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Terrorists Created? The Radicalization of Muslims in Denmark

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Senior Thesis

TERRORISTS CREATED?
THE RADICALIZATION OF MUSLIMS IN DENMARK

Submitted by

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In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

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INTRODUCTION

The upsurge in Islamist-based terrorism has thrust the concept of radicalism to the forefront of political and academic vocabulary, and it has become the “main frame for explaining, and preventing young Muslims from engaging in radical activities” (Sedgwick qtd. in Lindekilde). Following the September 11 (9/11) terrorist attack on the United States in 2001, concepts such as “home grown terrorism” have become increasingly salient. In the United States, there is also heightened concern for the safety of American citizens, as well as an increased suspicion of people from nations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. As the “War on Terror” continues, I turn my eye to the small country of Denmark, which has recently joined the United States and Belgium in combatting fighters from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other extremist groups.

Denmark’s involvement in the War on Terror is partly because of its vested interest in decreasing the presence of Danish Muslims in Iraq and Syria, who have gone to fight alongside extremist groups such as ISIS. Thomas Hegghammer, Director of Terrorism Research at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment noted, “Denmark has a large radicalized environment compared to the size of the country” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”). Adding to the concern is the enduring tension between the Danish majority and Muslims following the 9/11 attacks, as well as the subsequent policies targeting Muslims. Although the angst about radicalization has its roots in security concerns, it is also related to a wider debate on how Western liberal democracies should relate to, and integrate, especially Muslim minorities [sic]” (Lindekilde 110).

Traditionally, Denmark has been known as a progressive and liberal country, tolerant towards alternative beliefs and lifestyles while still emphasizing the importance and value of
social cohesion and equality (Mouritsen and Olsen 691). “It was the first to legalize pornography and recognize gay marriages” (Mouritsen and Olsen 691). Known for its functioning welfare system and its interest and involvement in international human rights issues, Denmark has shown itself to be an international contender and defender of the rights of others, including minorities. Denmark’s international position as a global humanitarian promoter is evidenced by its long list of signed and ratified human rights conventions and treaties, which it is obligated to uphold (see Appendix). Recognized as the world’s happiest nation by the “World Happiness Report” in 2012 and 2013 (“Happiest in the World”), and ranked first on the list of “world’s most responsible governments” by the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, on the basis of government accountability and criminal justice (Botero et al. 54), Denmark has amassed an impressive international record.

Denmark made headlines once again in 2014 with the implementation of a landmark law allowing transgender men and women to legally change their gender. The first of its kind in Europe, this law has garnered international attention, especially because of Amnesty International’s 2014 report, *The State Decides Who I Am*, which reveals the Human Rights violations of other European countries against people trying to change their gender (“World Must Follow Denmark’s Example”). Heralded by Amnesty International as a “progressive and courageous step,” the organization says that the world should follow Denmark’s example (“World Must Follow Denmark’s Example”).

Domestically, however, Denmark’s standard of human rights engagement for religious and ethnic minorities (namely immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers) has not been as impressive. Denmark’s treatment of women, refugees and asylum seekers, for instance, has put the country in violation of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) as well as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) policies towards refugees and asylum seekers (“Denmark Human Rights”). Despite Denmark’s glowing reviews from Rule of Law Index, the document also criticized the state on “police discrimination against foreigners and ethnic minorities,” and noted this a “problem” (54). In the same light, a recent article from Amnesty International outlined its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers:

- In August [2013], in the middle of the night, police raided a church in Copenhagen, and detained a number of Iraqi asylum-seekers who had sheltered there for months. There were complaints that the police used excessive force to remove people who were demonstrating in solidarity with the asylum-seekers.

- During the year [2013], 38 Iraqi asylum-seekers were forcibly returned to Iraq, including at least 25 to central and southern Iraq contrary to the advice of UNHCR, the UN refugee agency.

- Newly arrived refugees and other aliens were still only entitled to between 45 and 65 per cent of regular welfare benefits, giving rise to concern that this would lead to their being destitute. (“Denmark Human Rights”)

Although the Danish list of human rights violations is comparatively shorter than many other countries, Denmark’s struggle with addressing immigrant affairs makes this one of Denmark’s key shortcomings, gravely impacting ethnic and religious minorities in Denmark.

The state of religious and ethnic minorities in the country is, perhaps now more than ever, an important part of the human rights discourse. The increase in Danish Muslims’ involvement in extremist activities with groups such as ISIS (which is well known for a wave of beheadings as well as the kidnappings of numerous women) has sparked a response from Denmark that is unlike many other European countries. In an article from the Guardian, David Crouch and Jon
Henley noted, “Denmark has produced more fighters per head of population since 2012 than any other Western European country except Belgium. [Therefore]…Denmark has been at the forefront of exploring new models for preventing extremism” (“A Way Home for Jihadis”). In addition to joining the military fights against ISIS, Denmark has begun a de-radicalization program for jihadi fighters returning from Syria.

This initiative is the successor to another radicalization prevention project the Danish government embarked on in 2008, an action plan called “A Common and Safe Future.” The project was to be overseen by the Center for Prevention – a sector of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET). According to the PET, the goal of the program was to “encourage people to change their behaviour towards a non-extremist direction by means of direct contact and dialogue. The idea [was] for PET to support the actors that are best placed to reach vulnerable people by equipping them with tools for tackling the difficult challenges” (“The Centre for Prevention”).

Lasse Lindekilde, a researcher in the Department of Political Science at Aarhus University in Denmark, notes that “A Common and Safe Future” has been targeted towards Muslims, thus suggesting that Muslims are violence-prone “radicals” who should be encouraged to become active citizens in Danish society (110). Lindkelde also asserted that the action plan would have “inotropic effects” due to its programming structure as well as its hard focus on Muslims (110). With Denmark’s shift in focus from radicalization prevention to de-radicalization, along with the general salience in discourse on terrorism and radicalization, this thesis asks the question: “Have Denmark’s immigration and integration policies contributed to the growing radicalization of the Muslim minority in the country?”
Denmark was once a largely homogeneous nation before the rise of immigration in the 1970’s. The inflow of immigrants from Turkey, Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia and Morocco onto Danish soil triggered a set of social and political changes in reaction to the emerging diversity. Chapter One will provide an overview of Denmark before the rise in immigration, and also examine the changes in the social and political climate following the increase in immigrants. Chapter One will also chronicle the rise of the immigrant presence in Denmark, starting with immigrants who were considered “guest workers” and then immigrants fleeing to the country to escape the Yugoslav war. In Chapter One, I show that perceptions of immigrants to Denmark changed – negatively – as immigrant rates increased. Immigrants went from being “welcomed” as “guests” who provide cheap labor, to being perceived as a social problem and potential burden to the welfare state (Jønsson 593). The rise of anti-immigration organizations, and the rise in far right populism also advanced the discourse on immigration in Denmark.

Focusing on the years following 9/11, Chapter Two discusses the Danish emphasis on the integration/assimilation of the migrant population, as evidenced by the gradual tightening of Denmark’s citizenship laws during the years 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2010. Chapter Two also explores the impact immigration laws had on immigrants’ chances of receiving Danish citizenship. From this, I reveal the underlying bias towards certain immigrants over others, and the resulting divide between the “good” and “bad” immigrants. In Chapter Two, I trace the construction of Danish immigration policy through the influence of several factors: religion, Danish language, pride in the welfare state and Grundtvigian philosophy. Overall, Chapter Two provides a conceptual understanding of the Danish philosophy of integration, while also revealing the ways in which the desire to protect the Danish culture and belief system has informed their policies and, in turn, impacted immigrants.
Chapter Three focuses on the adoption of internal and external securitization measures in Denmark after the September 11 attacks in the USA. Key to the discussion is an analysis of the ways in which Denmark’s cultural and religious history merged with this larger event, to create a set of policies targeting Muslim immigrants and Muslims living in Denmark. Chapter Three reveals the normalization of a deep distrust of Muslims living in Denmark, and of immigrants from Islamic countries, after 9/11, as well as the restructuring of the Muslim image into “the usual suspects.” In Chapter Three, I discuss how immigration, integration and security have intersected in crucial ways. I also review the infamous Cartoon Controversy, an event that sparked a debate between Muslims and the majority on free speech versus discrimination, while simultaneously triggering an outcry from the Muslim community that was so large it marked the first time since the Thirty Years War that a conflict with religious connotations had such an impact in Danish society (Rudling 76).

Chapter Four examines the Muslim response to their constant state of hyper-visibility brought on by the media, the policies focused on them, as well as their social encounters with the majority. It chronicles the ways in which Muslims have chosen to cope with the situation in Denmark, showing that some have elected to use the hyper-visibility as a way to affirm their identity as Muslims, while others have either decided to withdraw from the public sphere or leave Denmark entirely, in search of a place where they will feel welcomed. Personal anecdotes cited from focus groups and interviews with several Danish Muslims supplement the discussion of policies and practices discussed in the previous chapters. Chapter Four examines the growth in the number of radicalized Muslims in Denmark and the ways in which the government is trying to address this issue.
Overall, this thesis outlines the demographic and political shifts in Denmark, which have contributed to its transformation from liberalism to nationalism. The thesis shows how domestic socio-political and cultural changes, as well as critical international events have played a role in establishing the importance of “Danishness,” while simultaneously causing apprehension towards anything or anyone that is considered “un-Danish.” The result is a weariness of different cultures and religions, as demonstrated in Denmark’s political atmosphere, which favors immigrant integration or assimilation over multiculturalism.

This notion of “welfare chauvinism and the idea of cultural homogeneity as a stabilizing factor [in society]” (Huysmans 753) is what makes the integration of migrant minorities difficult. Denmark’s immigration and integration policies, as they currently stand, are worrisome – not just because of their impact on Muslim migrant minorities – but also because they speak to the “wider politics of belonging, that is the struggle over cultural, racial and socio-economic criteria for the distribution of rights and duties in a community” (Huysmans 753). With ISIS still actively recruiting fighters to Syria,¹ maintaining policies that lead to the creation of a disenfranchised population may defeat the purpose of having a de-radicalization program to begin with.

On a broader scale, this is not just a Danish problem. It extends to other European countries such France, Austria and the Netherlands. No strangers to controversy, these countries have also had various incidences of cross-cultural tensions, as demonstrated by the Charlie Hebdo shootings in France (Vinograd et al., “Charlie Hebdo”), the assassination of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands for his controversial film about Muslim culture (“Gunman Kills Dutch Film Director”) and the 2015 reform to the 1912 Islam Law in Austria, banning foreign funding for Muslims and Imams (“Austria Passes Controversial Reforms to 1912 Islam Law”).

¹Citing information from French authorities on the fighters joining ISIS, Richard Barrett, Senior Vice President of the Soufan Group, identifies ISIS recruits as “disaffected, aimless and lacking a sense of identity or belonging” (18).
CHAPTER 1
The Transformation of the Liberal State

Denmark today is often associated with its notion of homogeneity and smallness, tying in with the Danish model of egalitarianism and democracy (Mouritsen and Olsen 697). Less known is that Denmark was once a multinational power that ruled over territories in the Caribbean, Norway, southern Sweden, northern Germany and elsewhere (Campbell and Hall 21). Denmark’s territory was gradually diminished due to invasions (most notably the 1941 Nazi invasion of Denmark) and repeated lost wars that resulted in lost territory. The depletion of territory also led to decreased ethnic and linguistic diversity. Effectively, the loss of a heterogeneous mix of people resulted in a loss of multiculturalism, and gave birth to ethnic and linguistic homogenization (Campbell and Hall 22). These factors facilitated the conditions under which the Danish state could become ‘right-sized’ and ‘right-peopled’ in the sense that its homogeneity “created a strong, politically stable, and unified nation with a strong national identity” (Campbell and Hall 22). This identity, which was centered on the preservation of the Danish language, history and culture, became the foundation upon which Denmark was rebuilt after losing its territories. The focus on things considered inherently Danish and symbolic of the Danish identity is what I believe paved the way for the evolution of Denmark into a nation that placed egalitarianism above multiculturalism.
The Establishment of Danish Customs

“Through language and history, a cultural nation is fashioned”
(E.F Fain 80)

The development of a Danish national identity began during the 17th century and peaked in the 19th century primarily because of the influence of the teachings of Nikolaj Frederik Grundtvig. Grundtvig and a dedicated group of supporters “took it upon themselves to define for Danish population their national identity” with teachings that surpassed social class divisions and stressed the importance of individual freedom, volunteerism, classic liberalism, popular education, free association and the development of civil society and social solidarity (Campbell and Hall 22). Education thus became a fundamental part of establishing national identity through the formation of Grundtvigian schools, which emphasized the teaching of Danish history, poetry and literature (Campbell and Hall 22).

