Spring 2023

Immigration, Identity, and Sub-state Nations: A Comparative Analysis of Madrid and Catalonia

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A thesis presented

by

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to

The Political Science Department

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for Honors in Political Science

Trinity College
Hartford, CT
April 21, 2023

Anthony M. Messina
Thesis Advisor

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Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without the support of my many mentors and supporters. In particular, a handful of individuals were invaluable throughout the process of completing this thesis. First, thank you to Professor Anthony Messina, my devoted thesis advisor, who took the risk of embarking on a year-long project with a student he did not know. Guided by his nuanced criticism and propelled by his constant encouragement, writing this thesis has been the highlight of my academic career. Thank you to Professor Daniel Douglas, who gave so much of his time to help a math-averse student conquer a quantitative analysis. His patient collaboration helped produce the linchpin of my argument. Thank you to Professor Reo Matsuzaki, my academic advisor and trusted mentor of three years. His influence shaped me into the student, writer, and thinker that I am today. This thesis is a testament to the tremendous intellectual growth that I have achieved as a result of his mentorship. To my friends, thank you for the laughs, words of encouragement, and technical support which helped to deliver me through the difficult moments this past year. Most importantly, thank you to my parents, who made possible my education at Trinity and—for better or for worse—raised me to believe that I am capable of accomplishing anything. Mom and Dad, this thesis is dedicated to you.

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Introduction

The issue of migration is not one that is lacking in scholarly attention. In fact, the study of migration is one that spans academic disciplines ranging from economics and psychology to religion and literature. Amidst the robust academic discussion that exists surrounding the many facets of migration scholarship, some issues are explored more deeply, and more frequently, than others. Accordingly, certain phenomena are explored at length in academic research, while others are largely ignored or dramatically under-investigated. One such theme which is underexplored in migration scholarship is the relationship between national identity and immigration. There is limited discussion of the phenomenon of immigration in multinational states and, specifically, the potential impacts of a sub-state national identity on the reception of immigrants into a community. This is somewhat puzzling, given the extraordinary salience of subnational identities around the globe, which precipitate nationalist movements, heated political conflict, and even violence. For the purposes of this thesis, the term "subnational identity" refers to a sub-state national identity, and these terms will be used interchangeably. One country which is globally renowned for its semi-autonomous subnational communities is Spain, a country whose long and tumultuous history led to the formation of a state which encompasses several nations.

The Iberian Peninsula has long been home to a variety of cultures and languages, stemming from the region's origins as a collection of various kingdoms. These different regional cultures and ethnicities have been formally recognized in Spain for nearly two centuries now, originally as provinces in 1833.[1] Under the rule of Francisco Franco in the 20th century, this

[1] Robert P. Clark, "Territorial Devolution as a Strategy to Resolve Ethnic Conflict: Basque Self-Governance in Spain's Autonomous Community System," in *Ethnic and Racial Minorities in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, ed. Anthony M. Messina, Contributions in Ethnic Studies, no. 29 (Conference on Ethnic and Racial Minorities in the

recognition faltered, with the Franco regime harshly repressing the minority languages and cultures through its passage of repressive laws and the mandated distribution of anti-minority propaganda.[2] After the death of Franco, during the 1975-1978 Spanish democratic transition, this experience fueled demands on the part of three sub-state nations which had been granted autonomous status under Spain's Second Republic—Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia—that they be afforded explicit protections of their autonomy within the newly crafted Spanish Constitution.[3] While these three regions were originally the only nations which were awarded the status of autonomous community, the provisions within the Spanish 1978 Constitution allowed for any region to obtain this same designation. Therefore, the original three were quickly joined by Andalusia and later each region of Spain eventually obtained, or joined with a nearby province to obtain, the rights associated with the title of autonomous community, even though this had originally been designed as a measure to appease the Catalan, Basque, and Galician peoples. Thus began the process of territorial devolution in Spain that came to define the modern organization of Spanish society.[4]

In addition to Spain's status as a multinational state, the country has been rapidly growing in popularity as an immigrant-receiving country. While immigration to Spain was virtually nonexistent as late as the 1970s, the final decades of the 20th century saw a massive uptick in migration to the country, which has only continued to grow.[5] Now, Spain has climbed to become

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Advanced Industrial Democracies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), https://catalog.lib.uchicago.edu/vufind/Record/1311475.

[2] Henry Miller and Kate Miller, "Language Policy and Identity: The Case of Catalonia," *International Studies in Sociology of Education* 6, no. 1 (January 1996): 113–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/0962021960060106.

[3] Clark, "Territorial Devolution as a Strategy to Resolve Ethnic Conflict: Basque Self-Governance in Spain's Autonomous Community System."

[4] Clark.

[5] María Bruquetas-Callejo et al., "Immigration and Integration Policymaking in Spain," n.d.

the country with the fifth highest number of annual immigrants worldwide.[6] With this relatively recent status as a prominent immigrant destination and the country's history of subnational cultural autonomy, the Spanish case presents an environment which is ripe for academic investigation. Though many scholars have seized this opportunity and studied migration or sub-state nationalism in the Spanish context, this thesis will explore the largely unexplored intersection between subnational identity and attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.

Literature Review

Undoubtedly, a variety of factors are influential as individuals and societies formulate their attitudes regarding immigrants and immigration. Scholars have investigated countless variables that could contribute to this equation, coming to disparate conclusions as to the most important factors. Accordingly, I will review some of the most prominent theories in this sphere (contact, conflict, and politicization) and then discuss the role of identity as it is layered with these other influences. After reviewing these competing perspectives, I will introduce what, I argue, is the underexplored intersection of sub-state nationalism and popular attitudes towards immigration. Many scholars who discuss immigration in their scholarship seem to view states as monolithic; they make arguments and form conclusions based on national metrics. While this approach is not always problematic, I argue that a study of immigration that acknowledges the influence of subnational identities could be revelatory and informative for future research. Accordingly, this thesis will also draw upon the scholarship on sub-state nationalism and

[6] "Net Migration - Spain | Data," accessed April 14, 2023, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.NETM?end=2021&locations=ES&most_recent_value_desc=true&start=1960&view=chart.

regional autonomy. In applying this lens to the current scholarship on migration, my analysis will present a unique perspective on immigration in Spain, and in Europe as a whole.

Conflict Theory vs. Contact Theory

In considering the variables which impact collective attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, many scholars turn their attention to the impact of interactions between immigrants and citizens of the immigrant-receiving country. From the study of this relationship has emerged two disparate academic perspectives, *conflict theory* and *contact theory*. Scholarship advancing intergroup conflict theory, such as a study conducted by social scientist Ryan D. Enos, indicates that contact with immigrants increases anti-immigrant attitudes. As part of his study, Enos planted Spanish speakers on morning train routes in predominantly white suburbs of Boston. At the end of the studied period, he compared the exclusionary survey responses of those who had ridden the train with the Spanish speakers to those who had been on the control trains. His results showed a clear relationship between exposure to the Spanish speakers on the train and exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants, specifically immigrants from Mexico.[7] Enos's work bolsters the idea that the presence of an immigrant population creates intergroup conflict and therefore negatively influences the perception of immigrants in that region.

Alternatively, contact theory supports the notion that intergroup contact promotes tolerance and inclusivity. In a 2010 study on the prejudice levels of hospital workers in Italy, the researchers found a correlation between increased contact with patients from immigrant

[7] Ryan D. Enos, "Causal Effect of Intergroup Contact on Exclusionary Attitudes," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 111, no. 10 (March 11, 2014): 3699–3704, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1317670111.

backgrounds and heightened empathy towards immigrant groups.[8] Similarly, Gordon Hodson's 2011 article "Do Ideologically Intolerant People Benefit from Intergroup Contact?" examines the influence of intergroup contact on attitudes towards marginalized groups among intolerant individuals. This research goes one step beyond the basic assumptions of intergroup contact theory by applying this hypothesis to groups that can be considered less likely to adopt inclusive viewpoints. The study ultimately finds that intergroup contact remains effective under these conditions, proposing the facilitation of intergroup contact as a strategy for mitigating prejudice in a community.[9]

Some scholars build upon contact and conflict theory to investigate the influence of environmental factors on the veracity of these scholarly viewpoints. For example, a central component of intergroup conflict theory is the idea that the presence of different cultural groups in a community, in this case immigrants and the host population, can prompt competition over resources (either legitimate or perceived) and therefore increase hostility. This concern with the availability of resources prompts consideration of another factor that is theorized to impact attitudes towards immigrants and immigration: economic conditions. Specifically, scholars are interested in how economic factors intersect with immigration rates to influence the direction of public sentiment. This intersection within the context of Western Europe is explored in the research of Joachim Vogt Isaksen, who conducted a study on the impact of the European financial crisis on attitudes towards immigration.[10] In his work, Isaksen explores the conflicting expectations of intergroup contact theory and conflict theory, while also investigating the

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[8] Lisa Pagotto, Alberto Voci, and Valentina Maculan, "The Effectiveness of Intergroup Contact at Work: Mediators and Moderators of Hospital Workers' Prejudice towards Immigrants," *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology* 20, no. 4 (2010): 317–30, https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.1038.
[9] Gordon Hodson, "Do Ideologically Intolerant People Benefit From Intergroup Contact?," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 20, no. 3 (June 1, 2011): 154–59, https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721411409025.
[10] Joachim Vogt Isaksen, "The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Attitudes toward Immigration," *Comparative Migration Studies* 7, no. 1 (June 13, 2019): 24, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0127-5.

applicability of scapegoat theory to the European case. Scapegoat theory, in the context of immigration, is the theory that those who are poor, unemployed, or work in low-skilled fields are most likely to blame immigrants for their economic hardship in times of recession. In his analysis of attitudes towards immigration in Europe across countries that were impacted in varying degrees by the financial crisis of 2007-2008, Isaksen finds that negative economic performance was correlated with more negative attitudes. Furthermore, he concludes that instances of scapegoating and group conflict/group threat are tied to economic decline. This was found to be true even in cases where a country's attitudes towards immigration were considered favorable before the onset of economic hardship.[11] Generally, the theorized cause of this phenomena is the idea that economic downturns create increased competition over material resources, therefore heightening intergroup conflict and feelings of hostility towards outgroups. In sum, many scholars condition the applicability of contact and conflict theories on the economic conditions of the region studied.

Politicization Theory

Despite the broad-ranging scholarship exploring the idea that sharing a community with immigrants directly impacts an individual's attitudes towards immigrant groups, some scholars challenge the general applicability of this conclusion. In his research on local attitudes and policy decisions regarding immigration, political scientist Daniel Hopkins questions the validity of both intergroup contact and conflict theory. Hopkins instead proposes a more nuanced hypothesis which suggests that it is not necessarily the size of immigrant populations that predicts attitudes, but rather the speed at which the immigrant population grows. However, Hopkins acknowledges

[11] Joachim Vogt Isaksen, "The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Attitudes toward Immigration," *Comparative Migration Studies* 7, no. 1 (June 13, 2019): 24, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0127-5.

that even this variable alone is not enough to accurately predict heightened anti-immigration attitudes at the local level. In order for an influx of immigrants to provoke increased hostility from natives, immigration must first be politically salient at the national level. When these two conditions — political salience and sudden, heightened immigration — are met, Hopkins demonstrates a clear connection to localized political hostility towards immigrants.[12]

Hopkins' hypothesis, labeled "politicized places," addresses some of the flaws inherent to hypotheses that focus on the size or social prominence of immigrant populations. For one, Hopkins points out how relying on mere population data to make assumptions about the level of cross-cultural interaction actually occurring is often misguided, as many communities are structured to be so racially or culturally segregated that there is very little in-group/out-group interaction. Therefore, any analysis that emphasizes the role of interaction should ideally take on the added burden of proving how and to what extent intercultural connection is occurring and subsequently impacting attitudes or policy. Similarly, contact and conflict theories have thus far failed to convincingly explain why exposure to immigrant populations in one's region sometimes prompts hostility and other times prompts increased acceptance. How can these diametrically opposite theories be equally valid? Ultimately, there are a plethora of exogenous variables that could impact whether or not a large immigrant population positively or negatively inclines other citizens towards pro-immigrant views, such as the history of the locality or the cultural distance present between the in/out-groups, and it is nearly impossible to control for all of them. Hopkins'

[12] Daniel J. Hopkins, "Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 40–60, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990360.

theory of politicized places attempts to evade these complications by placing the causality most directly on a change in population and the subsequent impact on policy and public sentiment.[13]

As is emphasized repeatedly in migration scholarship (including by Hopkins), the political salience of immigration in a given environment is a crucial factor in the formation of popular attitudes. In effect, this means that those who help create political salience around an issue—including politicians and the media—can significantly influence attitudes towards immigrants and/or immigration. However, there is disagreement among scholars about the extent to which political salience truly *fosters* anti-immigrant sentiment. In their recent article, James Dennison and Andrew Geddes question such an assumption. Writing in response to assertions that there exists a so called "rising tide" of anti-immigration sentiment in Western Europe, Dennison and Geddes deny the existence of a causal link between politicization of immigration and the spread of xenophobia and racism. Their article references the widespread concern among leaders in the European Union that these attitudes are spreading across Western Europe as a result of far-right politicians and the media sensationalizing immigration. In response to these concerns, Dennison and Geddes investigate whether the observed increase in support for far-right parties is truly a result of spreading anti-immigrant attitudes. Ultimately, they conclude that the increasing political salience of immigration is not, in fact, drastically changing the public's perception of immigrants; rather, they argue that the political weaponization of immigration is strengthening hostility towards immigrants among those who already held that view. Then, these strengthened attitudes mobilize anti-immigrant voters and bolster support for far-right political

[13] Daniel J. Hopkins, "Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 40–60, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990360.

parties, explaining the rise in far-right support that has been observed across Western Europe.[14] So how should this research influence the way we consider the construction of attitudes towards immigrants? Effectively, the findings of Dennison and Geddes indicate that individuals are mostly predisposed towards holding certain viewpoints on immigration based on factors unrelated to politics, and that political mobilization around immigration is merely a catalyst in the anti-immigrant reaction – that is, the appropriate conditions must be met within an individual for the reaction to occur.

The Role of Identity

Thus far, my discussion has revolved around factors in the production of attitudes that are exogenous to the individual. I have focused on variables that are situational or political in nature. While these considerations are crucial to an investigation that is interested in public sentiment, it is similarly vital to consider how an individual's characteristics can shape the development of pro/anti-immigrant attitudes even in the absence of external factors. Specifically, it is important to consider the role of identity in driving individual attitudes towards immigrants. In a study on the impact of a strong ethnic identity on positive intergroup attitudes among young people, psychologists Jean Phinney, Brian Jacoby, and Charissa Silva advanced and confirmed their hypothesis that a well-developed ethnic identity was associated with lower feelings of intergroup threat. Underpinning these results is the theoretical foundation that those who have a well-developed ethnic identity feel more socially secure, therefore allowing open-mindedness towards outgroups, a more complete perspective on intergroup relationships, and a nuanced appreciation

[14] James Dennison and Andrew Geddes, "A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe," *The Political Quarterly* 90, no. 1 (January 2019): 107–16, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12620.

for diversity.[15] While this research speaks more generally to the role of ethnic identity in intergroup relationships and does not specifically focus on attitudes towards immigrants, the conclusions drawn from this type of psychological research can be reasonably applied in the case of immigration and to the issue of national identity.

As exemplified in the scholarship exploring the various implications of ethnic identity, the way that individuals self-identify clearly has the capacity to influence attitudes towards other social groups. However, not every type of identity has been given this same attention in academic discourse. Accordingly, this thesis is interested in an intersection of ideas that has been explored very sparingly: the impact of subnational identity on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Though there has been limited discussion of this specific intersection, there are scholars who have discussed the unique nature of subnational identity and regional politics in the policy sphere. For example, Christina Zuber's work analyzing regional variation in immigrant integration policy in Spain, Germany, and Italy highlights the importance in recognizing sub-national differences in this area of study. In Zuber's research, she is able to use the disparate policy choices of regional governments within these three states to draw conclusions about the conditions under which regions in Western Europe choose to institute different immigrant incorporation strategies. Most interestingly for the purpose of my analysis, Zuber finds that the presence of minority nationalism in a region predicts the adoption of fewer inclusive measures and more restrictive policies.[16]

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[15] "Positive Intergroup Attitudes: The Role of Ethnic Identity," accessed October 22, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1177/0165025407081466.

[16] Christina I. Zuber, "Explaining the Immigrant Integration Laws of German, Italian and Spanish Regions: Sub-State Nationalism and Multilevel Party Politics," *Regional Studies* 54, no. 11 (November 1, 2020): 1486–97, https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2019.1599845.

