the pavement on our skin.
Face Masks and Fear: Impact of the H1N1 Pandemic Influenza on Asia
Lorenzo Sewanan

When I landed at the airport in Hong Kong for the first time, I felt as if I had stepped into the zone of a recent bioterrorism attack. It was not the thousands of people frantically rushing that gave me this impression; no, that is normal in overcrowded Hong Kong. It was the ubiquitous facemasks and the numerous, conspicuous signs (ref: Appendix, Figures I-II). I was piqued by how serious these Asian countries were taking the H1N1 influenza pandemic. In fact, at one airport, there were staff giving out health pamphlets and face masks. Of course, normal facemasks like these do not actually prevent the transmission of flu, as recent research established that only whole-face respirators were likely to be effective preventative (Sullivan et al., 2010). Face masks can be seen as a metonymic representation of the entire Asian reaction, possibly as a mark of fear, an indicator of the specific attitude towards the influenza pandemic. The particularities, uniqueness, and nuances of the Asian response to the threat of H1N1 can be understood through an exploration of the history of, public policy reactions to, and the social, cultural, and economic impacts of the H1N1 and similar infectious disease in Asia.

The History of Asian Pandemics

In the last sixty years, some regions of Asia have been plagued the emergence of novel respiratory diseases which often have become pandemic and even epidemic in nature. The Asian Flu Pandemic (1957-1968) of Influenza H1N1 started in South China, causing a lot of deaths in the regions, and infected about four million people worldwide. The Hong Kong H3N2 Flu (1968-1969) caused a regional epidemic of about two million people, with high incidence in Hong Kong (Bartlett and Hayden, 2005). In February 2003, there was the first Bird Flu H5N1 scare, with a very high mortality of six out of eighteen, which led to much anxiety due to being the highest death rate for any influenza. The second Bird Flu scare occurred in late 2003 and early 2004, in which H5N1 broke out again in countries including China and Cambodia, with over one hundred cases of infection in Asia, with the highest mortality rate of 95% (ref: Appendix, Figure III). In China, the bird flu has infected 38 people with 25 deaths while in Cambodia there were 9 people with 7 deaths and no cases were reported in Malaysia. However, beyond the human impact of the bird flu epidemic, it also causes the widespread killing of over one hundred million domestic birds and expensive immunization of poultry (Nation Vaccine Program Office, 2004).

While the costs and psychological impacts of the avian influenza were staggering, the disease known as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) which appeared in 2003 would cause far more widespread losses (ref: Appendix, Figure IV) for the Asian region (Chydesdale and Kollman, 2002). SARS spread from Asia to the rest of the world, causing at least 8,000 infections and 774 deaths, the majority of which (85%) were in the Asian region (Lam et al, 2003). Initially, China tried to hide the SARS epidemic to mitigate socioeconomic impact, but the WHO then advised against travel to China and Hong Kong (Sampathkumar, 2003). The direct results were devastating for Hong, its hotel occupancy dropped by 88%, its airport movement dropped by 49%, with an estimated GDP loss of 15 million HKD. For China, 50% of flights were cancelled, a projected 10% loss in sales was observed, and a calculated 1.5 percent of the GDP was lost due to SARS (ref: Appendix, Figure V) (Lam et al., 2003). Given the destruction wreaked by past epidemics, it would make sense that the observed reaction to the current H1N1 influenza would be vigorous and based on a rapid adaptation of previously established pandemic control measures.

Emergence and Epidemiology of H1N1 in Asia

The first cases of the H1N1 in Hong Kong were confirmed on 30 April, 2009 (Fast Track Communications, 2009), while mainland China confirmed its first cases on 10 May, 2009 (Cao et al., 2009) with their first case landing at the airport in Hong Kong for the first time, there were staff giving out health pamphlets and face masks (ref: Appendix, Figure VI). The 2009 H1N1 Virus was determined to be a recombinant form of the influenza H1N1 virus with genes from human, swine, and avian strains. Its clinical manifestation was indicated by a temperature of or greater than 37.5 °C with sore throat, cough, rhinorrhea, and/or nasal congestion in humans. Its mean incubation period was found to be a period of 2 days while it presented symptomatically for three days. Despite its novel form, treatment with oseltamivir, the antiviral, decreased the duration of the fever and thus the disease severity, to a minimum of 1 day. Despite there being no fixed epidemiological model for the disease in specific countries, rapid simulations indicated that the infection had a secondary attack rate of 0.273, meaning that there was a chance of infection at least one other person within the generation interval of 2.5 to 2.8 days.

As of current data, the H1N1 is in a global recession phase, after reaching its peak in the November-December months. At the very least, 1,462,361 cases have been found of H1N1, with a confirmed 24,403 deaths. In this past week alone, a thousand people have died from H1N1 complications around the world, which is in full 3% less than previous mortality rates. In Asia, so far, around 1,653 people have died from H1N1 (ref: Appendix, Figure VII). To compare the situations among some countries of Asia, the mortality rates in Cambodia, Hong Kong, China, and Malaysia are 0.45, 0.17, 0.61, and 0.63 per million respectively. In northern and southern China, rates of ILL have returned to normal non-H1N1 levels, though H1N1 occupies about 30% of the niche. In general, the pandemic influenza is in rapid decline in Asia, similar to worldwide trends. Comparatively speaking, we see that Asian countries have relatively low death rates and infection rates. Even though China has a large number of deaths and infected due to its massive population, its infection rates are lower than Malaysia and Hong Kong. Cambodia would seem to have one of the lowest infection and mortality rates in the world, but it must be cautioned that complete data is probably even less so available for that region as Cambodia is significantly lacking in healthcare infrastructure throughout the country. In terms of a worldwide comparison, China has the third most cases of all, but it has a much lower rate than some other countries by at least two orders of magnitude. This supports the theory that China's systems and responses—which are similar to most Asian systems and responses—must be performing effectively in stanching the epidemic (Merican, 2009; Flu Count, 2009; WHO, 2009). Despite this aggressive will surely yield interesting insights into the Asian model of response to this H1N1 that has started to leave lasting marks on Asian population.
The policies which can be found from reliable sources are mostly those directed outwardly and those that are commonly practiced, as per government guidelines in theory (ref: Appendix, Figure VII). For the most part, the policies seem to be based on WHO guidelines, adapted by the country as it sees fit, in consultation with local medical organizations. The key strategy shared among the countries is screening and containing the disease, and to reduce perturbations in the population in coming months, but it must be noted that numerous protests arose after two people died after receiving the vaccination (Merican, 2009; Quek, 2009; Travel Alert, 2009; Gouanvic, 2009; Juan, 2009; Ani, 2009). Also, when I was there, I remember hearing on the local news that the high-risk population of pregnant refused to receive the vaccine, due to suspicion that it would cause miscarriages. Another personal experience that I bring to bear is that Cambodia, despite its official policy dictations, did not have temperature scanners at its airport terminal. Thus, though the policies are in place, the effectiveness of them is also constrained by the existence of means for implementation.

However, one case of means of implementation of an integrated system is the Malaysia model, which is similar to other Asian responses. The public goals of the integrated suite of policies (ref: Appendix, Figure VIII) would be to reduce deaths, to reduce incidence of the disease, and to reduce perturbations in the normal functioning of society. Within this paradigm, the individual, healthcare system, and public agencies have a role of surveillance, containment, and notification. The framework binds these elements together with the government's commanding role, in both public health interventions and health systems responses. One interesting observation that I have is that perhaps in these cases, the more centralized the government, the more effective the integrated model. Also, this model, while important in the short-term, would be more designed to function in the long-term (ref: Appendix, Figure IX). H1N1 is a cyclical disease which has the phases of exponential growth and then decline, repeating as people recover, immunity fades, and the season returns (Malaysia, 2009). The model also recognized the long-term nature of these kinds of diseases which would be influenced most effectively during the first growth and the first decline stages. If the response is adequate, returning cycles of the disease will be diminished in effect, leading to an eventual end of the disease as a pandemic threat.

Evaluating the adequacy of the Asian response is in most ways indistinguishable from evaluating the healthcare available. The conditions of the disease are such that twenty percent of the cases will require hospitable treatment, which demands both hospitals capacity (ref: Appendix, Figure X) and stockpiles of antiviral medications. Specifically populations (ref: Appendix, Figure XI) will also specifically be more severely affected than others, such as the large pregnant segment in Cambodia and the segments that have tuberculosis or are obese in Malaysia. Fatalities will come from these sectors in the general scheme of a 30% incidence if the national pandemic plans developed do not adjust, especially in response opacity which is obscure at local levels (Kamigaki and Oshitani, 2010). However, I must observe, given the attitudes presented to me by various people to whom I inquired about this pandemic, the change of the pandemic seemed greatly exaggerated at first and is now taking longer than expected to decline because of some measures like self-quarantine being ignored. More generally, of course, the integrated model, which emphasizes personal action and strict reporting, must rely on the cooperation of the people.

