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United in Diversity? The Political Implications of Intra-EU Migration

Isabel Monteleone

Trinity College, Hartford Connecticut, isabel.monteleone@trincoll.edu

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Senior Thesis

United in Diversity? The Political Implications of Intra-EU Migration

Submitted by:
Isabel Monteleone

Presented to the Department of Public Policy and Law in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree with honors of Bachelor of Arts

Spring 2016

Director: Anthony M. Messina
Second Reader: Garth A. Myers
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Last but not least, I owe an immense thanks to my Italian immigrant parents. Their resilient and inspiring immigration story has always instilled in me the compassion and broad perspective necessary to value the importance of cultural integration and immigration reform efforts across the globe.
Introduction:

Intra-EU migration is a phenomenon innate to the structure of the European Union. A politico-economic union of twenty-eight countries, the EU does what no other alliance of countries has endeavored before, serving as a unique product of globalization and integration, in every sense of the word. Bound almost entirely by a common currency, the European Union is established in the belief that economic cooperation in Europe can be achieved through the principle of free movement, despite each member states’ individual way of life, language, and political, religious, and cultural ideology.

Since intra-EU migration allows for the possibility of EU integration and spans virtually every country within the Union, the question is how has intra-EU migration impacted the relationship of EU member states and the larger project for “ever-closer union”? Will and can the EU be an institution founded on the notion of collaboration for economic prosperity, or will the interests of the nation state obstruct the EU’s ability to transcend cultural differences? Exploring these two questions, and the sub-questions implicit within them, this thesis aims to reach a sounder comprehension of the political impact this stream of migration has across the EU.

Despite the purported economic contributions that EU migrants make to the countries to which they migrate, the political and social costs of intra-EU migration that have followed from this stream of migration have, for many member states, exceeded their economic benefits. This is especially true for Britain, where the global powerhouse boasts one of Europe’s strongest economies. If the EU continues to allow the free movement principle to operate
in its current form, then it may see an increase in cultural conflict in countries like Britain, where nationalism has, in many ways, been aroused by the increasing diversity of its population. Likewise, if the free movement principle, which serves as a prerequisite for EU membership, is jeopardized, it may alter the solidarity and cooperation of European countries “united in diversity”. In order to evaluate the complexity of free movement in the EU, its theoretical, economic, political, and cultural implications must be evaluated.

1. Literature Review

1.1 The Single Market: Economic Impact and Labor Mobility

The EU was created under the guise that endorsing a single market could better promote economic prosperity across Europe. A fundamental component of this is the adopting of a common currency, the euro, on January 1, 2002. The euro is a major expression of supporting a single market. As Thomas Risse (2006) argues, “money is not only about economics and finance, but also about nation and state-building. Money is among the most important identity markers in people’s daily lives.” In a Eurobarometer survey, evidence shows that the euro, despite its strength as compared to many other European currencies, affects the collective identity of the EU, and in many ways, threatens national pride, particularly for countries like Britain.¹

The single market also incorporates the notion of free movement, or the freedom that grants all EU members the right to live and work in another

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² Risse, Thomas. p. 69
member state. The data on migration measures the flows of individuals to and from different member states. They can be used, for example, to showcase the surge of migration that occurred during the 2004 EU enlargement, which produced the accession of ten Eastern European countries. Conversely, it can express the effects migrants make on a given country’s labor market or public services. Broadly speaking, migration statistics define “migrant” in three ways: a) someone born in a country different from that which they predominately reside; b) someone whose nationality is different than the country in which they reside; or c) someone whose country of residence has changed for a brief period of time. While the first two definitions of “migrant” are fairly transparent, the third is more difficult to determine. Otherwise known as a third-country national, this type of migrant’s distinct method of migrating is more challenging to quantify. This in itself illuminates the difficulties in dissecting migration data.

For this reason, several reliable indices have been developed for quantifying EU migration. These include: the International Passenger Survey, Labour Force Survey, National Insurance Numbers (NINos), Migration Statistics Quarterly Report, and Eurostat. For example, the International Passenger Survey notes that net migration to the UK, in the year ending in March 2015, was 333,000. Likewise, as of the first quarter of 2015, approximately 1.9 million EU born citizens were employed in the UK. In determining different outcomes of the

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EU migration story, such figures allow us to investigate the economic impact EU migrants are having and have had on the European Union.

Migration statistical data also provide a comprehensive understanding of how certain events over time impact the rate to which people choose to migrate to another member state. Events such as the European financial crisis, for example, stimulated migration flows to countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. This event triggered east-west migration, increasing migration from the periphery to the core. As of 2010, the EU countries holding the largest number of EU migrants were: Germany, Spain, France, the UK, and Italy. Each country contained over a million migrants. In addition to drawing connections between events, migration data provide the reasons for migrating, which most notably are: to seek better employment opportunities, reunite with family and provide family members with an increased quality of life, and enhance one’s education level, or obtain superior retirement benefits. These opportunity differentials indicate to what extent free movement is utilized, quantifying the impact of intra-EU migration on the labor market, public services, and communities of EU member states. Although migration statistics express the advantages gained by migrating, such as to benefit from welfare tourism, extensive data demonstrate that EU citizens migrate primarily to work, and thus might make a positive economic impact on the country to which they

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migrate." This contention in the facts will be further discussed in Chapter 2. There are significant disparities in the interpretation of the economic impact of migrants on the part of scholars. Notwithstanding the extensive evidence claiming that EU migrants economically improve, rather than harm the countries to which they migrate, few scholars are willing to reject the status quo, which takes a negative view on EU migrants and their labor mobility.

1.2 The Theory of Intra-EU Migration

Major discrepancies exist between the economic effects I previously outlined and the political motivations for supporting and opposing intra-EU migration. Fiscally speaking, the EU economy thrives off migration. Politically, migration creates a conflict of interest; it instigates economic competition between migrant workers and some natives and generally causes cultural conflict. Politicians use the topic of intra-EU migration to form allies among citizens, and their rhetoric filters down into news publications, influencing public opinion and distorting the evidence on intra-EU migration. Together the political, economic and cultural preferences of a country’s citizens lead EU politicians to act accordingly. For example, Hix and Noury (2006) cite that left-wing politicians are more apt to support liberal migration policies, regardless of

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* Ibid.
* Ibid.
Bogdanov, Latchezar. “Fiscal Impact of EU Migrants in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK,” no. European Citizen Action Service (October 2014).
the negative economic implications of an overly saturated workforce. In the same vein, right-wing politicians broadly support restrictive policies, despite the economic benefit of capital investment. Such contested viewpoints represent the complexity underlying the issue of intra-EU migration.

When using a theoretical framework, the goals of the European Union are analogous to the international relations theory of interdependence, which states that countries look to implement international solutions to solve domestic problems. This notion of interdependence and “citizenship of the Union” emerged in the rhetoric of 2003 EU treaties; what it did was reaffirm the free movement principle. The theoretical foundation for the federation of the EU is divided into two waves: prior to the 1990s, the first wave embodied a bottom-up approach to EU governance; the second wave, which began in the 1990s, introduced the concept of “Europeanization”, where a top-down approach to integration has since been utilized. This shift showcases how the EU as a whole, has exercised more governing power, whereas, prior to the 1990s, individual countries in the EU were predominately more autonomous. Despite this, evidence shows that increasing EU migration levels are causing member states to

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Ibid.

retreat to the bottom-up approach, fearing that intra-EU migration threatens the political, economic, and cultural values of the nation state.

Since the late 1990s, with the Treaty on European Union (formally known as the 1993 Maastricht Treaty) and the Treaty on the Functions of the European Union (formally known as the 1958 Treaty of Rome), the valued, yet feared principal of free movement has encouraged anti-migration sentiments, particularly as the EU as a whole has suffered from the financial and economic crises of member states. Such events played a role in the institutionalization of EU member states placing restrictions on their labor markets during enlargement years. In particular, the 2004 Enlargement was characterized by such strict limitations on labor mobility, where countries determined whether or not newly accepted members of the EU could immediately work in the current member states; during this wave, Sweden, the UK, and Ireland were the only three countries that did not enforce seven-year restrictions. The decisions by these countries to do so is in part a reason why public opinion in Britain has grown less favorable toward EU integration, as its decision served as a driver for the surge of Eastern European migrants. The consequences that derived from the 2004 enlargement and its affect on England will be discussed in detail in Chapters 1, 3, and 4.

1.3 The Politics of Britain and Resistance Towards Integration

Politicians and policymakers are consistently framing the contentious topic of intra-EU migration in relation to its effects economically and culturally.

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1. Ibid.
A political schism on the issue is especially evident in Britain, where the political discourse reflects a disconnect between the responsibility of the member state to abide by the law set forth by the European Union regarding free movement, and the need for politicians to respond to their respective constituents’ opinions. In recent years, xenophobic politics in Britain has become the norm. While some countries, like Germany, have championed greater economic, political, and cultural integration, the anti-immigration sentiment has underpinned popular support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), a party highly critical of pro-migration policies and the EU overall. UKIP members believe that the EU diminishes political representation and fiscal stability in Britain. Many of its members, like Peter Whittle, a UKIP candidate for London Mayor, have criticized those who frame Euroskeptics as xenophobes, a claim often made by supporters of the EU and the free movement principle. According to Theresa May, the free movement principle has been misinterpreted: it was founded on the idea that EU members would have the ability to work in another country, rather than move in order to obtain work benefits from another country. May echoes the sentiments of many who believe that the free movement principle overreaches its original goal of facilitating economic cooperation.

On the other side of the political divide are the supporters of the Labour Party, previously led by Ed Miliband, and the Conservative Party, whose leader, David Cameron, was re-elected Prime Minister this past May. For Labour,

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building a shared society is integral to the success of Britain and Europe; increased migration and integration should be welcomed with open arms.\textsuperscript{18} Rather, for Prime Minister David Cameron, renegotiating with the EU to mend free movement rules by dis-incentivizing migrants through cuts to welfare benefits is necessary, as he believes integration will incur negative costs on British society.\textsuperscript{19} Altogether, these statements reflect the reality that Britain has a more antagonistic relationship with the EU than many other member states. In addition, these views illustrate just how contested the political rhetoric in Britain is.\textsuperscript{20} The June 2016 UK Referendum will clarify how important EU migration to Britain is in deciding on their membership status in the EU.

Strongly correlated with political discourse is public opinion and life satisfaction of citizens, which are both dependent on various economic, cultural, and historical events.\textsuperscript{21} Recently, the Survation poll for the Daily Mail, a conservative British newspaper, found that, of the 49 percent of Brits who wish the UK to stay in the European Union, 22 percent said they would change their mind if the migrant crisis worsened.\textsuperscript{22} Many who hold leadership positions in Britain have expressed similar sentiments: Theresa May of the British
Conservative Party, for example, recently has called Europe a “system of no borders.” While politicians like May blame EU policy, others like Alp Mehmet of Migration Watch, a UK immigration think tank, place the responsibility to fix the migrant problem in Britain on the political parties themselves: “these figures do not surprise me. Labour let immigration get out of control and the Coalition Government couldn’t get a grip on it. Now it is down to the Conservative Government to try to get a grip.” What troubles many British citizens is the uncertainty of how long these migrants, particularly those from Eastern Europe, will stay in Britain. While EU migration has positively contributed to Britain in a myriad of ways, the growing skepticism apparent within the political system and public sphere has branded EU migrants and European integration in a negative light.

1.4 It’s Not Economic. It’s Cultural.

Multiculturalism in Europe is a product of globalization and such multiculturalism complicates the goals of integration. According to Bond (2011), “culture determines identity, and maintaining traditional religious faith can help bond communities – a little Anatolia in Berlin, an echo of Algeria in the Parisian suburbs, a miniature Pakistan in the English Midlands.” Conversely, multiculturalism feeds popular fears of increased crime, political backlash, 

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* Ibid.
* Behr, Rafael. “Setting the Record Straight on the EU.” New Statesman, December 2013.
concerns about job security and welfare benefits, and suspicion among nationals. In British neighborhoods, it has purportedly created an erosion of cohesion between residents, political backlash, and a lack of belonging toward the mainstream British way of life for certain ethnic groups. This is particularly true in regards to the Polish community in Britain, which has been subject to marginalization, as the introduction of multiculturalism in Britain perpetuated certain stereotypes or classifications and hindered their social mobility. These sentiments are not as stridently proclaimed in Scandinavian countries, where migrants are perceived as positive contributors to the diversification of Europe and Scandinavia as a whole; this, however, may be due to the fact that these countries have not experienced the level of migration, which Britain has experienced. Such diverse, subjective interpretations of the effects of multiculturalism showcase the complexity of the issue, as it affects all EU member states differently.

Even more so, with the ever-decreasing rates of “native” fertility, it remains clear that the challenge of diversity will only grow, as native populations age and EU countries continue to diversify; this may in turn lead to cultural conflicts across groups as migration becomes more prevalent. Such a reality has leaders like German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, to claim that the

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goals of multiculturalism have failed. Given that the EU is established under the notion that collaboration is beneficial, Merkel’s statement is ironic. It alludes to the social and cultural side effects that underpin EU migration. Cultural diversity, as discussed by Martyn Bond, “has been the source of many of our continent’s greatest achievements – but, when mishandled, has also played a part in some of its greatest tragedies.” For Britain, EU identity and British identity appear to be at odds with one another, where, to the perception of some, only one is capable of surviving. The psychology behind how the British choose to express such patriotism, in relation to their opinions of the EU, has not been abundantly researched.

1.5 The Turkish Case and European Identity

The European Union provides a platform to ask questions regarding the importance of nationalism, integration, and migration in international relations. Even more so, it begs us to question whether or not the EU has certain cultural prerequisites to join: “the EU supposedly rests on a proven capacity to sustain a set of institutions, which, although originating in the West, are in principle capable of functioning on other soils and in other cultures as well. European identity is not given a thick cultural or historical coating; no exclusionary appeals are made to commonalities of history or faith, language or customs...it is the will to live together in the future, and not the fractious past, that defines the new European federation.” Understanding the makeup of the EU will bring to light

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Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
the reasons why the membership of certain countries creates a more contentious environment and likewise, what the unspoken characteristics of EU membership truly are. This brings forth the issue of EU membership for Turkey.

While EU membership has been contemplated for countries like Iceland, Norway, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the membership of Turkey in the EU poses a particularly unique challenge to the future of the European Union. In the case of Turkey, an implicit qualification for EU membership is identified: affiliation to a Christian religion. In fact, many studies explore the notion that Turkish migrants are perceived more negatively than other immigrant groups, perhaps for the very reason mentioned above. Its stark cultural differences are what make Turkey such a fascinating study within the discourse of intra-EU migration; not a EU member itself, but not an irrelevant player in EU affairs, the potential inclusion of Turkey forces us to come to terms with the role culture plays in supporting the goals of the EU and whether or not cultural cooperation, just like political and economic cooperation, can exist in upholding an EU “united in diversity”.

