FIGHTINGS AROUND SHANGHAI

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FIGHTINGS AROUND SHANGHAI
FOREWORD

This is the first reliable account in English, so far published, of the recent military operations around Shanghai. It has been compiled from official data kindly furnished by the Press Section of the War Office. While heartily deploring the terrible loss of life and the unspeakable sufferings of body and soul which the clash of arms has necessarily entailed, one fortunately finds in the story of the campaign some features that call forth feelings of more pleasing character.

Speaking, for instance, from a national point of view, we may say, without any intention of boasting, that our heart glows with pride and thankfulness to see from incontestable evidence that our people have not lost their traditional traits of heroic bravery and self-sacrificing patriotism which have made Japan what she is now among the great nations of the world.

Nor are we less willing to bear witness to the great power of resistance and fine esprit de corps so abundantly shown by the Chinese forces pitted against ours. Without meaning any discourtesy to our continental neighbours, we may say this was a revelation not to ourselves alone but to the whole world. It has shown once more—for this is by no means the first time the world has had the chance to learn the same lesson—that the Chinese, contrary to a generally accepted theory in recent years, are
far from deficient in qualities needed for the make up of the first class soldiers. It is only training and organization that will be required for making them into a formidable military power.

We are pleased to pay this homage to the Chinese people, because we are convinced that the emergence of a sufficiently large army composed of strong men like those led by General Tsai Ting-kai, is one of the essential conditions for the unification of China.

There is another reason why we are pleased with the unexpected display of courage and strength by the Chinese. It is almost a truism to say that there can be no true and lasting friendship unless it rests upon the rock of mutual respect. This is true of nations even more than of individuals.

The prospect of a strong and well-armed China will necessarily give rise to reflections of a decidedly disquieting tenor. But after taking all things into consideration, we are persuaded to believe that a stronger and more self-reliant China will conduce to the establishment of happier and more endurable relations between her and Japan.

But all these considerations apart, we owe it to ourselves and to the sense of fairness to offer China our unstinted recognition of the good account her fighters have given of themselves at Shanghai.

MOTOSADA ZUMOTO
Tokyo, May, 1932.
FIGHTINGS AROUND SHANGHAI

I. The Start of the Military Expedition

The Imperial naval force, which was landed at Shanghai upon the outbreak of the trouble there, to protect some 30,000 Japanese residents and their property, was to find itself confronted by a Chinese army numbering more than ten times as large as itself. Our naval men, in their continuous struggle against such tremendous odds, had to fight under extremely trying conditions, day and night, with little rest or sleep. Inspite of such efforts, however, the situation in Shanghai went from bad to worse, plunging our resident population into a state of unbearable uncertainty and danger. But there being a limit to the number to be drawn upon the Navy for service ashore, the Government decided early in February to despatch, with Imperial sanction, a military force to Shanghai to assure the safety of our residents there and also to perform our international duties of guarding the Settlement.

There was organized an expeditionary army with the Ninth Division as its main body. In addition a mixed brigade was despatched from the
Twelfth Division. The latter force, for the time being placed under the Commander of the Third Squadron later to be put under the Commander of the Ninth Division upon his landing in Shanghai, boarded vessels of the Second Squadron and left Sasebo at 11 a.m. on February 6. In the following afternoon these men began to make a landing at a point some 3,000 kilometres south of Woosungchen. Towards 5.30 p.m. the first-line troops were advanced on the southern side of Woosungchen to face across the creek a hostile force garrisoning the Woosung forts, while our main force was concentrated near the railway station. After a survey of the field, it was decided for tactical reasons to suspend the offensive movement for the time being, and keep a watch on the opposing line.

The Ninth Division began to board ships at Ujina on February 9. The first portion, under cover of the bombardment made by the convoying ships for restraining the forts, proceeded past Woosung in the evening of February 13. A portion of these troops was taken to the railway wharf south of Woosungchen, while the main body was brought up to the wharf in Shanghai.

First Statement by Commander of the Ninth Division

Lieutenant-General Uyeda, Commander of the Ninth Division, upon his arrival at Shanghai, issued prior to his landing a statement which rendered into English reads as follows:
"I have this day arrived here charged with the duties of safeguarding the subjects of our Empire resident in and about Shanghai. The provocative Chinese attitude toward our landing party has placed the Settlement in a state of danger and uncertainty. Our nationals are now subject to extremely trying conditions of life. In directing the action of the Division under my command, I intend to cooperate with our Navy and save our nationals from their present difficulty with the least delay. While it is our aim to attain our object as peacefully as possible, any interference with the action of our Division will be disposed of promptly and with decision. With regard to the Powers with which we are to work, we shall aim at a friendly cooperation in our efforts to rescue the Settlement from the present menaces. As for the general populace of China who will offer no interference with our Division or its performance of duties, we are ready, being aware of their difficulty well deserving of sympathy, to show full regard for the peaceful tenor of their lives."

The Ninth Division began to land its first contingent at 7 a.m. on February 14. A part of these troops was stationed at a Chinese village about 6 kilometres east of Kiangwanchen, while the main body was quartered in the Japanese factories in Yangshupu, an eastern section of the International Settlement. On the following day, February 15, a portion of its forces, replacing the landing party, took over the guard of North Szechuan Road. The
second contingent, arriving at the wharf in the morning of February 16, completed its landing the same day.