Grundvig’s teachings stressed the importance of learning the mother tongue/native language, and highlighted the concept of Denmark as the “fatherland” (Fain 80). Grundtvig believed that it was “natural for a child to speak his mother tongue, so it was natural for a people to speak its native language” (Fain 80). Grundtvig warned Danes “their souls would shrivel if they continued to speak German [and] he mocked them with an old proverb about French clothes looking ridiculous during a Danish winter” (Fain 80). Grundtvig believed that language and history were essential to Danes becoming their true selves. He saw “literature as the mirror of a people’s spirit and history [as] not only the record of a people’s growth but the manifestation of God’s divine plan” (Fain 80). Therefore, it was incumbent upon Danes to use their own language and know their own history in order to “express their essential spirit” (Fain 80).

Initial literature on the fatherland theory portrays it as positioning Denmark as “the country in which one is citizen,” which meant that all members of the Danish state were
considered citizens, regardless of their place of birth and language (Brincker 356). This changed when an alternative definition of “fatherland” emerged a few years later, describing the term as exclusively representative of a shared language and place of birth (Brincker 356).

Grudtvig’s teachings fueled the growing interest in the Danish language and history and the growing acceptance of the alternative definition of fatherland. This new interest was interpreted by historians as an indication of a “growing national interest,” which ultimately led to other things such as the creation of nationally engaged groups that published literature about Denmark as the “fatherland” (Brincker 356). The Law of Indigenous Rights symbolized the first step towards Danish nationalism. The law “restricted the occupation of official positions to people born within the borders of the Danish state” (Brincker 357). Although this law largely resulted from an increasing antagonistic view of Germans, the law was received positively (Brinckser 357) and is, in my opinion, a key piece of legislation demonstrating the shift towards a more nationalist agenda.

The Rise of Immigration in Denmark

Denmark’s change in attitude towards minority groups, particularly immigrants, was triggered by the rise of immigration and integration policies in Denmark after the 1960’s. The late 1960’s to early 1970’s were Denmark’s golden years, reflecting the expansion of the welfare state (Jønsson 593). During these years, Denmark, along with other Western European countries welcomed labor migrants, refugees and family reunifications from countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia and Morocco. The immigrant workers were welcomed to fill labor shortages, because the demand for labor exceeded the national labor force (Moore 361). The immigrants occupied largely the “lower-tier economic positions” (Moore 358). Nonetheless,
they were now in a society that promoted universal social rights as well as a highly unionized workforce (Jønsson 593).

These benefits resulted in rising concerns in the social and political spheres about the future of immigrant workers on the country. In the social sphere, a general consensus existed amongst Danish citizens that the immigrant workers would not stay. Therefore, they were regarded as either *gæstearbejdere* (guest workers) or *fremmedarbejdstagere* (foreign workers), thus suggesting that immigrant workers occupied a place of “otherness” from the wider Danish society (Moore 361). In the political sphere, “the guest-worker issue” became the topic of debate, as politicians discussed the concerns about how the universal welfare state could and should deal with the problems associated with immigration (Jønsson 593). In Denmark, the main problems included language barriers, discrimination in the labor and housing markets, facilitating leisure time activities, etc. (Jønsson 593).

Initially, administrative changes and policies were attempted in order to assess, understand and then solve some of the political concerns (Jønsson 593). To start, the Elkær-Hansen Commission was appointed by the Minister of Labor in 1969 to examine the entry-related political issues as well as immigrant-policy implications regarding guest workers’ social problems and adaptation to Danish society. To ensure equality and avoid stigmatization, the Danish government included immigrants in the welfare-state system, assuring them the same rights and social-welfare as Danish citizens. To cement this policy, a guest worker was employed as a staff consultant at the Ministry of Social Affairs (Jønsson 593–594). Altogether, these were seen as ad hoc solutions in the absence of a genuine immigration policy.

Immigration issues in Denmark took a further turn in 1973, following the oil crisis and subsequent recession that impacted the country (Fernandez and Jensen 1140). Adopting the
larger European pattern of closing borders to foreign labor, by prohibiting labor importation – with the exception of political refugees and family reunifications – Denmark also closed its borders to foreign labor, thus stopping the entry of new guest workers (Jønssøn 593). This meant that only political refugees and family reunifications could obtain a permanent resident permit in Denmark. By this time, however, many guest workers had already earned the right to stay in the country, after already being there for some time. The absence of a comprehensive immigration policy, or official political reform to solve the challenges connected to immigration (such as increased pressure on the housing market and immigrants’ difficulties entering the labor market in an economic recession), left room for other political actors to “set the agenda, propose solutions and promote visions for the early Danish integration policy” (Jønssøn 593).

The aforementioned perception of immigrant workers being “guest workers” is key to understanding why a comprehensive immigrant policy was not yet developed. This idea of temporality “constituted the dominant policy framework in Denmark” (Jønssøn 595), and thus created a divide in what were considered Denmark’s fundamental values. On the one hand, the universal welfare state was aimed at social integration, reducing inequality and so on (Jønssøn 595). On the other hand, the role of immigrant workers was to “repatriate once the economic boom came to an end,” therefore creating no good reason to have a national integration policy (Jønssøn, 595).

*The Change: Immigrants as the Social Problem*

Politically, the debate on the establishment of a national immigration/integration policy was heightening in the early 1970’s (Jønssøn, 595). The Socialist People’s Party was in favor of the creation of a coherent immigration policy, whereas the Conservative Party was not. The
Socialist People’s Party argued that the added support for immigrants was to come from state funding, as well as the employers of immigrant workers. Employers, whose interests were represented by the Conservative Party, were utterly opposed to this idea (Jønsson 595). Jens Fisker, the head of the employers’ organization was quoted as saying, “the guest workers are especially welcome first and foremost because this reserve does not cost anything, in contrary to a reserve of unemployed or housewives. If we do not need the labor, it can just be deported” (Schwartz qtd. in Jønsson 596). The concern, at the time, was regarding immigrant workers undercutting the wages of Danish workers or becoming the “new underclass in society” (Jønsson 596).

One of the biggest issues for immigrants was finding housing. The Vognmandsmarken controversy created a real problem for the Danish political system, which was criticized for the poor quality and slum-like conditions in which guest workers and immigrants were living (Jønsson 598). Deemed a “tragic effect” of the lack of political action in the housing policy, Ludvig Hansen from the Danish Communist Party agreed to continue the characteristic Danish “left-wing-line” towards immigrants on the grounds that since Denmark invited immigrant workers to the country, the Danish political system was obliged to provide adequate accommodations for them (Jønsson 598).

With the social democratic stronghold in the country, the left-wing line was maintained in other ways. In 1983, a liberal law was passed. Considered one of the most liberal laws in the world at the time, the 1983 immigration law gave refugees the “legal right to asylum and family reunification. Immigrants (including immigrant workers already residing in Denmark) enjoyed the full rights of the welfare state and could vote in local elections after three years of residence” (Mouritsen and Olsen 691). Speaking in regard to the law, Bjorn Elmquist of the Liberal Party in
Denmark stated that “the law created a big consistent link between fighting for human rights ‘in the big world’ and not discriminating on the basis of nationality ‘here at home in our own house’” (Jensen qtd. in Mouritsen and Olsen 694). This idea of social citizenship and community heightened the recognition of Denmark as a pinnacle of internationalism and humanitarianism. It also made Denmark an attractive option for immigrants. By allowing guest workers access to these rights, Denmark became a secure option for them and their families through family reunification. Family reunification therefore meant a further influx of immigrants and the children of immigrants.

The inception of the 1983 immigration law also marked the heightening of concerns with immigration on the political and social spheres. Mass immigration was perceived as a threat to two important factors of the Danish society: the welfare economy and Danish culture. The slight uneasiness that emerged in the 1970s was about to become more serious. By the mid 1980s, the inexpensive labor migrants were replaced by asylum seekers and refugees, creating a more noticeable shift in the Danish perceptions of immigrants (Moore 358). As the demand for the labor of migrant workers decreased, and the number of asylum seeking refugees increased, Danish attitudes towards immigrants began to deteriorate (Moore 358).

In the mid 1980s and early 1990s, the majority of refugees were arriving from the Iran-Iraq war and the civil wars of Sri Lanka and the former Yugoslavia (Mouritsen and Olsen 694). The rising concern about immigrants was connected to issues of residential segregation and social problems. During a parliamentary debate in the early 1980s, a conservative MP was quoted as saying that accepting families with “roots in cultures which deviate from the Danish [culture]...would...lead to many tragedies for the families in question” (Hagensen qtd. in Mouritsen and Olsen 694). The issue was focused on how immigrants were to live on ‘an equal
footing’, given the differences in cultures (Mouritsen and Olsen 694). In the political sphere, immigration/integration was becoming a more prominent issue. The number of voters expressing concern about immigration grew from four percent in 1989 to 25 in 1998 (Moore 358). The polls indicated, “immigration issues superseded unemployment, taxes and the economy as the single most important concern to voters” (Moore 358).

By this point, Denmark was struggling with rising unemployment rates in the unskilled labor and lower-level management sectors due to shifting employment trends resulting from globalization (Moore 358). Language barriers and low education levels for immigrants were of particular concern (Mouritsen and Olsen 694). Politically, there was still an emphasis on equal rights. However, more weight was placed on the “duty of immigrants to make an effort to integrate and become economically self-supporting” (Mouritsen and Olsen 694). This marked the start of the shift from concern for cultural differences and human rights of immigrants to assimilation and integration.

Moving forward, I will use the words ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ repeatedly. In this paper, I interpret integration and assimilation as one in the same. Although by definition they are different, the policies and practices concerning integration, which will be later discussed in Chapter Two, contain elements of both terms. Brendan O’Leary, author of Right-sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders, defines assimilation as a process that “seeks to eliminate public and private differences between people’s cultures...through fusion or acculturation” (34). According to O’Leary, integration “stops at the public domain permitting private cultures to be maintained” (34). Although the integration discourse in Denmark was largely public, policies such as mother tongue teaching – which will also be discussed later – do interfere with immigrants on a private sphere. By discontinuing the teaching of an immigrant’s native language
on the stance that Danish should be spoken in the home, the goal is not just integration, but assimilation. Ultimately, the policies set forth were not just about active participation and self-support, but also about complete cultural adoption.

By the mid-1990s, immigration and integration in particular were salient within the political sphere. In 1999, the Social Democratic government introduced an ‘integration law’. This law aimed to “contribute to the newly arrived foreigner’s possibility for participating on an equal footing with other citizens (“borgere”) in the political, economic, work-related, social, religious and cultural life of society”; to induce economic self-reliance and to provide the ‘individual foreigner [with] and understanding of the fundamental values and norms of the Danish society” (Integration Law, article 1, qtd. in Mouritsen and Olsen 694–695). More humanitarian aims, such as “ensuring equal rights and opportunities and promoting a society of mutual respect, were deliberately excluded from the law” (Mouritsen and Olsen 695). The 1999 integration law also included the following dictates:

- Mandatory three-year integration programs in order to obtain permanent residency
- Family reunification eligibility only available to people with permanent residency status were eligible to apply for family-reunification of relatives
- Lower ‘introduction benefit’ for refugees
- Possible of repatriation of welfare-dependent and non-permanent residents
- Tougher demands on refugees (including a duty to remain in a designated municipality for the first three years in Denmark) to make them whole persons. (Mouritsen and Olsen 695)
In its “Concluding Observations” address to Denmark in 2000, The Human Rights Committee found issue with Denmark’s enforcement of Articles 3 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Committee noted the following:

- The Committee is concerned about reports of discrimination against ethnic minorities. The Committee recommends that measures be taken to prevent such discrimination (3).
- The Committee notes that asylum-seekers in Denmark are often restricted or discouraged from choosing a place of residence in specific municipalities or from moving from one municipality to another. Denmark should ensure that any such measures are applied in strict compliance with article 12 of the Covenant (4).
- [As per Article 13 of the ICCPR], the Committee notes that asylum-seekers are entitled to have the assistance of legal counsel. The state party should provide information as to the stages of the application procedures at which legal assistance may be had, and whether the assistance is free of charge at all stages for those who cannot afford it (4).