Over the course of the past half-century, Turkey has faced multiple rejections for EU membership, despite its willingness to reform on a political and economic level. Even without EU membership, however, Turkey is an influential component of the EU; the country represents the second largest group

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after ethnic German emigrants in Germany. Outside of Germany, Turks are especially visible in countries like the UK and France, too. This distinction of ethnic groups, like the Turks and Western European groups, has led to a nationalist intolerance in places like Greece, where a formal mosque, in the city of Athens, still to this day does not exist. It leads many to believe, as a plethora of scholarship shows, that the fear of a so-called “cultural invasion” supersedes a EU fear of economic downfall. The implications this theory holds, that is, that the inclusion of Turkey in the EU would further heighten cultural, economic, and political concerns between EU countries, will be further evaluated in Chapter 5.

2. The Argument

By taking into account these various factors that relate to intra-EU migration, I set forth the framework to establish my argument. In the midst of refugee crises, political discourse on building walls to keep illegal immigrants out of the United States, and the obvious presence of globalization that has blurred the borders of continent and state, lays the largely ignored phenomenon of intra-EU migration. Intra-EU migration, a fundamental component of the free movement principle and embedded in the founding document of the European Union, has generated benefits while also presenting problems for EU member states. Although this stream of migration is legal, it has sparked popular sentiments of xenophobia in some countries, which has led to potential turmoil,

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* Kaya, Asiyiye. Special Issue: The Fiftieth Anniversary of Migration from Turkey to Germany. Introduction: (Re) Considering the Last Fifty Years of Migration and Current Immigration Policies In Germany. Berghahn, 2013.


* Ibid.
causing member states to grow further apart, rather than closer together, and thus endangering the goal of 28 countries to be “united in diversity”, as the EU motto states. In particular, the impacts of intra-EU migration on Britain serve as a unique case study for understanding the boundaries between the EU and country, illustrating how nationality, culture, politics, and public opinion come into play as levels of EU migration continue to surge. While the issue of intra-EU migration can be understood through the lens of its economic, political, cultural, and national implications, scholars have not been able to come to consensus with regards to which of these factors is most threatening toward the maintaining and advancing of the project for ever closer union.

Since the topic of intra-EU migration is one that has not been analyzed as closely as the issues underlying international migration, a crucial piece of the immigration and migration discourse is lacking. The phenomenon of intra-EU migration derives in part from the fact that intra-EU migration is legal. It is the right of all EU citizens to partake in it and thus member states lack the governing power to regulate it through policymaking. While the free movement principle was enacted to foster economic prosperity for the countries that choose to participate, the cultural implications have become a cause of concern for countries, like Britain, that view free movement as an attraction for unskilled migrants and individuals whose presence will ultimately change the cultural composition of the country. This issue could alter what the European Union does and will represent, as it will challenge whether cultural prerequisites may exist for EU admission in the future.
2.1 Why Britain?

For some scholars, politicians, leaders, and citizens of Britain, intra-EU migration is more than just a battle for economic prosperity and political power; it has signified a struggle to preserve mainstream British culture. Britain, one of the four countries comprised of the United Kingdom, has historically maintained a less pro-EU mentality towards integration. The political and economic implications of intra-EU migration come together to unveil the true controversy behind free movement, where the pressing issue is the threat to national culture. Britain exhibits a unique case in which intra-EU migration and the subject of EU integration is a prominent and contentious issue.

Britain is attractive for its location within the European markets, language, adequate school system, business opportunities, culture, and lifestyle. Most notably, in general, Britain is a popular destination for Bulgarian, Romanian, and Polish migrants – all which have contributed to increasing fear and hostility among British citizens. For the year ending in March 2015, statistics show that 53,000 EU2 citizens (citizens from the countries of Bulgaria and Romania that joined the EU in 2007) migrated to Britain. However, while migration to Britain captures the arrival of EU citizens from all over Europe, the biggest issue has been regarding migrants who do not fit the general racial and religious composition of British citizens – most noticeably, Eastern Europeans migrants.

One defining factor of this immense influx of migrants to Britain, over the course of the last four years, is the elimination of the imposed labor restriction in 2011,

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Ibid.

which restricted access to the labor market for EU2 citizens.\(^a\) These restrictions actually created a surge of high-skilled migrants from non-EEA countries to the British labor market.\(^b\) Britain has also remained attractive to EU migrants because of its flexible and unregulated labor market and absence of vocational education and training, which has created a need for migrant workers.\(^c\) Despite regulations that were put into place to monitor the entry of migrants into the labor market, enforcement has been lacking. Many companies looking to hire migrants have therefore found loopholes in the system, providing social assistance to individuals who do not yet qualify to work in the EU.\(^d\)

When analyzing the case of Britain, migration data not only showcases how Britain has become one of the most desirable countries to migrate to; data also display how migrants have shaped the labor force. Britain is a unique case because it primarily attracts skilled migrants who are geographically dispersed across the country. However, despite being high skilled, many migrants to Britain are employed in jobs below their skill level.\(^e\) According to data from 2013, EU-27 citizens (citizens from the countries of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom)

\(^a\) Vargas-Silva, Carlos, and Yvonni Markaki. “Briefing: EU Migration to and from the UK.” University of Oxford, n.d.


\(^d\) Ibid.

\(^e\) Ibid.
represented 5% of total employment in Britain. Unlike the popular assumption expressed by politicians and public opinion polls that migrants create a negative economic impact on the EU countries they migrate to, scholars like Dustmann and Frattini provide evidence to showcase that EEA immigrants, in particular, have made a positive contribution to Britain, contributing 10% more than natives between 1995 and 2011. Such studies directly contradict political rhetoric, which claims EU migrants have a negative effect on the economy of the states they migrate to.

Perhaps even more illuminating is the following results from a Dustmann and Frattini study: between 2001-11, EEA migrants contributed to one-third more in revenues than in public spending. Further studies from Dustmann and Frattini demonstrate that the use of public goods by EU migrants does not burden British citizens; instead, migration allows for the sharing of public goods to be dispersed among a larger population, which should theoretically make them cheaper. Further research by the European Citizen Action Service, too, found that migrants have a rather small impact on the public finances of a host country. This information demystifies the notion that intra-EU migration is a net cost to the migrant-receiving member states. Still, despite these telling statistics, sufficient data is still lacking that might help clarify exactly how positive or negative intra-EU migration is overtime. These clarifications could be made in how much EU migrants spend on education, how much their children pay for

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
education, as well as how the use of government expenditures and revenues comes into play.\textsuperscript{11}

Each country in the EU has a different understanding of its role as a member state, as well as a different opinion regarding the issue of intra-EU migration. For southern EU states, like Italy and Greece, the primary cause of concern has always been international migration, given that they border the Mediterranean, Tyrrhenian, Adriatic, Ionian, and Aegean seas. For most Scandinavian countries, which traditionally have a more homogenous population, intra-EU migration has seldom been a contentious topic. Given their economic supremacy, countries like Britain and Germany have predominantly been responsible for managing fiscal issues that have affected the EU, which also means they have bore the burdens of larger inflows of migration. Their economic success and stability is central to their attraction of EU migrants. While Germany has altogether taken a fairly positive approach to intra-EU migration, Britain has not, as previously discussed, expressed similar sentiments.

For Britain, the free movement principle signifies just one of the many rules that has been imposed on them, due to EU admission. Given that Britain has largely attempted to distinguish itself from other EU countries (for example, its desire to use an entirely different currency), it is crucial to analyze how their response towards intra-EU migration differs from that of other EU countries and how this response may or may not create a domino effect for other member states. Given that the UK will have a referendum in June 2016 on whether or not

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
to remain in the EU, it is particularly timely that Britain be used as a case study for answering this research question.

2.3 Organizational Structure

In this thesis, I will study the economic, cultural, political, and historical implications of intra-EU migration in order to understand how these factors may or may not significantly impinge on the integration of EU member states. I do so through the evaluation of scholarly material, statistics pertaining to the movement and impact thereof of EU nationals across the European Union, public opinion data, and personal interviews with three established academics from UK universities, who have provided me with primary evidence on the role of intra-EU migration. This chapter expresses a review of the secondary literature on the function and effects of intra-EU migration, as well as outlines my central theoretical argument.

In chapter one, I begin with a historical examination of intra-EU migration, by discussing EU growth from the seven EU enlargements, which have each individually, shaped the EU’s current form and served to increase political salience in the region and the notion behind the free movement principle. In chapter two, I provide the economic framework for intra-EU migration, assessing whether or not intra-EU migration has positively or negatively contributed to labor mobility and the economy of member states. I do so by analyzing the single market system and compiling scholarly data on the economic impact of migrants. In chapter three, I discuss how cultural conflict, the most controversial and potentially severing of factors discussed in this thesis, has sparked from intra-EU migration. Here, I will examine cultural contention in the
EU post the 2004 enlargement, addressing how member states have dealt with changes to the nation state. In chapter four, I assess how the conclusions drawn out in the prior chapters pertain to the case of Britain; I articulate Britain’s special relationship with the EU and its sentiments towards EU migration, as it is expressed through public opinion polls, British political parties, British law and policy, and primary source interviews with three UK university academics in London. In chapter five, I expand on the discourse of intra-EU migration by delving into the potential for a EU accession for Turkey, considering what it means to be a member of the European Union and what it means to be European. Lastly, I conclude by summarizing the challenges of the EU for the future, question how member states can maintain a sense of national identity, whilst contributing wholly to a union of diverse European countries, and suggest how further research may expand on the contributions of my thesis.
Chapter One
Growing the Union – *History of Enlargements and Free Movement*

The genesis of the European Union began with the unwavering efforts of French diplomat, Jean Monnet and French foreign minister, Robert Schuman. These two men, who fervently believed in the “virtues” and “necessity” of European integration, intellectually constructed the foundation for what is today known as the European Union. Monnet and Schuman are credited with launching the Schuman Plan to restructure the distribution of coal and steel across Europe, striving to establish newfound European integration. Since the birth of the Schuman Plan on May 9, 1950, European countries have subsequently forged new treaties and rules, growing closer together, under the guise that unity in diversity supersedes the benefits of national political and economic independence.

The European Union today varies tremendously politically, economically, and culturally from Monnet and Schuman’s European Community. As Miles and Redmond observe (1996), “the consensus of the original six [Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands] has been gradually eroded by the accession of new members with politico-economic cultures which were different to theirs and which generated intergovernmental attitudes and/or were based on a very strong perception of the objective of participation in the EU as being the pursuit of economic self-interest.” Therefore, in order to understand the various implications that comprise the impact of intra-EU migration, it is imperative to understand its progression from a European

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Community to a European Union. Europe’s history is embedded in a series of laws, treaties, acts, and enlargements that serve as the foundation for its far-reaching influence and power in Europe and across the globe; the dominance of EU politics and its effect on international relations spans far beyond Europe today and its growth as a union over time alludes to several problems and challenges that it faces presently.

An analysis of European history and EU enlargements will provide the framework for unraveling a complexly structured organization founded on ever-changing circumstances, yet bound by tradition. The European Union is more than an alliance of countries that trade social and political cooperation for economic success; the EU serves as a unique case study, if not the only case, for the integration of different political systems, economic strategies, policy problems, and cultural preferences. In understanding these key historical events, we may begin to assess how enlargement years and changing laws do or do not effect current EU member state relations.

In this chapter, I will begin to unpack the nuances affiliated with the relationship between member states and the European Union through its extensive history. I will briefly outline the history of the European Union since 1945 to present day, from its birth with six founding member states, tracing its growth with each enlargement following, to its most recent addition of Croatia in 2007. Secondly, I will discuss the purpose and importance of the free movement principle – the challenges and benefits it poses as the foundation of the European Union. In looking at both enlargement history and evaluating free movement, I hope to create the framework for evaluating when and how intra-EU migration affects the member state relationship.
Each EU enlargement should be studied individually because each enlargement tells a unique story, showcasing the immense growth of the European Union since 1945 and bringing to light the key periods of time where political and cultural salience existed; this becomes particularly noticeable, for example, with the 2004 enlargement of ten Eastern European countries. Prior to 2004, enlargements were not widely discussed, nor were they politically, economically, or culturally salient; the countries that joined the EU prior to 2004 were easily absorbable and the volume of migration was relatively modest. Taking a historical approach clarifies when and where challenges to EU integration exist, as it wasn’t until 2004 that EU political, economic, and cultural fears intensified.

However, EU enlargements cannot be fully understood without taking into account the scope of the free movement principle, as it dictates the freedom allotted to each citizen under EU doctrines. Discussion and interpretations of the free movement principle influence political discourse and public opinion. Such opinions are historically correlated with the trends and surges in EU migration over time. Thus, by examining the historical context of the European Union and determining the role of intra-EU migration, inter-member state relations will be evaluated from past to present.

1. Enlarging the EU

1.1 The Founding Countries (1945 – 1971)

The origins of the European Union lie in the bloody battles of World War II. According to Dinan (1999), Monnet “came to the conclusion early in World War II that economic integration was the only means by which conflict in Europe
would be avoided,” citing that national independence and economic protectionism would not result in a prosperous and peaceful Europe. Even before the onset of the European Union, the Economic Community originated under the guise that it could help restore peace, prosperity, and cooperation in Europe. Those, like Schuman and Monnet, who believed in this possibility, endeavored to begin with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950. United in this goal of securing “lasting peace”, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands became the six founding countries for what would four decades later become the European Union.

The purpose of the European Coal and Steel Community was to facilitate political and economic unity. In fact, most countries that did join the European Community during this period (and in the future) did so to avoid political and economic isolation, rather than with the interest and intent to foster a notion of European integration and development. More specifically, the Treaty sought to create interdependence in both coal and steel so that individual countries could not “mobilize its armed forces without others knowing.” This goal is important because it symbolized a desire to ensure protection and defense across Europe. Overwhelmed by the Soviet Union’s advances in the space race and Communist takeover, this initial union of European states marks the onset of an east-west division.

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3. Miles and Redmond, p. 291.
1.2. The First Enlargement

The early 1970s were characterized by an impending U.S. decline, uneven distribution of power among countries, the rise of Germany, and fluctuating exchange rates, all leading to complications for the European Community. The economic prowess of Germany, in particular, encouraged European collaboration for countries, like France, that were amidst an economic decline. For countries like Britain, enlargement would be critical to avoiding the political and economic takeover of Germany, especially in regards to Ostpolitik, or Germany’s “new eastern policy” to mend relations with Eastern Europe. In a 1971 white paper...

- Dinan, Chapter 3.
issued by the British government, EU accession is described as an opportunity to provide security, peace, development, and economic prosperity that could not be adequately realized for Britain on its own. Interestingly enough, the document cited that British sovereignty would remain resilient, despite joining the Union; such a perspective uniquely expresses Britain’s particular relationship with the EU and directly notes the interests and concerns Britain had before joining.  