II. What was Done to Avert Hostilities

The Ninth Division thus completed its concentration near Shanghai by February 16; but being still hopeful of an amicable settlement, the Commander caused his Chief of Staff to arrange an interview with the Chief of Staff of the Nineteenth Route Army. At this meeting our advice was offered as to possible means of effecting a peaceful settlement. The conference, however, disclosed a wide divergence of views, and our suggestions, which were offered in a spirit of fairness, failed to win a favourable response. The Commander of the Ninth Division, still reluctant to forego his hope of settling the situation by means other than arms, addressed on February 18 at 9 p.m. a note to the Commander of the Nineteenth Route Army, asking for his reconsideration.

General Uyeda's Note to the Commander of Nineteenth Route Army

The Note which Lieutenant-General Uyeda addressed on the same occasion was to the following effect:
“Being most earnestly desirous of performing by peaceful means the duties I am charged with, I wish to submit the following with the hope that it may meet with your favourable consideration:

“(1) You will at once cease hostilities, completing the evacuation of your first line by 7 a.m. in the morning of February 20. Your army will then withdraw by 5 p.m. in the afternoon of February 20 to areas, excluding the Lion Hill Forts and 20 kilometres from the boundary line of the International Settlement as follows: in the area lying on the west side of the Whangpoo, to the northward of the line to be drawn from Tsaochiatuchchen at the northwestern point of the International Settlement to Chouchiaochiaochchen and Pusungchen; and in the area lying on the east side of the Whangpoo River, to the northward of the line from Lannitu to Changchialouchen, a line largely running through the heart of Shanghai from east to west. The forts and other military works within the designated areas should be removed not to be replaced by new preparations.

“(2) The Japanese army will make no shooting, bombing, or movement in pursuit, excepting reconnoitring by aeroplane, after your army have begun to withdraw. Upon evacuation of your army the Japanese army will confine itself to the maintenance in Hongkew of the area about the street on which the Municipal Council building is placed, including the locality round Hongkew Park.

“(3) Upon the complete withdrawal of your first-line troops, the Japanese army will despatch
under armed guard a committee of investigation to go over the evacuated area. The same committee will carry the Japanese national flag for identification.

“(4) Your army will offer full protection to the lives and property of Japanese nationals resident near Shanghai outside the above areas of evacuation. In case such protection should fail, the Japanese army will take such measures as may be considered proper. Your army will also put an effective stop to all activities of the plain-clothes soldiers.

“(5) As for the protection of foreign residents, other than Japanese, around Shanghai, including the above areas of evacuation, negotiation shall be made on some future occasion.

“(6) With regard to the suppression of anti-Japanese activities, the pledge given by Mayor Wu to Consul-General Murai on January 28 must be strictly put into effect.

“On this point the Japanese diplomatic officials will approach your civil authorities in Shanghai for separate negotiation.

“In case the foregoing points fail to be carried out, the Japanese army will be obliged to take free action against your army which should hold itself responsible for whatever consequences.”

Commander of the Nineteenth Route Army Replies

Replying to the above note, General Tsai Ting-kai, Commander of the Nineteenth Route Army, sent
a note at 8.15 p.m. on February 19, which ran in substance as below:

"We beg to acknowledge receipt of your note despatched at 9 p.m. on February 18. Our army, being responsible directly to the National Government, holds itself subject only to its order. We have reported the points contained in your communication to the National Government which, we trust, will transmit its reply directly to your Minister through the Foreign Department. While I am as yet in receipt of no official instruction, the National Government, according to Rengo news, has instructed Commander Tsai and Mayor Wu to reply to you to the following effect:

"(1) The Chinese army will withdraw to 20 kilometres from the boundary line of the International Settlement:

"(2) The Japanese army will likewise withdraw 20 kilometres:

"(3) As regards the permanent disarmament of the forts at Woosung and Paoshan, we refuse to comply with the Japanese proposal."

In such circumstances the Commander of the Ninth Division was obliged to conclude that the Chinese had no intention of agreeing to his proposal, and decided to follow the only course now open to him.
III. Topographical Features of Shanghai Region and Conditions of the Enemy's Forces

(A) Topographical Features

The country round Shanghai, which is a level plain made of the sandy mud carried down by the Yangtze, forms a veritable canal zone with Kiangwan Canal, Woosung Creek, Whangpoo River and hundreds of other creeks running in all directions between lakes and rivers. There are great facilities for water transport; but as for land traffic and especially roads over any speakable distance, there are absolutely no paths except those made along the wider creeks or canals used by men towing boats. The minor creeks are spanned at places by bridges hardly negotiable by anything heavier than cattle. Besides, these waterways are such that soldiers could never wade through by foot, and, therefore, form very serious obstacles to movement of organized forces. Military operations under such conditions were by necessity hampered to a very serious degree.

What is more, the towns in the neighbourhood of Shanghai are encircled by heavy brick walls which proved not only unclimbable but even formed effective barricades against field artillery fire. Smaller villages, though without such walls as a rule, are in many instances girdled by waterways. These villages generally have no defence work to guard the whole communal areas, but there are walls built
by family groups which live closely together behind them for self-protection. These walls offered considerable facilities for resisting the offensive fire.

(B) Conditions of the Enemy Forces

The Chinese force which the Ninth Division upon its landing had to face at the front was the Nineteenth Route Army, commanded by Tsai Ting-kai, which roughly consisted of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soldiers and arms</th>
<th>60th Div.</th>
<th>61st Div.</th>
<th>78th Div.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of soldiers</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>33,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of rifles</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>27,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine guns</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain artillery</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench mortars</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: — Each Division consists of 6 Tuan, one Tuan corresponding to one Japanese regiment.