Economic, Political, and Social Epidemiology Theory

The Asian people themselves have quite the motivation, and apparently from observations, the will to cooperate. Some psychological studies validate that Asians, in particular Malaysians, show much more preoccupation and anxiety with the H1N1 influenza than Western people, to the extent of even reducing travel, buying masks, and stockpiling food (Goodwin et al., 2009). The furrows of the historical pandemics, especially SARS, delved deep into the Asian psyche because of their substantial economic impacts. One theory hypothesizes that the cost associates with infectious diseases are of two types, direct costs which are used to treat or cope with the disease and indirect costs which include the effects of morbidity of workers and consumer, disability, and premature mortality which all amount to folding human capital in the workforce and the supply-demand chains (Brahmbhatt and Dutta, 2008).

With SARS, especially since there was no proper healthcare method of diagnosis or cure (Sampathkumar, 2003), incredible panic ensued with billions of messages being sent out about a mysterious illness which prompted negative demand effects as well with supply side disruptions and risk premium increases, resulting in such losses as a 1.1% GDP drop in Hong Kong (Brahmbhatt and Dutta, 2008). An economic-epidemiological examination of the MICE sector in one study indicated that this high revenue-generating sector breaks down immediately in the area of crises, especially due to government travel advisories (Campiranon, 2005). However, a game theory approach can be conceptualized in which these negative effects are controlled by proper management of the situation (Brahmbhatt and Dutta, 2008). Such economic measures taken the governments include staff mobilization minimization in hospitals in Hong Kong (Wabey, 2009) and price control of medications for related illnesses and tourism industry subsidies by China (Lydon, 2009). While it seems that China and Hong Kong have taken excessive measures in their restriction and infection control, it is important to remember that they were hit worse historically. The draconian measures have been induced to control the pandemic cost-effectively (Ong et al., 2009).

In the initial case of H1N1, people in Asian regions previously affected by such diseases like SARS were seen to fear it 10% more than SARS in terms of its perceived morbidity potential. In this case, the social dynamics were such that Asian government which effected extreme quarantine policies were highly supported by their publics, since many Asian economies have a high reliance on service and tourism industries which like MICE industries are particularly susceptible to local crises (Griffiths and Lau, 2009). However, the initial effects of H1N1 have seemed not to impact the economy strongly to the merit of the extant policies and Asian responses, as the WHO has suggested that travel restriction would have no benefit whatsoever in this case (Goslin, 2010).

In the case that the governments would need to enforce these strong-handed policies with the mobilization of particular workforces and industries, certainly there must be


Working for the Boss and Towards Power in Chinese Special Economic Zones

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The dagongmei are a newly formed class of temporary workers, characterized by their migrant, gender, and regional features and structurally hindered in the "post-socialist" Chinese state. Neoliberalism and the push for modernity co-opted the state, geography, and sources of capital to exploit and suppress the power of these predominantly female, rural workers in China's economic developing zones. Understanding the authority, power and politics of the dagongmei allows for recognition of their potential in restructuring the system that restrains them. According to the post-structuralist view of Foucault, everyone has power as the engineers of society and its structures; they simply give it up to the system. As subjugated and down-trodden as they may seem, the dagongmei possess agency in reclaiming their power. In small ways everyday they fight for wages, humane factory conditions, decent hours, and small liberties. These struggles ensue as a result of state withdrawal from management-labor relations and the lack of non-state labor forces (Ngai, 108). The dagongmei are battling against the phenomena that keep them down: time management and discipline, language of class and identity, politics of difference and differentiation, and the patriarchal and anti-rural system. The "engines of Chinese growth", they are some-what educated, motivated, disciplined, and above-all impossible to completely mechanize. A cohesive struggle for power is somewhat obstructed and complicated by individual confusions of identity and opportunity. The dagongmei come to the factories and undertake the toil and conditions on their own accord. The element of consent and the immediate calculated subjection they face can obscure feelings, which are often blurs of freedom, fatigue and homelessness.

Barriers to collective action are the main impediment to the accrual of power in their factories and society. Tactics of formal politics, "the political activity allied to the hierarchies of administrative power in local and central government- primarily political parties but also trade unions," are largely unavailable to them (Micinski, 2). The dagongmei then must rely on informal politics which "represent the forms or organization such as voluntary and women's and ethnic organizations which are seen as being largely outside state structures and less linked to the exercise of executive power"(Micinski, 2). While movements employing informal politics are often set aside to occur in the private sphere, it is in the public sphere that the suppression of the dagongmei occurs, and thus it should be a goal to eventually achieve resistance through formal politics (Micinski, 2). The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is a state apparatus that controls labor unions in China, but they do not represent workers in foreign-owned factories (Interview). The creation of an Independent trade union, which would be built on the "organic" slow down, is in the superiors' interest to make concessions, even if not immediately or directly. The radio was important to the workers, not for economic reasons, but for the purpose of "cultural activities" for which they would "act militantly" but without aggression (Ngai, 108). Because of their strict schedules and time constraints, radio time was one of their only opportunities for exposure to the outside world (usually through Hong Kong channels). The line leaders recognize the value of small, tacit compromises, one at Meteor stating, "It's no use being too harsh... Sometimes I don't even prevent them from talking or daydreaming, you know, it is the only way to keep work moving" (Ngai, 103). Foremen reflect similar attitudes towards attempting to rigidly regulate "human world of action, agency, and limitation," in that the path of least resistance, which is really interstitial resistance from the dagongmei, is at times the most productive.

The workers are adept at seizing gaps in the disciplinary chains and striking at opportune times. They get away with anything they can. As soon as they feel the control lessening, they strike. This may be spontaneous conversation sparked in the afternoon or at night, increased violations of workplace regulations in the dormitories (cooking, visitors, changing beds), or even bathroom breaks. Ngai describes innumerable "daily life transgressions" which were tolerated to the extent that there was no perceived serious threat to order (Ngai, 105). These small forms of resistance are platforms for the dagongmei that arise from physical limitations and failures of regulating the human body. Lack of sleep was a limitation to discipline and almost a sort of device for the dagongmei because of its legitimacy. The more likely the events of extreme exhaustion and boredom, the more leniencies the workers were granted. According to Ngai, the workers broke from discipline almost as a psychological necessity: "What the girls could do was making an effort to cheer themselves up. Every chance to have fun and share snacks was taken" (Ngai, 98). The "disciplinary machine" of the line was not a match for "drowsiness or work-related accidents. It fell upon the line leaders and foremen to eliminate or control "human factors such as slow down, sickness, temporary leave to use the washroom and whatever unpredictable human elements might escape the dictates of the moving line" (Ngai, 89). The nature of the work itself, the fact that it requires a "collective labor for the line", disables it from completely disconnecting from humanity. As individualized as the process may be, there is still the necessity of cooperation and a bond with the people near and across from each other on the line. The workers are joined by their exploitation and need to confront it every day; they commiserate the same daily inequalities and assert a collective defiance. Without leaving their factory stool or voicing a problem, the dagongmei are able to collectively identify difficulties and eke out concessions from authorities.
2. While silent communication of resistance yields results, spoken communication, specifically in a shared dialect, helps the workers navigate life in the factory and city. As anyone looking for a job knows, networking works as it connects people and brings a sense of legitimacy to a cause. The dagongmei already heavily employ kinship and ethnic ties as practical tools to enter and maneuver in a workplace. Nagi describes the concepts of kinship and ethnicity as "performative cultural artifacts and practical relationships" (Nagi, 59). Such ties can be viewed as a sort of cultural capital, and the formation of responsibility for others, which moves away from the destructive individualization of the disciplinary machine. Communication is essential in coordinating a factory line, voicing grievances, and creating a sense of community. Region and kin-ethnic groupings create different "networks of obligation and authority in the workplace" (Nagi, 121). Power and authority often emerge from the abilities of persuasion, trust, and influence, which are all better achieved in the factories with network ties. Network affiliations and esteem of the workers aid in the promotion of a worker to line leader. In a factory with hundreds of workers hailing from various regions across a huge country and speaking different dialects, the creation of communities is a powerful agent (Ngai, 100). The kinship and ethnic networks create a resistance to the demands of the factory in a way, they benefit from the value of the rural life, refusing the ablation of their rural ways.

The classification of localities or ethnic groups helps some dagongmei's bargaining power and connections, but it also works to divide the dagongmei and create hierarchies (Ngai, 121). The dagongmei have a solid platform of networking to work from, but they need to broaden their networks and refrain from limiting themselves with differences. Ethnic ties are still very powerful, but they should not be the only means of networking and should not destroy a cohesive movement of the dagongmei overall. A common example is informal networks, such as sharing membership in a closed network, whereas formal industries "tended to foster interethnic solidarity through unions and radical political parties" that are unavailable to the dagongmei (Davis, 185). Extreme ethnic differentiation can lead to violence and decreased power. Ethnic and kinship ties are highly effective in drawing people to solidarity created around it, as opposed to that of Mao's proletarian gongren (Ngai, 110).