These dictates also violated Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states, “everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state” (‘United Nations. General Assembly”). Altogether, these policies reversed the 1983 immigration law, and also marked the beginning of a series of immigration laws that were to come in the immediate years (Mouritsen and Olsen 695). The demand that refugees stay in a designated municipality for three years, as part of an effort to make them “whole persons” (Mouritsen and Olsen 695), is not only restrictive but also repressive.
Far-Right Populism in Denmark

Right-wing populism has long existed in Denmark. In fact, the country became famous for having the strongest right-wing populist party in the continent in the early 1970s. This party was the Progress Party, which came to power in 1973 – the same year as the oil crisis. Notably, the emergence of “guest workers” in the 1960s did not create an uproar about immigration (Rydgren 474). This was therefore a non-issue in the party’s political policy. Though far right, the Progress Party was largely a “tax-populist, anti-bureaucracy, protest party” (Rydgren 474). Denmark’s first far-right party was the Danish People’s Party (DPP), which was founded in 1995 as a breakaway from the Danish Progress Party (Rydgren 480).

Far-right parties rose in popularity because of the deep division in sentiments concerning membership in the European Union (EU), along with a “significant distrust” of and alienation from politicians and government institutions in general. These attitudes stemmed from a deep disappointment with the conservative government’s rule and their handling of the country’s new taxation policies (Moore 359). The burden of taxes, rising levels of unemployment and shifting employment trends gave rise to increased economic inequality, insecurity and unfavorable attitudes towards immigrants. These factors “produced a deterioration of class and political party identification, and opened the door even further to the far right” (Moore 359).

It is worth noting that immigration was not the DPP’s initial platform for emerging on the political sphere. Rather, its platform was the opposition to taxation and the increasingly high rates of taxation in the welfare state (Moore 357). Increased immigration simply furthered citizens’ mistrust of the government and led the Danes to support their more radically right and anti-establishment parties (Kestilä and Söderlund qtd. in Moore 358). Following the DPP’s significant rise in popularity, the party maintained its position by bringing immigration issues to
the forefront, and then by keeping these issues on top of electoral agendas, in order to further influence new “rightward drift” of Danish politics. Central to the DPP’s message was the point that immigration was a threat to Danish culture, as illustrated in the following message:

Denmark is not a country of immigration, and has never been one. We cannot therefore accept a multiethnic transformation of the country. Denmark is a country of Danes, and its citizens should be granted the opportunity to live in a safe community founded on the rule of law which is evolving in line with Danish culture...The Danish People’s Party is in favour of cultural cooperation with other countries, but we are against giving other cultures, building on completely different values and norms than ours, leverage in Denmark. The way of life we have chosen in Denmark is outstanding. It is conditioned by our culture, and in a small country like ours it cannot survive if we permit mass immigration of foreign religions and foreign cultures. A multicultural society is a society without coherence and unity, and, consequently, existing multicultural societies over the globe are characterized by a lack of solidarity and often by open conflict, as well. There are no good reasons to assume that Denmark would escape the destiny of other multicultural societies if we let ourselves under the sway of foreign cultures (Den Danske Foreing qtd. in Rydgren 484).

As cheap immigrant labor continued to be replaced by a sharp increase in asylum seeking refugees, the rising anti-immigration sentiment in Denmark increased, with the formation of organizations such as the Committee against the Refugee Law, founded in 1984 (and considered the first anti-immigration organization in Denmark) and the Danish Association, founded in 1987. The message of the Danish Association was very similar to the DPP’s. The DPP’s message
concerned the desire to “secure Danish culture, language and mode of life in a world threatened by chaos, violence and fanaticism...[while warning against] the disintegration of [Danish] culture and popular unity, which is caused by an influx of people from overpopulated countries” (Den Danske Forening, qtd. in Rydgren 481).

In reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Danish Association claimed “the right of the peoples of Western Europe...to their own households and their own resources, [noting] the fundamental principle that nobody has the right to force one’s way into another country at the expense of the peoples of that country” (Den Danske Forening qtd. in Rydgren 481). Going even further, the organization’s ideology was akin to that of the French far-right wing party, Le Front National. In a firm display of its stance against immigration, the organization was centered on the following ideology:

When a foreign culture is pressed on another country, there will be a shower of sparks. Those who today are intruding [on] our country do not want to become ‘integrated’. They are too many. And experiences from other European countries, which have had mass migration for a long time, show us what will happen: disturbances, violence and conflicts (Den Danske Foreing qtd. in Rydgren 482).

The Danish Association’s message addressed their concerns about foreign cultures and religions; of which, the most vilified was Islam. Focusing on Muslims in a further effort to rationalize its stance against immigration, the Danish Association said, “The majority of the immigrants have another view of life than we have. For most Muslims there is no equality for women and people of other religions. And the supreme law is not the one that is stipulated by our democratic institutions, but Allah’s law, the Koran. The order they will try to implement here – when they are many enough” (Den Danske Forening qtd. in Rydgren 482).
The concept of ‘cultural anxiety’ (Grillo qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2311) contextualizes why foreigners (particularly Muslims) may be perceived as threats (Rytter and Pedersen 2311). “Cultural anxiety is directed at external transgressors...or local ‘enemies within’, such as the immigrant population, which personifies the disturbing forces of globalization, transformation and change” (Rytter and Pedersen 2311–2312). Most noticeable in the public and political discourse, this concept was heavily articulated and promoted by the DPP (Rytter and Pedersen 2311) as another component of their anti-immigration rhetoric.

The subsequent growth in public anti-immigration sentiment was certainly a factor in the DPP’s win of the 2001 general election, which was dubbed the immigration election. With a clear stance on immigrants, it was not surprising that the new ruling party would strongly espouse its liberal-conservative values, which would ultimately help to usher in policies and practices aimed at tightening immigration. In a series of steadily increasing conditions and regulations, which will be discussed in Chapter Two, the Danish populous witnessed a seismic shift in the Danish integration and immigration policy, with added constraints on access to permanent residency or Danish citizenship, with added stringency for Muslim immigrants.

Overall, the pattern of Danish resistance to varying cultures and religions reflected something that has been deeply embedded in their history. On the one hand, as a contracted state, there was a need for security, which was in the comfort of having something “distinctly Danish” to maintain the spirit of the nation. However, the framing of immigrants as threats and their immediate association with violence, social unrest and the loss of social and cultural cohesion also led to immigrants being portrayed as the cause of destabilization in an otherwise stable state. The point is there is no true stability in a recently contracted state. The country’s sense of

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2 Rytter and Pedersen define “external transgressors” as the international economy, the European Union (EU), the Human Rights Charter or the United Nations (2311–2312).
national identity needed to be rebuilt and restored at that time. However, by portraying immigrants as risks, it was easier to associate immigrants with destabilization and destruction, and blame them for the country’s socio-economic problems – even though the Danish nation was anything but ideal.
CHAPTER 2

Citizenship Policies: Creating ‘Good Citizens’

“The more alike we are, the easier it is to sustain the idea of equality. To be equal in Danish society, thus tend[s] to imply to be similar”

(Johncke 2007 and Hervik 1999 qtd. in Jensen et al. 5)

Denmark’s accolades for its system of government and enforcement of human rights internationally have not dispelled the fact that immigration is still a challenge for the state. Despite the religious shifts to the formerly Christian state over the years, the Grudtvigian ideology remained central to the Danish identity. With its emphasis on Danish poetry, history and culture, Grundtvigism became embedded into the fiber of the nation’s being – thus informing its national identity. Grudtvigian teaching was not just about spirituality, but also about nationality – which very strongly influenced Danish customs. This notion of “Danishness” is therefore quite impactful, especially on issues relating to assimilation and acculturation; and they could explain the immigration issues present for Muslims, as well as the social perceptions of Muslim minorities and whether or not they fit the definition of a “good citizen.” Considering these factors as a conceptual foundation for understanding the immigration and integration policies in Denmark, this chapter will examine how they have been modified to affect immigrants and cultural minorities.

Integration as Assimilation: The Creation of the ‘Good Citizen’

From Chapter One, we know that the 1980s marked the start of integration becoming a significant political issue – leading to the creation of a 1983 immigration law – which was then effectively reversed with the 1999 immigration law. The new law also marked the start of further systematic changes in Denmark’s immigration and integration policies. The Danish immigration
law comprised of two main features: the Aliens Act and the Integration Act. “The Aliens Act addressed foreigners’ legal status in Denmark concerning [circumstances such as]...entry and residence permits (temporary and permanent). The Integration Act concerned the actual process of integration [for]...refugees and family reunification of refugees and immigrants from its inception until 2010 – after which further changes came into effect (Jensen et al. 3).

Analysts from the Danish Center for Social Research (SFI) identified the objective of the Integration Act as, “to ensure that newly arrived foreigners are given the possibility of using their abilities and resources to become involved as contributing citizens on equal footing with other citizens of Danish society” (Jensen et al. 4). This, the researchers say, must be done via an “effort of integration” (Jensen et al. 4). One of the objectives listed under the Integration Act pertains to the imparting of “the fundamental values and norms of the Danish society” (Integration Act qtd. in Jensen et al.). The act also emphasized the importance of “making newly arrived foreigners self-supporting as quickly as possible through employment” (Jensen, et al. 4) as well as ensuring that immigrants can function in the political, economic, social and religious spheres “on an equal footing with other citizens” (Jensen et al. 4). Based on these objectives, researchers from SFI concluded, “The notion of equality is central to the Integration Act and in the integration policy as such. However, the concept of equality is closely related to a perception that equality requires a certain degree of sameness…” thus making the law somewhat contradictory (Jensen et al.5). This analysis explains why I define integration and assimilation, in the Danish, context as one in the same.

Despite the recommendations from the Human Rights Committee in 2000, the criteria for gaining access to citizenship was further tightened in 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2008 (Mouritsen and Olsen 699). In 2002, the government implemented what was recognized as the strictest rule in
the world at the time (Schmidt qtd. in Fernandez and Jensen 1140). The government reintroduced the lower ‘introduction benefit’ (first presented in the 1999 immigration law) for new immigrants entering the program as well as “lower ‘start help’ payments for those unemployed (including Danish citizens) who had not spent seven of the previous eight years in Denmark” (Mouritsen and Olsen 698). In 2005, ‘integration contracts’, which were to be signed by immigrants, were also introduced. These contracts “specified increased obligations (attending language school, active job seeking) as conditions for financial support...” (Mouritsen and Olsen 698). Later, “the legal right to family reunification was withdrawn and a controversial twenty-four year rule (requiring both the Danish-resident spouse and the new immigrant to be at least twenty-four years old for residency to be granted) in order to prevent forced (and arranged marriages) and to reduce the number of immigrants from lower socioeconomic backgrounds” (Mouritsen and Olsen 698).

Going even further, the criteria for gaining access to citizenship also included the following:

- Residence requirement of nine years
- A loyalty affirmation
- A written citizenship test without publicized questions that can be practiced beforehand
- A stiff language requirement (minimum grade D (ECTS) in level 3 Danish test
- Tough restrictions and waiting periods in case of previous welfare dependency, public debts or criminal offenses. (Mouritsen and Olsen, 699)

In keeping with the Danish focus on integration and assimilation, the required citizenship test included questions that tested immigrants’ knowledge of Danish national culture by asking trivia questions related to sports, such as football championships. The test included questions on high culture (testing knowledge of painters and authors) and early national history (e.g., the introduction of Christianity in Denmark). The language test also exceeded the typical
‘functional’ competence needed for the labor market and political participation and instead tested for a level of language competence that “many non-Western immigrants, especially the lower educated, [would] not be able to reach” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). Finally, in what Mouritsen and Olsen describe as a conspicuous act, Denmark rejected dual citizenship, but provided “special fast-track naturalization procedures for ‘culturally close’ applicants from Nordic countries and northern Germany” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700).