It may also be noted that the main forces of the Guard Divisions at Nanking and Hangchow were at the time still placed at Sungkiang, Nanhsiang, Kunshan and also westward of these places. The dispositions of these troops were as shown in Chart I.

With regard to these enemy positions, further
details mentioned below were learned as a result of open hostilities.

The construction of the enemy’s positions near Shanghai had been started before February 12. It was apparently planned from the start that Kiang-wanchen and Miaohsiangchen should form the first line of defence. The Chinese positions at the former town and northward were each constructed strongly with a village as its basis and effectively guarded on the flanks by a series of strong emplacements for machine guns. These preparations may further be described as follows:

(1) Shelter Trenches

These trenches consisted of standing fire trenches with traverses and also of double bottomed trenches which were not of uniform strength. As a rule the trenches were narrow but fairly deep, occasionally lightly sheltered by wooden boards or panels, and iron sheets.

(2) Covered Machine Gun Emplacements

The machine gun emplacements were generally covered. The protective covers were fairly strongly built with thin iron sheets and brick. The mounds or Chinese graves, wherever found, were utilized for defensive purposes. Concrete and brick buildings were seldom overlooked, not a few of them being provided with loopholes.

(3) Outer Trenches

The outer trenches before the enemy’s positions generally seemed to have been made by utilizing waterways. At some points d’appui there were
formed special outer trenches 4 metres wide at the top and 2 metres deep.

(4) Barricades, etc.

Points d'appui were invariably guarded by light wire entanglements made by use of standing trees, wooden beams of houses and so forth joined by a network of barbed wire. These were mostly built to a depth of about 4 metres, some of them being movable. Palisades were also seen at some places.

(5) Armour-Sheltered Positions

As for positions protected by armour, there was nothing specially noteworthy except those with light protective covers of iron for use of commanding officers.

IV. Offensive about Kiangwanchen

(See Accompanying Chart)

What should particularly be noted about the present operations is that the Japanese army, in the first place, openly set the date for commencement of its general offensive, thus sacrificing tactical advantages, and, in the second, it directed its action by only frontal attacks. These tactical moves were deliberately chosen, despite the obvious disadvantages, in consideration of serious eventualities otherwise likely to involve the other Powers in Shanghai. If, for instance, attack was made on the enemy's flank from the north, his force might have fallen back in disorder into the International Settlement to imperil the civilian population there. Opera-
tions from the southern side were likewise out of the question because of the existence of the French Concession. The Japanese forces in the circumstances were obliged to fight under the worst given conditions.

(A) Fighting on February 20

At 7 a.m. on February 20 the Chinese first line showed no signs of withdrawal, but even displayed their hostile disposition by firing upon our aeroplanes. Nor had the National Government sent its reply. The Ninth Division, therefore, launched its offensive action at 7.30 a.m. with its troops disposed as below:

The Woosung Detachment (two infantry companies as unit).

Placed south of Woosungchen; this detachment covered the rear of the right flank of the Division.

The Mixed Brigade (less the Woosung Detachment).

By advancing through the area southwest of Woosung, this brigade directed its action against the enemy's positions northwest of Kiangwanchen.

The Right Column (6 infantry battalions and one battalion of mountain artillery as unit).

This column attacked the enemy about Kiangwanchen from the east side.

The Central Column (approximately 4 battalions
of infantry and one battalion of mountain artillery as unit).

This force attacked the enemy to the south of Kiangwanchen.

The Left Column (the landing party as unit).

These troops held their positions in Chapei, keeping watch over the opposing front.

Field Artillery and Aerial Force.

In the earlier stages of fighting these forces chiefly cooperated with the Right Column.

The Third Naval Squadron at the same time cooperated with the Ninth Division in support of the Woosung Detachment by bombardment of certain strategic points and manoeuvring in the direction of Liuhochen.

Our first-line troops continued to move forward at each point, by driving off small enemy forces on their way, until they reached at 10 a.m. the line from north to south of the Kiangwan race course. Then our Right Column routed the enemy force, two to three thousand strong, occupying the strong positions along a line from north to south of the eastern side of Kiangwanchen. A portion of this column entered the same town at 1 p.m.

Toward the evening the Mixed Brigade in the right wing advanced to the northwest of Kiangwan- chen, reaching the line of Peisungchai, Chinfengchai, and Maochiachai. The main body of our Division had in the meantime moved eastward from the areas north of Kiangwanchen along the railway line, until
it advanced to a line on the east side of Fangpin, 1 kilometre south of Kiangwan.

By midnight of the same day it had been learned that the enemy's first line occupied the fortified positions on a line extending from near Miaohsiang to the neighbourhood of the North Station, Shanghai, across the creeks on the west side of Kiangwanchen. A hostile force placed in the centre of Kiangwanchen was still offering stubborn resistance. There was a massed force of Chinese in the neighbourhood of Tachangchen. The areas about Woosungchen were still held by the enemy. It was also learned that the enemy's second line of positions was placed along a line from north to south touching at the east end of Tachangchen, while his third line, close behind, on a north to south line running at the western end of the same town. In the light of such knowledge the Commander of the Division transferred the main body of the Central Column to the area between the Right Column and the Mixed Brigade, in preparation for the operations of next day. He also made the following changes in dispositions of our forces:

The Woosung Detachment.

This was to continue its duties as before.

The 24th Mixed Brigade.
Prepared for the offensive against the enemy force in front.