Denmark, Ireland, and Norway also campaigned for European integration, each holding referendums for EC membership in the two years prior to 1973. Receiving a 53.5 percent vote against accession, Norway public opinion showed that its citizens did not view integration favorably, and thus they never did join. In Denmark, EC membership was welcomed with open arms, as Danish citizens believed that refraining from joining would be economically disastrous, given its vigorous trade relationship with Britain and Germany. Ireland would later be forced to join as well, under this logic, if it hoped to continue prospering economically in connection with Britain’s bustling economy. After much deliberation, the first EU Enlargement took place on January 1st of 1973, extending Community membership to Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.

1.3 Six Additional Members (1973 – 1986)  
While the last four decades showed significant progress in integration, the 1980s were filled with a sense of fear and anxiety for the state of the European Community. Was it successful? Had it done enough to foster integration since

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* Dinan, Chapter 3.
* Dinan, Chapter 3.
World War II? These were the questions being asked and answered in academic reports, like that of The European Community: Progress or Decline? Despite budgetary obstacles, a need for reform in the European Commission, and new political leadership in Britain and France, the accession of Greece, the first European Parliament Elections, and the inauguration of the Economic Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 culminated to form newfound revival and interest in deepening integration efforts. Still, the 1980s accession applications for Greece, Spain, and Portugal questioned whether the Community would crumble economically.

Despite some misgivings on the part of European Union member states, these three countries would later join the Union (Greece in 1980 and Spain and Portugal in 1986). Their recent emergence from a dictatorial regime generated fear on the part of European Community members: France felt threatened by the potential inclusion of another Mediterranean power, while former European Commission president, Jenkins, was quick to express Greece’s lack of qualifications for membership. As the possibility for expanding the European Community became a reality, the importance of maintaining economic stability became ever more indicative of the Community’s mission and intentions.

The mid-1980s to early 1990s brought several accomplishments for the European Community. The Treaty of Rome was reformed to create the Single European Act, instituting the single market program. In addition to improving efficiency, trade, and competition, the program endeavored to revive poverty-stricken Portugal and Spain. For both countries, joining the Community would aid in their physical isolation and assist in establishing their new democracies.

Dinan, Chapter 4.
Yet, their economic state could cause problems for EC membership. The expansion of communism also removed several barriers between the east and west and individual European countries, spiking the level of asylum and refugee movements to Northern and Southern Europe.

The inclusion of additional countries to the European Community prompted the commitment to four freedoms: movement of goods, services, people, and food. It broadened the scope of the European Union, enhancing communication between European countries, particularly with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1993 and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. The Maastricht Treaty is formally known as the birth of the European Union and the euro, the latter developed to encourage the economic and political exchange between member states. It did so, particularly, by creating a common foreign affairs policy and citizenship standards. Other political reinforcements that took place during the 1980s and 1990s include: improved cooperation between EU governments, in regards to defense and home affairs and increased power to make decisions for Parliament.

1.6 1995: The Eftan Enlargement

In 1995, Austria, Sweden, and Finland, three members of the European Free Trade Association, joined the EU. The accession of these three countries,

\[^{66}\] Dinan, Chapter 5.
\[^{68}\] The history of the European Union, ibid.
\[^{69}\] EU Treaties, ibid.
according to Miles and Redmond (1996)* primarily occurred under the guise that it was “now politically essential for each country to fully participate within EU decision-making.” Despite being allegedly uninterested in the support of a “Federal Europe”, or one that promoted political homogeneity, the inclusion of these affluent countries brought environmental issues, discussions of Third World development, and social policies to the forefront. The inclusion of Sweden and Finland, in particular, connected the European Union with the far north. Unlike Finland, Sweden was fairly Eurosceptic, although its deep economic recession was slightly alleviated by its membership. Contrastingly, Austria and Finland have a positive relationship with the EU, viewing its membership as a mechanism for enhancing security. Despite their reservations, the addition of these three countries would strengthen the EU’s desire to foster open government and democratic traditions.

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* Miles and Redmond, p. 295.
* Dinan, Chapter 7; Miles and Redmond, p. 288.
* Dinan, Chapter 7.
1.7 The 2004 Enlargement

Despite each enlargement’s significant contribution and impact to the formation and progression of the European Union, the enlargement that produced the most transformative change is that of 2004. Today, it is by far, the most critiqued and examined by scholars and politicians. Welcoming in the countries of Czechia, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the 2004 enlargement is the largest enlargement to date. This enlargement is momentous for two reasons: 1) the Eastern European countries that joined vastly differed culturally from EC member states; and 2) this enlargement enacted seven-year labor restrictions for countries that chose to
initially reduce their membership benefits, displaying a major attempt to integrate new member states into the EU, without acquiring economic or political damage.

In an attempt to maintain economic stability in the Union and integrate new Member States, all but three (the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden) EU countries imposed labor restrictions on the 2004 Enlargement states. These labor restrictions account for the specific migration patterns evident in the mid-to-late 2000s. Since EU countries like Italy, Germany, and France imposed labor restrictions on the 2004 countries, Eastern European migrants were more prone to move to places like Britain, where they were given rights to work almost instantly. It is this decision, on the part of these three countries, that would forever change the course of EU member state relations and public opinion toward intra-EU migration across all of the EU. The labor restrictions, instituted on the part of every other EU country, were not completely effective; these migrants did gravitate toward countries like Italy and Spain, where illegal work relationships were prevalent. Coupled with increased tensions in the east, this brought trouble to the border countries that saw an increase in asylum and refugee migrants. Still, the inclusion of Eastern European countries in the 2004 enlargement holds serious implications for the EU project for “ever closer union”. More on this will be discussed from a cultural standpoint in Chapter 3.

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72 Dustmann and Frattini, p. 9.
1.8 Expansions Today

In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed and Bulgaria and Romania became EU member states. The Treaty of Lisbon’s main purpose was to improve several facets of the EU: increasing the power of the European Parliament, amending the voting process, and expanding the democratic functions of the EU. In doing so, it also sought to discuss the power balance between individual EU member states and the EU as a whole – an issue still being addressed today. Six years later in 2013, Croatia joined the European Union. Currently, Croatia is still under labor restrictions; therefore its impact, as a member state, cannot be fully assessed. Still, it exemplifies yet another enlargement of the EU to the east. What these two most recent enlargements show is that complication of the EU goal to
be “united in diversity” has only increased, as efforts to keep pro-nation state supporters at bay continues to prove difficult. The inclusion of Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia dare us to ask the questions: how big is big enough, and how free is free enough?

Figure 4. Image of the European Union today, as it stands with 28 member states

Source: BBC News (2014)
2. What is Free Movement?

The free movement principle is a fundamental privilege bestowed upon each European Union member state. It is undoubtedly the cornerstone of the most unique inter-state relationship across the globe. Free movement is what Arendt (1958) calls the “right to have rights” and what other scholars refer to as the “bedrock of the European common market.” Although the essence of free movement is to provide “unfettered movement of capital and goods”, the social and cultural factors of free movement go hand in hand with the economic benefits. This is why it is crucial to evaluate the components of free movement.

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Ibid.

Drzewiecka, Jolanta A., Joshua F. Hoops, and Ryan J. Thomas, p. 411
Outlined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Article on free movement reads:

1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health:
   (a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
   (b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
   (c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;
   (d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public service.

Article 45 discusses free movement as a freedom with regards to labor rights, again in reference to the EU’s goal of facilitating economic cooperation. Yet this principle cannot solely be impactful economically. It has massive implications for governing structures as well; free movement shifted power from the states to the EU and changed the rhetoric on politics of mobility and belonging. Free movement can be advantageous for EU nationals living and working in another EU country, as well as their family members, while also challenging national representation and understanding of migrants. Most importantly, the extent of free movement goes far beyond its ability to offer employment opportunities to the citizens of EU member states. Free movement also allows individuals to strengthen familial ties,

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76 Drzewiecka, Jolanta A., Joshua F. Hoops, and Ryan J. Thomas, p. 411
allow students the opportunity to study abroad, grant improved retirement benefits, and assist member state citizens to weather economic crises. It is an expansive freedom that sets the EU story of migration apart.

According to the studies conducted by the European Commission (2015) in Frankfurt, Leeds, Milan, and Rotterdam, the free movement of workers presents several challenges and opportunities. Integration must occur not only in the labor market, but also at the community level. These studies reveal that EU workers are a diverse subset of the labor force, both socioeconomically and culturally. Although EU workers benefit the economy by “bringing in entrepreneurial energy, purchasing goods and services, and helping to revitalise the housing market,” mass movement of migrants also presents housing challenges and imposes financial pressure on local services. The study does make clear that the perception that EU workers relying heavily on local services is much more pronounced than the reality of their use.

The pattern of free movement has predominately been affected by seven enlargement dates. Free movement has also been relevant during periods of economic turmoil in Europe and across the globe. According to Benton and Petrovic (2013), particular characteristics of EU enlargement can be seen prior to the 2004 enlargement of Eastern European countries (pre-enlargement), in the post-enlargement period of the 2004 enlargement.
and during the economic crisis. As mentioned above, no enlargement has garnered the same level of attention and influence as those of 2004. For this reason, the sheer distribution of the 2004 enlargement reaffirms the notion that the salience of intra-EU migration is dependent on the volume of migration and the kind of member states admitted.

Between 2004 and 2008, two particular shifts occurred in the movement of citizens of new member states moving to live in the EU-15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom): thousands of Polish and Baltic citizens migrated to Britain and Ireland, while Romanian and Bulgarian citizens moved to Spain and Italy. For governments like that of Britain, the sheer volume of migrants came as somewhat of a shock, underestimating by 90,000 the EU migrants it received. Due to the 2008 economic crisis, the most evident shifts of migrant patterns came to be seen from Greece and Spain to Germany. This shift continues to be clear today.

The history of EU enlargements sets the stage for dissecting the various elements of intra-EU migration: the importance of economic development, the challenges of cultural inclusion, the political arguments that have formed around the free movement principle, and the unique relationship Britain shares with the EU. Each EU enlargement has brought new challenges and concerns to the Union, continuing to question how the benefits of free movement and inclusion of new countries to the European Union may alter the phenomenon of this politico-economic union. Just as

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\[\text{\textsuperscript{81}}\] Benton and Petrovic, p. 6.
Martin Ruhs (2015) has posed in his book and blog “The Price of Rights”: can and should free movement in the EU movement be reformed to offer unrestricted labor migration policy, whilst still maintaining an inclusive welfare market or do the benefit of intra-EU migration outweigh the costs (Ruhs 2015)? The following chapters seek to answer these questions through their respective economic, cultural, and political lens.

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Chapter Two
Labor Mobility and the Economic Impact of Intra-EU Migration

As previously discussed, the European Union’s raison d’être, in essence, is to display an ability to function more effectively in an economic capacity, together as member states, rather than apart. For decades now, politicians and public figures on the right have made forceful arguments for why the free movement of EU citizens, and of international migrants for that matter, hinders economic growth. They have encouraged anxiousness among EU citizens and have affected the media’s portrayal of free movement in the EU. On the other hand, economists and individuals who favor economic integration in the EU champion the notion that diversifying the labor market will strengthen EU member state economies as a whole.

This is how the free movement principle was born. As stated by Brauninger (2014), “from a macroeconomic point of view, open labour markets are a precondition for the efficient use of labour and thus a major instrument to foster growth and employment in Europe.” At the same time however, economic crises can cause shifts in migration trends. For example, it has caused increased east-west migration and migration from the periphery to the core member states. These events have become commonplace for countries like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In addition to this, there are two aspects of the relationship between the economy and intra-EU migration that are said to be true: 1) economic factors relate to why people migrate in the first place, and 2) economic integration of the EU has had a pronounced difference on a member state’s given

\footnote{Ibid.}
labor market, which then precipitates fears on the part of citizens, regarding the lasting effects of intra-EU migration and how it could affect their labor markets. The economic argument against further intra-EU migration and expansion of the Union is one of the strongest obstructions to furthering the goal of EU integration. Thus, it is fitting to begin discussing this factor, before delving into the possible cultural and political aspects of intra-EU migration. Despite such passionate debate and discussion that claims EU migrants steal jobs and hurt member state economies, scholarly analysis largely contradicts this, claiming that EU citizens do not negatively affect the member states to which they migrate. In fact, data shows quite the opposite. Yet despite this, the economic evidence proven by the scholars does not sway Eurosceptic individuals. Recognizing the contention that exists between these two sides, and understanding the economic analysis of several scholars will allow us to see how the economy impacts EU migration, and later on, look to provide evidence for whether or not these factors serve to further advance or impede the goals of “ever closer” union.

More specifically, it is most relevant to the goals of this thesis to understand how the UK is affected by the economic impacts of intra-EU migration. As indicated in Chapter 1, and to be further bolstered in Chapter 4, the UK (Britain, in particular) has had significantly different experiences with intra-EU migrants, given the sheer number of migrants it has welcomed in and the political and cultural backlash it has created. Even more so, the fiscal effects of intra-EU migration on the UK are important to identify because they often contradict the personal views of many UK citizens. Several scholarly studies on the UK itself point to the positive contribution EU migrants make, as a result of their migration decision. Despite this publicly available data, few efforts have
been successful at challenging the viewpoints of politicians, public figures, and EU citizens.

In this chapter, I will discuss the levels of EU migration, particularly as they pertain to the EU enlargements. Doing so will demonstrate where EU migrants have chosen to migrate to over time, as well as which periods of time have lent themselves to particularly large movements of migrants. Then, I will analyze and summarize several economic arguments, as presented by prominent scholars to illustrate how EU migrants contribute positively to the member states and labor forces in which they migrate. It will not be my intention to create or pose any new understanding of the economic implications of intra-EU migration in this chapter. Rather, I wish to concisely aggregate the data currently available on intra-EU migration to exhibit the strongest possible argument in favor of the positive economic contributions made by EU migrants and to contribute to the understanding that economic factors have caused the backlash to intra-EU migration.

1. Migration Trends throughout EU enlargements

1.1 Pre and Post the 2004 Enlargement

The presence of EU migrants is not unique to the last decade. What is unique, however, is the increased presence of migrant groups since the 2004 enlargement. It can be viewed as partially responsible for triggering fears about the national economy, politics, and culture. As echoed by Bela Galgoczi, Janine Leschke, and Andrew Watt (2011), “in the accession countries, ‘free movement’ was seen unanimously as a fundamental right. In the EU-15 countries, accession
was preceded by intensive and at times controversial debates about likely immigration flows and whether countries should immediately open up their labour markets fully, permitting unhindered labour mobility, or whether existing restrictions should be maintained for the foreseen transitional periods.”