At the time of the Revolution, the gongren was constructed by and had the support of the state. By the 1970s, the gongren were no longer the center of the Revolution, and the iron rice bowl was removed from the working class as the government redirected its focus to economic growth (Nagi, 110). Dagongmei, meaning "working for the people", is an immediate implication of subordination, was created as a capitalise being separate from the proletariat and without its freedom (Nagi, 111). The definition of the dagongmei as a class was blurred between peasantry and worker and lacked the language of class granted to the gongren (Ngai, 46). Despite these barriers to solidarity and a language of articulation, the dagongmei have increasingly carved their own niche. Through informal politics, networks, celebration of womanhood, and sheer number, a reinvention of the concept of solidarity created around it, as opposed to that of Mao's proletariat gongren (Ngai, 110). While there are politics of difference and differentiation working against them within their identity as dagongmei, with contribution to discussion of their issues, common struggles in close quarters and increased articulation of them, an increasingly unified class prevails. The talking allowed at night, shared lunches and dinners, the creation of literature about dagongmei and magazines all help to mold an identity and community (Ngai, 156). The CWWN works to divide the dagongmei and create hierarchies in a way, as they benefit from the advantages of larger networks. The dormitories provide an excellent space for organization and community within the workers. All of the workers, who share a migrant status, are required to stay in a dormitory provided by the company (Interview). As already mentioned, there is increased interstitial resistance in the dormitories and articulation of grievances. In addition to organizing and creating networks amongst themselves, through efforts like the Chinese Working Women's Network (CWWN) the dagongmei could work with unions connected with the government controlled trade union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), such as the hospital and university unions (Interview). Larger networks could also include reaching to anti-sweatshop groups.

3. Networking and exercising interstitial powers collectively have aimed in growing awareness of and within agency and class consciousness. The slow and steady process of a new cohesive vision of Dagongmei as an assertive social body with rights is a platform to lead to collective action against the status quo and a social transformation. The dagongmei have been struggling with their torn identities between the urban and rural, (Interview). The "labor situation with one's past identity was for the sake of establishing a new identity" (Nagi, 117). Rather then completely feeding into the urban-rural divide, the workers get homesick and eventually return to the country, revealing some resistance to the surrounding bombardment of ideas of the subordination and unrefined incompetence of rural life. The identity of the dagongmei was impaired by the lack of culture and
are a number of dagongmei, who have taken steps towards their own collaboration and social coordination. In conclusion, in order to articulate and create a class consciousness and agency, the dagongmei must act upon the platforms they have built of informal, but collective, opportunity resistance and power, kinship and ethnic ties and broader networks, and the development of a cohesive, assertive social body with rights. Inevitable failures in factory regulation are the dagongmei's opportunity to demonstrate a silent collective resistance. Their collectivity is further fostered through reliance on their own kin networks, and a potential expansion to larger ones, be they national, corporate or NGO. Collectivity through these agents ultimately leads to the greatest strength of the dagongmei, their large, flexible population with an overt aversion to the oppression. While the dagongmei lack an official "worker" status or formal power, as a unified group they are essential to the functioning of China's production. Through a grassroots appeal to compensate for their authoritative absence and lack of unions, organized resistance employing weapons of the weak in an assertion of humanity is possible.

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Springtime for Clarissa?
Cristina Conti

It is no revelation that Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway (1925) is a literary masterpiece. Although it does display structural and thematic similarities to Northrop Frye's characteristics of a "great work of art," it does not neatly fit into any one of the seasonal categories that he enumerates in The Archetypes of Literature, published in 1950 (694). Through attempting to classify literature, Frye identifies archetypes or commonalities that are endemic to different genres. These categories are all "phases" of the year, and the phase the "myth" ends on determines the archetype of the work (Frye 698). Frye posits, "In the solar cycle of the day, the seasonal cycle of the year, and the organic cycle of human life, there is a single pattern of significance, out of which myth constructs a central narrative around a figure who is partly the sun, partly vegetative fertility and partly a god or archetypical human being" (698). Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf's heroine, represents this "figure" and is confronted with her humanity as a middle-aged woman "in the solar cycle of the day" (Frye 698). While Mrs. Dalloway supports Frye's claim that all great literature is written in the style of a quest-myth, it contradicts his divisions of the four archetypes of literature.

Through her search for her life's significance, Mrs. Dalloway is a middle-aged heroine, epitomizing Frye's concept of "the archetypical human being" who partakes in "ritual" (Frye 698). Mrs. Dalloway begins her quest with the ritual of buying flowers on a June morning—fresh as if issued to children on a beach (Woolf 3). The first sentence of the narrative is, "Mrs. Dalloway said she would buy the flowers herself" (Woolf 3). Fittingly, Frye defines ritual as "the deliberate expression of a will to synchronize human and natural energies" (698). The narrator of Mrs. Dalloway is careful to stress Clarissa's agency—her "expression of will"—in performing this ritual that typically accompanies preparations for a party. The verbs of this opening sentence are active: "said" and "buy" (Woolf 3). The narrator emphasizes Mrs. Dalloway's action further with the intensive pronoun "herself" (Woolf 3).

Frye lauds the importance of ritual in representing human experience. He asserts, "in ritual, then, we may find the origin of narrative, a ritual being a temporal sequence of acts in which the conscious meaning or significance is latent; it can be seen by an observer, but is largely concealed from the participators themselves" (Frye 698). It is true that the meaning of Mrs. Dalloway's act is "latent;" the narrator does not narrate the significance of this seemingly ordinary deed. Yet it is infused with meaning; typically upper-class women had their servants "buy the flowers," and the narrator is careful to justify Clarissa's action in the next sentence. "For Lucy [the servant] had her work cut out for her" (Woolf 3). Buying flowers was also a task relegated to the masculine sphere—men bought flowers for women. Thus, upper-class women were rarely found at the florists. Immediately, Clarissa is occupying the male space of the flower shop—not as an individual, but referred to as "Mrs. Dalloway," merely the wife of Dalloway.

In this beginning scene, as a married woman, Clarissa is void of her own identity and only sees herself in relation to her husband. The narrator describes, "She had the oddest sense of being herself invisible, unseen; unknown; there being no more marrying, no more having of children now, but only this astonishing and rather solemn process with the rest of them, up Bond Street, this being Mrs. Dalloway; not even Clarissa any more; this being Mrs. Richard Dalloway" (Woolf 10-11). Clarissa is an "invisible" woman without her own name, "not even Clarissa any more," only "Mrs. Richard Dalloway"—a consequence of her social status (Woolf 11). Her insecurity and lack of identity are key characteristics that usher the beginning of her quest.
Clarissa's search for her identity that "emerges" from the masculine action of buying flowers is, according to Frye, "the same central quest-math that emerges from ritual" (699). This action spurs Clarissa to ponder existential questions such as, "Did it matter then, she asked herself, walking towards Bond Street, did it matter that she must inevitably cease completely; all this must go on without her; did she resent it; or did it not become consoling to believe that death ended absolutely?" (Woolf 99). Clarissa wonders if her life matters and questions the nature of her existence, "but that somehow in the streets of London, on the ebb and flow of things, here, there, she survived. Peter survived, lived in each other, she being part, was positive, of the trees at home; of the whole river, rambling all to bits and pieces as it was" (Woolf 99). She discusses her life in prosaic terms and she coasts "on the ebb and flow of things," choosing the word "survived" instead of "lived." Mrs. Dalloway's description of her house as "ugly, rambling all to bits and pieces" is symbolic of herself as she sees her reflection in "Hitchard's shop window" (Woolf 9).

Frye also discusses the importance of symbols and "pattern of imagery" in "constructing narrative" meaning (698). He avers, "They too are encyclopedic in tendency, building up a total structure of significance, or doctrine, from random and empirical details" (Frye 696). The symbolic image of Clarissa's reflection is repeated at the conclusion of the novel when she stands alone at her "window" secluded from her party guests (Woolf 185). Clarissa remarks, "Oh, but how surprising!—in the room opposite the old lady stared straight at her! She was going to bed. And the sky" (Woolf 188). The image of the window is recurrent, aligning with another one of Frye's principles. He posits, "Some arts move in time, like music; others are presented in space, like painting. In both cases the organizing principle is recurrence, which is called rhythm when it is temporal and pattern when it is spatial" (Frye 697). "Recurrence" is an integral part of narrative. Frye continues, "We hear or listen to a narrative, but when we grasp a writer's total pattern we 'see' what 'she' means" (697). Clarissa sees her reflection in the old lady at the window, but this time the sun is setting, marking the end of the day and foreshadowing her future as an aging woman who descends into darkness.

