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**¡QUE SE VAYAN TODOS!
AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTINEOLIBERAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH AMERICA**

A thesis presented

by

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to

The Political Science Department

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for Honors in Political Science

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Thesis Advisor

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***Introduction:
An Alternative is Possible***

On 27 February 1989, hundreds of thousands of Caraquenians, residents of the Venezuelan Capital of Caracas, took to the streets to protest the economic policies of then President Carlos Andrés Perez. These protests were in response to a series of economic reforms called *El Gran Viraje* (The Great Turnaround) that Perez implemented to soften the effects of economic contraction and crisis that had plagued Venezuela throughout the 1980s. These policies included a slashing of social services, the privatization of social security, increases in gas prices, and the elimination of various subsidies.¹ After a decade of falling wages, the deterioration in standards of living, and the firing of state employees, Venezuelans became fed up with IMF-imposed structural adjustment and shock treatment policies and decided to take to the streets. During the ensuing week, people protested, barricaded buildings, created roadblocks on major transportation routes, destroyed shops, rioted, and looted. This widespread unrest quickly spread to other Venezuelan cities. In response to the protests and rioting, President Perez suspended constitutional guarantees and deployed approximately 10,000 soldiers into various Caracas neighborhoods to control the looting.² Between 300 and 2,000 people lost their lives during the government repression, additional thousands were wounded, and thousands of businesses and homes were destroyed.³ The event has since been referred to as the *Caracazo*.

The *Caracazo* was one of the first of what would be countless violent social movements that caused widespread unrest throughout South America during the 1990s and 2000s. The large majority of these protests were responses to the implementation of neoliberal economic and political policies during this time period. Between the late 1970s and the present day, every country in the world, from the United States to Papua New Guinea

has experienced some sort of neoliberal economic reform. These reforms, which will be discussed in depth later, stressed the ideals of free market economics and emphasized a noninterventionist central state. These policies were enacted worldwide primarily because of the success it brought to wealthy nations, the elite class, and large corporations. Extensive privatization, market liberalization, and austerity measures opened developing countries' economies up to foreign investment. These policies led to a high degree of macroeconomic growth for the developing countries and huge profits for international investors. However, they were often enacted rapidly and uniformly around the world, and domestic actors and institutions in many countries were inadequately prepared for the rapid inflow of foreign capital and resources.

Neoliberalism created vast riches for a select few and abject poverty for the majority in most developing countries, especially in South America. However, because there was the appearance of macroeconomic growth and those in power were often benefitting from the free market reforms, neoliberalism continued and strengthened throughout the 1990s. Along with widespread poverty, high rates of unemployment, low wages, and a lack of access to social services, neoliberalism also produced a number of executives who attempted to circumvent democratic processes in order to enact unpopular reforms. Since many of the neoliberal reforms were against the interests of the majority, many presidents found ways to implement their reforms through non-democratic processes, such as decrees and executive orders. They have also attempted to reduce the power of the opposition in the legislative and judicial branches. Some of these tactics include the weakening of political parties and labor unions and the creation of laws that permit executives to stack national courts with sympathetic judges. This combination of socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies

formed the grievances of the popular sector and prevented these people from using formal political channels to demand reform. Due to these policies, members of the popular sector around the world took to the streets to protest neoliberalism, as they saw it as their only way to voice their grievances and force change.

This project will examine the various social movements that arose in South America out of this neoliberal context. South America has been chosen over different regions of the world for various reasons. For one, the first national neoliberal reforms in the world were implemented in Chile under the rule of General Augusto Pinochet. Although Chile was the first, many other neighboring countries quickly modeled their economic programs after Chile following the rapid economic stabilization the country was able to achieve. In the matter of just a few years, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay, and Brazil all had experienced the best and worst aspects of neoliberalism. Unlike other regions of the world, South America experienced acute neoliberal policies for nearly a quarter of a century while Asia and Africa was not exposed to the ideology until the late 1980s and early 1990s.⁴ Along with its duration, the implementation of neoliberal policies in South America has been particularly intense for a variety of reasons, including the severity of the Latin American debt crisis on these countries in the early 1980s. Therefore, South America has experienced the longest and most intense period of neoliberalism in the world.⁵ South America is also the region of with the most number of national anti-neoliberal protests during the 1990s and 2000s. Although social movements against neoliberalism, the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, and other manifestations of the neoliberal ideology took place around the world, they were nowhere near as frequent or effective as they were in South America.⁶ National anti-neoliberal social movements caused the resignation, overthrow, or electoral defeat of

multiple heads of state in a number of different South American countries. Moreover, their existence or the threat of their return forced presidents to either listen to their demands or risk facing widespread political and social instability. Examples of these powerful and successful social movements can be found in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, among others. These social movements helped install a number of left-leaning presidents who were willing to challenge the neoliberal ideology and its powerful economic institutions, something that few people had attempted to do. Since being elected, these presidents have abandoned neoliberalism for a more humane form of capitalism. Therefore, it is important to understand how these movements arose and why they were so successful.

The Argument

In examining six South American countries, I explain why national anti-neoliberal social movements were able to oust neoliberal politicians in favor of more nationalist and socialist ones in certain countries and unable to do so in others during the 1990s and early 2000s. In Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, these kinds of social movements were widespread and generally successful in accomplishing these goals. However, in Chile and Peru, national social movements largely did not occur during this time period. I argue that four factors are essential in understanding how these movements arose and why they were so successful in certain countries but did not exist in other countries. Drawing on a variety of social movement theories and the unique historical context of each country and of South America as a whole, I identify four factors: a history of strong national populism, the existence of neoliberal-induced socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies, economic crises that exacerbated these exclusionary policies and weakened the power and appeal of the neoliberal government, and the ability of social movement organizers to frame their

grievances in a national context and form horizontal linkages with each other to attract supporters of all classes and identities. Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela experienced all four of these factors to a certain degree while Peru and Chile did not experience one or more of these requisites.

Organization

This thesis will be organized into four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter will trace the history of neoliberalism and attempt to explain how it went from being a theory developed by elites in the backrooms of Davos, Switzerland to a global ideology that has affected every human being in the world over the past 35 years. It will also examine why the creators chose South America as neoliberalism's first experiment and why neoliberalism was so prevalent and intense during that time period.

The second chapter will review the major social movement theories of the 20th and 21st centuries and attempt to apply those theories to the South American context. Social movement theory, also known as contentious politics, became a popular field of study in the 1970s in the wake of the number of social movements that spread around the world in the late 1960s. This field of study combines aspects of economics, political science, psychology, and sociology to explain when and why people will engage in collective action. In this chapter I first outline the idea of collective action and then review the prevailing theories of social movements. These theories are: relative deprivation, resource mobilization, political process/political opportunity, and the new social movement model. I then apply these theories to the unique South American neoliberal context and outline the four factors that led to the formation and success of social movements in South America during the neoliberal era.

The third and the fourth chapters are the case studies in which I analyze the four factors as they relate to six South American countries. In the third chapter, I examine Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela and attempt to explain the role of the four factors in the formation and success of social movements in these countries. All four countries featured heads of state who used various political policies to enact a series of comprehensive neoliberal structural adjustment reforms without the consent of the people. In the wake of these policies, people took to the streets to express their grievances with the government because they often saw it as their only opportunity to have their voices heard. However, in each case, these movements were neither sporadic nor unorganized. Social movement organizers – such as labor unions, community organizations, popular assemblies, and indigenous movements – were essential in framing the people’s issues in a national context and coordinating with each other to get all people from all walks of life to support their causes. In each country, national social movements helped cause the resignation, overthrow, or electoral defeat of various neoliberal politicians.

The fourth chapter analyzes why Chile and Peru did not experience national social movements similar to those in the other countries examined. Both of these countries border at least two of the countries covered in Chapter Three and underwent many similar neoliberal policies. However, unlike other South American countries, Chile and Peru suffered through dictatorships during the neoliberal era. Authoritarianism made it easier for Pinochet (Chile) and Alberto Fujimori (Peru) to implement controversial or unpopular policies without the threat of political opposition. Moreover, under the guise of national security, these two dictators effectively closed all political associational space and prevented social movement actors from organizing collective action. The legacy of violence and terror that these two

leaders left behind, combined with the high degree of socioeconomic and political inclusionary policies of the governments that followed the dictators, largely prevented the formation of national social movements after the return of democracy. Although neoliberalism continued after the return to democracy, most people did not take to the streets to voice their grievances because of a fear of a return to violence, the improvement in the relationship between the government and the people, and the implementation of a number of social policies that dampened the most extreme effects of neoliberalism.

In the conclusion, I review how the main argument manifested itself in the case studies and also briefly look into the successes and failures of current anti-neoliberal presidents. In the four countries that experienced successful social movements, the living standards of the popular sector drastically improved in the wake of the election of presidents willing to resist both neoliberalism and the economic hegemony of the United States and the IMF. In each of these countries, an anti-neoliberal president has yet to resign, be overthrown, or defeated electorally. In Argentina, Nestor Kirchner was elected in 2003 and then his wife, Cristina Fernandez was elected in 2007. In Bolivia and Ecuador, respectively, Evo Morales was elected in 2005 and Rafael Correa in 2006 and both have ruled since. Hugo Chavez was elected president of Venezuela in 1999 and served in that capacity until his death in March 2013. Although each of these presidents faced ongoing criticism from external actors and domestic elites and occasional collective action against their policies, they have also all experienced high levels of public approval, especially among the popular sector. While poverty, unemployment, low wages, and economic inequality are still common, the leaders of these countries appreciate the ability of the popular sector to cause widespread political and

social instability and have realized that their jobs and lives are in jeopardy if they do not represent the interests of the masses.

¹ Flores-Macias 2012, 97. For more information on Caracazo see Silva (2009).

² Silva 2009, 204.

³ Flores-Macias 2012, 97.

⁴ Friedman (2000), Harvey (2005), Stiglitz (2003), Gautney (2010).

⁵ Silva (2009), Prashad and Ballvé (2006), Flores-Macias (2012), Harvey (2005).

⁶ For more information on anti-neoliberal social movements outside of South America, see Gautney (2010).

Chapter 1

Neoliberalism: From Davos to Santiago to Global Ideology

On February 22, 2012, a commuter train transporting thousands of passengers from the suburbs of Buenos Aires to the downtown area crashed and killed 49 people and gravely wounded nearly 700 others.¹ During the height of morning rush hour, the thousands of people were jockeying for position to quickly get to work when the train hurtled at a high rate of speed into the Once Station in the geographic center of the city. In the wake of the disaster, the government was accused of forcing the private company that operated the trains, *Trenes de Buenos Aires* (TBA), to charge fees that were too low to keep the trains operational and safe. Others blamed the driver for inadequately operating the train. However, after a thorough investigation of the disaster, officials determined that a brake failure on the nearly 40-year-old train was the primary cause of the crash.² The investigation also uncovered that TBA had received a \$2 billion contract in 2008 to put into operation 25 new trains, yet only four had been installed as of the crash.³ Those few new trains were only installed on TBA's other major commuter line that serviced the wealthier suburbs of the city. Although there were other influences, the major cause of this horrific accident was that a privately owned company in charge of a typically public utility had put profit over all else and the government was inadequately prepared to regulate safety conditions. Unfortunately, fatal train accidents have been all too common in Argentina's recent history. In 2011 alone, there were four fatal train accidents in the city of Buenos Aires, three of which involved TBA.

Despite this multitude of mass transit catastrophes, Argentina had a UN Human Development Index (UNHDI) score of .797 and its economy had grown by about 9%, according to the World Bank during 2011.⁴ Many influential economists and political scientists, such as Thomas Friedman (1999), and Joseph Stiglitz (2003), and Kathryn Sikkink

(2011) often regard Argentina as one of the most developed and democratic countries in South America and one of the strongest defenders of human rights in the world. A dichotomy therefore exists: praise from foreign governments and economic institutions for high degrees of economic development and growth, juxtaposed with increasing degrees of inequality, a decreasing state capacity to provide for or protect its citizens, and an increasing sense of resentment among the majority of the people toward their government from the neoliberal state that dominated much of South America during the 1980s and 1990s and is still very apparent in the modern day.

The International Economy in the Postwar World

Neoliberal policies were not implemented on a national scale until the late 1970s. The theory was first articulated in the mid 1940s when a group of elite, western-educated, capitalists decided to develop an economic and political theory that would avoid another Great Depression, World War, and global instability. However, due to postwar prosperity in the United States and the astronomical investments flowing into Western Europe, policies encouraging a more active central government were much more prominent in the immediate postwar period. It was not until these activist state policies began to stall national economies that governments and society began to question the role of a strong central government. Neoliberalism, an ideology composed of various economic and political theories that stress the importance of the fundamentals of capitalism and a fairly weak or noninterventionist central government, had finally found its opportunity to be implemented in national policies around the world. While a few advanced industrialized economies, such as Great Britain and the United States, adopted a few minor neoliberal policies, elite economists and politicians throughout the Western world decided to implement the first experimental neoliberal policies

in Latin America, specifically Chile and Argentina. Since its implementation in the late 1970s, it has proven to be one of the most destructive forces throughout the entire developing world, but especially in Latin America. In this chapter, I will critically analyze how neoliberalism became a global ideology, to which every country has had to either conform or face serious consequences, and how the neoliberal framework has robbed many developing countries of their ability to provide for and protect their citizens.

In 1945, the worst economic depression and the most violent armed conflict in history had left politicians and economists trying to recover from the ashes of war and return to a sense of normalcy. During this time, the prevailing economic theory was that the state should play an active role in ensuring that economic and political institutions were rebuilt. This theory was a more modern version of Keynesianism, an economic-political theory developed during the Great Depression that stressed an active government in the economy, especially during crises. It stressed that the state should focus on “full employment, economic growth, and the welfare of its citizens, and that state power should be freely deployed, alongside of or, if necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market processes to achieve these ends.”⁵ In the postwar world, embedded liberalism replaced Keynesianism, a term first coined by John Ruggie (1982).⁶ This theory stressed the desire to balance free international trade with a state strong enough to encourage certain private sector activities while restraining the more dangerous ones. The Bretton Woods System implemented many of these embedded liberalism policies, most notably the formation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These two international economic institutions were created to ensure global economic stability and help countries reconstruct their economic and political infrastructure after a severe crisis.⁷ Under embedded liberalism, the state had the responsibility of ensuring

economy stability; if it did not have the power or the resources to do so, these international organizations would use funds from other members to stabilize the country and prevent another worldwide crisis.

Embedded liberalism led to unprecedented economic growth throughout the United States and Western Europe throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, primarily because of the postwar prosperity in the United States and the enormous amount of American investment in Western Europe under the auspices of the Marshall Plan. In less than two decades, Western European countries had rebuilt much of the infrastructure destroyed during the war, were fully functioning democracies, and the threat of another war on the European continent had drastically decreased. All of these accomplishments were achieved with a fairly strong central regulatory state that controlled many key sectors, such as coal, steel, and transportation.⁸ One of the main reasons for this unprecedented level of growth was the ability of the United States to run incredibly large deficits because the BWS pegged the dollar to the gold standard and then all other currencies to the dollar. However, by the 1970s, the economies of the United States and Western Europe began to stagnate. Inflation and unemployment rose drastically and increases in social expenditure due to an increasing need for welfare spending exacerbated these fiscal crises. In the wake of the first worldwide recession since the Great Depression, politicians and citizens called for reform. Neoliberalism had found its opportunity.

An Alternative Ideology

Throughout the postwar era of embedded liberalism and the BWS, economic elites prepared neoliberalism so that it could be implemented at the first sign of weakness of the state interventionist model. Instead of stressing the importance of the role of the state in

helping to prevent the worst economic crises, the neoliberals believed that an overly active state was the fundamental cause of such crises. These economists and political experts, including Frederick Von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Milton Friedman, stressed the importance of the ideals of personal freedom and that the "...hidden hand of the market was the best device for mobilizing even the basest of human instincts."⁹

To neoliberals, the freedom of the invisible hand was sacred and inviolable and, therefore, they were diametrically opposed to any form of government intervention in the market or any form of centralized state planning.¹⁰ The main role of the state should be to ensure the freedom of its citizens to enjoy access to the free market through the protection of private property and individual freedoms with a strong security state. Environmental regulations, support of labor organizing, trade restrictions, high income taxes, banking regulations, and state-run industries were all seen as disadvantageous and threatening. Along with being a political and economic ideology, neoliberalism also featured a moralistic view of the individual within society. Neoliberals asserted that individual human freedom and dignity were "...the bases for democracy, against the threat of fascism, communism, and other kinds of state control..."¹¹ and that freedom is "...best realized through free market activity and private property rights."¹² It was obvious from the beginning that the architects of neoliberalism did not intend for the theory to be solely a new economic model to bring states back to their capitalist roots to avoid further crisis; they wanted this theory to be a new way of governance and a new way to control the global economy.