The Right Column (approximately 3 battalions of infantry and one battalion of mountain artillery as unit).
This body prepared for its offensive by advancing to a line extending southward from Paiyangtsun to Sunchiachai and beyond. The Left Column (approximately 6 battalions of infantry and one battalion of mountain artillery as unit).

Prepared for the offensive against the enemy at Kiangwanchen and northward.

One Infantry Battalion.

Prepared for the offensive against the enemy south of Kiangwanchen.

The Main Force of Field Artillery.

This was placed near the Kiangwan Race Course chiefly to act in cooperation with the Right Column.

The Landing Party.

Was to guard its present positions.

The Reserve Force (approximately 2 battalions of infantry).

This was stationed on the east side of the Kiangwan Race Course.

(B) Fighting on February 21.

At 8 a.m. on February 21 our Division opened action with artillery fire, to be followed by assaults on the enemy at Kiangwanchen.

About 9.30 a.m. the enemy forces in the centre of Kiangwanchen began to show signs of wavering under our fire. A part of our Left Column was then charged with the task of clearing the enemy from the streets, while the rest advanced on two
sides of the streets, moving forward along a north to south line at the western end of the town.

In the evening of February 21 the enemy firmly held their ground from near Chichialiu, about 6 kilometres northward from the west end of Kiangwanchen, to the eastern ends of Siwan and Miaohsiang, and southwardly, to the villages along a small creek running from north to south at the western extremity of Kiangwanchen. Our first line closely pressed against these positions.

(C) Fighting on February 22

At daybreak our Division started operations against the enemy’s positions north of Kiangwanchen. At 6.40 a.m. or thereabout the 24th Mixed Brigade captured the hostile positions in the neighbourhood of Miaohsiang; and later, broke through the opposing line extending northward from Howkuochiaichai, about 600 metres north of the western end of Kiangwanchen. But what with a number of plain-clothes soldiers now overriding the field of battle, demanding our serious attention, and a series of creeks and narrow paths impeding our progress, considerable difficulty was experienced in employing our troops to full advantage. Our progress for the day was as far as the lines described below, a portion of our troops being posted in Kiangwan and southwestward to keep a watch over the enemy’s positions.

Main Body of the 24th Mixed Brigade: near the western point of Miaohsiang.
Right Column: at the western end of Maochia-chai and Pusi.
Left Column: near Shouchiashe and Shunchiachai.
Main Force of Mountain Artillery: near Liang-yinchai north of Kiangwanchen.
Main Force of Field and Heavy Artillery: near Kiangwan Race Course.
The defeated enemy soldiers stopped in the villages close before our line.

As a result of the day's engagements near Miaohsiang, it was definitely ascertained that the 18th Guard Division under Chiang Kai-shek had joined the Chinese first-line.

At midnight on February 22 an enemy force of about 3 battalions made an assault on the rear of the right flank of our 24th Mixed Brigade at Nansunchai and eastward. The assailants, however, were repulsed with heavy damage. The same night also saw a series of counter-attacks north of Chapei and bombardments by Chinese artillery, which were in each case overcome.

It was also in the course of this day's fighting that three Japanese privates met with their end in a manner that was to be acclaimed by the whole nation as mirroring national heroism of the highest order. Below is a brief account of the same incident.

The enemy's positions about Miaohsiang were well protected as the mainstay of his left wing. No less than a score of days must have been spent on their preparation. Protected by a system of barbed wire and outer trenches, they really presented
propositions of considerable difficulty. Besides, the wire entanglements happened to have escaped the punishment of our artillery fire. It became necessary in the circumstances that our engineers should undertake to open up paths through these areas of wire entanglements for the charge of infantry men which was set for an early morning hour of February 22. It was therefore planned to accomplish it by improvising for the purpose long explosive tubes, on which work was started in the evening of February 21.

A small squad of engineers, to whom the task of breaking down the wire entanglements had been given, made arrangements with the infantry troops which were to charge through the opened paths. These engineers then betook themselves close to their objective points about 5 a.m. and waited for the appointed time. In early hours of the seventeenth day of the lunar month, the moon was still out, though more often veiled by morning mists. So they could command a view to a distance of not more than 30 or so metres ahead.

The explosive squad under Sergeant Umada was divided into three parties each of three men. Intending to complete their work of destruction in the dark, they put up a smoke screen under cover of which they crawled on. But they had not approached within 30 or so metres from their objective when their presence was discovered. A heavy fusillade was poured upon them. But our men hurled themselves forward in their resolute attempt.
They were all killed or disabled. Whereupon the task of destruction fell upon the second squad under Corporal Uchida which had been holding itself in reserve. Private Sakue's first party and Private Kitamura's second party each prepared for their duties. It was plain that the enemy, now well on their guard, would give them no time to ignite the explosive after placing it in the entanglement. These men, therefore, decided to drive the explosive home in a way which, counting all chances of success in their favour, still meant their own destruction as sure as that of the entanglements. Having ignited the fuse, they carried the heavy explosive tube between them and ran for the wire entanglement. The second party of Private Kitamura managed to withdraw itself to some distance in time. The first party of Private Sakue and two others, however, with no thought of withdrawal, carried on their duties until their end. Corporal Uchida in command was also wounded. Thus there were opened up two passages, each about 10 metres wide. Sergeant Umada, in command of the first squad, who had sent his three parties with unsuccessful results, now leaped forth and hurled more than a dozen of hand grenades upon the enemy line. In the moments of confusion thus created he rushed single-handed into the wire defence and cut open a passage by means of hand shears. Three pathways thus having been made, the infantry
charged through to capture a sector of the Miaohsiang line.