The scene where Clarissa sees herself is the culmination of the quest-math archetype. Frye maintains, "The correspondence is largely an antithesis; it is in daylight that man is really in the power of darkness, a prey to frustration and weakness; it is in the darkness of nature that the 'libido' or conquering heroic self awakes" (700). Aply, darkness is descending on Clarissa: "There! the old lady had put out her light! the whole house was dark now" (Woolf 186). Frye establishes, "Hence art, which Plato called a dream for awakened minds, seems to have as its final cause the resolution of the antithesis, the mingling of the sun and the hero, the realizing of a world in which inner desire and the outward circumstance coincide" (700). Clarissa's resolution and catharsis takes place in this darkness: "with this going on, she repeated, and the words came to her, Fear no more the heat of the sun" (Woolf 186). In darkness, Clarissa mingles with "the sun," repeating the illuminating Shakespeare quote that she recites in the beginning of the novel when she sees her reflection, "Fear no more the heat of the sun." The narrator says that "the words came to her" like a revelation or 'epiphany,' in Frye's terms (Woolf 186; Frye 699). Frye asserts, "Finally, the tendency of both ritual and epiphany to become encyclopedic is realized in the definitive body of myth" (Frye 699). Epiphany is another integral part of the quest-math that Woolf includes in Mrs. Dalloway. When Clarissa speaks Shakespeare's words in an "oracle"-like recitation, they are infused with a new sense of meaning that motivate her to continue living and return to the party (Frye 698). Hence, Clarissa's quest is clear in Frye's terms, but attempting to define Mrs. Dalloway within generic confines is problematic.

By Frye's own definition, masterpieces are "complex" and "ambiguous" and consequently will elude precise categorization (696). Mrs. Dalloway is an example of this, though it could be argued that in the heroine's quest, she struggles with the significance of her own experience and chooses to continue living—triumphing over "death," which is part of the description of Frye's "dawn, spring, and birth phase" (Frye 698). One could argue that in coming "in from the little room" Clarissa emerges as a heroine who won the battle within herself over the death-drive, in Brookman terms. Still, the narrator comments, "the old lady had put out her own light" (Woolf 186). Reflecting over Septimus's suicide and her own destiny, it also could be maintained that Clarissa annihilates a part of herself in that room—the visionary part, the part that does not fit into society. When Woolf's hero Septimus, who represents this vision, kills himself, he is emblematic of "the dying god," one of Frye's tenets of "the sunset, autumn, and death phase" (Frye 698). The conclusion of the novel is also plagued by a satirical party of hypocrites, showing that Clarissa's supposed spring-like "rebirth" is not necessarily representative of new life. Although Mrs. Dalloway's ending could be construed as hopeful and resemble Frye's spring phase, it is also satirical, allowing the "triumph" of the "ogre" and "witch"-like characters of Sir William Bradshaw and Lady Bruton (Frye 699).

The ambiguous ending of Mrs. Dalloway illustrates our inability to completely categorize great works of literature into neat categories. Despite the fact that Frye's phases offer a fruitful way of analyzing literature, as a "profound masterpiece" with a "complex and ambiguous texture," Mrs. Dalloway eludes complete categorization by encompassing aspects of all of different seasonal phases (Frye 698). Thus, I aver that Mrs. Dalloway contributes to the "unraveling" of Frye's theory (694). Frye's archetypes are helpful with critical analysis, but are not all encompassing. Frye himself concludes, "Our tables are, of course, not exclusively but grossly oversimplified, just as our inductive approach to the archetype was a mere hunch" (701). He realized the limitations of his scientific classification of literary genres, but hoped that his inductive and deductive procedures for analysis would "meet in the middle" through balanced treatment (Frye 701).

Although it is important to examine the central "conceous meaning or significance," meaning can also be found in the periphery with characters who do not take center stage (Frye 698). They may even die before the curtain closes, like Septimus. Peripheral characters in Mrs. Dalloway work to bolster Frye's claim about "The social function of the arts" (700). He stipulates, "So in terms of significance, the central myth of art must be the vision of the end of social effort, the innocent world of unfulfilled desires, the free human society" (700). The fact that this "vision" must die in Mrs. Dalloway in order for Woolf's heroine to live gives a bleak conclusion to the novel, but espouses Frye's aim nonetheless (700). Still, there is hope as Clarissa lives with knowledge of the vision.

Works Cited
Our initials
James Gilland

Looking back on that day, I hear
The patter and chatter of the rain all around us,
Like the cracking of a warm record,
A constant shushing loud and silent,
The soundtrack to the adventure between a boy and his father.

My pale skinny and bony body,
Soaked with the damp heavy hanging air.
Wide eyed and skeptical,
A child,
Looked up at you and the Swiss Army knife,
Red and silver a dangerous thing.

I can just make out the up and down dance of the water on the lake through the rainy
static of that day and my mind.

And then so effortlessly it suddenly stopped,
Now only the dripping trees beat time on the forest floor.
And then we set out,
Just us.

No big brother, and no idea why.

We took a trail past the rusty tennis courts,
Through that Adirondack timber we marched.
I picture us walking along that brown path that sliced through
The soft green napmy moss,
Covered in the white beads of splattered water.
I feel the soggy twigs kind of crunch under my feet,
My little wet socks.

We've never been back, never again made this moment ours.
Our initials sometime somewhere on that tree.

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Child Development: Object Permanence
Milan Moore

The purpose of our study was to examine when children acquire the ability to recognize
an object after it is hidden because of its permanent existence. This is known as the
"object" concept, since the child is able to comprehend that objects are independent from
them and retain their existence when taking out of the child's sight. Piaget developed
this theory into stages and believed that children have limited object
permanence depending on what stage they are in. More recently, Baillargeon challenged
Piaget's theory because of the emphasis on motor ability to actively seek and pull off a
cloth from an object. Baillargeon theorized that children have an idea of "object
permanence" as young as 3 months old. The children's development of this concept is
debated heavily today, so we examined children according to Piaget's measures. For
our study, we focused on stages IV (child's ability to find hidden object on the most basic
level)-VI (child's ability to find hidden object is displaced). We hypothesized that older
children will exhibit more aspects of the object concept than younger children. We also
predicted that the scores are inversely related to tasks' difficulty, given that Task 1 was
the easiest and Task 2 most difficult.

Children between the ages of 8-23 months were used in the study since this is the
critical age range that shows the variety in children's levels of comprehension of
object permanence. To perform our study in pairs, we decided on who will be the
experimenter and who will be the observer. Then after a child was chosen, we followed
the steps below:

1. Warm- up Period: This is a five to ten-minute session in which the tester and the
child become comfortable with each other. This includes introducing the teacher and
playing with the child.
2. Testing Period: This is the part of the study in which the child is exposed to three
different conditions. Two cloths were needed, as well as an object that kept the
child's attention (i.e. toys, keys, jewelry). Each task was repeated three times.
   a. Task 1: The object is placed under one cloth and the child's response was
      recorded.
   b. Task 2: The object is hidden under the same cloth, yet the second cloth is in
      the area. The child has to choose which cloth the object is under.
   c. Task 3: The hidden object is now displaced to the second cloth, while the first
      cloth is still visible to the child. Again, the child is to choose the cloth with the
      object.

The child's response was rated on a scale from 1 (no search) to 6 (readily/correctly
searches at place where object is hidden).

The sample of 132 children was divided into 2 groups: younger (8-14 months)
and older (15-23 months). Overall as we hypothesized, the older children performed
better with averages of M = 5.65 (SD = .84), M =5.59 (SD = .80), and M =4.88 (SD =
1.20) compared to the younger children who averaged M =5.66 (SD = .97), M = 4.77 (SD =
1.63), and M = 3.47 (SD = 1.60) on the three tasks. Supporting our second hypothesis,
the average scores decreased as the difficulty of the tasks increased.
There was no significant difference (P>.05) between the younger and older children in Task 1, showing that by the age of 8 months children typically have developed a basic level of the object concept. Yet, based on the results, children in the younger group have not completely developed the cognitive structures to fully grasp the concept of object permanence. As seen in Fig. 1, similar to the younger children, the older children found it challenging to correctly find the object when hidden and displaced. Even for the older age group, they have not completely gotten the object permanence concept by the age of 23 months. There was variability amongst the children within their age group and between the tasks. The greatest spread in scores was in Task 2 with an $SD = 1.63$, showing that not all children develop at the same pace. Some children exhibit the comprehension of this concept earlier than others. There is individual variation in the development of the object concept. Parents should not be alarmed if by the age of 23 months their child has failed to completely comprehend this concept because each child is different. This can be seen amongst the older age group, there was a high variability in the scores from task 3 ($SD = 1.20$), indicating that even by the age of 23 months some children are still not fully understanding the magnitude of the object concept.