Zuber is certainly not the only scholar to focus on regional context as part of a broader investigation in the study of migration. A 2018 study by Anne Wilson-Daily, Markus Kemmelmeier, and Joaquín Prats investigated the applicability of intergroup contact/conflict theory in secondary schools in Catalonia. In the study, the authors were interested in whether students who had substantial interaction with non-European immigrants were more or less likely to express hostility towards immigrants than students who had minimal intergroup interaction with their non-European peers. Due to Catalonia's unique qualities as a sub-state nation, its relative economic prosperity (mitigating the likelihood that economic conditions would serve as a confounding variable), and status as a new immigrant destination, the region is an academically interesting setting for such research. After selecting schools which contained a representative sample of students from different geographic locations and socioeconomic backgrounds, the researchers found that students who had more interactions across group boundaries were more accepting of difference and friendlier to the interests of non-European immigrants, therefore supporting intergroup contact theory. Furthermore, the authors used the opportunity presented by Catalonia's status as a sub-state nation to compare attitudes among students who had different national identities. Through asking respondents to identify themselves as Spanish, Catalonian, or both, the authors were able to go beyond their initial conclusions regarding contact theory to observe a relationship between national identity and attitudes towards immigrants. They found that students who identified as Catalonian were generally more friendly towards immigrants and their interests, which poses interesting questions about the role of national/subnational identity and culture in the construction of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.[17] While this

[17] Ann E. Wilson-Daily, Markus Kemmelmeier, and Joaquín Prats, "Intergroup Contact versus Conflict in Catalan High Schools: A Multilevel Analysis of Adolescent Attitudes toward Immigration and Diversity," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 64 (May 1, 2018): 12–28, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2018.03.002.

study highlights the critical importance of considering subnational identity in social science research, it further demonstrates the lack of attention that has been given to this issue, as identity was considered in the course of an investigation into intergroup contact theory rather than investigated as the principle variable of interest.

As evidenced by the multitude of competing arguments advanced by migration scholars, there is no single variable that explains the development of an individual's, or a community's, attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Each one of the factors and perspectives explored in this review likely contribute to these attitudes to some degree, and in some circumstances. The best way that scholars can further their understanding of the development of these attitudes is to consider as many variables and variable combinations as is possible, thus adding to the number of theoretical explanations that could be applied to different real-world cases. This pursuit is a worthy one — but not merely because discovering an explanation would be interesting. Rather, understanding the factors that contribute to anti-immigrant or xenophobic attitudes can help those who wish to combat this sentiment in a political community. Without understanding the underlying causes, these attitudes are impossible to effectively address. Beyond this, the study of subnational identity as it informs feelings towards immigrants is a worthy endeavor, since a more complete understanding of this intersection could help explain attitudes towards immigrants in sub-state nations/regions around the world. While scholars such as Zuber and Wilson-Daily et. al. have produced engaging and informative scholarship that touches on this intersection, their work is limited in its capacity for widespread application due to the lack of a controlled comparison in either case. Since I have elected to focus my analysis on Spain, and regional differences that occur between different autonomous communities, my observations will be more

reasonably applicable to the general impact of subnational identity on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.

Methodology

The major goal of this thesis is to address the question: *What is the impact of sub-state national identity on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration?* With this goal in mind, my research will utilize a comparative analysis to test the following competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Members of a sub-state nation will feel more positively towards immigrants and immigration, due to a sympathy for those who are also treated as a cultural other by the central state.

Hypothesis 2: Members of a sub-state nation will feel more negatively towards immigrants, due to a fear of cultural dilution and a strong sense of cultural protectionism.

Case Selection

To test these hypotheses, this thesis will investigate two Spanish autonomous communities: Catalonia and Madrid. The logic for this case selection—both the choice of Spain and the selection of Catalonia and Madrid specifically—is straightforward. First, Spain's autonomous communities, and particularly the examples of Catalonia and the Basque Country, have long been a source of academic curiosity. However, scholarship on the issue of immigration in Spain has proliferated only during the past several decades, as Spain emerged from the dictatorial regime of Francisco Franco and gained popularity as a new immigrant destination.

This historical context, paired with Spain's de facto status as a gateway from Africa into the European Union, makes Spain an interesting case. However, what really makes Spain an ideal case for my research, and for that of many migration scholars, is the fact that immigration has only recently become widespread in the country. This offers a compelling advantage to anyone who hopes to investigate the causal mechanisms that contribute to a variety of phenomena related to migration, including policy outcomes, political saliency, and public attitudes. Chiefly, this is due to the fact that recency mitigates some of the potential confounding variables that a political scientist must confront when establishing a causal chain; if immigration is a more recent issue in the Spanish context, then any analysis that focuses on how individuals interact with immigrant populations or react to immigration-related issues is inherently more straightforward. Similarly, my decision to select two regions within the same country is justified as a strategy to minimize confounding variables. Logically, regions within the same country can be more closely compared, due to their shared history, geographical location, and political system. By electing to concentrate my analysis on a single country, I have eliminated a whole host of potential methodological problems. Finally, Spain fulfilled the most obvious requirement for this thesis which is the presence of salient sub-state national communities, and specifically those which enjoy a relatively high degree of political autonomy.

As suggested above, Spain is divided into 17 autonomous communities. This said, not every community necessarily has a salient regional, subnational identity. When constructing this comparative analysis, I was seeking one region with a strong national identity and one that was solely associated with the general Spanish national culture and language. While this criterion informed my selection of cases, most of the other considerations during the case selection process were motivated by a concern for methodological integrity throughout this project. Since

this thesis is concerned with the impact of sub-state national identity on popular attitudes towards immigrants, it is crucial to minimize other significant differences between the selected communities that could potentially influence attitudes towards immigrants or immigration.

For the purposes of this thesis, I selected two communities: one which had a strong sub-state national identity and one that did not. In selecting the former, it made the most sense to limit my consideration to the three historical nationalities that were originally recognized within the 1978 Constitution. For any of these three nations, the salience of the regional identity, and therefore, the plausibility that the culture of the region would differ from the dominant Spanish identity, is difficult to question. Similarly, the particularities of these regions are more often studied and analyzed in the academic community, providing a more thorough body of scholarship from which to draw information. With the search narrowed to only three Autonomous Communities, I directed my attention back to the case against which my potential sub-state nation would be compared—that is, to a community that was not also a minority culture. While few of the 17 autonomous communities have a truly separate cultural identity in the modern day, many were once home to one or more minority languages or cultures that have since become somewhat obsolete. Despite this obsolescence, I was wary of presenting a region as the typical Spanish identity with the very real possibility that the cultural history of that region might be influencing the results of my research. The only region that avoids this pitfall is one that is at the heart of the Spanish national culture, the autonomous community of Madrid.

With Madrid as the example of a lack of a strong sub-state national identity, the selection of a sub-state nation becomes obvious. Among the three original nationalities recognized by the central Spanish government (Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country) the only one which could reasonably compare against the populous, diverse, and politically important heart of Spain

is its fiercest rival: Catalonia. Home to the first and second most populous cities in Spain (Madrid and Barcelona, respectively) these two regions are economic competitors with similar levels of prosperity and cosmopolitanism. This similarity alone ameliorates one key concern within migration theory, which is the impact of economic conditions on attitudes towards immigrants. In this case, economic opportunity within both cities attracts immigrants in large numbers. As of 2022, Madrid and Barcelona had populations which were about 25% and 22% foreign-born, respectively.[18] Similarly, these statistics ensure that stark differences in the rate of immigration or conditions of cultural diversity could complicate the isolation of sub-state national identity, my independent variable.

Operationalization of Regional Attitudes

My research into these two regions and the subsequent analysis of my findings will be divided into three chapters that correspond with three different indicators of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. I will analyze each of these metrics (political rhetoric, policy outcomes, and public opinion) across both communities, using this comparison to test the competing hypotheses I identified earlier in this section. By operationalizing attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in this way, I hope to construct a well-rounded analysis that acknowledges the tremendous difficulty in accurately gauging public sentiment.

[18] "Idescat. Distribution by Districts. Barcelona," accessed April 21, 2023, https://www.idescat.cat/poblacioestrangera/?b=10&geo=mun:080193&lang=en; "Población nacida fuera de España residente en la ciudad de Madrid (por país de nacimiento) - Ayuntamiento de Madrid," accessed April 21, 2023, https://www.madrid.es/portales/munimadrid/es/Inicio/El-Ayuntamiento/Estadistica/Areas-de-informacion-estadistica/Demografia-y-poblacion/Poblacion-extranjera/Poblacion-nacida-fuera-de-Espana-residente-en-la-ciudad-de-Madrid-por-pais-de-nacimiento-/?vgnextfmt=default&vgnextoid=f4be27dc75580510VgnVCM2000000c205a0aRCRD&vgnextchannel=9ce23636b44b4210VgnVCM2000000c205a0aRCRD.

Politics

As support for far-right parties is on the rise across Europe, and around the world, many scholars have attributed this mobilization to increased xenophobia and waning acceptance of immigrants in some regions.[19] While it would be methodologically inappropriate to interpolate from these political advances and make sweeping conclusions about the ideas of the public, this metric is nonetheless a useful piece of the picture. In particular, the measurement of popular support for far-right parties is an interesting tool to gauge attitudes in the area of immigration, to the extent that there is a regional variation in this support. Further, investigation of the political rhetoric used by these parties sheds light on the political views of their supporters. To assess far-right support across both Catalonia and Madrid, I will rely principally on an analysis of the electoral success and political rhetoric of far-right parties and nationalist political figures. Specifically, electoral success will be operationalized as the share of seats in a governing body, and political rhetoric will be determined based on statements made by political figures or views expressed in party manifestos.

Policy

Due to the semi-federalist structure of the Spanish governmental system, autonomous communities are able to exercise a fair degree of control over local policy on many issues, one of which being immigrant integration. While much like political support, policy passage and implementation should not be construed to be a direct representation of popular sentiment, regional variation in immigrant integration strategy most certainly reflects different cultural and

[19] James Dennison and Andrew Geddes, "A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe," *The Political Quarterly* 90, no. 1 (2019): 107–16, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12620.

political priorities on the part of local governments. If nothing else, the decision on the part of an autonomous community to implement a regional policy on integration (rather than simply using the framework utilized by the central Spanish government) can be reasonably seen as an indicator of the salience of the issue within that region, which also holds enormous weight in my analysis. In this section, I will analyze disparate approaches to immigrant integration and their implications in the Spanish context through the assessment of policy outcomes—past and present—in Madrid and Catalonia. Largely, I will accomplish this by assessing policy components such as the accessibility of government services, the treatment of undocumented immigrants, and the type of immigrant integration strategy used.

Public Opinion

Arguably the most direct measure of public sentiment is public opinion data. Some scholars shy away from the use of this data due to concerns regarding reliability and methodological integrity; however, when conducted well, survey data can present an incredible opportunity to conduct quantitative research on issues that are often difficult to quantify effectively. Accordingly, this section of my research will rely heavily on a data analysis of a comprehensive survey of the attitudes of Spaniards towards immigrants that was conducted annually in Spain from 1991-2007. Conducted by the *Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos y Politicos* (ASEP), this survey asked respondents to answer a lengthy questionnaire which asked a variety of questions which aimed to pinpoint their feelings about immigrants from a variety of different backgrounds. Using this data, I will conduct a quantitative analysis which investigates the impact of national identity on xenophobia levels in the capital cities of each region, Madrid (Madrid) and Barcelona (Catalonia). To isolate the impact of the independent variable (national

identity), my analysis will compare xenophobia levels over time, across different levels of educational attainment, and between respondents with different national identities who reside in the same city.

Conclusion

Every research design has its flaws. This thesis will certainly not be exempt from that reality. For example, political party mobilization can be a product of strategic prowess on the part of politicians, policy outcomes can sometimes be a mere measure of government efficiency, and public opinion data can be troubled by non-representative sampling or biased surveyors. However, I have selected these three measures very carefully, with the idea that their *combination* presents a holistic and reliable picture of regional attitudes. To the extent that there is a consistent pattern across these three measures, then there is sufficient evidence to advance a causal argument linking the presence/absence of a regional identity to positive/negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. For this reason, the internal validity of this analysis is strong. In regard to the general applicability of my findings, or the external validity, this thesis is well-equipped to produce a conclusion which could inform our understanding of the role of subnational identity in determining attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. However, because this analysis only assesses two regions, there is an unavoidable possibility that the relationship discovered in this thesis is in some way unique. As such, further research will be required before any conclusions about this relationship could be relied upon as wholly externally valid.

Analysis to Come

In order to evaluate the role of sub-state national identity in shaping attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, this thesis will trace the emergence of Spain as a new immigrant destination, with a particular focus on the autonomous communities selected for comparative analysis: Madrid and Catalonia. To evaluate the role of identity in the development of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, this analysis will take a holistic approach which assesses political expression, aggregate elite attitudes, and public opinion (as outlined in the preceding section). This analysis will be divided into three chapters.

Chapter Two will draw extensively from the literature linking far-right party support to nationalism, identity, and concerns over immigration to assess the relationship between these variables in the Spanish context. Specifically, this chapter will examine the political rhetoric surrounding migration and national/subnational identity in both Madrid and Catalonia. This is a critical investigation, as a variation in the politics of immigration between these two regions could reflect a widespread difference in popular attitudes towards immigration. As part of this analysis, Chapter Two will chart the path of relatively new far-right party, Vox, and weigh the converging variables that led to the party's electoral success in the 2019 general election. After establishing this chain of events, my analysis will compare electoral support for Vox across the selected cases, while also evaluating the success (or lack thereof) of Catalonian far-right groups. All of this analysis will inform the central argument of Chapter Two, which is that Spanish nationalism (rather than Catalonian or another subnational or plurinational form of nationalism) predicts far-right support in the Spanish context, thus indicating a divergence in attitudes towards immigrants and immigration between Catalonia and Madrid.

After exploring the changing political salience of immigration and the emergence of the far-right in modern Spain in Chapter Two, Chapter Three will turn to the immigrant integration policies of both Madrid and Catalonia. How are immigrants received in each autonomous community? What, if anything, do policy outcomes indicate about regional attitudes? To answer these questions, Chapter Three will draw on migration scholarship, and specifically that which assesses the disparate approaches to immigrant integration and the ways that they have been employed in Western Europe. The chapter will relate the cases of Madrid and Catalonia to other European examples, while also situating them within the context of Spanish politics, policy, and culture. Most importantly, this chapter will compare the policy approaches of Catalonia and Madrid and conclude that Catalonian policy towards immigrants is more comprehensive and more welcoming than that of Madrid. In doing so, Chapter Three will make the argument that policy outcomes—while not necessarily a reflection of public sentiment—reveal elite attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.

Finally, Chapter Four will draw principally from a Spanish survey dataset that interrogates attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Through an analysis of this data, the chapter will expose numerous statistically significant disparities in xenophobia levels across respondents from different regions, national/subnational identities, and levels of education. After doing this, it will explore different explanations for these disparities, relating this discussion to the aspects of politics and policy that were discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Overall, Chapter Four will use the public opinion data to isolate the role of identity in predicting xenophobia levels and find that the Spanish national identity is linked to higher levels of xenophobia among respondents from Barcelona.

After the analysis portion of the thesis (Chapters 2-4), the Conclusion will revisit the key findings of each chapter to ultimately reject both hypotheses advanced within this introduction. This final chapter will weave together the conclusions from each section of analysis to ultimately argue that, in a multinational state, members of a sub-state nation have more pro-immigrant attitudes due to the perception of migration as an opportunity for nation-building.

Chapter 2: *Politics*
The Political Salience of Immigration and the Role of the Far-Right in Spain

Introduction

Any casual follower of current events could tell you that immigrants and immigration are a frequent topic of political discussion. Around the globe, the issue of immigration is prompting culture wars, political movements, and fervent public discourse. From concerns over border security, to fears of cultural dilution in an immigrant-receiving society, the process of migration is one that attracts controversy worldwide. However, this has not always been the case. Though it might seem unimaginable in our current global political climate, immigration has only recently become a highly politicized issue in many regions of the world, particularly in parts of Western Europe. This growing political salience has resulted in the growing success of far-right political parties in Western Europe, nearly all of which have explicit anti-immigration ideological and policy platforms. In Spain, this shift has been even more recent, with a national far-right party gaining traction only in the last five years. However, this far-right support—which is grounded in a nationalist ideology—is not uniformly distributed throughout Spain. While Spanish nationalism has encouraged the emergence of a nationalist far-right party, Catalonian nationalism is staunchly left-wing. Accordingly, the goal of this chapter is to indicate not only the political significance of these diverging nationalisms, but also their relevance to the dependent variable in this thesis: attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. This chapter will accomplish this goal by contextualizing the Spanish case within the growing political salience of immigration in Europe, charting the path of the contemporary Spanish far-right, and arguing that regional differences in support for the far-right in Spain are indicative of disparate attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Furthermore, this section of analysis will use the example of Vox to demonstrate how the expansion in electoral support for the far-right primarily resulted from the

political challenges posed by sub-state political leaders during the 2017 succession attempt in Catalonia. Lastly, this chapter will illustrate that Spanish nationalist political rhetoric relies heavily upon anti-immigrant views while Catalonian nationalist parties actively advocate for the rights of migrants.