Migration statistics, while varying from one index to the next index, typically quantify the movement of migrants to and from EU member states. This is done, in particular, by looking at net migration, or the difference between the number of migrants that come into and out of the country. Migration statistics can also be interpreted in terms of migrant stock, or the percentage of migrants residing in a given state. Using the NINo, or National Insurance Numbers, which are allocated to all migrants in the UK, can also demonstrate where migrants typically come from and how many arrive. For example, in 2013, net migration to the UK increased by 20% from 2011. In addition to this, NINo data demonstrates that the number of migrants grew from the years 2012/2013 to 2013/2014. The populations of migrants with some of the highest numbers were seen for Romanians (+63%), Italians (+28%), Poles (+12%), and Portuguese (+11%).

Each enlargement, since the founding of the European Union, has seen migration to and from each member state. Levels of migration were fairly modest during the first four enlargements, following the founding of the European Community. The period following 2004, however, has presented significant trends in the role EU migration has played in the EU. No longer moderate, EU migration accelerated after 2004, leading to the development of three main eras of free movement: 1) the period prior to 2004, 2) the period following the 2004

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*European Commission, p. 27.*
enlargement, and 3) the period since the economic crisis, experiencing a east-west shift in labor mobility.«

In the period prior to the 2004 enlargement, the main destination countries for work were Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Prior to 2004, there was a relatively stable number of Eastern European countries like Poland, Hungary, and Czechia present in the EU. For example, Germany had approximately 317,600 Polish migrants. Post 2004, these numbers exponentially grew. Between 2004 and 2008, Benton and Petrovic (2013) claim that the number of citizens living in the EU-15 increased by more than one million people. Specifically, these increased flows were seen in countries like the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, and Italy, which received large migrant populations from Romania, Poland and other Baltic countries.»

In 2010, six years after the 2004 enlargement, three years after the 2007 enlargement, and before the accession of Croatia, EU migrants represented 35% of the total migrant stock in all EU countries. For some countries, like Luxembourg, Ireland, and Czechia, migrants accounted for well over 70%. Still, for some powerhouse member states of the EU, such as Germany, the UK, and France, the total migrant stock exceeded 25%. Specifically, for Germany, migrants in 2010, represented 3.7 million of the population. The UK, on the other hand, accounted for 2.2 million of the population.« In order to understand what kind of migrants denote the largest proportion of such migrant stocks, we can refer to The World Bank, which in a 2010 study, reported that the largest ethnic

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* Ibid.
* Benton, Meghan, and Milica Petrovic, p. 5-6.
groups of people living in other EU member states are the Romanians, Poles, Italians, and Germans. When considering British citizens who live abroad, the largest population of Britons in 2010 could be found in Spain, Ireland, France and Germany – or in other words, other relatively economically prosperous EU countries."

**Figure 6.** EU migrants in each EU country, 2010

![EU migrants in each EU country, 2010](chart.png)

*Source: The World Bank*

**1.2 Migration Flows to and From the UK**

As stated, previously, the sheer movement in the number of intra-EU migration in the 2004 enlargement was the catalyst for increased social tensions in the EU: “the most important consequences of eastern enlargement has been the full or partial opening up of national labour markets to citizens of the other

- Ibid.
member states, not just within the – relatively homogenous – 15 ‘old’ member states, but for the entire EU of 25 countries.” This opening up of migration is credited with causing the spike in xenophobia, for economic, cultural, and political reasons, throughout the European Union (this is only further heightened by the presence of non-EU migration). Particularly, it is worth exploring the large number of migrants to the UK, a phenomenon not evident among all EU member states.

Figure 7. Number of EU-born in the UK, 1993-2015


2. Fiscal Impact of Intra-EU Migration

The financial impact, which results from intra-EU migration, takes into account an array of factors. When considering the position of migrants, it is important to distinguish between migrants to certain EU countries and the citizens born in their respective EU countries, specifically in regards to age, employment type, and level of education. Perhaps more importantly, it is necessary to understand that low economic contribution is not necessarily correlated with increased dependency on welfare benefits. Rather, low fiscal contribution is more closely related to low levels of income, which is not necessarily a characterization of migrants. Migrants are mostly young, with high levels of education that seldom rely on welfare benefits compared with their native counterparts. This is particularly true for the 2004 EU migrant groups. Migrants are also more likely to be over-qualified for the jobs they perform, tend to be engaged in temporary or part-time employment, and are predominantly female.

The member states that joined the EU during the 2004 and 2007 enlargements heightened the relevance of understanding the economic impact of EU migration, specifically amidst a global financial crisis. As echoed by the European Citizen Action Service (2014), “social expenditure (including old-age pensions) takes more than half of all government spending in most EU countries. As a share of GDP, it has gradually grown to exceed 30%.” Such evidence demonstrates that in times of economic distress, the overall share of social goods

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* Ibid.
* Ibid.
go up, which may be enough to further depress a country’s economic standing. For example, during the period between 2005 and 2012, Germany and Austria were able to keep their social expenditure levels fairly consistent. Conversely, levels of social expenditure for the UK and the Netherlands grew between the years 2005 and 2012. Welfare migration is particularly problematic for Britain since the 2004 enlargement. Migration flow from Eastern European member states to Britain, while larger than expected, was a direct response to the increase levels of social expenditure. Prior to 2011, economists predicted that the 2004 enlargement would introduce 5,000 to 3,000 migrants to Britain. Instead, in 2011, 521,000 Polish-born individuals migrated to Britain. Many Bulgarian and Romanian migrants, too, came in larger numbers to Britain. While both populations are relatively poor, studies by economists show that migrants, being young and able for employment, actually serve as net economic benefits, paying “more in taxes than they collect in tax-supported benefits.”

2.1 Fiscal Impact of EU Migration in the UK

Still, the fear that EU migrants are likely to hurt, rather than help, member state economies, has resonated strongly with Britain. In particular, it has caused Britain to reform its migration laws, denying unemployment insurances benefits for the first three months that EU migrants are in the country. Similarly, it

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* Bogdanov, Latchezar, p. 5.
* Ibid.
caused the UK to institute a policy where EU migrants needed to reach a certain salary threshold in order to be eligible for British welfare benefits.

The fiscal costs and benefits of intra-EU migration, particularly in regards to the A8 countries (i.e. eight of the ten Eastern European countries which joined the EU during the 2004 accession, excluding Cyprus and Malta), have been widely discussed by economists Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini. According to Rob McNeil, Head of Media and Communications at the Migration Observatory of the University of Oxford, it is Dustmann’s publications for the British government, which convinced government officials that it should not impose labor restrictions in 2004.

In several of Dustmann and Frattini’s studies individuals from A8 countries are largely characterized as a younger and better-educated cohort of people, in relation to the native UK population. The British Labour Force Survey (LFS), which surveys 53,000 households each quarter, determined that 32 percent of A8 men and 40 percent of A8 women are highly educated; by highly educated, the LFS means these individuals have left their academic studies at age 21 or over. This compares to 18 percent of native men and 16 percent of native women. The additional numbers that aim to show that the economic contribution of A8 individuals have not hindered economic growth in the UK or impeded on the labor force endeavors of UK citizens bolsters these facts. For example, Dustmann et al (2010) claim that A8 migrants are 59 percent less likely than natives to receive state benefits and 57 percent less likely than natives to rely on social housing.

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* Ibid.
* Ibid.
While debatable, and deserving of some exploration, these statistics represent the existing disconnect between how migrants economically affect the labor force in which they become a part of and the mainstream response from UK citizens: “the belief that immigrants ‘take out’ more than they ‘put in’ is reflected in responses in questions in surveys of public attitude: according to the 2002 European Social Survey, 57 per cent of the UK population believed that immigrants were taking more out of the welfare system than they put in, while only 11 per cent thought that immigrants were net contributors”.[3] In an analysis of welfare dependency, and when controlling for the limited information provided for in the Labour Force Survey, A8 migrants who have been in the UK for at least 2 years are said to be 19.5 percentage points less likely to receive benefits and tax credits than their fellow natives.[4]

These perceptions of A8 migrants are debunked in the Labour Force Survey, especially when considering the employment rate. The fiscal impact of the 2004 enlargement provided the creation for the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS), a database that tracked all A8 workers within the first 12 months of their employment. According to data taken from the Labour Force Survey, A8 countries, as a proportion of the UK population, increased from 0.01 percent to .09 percent between the second quarter of 2004 and the first quarter of 2009. The proportion of A8 countries represented in the UK only continued to grow more strongly over the course of 2009. Descriptive statistics for the years 2004-2008 suggest that for A8 migrants, approximately 90 percent of men and 74 percent of women factored into the UK employment rate; this compares with

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approximately 78 percent for native men and 71 percent for native women.\textsuperscript{102} Despite such employment rates, A8 migrants are still prone to lower wages than their native co-workers.

In another study by Dustmann and Frattini (2014)\textsuperscript{103}, again focused on supporting the claim that EU migrants are positive economic contributors to the UK, these economists make this claim by tracking the UK economy since 1994 up through the 2004 enlargement (up to 2011). In doing so, we can more robustly prove that EU migrants, specifically those from Eastern and Central Europe, have progressively contributed to the UK labor force. In the period from 1995-2011, EEA immigrants were said to contribute 10\% more than British citizens. Much of this can be due to the fact that migrants bring useful social and educational skills to the UK labor force. Most interestingly, Dustmann and Frattini (2014)\textsuperscript{104} found that “between 1995 and 2011 European immigrants endowed the UK labour market with human capital that would have cost 14 billion pounds if it were produced through the British education system.” While these studies undoubtedly make several assumptions in regards to the children of immigrants and their future contribution to the UK labor force, it is undeniable that migrants to the EU do play a pivotal, positive role in their economic contributions over time.

\textsuperscript{102} Dustmann, Christian, Tommaso Frattini, and Caroline Halls, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{104} Dustmann, Christian, and Tommaso Frattini, p. 3.
2.2 The Issue of Welfare Benefits

A central reason why many individuals are opposed to the free movement of labor is due to the reality that welfare benefits, such as health care services, are available to migrants. “Welfare tourism”, a fear for many EU citizens, is the notion that migrants choose to move to another EU member state primarily to obtain welfare benefits. Under this rationale, migrants do not make a net positive contribution to the country in which they migrate. Despite this, many scholars like Remeur (2013) make clear that “using entitlements deriving from free movement cannot be seen as an abuse….neither economic reasons nor failure to comply with formalities can be grounds for expulsion and exclusion.” Remeur’s statement is bolstered in research by Wadsworth (2014) who showcases that for the UK and Germany, migrants use health services at the same rate as native-born populations. This is particularly relevant, given the fact that EU migrants are, on average, a younger subset of the population.

3. A Demographic Issue: Re-evaluating Free Movement

Yet, despite the analysis of various studies, which prove that EU migrants are positive contributors to the states in which they migrate to, politicians on the right consistently believe that the benefits of the free movement of labor do not exceed the costs, be it economic or social. In an article in The Economist, Theresa May, the Home Secretary of the UK, was quoted as saying, that “there is no case, in the national interest, for immigration of the scale we have experienced.” Her

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Ibid.
opinion, which is similar to that of many British politicians, is not validated by studies like that of Dustmann and Frattini, which says that between 2001 and 2011, immigrants from the European Economic Area contributed one-third more in revenues than were taken for public spending.\textsuperscript{107} This information is only further strengthened when considering the ageing of the British population and the fact that such migrants would ease the “growing reliance on state health care and pensions.”\textsuperscript{108} Even more so however, the opinions of individuals like Theresa May give light to the idea that the contention regarding EU migration may not be economically induced. In the following chapters, I make the argument that the backlash to intra-EU migration appears to be culturally or socially induced.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
Chapter Three
Including Eastern Europe: Cultural Implications Since 2004

In 2005, Emanuele Ottolenghi, a political scientist and Senior Fellow for the Foundation of Defense of Democracies made this statement about European identity: “a united Europe is not far from becoming reality. A European identity that transcends the national identities of Europe’s member states, however, is still a distant dream.” Ottolenghi was not wrong in his critique of European Union integration; while enlargements and globalization have pushed EU countries closer together, the respective identities of the EU nation states, despite being threatened, have not budged.

Cultural integration substantially impacts the EU member state relationship. Politics and economics aside, cultural issues that engulf the EU truly determine to what extent the EU can remain a union that champions, rather than undermines diversity, as it is less malleable than economic or political differences. Historical data have showcased that the story of intra-EU migration within the European Union is a dynamic one; while the economic impact of intra-EU migration has consistently been calculated, support for and against EU integration and the cultural effects of EU integration are not as quantifiable.

Cultural differences are a significant source of intra-EU conflict; at the same time, the increasing diversity of the EU does encourage the goal of “ever closer union,” and thus while contentious, can provide benefits. Scholars, economists, and politicians have meticulously dissected the cultural shift that took place during the 2004 Enlargement, which later continued in 2007 with the

Ibid.
inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania and in 2013 with the entrance of Croatia. The 2004 Enlargement is not only recognized as the largest expansion of the EU to date, but also remembered as the most culturally impressionable, given that the EU was primarily a cohort of Western European states prior to 2004. This was the year that Eastern European states joined the EU. Given the distinct differences of Eastern European countries, which differs greatly from that of Western European states, it is apparent that 2004 intensified the relationship between intra-EU member states by embracing countries that have faced different economic challenges, histories, political systems, and cultural customs. Having experienced few cultural challenges in prior enlargements, 2004 pushed member states to fear the growing power of the EU, many reverting to a stronger pro-nation state sentiment. In more ways than one, 2004 operated as the test for whether or not the EU could navigate a union of diversity.

The cultural complications that have emerged, especially since the 2004 enlargement, are reinforced by several important facts in the intra-EU migration story. First, the arrival of EU migrants was never envisioned as a permanent process: unlike what most EU countries expected to witness, data shows that migrants mostly move with the intention to stay; today many migrant families have remained in their respective European countries for two or three generations, constructing a situation in which cultural change can, indeed, occur.\textsuperscript{110} This finding suggests that migrants do not simply move with the intention of utilizing another EU member state’s labor market; rather, many embark on a permanent migration, transporting elements of their own customs.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
with them. Second, the decline in fertility rates in Europe has led to a demographic deficit, as emigration of new EU member state migrants is partially filling the deficit. With a decline in European birth rates, countries have little choice but to hire from outside of the EU, or from Eastern Europe, where many migrants are willing to work in lower skilled jobs and for a lower pay. Whilst both of these trends have serious economic implications on the EU, both phenomena are grounded in a bourgeoning cultural change.

While economic impact is a not the singular factor that helps to facilitate contentiousness between EU member states, it does help explain why countries are driven to feel less positive towards the idea that compliance with the EU may lead to the diminishment in power of the nation state. As Aaron Andreason (2011) argues “economic downturns…make it harder for countries to cooperate with one another, since during economic hard-times the very diverse nations which make up the EU may start to look out for their own interests and become more protectionist as concerns regarding national sovereignty will reassert themselves”. If countries feel threatened economically, they will be even less willing to compromise over cultural values. The shift to prioritize the interests of the nation state is strengthened when countries sense that their customs and identity are being challenged.