None of these changes amounted to those implemented in the amendment of the Integration Law in 2010. One added stipulation was that ‘successful integration’ was a condition for obtaining a permanent residence permit (Jensen et al. 5). Although the term ‘successful integration’ was neither used nor defined in the Integration Act, researchers from the SFI assert that the wording of the act suggests that ‘successful integration’ is “apparently measured by educational performance, fast acquisition of Danish language skills, integration into the labour-market, economic self-reliance and active participation in society” (Jensen et al. 6).

In 2010, “the rules on access to (and forfeit of) permanent residency” were further tightened, with “the introduction of a required sustained course in Danish society, culture and history” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). In the same year, the minimum required years for residence before being eligible for permanent residence was reduced from seven years to four years; however a point system for immigrants was subsequently introduced (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). This point system allowed for immigrants to earn permanent residence only if they met the increased requirements of “labor market activity and language scores, with points added for active citizenship (i.e., voluntary work in schools and local associations)” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700).
According to Mouritsen and Olsen, the citizenship policies (especially those outlined in the revamped 2010 Integration Law) were designed to “pressure or motivate immigrants into becoming model citizens before they achieve actual citizen status (naturalization) and even before they earn the right to permanent residence” (698). Essentially, not only were the policies designed to force integration/assimilation, but also to serve as “civic-screening and exclusion devices” such that some people could not, and would not, become members of the Danish society (Mouritsen and Olsen 698). For immigrants, being a model Danish citizen entailed being self supporting, having or acquiring knowledge of Danish values, and also participating in society – *all for their own benefit* (Mouritsen and Olsen 695). These requirements revealed who could and could not meet the demands, resulting in a line being drawn between ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ foreigners (Jensen et al. 6).

With the plethora of changes in the Danish immigration policy, a new type of societal membership emerged, described as a “two-tier membership” (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). Effectively, either one was a societal ‘citizen’ or a full citizen. In “Denmark Between Liberalism and Nationalism,” Mouritsen and Olsen define societal ‘citizenship’ as being made available for those who can “integrate well in terms of work, active participation, and significant cultural knowledge and adaptation” (700). They define full citizenship as having “a Danish passport, including rights to fully participate politically, move freely across EU and other borders, and receive social transfers without implications for one’s rights to stay” (700). The rights, Mouritsen and Olsen say, “remain privileges for an even more select inner circle” (700).
Though the measures implemented by the Danish government may seem harsh, they serve as stark reminders of Danish history and the principles upon which Danish nationalism was built. Besides homogeneity, embedded in the cultural fiber of Denmark are the remnants of Christian, Lutheran and Grundtvigian principles. The four other elements that are arguably some of the driving forces behind the Danish philosophy of integration are: Christianity, emphasis on the Danish language, pride in the welfare society and Lutheranism.

Although Denmark is considered a secular state, the role of religion in society remains significant. According to the Constitutional Act of Denmark (The Danish Constitution, section 4), the Evangelical Lutheran Church, also known as the People’s Church (Folkekirken), is the established church of Denmark (Rytter and Pedersen 2311; Mouritsen and Olsen 696). Known as the state’s church since its integration into the state during the years of the protestant reformation, the church still enjoys a “privileged position in cultural life” (Mouritsen and Olsen 696), as it is “governed and financed by the state, from the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs” (Rytter and Pedersen 2311). “Protestantism still tends to play a significant role in various settings, from the annual ritual opening of parliament (Folketinget), to the Queen’s New Year’s speech and [most importantly] the state school (folkeskole) curriculum” (Rytter and Pedersen 2311). Moreover, as of April 2015, the national website of Denmark still lists its national religion as 90% Protestant (“Facts and Statistics”).

Given Denmark’s history with language (as propagated by Grundtvig), “mastery and public (or even private) use of the Danish language remains a strong parameter of national belonging both socially and legally, over the ‘functional’ considerations of both public communication and labor market flexibility” (Mouritsen and Olsen 696). Thirdly, “the smallness,
cultural homogeneity and tight-knit ‘cosiness’ of Danish society” stemming back to the loss of the war with Germany, along with the “homogenizing process through schools and monopoly television” are still part of the larger discourse on “national cohesion, the valuation of sameness and the mistrust of cultural pluralism...” (Mouritsen and Olsen 696–697).

The fourth thing to note is the “pride in the welfare society (not state)” in which solidarity is conditioned on working and paying taxes, provided that one is not “sick, handicapped, retired or temporarily unemployed” (Mouritsen and Olsen 697). Lastly, “Lutheranism remains significant” (Mouritsen and Olsen 697). The Grundtvigian-Lutheran ideology not only “challenges citizens to struggle for all that you hold dear” (Richardt qtd. in Mouritsen and Olsen 697), but also teaches them to “tolerate, with both goodwill and confrontation, the belief of others” (Mouritsen and Olsen 697). These policies became integral to the government’s approach to immigration and integration policies. For Muslims, this was particularly problematic. Despite the decline in traditional religiosity, discourses of ‘cultural Christianity’ and ‘Lutheran individualism’ have recycled some of the elements above in a manner which places Islam in an unfavorable light (Mouritsen and Olsen, 697), thus presenting further immigration and integration problems for Muslim immigrants and minorities, respectively.

Revisiting the Historic Danish Rescue of Jews During the Holocaust

The problems currently present for the Muslim minority are not unlike those experienced by Jews who had previously settled in Denmark in the 1930s. Close examination of the climate in Denmark at the time reveals stark similarities in the domestic experiences of Jews then and Muslims today. The following analysis reveals that like Muslims, Jews were stereotyped, they faced criticism because of their religious beliefs, they were subjected to strict immigration
restrictions, and were more likely to be accepted if they were assimilated (i.e., they spoke Danish, dressed like Danes and conformed to socio-cultural norms). The analysis shows the depth to which Danish culture has influenced its policies and practices. This does not mean culture is the only influencing factor, but it is certainly a significant one.

Despite the popular representations of the brighter side of Danish history – which includes the story of the rescue and safe smuggling of Danish Jews into Sweden, as protection from Nazi forces during the Holocaust – a dark undertone also existed within the Danish model of humanism towards Jews, particularly Jewish refugees in the 1930s. Before the 1940 German occupation of Denmark, Danish policies towards Jewish immigrants were not very different from those of other European countries at the time. Entrance visas were “strictly limited,” and some German Jewish refugees were stopped at the border and “sent home to their deaths” (Buckser 2). Though these instances were reduced during the German occupation, they still happened. As case in point, 21 stateless Jewish refugees were expelled to Germany between 1940 and 1943. They were neither ordered nor demanded by German occupiers, but were nonetheless sent to their deaths after living in Denmark for a number of years (Vilhjálmsson and Blüdnikow, “Rescue, Expulsion, and Collaboration”). Although there are no clear details as to why this was done, it is evident that anti-Semitism was very much alive in Denmark.

Another thing to note is that for three years (1940–1943), Denmark put up with the German occupation based on something known as the negotiations policy or Forhandlingspolitik (Voorhis, 173). This resulted in Denmark regarded as Germany’s Musterprotektorat (model protectorate) or ‘Hitler’s Canary,’ as Winston Churchill dubbed it (Friedman 318). There were very minimal signs of resistance on the part of the Danish people, as this policy reduced the number of Danish casualties (Voorhis 173). Further examination of the reasons behind the
Danish rescue of Jews incites speculation on Danish humanitarianism as it relates to their motivation for assisting Jews, especially when there were indications of anti-Semitic sentiments within the country.

There were notably high levels of assimilation for Jews living in Denmark from the 1600s. Danish Jews at the time spoke Danish, they dressed like other Danes, and they participated actively in the social and cultural life of the nation (Buckser 9). Danish Jews also enjoyed full civil rights since 1814. However, their assimilation meant that – unlike today’s Muslims – Danish Jews had a stronger identification with larger Danish culture and were (to some extent) accepted as such.

During the state’s economic disaster in 1813, anti-Semitic sentiments became more apparent as Jews were considered responsible for the nation’s bankruptcy, and were portrayed in the media as “parasitic and alien to the Danish nation” (Wagner 154). Although an 1814 law against racial and religious discrimination protected these immigrants, there was still opposition to the official acceptance of Jews into Danish society. At the assemblies of the Estate in the 1830s and 1840s, there were strong opinions against furthering the rights of Jews on a “combination of ethic[al] and religious grounds [such as the notion that]...Jews could never become Danes, because the core of being Danish was Christianity and the essence [of] being Jewish was to belong to that nation alien to the Danish people” (Wagner 154).

After the re-stabilization of the Danish economy and the successful full emancipation of Jews in 1848–49, due to activism (Wagner 154), there were post-emancipation conflicts that led to Jews being associated with “individualistic hedonism, materialistic capitalism, radical skepticism and anticlerical liberalism,” which was aimed at destroying the “organically grown Christian state” (Wagner 156). This statement, made by a Bishop named Hans Lassen
Martensen, was in reference to the “assimilated and emancipated Jewry,” who he felt were the “primary force undermining the concept of the Christian nation state” (Wagner 155). The ongoing debate surrounding Jewish integration continued – reaching a critical level in the 1870s. Described as the “critical transition period” (Wagner 156), there was now a “bridge between anti-emancipationist concepts of the first half of the nineteenth century and the rearticulation of anti-Jewish stereotyping since the late nineteenth century” (Wagner 156–157).

Years later, between 1901 and 1917, a new wave of immigrants from Russia and other Eastern European countries immigrated to the county. These Jews, on the other hand, spoke Yiddish and had trouble mastering the Danish language; their mode of dress differed from Danish styles; their Jewish practice was more orthodox than the ‘reform-influenced Danish Jews’, they had little to no income; and, overall, they were easily distinguishable³ (qtd. in Buckser 9–10). “Since the immigrants had to walk to services on the Sabbath, they soon formed a small immigrant slum in the cramped streets surrounding the synagogue. This new group was very visible, and its image soon came to dominate public perceptions of Jews in Denmark” (9). From there, caricatures of Jews in Danish newspapers began to appear, portraying Jews as “...dark, bearded men in Eastern European dress,” thus upsetting native Jews (Buckser 9). In response to the caricatures, several comments were made, such as, “[they] used to see us as Danes of Mosaic faith, but now they look at us as Jews!” (Blum qtd. in Buckser 10).

Given the aforementioned examples, it is therefore quite plausible that the need to safeguard the interest of the Danish state was the primary driver in the resistance to the Nazi invasion. After all, Denmark was willing to make concessions with the Germans for three years, while she was occupied by the Nazis to “keep her own parliamentary system, the monarchy, and

³ Buckser notes that this description of the immigrants is based primarily on Pinches Weiner, Fra polskjode til dansk (Copenhagen: Hasselbach, 1965); Bludnikow, Immigranter; Melchior, A Rabbi Remembers; Blum, Dansk og/eller Jode; Benjamin Balslev, De Danske Joders Historie (Copenhagen: Lohse, 1932); and Bamberger, Viking Jews.
a degree of constitutional liberty...This ability to maintain her independence and prevent a German or Nazi take-over resulted partly from the Danish government’s policy of cooperation and non-resistance” (Voorhis 173). Of course, there were other factors, such as the strength of the German military. Nonetheless, up until this point, the only Danish resistance to the German occupation pertained to issues which would alter the political structure of Denmark, such as blocking the increasing push from Germans for Danish support of the economic development of German-held areas in the Soviet Union, blocking the German push for a Quisling-type government (Voorhis 176). If there was not a threat to the Danish way of life and belief system, there may have been no famous historical WWII achievement of which to speak.