Parents can help strengthen their child’s cognitive structures by giving them toys that exercise this object permanence concept. Our advice would be to buy age appropriate toys. Interactive toys are useful because they are both mentally stimulating and gives parents time to bond with their child to assess their child’s cognitive abilities. Discovery Toys should continue their production of educational toys that facilitate learning and strengthening of children’s cognitive structures. We suggest that parents should continue investing in hide in seek toys such as the Hide and Seek Safari, in which the tiger is hidden and the child has to find it using the magic branch, or The Mailbox Fill and Spill, in which the child has to look for the hidden mail in the mailbox. Toys such as these will help their child progress through the developmental stages of object permanence as in Piaget’s theory.
An Era of Partisanship and Anti-Intellectualism
Zachary Sonenshine

Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, John Paul Stevens, has announced that he intends to retire from the Court in the near future. This comes as no surprise. Stevens, age 90, is the fourth-longest serving Justice in the Court’s history. While his imminent retirement has been predictable for some time now, the effects of his retirement both on the Court and on the national societal and political landscape symbolize a generational and ideological shift.

As legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin points out, “Stevens is an unlikely liberal icon.” Stevens was appointed to the 7th Circuit Court in 1970 by President Nixon and then to the Supreme Court in 1975 by President Ford. Stevens, who has always thought of himself as a Republican, is also the leader of the liberal wing of the Court. Yet, when asked whether it mattered which President named his replacement—whether he would aim to wait for another Republican—Stevens said that he would not answer that question.

Justice Stevens is what we might now call “post-partisan”—a term that entered our vocabulary during the Obama campaign that referred to hopes that his Presidency would lead to an era that transcended partisanship. In truth, Stevens is more of a pre-partisan. He is from a different generation. He is one of the last holdouts of an era that allowed for partisan-free thinking (at least in some capacity: I do not mean to romanticize his generation, which was still rampant with politicization). Still, Stevens represented the intended nature of the Court: elite and intellectual judgment, independent of politics. His retirement will make the Supreme Court a political battleground in a way that it has never been before.

There are few men whose ideological compass is nuanced enough to transcend partisanship. While he is not quite from the same breadth of intellectual dominance and ideological gradation as Justice Stevens, Senator Mark Warner aims to be of the post-partisan revolution for which many who voted for President Obama so hoped, though Warner is largely alone in his quest.

Warner is a Democrat with the pedigree of a Republican. He is a self-made businessman (with a late degree from Harvard) who, as Governor of Virginia, balanced the state’s budget. He preaches from what he calls “the radical center,” and has been known to often bridge the gap between Democrats and Republicans. He is one of the few people in the country who can mediate between Democratic and Republican lawmakers.

We’ve reached an era where men like Warner and Stevens are highly unique, where 60 is the new 51, where symbolic bipartisanship has replaced true compromise, and where talking points have replaced substance. Twitter, blogs, and 24-hour news networks make sound bites expedient and substance insignificant and nearly impossible to attain. With a shift in this paradigm, the post-partisan revolution came to a screeching halt well before it even left the station.

In the near future, Obama will likely have to replace Justice Stevens. I suspect that partisanship will prevail yet again in the appointment process. And Stevens, who I called “pre-partisan,” referring to an era free of sound bite journalism, is not in fact completely above politics. Rather, he is merely an intellectual, a trait that has largely been shunned in recent years. Intellectualism is the vehicle by which compromise and bipartisanship can exist, yet the spread of anti-intellectualism and partisanship has increasingly plagued our democratic process.

Extreme partisanship has always existed in and is an inherent characteristic of the House of Representatives; however, the Senate, which was supposed to be less reactionary and more deliberative than the House, has also been subject to extreme partisanship. Even the Supreme Court, which was intended to foster intellectualism and elitist thinking and deliver opinions free of partisan affiliations, has at times succumbed to partisan decisions, particularly in recent years. In an era of partisanship, sound bites, and anti-intellectualism, the departure of Justice Stevens may be a breeding ground to further politicize the previously impervious nature of the Court.

Conservatism, while by no means the sole culprit of the dissipation of intellectualism in public life, has most explicitly and entirely prohibited it, particularly during the Bush years, and now through fringe groups like the Tea Party movement.

Time and time again, the few conservative intellectuals have been cast aside and replaced by more hawkish politicians. The odd man out in Bush’s frat packed cabinet, for example, was Colin Powell. Ultimately his dissatisfaction with the President’s agenda led to his departure.

Additionally, conservative journalism, while not as brash as the politics it covers, also lacks and even repels intellectualism. New York Times Columnist David Brooks once considered himself a conservative. Now he freely admits that he can no longer identify with the conservative movement (he does not consider himself a liberal either).

Most recently, conservative pundit and former Bush speech writer David Frum was fired from the American Enterprise Institute for remarks on the Health Care bill that were largely critical of republican rhetoric. Frum had declared that the health care reform was “waterloo” for the GOP, not for Obama as Senator Jim DeMint (R-S.C.) had suggested. Frum went on to say that the GOP was in lockstep with Fox News.

The Internet is another reason for anti-intellectualism. The availability of information has seemingly cultivated a public sphere defined by shrill sound bites and talking points, not critical and merit based analysis. We as a society crave these sound bites, and our elected representatives feed our addiction.

Candidate Obama often referred to approaching issues with a scalpel, not a meat cleaver. He clearly understood the dangers of sweeping partisan rhetoric. What he may not have fully understood, however, was that partisanship, fueled in part by anti-intellectualism, was a beast that he alone could not tame. It was an illness that had worked its way into government, and was supported by the people, at least indirectly, through a need for sound bite news.

Justice John Paul Stevens’ impending retirement is a loss for intellectualism. Perhaps we have hit bottom and might soon take a cue from Steven. More likely, however, we must endure more partisan gridlock and meat cleaver anti-intellectualism before intellectualism can yet again prevail.
It was a warm night for October in Manhattan. Abby stood on the corner of Watts and Washington, one block from the West Side Highway, which was still full of cars at 9:45. She fiddled with the hem of her plain black T-shirt, her fingers working in time with the muscles twitching in her right leg.

Someone whistled behind her and she turned to find Cora strutting down the street, proudly displaying her newly re-enhanced breasts in a tight tube top framed with a liquid-red leather corset. Her long, pale legs flashed under the streetlights as her mini skirt swished back and forth, and her thigh-high leather boots clicked happily on the pavement.

Cora was pretty, curvy, and feminine. Everything that Abby wanted to be. Cora had begun the transition from male-to-female much earlier than Abby (18 to Abby’s 26), and she looked every bit the woman Cora had envisioned herself to be since childhood.

Next to Cora, Abby was nothing. Just five feet, three inches of something had always made her look cute.

"Baaaaaaby!"

Abby stood naked in front of her mirror, she saw a freak. A circus creature caught that had a direct view of St. John’s Park.

"Okay, on the party’s upstair’s."

"No, come on. The party’s upstair’s."

Abby followed Cora mutely through the only other door in the hallway and began climbing the stairs. They emerged on the building’s roof, and Abby felt a thrill of joy and nerves sweep through her small body.

"This is Savannah. Abby had heard stories about her. A wealthy artist who took in and protected runaways and the confused. There were rumors of an incredible loft somewhere in TriBeCa that was open 24 hours a day. All you had to do, apparently, was knock. Abby had heard whispers of fabulous parties centered around art and music, where discrimination was prohibited and anyone who spoke a foul word against another guest was chased down the street by a fearsome Great Dane. Abby had heard that there had once been a gay-bashing college kid who had snuck his way into the apartment last New Year with the intention of harassing a fellow student, but two drag queens from New Jersey and the dog made quick work of him.

The two friends entered the building and rode a freight elevator to the seventh floor. There were two doors in the hallway, and muffled music slipped through both.

Abby reached out to knock on the door marked with an infinity sign, assuming it was the front door, but Cora stopped her.

"It looks like it is. Thanks. Yeah. Let’s go."

She groaned. "I can’t. It’s my brother’s first holiday with his fiancée. I can’t miss that. Thanks though."

"Alright, well—Coral"

Savannah. Savannah. Savannah. Abby had heard stories about her. A wealthy artist who took in and protected runaways and the confused. There were rumors of an incredible loft somewhere in TriBeCa that was open 24 hours a day. All you had to do, apparently, was knock. Abby had heard whispers of fabulous parties centered around art and music, where discrimination was prohibited and anyone who spoke a foul word against another guest was chased down the street by a fearsome Great Dane. Abby had heard that there had once been a gay-bashing college kid who had snuck his way into the apartment last New Year with the intention of harassing a fellow student, but two drag queens from New Jersey and the dog made quick work of him.

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"This is Savannah. A braid of shining black hair flowed down her back. Two deep-sea eyes burned in her creamy oval face, framing a graceful nose and lips that kept making nasty comments about how I’m gonna go to hell if I keep wearing skirts, and the other one to pinch my ass every time I walk by."

"Weواب pants and keep your back to the wall," the blond boy said without opening his eyes.