The Changing Politics of Immigration Modern Europe

European immigration rates have increased dramatically in the past decade—between 2013 and 2019, the number of non-EU immigrants residing within the European Union rose by more than a million people.[20] On a similar timeline, anti-immigration political parties (typically classified as right-wing parties) have garnered increasing support, even in countries that had previously been known for a culture of tolerance or acceptance.[21] When faced with these coinciding trends, it is logical to conclude that they are somehow related; the simple conclusion is that the increased presence of non-EU immigrants prompted an anti-immigration political backlash across Europe. Alarmed by this development, activists, politicians, and academics have raised concerns that xenophobic sentiment is sweeping the European continent, while far-right politicians fan the flames. However, one crucial detail challenges this explanation for rising far-right support: anti-immigrant/immigration sentiment has *not* been rising in Europe. This puzzling detail is evidenced in data from the European Social Survey (ESS), which collects annual data on a variety of social and political issues across European nations and public opinion data from the polling organization of the European Union, Eurobarometer. According to ESS data collected between 2002-2016, attitudes towards immigrants from poorer, non-European countries actually

[20] "Migration and Migrant Population Statistics," accessed December 14, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics.
[21] Dennison and Geddes, "A Rising Tide?"

improved in over a third of EU member states over the 14-year period. Between 2014-2016 (the largest spike in anti-immigration party support in the 21st century), a Eurobarometer survey of all 28 EU states revealed decreased negativity towards both EU and non-EU immigrants.[22]

In a sense, these surveys could be seen as a source of comfort—most Europeans are not becoming xenophobic. However, as this relief subsides, the question remains: What motivates increased electoral support for far-right, anti-immigration parties in 21st century Europe? I am not the first, nor will I be the last, to pose this question. Existing scholarship has addressed this phenomenon from a variety of disparate theoretical perspectives. One popular explanation is that which centers economic insecurity, positing that ethnic threat and anti-immigration political support stem from economic challenges such as financial crises or widespread unemployment.[23] Another prominent hypothesis that mass immigration, coupled with high crime rates, engenders support for anti-immigration parties.[24] Other scholars then contend that the portrayal of crime and immigration in the media impacts the propensity to vote for anti-immigration parties.[25] Although these factors should not be excluded from consideration, empirical support for their robustness is lacking. Though economic insecurity, crime rate, and media influence cannot sufficiently explain increased voter support for the anti-immigration far-right, the research into these variables bolsters a different and compelling explanation for this puzzle: issue salience.

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[22] Dennison and Geddes.
[23] Jaak Billiet, Bart Meuleman, and Hans De Witte, "The Relationship between Ethnic Threat and Economic Insecurity in Times of Economic Crisis: Analysis of European Social Survey Data," *Migration Studies* 2, no. 2 (July 1, 2014): 135–61, https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnu023.
[24] Elias Dinas and Joost van Spanje, "Crime Story: The Role of Crime and Immigration in the Anti-Immigration Vote," *Electoral Studies* 30, no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 658–71, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2011.06.010.
[25] Bjorn Burscher, Joost van Spanje, and Claes H. de Vreese, "Owning the Issues of Crime and Immigration: The Relation between Immigration and Crime News and Anti-Immigrant Voting in 11 Countries," *Electoral Studies* 38 (June 1, 2015): 59–69, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.03.001.

The role of issue salience in the changing support for anti-immigration parties is one that undergirds nearly every other well-known theoretical explanation. The way that political meaning is assigned to immigration connects variables such as crime rate, media rhetoric, economic conditions, and demographic change to anti-immigration politics and voting behaviors.[26] Accordingly, Dennison and Geddes link growing far-right support in 21st century Western Europe to an increased salience of immigration that galvanizes anti-immigrant attitudes among those who were already predisposed to this perspective.[27] This argument is comprehensive in its application, as it explains not only the rising support for anti-immigration political parties in the absence of increased xenophobic sentiment, but it also corresponds with other research on this topic that looks at specialized variables such as crime rate, media coverage, and economic conditions. Part of the reason that these variables, on their own, demonstrate only loose correlation with anti-immigrant voting behavior is because there are often preconditions for their relevance; individuals must have certain existing concerns (e.g., about immigrants or their economic standing) for anti-immigrant parties to gain increased traction in their communities.[28]

The Political Salience of Immigration in Spain

In accordance with the growing political salience of immigration that has facilitated the electoral success of far-right parties in much of Western Europe, Spain has also seen increased political conflict surrounding immigration issues and the recent emergence of a far-right party.

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[26] Daniel J. Hopkins, "Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 40–60, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990360.
[27] Dennison and Geddes, "A Rising Tide?"
[28] Dennison and Geddes.



Figure 2.1: "Polling for anti-immigration parties in fifteen western European countries, January 2005 to June 2018" (Dennison and Geddes)

However, what makes the Spanish case especially interesting is the fact that, historically, immigration has simply not been an especially salient issue.[29] This lack of political importance is evidenced in an analysis of Spanish partisan electoral programs since the drafting of the 1978 Constitution, which demonstrates that immigration has consistently occupied very little space within these party programs. Even when references to immigration in politics rose from 1996-2004 under the influence of the conservative *Partido Popular* (PP), which pushed immigration and nationalism as central to their strategy, immigration still only occupied around 5% of party manifestos on average.[30] Relatedly, Spain and Portugal had—until recently—also been curiously spared from the political influence of the far-right, even as so many other European states experienced waves of right-wing electoral success (as demonstrated in Figure 2.1[31]). This *Iberian exception* ended in 2018 and 2019, following the remarkable electoral success of far-right party *Vox* (Latin for "voice") in

[29] Dídac Amat i Puigsech and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, "Politicisation of Immigration in Spain: An Exceptional Case?," *CEASEVAL RESEARCH ON THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM* 14 (2018), http://ceaseval.eu/publications/14_AmatGarces_WP5_Spain.pdf.
[30] José Rama et al., *VOX: The Rise of the Spanish Populist Radical Right* (Routledge, 2021).
[31] Dennison and Geddes, "A Rising Tide?"109, fig. 1

the Andalusian elections and subsequent Spanish national elections, as well as through the modest electoral success of the Portuguese far-right party *Chega* (Portuguese for "enough"). [32]

A puzzling component of the Iberian exception is that it challenges the widespread interpretation of the growing far-right support that has been experienced throughout the rest of Western Europe in the past three decades. First, the Spanish case is curious because it is an outlier in those theories which attribute the rise of the populist right to economic crises and unemployment. While most other countries that were hit hard by the Great Recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s saw a subsequent uptick in levels of far-right support, Spain experienced economic hardship which appears to have instead given way to left-wing challengers.[33] Similarly, a common association is that xenophobic, far-right politicians gain power and prominence in the wake of terrorist attacks.[34] Yet the liberal Spanish socialist party thrived in the wake of the 2004 Madrid attacks, and socialist President José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero extended temporary legal status to undocumented immigrants who were working in Spain the very next year.[35] Thus, in both times of economic crisis and national tragedy, Spain managed to steer clear of any major far-right influence. However, this exception came crashing down with the entrance of far-right party Vox into the Spanish political realm in 2018.

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[32] Mariana S. Mendes and James Dennison, "Explaining the Emergence of the Radical Right in Spain and Portugal: Salience, Stigma and Supply," *West European Politics* 44, no. 4 (June 7, 2021): 752–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2020.1777504.
[33] Jason Xidias, "Vox: The Revival of the Far Right in Spain," n.d.
[34] Jakob-Moritz Eberl et al., "The European Media Discourse on Immigration and Its Effects: A Literature Review," *Annals of the International Communication Association* 42, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 207–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2018.1497452.
[35] Bonnie N. Field, "A 'Second Transition' in Spain? Policy, Institutions and Interparty Politics under Zapatero (2004–8)," *South European Society and Politics* 14, no. 4 (December 1, 2009): 379–97, https://doi.org/10.1080/13608740903503803.

Understanding the Rise of Vox

Although Vox did not make electoral gains until 2018, the party had existed in Spain for half a decade before it began to gain political traction. In 2013, Vox was formed as a spin-off of the existing, conventionally conservative party, *Partido Popular* (People's Party in English). Though they participated in three elections prior to 2018 (one European election and two general elections) they failed to earn any seats in government.[36] Why then, after 5 years did the party finally garner national attention? This sudden shift in its political fortunes cannot be solely attributed to a single issue or incident. However, scholars agree that Vox's electoral success can largely be credited to a political platform that effectively harnessed public concern about the 2017 attempt by the Catalonian government (*Generalitat de Catalunya*) to declare independence from Spain.[37] This conclusion is consistent with previous scholarship which links ethnic conflict in Western European states to a rightward political shift.[38]

The 2017 constitutional crisis shook the Spanish political landscape in two principle ways: 1) It highlighted regional divisions and the extent of territorial devolution in Spain; 2) The Spanish government's handling of the crisis inflamed existing tensions and prompted criticism.[39] During this period of instability, Vox seized the opportunity to emphasize the party's rhetoric of strong Spanish nationalism to market itself as the solution for those seeking a unified Spain.[40] Among those who were concerned about the growing power of Catalonia and other regional governments, this rhetoric became extremely attractive in the wake of the greatest political crisis

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[36] Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte, José Rama, and Andrés Santana, "The Baskerville's Dog Suddenly Started Barking: Voting for VOX in the 2019 Spanish General Elections," *Political Research Exchange* 2, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 1781543, https://doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2020.1781543.
[37] Rama et al., *VOX*.
[38] Anthony M. Messina, "The Two Tiers of Ethnic Conflict in Westen Europe Ethnic Identity," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 16, no. 2 (1992): 51–66.
[39] Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama, and Santana, "The Baskerville's Dog Suddenly Started Barking."
[40] Rama et al., *VOX*.

in modern Spanish history. Thus, Vox began to gain significant political traction, winning their first big electoral gains in the Andalusian elections of 2018, and going on to win their first seats in the Spanish Congress (*Congreso de los Diputados*) in the subsequent year. Ironically, Vox's status as a newcomer to the national political scene was a quality that facilitated their sudden advances. By marketing themselves as political outsiders who would be tough on regional separatism, Vox was able to mount a critique of more established parties across the political spectrum by arguing that those in power across Spain were unable to control regional opposition. Through this anti-establishment political approach, Vox quickly amassed a following of millions which allowed the party—in a brief two-year period—to become the third most represented party in the Spanish Congress.[41]

Immigration and Vox

It is unambiguous that Vox's location on the political-ideological spectrum is on the far-right, with its closest neighbor in the Spanish context being the traditionally conservative Partido Popular. While this political position typically corresponds with a harsher stance on immigration, to understand Vox's relationship to the issue salience of immigration in Spain it is necessary to turn to the party's own formal statements on the matter. Interestingly, an analysis of Vox's electoral program yields somewhat surprising results on the topic of immigration. In contrast to other far-right parties that have emerged in Western Europe in the past decade, immigration is not among the most common topics referenced within the party manifesto. Although this is initially surprising, as far-right parties are commonly associated with explicit anti-immigration positions and rhetoric, further investigation and thought illuminates additional references to

[41] Rama et al.

immigration that are made with a bit more subtlety. Immigration alone is not within the top five issues in the Vox electoral program; however, when you combine the references to immigration with the references to assimilation, this blended category becomes the third most-referenced issue in the manifesto. As demonstrated in Table 2.1, the category of negative references to immigration/assimilation consumes nearly nine percent of the 2019 party program, trailing just behind law and order and national way of life to occupy the third-place spot.[42] With this data in mind, it becomes clear that Vox's stance on immigration flows from the party's deeply nativist ideology. Through this nativist ideology, Vox exploits the umbrella theme of Spanish nationalism to advocate against territorial devolution, regional separatism, multiculturalism, and certain types of immigrants. Specifically, Vox links immigration to anti-regionalism and ethnonationalism by advocating that immigrants who share ties with Spain or have a demonstrated ability to assimilate into Spanish culture be privileged over others.[43] So although explicit references to immigration are not as plentiful within Vox party discourse as some other far-right parties in Western Europe, their anti-immigrant agenda is still at the forefront of their party rhetoric as advanced through nativist ideology that calls for the prioritization of the so-called Spanish national way of life. It should be noted that the emphasis on nativist rhetoric

Top Five Issues in 2019 Electoral Program	**Percent of Document**
National way of life: positive	10.3
Law and order: positive	9.5
Immigration negative/assimilation	8.8
Traditional morality: positive	7.9
Welfare state: expansion	7.5

Table 2.1: Top Five Most Salient Categories in Vox Electoral Program (2019) Based on MARPOR data.

[42] Rama et al.
[43] Rama et al.

within the Vox manifesto far outpaces the manifestos of far-right parties in other European countries, indicating the extreme nature of this approach both within the Spanish context and abroad.[44]

Beyond the Vox electoral program, the party's ideology and political priorities are evidenced through the statements of its leaders. For any political party, speeches and other public statements are critically important to the dissemination of political ideas and the solicitation of public support. This is particularly true for political groups who rely upon emotion to galvanize their audiences. Reflecting this, the political speeches of Vox's leaders use evocative language to convincingly sell their political agenda. Through analyzing these speeches, we can learn not only what Vox advocates, but *how* exactly they go about advocating it. Francisco de Borja Navarro and Aiden Yeh conducted one such analysis in their investigation into the discursive practices used within the May 2021 closing campaign speech by Vox leader Santiago Abascal during the Madrid elections. In their analysis of the 30-minute, televised address, Navarro and Yeh discovered the use of several themes that speak to Vox's ideas about nationalism and immigration. Overarchingly, Vox's ideological narrative is structured around the creation of an "us" vs. "them" binary, whether that binary is Vox versus Catalan separatists, Vox versus socialists, or Vox versus the immigrant. It is within this view of immigration, however, that Vox makes a somewhat unexpected choice in their distinction of who is "us" and who is "them." Initially, Abascal's speech unabashedly advocates the deportation of undocumented immigrants and invokes racialized fears over undocumented minors from Africa—a tactic which was also utilized by Vox in a controversial national billboard campaign—who he refers to as delinquents. Despite this xenophobic rhetoric, Abascal goes on later in the same speech to extend a welcome

[44] Rama et al.

to Latin American "compatriots" who wish to immigrate to Spain. Although initially puzzling, this seeming contradiction is in fact consistent with Vox's ideology and vision for the future of Spain. By differentiating Latin American immigrants from those who come from Africa, Asia, or the Middle East, Vox portrays Latin America as an extension of Spain; this rhetoric establishes former Spanish colonies as a diasporic extension of the Spanish people. Not only does this implication contribute to the idea of the Spanish ethnostate that is desirable to Vox, but it alludes to a time when the Spanish Empire ruled massive amounts of global territory through colonization. By invoking this history, Vox convinces its supporters that the party could actually "make Spain great again," as their slogan claims.[45]

Speeches and party manifestos offer primary evidence of a party's political agenda and overall ideology. However, the way that a party portrays itself is only part of the narrative in a democratic political environment. After all, it is the public decides fate of political parties on election day. It is not merely relevant how a party explicitly represents itself, but also how that party's ideas are received by the public and referred to in the course of general political discussion. In the modern political landscape, much of this public discourse takes place on social media platforms such as Twitter. A recent study of anti-immigrant hate speech and Vox support on Twitter confirmed that Vox's nativist rhetoric is, at minimum, being interpreted online to be supportive of a xenophobic ideology. This analysis confirmed that Vox is closely tied to anti-immigrant nationalism, offensive language towards immigrants, and even direct incitements to violence on Twitter. Further, these digital conversations highlighted the islamophobia that is

[45] Francisco de Borja Navarro and Aiden Yeh, "The Dangerous Discourse of 'Us' vs. 'Them:' Spain's VOX Discursive Practices," *Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics* {"content-type":"ahead-of-print","content":0}, no. 0 (September 30, 2022), https://doi.org/10.2478/jnmlp-2022-0005.

rampant within Vox (and much of the European far-right), as Muslim immigrants were found to be frequent targets of anti-immigrant hate speech on Twitter.[46]

Voting for Vox: What motivates far-right support amongst Spanish voters?

Despite the repeated failure of a far-right party to gain traction in modern Spain, Vox was able to leverage fears over Catalonian separatism to build an enthusiastic nationalist base of support that carried them to a sudden national prominence. Although the impetus for this shift and the political impact of Vox have become clearer throughout the course of this chapter, an important question remains unanswered: Who are Vox's voters? Similar to the different theories that attempt to explain anti-immigrant sentiment, scholars have proposed various frameworks for understanding far-right support among voters. Thus far, this chapter has emphasized the role of issue salience in the development of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Beyond merely linking issue salience to anti-immigration politics, some scholars attribute the increasing support for the populist far-right across Europe to the growing salience of immigration, thus rejecting competing theories that focus on issues like crime or terrorism.[47] Although the linkage between the issue salience of immigration and the rise of Vox in Spain is strong, this explanation fails to address individual-level Vox support. Insofar as salience is a generally consistent variable throughout the Spanish political landscape, there are clearly other factors that motivate some to become Vox supporters, while others are unconvinced. As this thesis is ultimately concerned with investigating the impact of subnational identity on attitudes towards immigrants and

[46] Carlos Arcila Calderón, Gonzalo de la Vega, and David Blanco Herrero, "Topic Modeling and Characterization of Hate Speech against Immigrants on Twitter around the Emergence of a Far-Right Party in Spain," *Social Sciences* 9, no. 11 (November 2020): 188, https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci9110188.
[47] James Dennison, "How Issue Salience Explains the Rise of the Populist Right in Western Europe," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 32, no. 3 (September 1, 2020): 397–420, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edz022.

immigration, assessing the shared qualities of voters for an anti-immigration political party is critical.