Although neoliberalism started out as primarily an economic theory, it has proven to have drastic political consequences for the states that have been forced to adopt it. Despite the fact that a group of western educated elites crafted the theory, it could not just simply

replace the embedded liberalism of the United States and Western Europe. Although the United States and Great Britain implemented some minor, almost covert, neoliberal policies in the mid 1970s, these changes cannot be considered major ideological reforms. An example of these covert neoliberal policies came during the 1975 New York City fiscal crisis.

Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, many American urban areas were facing severe economic crises due to industrialization and suburbanization. Where it used to be that only upper class citizens could afford to live in the downtown areas of large cities, poorer and working class citizens began to settle in America's inner cities. The initial solution was a large amount of federal funding and the expansion of public employment under President Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" program, a textbook embedded liberal response. However, in the early 1970s when the worst effects of stagflation were beginning, President Richard Nixon decided that there were not sufficient federal resources for this program and simply declared the crisis over.¹³ With this lack of federal funding, New Yorkers had to resort to private financial institutions for funding. Once these actors were in charge of the money that was flowing into the city, the composition of the city budget drastically changed and focused primarily on "essential services"¹⁴. The federal government's economic maneuvering proved to have drastic social and political consequences. Unions lost a significant amount of power, public workers either lost their jobs or had their wages froze, and social provisions for health care, education, and transport were slashed.¹⁵ Crime increased, the city became much dirtier, and "...city business was increasingly conducted behind closed doors, and the democratic and representational content of local governance diminished."¹⁶ The response of Nixon and the private financial institutions to the New York fiscal crisis did not even amount to a formal neoliberal process, yet it set the stage for how neoliberalism would be implemented in the

real world. Unfortunately for many Latin American countries, the first neoliberal “experiments” were formal economic and social policies implemented by powerful international actors, by force if necessary, on a national scale.

Why Latin America?

Neoliberals chose Latin America as the region to first implement their theory on a national scale for many reasons, including the region’s geographic proximity to the US, a strong allegiance with Latin American elites, and an abundance of key natural resources. During the 1970s, the spread of communism to Latin America was still a legitimate threat and the United States was dedicated to making sure that Cuba would be the only communist country in the Western Hemisphere. Throughout the Cold War, the US would use any economic, military, political, and intelligence resources at its disposal to ensure that the USSR could not establish another base in the Americas. Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Brazil, El Salvador all experienced the power of the United States’ military or the CIA even before neoliberalism gained prominence. However, as embedded liberalism spread to Latin America and more “leftist” politicians came to prominence in the region, the United States could no longer simply just overthrow popular leaders with suspected Marxist tendencies. They needed a way to reform the economic, political, and social structures to ensure that the politicians and the people would always choose capitalism over communism. Neoliberalism was the solution. It would ensure that the economies of the region would remain dependent on the US but also create the sense of economic growth and development and, therefore, curtail the power of Marxist and populist movements.

The richness of natural resources throughout Latin America is another reason why neoliberals looked to the region to implement their first policies. Not only was Latin America

in a politically strategic position, it was also crucial to the economic well being of many powerful American multinational corporations. For example, Chile is the world's top producer of copper. Throughout the industrialization and militarization of the United States in the 20th century, copper was one of the most valuable resources in the world. The high demand for copper made Chile an important country for US economic and business interests. Copper made Chile's economy almost entirely dependent on the export sector, a common theme throughout Latin America. In the 1960s, two American firms, Anaconda and Kennecott, controlled about 80% of Chile's copper mines and accounted for 50% of Chile's exports and 20% of its government revenues.¹⁷ The investments of these companies greatly benefitted Chile's upper and upper middle class but impeded the Chilean economy from truly developing or industrializing. Due to the control of Anaconda and Kennecott over the Chilean economy, they essentially bought off politicians with high salaries and large amounts of land. In exchange, the Chilean elites and politicians ensured that costs would remain low in the form of low wages or lax safety standards. Chile's dependence on copper and foreign corporations made its economy incredibly vulnerable to international economic fluctuations. Because the foreign corporations encouraged copper mining over other forms of economic production, Chile's economy was overly specialized. The elites were making such lucrative profits from copper that they did not worry about strengthening their overall economy or increasing the quality of life of their fellow citizens. For example, although elites owned large tracts of fertile land, they saw no need to cultivate or utilize it and Chile was a net importer of foodstuffs, even though it had the potential to feed its people.¹⁸

Copper's role in Chile was eerily similar to soy's role in Argentina, iron's role in Brazil, and natural gas' role in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. American corporations

could reap huge profits, American consumers could purchase the cheap natural resources, and political elites in these countries could stay in power or acquire large amounts of wealth and land. Neoliberalism's ideals of keeping the state out of the market, reducing trade barriers, and encouraging capital inflows reinforced the benefits of export-led growth for American multinational corporations and Latin American elites. However, the neoliberal era was different than this previous era of US-Latin American relations because of the way neoliberalism was sold to the public. Although neoliberalism was still largely implemented by force in its first stages in Latin America, the citizens of these countries initially embraced it because of its ability to produce rapid initial growth and because of its appeals to individual freedom. During the 1960s and 1970s, social movements pushing for social justice and individual freedoms against interventionist governments and powerful corporations were rampant all around the world. According to Harvey (2005), "By capturing the ideals of individual freedom and turning them against the interventionist and regulatory practices of the state, capitalist class interests could hope to protect and even restore their position."¹⁹ Prior to neoliberalism, the US government and corporations were content with forcing a certain political ideology on Latin America. If they encountered any resistance, they would simply silence the protest movement or government in power and install one that would represent their interests. However, this tactic was no longer sustainable in the 1970s due to worldwide negative perceptions of big government and big corporations. Therefore, to ensure that they could have the same access to Latin American natural resources and maintain their political influence in the region, they had to build some sort of consent. This consent was built through appeals to individual freedom and economic growth.

Neoliberalism's First Victim

The first instance of neoliberalism in Latin America came in Chile directly after the US-supported coup of Salvador Allende, a democratically elected socialist. Allende won the 1970 election with only about 40% of the popular vote but his victory was an enormous threat to the US because of the fear that he would nationalize key industries or grow closer to the Soviet bloc. Therefore, both the Chilean upper class and the CIA constantly tried to undermine Allende's policies. Eventually, these attempts culminated in General Augusto Pinochet's violent coup and the murder of Allende. Once Pinochet took office, he appointed a number of economists trained at the University of Chicago to transform the Chilean economy and society. These "Chicago Boys" were trained by one of neoliberalism's founders, Milton Friedman. Although Pinochet had a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and was not particularly concerned about political freedoms, he still wanted to legitimate his regime. According to Carlos Huneeus:

The military regime sought another kind of legitimacy based on economic success, proposing an ambitious program of radical reforms whose purpose was to overcome the serious crisis inherited from the Popular Unity government. This was intended to produce an economic boom based on a new institutional foundation: a market-based economy and a new relationship between state and society. The market-based economy and the newly conceived relationship were intended to eradicate poverty and achieve development, but also to serve as the basis for the new political system.²⁰

Pinochet's initial tactic was proliferating constant propaganda comparing his economy to that of Allende. In essence, Allende's government represented a failure of democracy and Pinochet's military government was necessary to the founding of a new Chilean Republic.

The increased power of the armed forces and police was to ensure a smooth transition to this new Republic. In one of Pinochet's first speeches as president, he said, "The government of the armed forces and police aspires to begin a new phase in the national destiny, opening the way to a new generation of Chileans formed in a school of healthy civic habits."²¹ Notice the appeals made to the ideas of a healthy democracy and true individual rights. Although the actual situation in Chile under Pinochet was nowhere near these ideals of "healthy civic habits", these appeals to democratic freedoms have neoliberal roots.

Despite these appeals to democracy and individual freedom, the main way Pinochet developed support for his economic and social policies was through economic success. Carlos Huneeus identifies Pinochet's Chile as a "developmentalist dictatorship" that employed the Prussian model of development in which rapid industrialization policies were implemented in an authoritarian context.²² Without any democratic limitations, Pinochet enacted economic reforms with little to no resistance. These reforms were initially successful, in part because of the dire state of the economy at the time of Allende's murder, but also because of the temporary benefits associated with the shock doctrine of neoliberalism. Many of these reforms would go on to be standard neoliberal policies. This economic plan, called "The Brick", involved the reduction of trade barriers, liberalization of financial markets, deregulation, privatization, a reformation of the balance of payment system, and the drastic weakening of union powers.²³ In the first few years of these policies, "Growth rates were high and unemployment was low. Inflation declined, boosting the income of formal sector employees, and capital inflows boomed, thus strengthening the balance of payments and helping the central bank increase its reserves."²⁴ A dictator had enacted the first national neoliberal reforms in history and Chile's economy was growing. The upper and business

classes were flourishing and were willing to sacrifice political freedoms in exchange for economic success. The global neoliberal project was underway.

Along with this ability to rapidly enact economic reforms, Pinochet's absolute power also enabled him to control the media and manipulate Chileans into thinking that they were better off under an authoritarian regime than a democratically elected government. Because elites who greatly benefited from these neoliberal policies controlled the media, Pinochet and the Chicago Boys "...enjoyed the full support of the media, which worked to report on these initiatives in a positive light, hiding weaknesses and ignoring criticism from some business and opposition circles."²⁵ This positive media portrayal and the ability to quickly silence any potential opposition led to Pinochet's victory in a 1980 plebiscite that granted him a new presidential period of eight years. To this day, many Chileans still hold Pinochet in a high regard because of his ability to save the country from the economic and political catastrophe of socialism.

However, these successes only outline a minor aspect of Chilean neoliberalism and completely ignore the rampant human rights violations, drastic cuts in social services, high unemployment, increasing poverty, and environmental degradation. Neoliberalism was designed to favor the upper classes at the expense of the middle and lower classes. In order to benefit the elites and employers, the Chicago Boys drastically curtailed the power of both workers' and student unions to prevent the formation of any strong opposition. Anyone who tried to form a strong workers' union or join an anti-government student union was usually fired, imprisoned, tortured, and killed.²⁶ With no workers' unions and few regulations, businesses could ignore safety conditions, force long hours, and pay incredibly low wages. Moreover, the lack of regulations meant that businesses could ignore the environmental

impact of the extraction of natural resources. Many of these natural resources were finite and the process of mining them was taxing on the environment. This environmental degradation adversely affected all Chileans, but especially those of the lower and working classes who depended on the land for survival. Rapid and extensive privatization robbed the central government of valuable revenue. This revenue was once used to provide social services in the form of healthcare, public housing, and public education. With no revenue, these services were cut and the people who were generally net recipients of social services, the working class, suffered tremendously. These are just some of the negative aspects of neoliberalism.

The arbitrary detention, torture, and murder of tens of thousands of Chileans throughout Pinochet's regime should not go unnoticed. Many of the other South American countries experienced similar violent, military or authoritarian regimes during this time in a campaign that is now known as Operation Condor. The 1970s and early 1980s is now known as the "lost decade" in South America because of these brutal dictatorships in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. However, the goal of this chapter is to argue that the Chilean neoliberal model was designed to be exported around the world. Although neoliberalism may have enabled these authoritarian regimes, the theory's architects did not necessarily intend to utilize the same amount of violence in its implementation in other countries. The relationship between neoliberalism and these regimes in South America is no minor connection, further investigated in the coming chapters. However, the derogation of workers' rights, increasing unemployment and poverty, environmental degradation, decreasing democratic capacities, and a slashing of social services have proven to be common themes in the neoliberal state largely because of the "economic successes" of Chile.

Globalization and the Modern Neoliberal State

The successes of Chile led neoliberals to implement similar policies around the world, from the United States and Great Britain to Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although each country has had its own unique experiences with these policies, an increase in income inequalities, a decline in the ability for the government to provide social services to its people, and a growing dependence on foreign aid or international economic institutions are all characteristics of the modern neoliberal state. Neoliberalism was first implemented in Chile thanks to a US supported coup. However, neoliberals realized that they could not violently overthrow every functioning government in the developing world. Instead, starting in the 1980s, they turned to international economic institutions to force neoliberalism onto these countries. Up until this time, the IMF was a Keynesian organization dedicated to giving aid to countries in order to prevent global instability. They would give funds to governments to stimulate demand and help the country spend out of its crisis. However, in the 1980s, the IMF succumbed to the free market ideology of Reagan and Thatcher and began to enact policies that severely limited the power of the government and rapidly liberalized a country's economy in exchange for aid.²⁷ Many of these policies were neoliberal in nature and made these countries entirely dependent on international aid to survive. These policies became known as the Washington Consensus and included imposing fiscal austerity, privatization, and market liberalization. Although these policies were often well-intentioned and appropriate responses to countries with inefficient governments and huge fiscal deficits, they were often implemented rapidly and in a cookie-cutter model that did not take into account the unique situations of each economy.²⁸ This rapid implementation often overwhelmed the country's economy and the citizens were the ones who suffered the most. Unemployment and

poverty increased, wages dropped, the middle class eroded, and crime skyrocketed.

According to Stiglitz, "...the Washington Consensus has all too often been to benefit the few at the expense of the many, the well-off at the expense of the poor. In many cases commercial interests and values have superseded concern for the environment, democracy, human rights, and social justice."²⁹ Not only had neoliberalism come to dominate the national economies and governments of many Latin American countries, it had also come to dominate the international economic system and became a standard response to any developing country.

Although the US largely controls IMF policy because it is its largest supplier of funds, the IMF has still sought some form of consent from the aid receiving country as a legitimization strategy. This consent has often involved some coercion, but it is important to note that many developing countries have accepted this aid willingly. Unfortunately, willingly often meant that governments would rather impose these strict policies on their economies instead of losing out on the aid. Accepting IMF aid was the only way to survive. "The IMF's view was simple: questions, particularly when raised vociferously and openly, would be viewed as a challenge to the inviolate orthodoxy. If accepted they might even undermine its authority and credibility. Government leaders knew this and took the cue."³⁰ Argentina in the late 1980s, Ethiopia and Botswana in the early 1990s, and the East Asian Tigers in the late 1990s all either had to accept the conditions of IMF aid or be shut out of the international economy. Unfortunately, the IMF conditions often exacerbated the adverse economic conditions and robbed the national governments of the ability to provide basic services for their people.

The combination of the new IMF ideology and the increasingly globalized economy meant that neoliberalism could now penetrate every aspect of all societies and become a truly global ideology that defined the international economic system for much of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Thomas Friedman defines globalization as “the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before – in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before...”³¹ In essence, globalization is the worldwide spread of neoliberalism. Countries can either adopt these policies or risk losing funding from international organizations, losing investment from foreign corporations, and having their currency destroyed by wary currency speculators. In this modern system, governments can experience unprecedented amounts of economic growth and development in a short amount of time, such as Argentina in the 1990s. However, they can also experience crippling economic crises that lead to social and political unrest, such as the peso crisis in Mexico in the mid 1990s or the Argentine economic crisis in 2000. In the modern world, national governments can no longer control their economies. Instead, international economic institutions, multinational corporations, and finance and currency speculators determine a country’s economic and political fate. In South America during this time, the people realized the incapacities of their governments to challenge the international system and decided to find alternative ways to fight for their economic, social, and political rights. Due to these governmental incapacities, the history of success of social movements in forcing profound reforms in the region, and the profoundly negative effects the neoliberal ideology had on the popular sector, the people turned to the streets and non-governmental organizations to make sure that their countries integrated into the international community at their own pace and

according to their own unique conditions. In the next chapter, I will critically review the major social movement theories to better understand these instances of mass mobilization in South America. Although they appear chaotic and sporadic, these movements were often highly organized and massive in numbers, largely because of the devastatingly negative exclusionary policies that neoliberalism produced.

¹ *La Nación* (2012).

² *USA Today* (2012).

³ *La Nación* (2012).

⁴ UNHDI (2011), World Bank Data (2011).

⁵ Harvey 2005, 10.

⁶ Ruggie, 1982.

⁷ Stiglitz 2003, 11.

⁸ Harvey 2005, 10.

⁹ Harvey 2005, 20.

¹⁰ Harvey 2005, 21.

¹¹ Gautney 2010, 13.

¹² Gautney 2010, 13.

¹³ Harvey 2005, 45.

¹⁴ Harvey 2005, 45.

¹⁵ Harvey 2005, 45.

¹⁶ Harvey 2005, 47.

¹⁷ Galeano 1971, 187.

¹⁸ Galeano 1971, 188.

¹⁹ Harvey 2005, 42.

²⁰ Huneus 2007, 140.

²¹ Huneus 2007, 142.

²² Huneus 2007, 9.

²³ Huneus 2007, 163.

²⁴ Huneus 2007, 166.

²⁵ Huneus 2007, 164.