Economic implications aside, as I discussed in Chapter Two, the cultural piece of the intra-EU migration story is less transparent – and possibly a larger piece to understanding how intra-EU migration has affected the inter-member state relations. While economic discourse on intra-EU migration largely

\[\text{\textsuperscript{111}} \text{Ibid.}\]
showcases how the EU single market and free movement principle encourage economic productivity throughout the EU, cultural changes due to intra-EU migration are mostly regarded as a cause for inter-member state conflict, showing little progress for embracing European integration. Each EU member state has experienced intra-EU migration differently, but most have not felt that the inclusion of different cultures has benefitted the nation states; irrespective of the economy, the issue of culture remains a reason why most member states’ publics endeavor to identify primarily with their nation state, instead of with the European Union. Despite the EU’s hope, a passionate and resounding acceptance of EU pride has been hard to come by.

In this chapter, I look to address how culture plays a role in inter-member state relations, predominantly as it has driven EU member states away from championing an EU “united in diversity” with the manifestation of the 2004, 2007, and 2013 enlargements. While most scholars and politicians believe economic factors to be the motivation for member states to prioritize the nation state over the EU, I argue that the cultural shift of the EU has played a larger role in creating the barrier to an “ever closer union”. I will begin by discussing how the 2004 Enlargement created a contentious relationship between EU member states, as it brought cultural diversity in the EU to the fore. Then, I will discuss how several factors have stalled the progress for “ever closer union” and acted as bastions for promoting cultural fears. Lastly, I will illustrate how the inclusion of diverse cultures in the EU has served as the catalyst for political instability within the last decade of the EU, by evaluating how countries such as Italy and Spain have dealt with cultural diversity, predominately as it has been produced by the inclusion of Eastern Europe.
1. Explaining the 2004 Enlargement

In a *Wilson Quarterly* article published in 2001, European progress towards becoming “whole and free” after years of wars, revolutions, and genocides, was described by Martin Walker as “botched.” Even more so, since 2001 little progress has been made in coming to terms with whether or not the boundaries of the European Union would be determined by its boundaries with Russia or perhaps in terms of the European Union’s affiliation to Judeo-Christian religions. Each enlargement changed the nature of what the EU identity would mean and what the EU would represent. For Walker, the EU is “not yet a state, or a political actor so much as it is a process, constantly in the course of becoming. It defies conventional analysis, being simultaneously less and more than the sum of its parts.” While each enlargement supposedly helped serve a more “whole and free” EU, Walker echoed this sentiment regarding increased European integration: “the EU’s chosen task of bringing prosperity and stability to eastern Europe and the Balkans will be a costly and controversial mission for at least a generation to come.” The obstacles of this mission came to fruition during the 2004 enlargement, as the overwhelming number of Eastern European migrants to the West became the catalyst for cultural contention.

The 2004 Enlargement received Czechia, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia into the EU. Unlike every enlargement prior to 2004, the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 form part what is referred to as Eastern Europe. Distinctive from Western Europe, Eastern Europe has had unique political experiences, given their history.

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Walker, Martin, p. 46-47
as constituent republics of the USSR, and for some, religious ties to Islam and other non-Christian-Judeo religions. Specifically what the 2004 enlargement contributed to, which was little to nonexistent in the prior enlargements, was the installment of fear that increased crime and terrorism would become a reality for the EU. While not necessarily proven accurate, the inclusion of “distant cultures” may threaten national integration and certainly seemed threatening to Western Europe, as some of these cultures affiliate with Muslim or stereotypically Muslim practices. Anti-east sentiment, as it has been amplified in the political and public sphere, has further complicated the project for EU unity.\footnote{Ibid.}

2. Assessing the increasing cultural backlash since 2004

2.1 A Noneconomic analysis of the intra-EU story

According to Lauren McLaren of the University of Oxford, as the EU has become a more popular destination to live in, the interests of these citizens on the role of the EU have increased as well; that said few studies draw attention to levels of support, for and against European integration.\footnote{McLaren, Lauren M. “Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?” The Journal of Politics 64, no. 2 (May 1, 2002): 551–66.} While economic analysis has purported that the liberalization of the EU market will undoubtedly create winners and losers (the losers being low-skilled, uneducated individuals), the intra-EU migration narrative is far more complex when evaluating noneconomic factors. Acceptance for the idea of the EU is more embraced among individuals who value improving democratic ideals and protecting the environment, while less so with individuals who feel that the economy is the issue they value the most. To bolster her claims, McLaren writes: “antipathy
toward the EU is not just about cost/benefit calculations or about cognitive mobilization…but about fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures.”

Economists, too, know it to be true that noneconomic factors play a large role in how individuals react towards increasing intra-EU migration. According to a study by Christian Dustmann and Ian Preston (2007), cultural and ethnic differences fuel opposition to EU migration: “cultural and ethnic distance may severely hinder the social integration process, and this may be considered to induce social tensions and costs.” Both academics go as far to say that such hostility establishes itself in the kind of rhetoric politicians use to discuss intra-EU migration, an idea I discuss further in Chapter 4.

Cultural fear, and with it, a lack of attachment toward Europe, demonstrates itself in the results from Eurobarometer surveys that question citizens about their affiliation with the nation state and the European Union in general. In one such survey conducted for the years 1999 and 2005, citizens from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and Austria were asked: “in the near future, do you see yourself as (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality), or European only?” The survey illustrates that on the whole, EU citizens have increasingly self-identified with their nation state first, before identifying with being a European. Few reported feeling attached to Europe before their own nation state, a response that, once again, thwarts the progress towards “ever closer union”.

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116 McLaren, Lauren, p. 553
118 Gould, Andrew C., and Anthony M. Messina, p. 35.
While not pertaining to EU migrants specifically, other studies, as well have supported the notion, in reverse, that migrants are more likely to see themselves as members of the EU, rather than of the country to which they migrate. Marco Cinnirella and Saira Hamilton’s (2014) study explores how South Asians with British citizenship describe their affiliation with Britain and the European Union. The results in this study may align with the sentiments of Eastern European migrants who have made the “traditional” Western EU member states their homes. Cinnirella and Hamilton’s study asked South Asian Britons and white Britons to express to what extent they feel part of Britain versus part of the European Union and to determine how important the European Union is for the future of Britain. As predicted, the results of the study suggest that South Asian Britons manifest a higher European identity than white participants, possibly because South Asian Britons, unlike white Britons, do not

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Gould, Andrew C., and Anthony M. Messina, p. 170.
share a negative history with much of Western Europe. While not yet tested, it is possible that the same results would hold when comparing Eastern European and Western European citizens; Eastern European migrants to Western Europe may be able to express greater support for the European Union as compared to Western European citizens. It is, thus, even possible that the increased occurrence of intra-EU migration would make for a less Euroskeptic Europe, if intra-EU migration were to earn enough support.

2.2 Threats to European Integration

As I have described, multiculturalism, or the “uncritical acceptance of cultural diversity” has only grown more prevalent since the 2004 enlargement. For many political leaders, the backlash multiculturalism has caused for EU member states only further points to its failures: “we fail to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values,” said British Prime Minister David Cameron in 2011. Although many of the EU’s largest member states, such as Germany, France, and Spain, have all become the homes for a large EU migrant population, none have truly embraced the assimilation of other EU cultures at home: “ethno-cultural diversity was tolerated, but within a restricted band and as cultural ‘ornament’, rather than as an integral feature.”

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120 Ibid.
121 Lesińska, Magdalena, p 39.
122 Lesińska, Magdalena, p 42.
123 Ibid.
By far, the largest threat regarding the cultural shift following the 2004 enlargement is the degradation of the nation state. This is particularly seen through the lack of ability to entirely distinguish between national cultures and member state policies. This is because “the same people who fear such changes from minority groups living in the country...are very likely to fear similar changes resulting from the process of European integration.” Some academics, like Andrew Gould and Anthony Messina (2014) have questioned whether or not it is possible for EU identity to ever supplant national identity. While not likely in the foreseeable future, overwhelming identification with the EU over the nation state is difficult to come by for many EU citizens; in addition to this, it is difficult to even ascertain what “EU identity” refers to, as the EU incorporates a people who speak different languages, embrace different histories, and affiliate with different religious beliefs.

This barricade to embracing a EU identity is also reinforced by “the tendency of a critical number of Europeans to perceive few, if any, meaningful distinctions among the many ethnic, linguistic, racial, and religious groups that are defined as ‘the other’.” This is especially true for Western Europeans, who generally identify few differences between the “economic” migrants and asylum seekers; this was corroborated in a study by Bromley, Curtice, and Given (2007) which revealed that Scottish citizens felt equally threatened by the inclusion of Muslims, Blacks and Asians, and Eastern Europeans. Such a mentality from Western European countries may suggest that an acceptance toward Eastern

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124 McLaren, Lauren M, p. 554.
125 Ibid.
126 Gould, Andrew C., and Anthony M. Messina, p. 57
127 Gould, Andrew C., and Anthony M. Messina, p. 58
European migrants, despite possibly being economically or politically positive contributors to the EU, if they are seen as potential threats to national culture.

Without a lingua franca, or common language, member states continue to maintain hyper-diversity, despite the attempts at the EU level to unite member states; this is especially difficult given that there are over sixty indigenous regional or minority languages spoken across the EU. While a strong religious affiliation in Europe is less prevalent than it is in the Americas, the 2004, 2007, and 2013 enlargements showcased that “public accommodation of Islamic civil and religious practices has only further diminished the prospect that religion could ever play a central role in facilitating the emergence of a European identity.” Bhabha (1998) has similar sentiments: “Western Christianity no longer occupies an exclusive or even preeminent position in the heartland of Europe. Three in every 100 ‘European’ workers are third country nationals; the proportion of ethnic diversity is much higher if non-white citizens are included. As second- and third-generation immigrant populations become established within Europe, the look and sound of Europeans is changing.”

Religious affiliation, too, is an obstacle for achieving European integration. While the European Union does not adhere to any particular religion, most traditional Western Europeans affiliate with the Christian religion. This differs greatly from Eastern European countries, some of which have larger Muslim populations: “with the fall of Communism, it is Europe’s Muslims who now straddle the deepest rift in European identity formation. Until asserted

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128 Gould, Andrew C., and Anthony M. Messina, p. 13-15
129 Ibid.
otherwise, they are taken to represent a religious, cultural, and political worldview opposed to Europe’s own imagined traditions.” Similarly to Gould, Givens (2014) states that Muslims in Europe have become “more defined as a group rather than as part of their respective nationalities and ethnicities” becoming “the focus of restrictive immigration policies, punitive immigration measures, and citizenship tests designed to test for ‘antiliberal’ values”.

3. Attitudes towards Migration: Some examples

Throughout this chapter, I have sought to express how the 2004 enlargement, and later the 2007 and 2013 enlargement’s, inclusions of member states with substantially different cultures than Western European member states, created an impediment for the progress towards an “ever closer union”. This is due to resistance, both from migrants who do not integrate themselves into the EU member state they migrate to and from member state governments that do not adequately foster integration programs and policies. In this final section, I use specific examples from four EU member states (Italy and Spain) to describe how the issues of identity and integration have shaped intra-EU migration. In doing so, I aim to underscore how individuals and groups in countries that are traditionally associated with the EU express sentiments of cultural fears throughout the most recent EU enlargements. A deeper analysis of this for the case of Britain will follow in Chapter 4.

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* Gould, Andrew C., and Anthony M. Messina, p. 239.
* Gould, Andrew C., and Anthony M. Messina, p. 207.
3.1 Romanian migrants in Italy and Spain

Italy and Spain are two countries that have experienced cultural conflicts with the occurrence of the 2004 enlargement, particularly with regards to Romanian migrants. According to Simon McMahon (2015) the Romanian population represents the second largest of migrants in the EU. They have made a significant impact on Southern Europe, however, where they have dominated the labor market in low-skilled labor, and affected national immigration laws. According to this literature, however, “what distinguishes the Romanians from the other large immigration populations in both countries, such as Moroccans and Albanians, is their accession in the EU in 2007 and the associated granting of a set of rights not afforded to third country nationals. Thus, despite…that the formal status of Romanian immigrants in both countries has changed…a certain ‘stickiness’ has been visible in national responses to mobility from within the EU meaning that Romanians have not directly become legal insiders in Italy and Spain.” What McMahon suggests here is that EU membership is not enough to create a sense of community or identity within the EU. It is not a prerequisite for acceptance, nor does it automatically foster European integration. Still, without willingness to conform to a EU member state’s way of life and the assistance of EU countries to encourage integration it is plausible that cultural contention will prevail.

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Ibid.
3.2 Public Opinion in the European Union for 2015

According to a European Commission Eurobarometer survey that asks individuals: “in general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative, or very negative image?” results suggested that opinions are relatively neutral, as compared to survey conducted in autumn 2014 and spring 2015. Specifically, the autumn 2015 survey suggests that 37% of Europeans have a positive image of the EU, a 4-percentage drop from the spring 2015 survey results. Furthermore, when looking at member states specifically, this “positive” image is more likely to be seen in EU countries like Romania (57%), Poland (55%), Ireland (54%), Lithuania (53%), and Croatia (51%). On the other hand, for countries like Germany and Czechia, the positive image of the EU has decreased in percentage points since spring 2015, an 11-percentage point drop in Germany, and a 10-percentage point drop for Czechia.

The lessening in the EU as a “positive” image among Europeans is echoed through the European Commission’s survey on trust in national governments and parliaments in the European Union. The results from this survey suggest that since spring 2015, trust in national political institutions has decreased by 8-percentage points. While trust in the European Union still remains higher, there has been an increase in individuals who do not trust the EU. The survey suggests that since spring 2015, the proportion of individuals who do not trust the EU has risen by 9-percentage points.

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European Commission, p. 7.
European Commission, p. 8.
Lastly, while immigration proves to be the main concern for European Union member states, immigration does invoke different feelings among the member states. One survey suggests that countries like Sweden (80%), Luxembourg (77%) and Finland (74%) have the most positive responses towards migration from other EU member states. Countries that have a majority citizenry with negative feelings towards EU migrants, on the other hand, are Czechia (56%), Greece (50%), and Italy (49%). These statistics generally conclude that migration is a key issue in the European Union, strongly correlated with the perception and attitudes people have of the European Union as a whole. At the same time, they also point to the geographical proximity of these countries, as Czechia, Greece, and Italy’s geographical position (on the water and near Eastern Europe) may be a cause for contention and animosity towards migrants.