Fortunately, the legwork of determining which characteristics predict who will become Vox voters has already carried out it.[48] This quantitative research yielded a handful of very intriguing discoveries, some of which contradicted the conventional understanding of far-right support in 21st century Europe. Conforming to the European norm, middle-aged men exhibited the highest propensity to support Vox. Defying this norm, however, the study found that urban dwelling, higher-educated voters were more likely than their rural and/or uneducated counterparts to cast a vote for Vox in 2019. Additionally, the findings of this study contradicted the theory that economic hardship predicts far-right support, as the relationship between income and support for Vox was found to be positive.[49] Most importantly, Turnbull-Dugarte et al. found a demonstrable link between nationalist identity and voting for Vox in 2019. According to Turnbull-Dugarte et al., "nationalism clearly had an influential role in predicting support for VOX, with identification with a Spanish identity (vis-à-vis a more plurinational or regional identity) exhibiting a substantively important and statistically significant increase in the PTV (probability to vote) for Vox."[50] However, the authors found that the association between nationalist identity and Vox support was conditioned by respondents' negative evaluation of the political situation in Spain, which makes sense given the role of the 2017 constitutional crisis in Vox's political emergence.[51] The discovery of this link illustrates the role of Spanish nationalism within Vox's recent political success and begins to bring into focus the intersection of subnational identity, far-right support, and attitudes towards immigrants.

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[48] Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama, and Santana, "The Baskerville's Dog Suddenly Started Barking."
[49] Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama, and Santana.
[50] Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama, and Santana.
[51] Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama, and Santana.

Regional Distribution of Vox support

Vox's Spanish nationalist, far-right platform has successfully gained a dedicated following and shaken up the Spanish political landscape. Unsurprisingly, its political success has not been consistent across Spain. Just as Vox first found success among the politically disillusioned voters of Andalusia, support for the party has taken hold at different rates in different Autonomous Communities. In the regional government of Madrid, the party has amassed substantial political influence, though not necessarily through the most direct avenue. In the regional parliament, or *La Asamblea de Madrid*, Vox currently holds only 13 out of 136 seats. With this number, Vox constitutes the fourth most represented party in the governing body.[52] However, the true influence of the party is not illustrated through their seats in government, but rather through the pressure they have put on more traditional parties to cater to their radical interests. For example, while the regional President—Isabel Díaz Ayuso—belongs to the traditionally conservative Partido Popular (PP), she has consistently been willing to cater to the interests of Vox to achieve her political goals. In doing this, she has legitimized Vox's rhetoric and openly borrowed from Vox's extremist ideology to curry favor with the party's supporters. When criticized for deviating from the mainstream conservatism of her party, President Ayuso has been unconcerned, going so far as to say, "when they call you a fascist, you know you're doing something right."[53] This strategy paid off, as Ayuso and the Partido Popular won huge victories in the subsequent snap election. Thus, the mainstream response to the entrance of Vox into the Madrilenian political sphere has been for the conservative parties to grow closer to Vox in the hopes of stealing back some supporters and facilitating compromises on the political right

[52] "Parliamentary Groups - Asamblea de Madrid," accessed April 18, 2023, https://www.asambleamadrid.es/en/composicion/grupos-parlamentarios.
[53] "Spain's Pop Polarizer: The Unlikely Rise of Isabel Díaz Ayuso," *POLITICO* (blog), June 13, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/isabel-diaz-ayuso-profile-spain-madrid-pop-polarizer-unlikely-rise/.

– even if that means shifting into far-right territory. While somewhat of a surprising move, this political tactic is not entirely unexpected, given the recent hold of the conservative PP over the Community of Madrid and the fact that Madrid (a rival of Barcelona and the historic home of the Spanish identity) seems a naturally receptive audience to Vox's Spanish nationalist message.

Given that Spanish nationalism is diffused throughout Vox's platform, and the reality that Vox's success was born out of opposition to Catalonian separatism, one might expect that Vox would struggle to gain any support at all among Catalonian voters. Surprisingly, this is not the case. Per the results of the 2021 Catalonian elections, Vox enjoys the fourth most seats of any party in the Parliament of Catalonia, putting Vox in the middle of the eight parties who have representatives in the regional government. However, Vox is only a hair ahead of the next most popular parties in Catalonia, having control of 11 out of 135 seats while the left-wing parties *Candidatura d'Unitat Popular* (Popular Unity Candidacy) and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (Republican Left of Catalonia) fall right behind with nine and eight seats respectively. Notably, Vox has failed to capture the anti-separatist vote in Catalonia, as the Socialists' Party of Catalonia (PSC), a party which is pro-Spanish unionism, is tied for a plurality of votes in the Catalan Parliament at 33 seats.[54] Finally, it is a compelling possibility that Vox's level of support in Catalonia is more so driven by non-Catalan residents of the major urban center of Barcelona than by any real success on the part of Vox to build support among Catalan-identified voters. Though Vox's level of representation in Catalonia trails only slightly behind that of Madrid, there is no evidence to indicate that the presence of Vox has impacted the values and rhetoric of the mainstream parties in the region, indicating the party's diminished political influence in the Catalonian context.

[54] "Resultats Electorals," Processos electorals, accessed December 20, 2022, http://eleccions.gencat.cat/ca/resultats-electorals/.

Sub-state Nationalism and Political Parties in Catalonia

Although there is certainly empirical value contained within an analysis which compares Vox support between Madrid and Catalonia, this comparison would be hindered by the fact that Vox's far-right platform is built around a *Spanish* nationalist agenda. It is very plausible—if not likely—that some voters who may agree with Vox's views on issues of immigration or social conservatism balk at their demonization of plurinational/subnational identities, even though they may have otherwise cast a vote for the party. Therefore, it would be methodologically inappropriate to conclude this investigation into the political salience of immigration in the context of nationalist, far-right parties at an analysis of Vox, without also investigating the political platforms and public support of Catalonian nationalist parties.

Catalan nationalism is a prominent component of Catalonian politics, particularly in the wake of the 2017 secession attempt and the corresponding political fallout. However, nationalism in Catalonia looks a bit different from the Spanish nationalism, as Catalonian nationalist parties come from the left-wing rather than from the right. Political opponents to this left-wing nationalism have not generally formulated right-wing nationalist movements, but rather, have deemphasized Catalonian nationalism and issues of identity altogether. One such example is the *Ciudadanos* (Citizens) party, which was founded in Catalonia in 2006. This anti-separatist, center-right party was founded as an alternative home for those from a range of political backgrounds who opposed Catalonian nationalism and pro-Catalan independence parties on the Left. Overall, the party was critical of the growing importance of identity in regional politics and the administrative privileging of nation-building initiatives throughout Catalonia. However, this counter to Catalonian nationalism did not offer a counter nationalism, but rather appealed to both those who held Spanish identities or equally Spanish/Catalan

identities and did not support secessionism. While Ciudadanos was initially a small regional party, the economic fallout of the Great Recession and a growing dissatisfaction with traditional Left-Right parties slowly and steadily pulled more centrist voters under Ciudadanos' umbrella. By 2015, Ciudadanos was able to advance candidates in every region of Spain. Back in Catalonia, political indications of the upcoming secessionist vote inflamed tensions over separatism, helping Ciudadanos grow to be a real contender among more established parties in Catalonia.[55]

Comparing Spanish and Catalonian Nationalist Movements

Much of this chapter has been devoted to an analysis of the far-right in Spain; specifically, I have heavily focused this analysis on the role of right-wing party Vox in the modern Spanish political landscape, especially as this pertains to attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. This focus was not a result of tunnel vision, but rather, reflective of the impact Vox has made on Spanish politics since the party's rise to prominence. Yet, this right-wing mobilization has not impacted Catalonian politics. While Vox's nativist and Spanish nationalist ideology inform a far-right platform which eschews social progressivism and socialist politics, Catalonian nationalist political parties (while sometimes populist) are left-wing. Even the parties which advocate Catalonian independence without advancing an openly nationalist rhetoric fall on the left side of the political spectrum. Therefore, it is not only notable that the first far-right party to gain widespread support in Spain is one which espouses Spanish nationalism, but it is equally notable that Catalonians have not since responded with a right-wing nationalist political

[55] Juan Rodríguez Teruel and Astrid Barrio, "Going National: Ciudadanos from Catalonia to Spain," *South European Society and Politics* 21, no. 4 (October 1, 2016): 587–607, https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2015.1119646.

force to counter the influence of Vox in the region. This bolsters the argument made by some experts in the field that the far-right networks established by the Franco regime never truly disappeared in Spain, and that Franco-era extremism has been camouflaged within the traditional right in Spain since the democratic transition, seeking a politically fertile opportunity to emerge.[56] That political opportunity presented itself when the Catalonian constitutional crisis stoked fears among Spanish nationalists that sub-state nations presented a threat to the Spanish national way of life.

It is clear that Spanish and Catalonian nationalisms are propagated very differently in their respective political spheres. As mentioned, Catalonian nationalism is left-wing, while Spanish nationalism comes from the far-right. But what does this mean, specifically, in regard to their stances on immigration? Table 2.2 compares statements from recent years that were made by each nationalist party (or a representative) on the issue of illegal immigration in Spain. As is made clear through these examples, Catalonian nationalist parties are very friendly to immigrants, seek progressive policies which facilitate migration, have substantial concern for the provision of basic services to migrant populations, and do not use race or ethnicity to privilege certain migrants over others. Conversely, Vox's rhetoric around immigration is one that relies upon racism and fear and reflects hostility towards immigrants from many backgrounds.

[56] Xidias, "Vox: The Revival of the Far Right in Spain."

Nationalism	Party	Statement on Immigration
Catalonian	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia)	"We will bring parliamentary initiatives [to grant full rights for migrants] to the Congress because we have had enough with administrative irregularity! No one should be illegal." – Maria Dantas, Member, Congreso de Diputados[57]
Catalonian	Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (Popular Unity Candidacy)	"That the immigrant detention centers will never open again, and that never again will a person be illegal" – Mireia Vehí, Member, Congreso de Diputados[58]
Spanish	Vox	"Any immigrant who has entered Spain illegally will be unable, for life, to legalize their situation and therefore to receive any help from the administration" – Vox manifesto, page 5[59]

Table 2.2: Political Statements Regarding Undocumented Immigration to Spain.

Conclusion

The changing politics of immigration in Europe have yielded many interesting insights into political behaviors and their causes. In particular, the widespread surge in popular support for anti-immigration, far-right parties has produced curiosity among academics. It is through the research of these phenomena that the academic community has arrived at new theories regarding the causes of xenophobia and extremism in the modern world. For years, the Spanish case defied many of these theories, creating a new source of academic intrigue in the country's stubborn

[57] "Esquerra Republicana Presents a Series of Measures to Protect and Regularize Migrants," accessed December 21, 2022, https://en.esquerra.cat/en/measures-migration-erc-esquerra.
[58] *Extracto Intervención de La Diputada Mireia Vehi Sobre Inmigración y CIEs*, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bmAs4SgdZSw.
[59] Rama et al., *VOX*.

resistance to the norm. Even now that a far-right party has emerged and ended the notion of the Iberian exception, Vox's strong nativist rhetoric continues to distinguish the party from its ideological counterparts in Western Europe. For the purposes of this thesis, the case of Vox offers an opportunity to assess the relationship between nationalism/sub-state nationalism, the far-right, and attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. As this chapter has demonstrated, *there is a relationship between national/subnational identity and support for the far-right in Spain.* Those with a Spanish identity who had a negative perception of the political environment in Spain were more likely to vote for Vox in the 2019 national elections. Further, Vox's Spanish nationalist rhetoric holds significant weight within the conservative regional government of Madrid, while Catalonian nationalist parties are exclusively leftist and openly welcoming of immigrants. In the next chapter, I will assess the different approaches to policymaking in Madrid and Catalonia and determine whether disparate approaches to immigrant integration could indicate a second regional disparity in attitudes towards immigrants and immigration between the two Autonomous Communities.

Chapter 3: *Policy*
Immigrant Incorporation Policy and Aggregate Elite Attitudes in Spain

Introduction

Thus far, this thesis has investigated the impact of sub-state national identity on popular attitudes towards immigrants by measuring attitudes as they are expressed through political rhetoric and mobilization. The rise of *Vox* and the asymmetrical invocation of xenophobic rhetoric between Madrid and Catalonia reflects attitudes as they are represented in regional politics and reveals a tentative relationship between the Catalan identity and pro-immigrant/immigration attitudes. Now that I have addressed popular attitudes through this metric, Chapter Three will measure aggregate elite attitudes towards immigrants and immigration by assessing the presence and content of regional immigrant policies in Madrid and Catalonia. In doing this, I will neither claim that policy outcomes are a proxy for regional attitudes, nor will I extrapolate from elite attitudes to make sweeping claims about the attitudes of the public. Rather, I will establish the link between elite attitudes and policy outcomes and consider how an interregional disparity in elite attitudes could add to the mounting evidence that sub-state national identity exercises a meaningful impact over popular attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.

While—as is fundamental to this chapter's empirical contribution—policy outcomes can reflect elite attitudes, they are not a *direct* reflection. Elite attitudes are not directly translated into policy, whether at the individual level or in aggregation. Between these two variables lies a critical intermediary: policy preferences. The relationship between attitudes, policy preferences, and policy outcomes can be represented as a paradigm (Figure 3.1). Attitudes constitute the foundation from which the other two categories derive their inspiration. However, not all

attitudes go on to inform policy preferences. Attitudes might not become preferences for any number of reasons, including a conflict between attitudes and political philosophy or policy priorities. For example, a legislator could conceivably have a negative attitude towards homosexual couples, but not include anti-gay legislation in their policy preferences due to their belief in small government. In aggregation, this means that some popular attitudes among lawmakers do not make their way into law. Despite the fact that not all attitudes go on to inform preferences, all policy preferences are influenced by aggregate attitudes.

Moreover, not all aggregate preferences are faithfully reflected in policy outcomes. Once legislators have formulated a preference, policies still must be conceptualized, designed, written, receive sufficient support, and voted on in order for a preference to move into the final category



Figure 3.1: The Relationship Between Aggregate Elite Attitudes and Policy Outcomes

of the paradigm. Accordingly, there are many elite attitudes which are unrepresented in policy outcomes, as they have been filtered out at some other point in the formation of preferences or policy. As such, it would be misleading to assume that policy outcomes offer a mirror image of

aggregate elite attitudes. Instead, this chapter merely claims that regional policy reflects aggregate elite attitudes, even if that reflection may not show the full picture. Further, the central claim of this chapter is that the disparity between the regional immigration policies in Catalonia and Madrid supports the notion that sub-state national identity impacts attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Even though policy outcomes represent only the attitudes of elites, a noticeable difference in elite attitudes provides compelling evidence that sub-state national identity is linked to the formation of attitudes.

Often, a significant barrier in conducting credible analyses of policy outcomes is the fact that different political systems legislate in different ways. Policymaking functions very differently across different states due to varying political climates, party landscapes, and legislative structures. Analyses which attempt to make policy comparisons across governments then have the often-insurmountable task of controlling for exogenous variables such as partisan gridlock or procedural differences between political processes. The advantage of comparing two regions within the same country is that many of the confounding variables which stem from international comparison are mitigated. By comparing Catalonia and Madrid, this thesis diminishes the role of outside factors; both of these regions are home to major European cities, are tasked with governing a large and diverse population, and wield significant political influence within the broader Spanish context. Therefore, this analysis attains a level of empirical legitimacy which is unusual in analyses of policy outcomes in comparative politics.

Immigrant Integration: Disparate Ideologies and Applications

Closely tied to immigration policy is the study of immigrant incorporation, and the disparate ideological approaches which underpin policy approaches in this policy area.

Generally, incorporation strategies are categorized by scholars into one of two models: assimilationist or multiculturalist. Under the assimilationist model, immigrant incorporation is accomplished when immigrants fully adopt the dominant culture and norms such that minority groups are essentially identical to the cultural majority. This framework favors a cohesive, monocultural society. In contrast, the multicultural model prioritizes cultural plurality. Immigrant incorporation under a multicultural framework encourages the preservation of immigrant cultures during the incorporation process and values cultural diversity within society.[60] For example, an assimilationist society might require that immigrants demonstrate host-culture language proficiency, while a multiculturalist society might actively provide language accommodations to immigrants. While these models may often take shape in the political and cultural spheres, they are most clearly evidenced in the policy outcomes of a state or region.