²⁶ Huneus 2007, 285.

²⁷ Stiglitz 2003, 13.

²⁸ Stiglitz 2003, 65.

²⁹ Stiglitz 2003, 20.

³⁰ Stiglitz 2003, 43.

³¹ Friedman 1999, 9.

Chapter 2

Theorizing the Revolution: A Review of Social Movement Theory

To examine the social movements that have arisen in South America in response to neoliberal policies, an analysis of the major social movement and collective action theories is necessary. Although these neoliberal protests have been unique, the second half of the 20th century has witnessed an unprecedented number of social movements that have caused major instability and produced political reforms around the world. According to Charles Tilly (1978), a social movement is "...a deliberate collective endeavor to promote change in any direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into 'utopian community' ..." and it must "...evince a minimal degree of organization."¹ Social movements have existed for thousands of years but the combination of a high frequency of violent and substantive mass movements with a boom in sociological studies in the second half of the 20th century helped create the new field of social movement politics, or contentious politics. Scholars in this field attempt to explain how mass social movements form and which kinds have had the most significant impact. A number of these theories incorporate psychological, economic, political, and historical concepts to not only explain past social movements, but also to predict the occurrence and effectiveness of future movements through the identification of certain key variables. Some of the major social movement theories include the classical, or relative deprivation, theory, the resource mobilization theory, the political process/opportunity theory, and the new social movement theory. This chapter will outline the key aspects of each theory and assess which may be most effective for analyzing the social movements in South America over the past two decades.

Collective Action

At its core, a social movement is a manifestation of collective action that does not necessarily have any affiliation with a state government. Since the majority of social movements analyzed in this work began outside of the state's control, a brief analysis of collective action theory is necessary before examining the major social movement theories. Neil Smelser (1963) identifies six elements that are necessary for any kind of collective action. According to his *value added* theory, these six elements are structural conduciveness, structural strain, generalized belief, precipitating factors, mobilization for action, and the failure of social control.² Structural conduciveness refers to how the structure of a society can either inhibit or promote the likelihood of mass social action. People are generally aware of these structures and act accordingly. If a society is structurally conducive, then a structural strain can prompt a panic that leads to collective action. A structural strain can be mass inequality or injustice, a financial crisis, or other societal problems that those in power choose not to or cannot change. According to Smelser, "...the *combination* of conduciveness and strain, not the separate existence of either, that radically reduces the range of possibilities of behavior other than panic."³ Along with these structural conditions, the growth and spread of a common belief system is also necessary. This belief makes the movement meaningful to potential actors by identifying "...the source of strain, [attributing] certain characteristics to this source, and [specifying] certain responses to the strain as possible or appropriate."⁴ The fourth component needed for collective action within a panic is a series of precipitating factors. These factors often determine the likelihood of a strain causing a panic and can contribute to the formation of a generalized belief system. Once these previous four components have been established, the mobilization of participants for action, the fifth

component, brings the group into action and can transform collective behavior into a riot, a protest, or a revolution. The final component, the operation of social control, determines whether the other components materialize and, if so, how successful they can be. Social control can take the form of police, military, the courts, the press, religious institutions, or community leaders.⁵ These actors can minimize the conduciveness and strain, or prevent a panic involving collective behavior. They can also be mobilized after the commencement of collective action and be essential in determining how the movement will be controlled or embraced. Smelser argues that these six components are all interrelated and interdependent in the formation and existence of social movements. Although future social movement scholars have crafted a variety of theories to explain different social movements, many of these components are fundamental pillars of these newer theories.

Tilly (1978) identifies five major components of collective action: interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action.⁶ These five components acknowledge some of Smelser's contributions but also build on his arguments. The interests are the gains and losses resulting from a movement's interaction with other groups. The organization is how a group is structured that enables or disables it from advancing its interests. Mobilization refers not only to how a group can recruit members, but also how it goes about gaining control over the resources it needs to advance its interests. These processes include exercising labor power, goods, weapons, votes, and other forms of coercion.⁷ Opportunity is one of the most important components and determines when a group may act. The relationship between the group and the outside world can either threaten or encourage the group's interests. This relationship is essential in understanding when a group may act. The fifth component, collective action itself, is a result of a changing

combination of these four components.⁸ Similar to Smelser's arguments, all of the components are interrelated and interdependent but a slight change in just one can often produce a mass social movement. With this theoretical background in collective action, an examination of the major social movement theories of the past half-century and their relation to the social movements of South America in response to neoliberal policies is possible.

Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation is one of the oldest social movement theories and its main architects include James Davies (1962, 1974), Smelser (1962), and Muller and Seligson (1987). This theory stresses that social movements and collective political violence are products of the widening gap between what people want and what people actually receive. When people feel that they have been relatively deprived, they are more likely to commit collective violence. According to Davies (1962), "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal."⁹ Instead of simply being a product of inequality, poverty, or injustices, collective violence is most likely to occur when people think they deserve more than they are receiving. Impoverished and corrupt nations do not often experience much collective social violence because the people have not experienced any sort of growth or development. Many of the people in these nations must expend the majority of their energy just to survive and generally do not look to collectively challenge those in power. Along with this drastic drop in living conditions, wages, or political rights after a period of economic and/or social prosperity, the relative deprivation theory is dependent on the masses being able to assign responsibility on an institution, generally the government, for the suffering. "The crucial factor is the vague or specific fear that ground gained over a long period of time will

be quickly lost. This fear...generates when the existing government suppresses or is blamed for suppressing such opportunity.”¹⁰ This theory is largely psychological in nature and is dependent on people’s life expectations and views on national stability. Although this theory was first articulated in the early 1960s, it has been used to explain many historical and contemporary social movements.

Scholars have used the relative deprivation theory to explain a variety of social movements, including Dorr’s Rebellion of 1852, the Paris Uprising of 1871, and the Russian Revolution of 1917.¹¹ In Dorr’s Rebellion, industrial workers and farmers organized a social movement against the Rhode Island state government after the state refused to extend suffrage rights to all adult males. The surrounding states of Massachusetts and Connecticut had already extended voting rights to all adult males. A sharp economic depression in the 1830s after periods of post-war and industrial revolution prosperity combined with this lack of political rights to prompt workers and farmers to create their own constitution and hold their own elections for state officials. The Rhode Island state government considered these actions treason and eventually violence broke out between the two groups that lasted for about a month.¹² According to relative deprivation scholars, this movement occurred because a sharp decline in economic and social prosperity followed a long period of relative stability. When Rhode Islanders realized that there was a gap between what they were receiving and what they were expecting to receive, they rebelled. Similar gaps between expectations and actual living standards can be seen as the cause of the Paris Uprisings in 1871. After periods of economic and social development throughout the 19th century, the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 adversely affected many Parisians because of the German siege of the city. Moreover, once the war ended, the French national assembly severely restricted

the rights of all Parisians, including former soldiers.¹³ Once again, a sharp social crisis followed a prolonged period of economic and social development and because the masses felt relatively deprived, they decided to commit collective violence.

Although scholars such as Davies, Smelser, and Tilly used the collective deprivation theory to explain many historical and contemporary social movements throughout the 1960s and 1970s, contentious politics scholars have mainly abandoned the theory in the modern day. One of the major critiques of the theory is that it largely ignores the power dynamics involved in every social movement. The theory asserts that when people's expectations do not match what they are receiving, they rebel. However, scholars often did not account for the fact that these movements do not simply just occur when there is relative deprivation. Some sort of organizational structure that can gather sufficient resources is also needed. Moreover, this theory largely ignores the individual political contexts in which these movements arose. It does not factor in alternatives to collective violence that might be possible in unique political contexts and the idea that "Domestic political institutions and power relations mediate collective responses to poverty and inequality."¹⁴ Moreover, it is often difficult to gauge the mood of a group of people before or during a social movement. Although this theory may be applied to events that have already happened, it falls short of providing a framework to anticipate future events. Nonetheless, the idea of a sharp crisis following sustained development being an impetus for collective violence has been a fundamental pillar for future social movement theorists. Moreover, the idea of relative deprivation is particularly useful in the South American context. Throughout the 1990s, neoliberalism allowed many South American countries to experience unprecedented amounts of economic growth. However, this growth often manifested itself as tremendous

development for the elites at the expense of the lower classes. Therefore, many people began to realize the gap between their expectations and what they were receiving. Although the relative deprivation theory can help explain some aspects of social movements, it is insufficient as a comprehensive theory.

Resource Mobilization

Another social movement theory that gained prominence in the 1970s and is still widely used today is the resource mobilization theory. This idea is originally an economic concept but scholars such as McCarthy and Zald (1977) and Piven and Cloward (1977) have applied it to collective action. Unlike the psychological basis of relative deprivation, resource mobilization is based on political, economic, and sociological theories. It states that certain resources must be mobilized in order to have a social movement, there must be links between social movements and other groups inside and outside of the state apparatus, these movements are often dependent on external actors for support, and that state authorities will generally try to control or incorporate these movements through the mobilization of their own resources. Although discontent with those in power or a feeling of relative deprivation may be important in the formation of a desire for a social movement, access to resources is key for mobilization. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), “Social movements may or may not be based upon the grievances of the presumed beneficiaries...in some cases supporters – those who provide money, facilities, and even labor – may have no commitment to the values that underlie specific movements.”¹⁵ Unlike the relative deprivation theory, resource mobilization recognizes the complex relationships between the subjugated, the leaders of the subjugated, and those who control the legitimate use of force. Organizers of social movements must act according to the resources they possess. Sometime those

resources will promote conflict and collective violence, other times they will promote or force reconciliation with those in power. “The concern with interaction between movements and authorities is accepted, but it is also noted that social movement organizations have a number of strategic tasks. These include mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or transforming mass and elite publics into sympathizers, [and] achieving change in targets.”¹⁶ Social movement organizations are always looking for more resources and are trying to turn nonadherents into adherents and adherents into constituents. Not only do resource mobilization theorists want to explain why collective violence occurs, but they also want to determine how they are operated. Another deviation from the relative deprivation theory is that the resource mobilization perspective assumes that social movements constitute rational behavior. According to Roberta Rice, “Instead of a collection of dissatisfied individuals, social movements are viewed as collections of political actors dedicated to advancing specific substantive goals.”¹⁷

Another crucial aspect of the resource mobilization theory is the importance of external actors in the formation and proliferation of social movements. These external actors may be wealthy investors looking for philanthropic ventures and have no real ties to the issues surrounding the movement. Philanthropy is one reason why social movement organizations actually benefit the most during times of economic prosperity, as people are more likely to give money to charities and non-profit organizations during these times.¹⁸ These external actors can also be members of transnational non-governmental organizations or international groups, such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and transnational indigenous movements. These international organizations often have more resources and

more political power than local social movement organizations and are valuable for gaining both domestic and international recognition.

Although scholars have generally used resource mobilization to understand American and Western European social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977, Piven and Clowerd 1977, McAdam 1982, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996), the role of transnational actors and organizations has permitted other scholars to apply the theory to the Latin American context. Regional and international organizations have played a significant role in South American politics for decades. For example, Sikkink (2011) outlines how crucial transnational activist networks were to the arrest and prosecution of former members of military governments in Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The arrest and attempted extradition of Augusto Pinochet would have been impossible without the efforts of Chileans living in Europe, the Spanish government, and other international human rights organizations. The arrest and prosecution of former Peruvian President, Alberto Fujimori, would have been impossible without the Inter-American Court for Human Rights. These examples illustrate the use of transnational actors in the process of holding former military government members legally accountable for their actions. However, regional and transnational organizations have also been influential in the formation of social movements against neoliberalism. For example, Yashar (2005), Ballvé and Prashad (2006), and Silva (2009) examine the significance of transnational community networks in the formation and proliferations of religious and indigenous movements throughout Ecuador and Peru in protest of neoliberal policies. The necessity of resources and external actors to the formation and operation of social movements allows the resource mobilization model to be

applicable to the South American context, but it still ignores some of the most important aspects of these recent mass protests.

Some of the main critiques of the resource mobilization theory include the downplaying of unique political contexts, it underestimates local capacities and actors, makes it easier for the powerful to coopt and corrupt social movements, and discounts the importance of identity. Many resource mobilization theorists criticize the relative deprivation model for ignoring the political context in which social movements are occurring. However, the resource mobilization model also often ignores the unique political context of different movements. The theory states that social movement organizations will collectively act when there are sufficient resources to gain support and produce legitimate change. However, they do not always realize that there are often other contributing factors. According to Rice, “resource-mobilization theorists problematically assume a direct connection between resource availability and insurrection.”¹⁹

Another common criticism of resource mobilization is that it downplays the contributions and capacities of local actors and resources. According to Piven and Clowerd (1977), the protest is the only recourse of the poor.²⁰ The poor are the ones who generally put the most effort into these movements and are usually the ones who have the most to lose or gain. However, in an analysis of many of the workers and civil rights movements of the 1930s and 1960s in the United States, Piven and Clowerd determine that social movement organizations often severely limited the movements. They state that mass defiance was generally more effective than the political maneuvering of formal organizations, the organizations often tried to soften the militancy of the movements (even if the militancy gained concessions), and that the organizations generally dissolved once the movements

ended.²¹ Therefore, support from external actors, especially elite actors, can often limit instead of promote effective social movements. In Piven and Clowerd's examples, local actors using their own skills and resources can organize a successful social movement. The success of local or indigenous groups without the help of outside actors is also apparent throughout Latin American and Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the Movement of the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) gained significant concessions from the Nigerian government and the Shell Oil Company. Workers committing civil disobedience, students occupying public spaces, and indigenous populations taking back stolen lands or organizing mass roadblocks can often be just as effective as movements backed by social movement organizations or international human rights organizations.

A disregard for the importance of identity in the formation of social movements and social movement organizations is another issue that resource mobilization does not effectively address. Although some scholars recognize the importance of transnational organizations to the success of indigenous movements, the vast majority view social movements as a clash between classes and do not take into account identity in the formation of solidarity. With the growth of identity politics based on race, gender, ethnicity, and people's relation to the environment, social movement theorists have begun to treat identity as crucial to social movement formation. Although the resource mobilization theory provides valuable insights into the necessity of resources from external actors in the formation and operation of social movements, the theory is still insufficient to explain many of the neoliberalism responses in South America because of its inability to account for unique political context and the importance of identity politics.

Political Process

In order to respond to the inability of the relative deprivation and resources mobilization theories to recognize the importance of the unique political contexts of each social movement, McAdam (1982), Tilly (1978), and McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) formed the political process model. This theory states that protest movements must constantly interact with institutionalized politics and that certain political opportunity structures either prohibit or enable the possibilities of collective action.²² These political opportunity structures are the most crucial determinant of the formation of social movements. According to McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996), there are four dimensions of a political opportunity structure: the relative openness of the institutionalized political system, the stability of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity, the presence of elite allies, and the state's capacity and propensity for repression.²³ The emergence or repression of collective action is based on changes in these four dimensions. If an institutionalized political system becomes more open and more willing to represent the views of its constituents, the chances of collective action outside of the political system are greatly diminished. Conversely, if a political system becomes more closed or the state's capacity or propensity for repression increases, people are more likely to take to the streets to further their interests.

Tilly's (1978) *polity model* is the best way of understanding the political process theory. Society is composed of governments, members of a polity, and challengers.²⁴ The government and its members form a polity while the challengers are forced to operate outside of that polity. Even though both members and challengers are seen as contenders with the government, members can often access government resources with greater ease than the challengers.²⁵ Governments, members, and challengers all attempt to form coalitions to

further their interests. However, depending on various political opportunities and the conduciveness of various institutions, sometimes these coalitions are impossible to form. If there is no opportunity of coalition, a social movement or collective violence is highly possible. According to Tilly's model, opportunity has three distinct elements: power, repression, and opportunity/threat.²⁶ Power refers to the chances that an organization can further its interests through interactions with other social movement organizations, members, or the government itself. Repression is the cost of collective action and interacting with other members of society. Facilitation is the opposite of repression where the interaction is positive and lowers the group's costs of collective action.²⁷ Opportunity/threat refers to the extent to which groups other than the challengers are either vulnerable or threatening to the challenger furthering its interests. This model reveals the delicate relationship between challengers and the government and how slight changes in these relationships can often determine the likelihood of collective political violence.

Unlike the resource mobilization and relative deprivation models, the political process theory recognizes the centrality of unique political contexts to the formation and operation of social movements. Tarrow (1997) argues that these political opportunity structures are best understood by the "dynamic statism" model. According to this model, "entire political systems undergo changes which modify the environment of social actors sufficiently to influence the initiation, forms, and outcomes of collective action."²⁸ Some examples of these political changes include the end of a war, a regime change, or the formation of a new constitution. Although this theory has been applied to changes in state or national governments causing or impeding social movements, the growing importance of international and supranational institutions has allowed scholars to apply the political

resources theory in an international context. Changes in the policies or construction of organizations such as the EU, the UN, or the IMF can also facilitate collective action.