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As explored through the examples of European member state’s reactions towards intra-EU migration, cultural diversity is very indicative of subjective wellbeing and such levels of wellbeing affect economic and political factors of intra-EU migration. In a (2014) paper, Simonetta Longhi measures overall satisfaction according to diversity of birth, ethnicity, and religion. What she finds is that where assimilation is low, life satisfaction is high; this holds true when measuring diversity in the UK, which suggests that white Britons living in more diverse neighborhoods have a lower life satisfaction. Longhi’s study, while only one of many, has serious implications for the inter-member state relations, and

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serves to bolster this theory that cultural differences are a serious obstacle to the project for “ever closer union”.
Chapter Four
The Case of Britain – Politics, Public Opinion, and Polarization

While the economic, political, and cultural salience of intra-EU migration has gained exposure across all Europe Union member states, no country has maintained quite as unique a relationship with the EU as has Britain. Although eight other EU countries have yet to join the Eurozone (i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Sweden), Britain is certainly not the only EU country to have resisted widening the EU’s scope of power. Britain serves as a dominant force within the union, despite striving to maintain its unique political, economic, and cultural characteristics. Boasting the EU’s second largest GDP and a major receiver of EU migration, Britain is simultaneously a leader in EU affairs, whilst maintaining remarkable focus on fostering independence and self-growth.

Uniqueness aside, Britain’s vocal discourse and debate on intra-EU migration have garnered significant attention in the media. The issue is a contentious topic both for politicians and the general public. The sheer noise it has produced has contributed to its development of a referendum on Britain’s continued membership within the EU – a potentially divisive instrument for damaging the solidarity and cohesion of the European Union, which will be held on June 2016. All throughout Britain, from the city center to London’s ethnic neighborhoods and into the countryside, the implications of intra-EU migration on the nation state’s economy, politics, and cultural values have been seriously challenged.

Having joined the European Union during the second enlargement in 1973 (along with Ireland and Denmark), Britain has risen to the top of Europe as one
of the European Union’s most economically successful countries, thus attracting EU migrants and immigrants, and students from all over the world. Most importantly, for the purpose of this thesis, the desirability on the part of EU migrants to live and work in Britain, and the British response to this, magnify the distinctive relationship between England and its member states. This relationship, which has grown more antagonistic overtime, aims to confirm that unlike other member states that have responded positively to the advantages of free movement throughout the European Union, Britain, on the other hand, in comparison to other EU countries, has demonstrated animosity towards intra-EU migration. This attitude, held widely by scholars, politicians, and citizens of Britain themselves, further distances Britain from the rest of the European Union.

In this chapter, I aim to discuss the uniqueness of the British relationship with the European Union. I do so by briefly characterizing Britain’s relationship with the EU, examining the political system’s response to intra-EU migration by citing several political speeches, and demonstrating the importance of London as a space of concentrated diversity. Next, I outline the methodology behind my research trip to London in January 2016, where I conducted interviews with three academics from the University of Sheffield, University of Oxford, and National Institute of Economic and Social Research. During my time in London, I also explored the two ethnic neighborhoods of Ealing and Palmer’s Green in order to establish a “feel” for the ways in which migrants from Greece, Cyprus, and Eastern Europe have adapted, or lack thereof, to Britain. I draw conclusions from the aforementioned interview transcripts and visits to the ethnic boroughs in order to provide clarity on the British relationship with EU migrants, in the past, present, and future. Lastly, I discuss the British portrayal of intra-EU migration
in the media and according to public opinion polls to assess how the rhetoric of politicians and the inclusion of EU migrants to Britain have affected British citizens. Altogether, I analyze these concepts in order to gain a better understanding of Britain’s strong proclivity to hold tightly to mainstream British culture.

1. Britain as a “unique” member state

   1.1 Country before Union

   The study of Britain brings forth a unique and challenging portrayal of globalization in the works as it functions within the European Union. As we have previously established, the European Union itself is a direct response to the forces of globalization. It is no novelty that “governments have ceded power to mobile financial capital, to cross-border supply chains, and to rapid shifts in comparative advantage” under the premise that economic growth and peace will follow. However, how a country chooses to manage globalization is not uniform across the European Union. This was recently shown in a response by Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne in September 2015, where he claimed that Britain’s “ability to opt out of any EU quota system on sharing out refugees was proof of its advantageous membership terms.” Britain has notoriously positioned its economic needs before that of the EU, but in the discourse on EU migration, the economy is not the only thing at stake.

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1.2 The City of London

It is a common misconception that the presence of multiculturalism in a city is a sign of a welcoming and accepting attitude towards migration; even more so, it is wrongly assumed that multiculturalism is akin to integration. Such misunderstandings are attached to the general public’s opinion of London. From a tourist’s perspective, London is highly multicultural, standing apart from historically more homogenous cities, such as Rome and Vienna. However, after extensive evaluation, the Eurosceptic attitudes being portrayed in the media by the public and political figures are evident by the existence of cultural boroughs, divided by ethnicities.

More than eight million individuals live in London, a cosmopolitan city politically, economically, and culturally distinct from the rest of Britain itself. It was this multicultural vision I embraced of London, prompting me to decide to spend eight and a half months studying abroad there from September 2014 until June 2015. As a EU citizen of Italy, and a born American, London appeared to be the mecca of multiculturalism. This is what always left me surprised when I learned and experienced first-hand accounts of British animosity towards intra-EU migration.

Despite being a highly multicultural city that serves as the intersection of Britain’s growing EU migrant population, London’s neighborhoods are anything but integrated. Rather, they embody subcultures of other EU member states, expressing the ways in which these cultures have adapted (or not) to life in Britain and faced adversity amongst the ever-growing discourse of EU animosity. A different story is told anywhere between twenty minutes to an hour away from the city center in London’s thirty-three segregated boroughs.
Goodhart (1995) acknowledges such segregation in saying: “London is not the happily colour-blind multiracial city that many people imagine or that one might think from wandering around in the centre [sic] of the city.”

London boroughs, in particular, are the home of Britain’s Eastern European migrants. Their presence is so large that the 2011 Census recorded that over half a million individuals living in England and Wales are primarily Polish speakers, making Polish Britain’s second language. My personal experiences, first-hand interviews, and research have underscored is that the topic of intra-EU migration in Britain has multiple layers, where certain ethnic groups are more “unwanted” than others.

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142 Goodhart, David, p. 51
Figure 11. Image of London’s thirty-three boroughs

Source: London Government Directory
2. Political Influences and Party Responses

Now that we have discerned the characteristics distinct to Britain as a member of the European Union, it is necessary to analyze the way its politicians have framed the issue of intra-EU migration and served as an impetus for its Eurosceptic attitudes. Delving into the rhetoric put forth on intra-EU migration by individuals such as Prime Minister David Cameron, former Labour Party leader Ed Miliband, and UKIP Leader Nigel Farage can facilitate such an understanding.

In several speeches delivered by David Cameron, the rhetoric is highly centered along supporting a controlled migration policy. In his 2015 speech following his victory in the parliamentary elections, Cameron spoke about
delivering security to British families, primarily in regards to the economy. Refusing to compromise on Conservative values, Cameron is adamant that Britain’s belief in both the nation state and free trade are why a strong Britain will make for a strong EU. Yet, just as Cameron refuses to compromise on conservatism, he also makes clear that Britain is different and will fight against EU policy with which it does not agree with: “believe me, I have no romantic attachment to the European Union and its institutions. I’m only interested in two things: Britain’s prosperity and Britain’s influence.” Cameron is clear what Britain seeks to achieve from its membership in the EU: a stake in the common market, not creating “ever closer union”.

These ideas of commitment to the EU on an economic basis alone were reiterated in Cameron’s speech with Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho in September 2015. Cameron references Britain and Portugal’s bustling economies in 2010, claiming that both have suffered economically since, urging that the EU do more to capitalize on the advantages of the single market system. For him, this can only be realized with stronger nation state power and the diminishing the power of the European Union as an institution. UKIP Leader Nigel Farage and his supporters, too, are keen on expressing their distaste for the UK’s dwindling political representation at the EU level: according to a UKIP

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article published in October of 2015, the UK does not hold a seat on the World Trade Organization.\textsuperscript{146}

Cameron’s speeches have only ever alluded to the importance of cultural diversity in reference to the economy; the rhetoric is based on the migrant ability to contribute to Britain economically, but his views on diversity, notwithstanding the economy, do not seem particularly positive. This differs from Labour Party Ed Miliband’s rhetoric on migration, whose speeches have discussed the importance of building a “shared society.”\textsuperscript{147} In Cameron’s speech in May of 2015, his rhetoric focused on cracking down on uncontrolled immigration, reducing the demand for skilled migrants by training citizens and minimizing the incentives to move to Britain, because “under free movement rules, national welfare systems can provide an unintended additional incentive for large migratory movements.”\textsuperscript{148} Eventually, all such desires on the part of David Cameron and the Conservative Party rest upon its ability to obtain comprehensive renegotiation with the EU.

3. Neighborhood Case Studies Results

Before discussing the results from my London ethnic neighborhood visits, it is crucial to first grasp the key themes that justify why evaluating ethnic neighborhoods in London is so important. These themes are life satisfaction, minority representation, and integration. As referenced in my interview with Cinzia Rienzo, a discussion paper written on behalf of the Centre for Research

\textsuperscript{146} “Lord Rose Deliberately Confused Europe with the Political Union That Is Called the EU.” UKIP. Accessed October 21, 2015. http://www.ukip.org/lord_rose_deliberately_confused_europe_with_the_political_union_that_is_called_the_eu.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
and Analysis of Migration at University College London associates higher life satisfaction with individuals who tend to live in groups of their ethnic background. Thus, this may largely account for the reason why so many EU immigrant groups, such as the Greeks and Eastern Europeans, are highly concentrated in certain British neighborhoods; this is not particularly the case for other Western European groups and may go to show that certain ethnic groups are less capable of integration in Britain than others. Such lack of integration may also lead to disproportionate underrepresentation of minorities, as Messina (1987) portrayed in his case study on the London Borough of Ealing; the discovery that Ealing’s politicians were less involved and engrossed in minority concerns brings to light the fact that such separation breeds animosity, neglect, and disunity.

In this section, I will detail my personal experiences as I walked the streets of Ealing and Palmers Green. When visiting both neighborhoods in January of 2016, I strived to capture how the ethnic population transformed the space and made it their own. In observing ethnic landmarks, such as churches, shops, and housing developments, I noted human interactions and compared my experience with that of living in central London. Lastly, I incorporated these observations with conversations I had with three British university academics (two of whom were born in Britain, one born in Italy). In doing this case study comparison, I hope to show not only the uniqueness of these ethnic neighborhoods, but also to

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demonstrate how their relative exclusion from the mainstream of British life has furthered the air of mystery surrounding and animosity toward certain EU migrant groups.

3.1 The London Borough of Ealing

In an effort to seek out the residential concentration of one of Europe’s largest Polish communities, I proceeded to spend my first full day on my return to London by traveling to Ealing Broadway, the final stop on one of the Western branches of the Piccadilly Line. Ealing Broadway, located within the Borough of Ealing, is the center of a dominant Polish community in London. Approximately thirty-minutes outside of the central city, this borough transformed into “Little Poland” virtually the second I stepped foot outside of the Underground station. The surrounding streets bore the signs: advertisements for the “friendly” English language school down the street, a massive, ornate Polish Roman Catholic Church peaking above the trees, Middle Eastern and Turkish shops that covered the main street, and the hustle and bustle of Polish Londoners emerging from and entering into the main road shopping center. Alongside the main street of Ealing, I found the homes of many of these Polish Londoners; long rows of similarly-shaped houses, many marked with iron fences and stone gates were laid out in close quarters. Unlike the main shopping street, the neighborhoods were quiet, except for the soft murmur of Polish speakers in the background.

Several of the landmarks I came across during my visit to Ealing serve as fundamental components to Ealing’s Polish culture. The Church of the Most Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of the Church is one of twenty-three Catholic churches in London and home to over 4,500 Polish-Catholic worshippers in the
Ealing community™. The epicenter of the Polish community, the church also functions as meeting space, coffee shop, and library. Ealing’s culture is also expressed through its eateries. Boasting around twenty-six Polish delis, like that of Parade Delicatessen. According to Piotr Stolarski (2016) of the Ealing Local History Centre, “as well as being places where you can buy Polish foodstuffs, Polish delis sometimes act as community hubs by displaying community information and classified adverts in their windows”. Lastly, Ealing residents boast maintaining their sense of culture through its school system. Ealing has several Catholic day schools and Polish Saturday schools which aspire to teach Polish language, history, literature, and the Catholic religion. These distinctive features permeate Ealing with a distinct Polish culture that cannot be found anywhere else in London.

Albeit brief, my visit to Ealing provided me with an important understanding of the systematic way in which diversity functions in London: these large ethnic populations predominantly stay together, but consequently, this causes them to live at a distance from mainstream British life. My visit also revealed to me the power of ethnic neighborhoods. Unlike the city center, the borough of Ealing, a mere 9.6 miles away, depicts a life unlike that of London’s more bustling areas like Charing Cross, Piccadilly Circus, and Oxford Street. Ealing, on the other hand, is quieter, less ethnically diverse, and poorer than the heart of London.


Ibid.
My portrayal of Ealing, however, is but a snapshot in time, as Ealing’s past is drastically different than its present. Using the account provided by Jonathan Oates and Peter Hounsell, entitled “Ealing: A Concise History”, the Ealing in which I stepped foot during January 2016 is not the Ealing of the last few decades. In this recounting of Ealing’s history, Oates and Hounsell bring to life the transformation of the borough. Most importantly, however, what Oates and Hounsell capture is the demographic change and growing relevance of Ealing. While the residents of Ealing have been concerned with fostering a relationship with the central city since the 1300s, the modernization of transportation between central London and Ealing over the course of the centuries has greatly improved this endeavor.

Ealing, which became a borough in 1901, is described in Oates and Hounsell’s account as a religious, peaceful, and pleasurable place to live. Ealing can also be distinguished by the relative wealth of its residents, which remained prominent prior to the rise in migration levels from Eastern Europe. Over the course of the centuries, Ealing maintained a thriving economy through the agricultural industry, as well as religious importance with the average resident, despite tensions existing between various Christian religious groups. In the mid-1900s, Ealing was proclaimed the “Queen of the Boroughs”, a title which insinuated it served as the best place to live in London. This was due to its expansion of housing opportunities, parks and other green spaces, shopping centers and proximity to the central city.