(D) **Fighting on February 23–24** (Chart II)

A tactical change was now thought advisable in the light of the experience gained during the past few days. The enemy, in fortifying their positions, seemed to have overlooked no creek, village or dwelling house of any strategic value. At each important point a barricade of one sort or another had been put up. In consideration of these points and also our numerical strength put into play, the Ninth Division decided to drop the idea of making operations on the general line at the same time. They decided on a new line of tactics in which our bombardment, especially from the air and by heavy artillery, after full preparation on well elaborated schemes, was to be concentrated on the enemy's strategic points one after another until a complete destruction should be wrought all along and the field opened up for more extensive and freer operations. On the two days February 23–24 our troops generally remained at their positions of the previous night, making preparations for the proposed offensive.

The enemy, however, made around sunset on February 23 counter attacks against the front of our Mixed Brigade and the front of our Left Column. About 8.30 p.m. they attacked the neighbourhood of the radio station of the Divisional Headquarters.
These sectional counter-attacks were repulsed in each instance.

From the information in hand from various sources, it was gathered that the enemy’s positions at this stage were roughly as shown in Chart II.

(E) Fighting from February 25 to 29

On February 25 our Division launched the second general offensive. The 24th Mixed Brigade was charged to maintain the captured positions about Miaohsiangchen. The Right Column was the first to start action, opening the fire at 6.30 a.m. by heavy artillery and from the air, concentrating it upon the enemy line in front. At 10 a.m. these forces captured the hostile positions to the north and south of Chinchiachiang. By this time the enemy line to our south or to the southwest of Kiangwanchen, began to waver with some numbers already in retreat to the west. Our Division then had its artillery fire concentrated upon the enemy in and about Howkuochiachai and Tsienkuochiachai in front of our Left Column, which had by 4 p.m. completely captured the enemy’s positions in these areas.

The routed enemy ranks were being concentrated at Erhshihhsanyuan, a point about 2 kilometres northwest of Kiangwan, when a force of Inspecting Soldiers or “shock troops in the rear,” who are charged to encourage or punish the soldiers of their own side in retreat, happened to appear on the scene on their eastern advance. These two
groups had an armed clash the while our aeroplanes and artillery went on to inflict heavy damage upon them. However, the ruthless barrier set up by the Shock Troops in the rear at least had the effect of causing the routed soldiers to heel about and advance eastward for the recovery of their lost positions. These men reappeared before the villages now in our hands. But almost completely demoralized, they were no longer capable of brisk action. Of the enemy force, too, which had been offering a stubborn resistance from within Kianwanchen, some began to retreat toward 4 p.m.

On the other hand, fresh enemy troops began to move forward about noon from two directions, one from the west, and the other from Lotienchen, both proceeding towards Tachangchen.

During the offensive of this day the Navy accorded very effective aid. Cooperation between our infantry and artillery likewise being effected to satisfaction, our men succeeded in wresting all of the objective positions from the enemy. Though we were unable to develop our fighting capacity to the full for numerical and topographical reasons, our army this day inflicted on the hostile line damage of serious material and moral significance.

On the following day, February 26, at 6:20 a.m., a company under Sub-Lieutenant Wakabayashi, of the Seventh Infantry Regiment, made a surprise attack at Yenchiachia, on the northwest side of Kiangwan. By an adroit movement at a dead angle
of their arms, these men succeeded in capturing the Chinese position, guarded by four machine guns.

At 2.10 p.m. on February 27 our Division occupied the western end of Kiangwanchen, thus taking the whole enemy line extending from Miao-hsiangchen to the western end of Kiangwanchen. Our work was now to be directed to preparation for the offensive against the enemy's second line near Tachangchen.

V. Our Army Reinforced

At the time of despatching the Ninth Division to Shanghai there was no knowing as to the attitude of Chinese troops other than the Nineteenth Route Army. It was not until February 22 that it was ascertained as a result of engagements that the enemy's ranks had considerably been swelled by addition of the Guard Divisions under Chiang Kai-shek. Now taking into reckoning the topographical elements to be overcome and the numerical strength of our side, the existing situation suggested possibilities of our Division coming to a deadlock on the field of battle. A speedy reinforcement was plainly necessary in order to dispose of the Chinese opposition for an early settlement of the situation. It was therefore arranged to form an expeditionary army in the Shanghai region by addition of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Divisions, together with some special forces from elsewhere. General Yoshinori Shirakawa was placed in command of
this army. The transportation of these reinforce-
ments was prepared with the least possible delay.

The Commander of the expeditionary army, accompa-
nied by his staff, sailed from the home waters on F e b r u a r y 2 7 . A r r i v i n g a t t h e m o u t h o f
the Yangtze on February 29, he effected arrange-
ments for the Naval cooperation for the landing of
the troops. The Commander, taking all the circum-
stances into consideration, deemed delay impermis-
sible. A general offensive was set for the next day,
March 1, and instructions were issued accordingly.
The Ninth Division was ordered to advance, accord-
ing to its prearranged plans, to a line from near
Changchiachiao, west of Miaohsiangchen, to Hsimaw-
wan about 2 kilometres to the south of Kiangwan-
chen via Tahsingchiao, some 2 kilometres west of
Kiangwanchen. The main body of the Eleventh
Division, freshly arriving, was to make a landing
early in the morning of March 1 on the shore of
the Yangtze in a northwesterly direction of Liuho-
chen, with the instruction to take possession of the
last named place with the least possible delay so
as to be in readiness for later offensive moves on
Tachangan and Chenju.