In the context of Western Europe, the differences between these two models have been a major focus of the scholarship of the past 30 years. In large part, this is because of an observed shift away from multiculturalist incorporation styles to more assimilationist policy and rhetoric. This shift is best exemplified, and most often discussed, by the example of the Netherlands. In her article examining the Dutch departure from the multiculturalist model, migration scholar Ellie Vasta discusses the evidence, origins, and implications of this shift. As explained by Vasta, the Netherlands are an apt case study to explore the growing assimilationist trend in Europe, due to the country's rapid reversal of a traditionally accepting incorporation strategy that was largely a result of public outcry and right-wing populist mobilization. She argues that the changes to the Dutch approach were rooted in the perception that the multiculturalist framework had failed and

[60] Dan Rodríguez-García, "Beyond Assimilation and Multiculturalism: A Critical Review of the Debate on Managing Diversity," *Journal of International Migration and Integration / Revue de l'integration et de La Migration Internationale* 11, no. 3 (August 2010): 251–71, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-010-0140-x.

that social and cultural cohesion was being destroyed in the Netherlands as a result of the culturally tolerant Dutch integration policies.[61] This case is often used by migration scholars to support arguments that assimilationism is on the rise across Europe, specifically in regard to islamophobia and the growing influence of the populist right.[62]

Amidst this period of policy shift, many scholars have weighed in on the benefits and pitfalls of both models. Rather than advocate for one framework over another, some scholars have argued that a blended model is the most effective strategy for integrating immigrant groups into a larger society. Anthropologist Dan Rodríguez-García makes this argument in his article "Beyond Assimilation and Multiculturalism: A Critical Review of the Debate on Managing Diversity." In his work, Rodríguez-Garcia assesses the central critiques of both models using various examples from the past two decades. While an assimilationist approach often diverts from the goal of societal cohesion into an oppressive and discriminatory regime that eventually prompts civil unrest (such as in the case of France in the late 90s and early 2000s), the multiculturalist approach can produce a similar system of oppression and exclusion based on culture or national origin. This result stems from the fact that certain foreign cultures are inherently privileged in any given host society, due to factors such as the history of the host culture, shared religious or cultural norms, or the racial background of the immigrant group. Therefore, cultures that do not enjoy privilege in their host society often end up ostracized under the multiculturalist model that does not necessarily value cross-cultural engagement to match the value placed on cultural pluralism. Lastly, Rodríguez-García points out how this hands-off

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[61] Ellie Vasta, "From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy: Multiculturalism and the Shift to Assimilationism in the Netherlands," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30, no. 5 (September 2007): 713–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870701491770.

[62] Terri E. Givens, "Immigrant Integration in Europe: Empirical Research," *Annual Review of Political Science* 10, no. 1 (2007): 67–83, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.062404.162347.

approach to incorporation also risks ignoring the marginalization of certain groups within various immigrant cultures, such as the oppression of women within certain religious communities.[63]

In acknowledgement of the failings present within the theoretical and practical iterations of both the assimilationist and multiculturalist models, Rodríguez-García argues the merits of a blended, *interculturalist* framework. This model combines the cultural tolerance of the multicultural lens with the civic engagement and societal cohesion prioritized in the assimilationist view. When effectively employed, this approach can lead to a diverse, civically engaged society that is able to navigate cultural conflict peacefully.[64] This model challenges the traditional binary view of incorporation strategy, arguing instead that many facets of these models are not mutually exclusive. As this chapter will describe, this hybrid lens is particularly useful in understanding how sub-state nations craft inclusive immigration policy while mitigating concerns regarding cultural dilution.

Spanish Territorial Devolution

Prior to investigating the status of regional immigrant policy in the Spanish Autonomous Communities, it is useful to first have a background on the features of governance which allow for regional policymaking within the Spanish state. The semi-federalist governmental structure in Spain is a product of the multinational origins of the country; the Iberian Peninsula has long been home to a variety of cultures and languages, stemming from the region's origins as a collection of various kingdoms. These different regional cultures and ethnicities have been formally

[63] Dan Rodríguez-García, "Beyond Assimilation and Multiculturalism: A Critical Review of the Debate on Managing Diversity," *Journal of International Migration and Integration / Revue de l'integration et de La Migration Internationale* 11, no. 3 (August 2010): 251–71, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-010-0140-x.
[64] (Rodríguez-García 2010)

recognized in Spain for nearly two centuries now, originally as provinces in 1833.[65] Under the rule of Francisco Franco in the 20th century, official recognition of these regions was withdrawn, with the Franco regime harshly repressing the minority languages and cultures through the passage of repressive laws and the mandated distribution of anti-minority propaganda.[66] After the death of Franco, during the Spanish democratic transition in the mid to late 1970s, this experience fueled demands on the part of three sub-state nations which had been granted autonomous status under Spain's Second Republic in the 1930's—Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia—that they be afforded explicit protections of their autonomy within the newly crafted Spanish Constitution.[67] While these three regions were originally the only nations which were awarded the status of autonomous community, the provisions within the Spanish 1978 Constitution technically allowed for any region to obtain this same designation. Therefore, the original three were quickly joined by Andalusia and, later, each region of Spain eventually obtained, or joined with a nearby province to obtain, the rights associated with the status and title of autonomous community, even though this had originally been designed as a measure to appease the Catalan, Basque, and Galician peoples. Thus began the process of territorial devolution in Spain that gave a degree of autonomy to regional governments and came to define the modern organization of Spanish society.[68]

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[65] Clark, "Territorial Devolution as a Strategy to Resolve Ethnic Conflict: Basque Self-Governance in Spain's Autonomous Community System."
[66] Henry Miller and Kate Miller, "Language Policy and Identity: The Case of Catalonia," *International Studies in Sociology of Education* 6, no. 1 (January 1996): 113–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/0962021960060106.
[67] Clark, "Territorial Devolution as a Strategy to Resolve Ethnic Conflict: Basque Self-Governance in Spain's Autonomous Community System."
[68]

Immigration Policy in Spain: History and Development

In the wake of the democratic transition, the redesigned Spanish state was tasked with navigating many newfound challenges, across the cultural, political, and policymaking spheres. Beyond these hurdles and the overall political upheaval of this period in Spanish history, the late 20th century in Spain also ushered in a changing immigration landscape for the Spanish state. Prior to the mid-1980s, Spain's role in the global network of migration was as an exporter of labor; Spain was a country defined by emigration.[69] While this tide began to turn in the 1980s, the most notable increase in immigration to Spain began at the turn of the 21st century. Between 1998 and 2002, the number of annual immigrants to Spain increased more than seven-fold, from 57,195 to 443,085. By 2006, the number had risen to 802,971 immigrants per year (Figure 3.2).[70] As should be noted, these numbers are an underestimate for the actual inflow of international migrants to Spain, since those who entered the country illegally are likely excluded from the official statistics. In large part, this dramatic increase can be attributed to the economic appeal of Spain as an immigrant destination. Due to the booming economy of the early 2000s, job creation in Spain soared. However, Spanish workers were not able to meet the high demand for labor due to the decline in birth rates beginning in the late 1970s and the low unemployment preceding the economic boom.[71]

[69] Bruquetas-Callejo et al., "Immigration and Integration Policymaking in Spain."
[70] Bruquetas-Callejo et al.
[71] Ricard Zapata-Barrero, *Diversity Management in Spain: New Dimensions, New Challenges* (Manchester University Press, 2015).



Figure 3.2: Annual Immigration to Spain 1998-2006
Based on data from *Estadistica de Variaciones Residenciales* (Statistics of Residential Movements) INE

Spanish efforts to legislate on the issue of immigration parallel the emergence of Spain as a popular immigrant destination. As the inflow of immigrants began to pick up in the 1980s, the need for legislation which legally organized the reception of immigrants in Spain became pressing, for both practical and political purposes; the nascent Spanish democratic state needed to legislate on the matter of immigration in order to maintain societal order and prove to its European neighbors that the Spanish state was at a sufficient level of sophistication to be admitted to the European Union (at that time, the European Community). As such, Spain's first laws pertaining to the reception of asylum-seekers and immigrants were passed in 1984 and 1985, respectively, and Spain was fully admitted to the European Union in 1986.[72] These laws established a baseline from which to construct the legal framework for the treatment of foreigners in Spain, as well as the opportunity to restrict immigration if desired.

[72] Bruquetas-Callejo et al., "Immigration and Integration Policymaking in Spain."

I would be remiss to move on from this period in the history of Spanish immigration policy and exclude mention of the role of the Constitutional Court in determining the legal positionality of immigrants in Spanish society. Since the new Spanish Constitution was less than a decade old when both the Law on Asylum (*Reguladora del Derecho de los Extranjeros en España*) and the Foreigner's Law (*Orgánica de Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en España*) were passed, the Constitutional Court was still in the process of considering the Constitutional view of the rights of immigrants in Spain. In 1984, the Court considered which of the rights outlined in Title I of the 1978 Constitution were intended to be extended to foreigners residing in Spain. The Court ultimately concluded that many of the most basic rights contained within Title I (freedom of expression, right to life, etc.) were to be extended to immigrants and refugees. However, not all political rights (such as the right to vote) were determined to apply to non-citizens. Outside of these two categories, the Court determined that other rights should be extended on a conditional basis depending on the particular legal status of the foreign resident in question.[73] This ruling proved vital in laying the legal foundation from which Spain began to build a set of policies regulating immigration and governing the status of immigrants in Spanish society.

After Spain's initial foray into immigration policymaking in the 1980s, the 1990s saw a second wave of policy attention for the issue of migration in Spain; due to the accession of Spain to the European Union in 1986 and the accompanying status of Spain as an exterior border of the EU, the country was faced with the task of thoroughly regulating non-EU immigration to Spain.[74] During this same time, increasing calls from the Left to create a path to legal residency

[73] Bruquetas-Callejo et al.
[74] Désirée Kleiner-Liebau, *Migration and the Construction of National Identity in Spain* (Iberoamericana Editorial, 2009).

for undocumented immigrants prompted the Spanish Congress revisited the issue of immigration in 1991, with the goal of developing a more comprehensive plan for immigrant incorporation. The path to legal status which stemmed from this lawmaking permitted tens of thousands of undocumented immigrants to obtain legal status in Spain within a year of implementation. Throughout the 1990s, subsequent policy initiatives built upon this progress, regulating processes such as family reunification and clarifying the extension of social rights to immigrants.[75] The most important development in immigration policy during this period was merely the recognition that immigration had become a salient policy issue in Spain that would only continue to grow in relevance. As the Spanish government continued to further regulate immigration, they also acknowledged the structural implications of immigration on Spanish society. Moving into the 21st century, this shift in perspective paved the way for policymakers to finally legislate on the issue of immigrant incorporation.[76]

As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the conversion of Spain from a country of emigration to one of immigration intensified during the early 2000s. Logically, this precipitous rise in the number of immigrants residing in Spain was accompanied by a changing political and social awareness of immigrants and immigration. While the sheer volume of immigrants to Spain would, in and of itself, explain some increase in the social consciousness of immigration among citizens, this shift in awareness seems to have been a direct result of the changing demographic of the foreign residents of Spain. While in 1996, EU immigrants accounted for 46% of all foreign residents of Spain, by 2006 this proportion had dropped to a mere 21.9%, with Morocco taking the lead to become the most common country of origin among immigrants to Spain.[77] This shift

[75] Bruquetas-Callejo et al., "Immigration and Integration Policymaking in Spain."
[76] Kleiner-Liebau, *Migration and the Construction of National Identity in Spain*.
[77] Kleiner-Liebau.

amplified the visibility of immigration, as racial and religious differences created more salient cultural cleavages between North African immigrants and native Spaniards. As a result, this period in Spanish policymaking was marked by an emphasis on border security, specifically as it concerned the Southern tip of the Iberian Peninsula. This continued until 2004, when the progressive PSOE (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*) party won control of the Spanish Congress from the conservative PP (*Partido Popular*). Under the new government, the narrative surrounding immigration in Spain shifted to center more around the labor market and its capacity to accept immigrants. Ultimately, these concerns over security and economic prosperity continued to define the issue of immigration in Spain for years to come, even as immigration rates continued to increase throughout the country.[78]

Chapter Two of this thesis outlined the changing political implications of immigration in Spain and the recent amplification of xenophobic political rhetoric, particularly by the Spanish far-right party *Vox*. While the political rhetoric surrounding this issue has clearly shifted since Spain first became an immigrant destination, the policy landscape for issues of immigration and immigrant incorporation has been remarkably stable for decades. Since the first attempts to legislate on the issue of immigration in the 1980s, immigrant policymaking in Spain has adhered to an assimilationist model. Whether through lengthy residence requirements for naturalization or by offering priority to migrants from former Spanish colonies, the Spanish policy on immigration is almost a surviving remnant of the Francoist regime's obsession with cultural homogeny. In particular, the continuing political support for policies which favor migrants from Latin America illustrate the surviving strength of Franco-era ethnonationalism within the Spanish

[78] Zapata-Barrero, *Diversity Management in Spain*.

central state.[79] Since Franco's legacy was able to influence the initial waves of policymaking on the issue of immigration in Spain, path dependence ensured that assimilationism would still underpin immigration policy in Spain for decades to come.[80] Now, this is neither to say that an assimilationist framework is necessarily exclusionary, nor that assimilationist measures in Spain have faced no opposition. In fact, many attempts were made throughout the early 2000s to extend a path to citizenship for those working in Spain and even provide funding to regional governments to help settle migrants in their communities.[81] Further, political efforts have been made in the past decade to combat exclusionary assimilationism, such as attempts by PSOE to reduce the years of residency required for naturalization. Similarly, in 2015, when the PP introduced a requirement that foreigners pass an exam on Spanish language and culture to become naturalized, they faced strong opposition from PSOE.[82] In general, immigration policymaking in Spain continues to be closely tied to economic health and the fluctuating demand for foreign labor.[83]

With a policy history which chiefly addresses border security and economic health, and an assimilationist framework which only recently has begun to face any meaningful multiculturalist opponents, Spain's immigration policy has a history which is truly unique in the European context. However, what makes immigration policy most interesting in the Spanish context is how policy responsibilities are dispersed to the regional governments, or the

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[79] Roxana Barbulescu, *Migrant Integration in a Changing Europe: Immigrants, European Citizens, and Co-Ethnics in Italy and Spain* (University of Notre Dame Pess, 2019).
[80] João Miguel Duarte de Carvalho, "Immigrants' Acquisition of National Citizenship in Portugal and Spain: The Role of Multiculturalism?," *Citizenship Studies* 24, no. 2 (February 17, 2020): 228–46, https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2019.1707483.
[81] Kleiner-Liebau, *Migration and the Construction of National Identity in Spain*.
[82] Carvalho, "Immigrants' Acquisition of National Citizenship in Portugal and Spain."
[83] "Spain: Government Adapts Immigration Law to Include Migrant Workers in the Labour Market | European Website on Integration," September 5, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/spain-government-adapts-immigration-law-include-migrant-workers-labour-market_en.

autonomous communities. As outlined earlier in this chapter, the decentralization of powers permitted through the creation of the autonomous communities allows for regional governments to craft their own policy approaches to certain issues. In the case of immigration, the omission of reference to immigration in the 1978 Spanish Constitution, by default, left the big-picture aspects of immigration policy in the hands of the central government (such as nationality, asylum, foreigners' rights, and border administration).[84] However, control over immigrant incorporation was effectively left to the regional governments as it came to be considered an extension of social services.[85] As I will explore through the example of Catalonia, this division of power has proven to be a source of conflict as regional governments push the boundaries of their Constitutional authority on the issue of immigration. Despite their right to exercise regional control over immigrant incorporation, not every autonomous community has elected to navigate this policy sphere in the same fashion. In fact, only three of them—Catalonia, Valencia, and Castilla y León—have passed laws governing the treatment of international migrants within their region.[86] The other 14 autonomous communities thus navigate the issue through a less-formalized set of procedures or simply cede to the policy approach of the central government. The subsequent sections will explore the processes in place for immigrant incorporation in the autonomous communities of Madrid and Catalonia and consider how their differences could shed light on disparities between aggregate elite attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in each region.

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[84] Barbulescu, *Migrant Integration in a Changing Europe*.
[85] Zapata-Barrero, *Diversity Management in Spain*.
[86] Christina Isabel Zuber, *Ideational Legacies and the Politics of Migration in European Minority Regions* (Oxford University Press, 2022).

Immigration in Madrid: Regional Integration Plans

This thesis is based around a comparative analysis of the Autonomous Communities of Catalonia and Madrid. In constructing this comparison, it is therefore established that the Community of Madrid is being considered as separate from the Spanish central government, which is based out of the capital city of Madrid. While this distinction has been critical in the analyses advanced in Chapters 2 and 3, the boundary between the Community of Madrid and the central government of Spain becomes obfuscated when we turn to the issue of immigration incorporation. In large part, this is because this issue is one where the distinction between sub-state nations and regions without sub-state identities becomes very important. Since the responsibility over matters related to immigration are split between the central government and the autonomous communities, Spanish regions without a distinctive regional identity may not have much cause to deviate significantly from the state level approach to immigrant incorporation. This is particularly true when considering the political trajectory explored in Chapter Two, which indicated the recency in which immigration has even become a politically salient issue in the Spanish context. With this said, this chapter will only briefly discuss the actions of the Community of Madrid on the issue of immigrant incorporation, due to the mere fact that they are far less extensive than the approach taken at the regional level in Catalonia. While Catalonian leaders have chosen to work aggressively to advance a uniquely Catalonian approach to immigrant incorporation, the same distinction has not been clearly drawn between the approach of Madrid and that of the Spanish state.