Overall, the newer integration/assimilation requirements appeared to be more extensive and stringent, but their intent was the same – to achieve the greatest level of assimilation/integration and to uphold and protect the Danish national culture. What is different, however, is the context through which the policies were created, and the way the minority reacted to them. What is clear is that there was a focus on maintaining a culturally homogeneous society by controlling who is best positioned to receive permanent residence or citizenship, based on “cultural closeness.” This exclusivity transcends nationalism and extends to xenophobia.
CHAPTER 3
The Intersection Between Immigration, Integration and Security

2001 is an important year in Danish history for several reasons: 2001 was the year of the September 11 (9/11) attacks against the United States, and it marked the first of a 10-year rule of Denmark by the far-right wing political party, DPP. The DPP succeeded in the state elections, two months after the 9/11 attacks, which was a critical event that sent shockwaves through the American nation, and other parts of the world. In Denmark, 9/11 aided the DPP’s push for more stringent immigration and integration policies. What followed is what I call the 9/11 effect, which was a rise in Islamophobia, and a subsequent immigration policy that was overall restrictive but also slightly more disadvantageous to Muslim immigrants, who were seen as possible threats to the country.

The 9/11 attacks heightened the already salient debate on immigration, while also merging these issues with “concerns of national security and the potential threat of Muslims both inside and outside of Denmark” (Olwig and Paerregaard, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2306). The measures employed to tackle both the immigration and security concerns became known as the ‘security/integration response’. These actions ushered in a period that Mikkel Rytter and Marianne Holm Pedersen call “a decade of suspicion,” especially towards Muslims who became cast as “the usual suspects” in society (Rytter and Pedersen 2303).

This chapter discusses Rytter and Pedersen’s suggestion that the policies and practices enforced against Muslim immigrants are not just because of Denmark’s historical, political and cultural processes towards immigration and integration. Instead, they assert that these factors merged with 9/11 as a global factor and joined with the European adoption of a
security/integration response, subsequently producing what they refer to as a “distinctly ‘Danish’ version of a much broader phenomenon” (2309).

_Understanding Securitization_

9/11 signaled the beginning of changes in security policies, hence ushering a series of new laws and policies, as well as “altering notions of identity, belonging and day to day relations between majorities and minorities in various countries around the world” (Rytter and Pedersen 2305). European countries embarked on a process known as ‘securitization’, which is defined as “the process where something (a referent object) is deemed threatened and security actions are taken in its defense” (Lausten and Wæver, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2305). Through securitization, European countries also introduced “far-reaching pre-emptive policies and legislation to protect the states and citizens against “religiously motivated terrorism” (Rytter and Pedersen 2305).

After 9/11, there was a noticeable shift in the perception and conceptualization of ethnic and religious minorities in Denmark (Rytter and Pedersen 2306). This shift was more apparent for Muslims. An “essentialist understanding” of Islam emerged, highlighting Muslim militant groups, while casting a shadow on the religious faith and practices of the world’s Muslims. For many politicians, commentators and European citizens, Islam became seen as being “opposed to democracy, equal rights and freedom of speech” (Cesari qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2303) and Muslims were seen as potential internal enemies because of their difference in ideology. This resulted in debates and politics regarding Muslim immigrants as needing new and heightened security dimensions.
As part of the ‘security’ component of the security/integration response, a Ministry of Integration was created “in order to deal with the urgent political questions concerning immigrants and refugees in Danish society” (Olwig and Paerregaad, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2307). There was “increased control, surveillance and regulation of Muslim immigrant families already living in Denmark” (Rytter and Pedersen 2307). There were also increased barriers to entry into Denmark, as the criteria for being granted permanent residency as a refugee were changed, resulting in a plummet in accepted refugees to Denmark from 5,211 in 2001 to 233 in 2007 (Rytter and Pedersen 2307).

Understanding Integration

Following the adoption and implementation of securitization initiatives, the Danish government began revisiting its integration policies and implementing several changes, some of which were already discussed in the “Integration as Assimilation” section of Chapter Two. Another major change, not yet discussed, was the abolition of mother tongue teaching in 2002, which “up until that point, had been obligatory and was provided to children with an immigrant background” (Rytter and Pedersen 2308). Despite international research findings stating that “bilingual students perform better in education if they are fluent in both Danish and their native language…the argument was that children – in the name of integration – should speak Danish at home” (Holmen qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2308). “Subsidies paid to immigrant associations were [also] significantly reduced” (Rytter and Pedersen 2308).

“While immigrant, cultural and religious associations had formally been encouraged as a means of enhanced engagement in civil society in the wake of 9/11 these groups were monitored and controlled and, to a large extent, regarded as suspect” (Rytter and Pedersen 2308).
According to Rytter and Pedersen, “while [the Danish response to] the war on terror was, at first, an immediate reaction to an extreme situation, it later became normalized as an obvious aspect of the resort and jurisdiction of the nation state” (Andersen qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2308). Essentially, “the reconstruction of Muslim immigrants as a potential enemy within became an almost permanent, naturalized condition” (Rytter and Pedersen 2309).

This transformation of the Muslim image into being a threat to the Danish nation and its values was most evident in Denmark’s change in its citizenship policies; which made the possibility of Muslim immigrants being part of Danish society far more difficult. The citizenship policies required immigrant applicants to “pass a test on Danish history, culture and society”...as well as sign a “declaration in which they swear allegiance and loyalty to Denmark and Danish society, and declare their willingness to observe and respect the national laws” (Rytter and Pederson 2308). “Denmark also started to select the refugees making up its United Nations (UN) quota on the basis of so-called ‘integration potential’. In practice, this meant that more Christian refugees were granted residency at the expense of refugees with a Muslim background” (Whyte qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2307).

*Immigration, Securitization and Integration*

The rapid decrease in the number of accepted refugees to Denmark after 9/11 was due in large part to the Aliens Act which was enacted in 2002, as part of an agreement between the Danish government and the DPP. The Aliens Act facilitated the abolition of the *de facto* concept, which was replaced by the *protection status or status B* concept, which limited Denmark’s role in receiving immigrants only to its obligatory human rights convention requirements (Kjær 255). In what was an unambiguous departure from its long history of having more favorable policies
towards refugees and asylum seekers, this change was in keeping with the desire to reduce the number of foreigners entering Denmark, and to implement stricter requirements in order to help facilitate faster integration.

The de facto concept was part of the 1983 immigration law. Its goal was to protect people who fell outside of the definition of "refugee," as stipulated by the 1951 Refugee Convention (Kjær). In addition to ‘traditional’ refugees, who fled their native countries because of the threat of persecution or lack of protection, the Danish de facto concept also applied to migrants who fled their country to avoid active war service “republic refugees,” and migrants whose cases provided insufficient evidence to support their claims for applying for citizenship. This particular provision was justified using the “general acknowledged principle of international asylum law relating to benefit of the doubt” (Kjær 255). The change meant that asylum seekers and refugee applicants would be assessed based on international covenants. The status B concept guarantees protection to those who are protected under the 1951 Convention. It also protects persons who risk ‘being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,’ as well as “foreigners risking the death penalty,” which is included in the sixth article of European Convention of Human Rights (Kjær 256).

Denmark’s amended refugee and asylum changes were most harmful to asylum seekers from Afghanistan and Iran. Kim Kjær, Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Institute for Human Rights, asserts that Danish administrative initiatives were launched at Afghan and Iranian asylum seekers when, for a brief period of time, Danish officials decided to “suspend the processing of applications for asylum from Afghan nationals” (Kjær 268). This occurred despite their

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4 “When the provision on de facto status was introduced in The 1983 Act, the relevant persons received a proper legal claim to reside as refugees in Denmark as ‘de facto refugees’ on more or less the same terms as convention[al] refugees” (Kjær 256).

5 These were ‘refugees’ “from the former eastern bloc countries who, if they returned, risked violent reprisals merely because they had stayed for a long period and/or applied for asylum in a Western country” (Kjær 256).
recognition as refugees, in order to “procure new updated background information on the situation in the country” (Kjær 268). According to Kjær, the hope was that the situation in Afghanistan would improve, reducing the number of asylum seeker applications (268).

Whatever the reasons, it is quite possible that Denmark’s actions were in violation of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (“United Nations. General Assembly”). As a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Denmark is obligated to uphold the duties and principles set forth within the Convention. Although the state may reject an asylum application, the choice to halt the processing of applications from a distinct region can also be seen as a violation of Article 3, Section 4 of the Council Resolution of 20 June 1995 on Minimum Guarantees for Asylum Procedures. More specifically, it could be said that Denmark’s actions violated the stipulation that “[d]ecisions will be taken independently in the sense that all asylum applications will be examined and decided upon individually, objectively and impartially” (“Council Resolution of June 20 1995”). The act of suspending the asylum applicants of Afghan immigrants denied them the right to an impartial and objective examination, as well as their right to seek asylum as stated by the Council Resolution and UDHR, respectively.

*When History, Politics and Culture Collide: The Danish Cartoon Controversy*

The image of Islam “as a dangerous and threatening religion…has been a concern that has, in various ways, been part of European history and identity since the expansion of the Ottoman Empire” (Said qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2309). One notable instance of an Islamic uprising is what was called the Rushdie affair in 1989, “which mobilized a visible Muslim public
in Europe” (Rytter and Pedersen 2309)…[and] created a new enemy of European values, identity and sovereignty, as the threat of communism was succeeded by the threat of Islamism” (Hervik; Werbner, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2309).

According to Rytter and Pedersen, Denmark had its own ‘Rushdie affair’ with its cartoon controversy in 2005–06 (and again in 2008), which led to a mobilization of Muslims on an “unprecedented scale” (2309–2310). The Cartoon Controversy concerned the printing of twelve caricatures of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad, along with an editorial that “instructed Muslims to accept ‘insults, mockery and ridicule’ as necessary aspects of contemporary democracy and freedom of speech” in *Jyllands-Posten*, the country’s largest newspaper (Hervik; Klausen; Lindekilde, Mouritsen and Zapata-Barrero qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2309–2310).

*Rage Ignited: The Muslim Response to the Cartoon Controversy*

Following the release of the cartoons, there was a large outcry from members of the Muslim community, and a push to bring attention to the issue. This uproar was so large, in fact, that the Muslim reaction to the cartoon controversy marked the first time since the Thirty Years War that a conflict with religious connotations had such an impact in Danish society (Rudling 76). Members of the Danish community implemented many initiatives, such as traveling to the Middle East to bring international attention to the case and to gather Muslim Imams/representatives (Rytter and Pedersen 2310).

A primary catalyst for the immense Muslim response was Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen’s refusal to meet with eleven ambassadors from Muslim countries who wanted to

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6In “Denmark as the Big Satan,” Per Anders Rudling outlines the degree of outrage in the Muslim community. He notes, “The decision to publish these cartoons outraged some high-profile Islamists within Denmark. 3,500 Muslims protested on the streets of Copenhagen against the cartoons. A 17-year old Muslim boy was [also] arrested for attempting to kill one of the cartoonists” (77).
discuss “what they considered to be an anti-Islamic campaign” (Rudling 77). The Danish Prime Minister and the Danish government also refused to censor the media or compel them to portray Muslims in a more positive light on the grounds that the cartoons were being portrayed as expressions of freedom of speech” (Rudling 73–74). In his official response to the Muslim protesters, Prime Minister Rasmussen said, “the freedom of expression has a wide scope and the Danish government has no means of influencing the press. However, Danish legislation prohibits acts or expressions of a blasphemous or discriminatory nature” (Larsen and Seidenfaden qtd. in Hervik 60).

For many Muslim protestors, the cartoons were derogatory because they associated the Prophet Muhammad with terrorism, thus implying that all Muslims are terrorists (“Questions and Answers”). According to Rytter and Pedersen, the larger populous generally viewed the Muslim response objections to the cartoons as “inappropriate; instead of being seen as expressions of freedom of speech, their positions and protests were framed as threats to the freedom of speech and Danish secular society” (2311). This boosted the outrage of Danish Muslims, resulting in riots, which led to the deaths of 139 people (not including the deaths of the 146 killed in Nigeria), over 800 people injured and over 10,000 unemployed because of political embargoes and destroyed buildings, by torching and vandalism (Rudling 76).^7

In further signs of protest, governments like those of Saudi Arabia and Syria, who are not otherwise champions of religious freedom, sided with the Danish Muslim community by supporting boycotts of Danish goods and also withdrawing their ambassadors from Copenhagen (Kimmelman, “A Startling New Lesson in the Power of Imagery”). In solidarity with Jyllands-Posten and in defense of free speech, European papers republished the cartoons in countries such as in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Hungary, New Zealand, Ukraine and Jordan.