General Shirakawa, the Commander, landing at
Shanghai at 1 p.m. on March 1, at once issued a
statement.
Commander Shirakawa's Statement

"I have this day arrived in Shanghai in command of the expeditionary forces and charged with duties of according protection to the Japanese residents in and about Shanghai, in cooperation with the Imperial Navy.

"Japan's solicitous efforts to make an amicable settlement of things has met with no success. Since our Ninth Division was called forth for armed operations, the Chinese have been increasing their military preparations, leaving no doubt as to their determination on armed action. Our Empire under the circumstances is compelled to make such an increase in its expeditionary forces as necessary for the attainment of its original objects. However, being without hostile designs and solicitous to avoid any unnecessary complications, our army is ready to suspend hostilities at any time, if the Chinese withdraw their army, in compliance with our request.

"As for the civil population of China, we shall show them due regards as our friendly neighbours. Regarding the nationals of other Powers, we shall, needless to say, remain in friendly harmony with them, showing full respect for their rights and interests.

"Upon my arrival in Chinese territory in command of the Imperial army, I declare, in pursuance of our present object, my intention that our warlike operations will be confined within the least
possible area, with always in view an early restoration of orderly conditions, so as to ensure the safety of our nationals and restoration of peace in the Far East.

General Yoshinori Shirakawa,
Commander of the Expeditionary Army to Shanghai

March 1, 1932.

VI. Operations in Liuho, Tachangchen and Thereabout

(See Chart III)

(A) Positions of the Chinese Armies Prior to Action

The Chinese troops were generally disposed as shown in Chart II, except the 60th and 61st Divisions which Tsai Ting-kai had concentrated near Tachangchen, evidently determined to hold the second line there at all costs. At the first line in the area of Chapei a great number of volunteers had been placed, while the 89th Division had been distributed in the rear toward Chiating and Nanhsiang.

The Nineteenth Route Army had originally been full of spirit, with fairly good fighting capacity. When, however, the number of casualties steadily mounted they became more and more demoralized. Soldiers of the Guard Divisions who had had but little experience in actual warface were heavily punished by our fire from the first hour of their appearance at the front. The damage was so heavy
that these men were soon to lose their fighting spirit. Besides, their clash with the “shock troops in the rear” from the Nineteenth Route Army at Erhshihsanyuan on February 25 caused a fatal discord between the leaders of these two armies. The attitude of the Nineteenth Route Army men parading themselves as the only laurel-winners in the fight were also the cause of an eventual collapse of their solidarity. Besides, the Chinese soldiers took after February 28 to looting and plundering in the neighbourhood of their quartering places. At Tachangchen and Woosungchen the whole villages seemed to have been sacked.

What with the pressure given by our army and internal discords and trouble, the Chinese, when informed of our reinforcements, felt that further fighting would be futile. The Chief of Staff of the Nineteenth Route Army and Wellington Koo notified us on February 28 through the British Naval Command that, “if the Japanese would withdraw within the International Settlement the Chinese army was ready to evacuate beyond 20 kilometres.” The same day Wu Tieh-cheng, the Mayor of Shanghai, likewise had a message of a similar purport conveyed to us by Yin Chao-chen. The Chinese first line nevertheless went on fighting, showing no signs of withdrawal.

On February 29 Wang Chin-wei (Wang Chao-ming) sent us a messenger bearing a proposal for withdrawal of both armies, who, however, emphatically stated that “the voluntary evacuation of the
Chinese troops as stated by Wellington Koo would never accord with the will of the people. The Nationalist Government would consider nothing short of the evacuation of both armies on terms of equality.

(B) Fighting on March 1

The Ninth Division, including the 24th Mixed Brigade, and reinforced with three infantry battalions from the Eleventh Division landed the previous day, resumed action early this morning. Placing the fresh troops between its two regiments, the Division directed its attack on the line between Miaohsiang and Kiangwan. The situation generally turning favourably, our men captured the enemy’s positions about 4 kilometres in front and 2 kilometres in depth. At the close of the day our first line was advanced to the line of Miaohsiangchen, Tienyuan, Ssuchetou and southwards. In course of these engagements, Colonel Hayashi, commander of the Seventh Infantry Regiment, was killed in action about 1 p.m., while assaulting a point to the west of Kiangwanchen.

On the same night the Ninth Division advanced all along the front, reaching the line of Paoyuhsiang, 500 metres northwest of Miaohsiangchen; Huchia­wan, to the west of Miaohsiang; Tahsingchiao; Maochiahsiang; Yangchiachai, 3 kilometres to the southwest of Kiangwanchen.

The main body of the Eleventh Division, receiv­ing a close cooperation from the Navy, began to
make a landing at 6 a.m. on March 1 in the face of the enemy's machine guns. The hostile force in this region consisted of about one battalion. The landing place was guarded by a Chinese force, about 100 strong and equipped with 3 machine guns. However, our troops were completely landed during the forenoon with no more casualties than one engineer officer and private killed. These forces started their southward march after noon to come at 1 p.m. to a clash with the enemy at Chien-chingying which was taken at 5 p.m.

The destruction by our navy of the Woosung fortress at the mouth of the Whangpoo gave material help to the transportation of our military forces. When the Twenty-Second Regiment of Infantry and a small force to fill up the Twenty-fourth Mixed Brigade were landed at Woosung, the Chinese were misled to think that the main body of our reinforcements was first to be concentrated at this point, and their attention was consequently diverted in these directions. When, therefore, a portion of the Eleventh Division was landed up the Yangtze, the Chinese forces were given a surprise, and turned in rout.