Savannah laughed empathetically. "I’m sorry, honey. Why don’t you spend Christmas with us?"

"Yeah, it is. Well it was. It used to be a watch factory, or a battery factory. I don’t know, something like that. Savannah got the top floor for a song."
Cora leapt forward into Savannah's arms as the other woman stood up, gently moving the boy's head from her lap. The women embraced, Cora's honey-colored curls mixing with the loose floating strands of Savannah's black mane that had slipped from her braid. Abby's hands clutched her loose jeans eagerly as her nerves returned.

"Hey!" Savannah said, pulling back to look at Cora. "You look great! Is this new?"

She fingered the shiny red corset.

"Yeah. I went to that place on Broadway, the one with all the wigs."

The drag queen looked up from the dog. "Rickey's. I get all my body glitter there!"

"The trio chattered about who had the best wigs: Rickey's or 'that tiny place by the Brooklyn Bridge.' Abby could feel herself fading into the background again.

Cora motioned towards the singer, now being plded with wine by an earnest young man. "She's great!"

"Yeah, isn't she?" Savannah said, nodding approvingly. "Her name's Collette. She and Dak met in Paris a few months ago, and when she needed a place to crash here in Manhattan, Dak volunteered me. I don't mind though; she's sweet."

The women laughed. In her mirth, Cora's eyes slid over to Abby and she suddenly seemed to remember that they had come down to TriBeCa with a purpose that night.

"Oh God! Where are my manners? Savannah, I'd like you to meet a friend of mine. This is Abby."

Savannah turned to Abby and the world went dark. The purple lips moved, but Abby's ears refused to accept the sound.

Other faces began seeping into the darkness. The black drag queen with her incredible afro and the boy in the wife beater were staring at her over Savannah's shoulders with confused interest in their eyes.

She was staring. She was just staring at them!

Cora slid in next to Abby and wrapped an arm around her hips, giving her a discrete pinch to wake her up. She jumped.

"Hi! Umm, yeah, hi."

Savannah smiled. "Hello, it's nice to meet you. Welcome to my home." Her easy nature was infectious, and Abby felt herself relaxing under Savannah's stunning gaze.

Abby was about to say something else when the singer, Collette, pushed her way into their midst and held a cell phone out to Savannah.

"Savannah, iz Dak. 'E need to speek wit you. I tink 'e iz in trouble again."

"What's he done now?"

"I do not know. E will not tell me."

The blonde boy muttered, "Probably needs more money."

Savannah gave him a silencing look as she took the phone from Collette. "That's enough, M."

"I don't know why you put up with him," the boy insisted.

"He's family. You know that!"

Cora linked her arm through Abby's and led her away. "C'mon. Let's leave them alone. It's time to have some fun!"

Abby finally smiled; when Cora promised fun, a good time was generally in store. They danced all night, with boys, with girls, and with the undecided. There were trannies with new breasts, fake breasts, no breasts. Natural boys in sparkling wigs and not so natural boys in band t-shirts and baggy pants.

Abby felt safe here. Certainly safer than she had ever felt in her small farm town or any of the clubs here in New York. This was the community she had been searching for since her arrival in New York.

Before she had made the move from Ohio, a small part of her had dreamed that she would move to New York, and within minutes there would be a welcoming crew of transvestites at her door to guide her through the mores of her transition.

This was not the case.

The reality of her life was that she went to work, came home, made a mediocre dinner with whatever was left in the fridge, and continued to work at her computer until she fell asleep. Sure, she occasionally went out to a club, but those excursions were pretty rare, and she had never really enjoyed them. The only good thing to come out of the last one was that she had met Cora.

Savannah came and went throughout the night, floating from roof to stairwell to apartment to hallway. Abby saw her scaling the fire escape several times in her glittering sari, never tripping or slipping on the metal scaffolding. Savannah's grace was reassuring.

Around midnight Cora made her way through the crowd of dancers to tell Abby that she was leaving with the Ethiopian guitarist who had accompanied Collette. Cora offered to share a cab uptown with Abby, but Abby decided to stay. For once, she wasn't afraid to be alone in a new place.

Not long after Cora departed, a redheaded woman flowed through the crowd and curved her body around Abby's. Abby silenced her normal inhibitions and let her. The night spun away from her then. They danced to Lady Gaga songs, drank car bombs, and exchanged wild stories with the musicians.

Her name was Joanna, and she had a room downstairs.

At 3 a.m., Joanna led Abby into a sparsely furnished bedroom in Savannah's massive apartment. Abby let Joanna take the lead. The other woman's cool hands slipped under Abby's shirt as her lips explored Abby's neck. Her tongue was rough, like a cat's, and like a cat, she left light love-bites on Abby's collarbone that Abby couldn't decide if she enjoyed or not.
Alternative to a Human-Centered View of Nature
William Buchanan

Humanity's moral development shows that the range of recipients of our moral attention—our objects of moral consideration—has slowly but steadily grown. The circle of those to whom moral obligations in principle are due has expanded. At first, man showed regard only for himself and those very close to him, such as his direct family. This sphere eventually expanded to include all of humankind, including the weak and the incapable. And that is not all; humanity's moral obligation extends beyond mankind and includes non-human entities as well. Man, therefore, recognizes the significance of the non-human world and the need to protect it. The history of the law suggests a parallel development in its extension of its sphere of considerability. Like man's moral development, law has expanded from protecting only the elite to include all of mankind. This parallel development is not surprising in that law was created and developed to protect man's moral standards.

From common experiences, interactions, and instincts, man had established a variable moral standard. Man created law and its associated system of punishment to enforce moral standards. This standard, or in other words, to promote justice. In this way, the principle of justice can only be protected under law. The change in man's moral standard changes his notion of justice, which requires a change in his system of law. Therefore, the development of law is predicated upon man's moral development. Excluding non-human entities from the protection of law, however, unjustly stunts the causal relationship between man's moral development and law's development. To preserve this indispensable relationship, Congress must extend legal rights to non-human entities.

The skeptic may claim that since non-human entities cannot communicate their needs to us, they do not have a good of their own, or intrinsic value; and since they do not have a good of their own, non-human entities are undeserving or incapable of receiving the kinds of protection afforded by legal rights. However, this is certainly the case for countless incompetent human beings who enjoy the kinds of protections afforded by legal rights. Consider an infant child. Surely an infant is incapable of communicating his or her right to life, but we still acknowledge that the infant has a good of his or her own. Since we recognize the infant's good and right to life, we acknowledge the infant's intrinsic value. By bestowing intrinsic value on the infant, we recognize that the infant has an inherent value—in other words, the infant is valued as more than the sum of its parts. This is a respect we bestow because of its human nature.

In the less extreme case, consider a senile man. Since he is incompetent and incapable of communicating his rights, a competent person speaks on his behalf. For example, a caring son may step in and do the senile man's taxes for him in order to protect his father's legal rights. Non-human entities that cannot communicate their needs to us, but have attributes that have intrinsic value, also deserve to be treated with respect because of this.

In the extreme case, consider a non-human entity. Since he is incompetent and incapable of communicating his rights, a competent person speaks on his behalf. For example, a caring son may step in and do the non-human entity's taxes for him in order to protect his property rights. Non-human entities that cannot communicate their needs to us, but have attributes that have intrinsic value, also deserve to be treated with respect because of this.

Fortunately, it is possible to understand the good of a non-human entity. Knowing what is required by a non-human entity is essential to the understanding of the entity's rights. Knowledge of the entity's needs, both physical and social, is required by a non-human entity.

Whatever is required to promote an entity's normal conditions is its good and, therefore, constitutes the entity's rights deserving of protection. In other words, the good of an entity is indicated by the characteristic features of the kind of being it is. The kind of being it is. The kind of being it is.

Biocentrism focuses on living organisms as the loci of intrinsic value. Therefore, just as all living human entities are bearers of intrinsic value, so are all living non-human entities. Biocentrism claims that non-human creatures not only have intrinsic value, but that there is no disparity in the level or intensity of intrinsic value amongst individuals. In other words, all living creatures have the same degree of intrinsic value regardless of their species, mental capacity, experience, etc. However, egalitarian biocentrism makes an important distinction between domesticated animals and wild animals that highlights the importance of a creature having a good of its own. Domesticated animals have a good of their own generated by evolution, domesticated animals do not. Domesticated animals are really human artifacts, as a book is. Domesticated animals have the characteristics they have survival of its species as a whole, not of that particular bee. These characteristics constitute the individual good of the bee and, therefore, deserve the kind of protections afforded by legal rights.

By comparing non-human entities to incompetent humans, we can understand that all living beings have a good of their own; and by determining what promotes a being's normal conditions, we can know what constitutes the being's good. These constitute the only preconditions for granting non-human entities legal rights. Since we are capable of effectively doing so, we should extend the protections afforded by legal rights to non-human entities just as we have already done based on its capacity for communication.