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3.2 Palmers “Greek”

On the Sunday morning of my trip to London, I rode the tube for approximately thirty-seven minutes from Charing Cross Station to Arnos Grove Station, followed by a twenty-five minute bus ride from the station to the center of Palmers Green. Arnos Grove is the nearest underground station to Palmers Green, an area popular with the Cypriot Greek community in London. Located in the London Borough of Enfield, Palmers Green is commonly referred to as “Palmers Greek” and its name certainly reflects its look and feel. Less populated and busy than Ealing, Palmers Green is highly residential, with long rows of “Greek-style” houses split by a main road used to transport residents by bus to the neighboring train and underground stations. Along the roads, families travel together and friends salute each other as they walk by. I even received a “good morning” greeting from two residents. Similarly to my experience in Ealing, my time in Palmers “Greek” was brief and provided me with insight about the nature of the relationship between the Cypriot Greeks and the British in London.
4. Images of London’s Ethnic Neighborhoods

Figure 13. Photograph of English Language School in Ealing Broadway

Source: Author’s photography
Figure 14. Photograph of a quiet ethnic neighborhood in Ealing Broadway

Source: Author’s photography

Figure 15. Photograph of the main street outside of the Ealing Broadway tube station, lined by various ethnic shops and eateries

Source: Author’s photography
Figure 16. Photograph of the homes in Palmers Green

Source: Author’s photography

Figure 17. Photograph of the homes outside of the tube station in Palmers Green

Source: Author’s photography
5. EU Migrants in Britain: Public Opinion and the Media

The political discourse on intra-EU migration, coupled with my personal experiences and interviews, reveal the complex public opinion data related on the topic. In essence, the data showcases how the formation of ethnic neighborhoods often poses a direct challenge to white citizens, who once resided in these areas. In the case of Britain, this may be because ethnic neighborhoods are not well integrated in mainstream British life. In a journal article written in the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Robert Ford (2015) dissects British public opinion on intra-EU migration by presenting the issue as dependent on a migrant’s region of origin. This finding, in particular, relates to the inclusivity of the migrant groups I observed during my research trip, namely Eastern European groups and EU migrant groups from less economically stable countries, such as Greece. Ford’s analysis, primarily based on American ethnic identity research, showcases that similarly to Americans, Britons primarily choose to socialize with those who closely resemble them on a cultural, linguistic, and socioeconomic level. However, one main finding from Ford’s research is that opposition to migrants is not grounded in a competition for economic resources: “no political movement has ever mobilised in opposition to the settlement of Irish, European, or Australian immigrants”, but Eastern European migrant groups have faced negative reactions toward their settlement, in Britain specifically (Ford 2015).

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Ibid.

Ibid.
In an effort to amass British opinions on the implications of intra-EU migration and the position of Britain within the European Union, I conducted three interviews with London academics. While these interviews cannot and do not reflect British public opinion in general and do not serve as representations of British politics, they do, however, illuminate the complexities of British public opinion, with each interview offering the nuanced interpretations of intra-EU migration.

5.1 Scholarly Opinion: Dr. Cinzia Rienzo

In my interview with Dr. Cinzia Rienzo of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, I learned that Rienzo’s analysis of intra-EU migration was founded in the recognition that the sheer volume of multiculturalism in London, which is highly distinguishable from other regions in the UK, accounts for its more “open” and accepting” mentality toward migration. However, London’s attitude toward migration does not necessarily holistically reflect that of Britain. Political rhetoric claiming that EU migration is economically damaging to Britain is still a sound argument many are bound to believe.

In an effort to dissuade the popularization of such economic arguments, Rienzo cites a paper she co-wrote, which appears in the Journal of European Labor Studies. In the paper, Rienzo and Vargas (2015) refer to banning non-EEA low-skilled migrants as causing a “balloon effect”, where the ban would prompt increased migration from high skilled migrants from outside of the EU. Rienzo declared, “if you start with the principle that England is looking to attract the

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Ibid.
'best and the brightest’, it doesn’t matter where the migrants come from” (Rienzo 2016), but this is not necessarily what the UK Government believes. Rienzo and Vargas cite studies from the 2011 Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development to substantiate their findings: a survey conducted in 2011 of more than 1,000 UK employers claimed that 34% anticipated that they would recruit more EEA migrant workers to combat the government’s non-EEA migration restriction policies. This study was re-evaluated three years later in 2014, where it was found that 20% of the employers in the study actually recruited more EEA migrant workers.\(^\text{158}\)

Contrary to popular belief, Rienzo’s research has shown that Eastern European migrant men and women, particularly Polish women, are strong contributors to the British economy; this can be favorably compared to non-EU populations like Bangladeshi women, who have very low rates of employment. While a “sense of belonging” to mainstream British life is still hard to come by for many EU migrants, and higher rates of life satisfaction have reportedly been found among groups that choose to live with those who share their ethnicity, Rienzo claims that Britain is “coping well” and is “more prepared than other EU members” to handle diverse migrant populations and large volumes of migration.\(^\text{159}\)

Still, the perception of EU migrants among British citizens is still highly problematic; many believe that EU migrants are predominantly low skilled. Misconception of such facts has only further exploded due to tremendous political pressure on individuals, like Prime Minister David Cameron, Rienzo

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\(^\text{158}\) Rienzo, Cinzia, and Carlos Vargas-Silva, p. 5
\(^\text{159}\) Rienzo, Cinzia. Intra-EU Migration, January 11, 2016.
says. In addition to this, since the public is only privy to a small selection of data, it is easy for the facts to be distorted. Rienzo exemplifies this finding in telling me about a study she created, which argued that EU migrants contribute more than British citizens to the national economy. This led to a Daily Mail article that interpreted her study by professing that EU migrants are stealing jobs from British citizens.

5.2 Scholarly Opinion: Professor Andrew Geddes (University of Sheffield)

My interview with Professor Andrew Geddes of the University of Sheffield emphasized for me the importance of understanding the cultural and political challenges of intra-EU migration. To begin, Geddes expressed that “cultural conflict” in Britain has not been a predominantly physical occurrence; in fact, cultural conflict has mainly been precipitated by word of mouth: newspaper articles and politician speeches. Geddes argued that Britain has always championed the free market that is the objective under the free movement principle.

British support of the free market is thus crucial, according to Geddes, to understanding Britain’s position in the intra-EU migration discourse. A key advocate for the free trade of goods and services, Britain has endured a lifetime of migration from post-colonial immigrants. In the 1980s, England advocated for the free market system under the rule of Margaret Thatcher. This mentality stayed consistent through the European Union’s decision to enlarge in 2004 to ten Eastern European countries. According to Geddes, Britain saw EU expansion

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~ Ibid.
into the East as an opportunity to form allies with these former Cold War states. Their accession was also occurring at a key moment in British history: its economy was growing, and the promise of increased labor migration through the 2004 enlargement was highly favorable at the government level. In hindsight, the British government’s embrace of the 2004 enlargement is intriguing, given the migration outcomes it produced. In 2005, the enthusiasm for the mass movement of Eastern Europe migrants to Britain rapidly deescalated and with it, arose UKIP.¹¹

The 2004 enlargement promoted cultural salience in Britain. While demographic change does not determine economics, it does have the power to change it. In our conversation, Geddes made clear that unlike the United States, Britain does not see itself as a “nation of immigrants”. Despite this, Britain does not hold animosity towards immigrants; many Britons have migrants in their families. In fact, Geddes believes that Britain is considerably more tolerant of ethnic groups than other countries, such as Italy, which has a predominantly less heterogeneous population.¹² However, similarly to Rienzo’s comments, Geddes states British citizens generally place non-EU immigrants and EU migrants in the same category. It is only more fuel to the fire that the EU is under a global threat, an atmosphere of fear that has penetrated through the hearts and minds of British citizens and their political leaders.

Politically, Geddes characterized the voting decisions of the British citizenry in terms of increased support of UKIP and downfall of the Labour

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¹² Ibid.
Party, which has “left behind the working class.” Such former Labour supporters, many of whom have endorsed UKIP, represent the British subculture that fears neoliberalism and globalization; many have had first-hand experience with the crumbling job market or demographic change in their neighborhoods. Even the highly Eurosceptic Cabinet of David Cameron validates this anti-EU sentiment. This said, the possibility of the UK leaving the EU is “enormously destructive”, and the chances of a complete EU exit are slim. Just as EU migrants have benefited from working and living in Britain, so too have Britons enjoyed this benefit in the EU. Leaving the EU would require years of renegotiation on the part of Britain, as well.

5.3 Scholarly Opinion: Rob McNeil (University of Oxford Centre of Migration, Policy, and Society)

In my final interview with Rob McNeil, Head of Media and Communications at the University of Oxford’s Centre of Migration, Policy, and Society (COMPAS), my research and discussions on Britain’s opinions of intra-EU migration culminated in a discussion centered on media framing and the crucial role it has played in fostering anti-EU sentiments. Much like Rienzo and Geddes, McNeil cites the 2004 enlargement as a crucial shifting point in British politics, public opinion, and media portrayal of intra-EU migration.

Most importantly, my inquiries regarding the 2004 enlargement provided McNeil with the possibility to reveal to me a crucial, influential factor that further pushed the UK to support the accession of these ten Eastern European

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Ibid.

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Ibid.
member states: the scholarly contribution of economist Christian Dustmann at the government level. Dustmann, an esteemed scholar and economist, whose distinct economic findings support EU migration, which I cite in Chapter 2, played an important role in the British discourse on EU migration, circa the early 2000s. According to McNeil, Dustmann helped shape policy in Britain by writing a report for the government in 2003. His insights, which were fundamentally grounded in the notion that EU migration is highly beneficial for the British economy, assisted in convincing the British government, at a time of high economic stability, that the 2004 enlargement would do nothing but support Britain’s fiscal and monetary status.

More specifically, Dustmann’s theory helped encourage the UK to become one of the three countries to refuse imposing labor restrictions on the new EU member states under the 2004 enlargement. His publication specifically stated that when EU expansion occurred, it would not create a large in-migration to the UK. This only amplified the confidence of the Labour Party under Tony Blair, which supposed that open border policies and a willingness to allow for such policies would provide economic benefits to Britain. However, despite Dustmann’s reputation and the sound arguments that have made him a notable scholar in the field of migration economics, his predictions for the impact of the 2004 enlargement countries on Britain were profoundly inaccurate. EU migrants entered Britain in droves, and their arrival noticeably impacted mainstream British culture and the British economy. Therefore, this publication in 2003, while

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not the sole reason by the UK’s decision-making policies, was divisive in its impact on the future of EU discourse on a political and local level.

McNeil’s exposure to the media and public opinion in his research also show that there is a distinction to be made between attitudes towards migrants and exposure of migrants. In other words, the presence of migrants does not necessarily mean that those exposed to migrants will adopt a more pro-EU approach to the migration discourse. McNeil proves this by outlining the political bent of British newspapers, claiming that the Times, Star, Telegraph, Sun, and Daily Mail are anti-European; the Independent, Mirror, and the Guardian are slightly more pro-EU; and the Financial Times and The Economist are pro-EU. The prevalence of right-wing newspapers only fuels “economic fears,” thus making it increasingly difficult for the average citizen to come to an informed opinion on EU migration. As McNeil claims, the “power and effectiveness of the media to engage in this issue is what creates the public opinion we see today.”

McNeil’s findings establish the polarization of political parties in Britain. Do two polarized parties allow one to make an informed decision? For McNeil, the answer is no; rather, the decision-making is entirely contingent upon trade-offs: what is it that Britons most want, a strong economy or diversity? It seems that both of these factors are not mutually exclusive. Such trade-offs, and decisions, like the evaluation of the EU referendum, are discussed in “emotional” terms, say McNeil, where the substantial evidence supporting or refuting the claim that EU migration is beneficial is lacking.

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
The mass media has portrayed the contentious mass settlement of Eastern European migrant groups, like the Poles in a variety of ways. In a journal article on the ways in which Polish migration to the EU is discussed in UK newspapers, Jolanta Drzewiecka, Joshua Hoops and Ryan Thomas examine how different British newspapers frame the issue of intra-EU migration through their use of words such as -“asylum seekers”, “immigrants”, “migrants”, and “refugees” – many of which were wrongfully used interchangeably. These British newspapers, which are highly partisan, have drastically different interpretations on the subject of intra-EU migration and specific migrant groups; these interpretations filter down to the readers, whose views on Britain and the EU are formed.

6. What it Means to be British

As previously mentioned, London (and Britain on the whole) is racially diverse, but there is little real integration. In his research, Goodhart (1995) speaks of the concept of lived integration, a necessity for creating a more ethnically accepting Britain. Goodhart states his claim in saying: “this is about neighbourhoods and workplaces, about common spaces and language; it is not about being represented to ‘official Britain through your ethnic community leaders. It therefore depends on repeated interaction with the mainstream, something that is obviously harder to achieve if you live in an ethnic enclave immersed in the institutions of your own community.” Thus, to reintegrate what

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Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

I have previously proposed, an improved relationship between the nation state and migrants is necessary.

What Goodhart and other scholars who specialize on the topic of immigrant integration in Britain are getting at is that Britain’s areas of concentrated ethnic groups further distance EU migrants from British life. This only validates or reinforces political claims that such migrants are not fit for Britain, a sentiment that seeps into the public opinions of its citizens. What is troubling is the push and pull between British identity and EU unity, both of which appear to be seen as incompatible. Thus, to advance the understanding of this viewpoint, the guise of the European Union needs defining.
Chapter Five
If They Become Us, What Will We Be? Assessing the Turkish Issue and Maintaining National Identity in an Integrated EU

In this thesis, I have endeavored to showcase how free movement of EU migrants has triggered supposed economic, political, and cultural turbulence. I have developed my argument around the phenomenon of the 2004 enlargement – a significant moment in EU history that brought forth issues of identity and cultural integration for European Union member states. While a unanimous decision stating which of these factors – political, economic, or cultural – is primarily responsible for causing popular resistance towards intra-EU migration, has not been made, one statement has continued to remain relevant over time: the diminishing power of the nation state and its inability to concretely characterize the European Union as a collection of states continue to push member states away from accepting enlargement and the integration goals of the EU.

This notion of increased enlargement begs the question: which country/countries are next to join the EU and when will the EU reach its optimal goal in serving as a union that champions diversity and remains economically successful? These questions preoccupy the minds of scholars and political figures, with many fearing any further enlargement towards the east. Although there are still several countries in Europe that have either refused or been denied EU membership, the fear of enlargement among the current member states is no stronger than that for Turkey – a country viewed as so different socially from that of the current EU member states. A country, whose social, economic, political, and cultural values have historically differed tremendously from those
of Western Europe, the potential inclusion of Turkey in the EU endures as possibly the most challenging reality for the future of the European Union. Up until the most recent enlargement in 2013, all EU member states have shared similar social goals, even despite the cultural differences that were present in the accession of the 2004 countries.

A Turkish entrance in the EU has the potential to challenge the political, economic, but mostly cultural values of the EU. By the same token, Turkey’s inclusion, in re-defining the European Union, could augment the EU’s political power and the role it plays in international relations in the east. While the enlargement of 2004, in which accession drove “the Central European states in a position where they had to adapt to EU legal rules rather than being able to develop genuine policy solutions to given problems” (Barnickel and Beichelt 2013)\(^\text{171}\), a Turkish enlargement, given its size and influence, may in turn compel the EU to increase its own flexibility in creating policy to adhere to Turkey.

Altogether, unlike the countries that joined in the prior enlargements, Turkey’s entrance into the EU would alter the social composition of the EU like no other enlargement before, as well as challenge the EU to recreate its identity.