Although the link between international political opportunity structures and the feasibility of social movements will be examined in further chapters, the IMF has been very influential in the determination of the openness of a political structure in South America, as has the EU in its policies to Greece and Spain.

Despite the ability of the political process model to incorporate the importance of different political contexts to the formation of social movements, it has been criticized for being too state-centric and for discounting the importance of identity. Meyer (2004) argues that the political process model often discounts the role of coalitions in favor of focusing specifically on the openness of political institutions.²⁹ This debate is basically between scholars who believe that social movement actors are always trying to mobilize and are unaware of the openness of political institutions and scholars who believe that social movement actors are rational and highly aware of political opportunities and will only mobilize when they think political institutions are particularly conducive to successful movements. Meyer (2004) argues that although the openness of political institutions are often essential to the formation of substantial movements, social movement organizers are constantly framing their issues to gain support, regardless of the conduciveness of political structures.³⁰ Rice (2012) argues that shifts in political opportunity structures is not sufficient to the formation of collective action, especially in the South American context, because this emphasis on state-society relations is too Euro-centric.³¹ Moreover, identity is particularly important in the South American context and the formation of social movement organizations based on identities or common grievances can often form outside of the government's control.

New Social Movement Model

The New Social Movement Model (NSM) is the most contemporary social movement model and has attempted for some of the deficiencies of the older models. Instead of emphasizing psychological, economic, or political theories, this theory asserts that collective action results primarily from structural changes in society.³² Another deviation from the traditional social movement theories is that the NSM model states that contemporary social movements are based more on identity and culture than class. Instead of the Marxist theory that class struggle explains most social movements, NSM asserts that political and cultural processes are essential. Moreover, social movements should be operated independently of political institutions because the state is most likely to either destroy or corrupt the inner workings of the movement. Instead, the movements must focus on attracting civil society to bring about political change.³³ The fact that these movements must operate independently of political institutions and appeal to identities and culture instead of class oppression means that the framing of the movement is particularly important to the NSM. Framing is the process by which a social movement organization attempts to appeal to different members of society. Sometimes, a movement is framed as only pertaining to one particular identity, such as the MOSOP in the Niger Delta of Northern Nigeria. However, often mass social movements attempt to appeal to multiple identities, as is the case in the majority of South American social movements of 1990s and 2000s.

Zald (1996) outlines six components of framing and its role in the relationship between movements and society. Those six components include: the cultural construction of repertoires of contention and frames, the contribution of cultural contradictions and historical events, framing as a strategic activity, the competitive processes in which frames are chosen

and come to dominate, the role of the mass media, and the intersection of framing with mobilization and political opportunity structures.³⁴ These six components recognize the importance of mass culture, the media, and propaganda and can determine the likelihood of social movements occurring in different locations. Zald uses the different responses to the nuclear accidents in Chernobyl and Three Mile Island to outline the importance of these components and the applicability of the NSM.³⁵ These two similar accidents produced very different social responses because of differences in culture, relations between the media, government, and citizens, and the role of the state in movements or countermovements. A movement's ability to appeal to particular historical events, multiple identities, cultural traditions, and the media are often just as important as its ability to obtain resources, reveal relative deprivation, or capitalize on changes in political opportunity structures.

Many scholars (Yashar 2005, Balvé and Prashad 2006, Silva 2009) have adopted the NSM to explain contemporary social movements in Latin America largely because of the number of indigenous or populist movements in the region. Many of these movements, such as the indigenous movement in Ecuador and *cacerolazo* movements in Argentina, have appealed to indigenous identities or a shared history of exploitation and subjugation by foreign powers or corrupt governments.³⁶ Since the goals of most movements have been to disrupt or dismantle the existing state or economic apparatus, organizers are attempting to work independently of the government to appeal to civil society without government intrusion.

Two main critiques of the NSM are that they over-romanticize the abilities of social movements to produce change and it fails to recognize the continuity between classical and contemporary social movements.³⁷ Asserting that social movements must appeal to common

cultures and identities to enlighten the population of its subjugation at the hands of the government ignores the very real necessity of acquiring resources and acting in unique political contexts. However, social movements are not without costs and simply appealing to common identities is rarely sufficient for the survival of a mass social movement. Moreover, many contemporary social movement tactics, such as occupying public spaces, sabotaging large corporations, and marches have been borrowed from historical social movements, such as the Civil Rights Movement in the US in 1960s.

Figure 2.1: Social Movement Theories and Relation to Anti-Neoliberal Mobilization

Theory	Scholars	Causes of Mobilization	Weaknesses	Anti-Neoliberal Mobilization Relation
Relative Deprivation	Davies (1962, 1974), Smelser (1962), Muller and Seligson (1987)	Prolonged period of economic growth and development followed by sharp economic crisis	Ignores unique political contexts, overly psychological	History of National Populism
Resource Mobilization	McCarthy and Zald (1977), Piven and Cloward (1977), McAdam (1982)	Resources and community networks that transcend class or typical boundaries must collaborate based on common grievances	Ignores unique political contexts, underestimates capacities of local actors	Framing
Political Opportunity	McAdam (1982), Tilly (1978), Meyer (2004), Tarrow (1997)	Political opportunity structures permit or prohibit the probability of a social movement occurring	State-centric, ignores the importance of common identities outside government control	Socioeconomic and Political Exclusionary Policies
New Social Movement	Zald (1996), Rice (2012), Yashar (2005)	Collective action results primarily from structural changes in society and is largely based on common identities	Over-emphasizes social movements in producing change, lack of continuity between classical and modern social movements	Framing

Conclusions and a Hybrid Model

This chapter has outlined some of the major social movement models of the past half-century. As social movements drastically increased in frequency in the 1960s, social scientists created theories to explain collective action and how mass social movements could produce drastic political and societal changes. Figure 2.1 outlines the major social movement theories, the scholars associated with each theory, what causes social movements, the flaws of each theory, and how that theory specifically relates to the South American anti-neoliberal social movement context. The relative deprivation theory asserts that social movements are most likely to occur when a sharp economic or societal crisis follows a prolonged period of economic or political development. If people feel there is a gap between what they expect and what they receive, they are more likely to commit collective violence. This theory is not used as extensively in contemporary settings because it fails to recognize the importance of resources and external actors or unique political contexts. The resource mobilization theory was another common theory that developed in the 1970s. This theory states that the formation and operation of social movements is dependent on social movement organizations' ability to gather economic resources. These resources are necessary to gain the support of external actors and to frame their argument in an effective manner. This theory has often been criticized for its inability to recognize the importance of unique political contexts as it states that the most important determinant of a social movement is the availability of resources. The political process model has attempted to address this inability to recognize the importance of political context. It states that the likelihood of success of a social movement is dependent on various political opportunity structures. Changes in these structures make a social movement either more or less likely to occur. These three theories have often

encountered difficulties in explaining social movements in Latin America because of their inability to account for cultural and identity politics. The New Social Movement Model has attempted to address this deficiency by examining the importance of identities, historical traditions, and how a movement may be framed in different cultures.

Although the NSM has been most widely used to analyze contemporary social movements in South America, the availability of resources and the conduciveness of political opportunity struggles cannot be ignored. As the following chapters will show, appealing to indigenous and populist identities has been crucial for these social movements. However, the role of social movement actors and the repression capacities of different state governments have been just as crucial. Moreover, the social movements in response to neoliberalism have presented a unique corollary to the political processes model. Typically, the political process model refers to the political opportunity structures of either local or national governments. However, since international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank have played such a crucial role in the implementation of neoliberal policies, they have often acquired capacities typically reserved for sovereign governments. Therefore, the political opportunity structures within these organizations must also be taken into account. Given these different factors, a hybrid model that accounts for the major themes covered in a number of major social movement theory is necessary. Below is the model used in the analysis of the anti-neoliberal social movements in South America. This model includes aspects of the relative deprivation, resource mobilization, political process, and new social movement models because I argue that each of the theories examined above are necessary but insufficient to explain why social movements occurred in certain countries but did not in others. I identify these four factors as: a history of national populism, neoliberal-enacted socioeconomic and

political exclusionary policies, economic crises that weaken both the appeal and the power of the neoliberal state, and the framing ability of social movement actors.

History of National Populism

In the wake of the Great Depression, national populism as an economic and political ideology spread throughout South America. After such a profound economic crisis, many Latin American leaders believed that the state should have a stronger role in the economy to avoid being so dependent on international actors or business interests. In many ways, national populism was Latin America's Keynesianism.³⁸ One of the fundamental pillars of national populism was import substitution industrialization (ISI), which created more state-led efforts to develop industry and infrastructure.³⁹ ISI led to a much more powerful and active state, as more people began to work for the state and state revenue increased exponentially. This increase in state revenue enabled advancements in social services, subsidies to basic goods, and sustained national growth rates. The development of urban and rural labor rights, the strengthening of the welfare system, and a concern for rural and peasant workers are also characteristics of the national populism movements. Essentially, national populism was a form of capitalism designed to protect people from the unrestrained market.⁴⁰ Although there were many limitations to populism – such as the lack of democratic rights, the favoring of the urban over the rural, and a lack of strong international economic competitiveness – the advancement of the rights and the improvement in the quality of life for members of the popular sector are its defining aspects.

In many ways, neoliberalism is almost the exact opposite of national populism. It took the power away from the state and attempted to open South American markets to the

unrestrained market and turned South American countries into market societies.⁴¹ The popular sector, which had benefited so much from populism, was now the most marginalized group in society. Therefore, if a country has a strong history of populism, the popular sector may be more willing to draw on this history and resist policies that might destroy the rights they acquired under previous models. The importance of the history of populism to the formation and strength of social movements in response to neoliberalism draws on the relative deprivation theory of social movements. Although the periods of national populism in each country have been incredibly complicated, members of the popular sector consistently see these periods of sustained growth and development. As the relative deprivation model explains, social movements are most likely to occur after a sharp economic or political crisis that followed a period of prolonged growth or development. For the popular sector, this crisis was the neoliberal era. This history of national populism draws on the broader role of both ideology and historical institutionalism in the framing of certain grievances. Members of the popular sector bought into the old ideology of populism and may have even dramatized the past because in times of such devastating crises, they needed to resort to some sort of frame of reference

Exclusionary Policies and the Openness of Political Institutions

This factor is most closely related to the political process model of social movements. In the context of anti-neoliberal social movements, the governments of the countries examined enacted policies that socioeconomically and politically excluded the popular sector. On the one hand, economic and social policies led to unemployment, decrease in standards of living, restricted access to social services, and made it more difficult for members of the popular sector to survive, let alone actively participate in the legitimate political process.

These policies became the grievances against which the popular sector was protesting. On the other hand, neoliberal politicians also adopted political reforms that increased the power of the president, distanced the relationship between politician and citizen, and weakened the power of traditional organizational institutions, such as political parties and labor unions. According to Roberta Rice (2012), countries with weak political institutions were unable to channel the demands of the popular sector and, therefore, people in these countries turned to contentious politics.⁴² The openness of political institutions is a manifestation of the political process model because the social movements are dependent on the political opportunity structures available. If political institutions are strong enough to incorporate or silence the demands of the popular sector, then social movement actors will either willingly or unwillingly resort to political processes. However, if political institutions are either unwilling or unable to represent the interests of the popular sector yet the popular sector still has freedoms of speech and assembly, social movement actors will more likely resort to mass mobilization. According to Veltmeyer (2007), three potential paths were available to anti-neoliberal social movements. The three paths were through electoral politics and incorporation, direct action through mass mobilization, and local development.⁴³ Although these three paths were not mutually exclusive, the exclusionary policies and the openness of political institutions played a crucial role in which path was most utilized for each country.

Economic Crises

Economic crises played a large role in strengthening the effects of exclusionary policies, revealed the limitations of the neoliberal ideology to the masses, and weakened the government's capacity to implement further neoliberal policies or control its population. The severe Latin American debt crisis was one of the original motivations for the implementation

of neoliberal policies in the region. Various regional economic crises, such as the Mexican peso crash of 1994 and the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, strengthened the intensity and frequency of mass mobilization or provided a greater motivation for social movement organizations to create horizontal linkages. The effect of the economic crisis on the social movements varied by country and was dependent on the severity of the crisis and the extent of movement organization and coordination.

Framing

One of the most important factors to the sustainability and the ultimate success of a social movement was how the leaders were able to frame the movement and attract members from all different societal groups. Neoliberal policies hurt the popular sector the most and actors from this group were generally the leaders of social movements. However, the sustainability of anti-neoliberal social movements was dependent on the ability of these actors to form horizontal linkages across different groups and appeal to middle class actors. During the first waves of neoliberal contention in the late 1980s and early 1990s, labor unions were often essential in the formation of these horizontal linkages. However, as the 1990s advanced, social movement organizations began to act alongside or independent of unions and appeal to cultural and identity ties. Indigenous groups and community organizations replaced unions as the most important actors. This framing factor is similar to the resource mobilization theory of social movements, as it emphasizes the importance of making a movement appealing to multiple societal groups in order to acquire both resources and support.

Each of these factors is necessary but insufficient to explain the rise, proliferation, and success of national anti-neoliberal social movements. They are all interrelated, especially since social movements do not happen in a vacuum. A history of national populism is necessary because it provided the popular sector with an alternative ideology to the hegemonic neoliberal discourse and helped establish the policies of the anti-neoliberal regimes. Socioeconomic exclusionary policies are necessary because they formed the grievances of the popular sector against neoliberalism and the governments in charge. Political exclusionary policies forced the popular sector and, eventually the middle classes, to take to the streets to voice their grievances, as most formal political channels were restricted. Economic crises forced people to see the inherent weaknesses and flaws of neoliberalism and severely weakened the governmental capacity of the neoliberal state. In many ways, these economic crises made people realize that neoliberalism could and should have been overthrown. Finally, effective framing was essential to mobilizing both people and resources and making these movements national and sustainable. As will be seen in Chapter Four, national movements largely did not occur if the main social movement organizers were unable to form horizontal linkages with each other and the middle classes. However, if these organizations were able to frame their grievances in a national context to appeal to the largest number of people possible, the likelihood of a social movement causing the ouster of neoliberal politicians greatly increased.

The next chapter examines the role of these factors in the successful anti-neoliberal social movements in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

¹ Tilly 1978, 39.

² Smelser 1963, 15.

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- ³ Smelser 1963, 16.
- ⁴ Smelser 1963, 16.
- ⁵ Smelser 1963, 17.
- ⁶ Tilly 1978, 7.
- ⁷ Tilly 1978, 7.
- ⁸ Tilly 1978, 7.
- ⁹ Davies 1962, 6.
- ¹⁰ Davies 1962, 8.
- ¹¹ Davies 1974, 609.
- ¹² Davies 1962, 9.
- ¹³ Davies, 1974, 608.
- ¹⁴ Rice 2012, 22.
- ¹⁵ McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1216.
- ¹⁶ McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1219.
- ¹⁷ Rice 2012, 23.
- ¹⁸ McCarthy, and Zald 1977, 1224.
- ¹⁹ Rice 2012, 23.
- ²⁰ Piven and Clowerd 1977, 3.
- ²¹ Piven and Clowerd 1977, XV-XVI.
- ²² Rice 2012, 24.
- ²³ McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 10.
- ²⁴ Tilly 1978, 53.
- ²⁵ Tilly 1978, 53.
- ²⁶ Tilly 1978, 55.
- ²⁷ Tilly 1978, 55.
- ²⁸ Tarrow 1997, 44.
- ²⁹ Meyer 2004, 139.
- ³⁰ Meyer 2004, 140.
- ³¹ Rice 2012, 25.
- ³² Rice 2012, 25.
- ³³ Rice 2012, 26.
- ³⁴ Zald 1996, 261-262.
- ³⁵ Zald 1996, 273.
- ³⁶ The *cacerolazo* movements were a part of the larger national social movements that consumed Argentina in the late 1990s and early 2000s. During these movements, hundreds of thousands of Argentine citizens, from all classes, would take to the streets to protest neoliberal policies. The reason this movement has been called the *cacerolazo* is because the banging of pots and pans, or *cacerolas* in Spanish, to make a deafening sound. Although this type of movement has been popular all around the world, it has been most frequently used in Argentina. For more information on the *cacerolazo*, see Silva (2009), Auyero (2001, 2002), and Dinerstein (2001).
- ³⁷ Rice 2012, 26.
- ³⁸ Silva 2009, 20.
- ³⁹ For more on national populism and the role of ISI, see Bulmer-Thomas (2003). ISI first began in the 1930s in countries such as Argentina and Chile, which were more industrialized.

Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela were not as industrialized during this time and continued with commodity export-led growth until the 1950s.

⁴⁰ Silva 2009, 21.