The only question that remains is which non-human entities should we regard as morally considerable and therefore deserving of legal rights?

An ethical individualist perspective is fundamental in approaching this question of considerability. Ethical individualism, within environmental ethics, holds that only individuals of the right kind can be justifiably regarded as having intrinsic value. It claims that collective entities—such as species, ecosystems, and the planet as a whole—cannot have intrinsic value. Since they cannot have intrinsic value, collective entities can have, at most, instrumental value, serving as resources for individuals with intrinsic value. Instrumental value can only be protected under law. Because the supremacy of intrinsic value, it is the prime indicator of which individuals are morally considerable.

If an individual has intrinsic value, it has moral considerability. If it has moral considerability, it deserves the kinds of protection afforded by legal rights. However, only individuals of the right kind have intrinsic value. Although ethical individualists agree that all human entities have intrinsic value, they disagree over which non-human entities do. A comparison of the four forms of ethical individualism reveals this range in inclusivity.

The four forms of ethical individualism are egalitarian biocentrism, hierarchal biocentrism, Peter Singer's psychocentrism, and Tom Regan's psychocentrism. All four views are examples of ethical extensionism, a particular strategy within environmental ethics that attempts to answer the following question: What entities besides human beings should we regard as morally considerable?

The first component of ethical extensionism involves determining what characteristics make individual human beings bearers of intrinsic value. This is where scholars differ. Ethical extensionism then treats the answer to that question as the standard by which to determine whether any creature has intrinsic value. The following component of ethical extensionism involves determining which non-human entities meet this standard—those that do must be regarded as having intrinsic value for the same reasons that individual human beings do; those that do not meet the standard must be regarded as having only instrumental value. I will now describe the four forms of ethical individualism, which are examples of ethical extensionism.

Ethical individualism is based on the idea that all living beings have the same degree of intrinsic value regardless of their species, mental capacity, experience, etc. However, egalitarian biocentrism makes an important distinction between domesticated animals and wild animals that highlights the importance of a creature having a good of its own.
because of generations of selective breeding for human purposes, so their good is derived from human interference, not something independent. Therefore, according to egalitarian biocentrism, all living creatures have intrinsic value, except for domesticated animals, which have only instrumental value. This distinction between domesticated and wild animals makes egalitarian biocentrism more appealing and realistic. It justifies killing animals to satisfy the human desire for the taste of meat, which is a constant reality. Since egalitarian biocentrism grants all living creatures equal intrinsic value, I infer that the distinction between domesticated and wild animals could be applied to humans as well in the form of slavery. According to egalitarian biocentrism, slaves would have been considered a human artifact and therefore had only instrumental value. However, this distinction also opens the door to anthropocentrism: a human-centered view that values non-humans as having only instrumental value, and therefore merely as a set of resources to serve human needs, desires, and wishes. The distinction allows for humans to transform some creatures into human artifacts, thereby denying them intrinsic value. Domesticated animals become human artifacts, not artifacts of a non-human source. In this way, non-human entities’ value is still a product of humanism, whereas biocentrism desires and is not necessarily intrinsic. Therefore, although very tenent in granting intrinsic value to most non-human entities, egalitarian biocentrism is not entirely biocentric.

The second most inclusive form of ethical individualism is hierarchical biocentrism. This view is similar to egalitarian biocentrism in its claim that all living individuals of any species have intrinsic value in the form of intrinsically satisfying experiences and that therefore all living individuals of any species are morally considerable; however, hierarchical biocentrism rejects the egalitarian aspect. According to hierarchical biocentrism, there is a hierarchical scale of intrinsic value in living things. Although all living creatures have intrinsic value, intrinsic value comes in varying degrees and intensities. Intrinsic value stems from inherently valuable experiences. Inherently valuable experiences come in different intensities and qualities. Therefore, the degree of intrinsic value that an individual bear is relative to the intensity and quality of its inherently valuable experiences. To ignore this hierarchy of intrinsic value would mean ignoring nature’s hierarchy of biological complexity.

The neurological complexity of a human being clearly outweighs that of a lobster. Therefore, the human is capable of more intense and qualitatively higher, inherently valuable experiences than the lobster; and thus the human is capable of attaining a more intense and qualitatively higher intrinsic value. Within the hierarchical scale of nature laid out by hierarchical biocentrism, the human being can sacrifice the lobster in order to generate an experience of greater intensity and quality, which is inherently more valuable. For example, the pleasure that the lobster gets from its torpid life can be seen as the mere, the more intense and higher in quality pleasure that the human gets from eating the lobster. This view, with its hierarchy of intrinsic value, is not entirely biocentric, however.

Like egalitarian biocentrism, hierarchical biocentrism also opens the door to anthropocentrism. To sacrifice a lesser intrinsic value in order to attain a higher intrinsic value is the same as treating the lower intrinsic value as instrumental. In the example above, the human being is using the lobster as a resource to enhance the human’s intrinsic value. Although hierarchical biocentrism grants all living creatures intrinsic value, its hierarchical component implicitly subordinates all other creatures’ intrinsic value to that of human beings.

Alternatively, Psychocentrism in the manner of Peter Singer resists anthropocentrism by using certain psychological capacities—which some non-human
Recognizing an organism’s intrinsic value involves recognizing what is required to promote that organism’s normal conditions, or identifying that organism’s interests. Since sentience is a precondition for having interests, it is the most appropriate determinant of intrinsic value. If an organism has sentience, it has interests; if it has interests, it has intrinsic value. Therefore, sentience is the only requirement for being a subject of a life. While the mollusks and crustaceans that lack sentience are merely alive, more advanced creatures possessing sentience have a life. Sentient creatures, in fact, have a biography and not just a biology since they have interests that guide and affect their individually unique lives.

Regan’s view is unrealistic because it values all subjects of a life equally. According to Regan, killing an animal is morally equivalent to killing a human. It is not anthropocentric to say that this is untrue because human capacities bestow them with more value than animals have. Therefore, according to Singer, an animal’s interest in life is not equivalent to a human’s interest in life. Killing an animal is not morally equivalent to killing a human being because more value is destroyed when human life is destroyed than when an animal life is destroyed. By acknowledging a hierarchy of value and a hierarchy of interests, Singer’s view is most in tune with reality and does not open the door to anthropocentrism.

The four views just described all focus on individuals and are therefore at odds with ethical holism. Ethical holism moves along the opposite plane as ethical individualism: ethical holism shifts the focus from the individual to the collective entity. In judging the meaning of “right” and “wrong,” holism puts the living land at the center: a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. Although offering a refreshingly non-anthropocentric view, ethical holism fails to provide adequate guidance to the issue of moral considerability of natural objects for three reasons.

The first reason is that at this stage of our biological and ecological knowledge, we simply do not know enough about the web of life to know for sure which actions will or will not in fact enhance the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. This ignorance is an enormous obstacle to confident policy-making, which our ethical success depends upon. According to ethical holism, when faced with the question of whether or not to extend moral considerability to natural objects, we must ask ourselves: “Will this decision benefit the biotic community?” The answer is simply, “We do not know.” Attempting to answer this question through some sort of policy-making may have detrimental effects to the natural world, whose balance transcends the scope of human understanding.

The second reason that ethical holism does not satisfy our needs is that it ignores a huge dimension of ethical life, which we would be wrong to ignore. Ethical questions exist that cannot be classified as having a good or bad impact on the biotic community but that demand ethical answers nonetheless: Is it morally acceptable to lie if it is for a good cause? Is slavery moral or immoral? Should torture be used to extract information from prisoners of war if it could help save lives? Ethical holism does not provide adequate guidance for many of the central issues of human life, even the intuitively obvious ones such as whether it is right to murder one’s mother for her car; and, therefore, a ethical holist approach cannot be applied to the question of the moral considerability of natural objects. Although the notion of murder as evil is ingrained into humanity’s conscience, it finds no support in ethical holism.

One of the earth’s greatest problems is overpopulation. Since the biotic community would be greatly enhanced if the world had fewer people, according to ethical holism, anything we could do to exterminate excess people would be morally right! Although that conclusion may be justified by ethical holism, we know that mass genocide is a moral evil. Therefore, ethical holism not only fails to provide adequate guidance in crucial ethical situations, but it can also lead us in heinous directions! By shifting the focus from the individual to collective entities, ethical holism ignores many of the specificities of reality, thus manufacturing an ambiguous, broad, and unrealistic guide to our moral behavior. In providing answers to the issue of the moral considerability of natural objects, we must examine the individuals in question and not put faith in the kind of umbrella guide outlined in ethical holism.
A Survey of Thrones
Daniel Morgan

The expression of a ruler's identity in Western Europe through thrones is the subject of this brief monograph. Thrones of Merovingian, Carolingian, papal, Italian, and English origin will each be examined. While using some periodization, it may be useful to imagine this examination structured between the dates of 634 CE and 1301 CE. During this period in history, the notion of what authority truly meant to a world after the fall of Rome first began to be articulated. Yet, medieval Europe never moved as one body in history, and was never a cohesive world—rather, it was a "sprawling and much divided community" (Southern, 12). What can be said about expression of identity in one kingdom cannot necessarily be said about another. This fact, however, may actually enhance an understanding of the Middle Ages rather than confound it. If one considers Western European identity in rule as a slowly enlarging process, it would nicely parallel the growth of a more consolidated Western European identity as a whole. Rulership in Western Europe between 634 and 1301, along with thought and culture writ large, went through a movement of fragmentation to unification.