The region selected for the above landing was swept by a violent northwesterly wind during the night. Rough waters gave promise of difficulties of landing. But just before the time set for the landing the wind turned to the south, a dead calm settling over the Yangtze water. Under these favourable conditions and with a perfect aid of the Navy, our military forces were able to effect such a successful
landing in the face of the enemy as has seldom been recorded in the military annals of the world.

(C) Fighting on March 2

The Ninth Division resumed action early this morning, and advanced to a line north to south of Tachangchen. The enemy retreated in a rout all along the front. Making unbroken pursuit, the Ninth Division advanced at 4.30 p.m. to the line of Wanchai, 3 kilometres north west of Tachangchen; Laojenliu, about 2 kilometres west of Tachangchen; Chungsiang, about 1 kilometre south of the same town; Sanchili, to the south of the same; Wangchiachai, about 2 kilometres west of the Chenju Railway station. Later toward sunset our first-line forces advanced as far as Hsiaonanhsiang, about 1,500 metres northeast of Nanhsiang and Chenju.

Our landing force in Chapei also swung into pursuit of the enemy.

The main force of the Eleventh Division, starting from near Chienching early in the morning, advanced on Liuohochen which was taken by 4.30 p.m. It then went on in pursuit of the enemy toward Chiating.

Throughout these engagements, the air forces of our Army and Navy operated in full and effective cooperation with the troops on land, assailing the enemy in retreat at many points, and carrying out their destructive work to the full.

(D) Fighting on March 3

The Ninth Division this day reformed its ranks by concentrating its main portion at Nanhsiang,
and a portion at Chenju. The Eleventh Division turned in the afternoon on the enemy at Chiating from two sides, directing its main force forward from the direction of Loutang, and another portion, which had been landed south of Woosung, from the direction of Nanhsiang. These troops took the same town at 5.30 p.m.

Early this morning men of our landing party, supported by an infantry force, effected a landing in front of the Woosung fortress and took it by assault.

In the afternoon of March 5 the Commander of the Expeditionary Army issued an order to his troops to suspend action so long as the Chinese should refrain from hostilities, and to remain in the present positions.

The Statement by General Shirakawa

"The Imperial Army, in concert with the Imperial naval forces, made every effort to discharge the duties of protecting the Japanese nationals through pacific measures. Our ardent desire, however, was frustrated by the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army, which led to hostilities.

"Now the Chinese troops have withdrawn to the distance originally demanded by the Japanese army, with the consequence that safety of the Japanese residents has been insured and peace restored in the Settlement."
"I hereby declare that so long as the Chinese troops do not resume provocative operations the Imperial army will suspend all armed action."

VII After Cessation of Hostilities

(A) The Japanese Army

On March 4 our troops were generally reformed on the line of Chiliaokou, Chiating, Nanhsiang and Chenju. The Eleventh Division advanced a part of its men to Hakkon, 10 kilometres to the northwest of Chiating, while a force from the Ninth Division was sent forth to Huangtu, 10 kilometres west of Nanhsiang, each for the purpose of keeping guard.

On this day a section of our forces took possession of the Lion Hill Forts.

From the outbreak of hostilities to March 17 the casualties of the Japanese Army were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th Division</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>1,274</td>
<td>1,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Mixed Brigade</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Division</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>718</td>
<td>1,788</td>
<td>2,506</td>
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Compared with what was experienced in the European war where armies assailing strongly fortified positions generally suffered a loss of 50 per cent of their numbers, our damage was remarkably small. While a large measure of credit is due to the good work of the Ninth Division and 24th Mixed Brigade, the landing of the Eleventh Division up the Yangtze, as a restraining movement, had good effects upon the decision of the day.

(B) The Chinese Army

The Chinese army seems to have withdrawn its main force toward Soochow, and a section toward Sungkiang, having suffered very heavy damage. It is reported that the number of their casualties since the outset, together with those who are missing, amounted to about 40,000. Small forces are still to be found at places near Taitsang and Kunshan, but there is no longer a single force of any considerable strength east of Soochow.

(C) Conditions in Shanghai

In the Settlement of Shanghai the news of our victory and the subsequent statement by the Commander of the Expeditionary Army were received with great rejoicings by our nationals. On March 4 the Japanese shops in Hongkew were all opened. The whole male population voluntarily offered their services to assist in the work in the rear. Most of the Chinese shops in the Settlement were also opened. The refugees in the direction of Yangshupu,
guarded by the Japanese, began to return to their homes. Our army further addressed an assuring message to these inhabitants, advising them to return to their peaceful pursuits.

(D) **Chinese Propaganda**

The Chinese press throughout the country had been filled with information of malicious and often ridiculously absurd characters. Chinese recoveries of Liuho, Nanhsiang and Chenju; complete annihilation of the Japanese army; repatriation of the routed Japanese troops; death of General Shirakawa and consequent hoisting of the national flag at half mast at the consulate; sinking of two Japanese warships—these are representative of the type of news printed in the Chinese newspapers. By propagating such misinformation the Kuomintang hoped to cover the reverses their army had been meeting with on the field of battle. They represented the retreats of their military forces as voluntary movements made necessary through the menaces on the flank, failure of the reinforcements to arrive, inferiority in military equipment and numerical strength, and all sorts of imaginable reasons.