⁴¹ Polanyi 2001.

⁴² Rice 2012, 28.

⁴³ Rice 2012, 43.

***Chapter 3:
¡Ya Basta!¹
Anti-neoliberal Social Movements in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela***

Mass movements protesting the implementation of neoliberal policies and leading to widespread social unrest characterized many South American countries throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. During this time, these countries were enacting economic and political reforms to address economic downturns, debt crises, and pressure from international actors. Many of these reforms adversely affected the lower and working classes and the popular sector, while benefitting those in power and the elites. They led to decreased wages, increased poverty, a rise in the power of the executive, and a decline in the political power of the people. Because the people most affected by neoliberalism often had neither the power nor the resources to challenge these policies through political channels, they turned to contentious politics to spread awareness and voice their grievances. This chapter examines the different social movements against neoliberalism in four South American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. These four countries represent examples of social movements and contentious politics that have been instrumental in defeating neoliberal politicians and empowering governments promising anti-neoliberal positions and then enacting legislation fulfilling these promises. In this chapter, I argue that certain historical, institutional, and social factors help to explain the success of a movement in accomplishing its goals. These factors include a country's history of national populism, exclusionary policies regarding the openness of a country's political institutions, economic crises that exacerbate this sense of exclusion, and the ability of social movement organizations to frame the issue and gain support across multiple groups while forming strong horizontal linkages. These four countries have all had a strong degree of national populism in their past, had governments that enacted exclusionary policies to restrict the openness of political

institutions, experienced multiple acute economic crises, and had social movement organizations that formed strong horizontal linkages.

Argentina: From Menemismo to Kirchnerismo

Argentina's anti-neoliberal social movements may be the most often covered example of the masses using contentious politics to force political and economic reform. Less than a decade after the fall of a military dictatorship that killed nearly 40,000 of its own citizens, Argentina experienced some of the most sweeping neoliberal reforms under President Carlos Menem (1989-1999). Although the country experienced large degrees of economic growth during Menem's presidency, the popular sector did not benefit from this growth. Eventually Menem's policies failed to produce sustainable growth and the country suffered one of the worst economic crises since the Great Depression that culminated in December 2001.² Throughout Menem's presidency and, most notably, in response to this economic collapse, contentious politics was a tool of both the popular sector and the middle classes. The movement achieved success in the wake of the economic collapse as mass mobilization forced the resignation of two neoliberal presidents in the span of just a few months. After a brief caretaker government, Argentines elected Nestor Kirchner in 2003. Kirchner was an openly anti-neoliberal president and his policies (described later in the chapter) reflected his worldview.

History of National Populism

Argentina has one of the richest populist histories in Latin America. Under the various presidencies of Juan Domingo Perón, Argentina replaced commodity-led growth with ISI and economic nationalism. Although Perón was president in the 1940s and 1950s

and for a brief period in the 1970s, Peronism left a lasting effect on Argentine politics that is still apparent to this day. Peronism emphasized a strong national state that employed a large portion of Argentine citizens, especially in the industries of energy, telecommunications, transportation, utilities and infrastructure.³ During this time, Argentina's middle class and skilled laborers grew and flourished and there were ample social services, including one of the most comprehensive pension systems in the region. Like other countries in the region, labor unions were the main vehicle for organization and political representation under Perón. The *Confederación General de Trabajadores* (CGT) became the dominant labor federation under Perón and remained a strong voice for the popular sector in Argentine politics until well into Menem's presidency. Although the CGT became a dominant force in labor organization and the political process, Perón also empowered millions of Argentines by extending political participation to the popular sector throughout the country. Despite Perón's occasionally antagonistic relationship with the United States and accusations of being a dictator, the Argentine popular sector constantly used Perón's policies as a way of framing their grievances against Menem's neoliberalism.

Exclusionary Policies and the Openness of Political Institutions

Carlos Menem is the president most associated with neoliberalism in Argentina. Despite being elected on a populist platform as a member of Perón's labor party, the *Partido Justicialista* (PJ), a severe debt crisis and pressure from international economic institutions forced Menem to adopt neoliberal policies to shrink the country's national debt and make Argentina's economy more open to outside investors. Many of these policies led to the socioeconomic exclusion of the popular sector – the working class, union members, and the poor. These exclusionary policies produced discontent among these sectors. Menem also

enacted politically exclusionary policies through the strengthening of executive power and the weakening of unions and political parties that had historically been ways for the popular sector to hold their leaders accountable. These exclusionary policies meant that neoliberalism's worst victims did not realistically have the option of voicing their grievances through traditional political structures. Therefore, when the formal political option was not there, these groups resorted to the street and contentious politics to enact reform.

In 1989, a large national debt, hyperinflation, stagnation, and a lack of capital inflows characterized the Argentine economy. The GDP had decreased by 10% since 1980, the fiscal deficit was 7.6% of GDP, the gross investment rate was only 14% of GDP, and hyperinflation was out of control.⁴ Menem, with the help of a team of economic experts and the IMF, implemented a comprehensive market stabilization program to lower inflation and privatize numerous state-run industries. The centerpiece of Menem's policy was the Convertibility Plan of 1991. This policy pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar at a one-to-one ratio and had the full backing of the monetary base of the IMF.⁵ Although the pegging of the peso to the dollar did help temporarily curb inflation, it also made the peso much more vulnerable to international economic crises and opened the country up to currency speculators.

Along with the Convertibility Plan, Menem also enacted a variety of reforms that privatized numerous industries and severely cut social services. These policies led to a drastic increase in unemployment, falling wages, increase in poverty and extreme poverty, and an increase in the number of workers in the informal sector. For example, although inflation drastically decreased during Menem's first years in office, unemployment doubled between 1991 and 1994 and the elimination of subsidies for food, energy and transportation reinforced

the cycles of extreme poverty.⁶ When people cannot find work and can barely find enough food to survive, they generally feel excluded by their government. These discriminatory policies against the marginalized would eventually become the main grievances that the framers of social movements relied on to mobilize the popular sector.

Despite these exclusionary socioeconomic policies that adversely affected the poorest sectors of society, the large degrees of macroeconomic growth during Menem's first years benefited a large number of Argentines, especially those of upper-middle and upper classes. Although there were some social movements against Menem during this time, they were mainly composed of the poorer sectors, generally unorganized, and usually relegated to the provinces, far away from the central government. However, Menem's response to the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994 drastically affected most sectors of the Argentine economy and made more people question the benefits of neoliberalism because of the exclusionary policies he enacted to mitigate the contagion. Because neoliberalism was so pro-free market and anti-government intervention in times of crises, Argentina's GDP plummeted and formal unemployment rose to over 16%, the highest it had ever been in the country's history.⁷ In the working class neighborhoods and *villas*, or shantytowns, unemployment was three to four times higher and finding enough food to survive was a daily struggle. Moreover, this crisis also hurt middle class and skilled workers who had previously not been as drastically affected by neoliberalism.

In the wake of the Mexican Peso Crisis, privatization and structural adjustment programs drastically increased and the working and middle class sectors of the Argentine economy were feeling socioeconomically excluded, especially in the provinces. Argentina is a country of more than 40 million people but nearly 15 million live either in Buenos Aires or

the surrounding suburbs.⁸ However, despite the size of metropolitan Buenos Aires, the majority of the country's natural resources – such as soy, natural gas, and oil – are found in the provinces of Argentina. Therefore, the urban-rural divide in the country is incredibly drastic. The people in the provinces experienced many of the neoliberal policies before the citizens of Buenos Aires. One of the biggest state owned companies to operate in the provinces was Fiscal Oil Fields (YPF), which operated mainly in the western province of Neuquén and the northwestern province of Salta. For 40 years, this company was the largest employer for each province and gave generous wages and benefits to its workers.⁹ However, the company was privatized in 1991; and unemployment and poverty skyrocketed. The exclusionary policies related to this privatization increased after the Mexican Peso Crisis, as the unemployment benefits expired and social services were virtually nonexistent.¹⁰ Similar privatization was rampant across the provinces. In the wake of these exclusionary socioeconomic policies, people began to demand more from their government. When the formal political route was not available, they turned to social movements. Some of these social movements, which will be analyzed below, included occupations of government buildings, riots, roadblocks, and widespread looting.¹¹ Social movement organizations, whether labor unions or community groups, mobilized those most affected and organized these movements because of their ability to frame the issue and forge horizontal linkages. A further examination of these framing tactics will be discussed below.

Although the provinces may have faced the most drastic socioeconomic exclusionary policies, the people of metropolitan Buenos Aires were not spared. In fact, *porteños*, residents of Buenos Aires, were often more acutely affected by exclusionary policies, especially in the final years of Menem's presidency. Buenos Aires is home to the richest and

the poorest members of Argentine society. Giant mansions are just blocks away from vast squatters neighborhoods and slums. However, there is also one of the strongest middle and working classes in all of South America that calls the city home. As neoliberal policies entrenched themselves into Argentine society in the 1990s, more and more porteños were feeling the effects of free market reforms. One of the neoliberal trends that particularly affected and excluded the middle classes was income concentration. The richest portions of society greatly benefited from deregulation, privatization, low taxes, and high degrees of capital flows. These same policies greatly affected the poorest sectors of society, making it difficult to find the necessary sustenance to survive. In the midst of this income concentration, the middle class was squeezed out. Lawyers, teachers, doctors, students, and state employees experienced the same cuts in social services and subsidies, along with decreases in incomes. These people became some of the most active members of social movements, especially in Buenos Aires.

Socioeconomic exclusionary policies reached an all-time high immediately after Menem's presidency, during the severe economic crisis from 1999-2001. In the wake of this economic crisis, newly elected president, Fernando de la Rúa, accepted another IMF structural adjustment program that included bills to increase labor flexibility, cut public sector wages, decrease social services, deregulate health insurance, and drastically cut fiscal spending.¹² After these programs did not ease the crisis, de la Rúa appointed Domingo Cavallo, the architect of the Convertibility Plan, as finance minister. Cavallo, who had always been a strong ally of the IMF, announced a plan that would rapidly slash the fiscal deficit through a 13% cut in public sector salaries, massive layoffs in state-run companies, the cutting of spending of public universities and hospitals, and the conversion of part of

public workers' salaries to bond issues.¹³ Once again, these policies severely hurt the popular sector but they also were incredibly painful for students and members of the middle class as well, and these groups became even more actively involved in the organization of social movements because of these exclusionary policies.

This growing sense of socioeconomic exclusion came to a head in December 2001 when the government introduced the *corralito* to help prevent a run on the banks because of rumors of devaluation of the already weak peso. The *corralito*, or playpen in Spanish, immediately closed all banks and then imposed strict restrictions on withdrawals from accounts. Since many of these banks were either failed or failing, many people lost their entire savings. Eduardo Silva sums up how the response to the *corralito* was indicative of Argentines' views of the neoliberal project after more than a decade of free market reforms:

The *corralito* summed up the public's anger with the entire neoliberal project: anger toward a heartless IMF – a symbol of international capitalism – that forced unreasonable stabilization targets on the country with callous disregard of its consequences for livelihood; anger at politicians for not standing up to the IMF's demands and, thus, for their complicity in foisting a policy of hunger and deepening misery; anger over persistent support for fiscal, economic, and social policies that translated into a bleak future of mushrooming unemployment, precarious work, and job insecurity.¹⁴

The *corralito* was the last straw for the majority of Argentines. Millions of porteños of all classes took to the streets of Buenos Aires to demand an end to IMF policies and the dismissal of corrupt politicians. There were widespread protests, looting, rioting, and

roadblocks around the country and de la Rúa was forced to resign only two weeks after the corralito's implementation. These socioeconomic exclusionary policies served as the grievances for these millions of Argentines in the formation of social movements during the 1990s.

These exclusionary socioeconomic policies were combined with exclusionary political policies that substantially increased the power of the executive and decreased the power and influence of political parties and labor unions. Since the time of Perón, political parties and labor unions had large amounts of organizational and political power and served as a strong conduit between the government and the lower and working classes. Although he ran on a populist platform and was a member of Perón's labor party, Menem enacted a number of policies that strengthened the power of the executive and his administration at the expense of unions and political parties. Given that Argentina is a democracy with a recent history of military rule, Menem had to find a way to democratically implement his financial policies and dampen the power of unions without being accused of overstepping his political powers. He maneuvered this challenge by granting executive decree powers to privatize, cut civil services, and control subsidies and regulations along with increasing the number of Supreme Court justices in order to stack the court with political supporters.¹⁵ The expansion of executive power also extended to the provinces, where governors were given more power at the expense of provincial legislatures. Along with strengthening the power of the executive, he also weakened the power of labor unions, most notably the CGT. Through clientelism, favoring loyalists, silencing dissidents, and manipulating union competition, Menem was able to virtually silence the CGT, which used to be one of the most powerful political organizations in Argentina.¹⁶ This increase in executive power combined with the decrease in

union and political party power to severely restrict the openness of Argentine political institutions to the masses. According to McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996), when a democratic institutionalized political system is relatively closed or restricted, people are more likely to turn to social movements and contentious politics to voice their grievances and demand reform. These political opportunity structures promote people to act outside of the formal political process, especially if they are living in a democracy where a state's capacity and propensity for repression is relatively low. Argentina represents the middle ground in that the institutionalized political system was not willing to represent the views of its constituents but it was democratic enough to allow other forms of association.

Not only did the executive become much more powerful in neoliberal Argentina, the IMF and the World Bank were the main architects of many of Argentina's economic reforms. As Joseph Stiglitz (2002) points out, these international organizations are notoriously authoritarian and lack transparency. Argentines did not know the people who were controlling their economy and knew that they did not have any political power to oppose these policies. Because they did not have any other way to protest neoliberalism, people turned to the streets, where they felt they had a bit more agency. These socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies combined with Argentines' history of populism and severe economic crises to motivate people to resort to contentious politics to bring about the reforms that traditional political methods failed to accomplish.

Economic Crises

Two international economic crises helped contribute to the weakening of the neoliberal state and to the implementation of exclusionary economic policies that fostered

widespread discontent and unrest among the popular sectors of Argentina. These two crises were the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994 and the East Asian Financial Crisis and Brazilian Currency Crisis of 1997-1999. Ironically, the Latin American Debt Crisis was one of the main reasons why neoliberalism first came to Argentina. In the 1980s, Argentina racked up massive foreign debts because of indiscriminate government spending. GDP was shrinking and inflation was high. This economic crisis prompted many Argentines to initially welcome free market reforms if it meant an end to fiscal debt and inflation.¹⁷ Both the upper and middle classes supported neoliberalism during Menem's first presidency because of the initial successes of his anti-inflationary and convertibility policies. However, the international contagion of the 1994 Mexican Peso was the first international blow against neoliberalism. Prior to 1994, the countries that had enacted neoliberal reforms had experienced immediate rates of economic growth and drastic declines in inflation. However, the devaluation of the peso revealed many of the risks associated with depending on conditional foreign aid to stimulate economic growth. It has also revealed how globalized and interconnected the international economy had become, as the crisis severely affected all of Latin America and affected economies around the world. Although the IMF and neoliberal supporters blame the crisis on irresponsible spending by the Mexican government, the crisis particularly hurt the countries of the Southern Cone, despite their adherence to the IMF.¹⁸ The crisis led to high rates of unemployment in Argentina, along with exclusionary policies. Moreover, this crisis revealed the flaws of neoliberalism and the vulnerability of the Argentine economy to external shocks and crises.¹⁹ No longer was neoliberalism an infallible economic doctrine; the number of supporters within the Argentine government and society quickly declined. This combination of exclusionary policies and the decrease in the ability

for the government to provide for its people and build consent to neoliberalism led to a variety of social movements against the government throughout the second half of the 1990s.

The most drastic economic crisis to hit Argentina began in 1999 when unemployment rose to over 50% and people lost their life savings when they were unable to withdraw their money from failing banks. However, similar to the Mexican Peso Crisis, other international crises both spurred on and sustained the 1999 crisis. The 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis caused currency crises around the world, including the Brazilian Real Crisis of 1999. Because the IMF had granted conditional aid to countries around the world and opened these previously closed economies to international currency speculators, the strength of one currency was often dependent on the health of another. Therefore, the collapse of a single currency could lead to economic crises around the world. Although there were other causes to the 1999-2001 Argentine economic crisis, these two international crises were significant factors. Once again, this crisis showed the weaknesses of and lack of support for neoliberalism. Menem had adopted so many political reforms to increase the power of the executive during his presidency that the only supporters he had were in his immediate circle or the upper classes. Once Menem left office, de la Rúa was not as effective and proved unable to follow the IMF policies in the wake of such a severe crisis. With virtually no supporters for neoliberalism left, de la Rúa was unable to address the grievances of the mobilized masses and was forced to resign in December of 2001. Although these economic crises were not the only causes of socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies, they often exacerbated these policies while also revealing the many weaknesses of neoliberalism. These crises served as essential catalysts on which framers depended to mobilize and organize the sectors of the population most adversely affected. They also weakened the

Argentine government so that their only responses were repression of social movements and more neoliberal policies.