By each small fragmented locality, every individual of power ruled not as an agent of something greater, but as a font of power unto himself. His character alone was enough to sway loyalties, exact influence, and control peoples. Rule by personal authority was how society functioned during the early medieval period, and the historical movement of rule from the seventh to fourteenth century was the movement away from such thinking. By the fourteenth century, one arrives at an expression of rule that combines the religious with the secular. Over the course of this period, symbols communicating greater power than the individual (yet still proceeding from the individual), legitimizing it, became supremely important to power. This line of thought was already present in the veneration of saints' relics, and was later reaffirmed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries' Investiture Controversy. Objects communicating power rose from the level of precious objects and unique items to actual tools in rule. Perhaps the most important tool, and the quintessential symbol of authority, was the throne.
Originally kept in Saint-Denis Abbey, Denis being a favorite holy figure of the king, this throne can be seen as a rerotation of classical Roman aesthetics before their disappearance in medieval Europe. Such artistic forms would not reemerge until the late fourteenth century in Italy. The bronze "x-frame" style of chair with framed panther protomes, intricate lacework about the arms, and vanguard "v-back" are all essential features of a distinctly Merovingian throne. More importantly, they are also features of Roman throne. These Imperial influences from late antiquity display the notion of what rule meant in Europe since the beginning of the common era. By this point in medieval history, there was simply no other way of imagining being a ruler without also imagining oneself as an Augustus, a Caesar. So it was here, at the high-water mark of Merovingian rule, that secular rule meant continuing on a Western tradition that had held true for nearly five hundred years. It would not be until the rise of the Carolingian dynasty that one can see a distinctly evolved medieval identity expressed in thrones coming into being.

Charlemagne's throne at Aachen, then, may be the first articulation of or Latin Christendom's changing identity. Or rather, the throne at Aachen is the earliest that survives. Built sometime around 803 CE in Charlemagne's grandiose new palace and chapel, this throne unmistakably radiates power. It is meant to place the ruler and rightful sitter both literally and figuratively above any individual seeking audience with him. Hewn of heavy blocks of stone, it is unlike the common movable folding stool of lords on campaign, or the bronze or wooden chairs of antiquity. Rather, it is a throne that implies permanency. Moreover, it is a seat that enthrones the king as a ruler under God.

The height of this throne, with the six steps leading up to it, is a symbolic attribute derived purely from the Bible, specifically, 2 Chronicles 9:17-19. In these verses, Solomon's throne is described as ornately overlaid gold on an ivory structure, a footstool, arms with lions standing by them, and six steps leading up to it (Oxford Art Online). Charlemagne's throne at Aachen perhaps serves as a prime example of what kingship meant at the beginning of Christendom. If late antiquity and early Middle Ages rulers were content to consider themselves as continuations of Hellenistic or Roman traditions of authority, then Charlemagne and his successors were markedly different. The Carolingian ruler entering the stage of history after 800 CE would not fashion himself as Caesar. After Charlemagne, the ideal to which rulers would aspire and articulate would be a "new David." In this, secular rulers would come to view themselves not just as warlords capable of mustering soldiers for war, but as temporal incarnations of Christ's will on earth capable of mustering souls for spiritual conflict (Kantorowicz 82, 89).

While the thrones of Dagobert and Charlemagne delineate some progression of identity in rule between 634 1301, they can only reveal so much. They both remained confined to the story of the Franks and their civilization's rise to power. It must be remembered that Western Europe, by the ninth century, experienced the clericalization of the royalty and the militarized nobility (with the latter striving to emulate the former). The secular thrones of Europe by the beginning of the twelfth century began to reflect an
increasingly united notion of what it meant to be a Christian king. It was by this period that strong biblical overtones and symbolisms became predominant in many of the stone and marble thrones of Italy, and in the wooden folding stools of France and England (Oxford Art Online). Of equal interest and importance, however, is the expression of rulership identity in the clergy at this time if only for the fact that it so clearly parallels the royalty.

Often, Secular and ecclesiastical thrones differed only in function (Oxford Art Online) with many of their design features identical or only moderately altered. Both drew similar sources of inspiration as to how authority should be displayed – first importantly (as the seats of the clergymen in Constantinople reflect) and then Christologically. Perhaps the greatest display of this crossover is in the fact that the throne of Dagobert was used by the Abbots of Saint-Denis as well as the king (Oxford Art Online). The transference of thrones between lay and holy uses does not end here – the Cathedra Petri in St. Peter’s, Rome, may have been a Carolingian royal throne (Oxford Art Online), the tenth century reliquary statuette of St. Foy is enthroned in such a way that it very closely resembles a later Holy Roman lord’s throne at Goslar Cathedral (Oxford Art Online), and throughout the early middle ages there was a tradition of literally enthroning the Gospel – placing it on a king’s seat in a chapel.

This is not to say that authority figures in the clergy continuously and slavishly copied ideas of Christian rulership from secular powers or vice-versa. In fact, one may argue that the reason why the authority of religious leaders was delineated in such a similar manner to secular rulers was because of how close the two parties actually were. Simony and nepotism were not unknown to the Church before the eleventh century, but it was here that one may argue they reached their peak (Southern 122). Many individuals did not view this practice as any form of corruption, but merely a logical and necessary way by which to exact influence (Southern 123). This influence only grew over the eleventh through the early thirteenth centuries, as the Renaissance of the Twelfth century found the Church in a position to seize a share of the mindset of Latin Christendom independent from secular rulers (Cook 212-213).

The papal throne in Saint-Maria in Cosmedin, Rome, demonstrates a change in the ordering of Christian life by 1123. This type of throne, distinct from all other thrones before it, is the unique product of Latin Christendom in the wake of Gregory VII and a papacy that felt it necessary to assert its own liberty and power. The Church of Rome, by this time, was a Church that organized Crusades, suppressed heresies, and vied for power in direct contention with some of the most powerful kings of Europe. This throne is the chair upon which such a pope would sit. While secular authorities may have felt in necessary to display their religious legitimacy by way of symbols in their thrones, the pope required no such symbols. The vicar of Christ, it may have been thought, was already the most obvious vassal of Christ the king. The throne at Cosmedin differs from traditional displays of power in its lack of direct biblical imagery. Instead, its lavish colored marble, stunning disc porphyry, and plain rectangular edges all aim to communicate power beyond any constrained symbolic allusion. In this display, a true schism in the display of identity was beginning to occur. Its fruition would not be articulated in any true way until the making of the Coronation Chair of Edward I in 1301.

This piece is perhaps the height of medieval throne craftsmanship and propaganda. Regal in appearance down to the last detail, it was made purely of oak and gold. Using a bevy of religious images, from the lions at the feet (now replacements for the originals), to the stops and footstool, to the figurative carvings covering every inch of
it, this was a throne that was meant to cry legitimate power as loudly as possible. While by this time ecclesiastical thrones took on displays of equal splendor (Oxford Art Online), none could match this pseudo-religious secular throne in weight for symbolism. An integral design feature of the throne was a carrying space for a mythic stone that legitimized the rule of the sitter (Illustrated History of Furniture) — in this, the Coronation Chair is carrying on a long tradition in ecclesiastical thrones as reliquaries, stretching back to the famous Maximian arch-bishop's chair circa 400 CE. Now, however, it would be a king sitting atop a relic – controlling it, and ruling as a coalescence of a number of ideas on rule that had been scattered across European thought since Charlemagne.

So, arriving at the year 1301 and Edward's Coronation Chair, one is left with a notion of what rule had come to mean in certain situations over the course of the period – one can hopefully begin to grasp the slow evolution of a display of rule antithetical to rulership in antiquity. The nature of control and rule, however, can be seen from 634 to 1301 as mercurial. Secular authorities, such as lords, counts, and royals, were all forced in varying degrees to reexamine what concerned their power, and what fell under their dominion. Meanwhile, religious authorities, both papal and local, found themselves struggling with being the de facto inheritors of what was once the Roman world. While both secular and ecclesiastical rulers struggled with their own self-images, they both found interacting with each other to be unavoidable. After a seven hundred year struggle, a throne such as the Coronation chair was produced. Illustrated in thrones was a view of Latin Christendom's rulership defined by the comingling of Christianity and grandeur to legitimize and explain authority.

Works Cited
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