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^7 The buildings destroyed include European consulates and embassies, Christian churches and fast food restaurants.
One also appeared in *The Philadelphia Inquirer* (Kimmelman, “A Startling New Lesson in the Power of Imagery”). The images also “spread worldwide via the Web, exacerbating Muslim outrage...” (Kimmelman, “A Startling New Lesson in the Power of Imagery”).

In an interview two years after the publication of the twelve images, Fleming Rose, one of the cartoonists responsible for the drawing maintained that his drawings were not discriminatory or racist, instead noting that the Muslim response was unjustified. While talking to *New York Times* reporter Michael Kimmelman, Mr. Rose said:

> It was not about mocking a minority but a religious figure, the Prophet, so it was blasphemy, not racism. The idea of challenging religious authority led to liberal democracy, whereas the singling out of minorities, as minorities, led to Nazism and the persecution of the bourgeoisie in Russia. So this distinction is crucial to understand. (Kimmelman, “Outrage at Cartoons Still Tests the Danes”)

Kimmelman, in another interview with Kurt Westergaard, a cartoonist responsible for one of the drawings of the prophet Muhammad, asked him if he went too far with the drawing. In response, Westergaard said, “Looking back, perhaps I should have made a cartoon that did not use the yellow star.” Kimmelman then asked, “But then why Muhammad and not a star?” and Westergaard replied, “Because millions of Jews died in camps wearing that star” (Kimmelman, “Outrage at Cartoons Still Tests the Danes”).

After referencing Prime Minister Rasmussen’s speech, in which he cited Danish law as prohibiting acts or expressions of a blasphemous or discriminatory nature (Larsen and Seidenfaden qtd. in Hervik 60), one may question why there was no government intervention on behalf of Muslims, on the grounds of blasphemy. Human Rights Watch (HRW) notes that countries with blasphemy laws rarely enforce them, and in general these laws usually protect
religions such as Christianity and Judaism. Noting the inconsistencies between offensive speech that is criminalized (for Christians and Jews) and tolerated (for Muslims), HRW acknowledges the existence of a “clearly discriminatory practice [that] raises legitimate questions about double standards” (“Questions and Answers”).

According to Human Rights Watch, Mr. Rose and Mr. Westergaard were within their rights of freedom of expression, since the cartoons are not considered “hate speech.” Hate speech “constitutes imminent incitement to unlawful acts of discrimination, hostility or violence” (“Questions and Answers”). In the case of Danish Muslims, “the main complaint against the cartoons is that they offend Islam, not that they have inspired acts of violence, criminal harassment or tangible discrimination against Danish or other Muslims” (“Questions and Answers”). Human rights law states that, “[s]peech that targets a religion for disrespect, as opposed to speech that targets believers for unlawful acts, is protected, however offensive it may be” (“Questions and Answers”). Therefore, Muslims do not have the right, under international human rights, law to “…censor the expression of others in the name of their own religious freedom” (“Questions and Answers”).

Although the twelve cartoons are not legally considered hate speech, I suspect that the images were nonetheless impactful and particularly offensive, not just because they made fun of the prophet Muhammad, but also because its satire associated the prophet with violence and terrorism (which, some may argue, implies that Muslims are also terrorists). It is also worth considering that Denmark was cited for reports of discrimination against ethnic minorities in the past. 8 Furthermore, in a post-9/11 world, cartoons simply suggesting Islamic terrorism may have (in the very least) resulted in increased suspicion, if not some discrimination against Muslims.

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8 Denmark was cited by the Human Rights Committee in its “Consideration of Reports” to Denmark in 2000 (3).
The Social Definition of Muslim

The media is a significant factor worth considering while assessing the policies and process that have influenced the way Muslim minorities are perceived and treated in Denmark. Though the focus of my thesis is on the cultural elements that have contributed to the policies and practices that have impacted immigration in Denmark, I cannot reduce these policies to one single element. I must also acknowledge that there are numerous other elements and actors that contribute to the formation of these policies, such as extreme right parties, grass roots organizations, national government, transnational governments and the media (Huysmans 758). Of these, the media is especially instrumental in the way Muslim minorities have been perceived because of its extensive coverage of immigrants involved in riots in urban ghettos, which led to “political renderings of these riots as manifestations of incivility,” and then fueled the perception of immigrants as a dangerous class that poses a threat to a culture (Rey qtd. in Huysmans 763).

In Figure 1, Peter Hervik, a Professor in Migration Studies in Center for the Study of at Aalborg University in Denmark, applies Robert Entman’s (1993) model of frame analysis to this incident. It represents common themes that emerged based on media coverage of the cartoon controversy in 232 news articles (47). From his research, Hervik concludes that Islam has been largely portrayed as a problem, and has been represented as a religion of violence and intolerance (48). These factors are supposedly demonstrated in the Muslim minority's inability to uphold a basic principle of Danish culture, freedom of speech, which is also a basic discourse of human rights. Finally, the demonization of Muslims created a “them” and “us” and a “good” versus “bad” distinction, as illustrated in figure 1.
In response to the Cartoon Controversy and the overall treatment of Muslim minorities post 9/11, Sune Skadegaard Thorsen adds to Hervik’s discussion on the prevailing perception leads of Muslim minorities, by commenting on how the perceptions of Muslims in Denmark have influenced the way they are treated. In this excerpt, a clear picture of the social climate in Denmark during this time further emerges:

Islam is under attack in Denmark and has been for some time, especially after September 11. Muslims have been prevented from building Mosques, from making burial places, from wearing scarves and holding meetings. Muslims have been pestered in the streets with words and with slaps. Muslim stores and clubs
are vandalized. Muslims are kept under surveillance, and are being arrested and are being portrayed in the press as uncivilized and ‘abnormal’, if not terrorists. The cartoons were the last straw. Let us kick who are already lying down.

Islamophobia is raging. Muslims in Denmark must react; anything else would be unnatural (qtd. in Hervik 50).

Because of the magnitude of the response from the Islamic community, “Muslims became redefined as they went from being a minority in Denmark to becoming the local representatives of a global religious community – that is, outsiders who may pose a threat to Danish or Western values” (Kublitz, qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2310). Also, “the fundamental structural differences between the Evangelic [sic] Lutheran Church and the Muslim communities (and other religious minorities) are seldom addressed in public debates. This ‘blind spot’ in relation to the constitution of Danish secularism tends to make Muslim activists susceptible to being classified as politically illegitimate or as Islamist” (Jakobsen; Henkel qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2311).

James Baldwin once said, “The most dangerous creation of any society is the man who has nothing to lose.” The publication of the 12 caricatures of the prophet Muhammad was the last straw for the Muslim community. The combination of stringent immigration policies, heightened surveillance and monitoring of Muslims, and the offensive illustration of a religious figure was all too much. Given the climate of the discourse against Muslims, it was only a matter of time before there was a break and some form of resistance. No matter the form this resistance took, it is clear that the Muslim vs. majority relations in Denmark was on the cusp of cataclysm.
CHAPTER 4
The Impact of the Security/Integration Response

The everyday lives of Muslims in Denmark have long been disrupted by how they have been portrayed, perceived and treated because of their faith and cultural difference. “Not surprisingly, many Muslims in Denmark [have become] frustrated about being associated with violence and terror because of their religious faith” (Schmidt; Mikkelsen et al. qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2312). This frustration is illustrated in a study revealing that 46 percent of young immigrants between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine consider leaving Denmark and starting a new life elsewhere (Shakoor and Riis qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2312). In general the broad use of the term ‘radical’ may have contributed to exclusion and stigmatization of the Muslim community, and heightened the risk of producing the very “counter society reaction they intended to prevent” (Rytter and Pedersen 2313). Now, some Muslims have decided to call Syria and Iraq their home – opting to fight as jihadists in extremist groups such as ISIS.

In yet another flurry of political campaigns, this time implemented by the Ministry of Integration and some of the largest municipalities against radicalization, anti-radicalization campaigns “applied categories and definitions that were so broad that many (often young) Muslims found themselves [being] categorized as ‘radicalized’” (Kuhle qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2313) – thus making them the target of radicalization prevention programs in Denmark. With such high attention on Muslim youth, a much larger debate has begun on whether the security/integration response has resulted in larger incidences of discrimination against the Muslim youth in Denmark (Kublitz qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2313). Using information cited from interviews and focus groups conducted with Muslim youth, I will explain the Muslim perception of the impact of the security/integration response on their identity,
everyday social interactions and sense of belonging. I will also discuss the concept of ‘radicalization’ and how the Danish government seeks to combat it. Finally I will end with a discussion of whether or not the policies and practices employed against Muslim minorities in Denmark have contributed to the rise in radicalization within the Muslim population.

The Effects of the Security/Integration Response

Since 9/11, the visibility of Danish Muslims, especially Muslim youth, has become one in which Muslim youth are subjected to “the omnipotent gaze and pressure of external expectations...” (Christiansen; Khawaja qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2314). In a study of Muslim youth in Copenhagen, psychologist Iram Khawaja suggests, “Muslims have become hyper-visible in the Danish landscape” (Rytter and Pedersen 2313). The security/integration response has cast a “panoptic gaze” on Muslims from “the majority, the media and the state (with which they must constantly comply)” (qtd in Rytter and Pedersen 2313) and has impacted the everyday lives of Muslims in Denmark. As Asad, a young informant in her study, explains:

I feel sort of surveilled. You can’t just walk around and think, hey, I’m just me.

Of course, you want to be yourself, but there is always this external pressure that makes you think: I have to behave, I have to behave, I have to behave, behave (qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen; as translated by Rytter and Pedersen 2313).

For some Muslim youth, hyper-visibility may become a creative way through which they can signal their identity (Christiansen; Khawaja qtd. in Rytter and Pedersen 2314). This is particularly so for Muslim children in Denmark, who during this post 9/11 buzz surrounding Muslims and the Islamic faith, have been “met with questions about their religion and are asked to defend a faith with which they are still becoming accustomed” (Schmidt; Gilliam qtd. in
Rytter and Pedersen 2314). “It is likely that this will affect how they view their own position and belonging as Muslims in Danish society” (Rytter and Pedersen 2314).

For Muslim youth, however, especially those who have made an effort to be active in Danish society on the local and national levels, there is some withdrawing from the public sphere. “Alongside hyper-visibility, there [also] seems to be a process of silencing developing” (Rytter and Pedersen 2314) as many Muslim youths have “been confronted with their stance on the death penalty and have been asked to denounce sharia. This latter demand in particular has caused many Muslims to resign from their positions and withdraw from the political scene” (Hervik; Jorgensen 2314). The monitoring of Muslim beliefs and behavior, as well as popular sentiment about how Muslims should behave, makes true integration difficult because of the prevalent perception of Muslims as threats.

_The Transnationalization of Islam: Where Do Muslims ‘Belong’?_

The presence of Muslims in the political scene post 9/11 in response to the political climate was largely evidenced through two Muslim groups, Hizb ut-Tahir (The Party of Liberation) and Muslimer i Dialog (Muslims in Dialogue), who take different approaches to how Muslims in Denmark should navigate their encounters with the majority. Hizb ut-Tahir stalwartly encourages its members to “isolate themselves and avoid contact with the Danish secular democratic society, which is seen as decadent and immoral [whereas] Muslimer i Dialog “encourages discussions about identity, integration and the rights of Muslims in Denmark” (Sinclair 51). Despite their differences, both groups emphasize the importance of having a “network” and a sense of belonging (Sinclair 49).
This is linked to Muslim concept of *ummah*, which is seen as a “very important element of being a practicing Muslim...” (Sinclair 50). This is based on the concept of transnationalism, in which the “global brotherhood of the *ummah* transcends national borders and citizenship and so belonging to the *ummah* means being part of a movement that reaches back in history and reaches out into the future and transcends time and space (Sinclair 50). On a psychological level, being a member of the *ummah* means that the individual has become part of something greater than one’s self (Sinclair 50).