Framing

Although a history of national populism, exclusionary policies, and economic crises were necessary to the formation of social movements in Argentina, the ability of social movement organizers to frame these issues and form horizontal linkages with other social movement organizations was crucial to the sustainability and success of these movements. Initially, labor unions were the primary social movement organizers as they had strong ties to the working and lower classes and were able to effectively mobilize these sectors against privatization, unemployment, declining social services, and increasing poverty. However, as the 1990s progressed, the power of labor unions declined because of government policies and an increase in policies that affected more than just the working class. Although labor unions still played a significant role in organizing and framing collective action throughout the neoliberal era, neighborhood and community organizations, unemployed workers, political brokers, and *piqueteros* became essential to the success of contentious politics. Appealing to both the middle class and popular sector and framing neoliberalism as a series of foreign-imposed policies that had corrupted Argentine politicians, social movement organizers successfully used contentious politics to oust neoliberal politicians and install a government that was dedicated to enacting a more humane form of capitalism.

When workers realized that the Menem government had coopted the formerly powerful CGT, major union players organized the CTA, which would prove to be the most powerful anti-neoliberal union throughout the 1990s. This union incorporated the teachers

union, a major state employee union, as well as various popular sector unions that were much more militant and willing to openly challenge neoliberalism.²⁰ Although the militancy and radicalism of the CTA made it difficult for them to align with more mainstream labor organizations, its ability to frame their grievances and attract workers from all sectors helped make it a significant player in the anti-neoliberal movement. Unlike other unions, the CTA appealed to both the employed and unemployed and reframed the identity of workers to include everyone, regardless of his or her employment situation.²¹ Moreover, its demands for workers' rights, full employment, social services, and the inclusion of social and economic rights in government policies appealed to millions of Argentines in the popular sector.²² The main ways the CTA attempted to voice its grievances were through strikes, protests, marches and demonstrations. These movements served two purposes: to protest neoliberalism and to gain more supporters or form more horizontal linkages. Another tactic to gain more power socially and politically was the formation of the Frepaso political party that featured candidates with views similar to the CTA. Despite its effective framing and political strategies, Menem was able to largely silence the CTA thanks to his vast executive powers and his control over the still influential CGT.²³

Although the CTA was not particularly powerful in Buenos Aires in the first half of the 1990s, it was able to get a strong following in the provinces where poverty and unemployment were generally higher and the federal government did not have as powerful of a say. The organization organized a number of important social movements against decentralization, unpaid wages, wage reductions, layoffs, loss of job security, welfare cuts, and government corruption.²⁴ The most notable of these social movements was the *Santiagazo* in December of 1993. This violent protest in the capital city of the northwestern

province of Santiago del Estero involved thousands of demonstrators and caused millions of dollars in damage.²⁵ The thousands of demonstrators protested the delayed payment of public sector employees and the adoption of an Omnibus Law by attacking, looting, and setting fire to the Government House, the courthouse, the Legislature, and the homes of prominent politicians. There was little to no riot or police control because the police officers were among the public employees who were owed back pay and did not want to risk their lives to protect a government that could not even pay them.²⁶ The *Santiagazo* was the first major movement against neoliberalism in Argentina.

Although the *Santiagazo* acquired similar characteristics of many mass protests (most notably a descent into chaos), the movement was neither spontaneous nor unorganized. First of all, there were more than 50 organized strikes or street demonstrations in Santiago del Estero in 1993 prior to the *Santiagazo*.²⁷ The CTA, along with the local teachers' and pensioners' unions were influential in the formation of these movements and formed strong horizontal brokerage ties through these constant interactions.²⁸ The CTA's tactic of protesting to voice grievances and gain support led to the incorporation of numerous state employees. Therefore, once the owed wages were not paid and the Omnibus Bill was signed in December, these groups had already formed strong ties and mobilization was much more effective. However, this movement greatly escalated in scope and significance because of a certain degree of spontaneity. In interviews with a variety of people who participated in the *Santiagazo*, Javier Auyero (2002) notes how many of the participants simply left their houses to join the movements because of a sense of "contagious anger" toward the government.²⁹ However, the organizers' abilities to appeal to these grievances attracted not only workers, but also doctors, teachers, lawyers, and students. Although the *Santiagazo* was unable to

accomplish much in the form of political concessions, it helped lay the foundations for more organized efforts by social movement actors in the future and set a precedent for violent protests as a way to voice grievances.

Following the effects of the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994, anti-neoliberal contentious politics began to be less labor union-centric and more focused on community and identity ties. Once again, the major social movements were relegated to the provinces, most notably Neuquén and Salta. In these provinces, where unemployment and poverty were so rampant, people formed neighborhood-based unemployment commissions with outside funding from the CTA.³⁰ The organizations focused on building ties based on community and identity as opposed to employment. The most significant contribution of these commissions was the implementation of the use of the roadblock as a form of political resistance. Although the roadblock was by no means a new idea, it proved to be an incredibly effective way of disrupting commerce and making governments and corporations notice the most marginalized of society. These roadblocks also introduced Argentines to the piqueteros, or professional picketers. These members of the unemployed commissioners defended the roadblocks and soon became a nationwide force that was involved in all of the major movements across the country. The piqueteros developed their own identity and helped form ties of solidarity among the many disillusioned youth throughout Argentina. They were also valuable in framing the roadblocks and forming strong horizontal ties. The roadblocks were often met with violent police repression because of the necessity of roads to the Argentine economy. According to Silva, “Outrage at the arrogant, willful disregard for their felt grievances, of their citizenship rights, and way of life, the whole town would come out to defend them. Middle-class persons – such as teachers, professors, doctors, lawyers

accountants, salespeople, and housewives – mobilized alongside unemployed workers and poor people from housing projects.”³¹ Through the visible repression of these innocent and peaceful protestors along with framing the actions as a recovery of the family and living with dignity, social movement organizers were able to form horizontal linkages with these middle class actors.³² Sympathetic media coverage and the government’s inability to resort to undemocratic means to deal with these groups gained them support around the country.

Although the majority of the social movements and protests took place in the provinces during the second half of the 1990s, community organizations in and around Buenos Aires were also framing responses to neoliberalism centered on community solidarity. Community organizations focused on trying to restore the dignity of the unemployed and of squatters’ communities and on working together on subsistence movements. The CTA and other community organizations created the slogan of “*la nueva fábrica es el barrio*” (“the new factory is the neighborhood”) to stress the importance of community organizing and expanded membership to unemployed workers and people who were not involved in the formal economy.³³ Along with this slogan, a number of subsistence movements arose that stressed community solidarity to help people survive. This included the use of soup kitchens, open congresses, movements in public spaces, and cross-community dialogues. One of the most popular ones was the worker-run factory movement where unemployed factory workers reclaimed shut down factories and worked in the factories to make a living.³⁴ There were countless examples of these subsistence movements among the most marginalized of Buenos Aires that did not openly challenge the government through social movements but helped form strong horizontal linkages among a variety of groups.

The CTA was able to bring these rural and urban movements together to form a national organization against neoliberalism. They experienced initial success with the election of the Frepaso candidate, Fernando de la Rúa, to the presidency on an anti-neoliberal campaign. However, once economic crises made de la Rúa dependent on the IMF and further neoliberal policies, the strong horizontal linkages that social movement organizers had made in both Buenos Aires and the provinces led to unprecedented contentious political actions. Political brokers, community organizations, subsistence movements, labor unions, piqueteros, and student organizations mobilized millions of Argentines of all classes to take to the streets and demand government reform. Without the effective framing and mobilizing across horizontal linkages during the 1990s, this sort of sustained social movement would have been impossible.

Bolivia

Argentina's neighbor to the northwest, Bolivia, experienced similar neoliberal reforms throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Although the two countries share a border, they are incredibly different socially, culturally, and economically. More than 50% of Bolivia's population is indigenous and there is much more poverty throughout the landlocked nation. Moreover, unlike Argentina, the Bolivian middle class was much weaker prior to the implementation of neoliberal reforms. However, the variety of socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies enacted by neoliberal politicians and international economic crises helped formed the grievances against neoliberalism and prompted citizens to look to contentious politics to voice their grievances. The history of national populism and the ability of social movement actors, most notably labor unions and indigenous organizations, to effectively frame the movements in a national context were essential in the sustainability and

success of the movements to eventually oust a number of neoliberal politicians and help install Evo Morales as president. Morales, a member of the Aymara indigenous community, has been an outspoken critic of neoliberalism and the United States and has enacted numerous policies that have favored the indigenous community and the working class during his presidency.

History of National Populism

In 1952, Bolivia experienced a major social revolution in which a new populist political party, the *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* (MNR) ousted the ruling political elites. This movement was the first major social revolution in Latin America since the Mexican Revolution and shared many similarities due to the role of the radically mobilized peasantry.³⁵ On the heels of this revolution, the MNR enacted a number of populist reforms that greatly benefited both the urban and rural peasantry. For example, the government nationalized a variety of industries (most notably tin mines), increased social services, enacted significant of land reforms, extended citizenship rights (most notably enacting universal suffrage), awarded peasants government positions, strengthened rural education, and increased the power of labor unions.³⁶ Similar to Perón's party in Argentina, the MNR was the only real political party in Bolivia. Although many of these policies greatly improved the lives of peasants and workers, the government was constantly accused of totalitarian practices and helped pave the way for the military governments of the 1960s and 1970s. However, the achievements the Bolivian peasantry earned in terms of employment, land reform, and citizenship rights was unprecedented. For example, prior to 1952, 8% of the landholders owned 95% of cultivable land while 70% of the population held less than .5% of the land.³⁷ The land reform was designed to make land more productive and activate the rural

labor force, which was generally well trained in agricultural practices, to work for themselves instead of working for *latifundistas*, or owners of large plots of land. The program was regarded as a success, as it redistributed about 1/3 of the land to poor farmers.³⁸ Therefore, despite the totalitarianism of the MNR and the ensuing military government, many rural and urban peasants greatly benefited economically and politically from the MNR during this period. It was essential for framers of anti-neoliberal social movements to emphasize this time in Bolivian history to both appeal to peasants and campesinos and forge the appropriate grievances.

Socioeconomic and Political Exclusionary Policies

Similar to Argentina, neoliberal policies that weakened the power of the state and labor unions while simultaneously impoverishing the popular sectors dominated Bolivia between 1985-2003. After more than two decades of military rule, democracy returned to Bolivia in 1985 when Victor Paz Estenssoro was elected president. Ironically, Paz Estenssoro was Bolivia's first president following the 1952 revolution so many Bolivians imagined a return to the times before the military regimes. However, due to the Latin American Debt Crisis and the worldwide spread of neoliberalism in the 1980s, Paz Estenssoro initiated the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was one of the most draconian neoliberal programs in South America.³⁹ In 1984 and 1985, Bolivia had a huge foreign debt and inflation was so high that paper money was virtually useless and social unrest was rampant. Neoliberalism was the response to this economic and social instability. Although neoliberal policies did help restore some degrees of economic growth and lower inflation, they also served to economically exclude large sectors of the population. In the aftermath of the implementation of the policies, poverty stayed above 50% in urban areas and above 77% in the countryside;

the prices of basic utilities exacerbated this increase in poverty levels; privatization of the tin mines cost thousands of workers their jobs; and trade liberalization permitted the introduction of powerful international agribusinesses that cost peasants their land, money, and livelihood.⁴⁰ Although not directly related to neoliberalism, the Bolivian government also adopted US-sponsored drug interdiction policies that included repossessing or destroying lands used for coca production. Coca is the main ingredient in cocaine and the US was trying to find ways to fight the war on drugs internationally. The US promised foreign aid in exchange for Bolivian compliance with these policies. However, many Bolivian farmers made their livelihood through the licit farming of coca and the crop has strong cultural ties to the Bolivian indigenous communities. Many of these economic exclusionary policies continued throughout the 1990s as more industries were privatized and the US war on drugs continued to affect more and more coca farmers. These policies helped form the grievances around which Bolivian peasants and indigenous groups would frame their social movements.

The most important socioeconomic exclusionary policies to understanding the formation of anti-neoliberal contentious politics were the privatization of water and natural gas in the late 1990s. These two privatizations led to massive and violent social movements in Cochabamba and La Paz in 2000 and 2003. The actual social movements, the “Water War” and the “Gas War” will be examined below, but it is important to note the exclusionary policies that resulted from these privatizations and served as the impetus for rebellion. In the wake of the international economic crises of the late 1990s, the Bolivian government, under pressure from the World Bank, was forced to privatize the Cochabamba water system. In 1999, the Bolivian government signed a contract with American multinational, Bechtel Corporation, which granted the corporation the right to provide tap water and remove

wastewater in Cochabamba for the next 40 years.⁴¹ The contract gave Bechtel an incredible amount of power because it allowed the corporation to set prices and take control of all existing irrigation systems. Prior to the water system's privatization, the state water company had difficulties responding to the rapidly growing Cochabamba metropolitan population but was able to provide fairly cheap water to the middle and upper classes.⁴² The rest of the population relied on community networks, private wells, and water trucks for their water needs. Although this situation was not perfect, people generally could access enough water to survive. Bechtel's contract gave the corporation control over these private wells and network cooperatives and the new water prices were too high for many Cochabamba residents. Unlike many of the previous economic exclusionary policies, the privatization of water affected virtually all sectors of Bolivian society, as everyone was forced to pay more for water. The breadth of people affected by the water privatization enabled framers to portray neoliberalism as an attack against all Bolivians. This privatization led to the "Water War" of 2000 in which hundreds of thousands of protesters were met with brutal police and military repression.

Three years later, in the midst of constant violent demonstrations against neoliberalism throughout the country, the Bolivian government decided to sell natural gas rights to a consortium of international corporations led by a California multinational. After the "Water War", the government continued to enact policies that adversely affected public employees and the working class. Some of these policies led to a protest of police and firefighters that resulted in violent military repression and the death of more than 30 people.⁴³ Therefore, the popular sector was already on edge prior to the privatization of natural gas, Bolivia's leading natural export. Although not as many people were directly connected to natural gas as they were to water, this privatization represented another example of the

popular sector's exclusion from the financial decisions of its government. This privatization primarily affected miners and gas workers, the majority of whom lived in the La Paz suburb of El Alto, but Bolivians of all classes participated in the ensuing "Gas War" of 2003 as a way to voice their grievances of nearly two decades of neoliberal policies. With the help of adept framers, the "Gas War" was the last straw for neoliberalism in Bolivia.

Along with these socioeconomic exclusionary policies, the MNR enacted a variety of political reforms that both extended the power of the executive while decreasing the power of labor unions. These reforms, along with the increasingly powerful role of international economic institutions, greatly excluded the majority of Bolivians from participation in the democratic politics of the Bolivian government. In the face of this exclusion, Bolivians turned to other groups, mainly labor unions and indigenous organizations, to voice their political grievances. Once they realized the formal political avenue was unavailable, Bolivians turned to social movements to make the government listen to them.

Shortly after Paz Estenssoro took office, he enacted a number of reforms to centralize the Bolivian government and grant the executive much more power in the implementation of neoliberal policies. Similar to Menem, Paz Estenssoro relied on the power of the executive to rule by decree to enact economic policies without having to worry about legislative opposition.⁴⁴ In a country where military regimes had decimated the power of political parties, legislative opposition was virtually nonexistent during the neoliberal era. The coercive power of the government, the role of international organizations, and the weakening of formerly powerful labor unions were other political exclusionary policies that restricted certain political opportunity structures and motivated people to turn to social movements. In order to implement his policies with greater ease, Paz Estenssoro used his constitutional

powers to declare a 90-day state of siege whenever he felt there was a state of emergency; this policy gave the executive the right to suspend constitutional rights and use the army to repress protests.⁴⁵ This state of siege policy was used liberally throughout the neoliberal era. More so than Argentina, Bolivia was incredibly dependent on aid from other countries and international institutions. The United States provided large amounts of aid to the Bolivian government in return for its role in the international war on drugs. Moreover, by 1999, Bolivia ranked 12th in the world in per-capita aid.⁴⁶ Virtually all of this aid was conditional and the Bolivian people had little to no say in the adoption of these conditions. Dependence on foreign actors is the perfect example of political exclusion. The weakening of labor unions was a final political exclusionary policy that furthered alienated the majority of Bolivians from the political process. During the MNR's first regime in the 1950s, unions served as an important resource for the government to gain support among the popular sector. However, because Paz Estenssoro knew that he would encounter strong opposition to his policies from unions, he set out to weaken their power and influence through a variety of decrees. As these formerly powerful unions were weakened, more militant unions arose who relied on contentious politics to voice their grievances. Although presidents in the 1990s attempted to open formerly restricted political organizations in order to incorporate indigenous organizations and dampen their power, many of these attempts were outdated and superficial and insufficient in the face of widespread socioeconomic and political exclusion. Moreover, the weakening of unions led to the rise of identity groups, most notably indigenous organizations, who would prove to be crucial social movement organizers.