While non-extensive compared to the regions which have passed legislation governing the incorporation of immigrants into their communities, the Community of Madrid has instituted a series of institutions and plans to direct the process of incorporation. The region's first plan

Integration Plan (*Plan de Integración*) was adopted in 2001, with subsequent plans being established in 2006 and 2009. In the 2009 Plan, the region professed goals such as family reunification, increased employment resources for migrants, and social cohesion between foreigners and native Spaniards. The local government works towards these goals through a combination of social programs and work with nonprofit agents.[87] In 2005, the sharp uptick in immigration to the region led to the creation of a Counsel on Immigration to help craft policy measures and implement them in the autonomous community.[88] After a brief lag in which the region did not update incorporation policy for several years, the Community of Madrid finally published a new incorporation Plan which went into effect in 2019. Throughout these plans, a common thread has been an emphasis on developing relationships between immigrants and the host culture, which is the Spanish culture.[89]

Within the most recent Integration Plan are contained many of the measures one would expect in a framework for immigrant incorporation, such as guidelines concerning employment, education, and the clarification of social rights. However, some of the language within the Plan indicates a certain set of views on the role of immigrants in the Madrid region. For example, the process of integration and the presence of illegal immigrants are consistently referred to as problems, conveying the sentiment that migration is ultimately a burden on the host community. Similarly, successful integration is juxtaposed against existing in the "margins of society," sending the message that—beyond merely developing the linguistic or cultural competence to function in Spain—one cannot truly join Spanish society while fully retaining their native

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[87] "Integration Plan of the Madrid Autonomous Community 2009-2012 | European Website on Integration," April 26, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/integration-plan-madrid-autonomous-community-2009-2012_en.
[88] Farah Ali and Carol Ready, "Integration or Assimilation? A Comparative Intertextual Analysis of Language Policy in Madrid and Catalonia," *Global Languages Faculty Publications*, January 1, 2021, https://scholarship.depauw.edu/mlang_facpubs/85.
[89] Ali and Ready.

culture.[90] Overall, the measures outlined in this Plan are of less interest than the way in which they are outlined; the rhetoric surrounding immigrant incorporation makes the assimilationism of the Madrid approach extremely clear. When viewed in combination with the relatively basic incorporation procedure outlined within the Madrid Plan, it becomes evident that the Community of Madrid does, in fact, approach the issue of incorporation in a similar manner to the central government.

Immigration in Catalonia: The Catalan Approach to Incorporation

Catalonia is among the most prominent immigrant destinations in Spain. In fact, Catalonia is one of the four Autonomous Communities (the others being Madrid, Valencia, and Andalusia) which together received two-thirds of all immigrants to Spain from 2000-2007. Between the Mediterranean Sea which attracts EU migrants seeking a hospitable beachfront destination and the capital city of Barcelona which offers the promise of employment opportunities to immigrants from Latin Americans, North Africans, and Eastern Europeans, Catalonia is a logical choice for a wide-range of migrants coming to Spain. [91] As such, it is not necessarily surprising that the region was the first autonomous community to legislate on the issue of immigration at the regional level. However, this detail becomes more intriguing when considered in context; it is not the norm in Spain for Autonomous Communities to pass laws governing the reception of immigrants into their region. Instead of formal legislation, the majority of Autonomous Communities instead choose to adopt regional immigration plans to organize the reception of immigrants to the community.[92] Further, the reasoning to explain why

[90] Ali and Ready.
[91] Kleiner-Liebau, *Migration and the Construction of National Identity in Spain*.
[92] Zuber, *Ideational Legacies and the Politics of Migration in European Minority Regions*.

the three Autonomous Communities that laws on this issue do have is not immediately clear, since only two of them (Valencia and Catalonia) are among those top four immigrant destinations I just mentioned. Accordingly, this analysis will not merely assess the content of Catalonia's immigration policy as a metric for discerning attitudes, but it will also address the question: Why did Catalonia choose to legislate on this issue at all?

Though immigration rate alone does not appear sufficient to predict formal immigration policymaking at the regional level, the early prominence of Catalonia as an immigrant-receiving destination clearly shaped the policy history of the region. Although the influx of foreign migrants was not initially noted as remarkable, due a population decline in Catalonia which continued to impact the region in the final decades of the 20th century, Catalonia quickly recognized the need to take appropriate steps to govern immigrant incorporation in the region in the early 1990s.[93] In 1993, 8 years after the Central Spanish government passed the Foreigner's Law, Catalonia adopted its first regional immigration plan. This plan developed procedure for immigrant incorporation in Catalonia, which accounted for the provision of social services and even included measures designed to include foreigners in Catalonia in the process of nation-building. Not only was this plan the first move to formalize immigrant incorporation among the Autonomous Communities, but it was actually instituted before the central Spanish government had addressed the issue of incorporation at the statewide level.[94] In doing this, Catalonia made its first move to utilize immigration as a mechanism for advancing the Catalan culture and challenging the sovereignty of the central Spanish state.

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[93] E. Hepburn and R. Zapata-Barrero, *The Politics of Immigration in Multi-Level States: Governance and Political Parties* (Springer, 2014).
[94] Zuber, *Ideational Legacies and the Politics of Migration in European Minority Regions*.

Overall, Catalonian incorporation policy shares some similarities with the central Spanish policy history; both governments take approaches which privilege cultural and linguistic assimilation as the highest goal for foreign residents. However, Catalonia's use of nation-building techniques within the process of immigrant incorporation should be viewed as distinctly different from cultural assimilationism which requires demonstrated cultural or linguistic proficiency to access social services or achieve naturalization, as has been proposed in the Spanish Congress in recent years. Although Catalonia's incorporation strategy has long emphasized the acquisition of the Catalan language and culture among foreign migrants, the primary focus of these policies is the issue of socioeconomic incorporation.[95] Further, Catalonia has consistently extended social services to immigrants—both regular and irregular—at levels which are unparalleled by any other autonomous communities or by the central government. At the municipal level, these services become even more expansive, as Barcelona operates numerous programs designed to help migrants and asylum-seekers by helping prepare them for employment or even provide direct financial assistance.[96]

Due to Catalonia's status as a regional minority, it is not surprising that their approach to immigrant incorporation would include safeguards against the cultural dilution of the autonomous community.[97] This cultural emphasis, combined with the relative friendliness of Catalonian policy towards international migrants, makes even more sense when you consider how these variables could combine to bolster the region's standing as a formidable opponent of the central Spanish state. As Catalonia became an increasingly enticing destination for

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[95] Zuber.
[96] Jenna Mazza, "Spain's Decentralized Immigration System Allows Local Integration Policies to Lead the Way," migrationpolicy.org, October 18, 2022, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/spain-immigration-integration-multilevel.
[97] Zuber, *Ideational Legacies and the Politics of Migration in European Minority Regions*.

international migrants hoping to settle in a modern European metropolis, the economic and political standing of the region only began to grow further. Instead of lashing out against this changing tide, Catalonian leaders united to embrace the influx, harnessing its power to advance Catalonian influence and autonomy. In the early years of the 21st century, Catalonian elites ran further with this idea, pushing back more and more against the central state as they sought to seize control over the issue of immigration as it pertained to the Catalonian autonomous community. These efforts even went so far as to include the Catalonian recruitment of skilled migrants abroad through the creation of Catalan pseudo-embassies which created a paradiplomatic network in countries likely to send immigrants to the region. While the most extreme of these efforts were sharply rebuffed by the central government by way of the Constitutional Courts, immigration to Catalonia and the resulting power struggle over the authority over its management continue to be an avenue for Catalan resistance.[98]

Conclusion: Immigrant Incorporation and Aggregate Elite Attitudes

This analysis has revealed differences in the approaches to immigrant incorporation between the central Spanish government, the Community of Madrid, and Catalonia. While some of these differences seem to stem from disparate ideology, even more interesting is the confluence of exogenous factors which together influence a region to pursue a certain policy trajectory on this issue. In Catalonia, immigration has been harnessed as a mechanism for national expansion. By actively welcoming immigrants of any status to the region and then advancing the notion that anyone can become Catalan, Catalonian leaders have effectively ensured that their population continuously grows stronger and more politically influential.[99]

[98] Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero, *The Politics of Immigration in Multi-Level States*.
[99] Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero.

Further, establishing Catalonia as a major immigrant destination in Spain lends credibility to calls for increased regional autonomy over the issue of immigration. For Catalan nationalists, this policy issue represents a foot in the door; if the Catalan government can negotiate increased autonomy on this issue, perhaps it will be able to secure this freedom on other policy areas as well. If nothing less, power struggles over the issue of immigration help Catalonia to mount a public offensive against the central government's monopolization of power, which serves an enormous political purpose in both the domestic and international contexts.

Now that I have discussed the motivations for, and implications of, different regional approaches to immigrant incorporation, the question remains: What does regional policy reveal about aggregate elite attitudes? At the start of this analysis, I anticipated that my contention on this question would stem directly from the provisions contained within the immigration policy of each region. In part, this has proven true. Despite the limited nature of the Madrid Plans as compared to the Catalonian policies, there is a clear discrepancy between the open social support of international migrants of any status that takes place in Catalonia, and the problematization of immigrant incorporation which is repeatedly emphasized in Madrid. With this disparity made evident, it is reasonable to conclude that there exists a gap between the aggregate elite attitudes in Madrid and in Catalonia. However, beyond this comparison of specific policy provisions, I cannot ignore the presence of an even more basic conclusion. Perhaps it is not merely the content of the legislation which offers a glimpse into the attitudes of the regional elite, but also the decision to legislate (and the extent to which to legislate) on the issue of immigration which reveals the aggregate attitudes of the elite. This chapter made it clear that the Catalonian approach to immigrant incorporation serves to benefit the region (and particularly the elite) in ways that go far beyond the actual acceptance of immigrants into Catalonia. Rather, the region's

approach to integration policy works as a tool for nation-building, helping to preserve the sub-state nationhood of Catalonia and intimidating the Spanish central government with the mounting strength of Catalonian national leaders. While this truth calls into question the motivations of the Catalonian elite in pursuing this policy platform, I argue that the motivations do not necessarily interfere with a conclusion about the attitudes of the Catalonian elite towards immigrants and immigration. Knowing that there are a whole host of political strategies and policy issues which the Catalonian elite could have seized as their opportunity to challenge central Spain, it is valuable to consider why they would agree to legislate extensively in order to become more welcoming to international migrants. Even if the argument were to be made that Catalonian efforts to incorporate immigrants are simply an attempt to maintain a healthy economy once faced with a significant inflow of migrants, this would not explain why legislators in Madrid have not taken the same approach. Further, it must be noted that the Catalonian legislative approach is not merely a fluke produced by a single cohort of outliers in the Catalan parliament; the culturally assimilationist yet socially liberal immigration framework advanced within Catalonia has been in action for 30 years now, with little opposition in the region. It is therefore logical to conclude that Catalan policymakers have, at minimum, at least neutral attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, as they have committed decades of lawmaking towards policy which welcomes immigrants into their region with open arms and highlights the issue of immigration as a means for political gain.

Chapter 4: *Public Opinion*
Quantifying Popular Attitudes Towards Immigrants in Spain, 1991-2007

Introduction

In Chapter Two, I assessed the dependent variable—attitudes towards immigrants and immigration—through the analysis of political rhetoric and far-right support in Spain. Specifically, the chapter endeavored to understand the recent entrance of a politically successful far-right movement in Spain and the role that xenophobic rhetoric plays in this political upheaval. Then, the chapter compared the invocation of xenophobic political rhetoric and the success of far-right parties across the autonomous communities of Madrid and Catalonia, drawing the conclusion that the clear disparity between regions reflects a difference in attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Chapter Three compared regional attitudes by narrowing in on the attitudes of the elite, assessing the policy approaches to immigrant integration in Madrid, Catalonia, and Spain as a whole. Combined, these two chapters reveal a connection between sub-state national identity and attitudes towards immigrants/immigration among regional elites and their electorates; in both of these analyses, Madrid demonstrated popular and aggregate elite attitudes which are less favorable towards immigrants. While the link between identity and attitudes that emerges from these analyses is strong, any conclusion based on these variables alone would face significant obstacles in its robustness. After all, how can public attitudes be adequately assessed without actually inquiring of the public what their attitudes are? To fill this empirical gap, this chapter will present a quantitative analysis of the relationship between sub-state national identity and attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in the Autonomous Communities of Madrid and Catalonia, as these are represented in survey data.

Before diving into the quantitative analysis in this chapter, it is crucial to acknowledge an apparent inconsistency between this chapter and the two that precede it: that is, the timeframe. In

Chapters Two and Three, the vast majority of the evidence presented was drawn from recent developments in politics and policy in Spain. In some cases, the preceding analysis actually relied on the current status of political parties or policy platforms in Catalonia and Madrid. With this said, the dates of the surveys upon which this chapter relies might be perplexing. How relevant is public opinion data gathered 16 to 32 years ago in the present? Well, the turbulent nature of modern politics and governance contributes directly to the justification (not merely defense) for including this older survey data in my analysis. Though the conclusions from Chapter Two and Three—which identified a link between the Catalonian identity and pro-immigrant/immigration politics and policy—are certainly supported by evidence, these analyses alone are insufficient to rule out spuriousness in this case. However, if a separate analysis of attitudes, conducted years earlier, in a different political era, were able to corroborate the relationship discovered in Chapters Two and Three, then the argument that sub-state national identity influences attitudes towards immigrants and immigration would become very empirically robust. In other words, this analysis of attitudes from 1991-2007 has the potential to prove the durability of the relationship between subnational identity and attitudes towards immigrants over time, as well as to demonstrate the existence of this relationship amongst the general population. In sum, the age of this data is not a limitation for this thesis, but rather, it is an asset.

Data and Methods

Data Source

This analysis will rely on survey data collected by ASEP (*Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos y Politicos*) annually between 1991 and 2007. The longitudinal study, titled "Attitudes of Spaniards towards Immigration," compiles data collected from 18 surveys which canvassed approximately 1,200 annual participants from a national, representative sample of Spanish adults (18 and over).[100] The breadth of questions on the surveys yields a multifaceted understanding of popular attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in Spain, as well as relevant demographic information. Though the questionnaires were not identical in each of the years they were conducted, this analysis will rely solely on data that was collected annually and measured consistently in the study period.

Sample

The ASEP study was a national sample of Spanish adults, with a sample size of about 1,200 annually. In total, the study contains the survey results of over 21,700 Spanish adults between 1991 and 2007. Despite the robustness of this national data, this chapter will only rely upon the entirety of this national sample very briefly, as a reference point against which to compare regional data. Beyond this initial comparison, this chapter will narrow the data sample to isolate responses from the cities of Madrid and Barcelona, the capital cities of the Autonomous Communities of Madrid and Catalonia, respectively. Even with this smaller sample, there are still ample responses to work with. Each city has an average of 170 respondents per year, with a total

[100] ASEP, "Immigrants Collection," accessed September 22, 2022, http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyAnalisis.jsp?ES_COL=130&Idioma=I&SeccionCol=05&ESID=524.

number of responses across all survey years at 2,790 for Madrid and 2,729 for Catalonia. By using a narrowed sample size, this analysis aims to isolate the independent variable of this thesis—sub-state national identity—more effectively. However, this chapter departs from the previous two chapters by narrowing the scope of analysis beyond the level of autonomous community. This decision recognizes the importance of comparing samples that are as similar as possible when conducting a comparative analysis. By isolating the data to solely include the respondents who reside in Madrid and Barcelona, we can ensure that every respondent is coming from an urban background. Although there are many shared qualities among urban dwellers which make this sampling method preferable, the most important for this analysis is the diversity of background and identity more often present in urban environments. Since the variable of interest in this investigation is attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, it would make very little sense to compare respondents from a diverse, urban environment to those from a more culturally homogenous small-town. Accordingly, the decision to confine the sample to solely reflect the attitudes of those who live in the capital cities of their region most effectively isolates the independent variable of this thesis (sub-state national identity) to establish an empirical relationship between identity and attitudes.

Measures

This thesis endeavors to understand the impact of sub-state national identity (main independent variable) on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration (dependent variable). Despite the fact that each of the previous chapters aimed to measure attitudes, this variable is operationalized differently within each of these sub-analyses. This quantitative analysis will operationalize the dependent variable as scores on a xenophobia index, according to the scale set

out by the original survey design. This index, which ranges from 0-14, scores participants based on their responses to 14 different survey questions. All 14 questions are weighted equally in the scale, with one point being awarded each time a participant gives an answer which was across the threshold preestablished by the original researchers. Contained within this index are questions pertaining to basic attitudes about foreigners in Spain, reactions to hypothetical situations involving immigrants, and evaluations regarding the impact of immigrant groups in the participants' communities.[101]

Consistent with the overarching methodology of this thesis, the main independent variable that will be utilized in this chapter is region of residence. Though, as specified, region has been narrowed to solely include respondents from the cities of Madrid and Barcelona (rather than the AC of Madrid and AC of Catalonia). This variable is useful as the most straightforward way to assess disparities in popular attitudes between regions with and without subnational identities. However, region of residence does not entirely capture the independent variable of this thesis, which is sub-state national identity. Therefore, this analysis will also include national identity as an independent variable, to confirm that identity (not merely region) is a relevant factor in determining attitudes. It should be noted that national identity is used interchangeably with the term nationalist identity throughout this analysis. This is due to the language of the original survey and should not be taken to indicate nationalist principles. Rather, nationalist feeling/identity in this context refers to one's identification with a sub-state national identity (Table A.1).