In “Islam in Britain and Denmark: Deterritorialized Identity and Reterritorialized Agendas,” Kristine Sinclair assumes that through transnationalization, members of Hizb ut-Tahir and Muslimer i Dialog are “turning to an Islam that is detached from the migrant generations’ Muslim homelands, just as they construct transnational identities and networks. The groups have chosen “Islam” as “homeland” over any concrete nation state” (51). Therefore, “*ummah* is understood as disengaged from specific national concepts” (51). With the continuous disenfranchisement of Muslims in Denmark, and the rise in groups such as Hizb ut-Tahir, I contend that Denmark’s effort for securitization may have come at the cost of integration of Muslims in Denmark, who may already feel like they don’t belong. The domestic consequences of dislocation and alienation may have led to the surge of Muslim youth leaving Denmark to fight for extremist organizations in Syria and Iraq.

*Terrorists Created? : The Increase in Radical Muslim Fighters from Denmark*

In “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical,” Louise Stigsgaard Nissen recounted her meeting with Abu Dinamarqi and Abu Tareq, both 23-year old Danes with Arab and Arab-Palestinian roots, who left Denmark to join the radical group ISIS. In the article, Nissen rejects
the generalized portrayal of radicalized Muslims in the media, and discusses what she calls a more “prismatic reality” behind the motivations that propel some Muslims to these extremist groups. According to Nissen, “there are some who have lived their whole lives in Syria, who have watched their houses bombed by Bashar al-Assad’s forces and see ISIS as a default option to the regime; there are some who fight alongside ISIS because they have no other source of income; there are some who find solace in the relative order brought by ISIS; there are some who trek from stable democracies, like Abu Tareq did, drawn by the lure of an indefinable utopia” (“Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).

Magnus Ranstorp, the Research Director of the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defense College, says, “Jihad is a whole new identity amongst these youngsters in Scandinavia” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”). He adds, “They have been defined by the war on Islam and the war on terrorism. They feel excluded” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”). Ranstorp’s statements are supported by Abu Tareq’s words in his interview with Nissen when he said, “When I saw ISIS raising their black flag in northern Raqqa – huge, fluttering in the wind with white signs – I was very sentimental. I felt that this is my identity. I don’t feel I belong in Denmark” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”). In the same interview, Abu Tareq also said, “I don’t really feel that Denmark is my home. Mentally, I’m in Raqqa” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).

Unlike researchers, the Danish police have a different explanation for the increase in fighters leaving Denmark to join ISIS in Syria. Allan Aarslev, the head of criminal prevention with Aarhus Police, described the increased Muslim exodus to Syria as a “trend amongst these young people” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”). He continued, “They feel that
Muslims have been under attack after 9/11. The attraction is to be a part of the war in Syria, to be seen as active and cool” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).

Nissen also notes that the feelings and choices of Abu Dinamarqi, Abu Tareq and other Danish fighters in ISIS and other groups do not represent the entire Muslim population in Denmark. I second Nissen’s assertion; not all second generation Muslim immigrants are attracted to the idea of fighting for ISIS or any other extremist group, nor are they interested in leaving Denmark. Therefore, I cannot generalize radicalization as the choice for all Muslim youth living in Denmark who have had unfavorable experiences socially or via policy. Nonetheless, for countries such as the United States and other European countries, the dramatic growth in ISIS fighters is alarming because of the fear that these fighters may return to their countries and commit acts of terrorism on their native soil (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).

For Denmark in particular, this a grave concern since Denmark “has produced more fighters per head of population since 2012 than any other Western European country except Belgium” (Crouch and Henley, “A Way Home for Jihadis”). There have also been at least four cases in which Danes have been involved in acts of terror – the first being in November 2013 when “a Danish-born suicide bomber, a blonde convert named Victor Kristensen, blew himself up in an ISIS mission in Iraq. Since then, three other Danish citizens, two of them Danish-Arab and one Danish-Pakistani, have committed suicide attacks for Islamic extremist groups in the Middle East” (Nissen, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical”).

Radicalization Prevention Measures

Denmark’s efforts at strengthening its security measures were greatly heightened post 9/11; however discourse on radicalization was still prominent. Following the initial
implementation of the security/integration response, Denmark ushered in another counter
radicalization initiative in 2009. This project, also known as the government’s action plan, was
called “A Common and Safe Future.” “A Common and Safe Future” was to be overseen by the
Center for Prevention, a sector of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET). According
to the PET, the goal of the program was to “encourage people to change their behaviour towards
a non-extremist direction by means of direct contact and dialogue. The idea [was] for PET to
support the actors that are best placed to reach vulnerable people by equipping them with tools
for tackling the difficult challenges” (“The Centre for Prevention”).

When outlining its radicalization prevention initiative, the Danish government used the
standard definition of radicalization, which is, “the process in which a person gradually accepts
the ideas and methods of extremism and, possibly, joins its organised [sic] groups. Personal
circumstances, group dynamics as well as political, financial and cultural factors may all
contribute to radicalisation [sic] processes” (Government of Denmark). Additionally, the
government’s packet rejected the idea that Denmark is “hostile towards– or outright waging war
against – Islam or Muslims” and instead noted that there is a common concern that radical
Islamism is threatening to Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Government of Denmark).

The action plan also discusses the “negative and distorted perception” of Denmark that
has emerged since Denmark’s involvement in the war on terror, and asserts that the government
works to promote the “fundamental values of freedom, security and opportunities for all, and
fight the forces that want violence, hatred and oppression” both domestically and internationally
(Government of Denmark). According to the document, these goals are being pursued through
initiatives such as counter-terrorism, international co-operation on peace, development and
democracy (as demonstrated through the fight against poverty in Africa, the overall engagement
in Afghanistan, the Danish-Arab Partnership Programme, the long-term political commitment to ensure a just and viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, etc.) (Government of Denmark).

Lasse Lindeklde, a researcher in the Department of Political Science at Aarhus University in Denmark, notes that “A Common and Safe Future" has been targeted towards Muslims, thus suggesting that Muslims are deemed to be violence-prone “radicals” who should be encouraged to become active citizens in Danish society (Lindeklde 110). Lindeklde also asserted that the action plan would have “inotropic effects” due to its programming structure as well as its hard focus on Muslims (Lindeklde 110). For Lindeklde, the Danish action plan is laden with what he calls “a particular concept of the “ideal citizen,” which he Lindeklde describes as “someone who is responsible and liberal. He also notes that radicalization is the opposite of this. Therefore, this alternative identity is “negative” (117). He continues to say:

The ideal citizen of the action plan is first and foremost pro-democratic and non-violent, and non-supportive/non-sympathetic vis-à-vis violent of un-democratic groups. The ideal citizen is also responsible and active. In several parts of the action plan active citizenship, in terms of participation in associational life and democratic procedures, is praised as an important aspect of citizenship. Becoming such an active citizen who contributes to the common good is framed in the action plan as an individual responsibility. Thus, ideal citizens not only oppose violent and undemocratic methods, they also play an active and responsible part in society (177).

Lindeklde’s line of analysis is evocative of past discourse on integration and immigration that suggests the existence of a parallel in the discourse between the diction found
in “A Common and Safe Future” and other material discussed in previous chapters. Also, despite the Danish government’s attempt to countering its criticism, I find Lindkelde’s point to be particularly interesting because it relates closely to the aforementioned statement by the PET, which says, “…to support the actors that are best placed to reach vulnerable people…” thus suggesting that there is indeed a target population. With the War on Terror raging against Islamic radicalism, there is surely a greater focus placed on Muslims.

From Radicalization Prevention to De-radicalization

The “Common and Safe Future” action plan ended in 2012, but the surge of Islamist radicalism did not; neither did Denmark’s efforts at counter-terrorism. In addition to joining the United States, Belgium and other states in the military fights against ISIS, Denmark has also begun a de-radicalization program in 2014 for jihadist fighters returning from Syria. This initiative, costing 60.9 million kroner (9.2 million U.S. dollars) (The Associated Press, “Denmark Spends $9 Million on De-Radicalization Programs”), was the successor to the “A Common and Safe Future” action plan, and a symbol of Denmark’s evolution from radicalization prevention to de-radicalization.

According to Ayan Sheikh, a reporter from PBS News Hour, Denmark is not the only country with a terrorist rehabilitation program. Instead, it has joined countries like Singapore and Saudi Arabia, who have been offering terrorism habilitation programs to former jihadi fighters following 9/11 (“Denmark Unveils De-radicalization Program”). Denmark’s terrorist rehabilitation program is based in Aarhus, Denmark’s second largest city. The program is designed to follow a more liberal approach, by offering returning fighters and their families a “wide range of services that include treating psychological trauma and wounds sustained from
shrapnel and gunshots. Families are put in touch with intelligence agencies and government officials tasked with bringing their loved ones home. De-radicalized fighters would also receive help to find jobs and continue with their education” (Sheikh, “Denmark Unveils De-radicalization Program”).

Bharati Naik, Atika Shubert and Nick Thompson from CNN report that “those returning must be screened by police, and anyone found to have committed a crime will be put through the courts and possibly prison.” [However], the program does not try to change the fundamentalist beliefs of the returning fighters – as long as they don’t advocate violence (“Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”). Despite this, Sheikh reports that Danish officials in Aarhus have deemed the program a success, due to the “sharp decrease in the number of Danish nationals [fleeing] to the Middle East” (“Denmark Unveils De-radicalization Program”). Sheikh also says that officials saw only 22 reported people join an extremist group in 2013, and only one in 2014 (“Denmark Unveils De-radicalization Program”). Despite what appear to be good reviews of the Danish de-radicalization program, Denmark has come under scrutiny from countries such as the U.K, which has a vastly different approach, as illustrated in the image below:

Fig. 2, Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab Without Jail Time – But Will It Work?

CNN. Web. 07 Apr. 2015
In the U.K, vastly different measures are employed when dealing with returning jihadist fighters. These measures often involve “surveillance, terror charges and jail time” (Naik, Shubert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”), as well as efforts to ban fighters from returning home entirely. This is due to fear of the influx of “home grown terrorists” who may cause an attack on their native soil (Naik, Shubert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”). Like Denmark’s “A Common and Safe Future” action plan, the UK also has radicalization prevention programs, but nothing targeting returning fighters from Syria (Naik, Shubert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”).

Another reason for the stark differences between both countries is the fact that “It is not illegal according to Danish law to go to Syria” (Naik, Shubert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”). Police Commissioner Jorgen Ilum stated that law enforcement’s inability to stop people from going to Syria did not deter them from trying “to persuade the young people not to go to Syria.” He added, “We could tell them about the risks that they might encounter going to Syria. We could tell them about the Danish legislation that makes it illegal to participate in direct terrorist acts and if they did do [sic] they might be punished when they come back” (Naik, Shubert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”). Naik, Shubbert and Thompson say that the program is designed to provide reintegration services, but also to keep close watch on returned fighters (“Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”).

In defense of the program Jorgen Ilum added, “this is not a gift shop. You have to be motivated; you have to really want to become a part of the Danish society. We help them find a way through the system, and what we’ve seen is that out of the sixteen who have returned, ten of them are now back in school and now have a job, and it seems to us that their focus is on
something else than in Syria” (Shubert, “Denmark’s De-radicalization for Jihadis”). In response to the approach to tackling the returning fighters’ fundamentalist beliefs, Ilum stated, “They are still Muslim believers, some of them perhaps in a way that we would call ‘radical’ but not to an extent that (as far as we can see) they are a threat to the society” (Shubert, “Denmark’s De-radicalization for Jihadis”).