Economic Crises

Similar to Argentina, various international economic crises in the 1990s exacerbated socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies and revealed the flaws of neoliberalism to the Bolivian masses. Although the Latin American Debt Crisis helped enable neoliberals to enact free market reforms in the 1980s, the Mexican Peso Crisis and the East Asian Financial Crisis severely weakened neoliberalism in Bolivia. Since Bolivia is a much poorer country than Argentina, international crises had more of an acute effect on the country. The Mexican Peso Crisis hurt the Bolivian currency and increased the country's dependence on foreign aid. This increase in dependence led to an increase in privatization and further drug eradication policies. These new policies drastically weakened the power of the state so that the only response the Bolivian government could provide to social movements was violent repression. The East Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s and the collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001 hit Bolivia particularly hard and further weakened the power of the central state. These crises reduced domestic demand and exports and increased the fiscal deficit. However, the Bolivian government could not increase spending because that would increase inflation and violate IMF conditions. Once again, all the government could do was enact unpopular economic stabilization policies that were met with massive social movements. The government's lack of capacity to peacefully respond to the grievances of the masses led to military repression and widespread political turmoil. Eventually, Bolivian presidents who supported neoliberalism could no longer simply respond with force to these social movements and were ultimately forced to resign.

Framing

Due to Bolivia's large indigenous and peasant populations, the most powerful social movement organizations in Bolivia's anti-neoliberal contentious politics era were based more so on identity than class. However, these indigenous and peasant movements were most powerful in the rural regions of the country and relied on militant labor unions to attract urban workers. By framing their grievances of neoliberalism in terms of an attack on indigenous identities, economic livelihood, and the Bolivian nation as a whole, these social movement organizations attracted the large number of Bolivians in the popular sector. Moreover, their effective responses to particular economic crises or exclusionary policies allowed them to appeal to the middle class and convince a large majority of Bolivians to support the ousting of neoliberal politicians.

From the 1950s until the 1980s, the national labor union, the Bolivian Workers' Confederation (COB), was the major social movement organizer in Bolivia. However, as the neoliberal governments coopted the COB in the late 1980s, indigenous organizations, most notably the Aymara in the highland plateaus, became the major social movement actors. Although the cultural and political identity of the Aymara in the highlands had been strong since the 1970s, they became more politically active throughout the nation in the 1990s. These groups mainly protested land reform policies, drug eradication efforts, and a lack of national recognition. Because an estimated 62% of Bolivians identified themselves as members of an indigenous community in the 2001 census and that percentage was even higher in politically important areas such as El Alto and Cochabamba, these organizations were crucial in the formation of horizontal brokerage ties.⁴⁷

Another crucial framing group was the coalition of coca-grower federations. This largely indigenous organization was able to bring urban and rural groups together because they were largely rural farmers but they also became powerful players in militant urban labor organizations. One reason for the increase in influence and success of the coca grower federations was due to the nature of their work. Coca is largely grown in rural areas on small plots of land away from the central government so it is nearly "...impossible for the government to cripple this economic sector and its unions as it had done with tin miners, where shutting down key firms with a concentrated work force did the trick."⁴⁸ In the wake of the demise of the COB, the CSUTCB became the most powerful national labor federation. This organization did not have the same power as the COB, so it was much more militant and open to new leadership. The coca grower federations accepted this new leadership position because coca eradication was one of the most contentious issues for all Bolivians in the 1990s. Moreover, the coca farmers became a national symbol for resistance against neoliberalism and international domination. Drug eradication destroyed the homes and livelihoods of so many people related to coca farming due to foreign interests. However, coca is a licit product in Bolivia and is a strong part of the Aymara and Quechua cultures of the region.⁴⁹ Since the coca growers were able to force some minor concessions from the government, they attracted support from other social movement organizations and were able to form strong horizontal linkages. For example, urban workers and teachers would add their grievances over privatization and education reform to help strengthen coca-eradication efforts and coca growers would supply manpower for roadblocks during education reform resistance.⁵⁰ These horizontal linkages helped transform anti-neoliberal protests from regional to national movements.

Throughout the 1990s, the CSUTCB and the coca growers framed mobilization around the ideas of “life, coca, and national sovereignty.”⁵¹ Coca became a symbol of indigenous culture in both urban and rural areas; national sovereignty symbolized the fact that the Bolivian government had little say in the implementation of neoliberal and drug eradication policies; and life spoke to the widespread poverty and atrocious living standards throughout the country brought on by free market reforms. Instead of focusing on class struggle, these movements focused on self-determination, identity, and human rights and appealed to many different social groups. Although the various social movements did not achieve many significant concessions in the 1990s, they were essential in the refinement of the framing of the issue and further strengthening of horizontal linkages between indigenous organizations, farmers, urban workers, and the middle class.

The two most successful and influential examples of effective framing were the Water War and Gas War. The Water War of 2000 featured hundreds of thousands of Cochabamba residents protesting the privatization of water and subsequent government repression. However, unlike previous mass mobilizations, this movement became a form of national resistance against neoliberalism and was able to gain significant political concessions. This movement was successful not only because of the fact that it negatively affected nearly all Cochabamba residents, but also because social movement actors were able to frame water privatization as an attack on every Bolivian, no matter where they lived or their economic class. Response to the privatization started on the local level when a variety of local unions formed the *Coordinadora por la Defensa del Agua y la Vida* (Coordinator for the Defense of Water and Life). Although largely ignored by the local government, it was able to cultivate the support of workers, farmers, indigenous groups, teachers, students,

doctors, and state employees. Government alienation prompted the Coordinadora to call for people to take to the streets. People of all classes turned out in massive numbers and there were widespread roadblocks, occupations of government buildings, and strikes. These movements were met with government repression but, similar to Argentina, government repression only strengthened the resolve of those protesting and motivated more bystanders to join the movements.⁵² As the movement gained more national attention, the coca growers and CSUTCB joined the protests and provided manpower and resources. Moreover, appealing to Bolivians' indigenous roots transformed the Water War from a regional protest to a national movement. One way they were able to make the Water War into a national movement was through the framing of the issue through the concept of ayllu democracy. Ayllu democracy is an Aymara term that refers to kinship networks that controlled and allocated land.⁵³ Ayllus was the primary form of social, political, and economic organization among the Aymara. The CSUTCB's framing of the Water War as a threat to the ayllu mobilized hundreds of thousands of Aymara throughout Bolivia. After weeks of political unrest, the Bolivian government agreed to terminate the contract with Bechtel and granted a number of concessions to make water more accessible to the residents of Cochabamba. According to Silva (2009):

The Water War marked a turning point in resistance to neoliberalism. It was a local issue with national resonance in which tried and true government mechanisms of political exclusion, manipulation, and repression only stiffened resolve and expanded mobilization by heterogeneous social groups that included middle classes who obtained significant concessions.⁵⁴

The Water War was the first successful anti-neoliberal social movement in Bolivia and showed people that neoliberalism could be defeated if enough of the public was educated and mobilized.

The second successful example of framing came in the 2003 Gas War that consumed metropolitan La Paz and eventually led to the resignation of then President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and the eventual election of Evo Morales. The transformations and advancements in associational power of anti-neoliberal social groups of the recent years came to a head after the Bolivian government privatized most of the natural gas industry. This privatization, along with the negative effects of the Argentine economic failure of 2001, prompted between 500,000 and two million teachers, miners, students, farmers, indigenous peoples, and pretty much anyone else to take to the streets across the country.⁵⁵ Once again, these protesters used roadblocks, occupations, strikes, and other form of contentious politics to cause political instability and reveal the weakness of the central government. When the demonstrators were met with military or police repressions, their resolve grew and the movement attracted more supporters. Throughout this entire movement, labor unions, coca growers, and indigenous groups were organizing movements and mobilizing people around the country. The widespread political unrest led to the resignation of neoliberal President Sánchez de Lozada and the protesting continued until a president was elected who vowed to end Bolivia's dependence on neoliberalism and international actors. According to Silva (2009):

Thus the Gas War completed what the Water War started. It transformed the demands from local, regional, or union-specific grievances to national-level demands centered on sovereignty, state control of natural resources, pro-

formal sector employment and workers' rights policies, agrarian reform, demilitarization of the drug war, and calls for a constituent assembly.⁵⁶

Like Argentina in 2001, Bolivia had successfully used social movements to replace neoliberal politicians with officials who pledged to enact policies that would implement a more humane form of capitalism.

After just over a year of a caretaker government, Evo Morales became the first indigenous president of Bolivia in 2005. The former leader of the coca grower federation and outspoken social movement organizer throughout the neoliberal period took office and promised an end to neoliberalism and a return to a more populist central government. Since taking office, he had nationalized many key industries, legalized coca production, enacted a variety of subsistence subsidies, enacted land reform, and organized a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution.⁵⁷ Thanks to a generous amount of aid from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Morales has been able to restore some of the power of the Bolivian central government. Although Bolivia is still a very poor country with a large portion of its population living in poverty, the economy has been improving and the international community does not have the same amount of control over Bolivian internal affairs as it once did. This defeat of neoliberalism at the hand of social movements was in large part due to political and economic exclusionary policies exacerbated by international economic crises that provided the motivation to look to social movements and the country's history of national populism and effective framing to make the movements sustainable and sufficient.

Ecuador

The social movements of Ecuador, the third country analyzed in this chapter, differed in many aspects from the cases of Argentina and Bolivia. Although social movements were

ultimately successful in toppling a series of neoliberal presidents in favor of one committed to a more humane form of capitalism, the main factors leading to these social movements differed from other South American countries. For one, Ecuador's history of national populism was nowhere near as strong as in Argentina and Bolivia. Moreover, the president does not have as much power in Ecuadorian politics as the other countries. The power of the opposition and the legislature presented a different degree of openness of political institutions and influenced how social movement actors framed their grievances. Similar to Bolivia, Ecuador has a very large and mobilized indigenous population. Although the Ecuadorian indigenous population is only about 25% of the total population, indigenous organizations were the most crucial social movement actors during the neoliberal era (1984-2006). The *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador* (CONAIE) is often regarded as the strongest indigenous movement in Latin America.⁵⁸ Similar to Argentina and Bolivia, contentious politics led to political instability and widespread social unrest that ultimately led to the resignation of multiple presidents who enacted neoliberal reforms. In 2006, Rafael Correa was elected president on an anti-neoliberal, economic nationalist platform. In his six years as president, he has acquired a strong anti-IMF position, increased social services, restructured the debt, and used his country's vast oil reserves for the benefit of Ecuadorians, instead of multinational corporations. The factors leading to the formation, sustainability, and success of anti-neoliberal social movements will now be examined.

History of National Populism

Ecuador does not have as strong of a history of national populism as Argentina and Bolivia. Due to regionalism, elite conflicts, political fragmentation, and commodity export-led economy, the central Ecuadorian state was not particularly strong, especially compared to

Perón's Argentina or Paz Estenssoro's Bolivia. Due to the amount of elite control in the government and the economy, the popular sector did not have power and did not achieve a high degree of rights and representation. The landed elite, the Catholic Church, and large landowners dominated both the urban and rural landscapes and prevented the growth of any populist leaders throughout the first half of the 20th century. The only populist period in Ecuadorian history took place during the mid 1960s and 1970s under various military governments. Due to external influence from the UN and USAID, the military governments enacted a variety of land reforms in the 1960s to replace traditional *latifundista* systems with more productive farms and less exploitative labor relations.⁵⁹ Throughout much of Ecuador's history, a small population of elites owned most of the land and many rural laborers, most of whom were members of indigenous communities, were forced to work in slave-like conditions on land that they did not own in order to survive. In 1964 and 1973, land reform acts granted a large number of civil, economic, and social rights to urban and rural peasants due to large revenues from the country's oil reserves and the state's desire to gain a strong base of peasant supporters.⁶⁰ Land redistribution, an expansion in social services, and a deeper awareness of the rights of the peasants characterized the military dictatorship. Although these reforms may have only been enacted to gain more support among the peasantry so that the state could have more power over the economy and natural resources, it is an important period in the history of Ecuadorian indigenous mobilization. According to Deborah Yashar (2005), "...throughout this period, the number of rural comunas, associations, and cooperatives increased accordingly and developed a certain degree of autonomy from the holy trinity that had regulated rural politics."⁶¹ This period of national populism, although brief and dominated by a military government, granted the popular sector many different

rights through a variety of inclusionary policies. These organizations were the foundation for collective mobilization and framing throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

Although the military governments empowered and represented the interests of peasants, particularly rural indigenous groups, urban laborers did not get the same type of preferential treatment. Therefore, Ecuador does not have a particularly strong history of powerful labor unions gaining significant political power during the populist era. Unlike in Argentina and Bolivia, labor unions were not major actors during anti-neoliberal social movements because they did not receive the same empowerment under the military governments.

Socioeconomic and Political Exclusionary Policies

Neoliberalism first came to Ecuador in the 1980s after a global decline in oil prices and the Latin American Debt Crisis slowed the growth of the Ecuadorian economy. However, unlike the other two countries, neoliberal policies were not enacted as rapidly or extensively during this time period. Nonetheless, socioeconomic exclusionary policies still hurt the popular sector and middle class. For example, a devaluation of the Ecuadorian currency that led to wage reductions hurt both wage and salary earners and cuts to subsidies hurt purchasing power and severely degraded the standards of living for peasants and people in the informal labor sector.⁶² Along with these economic exclusionary policies, there were a number of social exclusionary policies regarding the treatment of indigenous populations. As mentioned above, the populist era greatly empowered the Ecuadorian indigenous community through the granting of civil, economic, and social rights. However, neoliberal reforms were particularly hard on rural indigenous communities as decreases in social spending and

incomes prompted the communities to realize the still ongoing land inequalities. Some of these social exclusionary policies included a lack of formal recognition of Ecuador as a multiethnic population and a lack of equal rights to services or proper working conditions.⁶³

Although neoliberalism was not as radical or extensive in the 1980s, it became much more sweeping and intensive under President Sixto Durán (1992-1996) and the socioeconomic policies cut much deeper into Ecuadorian society. Unlike previous presidents who had enacted neoliberal reforms, Durán was much more aggressive and orthodox in his implementation of economic stabilization policies. This program included trade liberalization, further tariff reductions, widespread privatization, and land reform that greatly benefitted wealthy landowners. These traditional neoliberal programs eliminated most subsidies to oil and consumer goods, cuts to social services, and massive layoffs in the public sector due to privatization.⁶⁴ Although Durán lasted only until 1996, these exclusionary policies continued throughout the rest of the 1990s and were exacerbated by a series of international and domestic economic crises. As these policies affected more and more people, popular protests became much more prevalent and violent. One of the most controversial and contested economic exclusionary policies was the constant increase in fuel prices. Ecuador is one of the biggest oil producers in the Western Hemisphere and these vast petroleum reserves provided much of the revenue that the military governments used to enact popular populist policies in the 1960s and 1970s. However, neoliberalism also dictated the privatization of state-run oil companies. This privatization led to massive lay offs and sharp price increases in the 1990s. Although cuts to social services and subsidies mainly affected the popular sector, the extensive privatization of the oil industry hurt many skilled and middle class workers as well. As economic exclusionary policies expanded to more sectors of society, the appeal of

contentious politics greatly increased. These exclusionary policies continued into the 2000s as successive presidents attempted to enact neoliberal reforms, despite social movements causing their resignation or overthrow.