Beyond region and national identity, this analysis will also include two other independent variables, which principally serve to control for skewed or spurious results and contextualize the

[101] Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos y Politicos (ASEP), "ATTITUDES OF SPANIARDS TOWARDS IMMIGRATION AGGREGATED QUESTIONNAIRE 1991-2007," 2007 1991.

Spanish data in the broader landscape of migration scholarship. First, this analysis utilizes year as a means of tracking xenophobia over time so to ensure that the average scores are not being impacted by significant outlier years. To do this, the data is aggregated into three-year bands; this increment was selected as the minimum necessary to maintain an adequate sample size in each grouping. Finally, this analysis will consider the impact of educational attainment on xenophobia scores across the sampled cities. Beyond the merits of including this variable to create a more controlled analysis, the data yielded from this section of the investigation demonstrates Spain's conformity with the sociological understanding of the relationship between education and xenophobia.[102] See Table A.1 for a guide to all independent variables and their corresponding descriptions.

Analytic Strategy

This chapter will utilize a series of quantitative analyses—both bivariate and multivariate—to evaluate the relationship between the independent variables (region, year, nationalist identity, education) and the dependent variable (xenophobia score). These analyses are represented in this chapter through a series of tables and figures. First, Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 present the results of a bivariate analysis of xenophobia scores by region, and nationally, over time. Next, Table 4.2 displays the data from a bivariate analysis of xenophobia scores by national identity. Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 represent bivariate analyses of xenophobia and educational attainment by region (Barcelona and Madrid, Barcelona, Madrid). In Tables 4.2-4.5, a one-way analysis of variance was conducted to determine significance, followed by a Sheffe's test for multiple comparisons was used to identify which comparisons were significant. Finally, Table

[102] Mikael Hjerm, "Education, Xenophobia and Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 37–60, https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830124482.

4.6 illustrates the results of a multivariate analysis of xenophobia by education, region, and national identity.

Findings

Xenophobia by Time and Region

Table 4.1. Xenophobia Levels in Barcelona, Madrid, and Spain 1991-2007

	March '91 – March '93*	March '94 – October '95	December '96 – November '98*	October '99 – November '01*	September '02 – November '04*	November '05 – October '07*	All Survey Years*
Madrid	2.54 (2.28)	2.15 (2.28)	1.61 (2.05)	2.17 (2.49)	2.29 (2.80)	3.09 (3.06)	2.32 (2.57)
N	450	452	458	464	470	496	2,790
Barcelona	2.15 (2.00)	2.14 (1.93)	2.17 (2.06)	1.71 (1.78)	1.51 (1.52)	1.98 (1.39)	1.95 (1.82)
N	474	453	474	455	438	435	2,729
Spain	2.69 (2.32)	2.45 (2.31)	2.12 (2.20)	2.24 (2.32)	2.62 (2.55)	3.05 (2.61)	2.52 (2.41)
N	3,600	3,600	3,632	3,636	3,632	3,611	21,711

*p<.05 for Barcelona vs. Madrid



Figure 4.1. Xenophobia Levels in Barcelona, Madrid, and Spain 1991-2007

Table 4.1 displays the average xenophobia levels in Madrid, Barcelona, and Spain across all survey years and aggregated into three-year bands. After performing a t-test to compare xenophobia scores between Barcelona and Madrid, asterisks were included to denote statistically significant differences at the 95% confidence level. The result of this test indicates that the difference in average xenophobia score between the two regions was statistically significant in all but one three-year band (March 1994-October 1995), in which the xenophobia scores in Madrid and Barcelona were nearly identical. When averaged across all years, the difference in scores between the regions was found to be statistically significant, with Madrid having a higher average score. Given that the xenophobia index scores respondents on a scale of 0-14, all of the scores reflected in Table 4.1 are extremely low. However, the data indicate that residing in Madrid predicts higher average xenophobia scores than residing in Barcelona. Both Barcelona and Madrid demonstrate lower average scores than the aggregated Spanish average. Figure 4.1 illustrates the data presented in Table 4.1.

Xenophobia by National Identity

Table 4.2. Xenophobia by Nationalist Identity in Barcelona, 1991-2007

	Mean	Std Dev	N
Nationalist	1.02	1.85	698
Equally Spanish and Nationalist	1.83	1.64	1,198
Spanish	2.20	2.03	780

$F=10.11$, $p<.001$

Table 2 organizes the results of a bivariate analysis of xenophobia and national identity. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine if a relationship was present between xenophobia and nationalist identity in the survey responses from 1991-2007. A statistically significant relationship between these variables was discovered ($F=10.11$, $p<.001$).

Next, a Sheffe's test for multiple comparisons was used to determine which relationships cleared the threshold of statistical significance. Using this test, it was found that a Spanish identity among respondents from Barcelona is related to a higher average xenophobia score than both respondents who identified themselves as equally Spanish and nationalist (cv = .370, p<.001), as well as respondents who identified themselves as nationalist (cv = .282, p<.01).

Bivariate Analysis of Xenophobia by Educational Attainment and Region

Table 3. Xenophobia by Educational Attainment in Barcelona and Madrid, 1991-2007

	Mean	Std Dev	N
Low	2.54	2.26	2,307
Middle	2.07	2.18	2,920
High	1.62	2.10	1,008

F=67.73, p<.001

Table 4. Xenophobia by Educational Attainment in Barcelona, 1991-2007

	Mean	Std Dev	N
Low	2.41	1.98	1,035
Middle	1.78	1.68	1,320
High	1.27	1.52	365

F=66.23, p<.001

Table 5. Xenophobia by Educational Attainment in Madrid, 1991-2007

	Mean	Std Dev	N
Low	2.61	2.53	975
Middle	2.3	2.62	1,244
High	1.83	2.44	563

F=16.75, p<.001

Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 display the results of analyses which assessed the relationship between xenophobia scores and educational attainment in Barcelona and Madrid. While Table 4.3 aggregates the data from the two cities, Tables 4.4 and 4.5 represent the data in only Barcelona and Madrid, respectively. In each table, an ANOVA test was conducted to assess the relationship between xenophobia scores and educational attainment in the sample of interest. A statistically significant difference in average xenophobia scores was discovered in Table 4.3 (F-

statistic of 67.73, p<.001), Table 4.4 (F=66.23, p<.001), and Table 4.5 (F=16.75, p<.001). Next, a Sheffe's test of multiple comparisons was performed on the data in Table 4.3, to determine which differences in xenophobia scores were statistically significant. This test concluded that all possible comparisons between educational levels produced a statistically significant difference in average scores. This includes low/middle education (cv = -.469, p<.001), low/high education (cv = -.923, p<.001), and middle/high education (cv = -.454, p<.001). In short, educational attainment and xenophobia scores were found to have a generally linear, inverse relationship.

Multivariate Analysis of Xenophobia by Region, Education, and National Identity

Table 4.6. Predicting Xenophobia by Education, Nationalism, and Region

DV=Xenophobia	Model 1 (N=5,519)	Model 2 (N=2,676)
Educational Attainment (ref: Low)		
Middle	-.47 (.066)*	-.57 (.76)*
High	-.95 (.088)*	-1.10 (.11)*
Region (ref: Madrid)		
Barcelona	-.41 (.060)*	--
Nationalism (ref: Equally Spanish and Nationalist)		
Nationalist	--	.13 (.084)
Spanish	--	.22 (.083)*

*p<.05

Table 4.6 displays the results of two different models, which together assess the impact of education, region, and national identity on average xenophobia scores. Model 1 assesses the relationship between the dependent variable (xenophobia), educational attainment, and region of residence. The model demonstrates that, when compared to respondents with low levels of educational attainment and controlling for region of residence, those with moderate education have lower average xenophobia scores by approximately 0.5 points (t= 7.15, p<.05).

Respondents who reported high educational attainment display average xenophobia scores that are, on average, a little more than 1 point lower ($t=-10.77$, $p<.05$). Model 2 narrows the sample to solely include respondents from Barcelona. Further, Model 2 considers nationalist identity in addition to level of educational attainment. Model 2 demonstrates similar results in regard to the influence of educational attainment on xenophobia scores. As compared to those with low educational attainment, respondents with middle educational attainment have xenophobia scores which are almost 0.6 points lower, on average ($t=-7.54$, $p<.05$). Those who identified themselves to have a high level of educational attainment have scores which are an average of 1.1 points lower than respondents who had low educational attainment ($t=-9.83$, $p<.05$). Lastly, Model 2 reveals a statistically significant difference in the average xenophobia scores of Spanish-nationalist respondents in Barcelona, as compared to those who identify as equally Spanish and nationalist. Spanish-identified respondents, on average, had xenophobia scores which were 0.22 points higher than those in the equally Spanish and Nationalist category ($t=2.64$, $p<.05$). This relationship between nationalist identity and xenophobia score is significant even after controlling for educational attainment.

Discussion

The data presented in this chapter offer a variety of quantitative analyses which aim to understand xenophobia scores in Spain and their relationship to several key variables. While this research most directly contributes to the central question of this thesis when viewed in its entirety, each individual analysis contributes valuable insight into popular attitudes in Spain. In particular, this quantitative analysis effectively isolates the role of national identity in the construction of attitudes, dispelling concerns about confounding variables.

The first important takeaway from this data is that xenophobia scores in Madrid consistently outpaced scores in Barcelona from 1991 to 2007. Across all survey years, the average xenophobia score in Madrid was higher than that of Barcelona by almost .4 points (Table 1). Although it is evident that the xenophobia scores in both regions—and in Spain as a whole—fluctuated during the period surveyed, the overarching pattern demonstrates a consistent disparity between xenophobia in the two cities, and between these cities and the overall Spanish population. Consideration of Spanish history can help to explain some of these fluctuations in scores. For example, the fact that Spain, Madrid, and Barcelona all experienced increased averages in the years immediately following the 2004 Madrid Attacks is unsurprising given the extensive scholarship on the impact of terrorist attacks on the issue salience of immigration.[103] In fact, the global media narrative surrounding terrorism and immigration in the post-9/11 world could arguably be responsible for the general uptick in xenophobia scores reflected in the data from the 21st century. Another possible explanation for the climbing scores across Spain could be the changing origins of Spain's immigrant population. While the influx of immigrants to Spain began to grow over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, immigration to Spain during these years was dominated by EU migrants. Similarly, the growing prominence of illegal immigration in this same time period was most felt in Madrid and Barcelona, as the autonomous communities of Madrid and Catalonia receive more undocumented immigrants every year than any other region in Spain.[104] Accordingly, the increased prominence of non-EU immigrants and undocumented immigrants beginning around the turn of the century likely inflamed the issue of immigration in the country.

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[103] Eberl et al., "The European Media Discourse on Immigration and Its Effects."; Hopkins, "Politicized Places."
[104] Omar Guillermo Encarnación, "The Politics of Immigration: Why Spain Is Different," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 15, no. 4 (2004): 167–85.

Ultimately, the advance of xenophobia over time is not the ultimate focus of this analysis. This said, assessing the data in this way provides valuable insight into the consistency of these scores over the period surveyed. Most importantly, separating the scores into three-year bands eliminates the potential for any outlier years to distort the findings and compromise the legitimacy of this analysis. Despite fluctuations and irregularities (such as the sudden dip seen in the Madrid scores from 1996-1998), the conclusion from the data is clear: the disparity between Madrid and Barcelona is consistent over time. At this point, it is critical to note Spain's status as a new immigrant destination. Immigration to the country was so negligible as to not even be regulated until the mid-1980s.[105] Therefore, these figures allow us to track public attitudes from some of the earliest years of the immigration wave in Spain. This permits a unique insight into initial reactions to the presence of immigrants in the country, with minimal influence of any positive or negative history surrounding immigration in Spanish communities. Vested with this knowledge, the consistent disparity in xenophobia scores between Madrid and Barcelona indicates an inherent difference in the public attitudes towards immigrants in the two cities.

The average xenophobia scores from Madrid and Barcelona leave little doubt that a disparity exists between the levels of xenophobia in the two cities. However, this thesis does not endeavor to merely assess regional differences in Spain. Rather, the variable of interest in this analysis is the impact of *identity* on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Despite the fact that the regions—Madrid and Catalonia—which are compared within this thesis were chosen due to their disparate national identities, it is not a given that every resident of these autonomous communities shares the same background and identity. In particular, the fact that Madrid and Barcelona are the two largest Spanish cities, with overlapping business networks, it likely that

[105] Omar Guillermo Encarnación.

some exchange of citizenry occurs between the two cities. As such, it is critical to consider the results of the analysis which compared xenophobia scores in Barcelona by nationalist feeling (Table 2). While this analysis was also conducted with the Madrid data, this comparison did not yield usable results due to the very small number of respondents in Madrid who identified themselves as nationalist (Table A.3). However, the data from Barcelona was sufficient to isolate respondents with a Catalan identity, which was shown to correlate to lower xenophobia scores. Specifically, respondents with a nationalist identity had an average xenophobia score which was lower than those with dual identities and those with Spanish identities by 0.81 and 1.18, respectively. These results confirm the notion that identity, rather than city of residence, is statistically related to xenophobia scores.

Clearly, this finding contributes enormously to this investigation. However, even with this result, it is difficult to ignore the possibility that another variable is working in conjunction with identity to produce disparities in average xenophobia scores. Thus, this analysis controlled for another variable which is known by scholars to relate closely to xenophobia: educational attainment. It is well-evidenced in the pertinent scholarship that a higher level of educational attainment is inversely related to increased xenophobia. In fact, this relationship has proven to be nearly universal, despite country-level differences in culture or educational system.[106]Accordingly, it would be a disservice to this thesis to omit consideration of this variable in this quantitative analysis. To consider the potential role of education level in the construction of xenophobic attitudes in Spain, it was first necessary to ascertain whether the traditional wisdom on this relationship proved true in the Spanish context. This question was especially important, considering the early research which suggests a relationship between higher

[106] Hjerm, "Education, Xenophobia and Nationalism."

education levels and an increased likelihood that a voter casts their ballot for the far-right party Vox, whose political rhetoric relies heavily on xenophobia.[107] Despite this intriguing research, this analysis found that educational attainment maintained its inverse correlation with higher xenophobia scores in both Madrid and Barcelona. In both regions, those with a higher education level had the lowest average xenophobia scores (average of 1.62) and those with the lowest educational attainment had the highest scores (average of 2.54) (Table 3). Additionally, the average scores in Barcelona were lower than the average scores in Madrid for each of the three levels of education, further demonstrating the regional disparity which has been consistent throughout this analysis. Of note is the fact that the average score for highly educated respondents in Madrid (1.83) (Table 5) is higher than even the middle education level in Barcelona (1.78) (Table 4). This result could hint at an explanation for the puzzling conclusion that Vox voters are more likely to be highly educated.[108]

Due to the statistically significant relationship between higher educational attainment and lower xenophobia scores in Spain, it is necessary to consider how this variable might have an impact on the average scores in Madrid and Catalonia. Knowing that educational attainment influences xenophobia scores, is it possible that regional disparities in educational attainment could drive the disparity in scores? In regard to the issue of identity, could there be educational inequalities between different cultural groups in Barcelona? Something as simple as the systemic privileging of Catalan students in Barcelona schools could contribute to unequal educational access between Catalonian-identified and Spanish-identified respondents. First, we can dispose of concerns regarding disparate access to educational attainment between cities, as the sample sizes from each educational group are similar between Barcelona and Madrid. To address the

[107] Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama, and Santana, "The Baskerville's Dog Suddenly Started Barking."
[108] Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama, and Santana.

remaining concerns about the impact of education, this analysis performed a multivariate analysis which controlled for educational attainment in its comparison of xenophobia scores across regional and national groups (Table 6). This analysis confirmed that the inverse relationship between education and xenophobia remained significant even when controlling for city of residence. Most importantly, Model 2 concluded that identifying as Spanish was a statistically significant predictor of a higher average xenophobia score, even when controlling for level of educational attainment. In short, this means that, regardless of education level, respondents who identified their national identity as Spanish (as opposed to the dual identity) had higher xenophobia scores. So, even if there existed some sort of widespread incongruity in educational attainment between national groups, it would not impact the validity of the conclusion that national identity influences attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in Barcelona.

Conclusion

This chapter examined xenophobia levels, and their relationship to variables such as time, educational attainment, region of residence, and national identity through a quantitative analysis of survey data collected form 1991-2007. Though the data from this set of surveys is extensive, this analysis limited its scope to solely the variables which could reasonably be pertinent to the overarching research question: *What is the impact of sub-state national identity on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration?* The quantitative analyses presented in the findings of this chapter illustrate this investigation. However, within this research, this chapter provides three key takeaways which contribute to the ultimate response to the aforementioned research question.

The first important finding presented in this chapter is the regional divide in xenophobia scores. In four out of six 3-year groupings, Madrid had a higher average xenophobia score than Barcelona and the difference in scores met the criteria for statistical significance. Across all survey years, this same relationship was discovered, with Madrid having a higher average. This means that across the 16-year period in which this survey was conducted, respondents from Madrid were categorized as *more xenophobic* than respondents from Barcelona, according to the criteria of the xenophobia index designed by the original researchers. This is significant because it aligns with the findings of Chapters two and three of this thesis, which identified more anti-immigrant political rhetoric and fewer inclusive immigrant policies in Madrid as compared to Catalonia. Being that Madrid and Barcelona are the capital cities of their respective autonomous communities, discovering this disparity between the two cities suggests a regional divergence in attitudes.