The public was so misled in some instances that they fired off firecrackers in celebration of an imagined military success of their soldiers. It may also be of some interest to see, for instance, what would be the Japanese casualties according to the Chinese reports given out from the end of January to March 3. By adding up these figures we see
that Japan is represented to have lost 33,470 men, 29 aeroplanes, 6 warships and 15 tanks or armoured cars.

The common people, kept in ignorance, still seem to believe in such versions of Chinese military successes. In fact, most Chinese seem more favourably disposed toward the Nineteenth Route Army than the Nanking Government which, through the machinations of the Cantonese political influence, was incapacitated to render adequate support to the Nineteenth Route Army in hours of need. The movement against the Kuomintang still remains under the surface.

VIII. Expeditionary Forces Reduced

In view of a steady restoration of peace and order in and about Shanghai, the Imperial Government issued on March 14 an order recalling home the Eleventh Division, 24th Mixed Brigade and certain special forces.

On the same occasion our military authorities expressed themselves to the following effect: "As set forth clearly when our military forces were sent to Shanghai, our object in exercising our right of self-protection was first to safeguard the lives and property of our nationals there, and secondly to restore peace and order in the International Settlement in cooperation with the other Powers. In order to attain these objects, the commanders of our armed forces there tried all in their
power to confine the disturbances to narrow areas and settle them by amicable means. But the Chinese were not only totally lacking in sincerity but even assumed the offensive against us, causing, much to our regret, bloodshed and slaughter. But due to the august virtue of our Generalissimo and the gallant performance of duties by our troops and the effective cooperation of our navy, we have achieved a glorious victory over the Chinese, inflicting decisive damage upon them. The situation having thus been securely established, we are now able to withdraw a part of our expeditionary forces.

“However, the general situation there is still fraught with serious eventualities. Military bands still remain at places, and plain-clothes soldiers are still engaged in secret activities of various sorts, so that careful vigilance is required. The situation in such circumstances is far from reassuring. There are also probabilities, if current rumours be true, that the Chinese military authorities, with an eye to strengthening their positions both internally and externally, may after all decide upon a continuation of the anti-Japanese agitation or upon instigating their people again into armed action with slogans of recovering their lost territory.”

Incidentally, our military authorities stated at the same time that rumours that our troops had been despatched to Formosa in connection with the Shanghai trouble were utterly groundless.
IX. Conclusion

Our military expedition, after a series of successful operations, has accomplished its primary object. The comparatively slow progress seen in the earlier stages of the fighting was largely to be accounted for by the impediment caused by the topographical difficulties of those regions, offering favourable condition for defence and proportionately bad conditions for offence. There was also too great a difference in the numerical strength of the two opposing armies. Our action then was planned so as to keep our casualties as low as possible. Our men throughout showed superb and resolute courage in meeting all situations. In addition to the fightings continued practically day and night, our men had to experience considerable hardships through lack of drinking water, poor supply of food through absence of hands to transport, annoyances caused by plain-clothes soldiers, and difficulties of keeping communication with the rear.

It must also be noted that the present Shanghai incident stood against a background of inglorious strifes among the militarist politicians of China. The plan for causing disturbances in Shanghai was really conceived when the Cantonese were ousted in their struggle with Chiang Kai-shek. Schemes had subsequently been elaborated. It was the idea of these men to instigate the Nineteenth Route Army into action to the very end of complicating the situation, hoping thereby to place Chiang Kai-
shek in a political impasse and thus to acquire for themselves the ruling power of the whole country. These men purposely propagated misinformation as to the strength of our army so as to inspire their soldiers and others with proper courage and antagonism. However, even with military forces far superior in number, the Chinese were forced to suffer heavy damage and lose ground in every encounter. They are now at pains to shove the responsibility for each military failure to anyone but themselves. Under the circumstances the political situation in China is pregnant with uncertainties and far from settled.

Nor can we be blind to the efforts the Chinese are now making to draw the League of Nations Powers into the Shanghai imbroglio, apparently intent upon following their traditional policy of playing one Power against another.

But no matter however the military situation in China may change and however her political conditions may be aggravated, our army will follow its unchanged line, as set forth in the statements of the Imperial Government. Needless to say, it shall never be our purpose to acquire new interests or extend them by armed force, or harbour territorial designs. Our action will strictly be confined to the exercise of the inviolable rights of national self-protection, as may be seen from the statement our commander made at the first opportunity, ordering a cessation of hostilities,—a point which is no doubt
clear not only to the Chinese nation but to other friendly peoples as well.

What seems certain about this present question of Shanghai is that the settlement of the situation is not to be hoped for unless the National Government of China show good faith in extirpating the anti-Japanese education and likewise all agitation against Japan, awakening fully to the necessity of Sino-Japanese friendship. It is our earnest prayer that sanity will soon come to rule over China that she may see a peaceful and orderly state of affairs throughout her land.
Note:
1. Woosung Forts were reconstructed with concrete by Germans last November.
2. Japanese Troops

Chinese Troops

CHART I

A SKETCH SHOWING THE CHINESE POSITIONS NEAR SHANGHAI

(As reported on Feb. 17)
CHART II
A SKETCH SHOWING THE CHINESE POSITIONS NEAR SHANGHAI
(As reported on Feb. 23)
CHART III
MILITARY OPERATIONS NEAR SHANGHAI
(From Feb. 20 to Mar. 3)
CORRECTIONS

Please note the following corrections in “Fightings Around Shanghai” (the Herald of Asia Library of Contemporary History, No. 8):

1. On page 2, paragraph 1, line 8, “kilometres” should read “metres”.
2. On page 27, paragraph 1, line 8, “were” should read “was”.

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