In this final chapter, I address the following questions: what does it mean to be a member of the European Union? What are the principles in which the EU is founded? What are the reasons for which EU citizens are more apt to articulate national pride, rather than pride for the European Union? I delve into these questions in order to gain insight into how the possible inclusion of Turkey to the

EU would affect the dynamic of inter-member state relations and their relationship with the European Union. In particular, I give special attention to Germany, an economic force in the EU to be reckoned with, which has experienced significant levels of Turkish migration. In doing so, I hope this thesis can more comprehensively determine what the various implications of intra-EU migration and member state relationships regarding EU migration are.

1. Defining the values of the European Union

According to Pew Research Center, “belief that economic integration would strengthen national economies was the founding principle of what became the European Union.” Recent cultural conflicts since the 2004 enlargement, and even more so now with the potential inclusion of even more diverse countries, such as Turkey, has led many European Union member states to look less favorably on what was once an institution they were proud to join. The EU is an institution primarily based on the intuition that member states can thrive together economically. Even more so, however, the EU prides itself on being an agglomeration of countries that champion democracy, civil liberties, primarily align themselves with Judeo-Christian values, and altogether have fairly similar goals for the future of the European Union. Unlike Turkey, with a large Muslim population and a semi-authoritarian regime, European Union

member states are quick to perceive a boundary between Turkey and mainstream Europe.\textsuperscript{101}

2. Potential membership for Turkey

2.1 Costs and Benefits

Turkish membership in the EU has gained high political salience over the course of the last two decades. Politicians from all over the European Union have met countless times to discuss the Turkish issue, including its merits and drawbacks. While not always clear, of Turkey’s geopolitical position in the world, its youthful labor market, sixty percent of which is under the age of 35, and its market size, can be viewed as potential benefits for the European Union. Neill Nugent (2007)\textsuperscript{174} even suggests that Turkey, as an Islamic state, may even be seen as a positive for the EU, providing the EU with clout to “encourage moderate Islamism, to help extend the EU’s ‘soft’ influence in other Islamic countries…and to demonstrate that Islam, democracy, and western capitalism can mix.” Yet, Turkey’s many attractive features as a potential member of the EU do not obscure its culturally contentious features.

The perceived social and cultural costs of admitting Turkey into the EU are mostly founded on its treatment of women, history of political turmoil, and Islamic identity. In addition to this, Nugent (2007)\textsuperscript{175} believes that Turkish acceptance into the EU may also weaken the political influence of some of the


\textsuperscript{175} Nugent, Neill. p. 486
other EU countries: “Turkish membership will result in existing large and medium-sized member states losing significant physical presence in the European Parliament and proportionate voting strengths in the Council of Ministers.” While Turkey’s economic underdevelopment and size may burden the EU fiscally, the social and cultural distinctiveness of Turkey is certainly a greater cause for concern.

2.2 From Turkey to Germany

The fears of Turkish membership in the EU can be better comprehended by considering its relationship with Germany. In 1961, Germany signed a bilateral recruitment agreement with Turkey, at a time when Germany’s economy was strong and demand for labor seemed limitless. Endeavoring to employ predominantly semi-skilled and unskilled Turkish migrants who were at the “prime of their labor capacity,” Germany viewed the migration of Turkish migrants as an investment in their economic future, lifting tax revenues and production levels at the height of German economic advancement (Bartsch et al. 2010)." The incorporation of these low-skilled Turkish migrants helped enable upward mobility for many German workers, so much so that between 1960 and 1970, approximately 2.3 million German workers were elevated from blue-collar to white-collar employment. It is important to emphasize that the acceptance of this migration was purely economic in nature; it was not, in any way, intended to

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support the European Union’s or any member state’s desire to implement diversity.

Such enthusiasm on the part of Germany, however, did not take into account the realistic future expectations of these Turkish migrants, many of whom saw migration to Germany as a permanent decision. In a German magazine, *Spiegel International*, journalists expressed this lackadaisical attitude of Germany: “at the time, no one in Germany cared much about the fact that many of the new arrivals could hardly read or write, making it difficult for them to participate in German society. The guest workers, or *Gastarbeiter*, were expected to live together in newly built dormitories near the factories where they worked, and return to their native countries after working for a few years.”*178 The reality was that many Turks delayed their return home, especially once the “rotation clause”, which limited Turkish guest workers’ stay, was abolished in the 1964 German-Turkish treaty.

In 1973, German recruitment of the Turkish labor force ended, just as the Turks had become “the most prominent symbol of the guest worker in the eyes of the German public.”*179 In the media and throughout the rhetoric of German politics, this visible face of the Turks perpetuated this notion of the Turkish issue. How would they change German society? Would they be granted citizenship? For many Germans, the stark cultural differences between themselves and the Turks were too profound. Their cultural and religious loyalty to Turkey was linked to extremism and therefore, spurring racist and violent attacks in the

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*178 Ibid.
*179 Kaya, Asiye. p. 3
1990s. This intensified in 2005 when German citizenship law determined that nationality would be defined by birth, giving second-generation Turkish immigrants German citizenship.

Today, the Turks are the second largest group, after German emigrants, to reside in Germany. Despite not being a EU member state, the presence of the Turkish population in Germany shapes Germany’s migration policy, and in turn, that of the European Union. In an article published after a 2011 conference on the fiftieth anniversary of the Turkish migration to Germany, Asiye Kaya of Georgetown University asks what the significance is for German diversity and public opinion on migration: “given that the agreement with Turkey was the first with a country considered to be non-European and with Islamic faith, what is the significance of this for the past fifty years of German immigration history and in years since 9/11?” Statistically, in 2013, 20 percent of the German population had a migrant background, many of these from Turkey.

This burgeoning migration has not necessarily produced the acceptance of diversity in Germany, despite changes in German policy that relaxed citizenship so that more Turks could be eligible to apply; an “ethnicized” view of citizenship is still the largest barrier for Turks to feel included and accepted in German society and it is not clear whether or not ethnic belongingness and citizenship can cohabit. For some scholars, like Cornelia Wilhelm, Germans must embrace a “new understanding of Germanness, one that expands out of a broader discourse on the social reality of Germany and the patterns of constructing diversity,

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* Kaya, Asiye. p. 4
* Kaya, Asiye. p. 2
* Kaya, Asiye. p. 6-7
cultural difference, memory, and identity.” Text Turkey, Europe’s “quintessentially unpopular second-class neighbor”, has repeatedly applied for EU membership, first in 1959 for the European Economic Community (Mandel 2013). Despite decades of reforming the Ottoman Empire’s heritage and practices, abolishing the death penalty, limiting military power, and adopting the European Convention on Human Rights, all modeled after Western Europe, Turkey is one of few European countries without EU membership.

So what prevents Turkey from obtaining EU membership? What is it that truly differentiates Turkey from every other country that has joined the EU? Many argue that rather than being its inability to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria, or a list of political and economic conditions, which must be met for EU membership, it is the role played by Islam and the historical reputation of the Ottoman Empire. A certain sense of Uberfremdung, or “over-foreignization” is in the air for many Europeans who feel that Turkey’s historical affiliation with violence, crime, and extremism can never be forgotten, and its religious affiliation certainly cannot. Many Germans even claim that Turks do not wish to integrate into German society, that their devotion to the head scarf, and many of Turkey’s prohibitions on liberties, such as freedom of the press, signals their lack of interest in a mainstream German, and likewise, EU way of life. Germans too, who believe the “others” of Germany are the Turks, resist the idea of accepting Turkish immigrants: “Turkish accession threatens that basis of the structural opposition that defines the relationship. If the Other becomes ‘us’, then who are

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Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Mandel, Ruth. p. 65
Mandel, Ruth. p. 67
we? Still more problematic is what if that day has arrived, given the high members of Turks who have become naturalized German citizens” (Mandel 2013).

2.3 Public Opinion on Turkish immigrants

As mentioned previously, public opinion data on Turkish immigrants largely suggests that a certain difference exists between Turks and migrants from within the EU. As expressed in a study by Başak Yavçan (2013)\textsuperscript{189}, immigrants cannot be grouped together and their opposition is oftentimes grounded in the fear of a cultural invasion, rather than their economic threat. Yavçan shows that support of the EU is highly dependent on one’s socioeconomic status and occupation: “this is because, for those individuals who are better off economically, the EU project appears to be a much more beneficial and desirable process than it is for poorer, less educated and lower class individuals.”\textsuperscript{190} Yet, even despite high socioeconomic standing, reservations about the EU still remain high if an individual feels that the cultural values and the nation state are being compromised.

In his study, Yavçan tests how ethnically German citizens respond to the inclusion of Turkish, Italian, and Polish citizens in Germany. The purpose of the study was to determine whether certain ethnic groups increase or decrease the support for European integration and EU enlargement. Yavçan’s study found that when individuals were prompted with media portrayal of Turkish immigrants, their feedback regarding EU integration and EU enlargement was

\textsuperscript{188} Mandel, Ruth. p. 72
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{190} Yavçan, Başak. p. 160
mostly negative, given that, as compared to Polish and Italian migrants, Turkish immigrants are culturally, significantly different. Such results were less intense when individuals were primed with information on Polish or Italian immigrants. Ultimately, what this study implies is that “the hierarchy people have in mind when considering potential immigrant groups extends to their attitudes toward areas that they see these anti-immigration attitudes as closely linked to.”

Figure 18. Relationship between Euroskepticism, Opposition to EU Enlargement and Immigration Attitudes when Primed with Different Ethnic Groups

Source: Başak Yavçan (2013)

From the perspective of Muslim immigrants to Europe, a Pew Research Center report suggests that Muslims are more concerned with the economic situation of the EU more so than the issue of religious rights and cultural identity: “Muslims there [Europe] do not generally believe that most Europeans are hostile toward people of their faith.” This hostility is only slightly more pronounced in Britain, where Muslims worry for their future. While another Pew

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* Yavçan, Başak. p. 167
* Yavçan, Başak. p. 174

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Research Center poll suggests that EU nations have a more positive view of Muslims than they do of Roma, or gypsies, such favorability is not robust enough to make Muslim integration in Europe a non-issue.

3. National Identity vs. European Identity

3.1 Public Opinion on the European Union

Public opinion on Turkish accession can be better understood through the lens of public opinion polls on the European Union as a whole. In one Pew Research Center article entitled “The New Sick Man in Europe: the European Union”, Germans, Britons, French, Italians, Spanish, Greeks, Poles, and Czechs were asked to whether or not their support for the European Project has increased or declined. Specifically, they were asked if the economic integration of member states has served to strengthen the economy. In comparing results between the years 2012 and 2013, all national groups polled believed that economic integration has not improved the economic standing of the member states. These beliefs were stronger for Germans and Britons, and less strong for the Poles, Greeks and the Czechs. Most notably however, this “erosion of Europeans’ faith” has become increasingly evident in attitudes by the French, where in 2013 58% saw the EU as an unfavorable institution to be a part of, widening the gap between them and the customarily optimistic Germans.

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“The New Sick Man of Europe: The European Union.” p. 2
In another 2013 Pew Research Center public opinion poll, Germany’s so-called economic “exceptionalism” in the EU was viewed as problematic for EU integration, stating that the large divide between German sentiment of the EU and the remainder of EU member states poses a huge threat to member state relations, as Germany will undoubtedly have a sizeable say on EU policy. As previously mentioned, Germans have traditionally been most pro-EU, particularly given its economic success within it. In relation to the EU median, Germans feel 28 points better about European integration and 66 points better about the economy. This can be compared to countries like Italy, where 62% believe immigration is a large issue and only 16% were content with the country’s economic standing.

Figure 19. Decline in Support for the European Project.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic integration strengthened economy</th>
<th>Favorable of EU</th>
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<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Britain</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIAN</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Pew Research Center (2013)
In 2015, Pew Research Center suggested that citizens are beginning to look more favorably on the EU, despite the challenging political environment and former economic crisis. The article draws the following correlation: “those who now think economic conditions are good are much more likely to favor the EU and European economic integration than those who see their economy as doing poorly. At the same time, in some nations there are quite significant differences between the higher level of trust in the EU as an institution and the lower public confidence in the European project.” While centered mostly on Europeans’ perceptions on economic integration, polls like this one can be used to infer how these viewpoints coincide with opinions on cultural integration. If economic conditions are poor, cultural integration will be seen as less favorable.

3.2 Where do they stand?

Europeanization for Turkey is in the progress of taking root, despite Turkey’s continual denunciation for EU acceptance. Since 2001, Turkey has adopted a series of new policies that align with EU values: “the most noticeable of these changes have been in the highly-charged spheres of democratic and civil rights where, in many instances as part of new penal and civil codes, reforms have included a liberalization of the judicial system, stronger protections and rights for minorities, a greater emphasis on the importance of individual liberties and the abolition of the death penalty.” Still, Turkey has far to go if it ever wishes to sway its opposition for EU entry, and unless it were to compromise

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*Nugent, Neill. p. 491*
heavily on its religious and political values, the possibility of EU entry seems highly unlikely.

Nevertheless, this opportunity to discuss a possible inclusion of Turkey in the EU reaffirms the central principles of the European Union, strengthening its core values and allowing it to be better defined by something more than an abstract idea. According to Nilufer Gole, who speaks on European identity, “Europeanness is not part of a ‘natural’ historical legacy, it is appropriated voluntarily as a political project, as a perspective promising a democratic frame for rethinking commonness and difference.” Discussing the possibly of Turkey in the EU “reveals the difference between Europe as a project and Europe as an identity,” and going forward, it is this kind of distinction that the EU can use as an advantage to better brand itself for the future progress of its twenty-eight member states.\(^\text{11}\)

For Britain, the potential addition of Turkey in the EU calls into question how the various implications of intra-EU migration will affect British society and their attachment to the institution of the EU. How far is Britain willing to go to express its dislike of intra-EU migration? Will it go as far as to dismiss the benefits it receives as a EU member state when the June 2016 UK referendum is held? As discussed previously in this thesis, migrants to Britain are directly impacted by the backlash of free movement. By the same token, many British citizens themselves openly indulge in the ability to move freely across borders. With the UK referendum just around the corner, it is unlikely that British animosity towards intra-EU migration will wane; rather, as the research in this

\(^{11}\) Mandel, Ruth. p. 76
thesis shows, intra-EU migration will continue to be an issue pronounced in the media, in economic reports, and in the rhetoric of politicians in Britain, until Britain either risks leaving the EU or devises a plan to effectively deal with the issues surrounding intra-EU migration.

In the future, Britain must come to terms with its relationship with EU migrants and the EU as a whole, forced to decide where its priorities lie and to bridge the gap between the economic evidence of intra-EU migration and the political ways in which intra-EU migration is debated and discussed. This may require further research that demonstrates a more transparent understanding of the economic arguments behind scholars in the field and an analysis of the UK referendum post this June.
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