Beyond the impact of region on attitudes regarding immigrants and immigration, this thesis is focused on the role of identity. Therefore, the second—and perhaps most crucial—finding of this chapter is that sub-state national identity was related to xenophobia in the survey data. Though Barcelona was found to have a lower average xenophobia score than Madrid, this alone does not explicitly connect decreased xenophobia to the Catalonian national identity. However, this analysis found that, among respondents from Barcelona, indicating a Spanish identity was associated with a higher xenophobia score. This finding effectively disposes of any possibility that the disparity in xenophobia scores between regions is nothing more than a product of local differences. Because it defies explanation that these localized conditions would only apply to those with Catalonian or dual national identities, especially when the unit of analysis is already narrowed to the city level.

Despite the clear indications that identity, not region of residence, is related to xenophobia, this alone does not prove the existence of a causal relationship. Indeed, is possible that another variable could influence xenophobia and differ across subnational groups. For this reason, this analysis investigated the role educational attainment, which is known to influence xenophobia levels in societies across the globe.[109] This analysis found that the widely accepted relationship between educational attainment and xenophobia holds true in the Spanish context: higher education levels are related to lower xenophobia scores. With this finding comes the possibility that disparities in educational attainment across national identities cause disparities in xenophobia scores. However, the final quantitative analysis in this chapter debunks this idea, demonstrating that holding a Spanish national identity in Barcelona is related to a higher xenophobia score, even when controlling for educational attainment. This discovery cements the observed relationship between identity and average xenophobia score and constitutes the final key finding of this chapter.

As with any analysis, these conclusions are not without limitation. First, surveys of public opinion carry inherent risks such as sampling bias, misadministration, and respondent error. Consequently, these results should not be taken as universal truths. However, these results are made much more compelling when viewed in conjunction with the evidence and conclusions presented in the two preceding chapters. Chapter Two concluded that support for Vox, the far right, and anti-immigrant rhetoric was heightened in Madrid and virtually absent in Catalonia. Chapter Three discovered that Catalonian policymakers have made a concerted effort to produce very inclusive local immigrant policies, while their counterparts in Madrid generally fall in line with the statewide Spanish approach which is more lukewarm on the issue. Now, this chapter

[109] Hjerm, "Education, Xenophobia and Nationalism."

produces numerical evidence of a similar disparity among the public. Most interestingly, this data indicates that this disparity has existed for decades before many of the contemporary political events which might partially explain the results of the preceding chapters. Therefore, when considered in context, this analysis offers compelling evidence to support the existence of a relationship between sub-state national identity and attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in Spain.

Chapter 5: *Conclusion*
Attitudes Towards Immigrants and Immigration in a Multinational State

Introduction

In this thesis, I investigated the relationship between national/subnational identity and attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, posing the question: *What is the impact of sub-state national identity on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration?* To do this, I constructed a comparative analysis of two regions in Spain, one with a strong subnational identity and one without. Specifically, I investigated attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in the autonomous communities of Madrid (the home of the dominant Spanish identity) and Catalonia (home to the Catalonian sub-state nation). By selecting two regions within the same country, this analysis avoids some of the methodological complications which have befallen scholars who compare regions across state boundaries. In a further effort to avoid the influence of confounding variables, this thesis has taken a holistic approach to the evaluation of attitudes in each region, operationalizing attitudes in three distinct ways (politics, policy, and public opinion). Across each of these three metrics, the conclusion emerged that those with a Spanish national identity have attitudes which are less favorable towards immigrants and immigration.

Summary of Analysis

Chapter Two gauged regional attitudes towards immigrants and immigration by assessing political far-right support in each region, as well as through analyzing the political rhetoric used by political parties to discuss immigration. In particular, the chapter focused on the very recent successes of the far-right in Spain, as concentrated in the Spanish nationalist party, Vox. After tracing the political history of immigration in Spain and dissecting the role of anti-immigrant

rhetoric in Vox's party platform, the chapter assessed the relationship between Vox support and national identity, turning to the research of Spanish scholars who discovered a relationship between a Spanish national identity and voting for Vox, among those who expressed discontent with the political situation in Spain.[110] The chapter then assessed the unequal political influence of the party between Madrid and Catalonia. In the regional government of Madrid, the party has amassed substantial political influence, managing to form close working relationships with leaders from mainstream parties such as a the conservative Partido Popular (PP), which was incentivized to continue compromising with the far right when these efforts were rewarded with big victories in regional elections.[111] In Catalonia, this influence is far less prevalent. Though Vox holds 11 out of 135 seats in the regional parliament, the party does not appear to exercise much influence over the mainstream parties in the region.[112] Furthermore, Vox has failed to capture the anti-separatist vote in the region, despite the fact that opposition to Catalonian succession is understood by scholars to have fueled the emergence of the party.[113]

Though the diminished influence of Vox in Catalonia is certainly of interest, it cannot be ignored that Catalonian voters might be dissuaded by the explicit Spanish nationalism which courses through Vox's ideology. With this in mind, Chapter Two investigated Catalonian nationalist parties, to determine whether there could be a regional Vox equivalent. The finding of the chapter was that Catalonian nationalist political mobilization looks quite dissimilar to that of Vox. While Vox's nativist and Spanish nationalist ideology inform a far-right platform which eschews social progressivism and socialist politics, Catalonian nationalist political parties (while sometimes populist) are left-wing. Even the parties which advocate Catalonian independence

[110] Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama, and Santana, "The Baskerville's Dog Suddenly Started Barking."
[111] "Spain's Pop Polarizer."
[112] "Resultats Electorals."
[113] Rama et al., *VOX*.

without advancing an openly nationalist rhetoric fall on the left side of the political spectrum. This finding demonstrates that Catalonians have not responded to the rise of Vox in Spain with a right-wing nationalist political force to counter the new party's influence in the region. Moreover, the Catalonian parties which actively advance Catalonian nationalism are not anti-immigrant, but rather, are vocal supporters of expansive migration rights.[114] These findings suggest there is a fundamental difference between the attitudes towards immigrants in immigration in Catalonia and Madrid.

Chapter Three delved deeper into the differences in the way that the political systems of each region address the subject of immigration, by conducting a comparison of immigrant and immigration policies in Madrid and Catalonia. Before doing this, the chapter related the evaluation of policy outcomes to the measurement of attitudes by justifying policy outcomes as a reflection of elite attitudes, as they are translated into policy preferences and ultimately, outcomes. Then, the chapter evaluated these outcomes by assessing the immigrant integration strategies of each region and contextualizing them through comparison to statewide Spanish policy as well as dominant models for immigrant integration. Through this process, Chapter Three discovered that Catalonia has long been a leader in Spain in this policy sphere, having been the first autonomous community to adopt a regional policy on immigration.[115] Since the region first became a popular immigrant destination, the sub-state nation has opened its arms to newcomers, seeming to view immigration as a way to grow the political power of the Catalonian people.[116] Conversely, Madrid has shied away from significant policymaking in this area, choosing instead to govern their immigrant incorporation only with a less formal regional

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[114] Xidias, "Vox: The Revival of the Far Right in Spain"; "Esquerra Republicana Presents a Series of Measures to Protect and Regularize Migrants."
[115] Zuber, *Ideational Legacies and the Politics of Migration in European Minority Regions*.
[116] Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero, *The Politics of Immigration in Multi-Level States*.

immigration plan. Most interestingly, this plan seems to problematize immigration, consistently referring to the incorporation of migrants as a problem and a burden on the people of Madrid.[117] Ultimately, the policy approach to immigration in Madrid closely mirrors the statewide Spanish approach, while the Catalonian policies extend social services to immigrants (with and without documents) and even offer specialized career and financial services at the local level.[118] In Chapter Three it becomes evident that elites in Madrid and Catalonia have disparate approaches to immigrant policy, with one region viewing the arrival of immigrants as a problem to be addressed and another viewing this same circumstance as an opportunity for subnational growth. These policy preferences reflect a divergence in elite attitudes towards immigrants and immigration between the autonomous communities of Madrid and Catalonia.

Lastly, Chapter Four built on the preceding analyses of political parties and policy outcomes to conduct a quantitative analysis of xenophobia levels in the capital cities of Madrid and Catalonia (Madrid and Barcelona). Relying on survey data collected by ASEP (*Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos y Politicos*) annually between 1991 and 2007, the chapter first traced xenophobia levels across the survey period in Madrid, Barcelona, and Spain as a whole. This allowed for a comparison of average xenophobia scores between regions which was unthreatened by the possibility of outlier years skewing the averages and producing a faulty comparison. With this risk mitigated, the analysis of xenophobia scores over time found that, across all survey years, the average xenophobia score in Madrid was higher than that of Barcelona by almost .4 points (Table 1). Although xenophobia scores in both regions—and in Spain as a whole—experienced fluctuations during the surveyed period, the overarching pattern demonstrated a consistent disparity between xenophobia in the two cities, and between these cities and the

[117] Ali and Ready, "Integration or Assimilation?"
[118] Mazza, "Spain's Decentralized Immigration System Allows Local Integration Policies to Lead the Way."

overall Spanish population. After establishing that a regional disparity existed between the two cities, Chapter Four isolated the variable of national identity, assessing the relationship of this variable to xenophobia scores. This analysis yielded the discovery that, on average, respondents from Barcelona who identified themselves as Spanish had higher xenophobia scores than those with subnational (likely Catalonian) or mixed identities. This relationship held true in the final analysis of the chapter, in which a multivariate analysis was which measured the relationship between national identity and xenophobia scores in Barcelona while controlling for level of educational attainment. In sum, Chapter Four concluded that a Spanish national identity is related to higher xenophobia scores, even when viewed over time or controlling for education level.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this thesis, I presented two competing hypotheses which could explain the relationship between national/subnational identity and attitudes towards immigrants and immigration:

Hypothesis 1: Members of a sub-state nation will feel more positively towards immigrants and immigration, due to a sympathy for those who are also treated as a cultural other by the central state.

Hypothesis 2: Members of a sub-state nation will feel more negatively towards immigrants, due to a fear of cultural dilution and a strong sense of cultural protectionism.

Per the results of this analysis, we can confidently reject Hypothesis 2. Across the three metrics used, Catalonia consistently was found to be more open and accepting of immigrants, indicating more positive attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Accordingly, a possible conclusion to this analysis would be to confirm Hypothesis 1. After all, this conclusion broadly aligns with past research which indicates that a well-developed ethnic identity is linked to more positive intergroup attitudes and a decreased sense of intergroup threat.[119] Following this line of reasoning, one could conclude that the extraordinary salience of the Catalonian regional identity leads to a sense of security which is not felt by those with the traditional Spanish identity who may feel a diminished sense of national awareness.

However, I am unconvinced by this rationale, due to the lack of evidence for the notion that Catalonians feel more sympathy for the condition of immigrants. Furthermore, it could easily be argued that those with Spanish identities feel equally connected to their national identity, especially due to the strength of the Spanish nationalist movement that has emerged with the advent of Vox. Accordingly, this analysis must also reject Hypothesis 1 as a sufficient resolution to the question which seeks to understand the impact of subnational identity on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.

Though neither of these hypotheses proved sufficient to explain the relationship between attitudes and national identity in the context of immigration, this analysis has, in fact, uncovered the true nature of this intersection: *Members of a sub-state nation feel more positively towards immigrants due to the perception of immigration as an avenue for nation-building.* In a multinational state, sub-state nations are most often forced to vie for attention and influence in politics. In Catalonia, political and cultural leaders constantly seek to protect the region from the

[119] "Positive Intergroup Attitudes: The Role of Ethnic Identity," accessed October 22, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1177/0165025407081466.

encroachment of Spanish influence and challenge the dominion of the central government. Population numbers form a natural defense mechanism against overreach on the part of the central state; the larger and more prosperous the Catalonian cities are able to become, the more difficult it is for the Spanish state to control Catalonia and prevent the region from exercising autonomy over regional affairs. Accordingly, Catalonians welcome immigrants as an opportunity to grow their numbers and ensure the continued strength of their language and culture. After all, the Catalonian approach to immigrant integration—though quite welcoming—is highly assimilationist. Once immigrants are welcomed to Catalonia, they must pursue proficiency in the Catalonian language to access the full array of government services. Furthermore, the children of immigrants are instructed in Catalan in the region's schools, which helps to instill in them a sense of national identity.[120] Immigrant policy in Catalonia creates Catalonians. From this perspective, it is wholly unsurprising that the Catalan nationalist political parties speak so openly about their broad support for immigration.

If large immigrant populations are valued as an asset in Catalonia, why does this same logic not apply to the case of Madrid? The answer to this question lies in the source of cultural and political threat for each region. For Catalonia, the principal threat to the region—and primary barrier to succession—is the Spanish state. Catalonians need not concern themselves with competition among the other nations and cultures in Spain. Conversely, Madrid faces cultural and political threats of multiple origins. Rather than concern over a single culture's advances into Spanish territory, Spanish nationalists fear the power of the sub-state nations, regional cultures, and foreign influence. Because of this deeply held fear of cultural dilution, people in Madrid are

[120] Amado Alarcón, "Migration, Language, and Social Mobility in Catalonia," in *The Politics of New Immigrant Destinations: Transatlantic Perspectives*, ed. Stefanie Chambers et al., 1st edition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2017).

not as likely view immigration as an opportunity for cultural and political expansion. This conclusion coincides with the consensus of scholars that Vox's rise to national prominence was a reaction to the 2017 Catalonian succession attempt.[121] When a sub-state nation politically challenged the central Spanish state, the reaction from Spanish nationalist voters was to lash out against multinationalism in Spain. Beyond merely targeting sub-state nationhood, the party's rhetoric alienated all those who did not fit into the Spanish ethnostate, which included all non-Latin American immigrants to Spain.

This conclusion does not suggest that all individuals in Madrid experience such cultural threat as to be anti-immigrant. Rather, it's likely that a small group of radical actors are chiefly responsible for the results that have been explored in this thesis which indicate more anti-immigrant sentiment in Madrid. However, the presence of this contingent in Madrid, and not in Catalonia, is nonetheless evidence for an identity-based set of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration.

Limitations and Areas for Future Research

Despite the thoughtfully considered research design of this thesis, it is clear that the results discovered and the conclusions advanced cannot be uniformly applied to every sub-state nation, because they rely upon the presence of nation-building efforts in a region. If a sub-state nation is not engaged in nation-building efforts, is not incentivized to advance their national language and culture or concerned with the acquisition of political and cultural capital on the state level, then members of that nation may not be especially receptive towards foreign migrants. To investigate the attitudes towards immigrants in non-nation-building regions, it thus

[121] Rama et al., *VOX*.

would be interesting to compare attitudes between sub-state nations which actively nation-build and those which do not. Similarly, this analysis is limited in its general applicability due to its narrow scope; there is no guarantee that the relationship observed in this analysis is not in some way unique. Accordingly, this research could be continued and strengthened through a larger scale comparison which assesses more cases. If the association between sub-state national identity and more positive attitudes towards immigrants persisted in a larger research project, then these results could much be generally applied. Despite these limitations, this thesis presents a conclusion which contributes to our understanding of sub-state national identity and challenges conventional assumptions regarding the willingness of subnational communities to accept newcomers.

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Appendix

Table A.1: Independent Variables Guide

Region	Determined by the respondent's city of residency at the time of survey administration.
Year	Year in which response was collected from respondent.
Nationalist Identity	Respondent's self-identification as nationalist, Spanish, or equally nationalist and Spanish indicates their national identity for the purposes of this analysis. Identifying as nationalist does *not* imply nationalistic views in the conventional definition of the term, but rather, indicates identification with a regional identity.
Educational Attainment	Respondent's level of education was self-identified and then aggregated into four categories: Not asked, Low, Middle, High, Don't Know/No Answer. This analysis solely relied upon the categories of Low/Middle/High. These categories signify the following responses on the survey: 1) **Low** (Knows how to read, Doesn't know how to read, Primary education) 2) **Middle** (General Basic Education, Vocational Training, Secondary school certificate) 3) **High** (Orientation University, College, University Graduates)

Table A.2: Educational Attainment by Region

Respondent's Education Level	Madrid	Barcelona	Total
Low	35.95(975)	37.93(1,035)	36.42(2,010)
Middle	44.59(1,244)	48.37(1,320)	46.46(2,564)
High	20.18(563)	13.37(365)	16.81(928)
Don't know/No answer	.29(8)	.33(9)	.31(17)

Note: Values given as percent(number of respondents)

Table A.3: Nationalist Identity by Region

Nationalist Identity	Madrid	Barcelona	Total
Nationalist	7.15(190)	26.08(698)	16.65(888)
Equally Spanish and Nationalist	41.59(1,105)	44.77(1,198)	43.18(2,303)
Spanish	51.26(1,362)	29.15(780)	40.17(2,142)

Note: Values given as percent(number of respondents)