Denmark’s de-radicalization initiative is still very new, and there is no way to definitively gauge the success of this program at this time. However, based on Police Commissioner Ilum’s statements, there seems to be no present concerns about the impact of Denmark’s decision to rehabilitate its radicalized Muslim fighters on the wider Danish society. Instead, the combination of assistance and monitoring by the PET seems to suffice. I also would say that with the focus on integration, the Danish resolve for de-radicalization and reintegration of its jihadi Muslim groups symbolizes the beginning of a shift in the ways in which the Danes relate to and interact with the Muslim population. I cannot speak to how this program will impact Muslims in their daily lives, but I can say that this initiative may indeed be an acknowledgement of the impact that marginalization and poor integration have had in cultivating the sense of statelessness and resentment, which would have driven some other Muslims, like Abu Tareq, to find a place where they would feel welcomed and ultimately to radicalization.
CONCLUSION

Denmark post 2001 is unlike the nation that we have come to appreciate for its international involvement in human rights. The shift from liberalism to nationalism, along with the decade-long leadership of the right wing populist party, DPP, has propagated the need to protect the Danish customs, in terms of culture, language and social norms. In an effort to maintain the nation’s security, the Danish government has implemented several domestic security and integration-focused policies and practices that have targeted Muslims and Muslim immigrants. In the process, a cross-cultural tension has emerged between the Muslim minority and the general populous, thus resulting in several clashes that have led to numerous casualties and an underlying uncertainty about the next act of radical terrorism in Denmark.

In examining the conditions under which immigrants were embraced by Denmark, we see that the country only extended this welcome in an effort to improve its economic market, while taking advantage of cheap labor. As Denmark’s economy strengthened and the need for immigrant lessened, immigrant presence in Denmark evoked negative sentiments from the general populous. Focusing on the gradual changes in the perceptions of immigrants in Denmark over time, we see how the socio-cultural and political discourse on immigration helped shape public sentiments on the role of immigrants in a country that was recovering from economic shifts, resulting from globalization.

From early on, there was a concern that accepting immigrants with cultural differences would result in a form of socio-cultural deviance, which contrasted Danish norms. The fear of multiculturalism, combined with the absence of a structured immigration policy also created difficulties in assessing how to deal with the influx of immigrants in the 1970’s (Jønsson 593). With strong anti-immigration rhetoric on the potential dangers posed by people of different
cultures and religions (Rydgren 484), it is understandable how Islam would not be exempt from the generalized assumption that people with religious and cultural differences were incompatible or even threatening to the fiber of Danish society.

Amidst such tension, the DPP was able to grow while fueling the frenzy surrounding the immigration debate. The fact that a terrorist attack happened in the midst of this chaos was unfortunate for Muslims, but it was a lucky coincidence for the DPP, which was elected shortly after 9/11 (and after campaigning heavily against immigration). Given that 9/11 was a series of serious attacks, there was a genuine need for security. Given that 9/11 was carried out by radicalized Muslim terrorists, there was also a documented reason to ensure public safety against religiously motivated terrorism which – from an essentialist view – was associated with Islam. What started as a reaction a tragic and unfortunate event, morphed into a security and integration focused system, designed to ensure the highest degree of cultural conformity. After 9/11, we saw the intersection between integration and security, and the amalgam of obstacles the security and integration measures caused for Muslims living in Denmark, Muslim immigrants, non-Nordic/non-Western immigrants, and refugees or asylum seekers at large.

Throughout the paper, we see the gradual changes in the immigration policy, which became progressively stringent – ultimately reaching its peak in 2010. The incessant discussion of the duties of immigrants to a society, along with the ever increasing requirements for obtaining citizenship or permanent residency, display how the lack of multicultural policies have made the inclusion of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers more difficult (Huysmans 753). Close examination of Denmark’s immigration policies reveal the varying parameters developed to measure and ensure the “worthiness” of citizenship and permanent resident applicants outside of ‘culturally close’ Nordic countries (Mouritsen and Olsen 700). My analysis revealed that a
“successfully” integrated immigrant/ “good” immigrant was someone who demonstrated knowledge of the Danish language, culture and social norms, and demonstrated self-reliance through employment, which would decrease dependence on the welfare state (Jensen et al. 6).

Ultimately, by Danish standards, the people considered “good” immigrants were usually Christian or from another Nordic countries. Their immigration experience was often easier because of the “special fast-track naturalization procedures” made available to them by Denmark (Mouritsen and Olsen 700).

In my discussion of the historic Danish effort to protect Danish Jews from being captured by Nazis during the Holocaust, my intention was not to undermine the significance of this event, but to highlight the undercurrents in Danish society at the time, which also contributed to the gallant endeavor. After examining the motives behind the rescue of Jews from the Nazis, I would say that the goal of the rescue mission was not entirely about the Jews, nor was it for Danish land or to overthrow Nazis with the goal of making them irrelevant. The battle for Denmark was a battle for its soul, and for its “distinctively Danish values and traditions”(Buckser 21). From the high levels of Jewish assimilation in Denmark, I would say that Jews in some way shared in the Danish values and traditions. Therefore, in the context of the time, their rescue was more because of their acceptance as fellow Danes, rather than the fact that they were Jews.

Returning to my larger point about the experience of Jews and Muslims in Denmark, I hoped to show the parallels between the experiences of Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and Muslims today. From the discussion, you see that both these non-assimilated Jews and Muslims were subjected to derogatory expressions against their culture and religion. Recall, both groups of people endured offences through caricatures that were drawn in mockery of their religions; both were deemed outsiders in a Christian nation, etc.
The 2006 Cartoon Controversy holds particular significance because of the magnitude of the uproar and backlash against the majority and the Danish government, from the Muslim community. Here, we begin to see what appears to be the breaking point for the Muslim community. Arguably, the events that unfolded after this point were inevitable, especially because the controversy only heightened the pointed criticism of Muslims in the media, while furthering the negative perceptions that follow Muslims in their everyday lives. In essence, 9/11 furthered the shift in Muslim-majority relations, but the publishing of the cartoons in 2006 was the spark that triggered a cataclysmic chain of events that would lead to protests and violence in unimaginable proportions.

What results next can be seen as an illustration of some of the ways in which the Muslim community opted to cope with their hyper-visibility in the media, following their attempts at self advocacy. By looking at the different responses to hyper-visibility, I sought to show how instead of retreating from the public sphere (as some Muslims did), some Muslims chose to make their home elsewhere altogether, choosing to join extremist groups in countries such as in Iraq and Syria. Despite the large number of Muslim jihadi fighters in Syria and elsewhere, I cannot assert that Danish laws and policies focused on Muslims and Muslim immigrants have exclusively resulted in radicalized Muslim youth. However, I will say that these laws and policies have resulted in some Muslim youth feeling disconnected – as if they do not belong.

In February 2015, a 22-year old male of Palestinian descent embarked on a shooting spree that was “the worst terror spree in three decades” (Ritter, “Omar Abdel”). Omar Abdel Hamid el-Hussein attacked a free-speech seminar, and a synagogue in Copenhagen after he was released from jail – about two weeks prior to the incident – for viciously attacking a passenger on the train with a knife (Ritter, “Omar Abdel”). While serving his 15-month sentence, el-
Anderson

Hussein allegedly expressed an interest in going to Syria to join ISIS, and PET was called to monitor him as a potential terror threat (Ritter, “Omar Abdel”). It is unclear what (if any) counter-radicalization measures were taken to assist el-Hussein, but it is clear that el-Hussein never actually left Denmark to join ISIS. His radicalization allegedly occurred during his incarceration where he was inspired by the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris, France that killed 17 people (Ritter, “Omar Abdel”). Described as somewhat aggressive, but talented and incredibly smart, el-Hussein was a rising star at Copenhagen’s Muay Thai kickboxing club and was also passionate in political discussions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Chrisafis, “Copenhagen Shooting Suspect”). El-Hussein’s associates say that he was “not a terrorist [but instead]…someone who felt finished with life and decided to go out with a big bang” (Chrisafis, “Copenhagen Shooting Suspect”).

Speaking with Karl Ritter from The World Post, Jesper Braarud Larsen, a Danish court reporter who covered el-Hussein’s trial in December said el-Hussein didn’t come across as religious, and had the appearance of a “hardened criminal,” his shaved head pocked by scars (“Omar Abdel”). Although Mr. Larsen is no counter-radicalization expert, it is notable that he somehow expected el-Hussein to “come across as religious,” thus suggesting that the essentialist perception of “religious people” as threats is still evident even today. In the case of el-Hussein, Angelique Chrisafis from the Huffington Post reports that el-Hussein had a history of cannabis use and appeared to suffer from anxiety (“Copenhagen Shooting Suspect”). By all accounts, he was just a Danish-born young man who had lost his way after dropping out of school and later becoming homeless (Chrisafis, “Copenhagen Shooting Suspect”). El-Hussein’s appearance may have told quite the tale but – by appearances alone – there is simply no way of determining who is or isn’t a possible terror threat, as demonstrated by Anders Behring Breivik, a Norwegian far-
right terrorist responsible for the deaths of 77 people on Utøya island, Norway in 2011. Moreover, radicalization is not isolated to just Muslims or those of Muslim descent. Counter-radicalization efforts must be implemented in such a way that they extend to everyone who could be a threat, not just “religious” Muslims. By isolating one subset of people, Denmark’s counter-radicalization program may be missing chances to counteract other terrorist threats, from sources where it may be least expected.

In addition to its counter-radicalization efforts, the Danish government has undertaken a de-radicalization initiative, in what appears to be an effort to entice radicalized fighters to return to Denmark, and to pursue a life that does not include extremist crime and violence. By offering resources such as education, housing and employment to returning fighters – through this optional program – it seems quite plausible that fighters who have not committed any crimes would be willing to return to Denmark, without fear of prosecution. Known returning fighters are screened by police, and only face legal action if they have indeed committed a crime, and are also monitored by Danish intelligence (Naik, Shubert and Thompson, “Denmark Offers Some Foreign Fighters Rehab”).

Unlike Denmark, France has chosen a more hardline approach to monitoring returning “Islamists” and other fighters from Syria and Iraq. Focusing on surveillance and meta data collection, the French government has passed a new surveillance law in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attacks. Often compared to the United States’ Patriot Act – which was passed weeks after the 9/11 attacks – the French law allows authorities to tap phones and emails, spy on the digital and mobile phone communications of anyone linked to a “terrorist” inquiry (therefore forcing internet service providers and phone companies to give up data upon request), and place cameras and recording devices in private homes and install keylogger devices that record every key stroke
on a targeted computer in real time. The law also allows for mass data collection, which will be analyzed for “potentially suspicious behaviour” – all this is permitted without a warrant from a judge (Chrisafis, “France Passes New Surveillance Law”).

The rampant radicalization of Muslims and the increase in the numbers of other militant fighters have resulted in a number of reactive measures, laws and policies aimed at securing individual states. With surveillance and mass data collection becoming the new means of security, the implementation of hardline surveillance laws have raised questions about their possible infringement on constitutional freedoms and liberties. Beyond this, there is a concern that the targeted subjects may largely be ethnic and religious minorities. Denmark, like its European counterparts such as France, the Netherlands and Austria have been enthralled in controversy surrounding their prominent far-right parties and their issues of border control and security for many years. Although Denmark’s terrorist securitization policy is not as rigid as France’s or the UK’s, Denmark’s new de-radicalization program is only in its early stages, and may require changes in the future.

For now, what is clear about Denmark’s existing laws is that the creation of security and integration policies – in response to cultural mixing based on migration – became politicized in the form of challenges to the welfare state (Huysmans 762). Denmark’s effort to thwart “threats” such as (illegal) immigration, and terrorism have led to the institutionalization of policies and practices that have produced larger issues surrounding how “outsiders” are viewed and treated. In this globalized world, migration policy has to address the reality that European countries are becoming diverse (Huysmans 672). Cultural homogeneity is not being “threatened,” it simply cannot exist where there is immigration. “The political rendering of cultural identity involves a mixture of issues including multiculturalism, European identity nationalism, and xenophobia and
The result is a cultural war, which raises questions about the European approach to culture and racial identity, and their role in the politics of inclusion (Huysmans 761). Moreover, the pattern of labeling particular categories of people as a danger has not just made the inclusion of immigrants (Muslim and non-European), refugees and asylum-seekers more difficult, but has also impacted “the kind of solidarity, social integration, cultural identity, civility and public order that is promoted in the community” (Huysmans 771).
WORKS CITED


APPENDIX

RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES – DENMARK

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<th>International Bill of Human Rights</th>
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### U.N. Activities and Employees

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*University of Minnesota Human Rights Library. Web. 10 Apr. 2015.*