The political exclusionary policies were nowhere near as intense in Ecuador as in Argentina and Bolivia largely due to the power of the Ecuadorian Legislature, the opposition, and the fragmentation of political parties. Nonetheless, these policies restricted the openness of traditional political systems and prompted people to turn to contentious politics to address their grievances. Throughout the neoliberal era, presidents used decrees to implement many of their structural adjustment programs. However, in Ecuadorian politics, decrees could only accomplish so much. Presidential decrees allowed the implementation of monetary and fiscal policies but taxation and privatization required approval from the legislature.⁶⁵ Since neoliberal presidents had to deal with strong opposition in the legislature, often from members of their own coalitions, certain reforms were difficult to execute. In fact, a series of electoral reforms in 1994 made the political process more conducive to social movement organizations, such as the CONAIE. These reforms eliminated the requirement of political parties to register within at least 10 provinces and in all three of the most populous provinces, and they allowed independent movements to compete for political office.⁶⁶ These electoral reforms made the formation of indigenous political parties and representatives possible and were essential to the formation of the Pachakutik Movement, Ecuador's first indigenous political party. However, despite this appearance of political inclusion, the Pachakutik Movement has often been accused of being politically coopted by mainstream political parties and not representing the issues of its core constituents.⁶⁷ This cooption came to a head in the 2002 election when the Pachakutik Movement aligned itself with Colonel Lucio

Gutiérrez, who was one of the participating military officials in the 2000 coup. Once Gutiérrez was elected, he enacted neoliberal reforms and deepened the country's relationship with the IMF.⁶⁸ Due to Pachakutik's ties to Gutiérrez and his implementation of exclusionary policies, many members of indigenous communities and CONAIE grew disillusioned with formal political channels. Although contentious politics was always the primary method for the CONAIE to gather support and voice grievances, the Pachakutik's performance in elections helped many indigenous organizations and anti-neoliberal actors realize that formal politics was not the most effective way to achieve reform. Restriction and cooption were still rampant in Ecuadorian political institutions and helped push people from supporting these legitimate political channels to using contentious politics to voice their grievances with neoliberalism.

Economic Crises

Ecuador experienced the negative effects of the various international crises of the 1990s, but the importance of oil to the economy and its vulnerability to fluctuations in the global demand for oil often created or exacerbated existing economic crises. These crises expanded socioeconomic exclusionary policies and made the central government more dependent on international financial institutions. These economic crises "...reduced the functional power of the state – it could offer neither economic growth nor employment. This aggravated the chronic inability of presidents to forge policy coalitions in Congress."⁶⁹ They destroyed the appeal of neoliberalism for many the popular sector but successive governments continued to implement reforms. As these crises became more frequent in the late 1990s, the state was further debilitated and people took to the streets more frequently. Although every South American country suffered from the East Asian Financial Crisis of the

late 1990s, Ecuador was hit particularly hard because of global declines in oil and bananas prices and a severe El Niño period that destroyed many of their other export products.⁷⁰

These crises led to maximum currency devaluation, drastic price hikes, the collapse of the Ecuadorian banking sector, and further negotiations with the IMF and World Bank. However, these attempts to soften the effects of economic crises could not prevent the worst economic depression since the 1930s from hitting Ecuador in 1999. During this crisis, GDP drastically shrank, unemployment in the informal sector rose close to 60%, and poverty increased to 68% of the total population and 91% in rural areas.⁷¹ According to Jennifer Collins:

The crisis was characterized by a complete loss of faith in virtually all of Ecuador's political institutions. Only 7% of those surveyed in a national public poll, for example, expressed confidence in Congress, and by December the President's popularity rating was also down to 7%. As the economic crisis worsened during 1999, people increasingly perceived that the government, and in particular the President, as biased toward powerful banking interests to the detriment of the majority of poor Ecuadorians.⁷²

The economic crisis of 1999 was the impetus for the 2000 coup d'état in which a faction of the military, CONAIE, and thousands of disgruntled Ecuadorians forced President Jamil Mahuad out of office. Even the Ecuadorian military failed to protect the president as many soldiers who were tasked with protecting government buildings simply allowed the protesters to pass, or actually joined the coup.⁷³ Similar to the economic crisis during the same time in Argentina, this crisis revealed the vulnerabilities of neoliberalism and the true lack of political capacity of the Ecuadorian government.

Framing

Due to Ecuador's history of weak national labor unions and strong indigenous identity, indigenous organizations, most notably the CONAIE, were the principal social movement organizers. However, only about 25% of the Ecuadorian population is a member of an indigenous community. Therefore, forming horizontal brokerage ties among non-indigenous groups was essential to creating successful social movements against neoliberalism. Although many of CONAIE's grievances concerned indigenous cultural and land rights, it incorporated other groups because it framed neoliberalism as a new form of imperialism and stressed that the problems of the indigenous communities were the problems of all Ecuadorians.

As mentioned above, national populism was instrumental to the formation of collective indigenous identities and organizations in the 1960s and 1970s. Not only did many of the populist policies grant them civil, economic, and social rights, but the populist era also fostered dialogue between different communities and facilitated a future national indigenous movement. However, as the neoliberal era began in the mid 1980s, the role of multinational corporations threatened many indigenous communities, especially those who lived in the oil-rich parts of the country. The CONAIE was formed in 1986 under the presidency of Febres Cordero and combined two already existing indigenous organizations: the highland indigenous organization, ECUARUNARI, and the lowland indigenous organization, CONFENAIIE.⁷⁴ Even in its formation, CONAIE accomplished more than the indigenous community of Bolivia. Even though Bolivia has a majority indigenous population, there was always a tension and gap between highland and lowland indigenous communities that prevented the formation of a strong national indigenous movement. The CONAIE

accomplished a major framing task through the consolidation of the two major indigenous organizations into one movement. According to Silva (2009), “Although the social and cultural conditions of the highland and the Amazonian indigenous differed substantially, the intertwining of land and cultural survival issues as key framing elements united them.”⁷⁵ Despite these differences between the two groups, the CONAIE was a powerful and united movement throughout much of the neoliberal era.

Although the first major example of CONAIE-led national collective action against neoliberalism took place during the National Indigenous Uprising of 1990, CONAIE was forming ties with various indigenous communities throughout the 1980s. Prior to this national uprising, the CONAIE, ECUARUNARI, and the CONFENAIE formed strong relationships with small and local indigenous organizations. One of the most common ways of forming these relationships was through the provision of resources and knowledge to communities fighting multinational oil companies. Many of these MNCs, most notably Texaco, attempted to access previously untouched oil fields in the Amazonian region of Ecuador through negotiations with the Ecuadorian government instead of with the indigenous communities. The neoliberal Ecuadorian government was more than willing to accept this foreign investment and often gave these companies very favorable contracts. The indigenous communities often had little to no say in these contract negotiations. The larger indigenous organizations had more political power and more resources at their disposal and formed ties with international environmental groups, NGOs, and other indigenous organizations in the region.⁷⁶ CONAIE’s contribution to these local indigenous movements gained them a number of supporters for their anti-neoliberal social movements in the 1990s.

The National Indigenous Uprising of 1990 was the first national indigenous movement in Ecuador's history. Ten days of roadblocks, large demonstrations, and occupations across the country protested the neoliberal reforms that most adversely affected Ecuador's indigenous population: land reform, high inflation, and government indifference.⁷⁷ However, the Uprising was also a way for CONAIE to introduce itself to Ecuadorian politics. These protests allowed CONAIE to share its agenda with the rest of Ecuador. This agenda was a series of demands that focused on three different categories: ethnicity, citizenship, and class.⁷⁸ Although the Ecuadorian government did not award many political concessions, the Uprising was the first national mobilization of indigenous communities and proved to be valuable in the formation of an indigenous consciousness. It also showed the potential disruptive power of Ecuador's indigenous communities and that CONAIE could be a significant social movement organizer.

Contentious politics was not the only way CONAIE attempted to fight neoliberal reforms and build large coalitions; they also experienced some success using formal political channels. However, social mobilization was still fundamental to these experiences. One example of social movements converging with formal politics took place in 1994 in response to the Agrarian Development Law. This neoliberal law would have taken away many land rights from indigenous communities, benefited large corporations or landholders, and enacted mass privatization throughout rural Ecuador.⁷⁹ In response, CONAIE organized the 1994 "Mobilization for Life" which consisted of mass protests that demanded a repeal of this law and a greater recognition of the rights of indigenous communities. These movements forced the government to negotiate with CONAIE and reform the Agrarian Development Law to represent the interests of the indigenous communities. Another example of CONAIE's

attempts to engage in the formal political process was the formation of the Pachakutik Movement. This political party was a collaboration between CONAIE and the CMS, Ecuador's strongest urban labor union, which fielded candidates in local and national elections. Although the Pachakutik Movement experienced moderate political successes, as their candidates or coalitions achieved occasional victories due to the influence of Ecuador's indigenous communities, the party was also accused of being coopted by political elites and not representing the issues of their constituents. Although these forays into formal politics achieved some successes in the fight against neoliberalism, CONAIE and other indigenous groups realized that formal political channels were not the appropriate way to enact significant anti-neoliberal reforms.

Despite the limitations of these formal political processes, they also revealed to the CONAIE the importance of forming horizontal brokerage ties with the major non-indigenous popular sector groups in Ecuador. In order to accomplish significant anti-neoliberal reforms, CONAIE had to form ties with the remaining 65% of the Ecuadorian population that was not a member of an indigenous group. According to Silva (2009), "...the [CONAIE] leadership understood that accomplishing those [anti-neoliberal] goals required going beyond relatively narrow indigenous interests. The movement could accomplish its objectives only by linking indigenous struggles with those of all Ecuadorians..."⁸⁰ One of the major ways CONAIE formed these horizontal brokerage links was through interactions with the CMS. Although labor unions have been fairly weak in Ecuador's history, the CMS was able to gain a significant amount of power among urban workers in the mid 1990s. Through the formation of Pachakutik, CMS and CONAIE formed strong ties that brought urban and rural workers

together around a common cause. As these ties grew over time, CONAIE began to frame its grievances in a more national sense. By the end of the 1990s:

Issue framing stressed the common threat the government's sweeping neoliberal reform package posed to all Ecuadorians not of the socioeconomic elite. Protestors claimed neoliberalism favored an alliance of international economic interests and their domestic allies at their expense. In short, neoliberal policies promoted starvation and misery while entrenching foreign economic interests and domestic allies.⁸¹

Appealing to the effects of neoliberalism on the *entire* nation of Ecuador, CONAIE formed strong horizontal linkages between the indigenous communities, urban laborers, and the middle class. Between 1994 and 2006, mass nationwide social movements were frequent and intense. They were instrumental to the resignation or impeachment of a number of Presidents, including Abdalá Bucaram (1997), Jamil Mahuad (2000), and Lucio Gutiérrez (2005). Moreover, they also played a significant role in the 2000 coup d'état. As mentioned above, anti-neoliberal protestors stormed the Ecuadorian Congress and demanded government reform. Although CONAIE and other anti-neoliberal social movement actors successfully toppled the regimes of many neoliberal politicians, they were not successful in establishing a truly anti-neoliberal president until 2006. Bucaram and Gutiérrez were elected on Ecuadorian nationalism platforms that promised to decrease Ecuador's dependence on foreign actors.⁸² However, economic crises, the power of international institutions, and political greed forced these presidents to embrace neoliberalism.

After more than 20 years of neoliberal policies, the neoliberal era ended in 2006 with the election of Rafael Correa. Thanks to the support of the popular sector and a campaign

based on severing ties with the IMF and the World Bank, Correa was elected with 57% of the vote.⁸³ Since taking office, he has utilized oil reserves for the benefit of Ecuador, joined OPEC, helped form the Banco del Sur (South America's response to the World Bank), restructured the country's foreign debt, and increased ties with other Latin American countries and China. Although Correa has faced strong criticism and opposition from the US and Ecuadorian elites (he successfully avoided an elite-led coup in 2010), he has fulfilled his anti-neoliberal campaign promises and has better represented the interests of the popular sector, still the majority of Ecuadorians. Correa will remain president until 2017.

Venezuela

Although social movements were crucial to the ousting of neoliberal presidents and the implementation of socialist Hugo Chavez, these movements were much more highly decentralized and uncoordinated. However, political and economic exclusionary policies sparked these social movements; and framing, although not quite as evident, was crucial to the sustainability of these movements. The violence and political instability of these social movements eventually destroyed the power and support of neoliberal presidents and helped elect one of the most outspoken anti-neoliberal politicians the world has ever seen.

History of National Populism

The one aspect that separates Venezuela from its South American neighbors is its vast oil reserves, the largest in the Western Hemisphere. Oil has been both a gift and a curse for Venezuelans since the 1920s. Between the 1940s and the 1980s, oil was used to form and sustain one of the strongest populist states in the region. During this time, the government had virtually all control over the oil fields and used the revenues to enact import substitution

industrialization (ISI), which maintained an incredibly powerful and active state. The state built extensive infrastructure, maintained an extensive social state, and employed a large majority of Venezuelans. There was such a high worldwide demand for oil that the government had enough money to enact these social policies to benefit the lower classes without having to place too many taxes on the upper and middle classes.⁸⁴ Moreover, there were very few political strikes during this era because negotiation was the general way for groups to air their grievances and strikes were only seen as a way to destabilize political regimes. During this period of populism, many sectors of Venezuelan society benefited from a strong central government, especially the popular sector. This history was essential to the feelings of relative deprivation throughout the neoliberal era and served as a model that anti-neoliberal protesters hoped to emulate in the post-neoliberal era.

Socioeconomic and Political Exclusionary Policies

In the late 1980s, the dramatic decline in the demand for oil forced the Venezuelan government to adopt neoliberal reforms to control a large fiscal debt and a devalued currency. President Carlos Andres Perez (1989-1993) enacted a variety of IMF stabilization policies under his economic plan, entitled the Great Turnaround. Although the Venezuelan people suffered through a severe economic crisis in the 1980s prior to Perez's presidency, the Great Turnaround produced a variety of unprecedented socioeconomic exclusionary policies. Like many other IMF-supported stabilization policies, the Great Turnaround called for cuts to public services, the elimination of price controls, deregulation, mass privatization, and trade liberalization.⁸⁵ In the wake of these policies, the popular sectors and middle classes experienced a rise in the prices of goods and services, a decrease in the real value of their incomes and wages, and a decline in working conditions and standards of living. In a short

time, the number of Venezuelans living in poverty went from a small minority to the majority of the population.⁸⁶ The Great Turnaround forced a large number of people into poverty and fostered a large degree of discontent among the majority of the Venezuelan population. These socioeconomic exclusionary policies helped form the grievances of the lower and middle classes against the new neoliberal regime.

A second wave of socioeconomic exclusionary policies took place during the presidency of Rafael Caldera (1994-1999) as another IMF supported stabilization plan further exacerbated the precarious economic situation of the poorest Venezuelans. Despite being elected on an anti-neoliberal campaign, Caldera was forced to enact policies that led to drastic increases in gas prices, the abolition of foreign exchange controls, and further privatization. In a country that was so dependent on petroleum subsidies and so many citizens were state employees, these politics were particularly exclusionary. They eroded the political base of Caldera and motivated millions of Venezuelans to take to the streets to demand reform.

Along with these socioeconomic reforms, Perez also enacted a number of political exclusionary policies to increase the power of the executive, make it easier to repress social movements and decrease the power of unions. In order to maintain basic democratic principles, Perez enacted many of his Great Turnaround policies through decree. His goal was to restructure the state to separate politics from economic policy making.⁸⁷ An increase in the repressive power of the executive accompanied this increase in presidential power in the economic realm. Social movements throughout the working class neighborhoods during Perez's regime enabled the president to liberally deploy police and military personnel to working class neighborhoods at the first indication of mass mobilization, most notably during

the Caracazo riots. This liberal deployment of the armed forces distanced the relationship between the public and the president. The final political exclusionary policy was the incorporation of formerly powerful labor unions. During the populist era, unions, especially the CTV, were a crucial link between the government and the working class. They were incredibly popular among the people and were the main way for the popular sector to voice their grievances. However, after a lack of a strong response to the Great Turnaround or the Caracazo, the CTV was accused of being coopted by the government and lost a large amount of support among the popular sector.⁸⁸ In the wake of political exclusionary policies, Venezuelans realized that they had no institutional channels to influence policy and had to resort to social movements and contentious politics to voice their grievances and force changes.

Economic Crises

Due to its vast oil reserves and Perez and Caldera's sweeping and rapid neoliberal reforms, Venezuela was much more vulnerable to fluctuations in international commodity prices and economic crises. Not only did Venezuela suffer from the same international economic crises as the other South American countries examined, its economy also suffered from decreases in international demand for oil. These economic crises exacerbated many of the neoliberal exclusionary policies and weakened the power of the central government. The most important economic crises to the weakening of the neoliberal state took place in 1994 and 1997. The combination of the Mexican Peso Crisis and a sharp decline in oil prices forced then President Caldera to resort to the IMF for foreign aid. This resorting to the IMF turned out to be one of the most substantial blows against neoliberalism. Caldera was initially elected on an anti-neoliberal campaign and Venezuelans expected him to fulfill his promises

once elected. When he did not, Venezuelans blamed international economic organizations and the Venezuelan state.⁸⁹ This crisis greatly weakened the power and legitimacy of Caldera's government and destroyed the appeal of neoliberalism among the Venezuelan middle class and popular sector. Another sharp decline in oil prices fostered an economic crisis in 1997. By this time, social movements were occurring on nearly a daily basis and Caldera's political support was at an all time low. The crisis forced Caldera to enact further economic stabilization programs and weakened his political legitimacy.

Framing

Unlike the other countries examined, Venezuelan social movements did not experience a large amount of associational collective action. Although social movements were instrumental in the toppling of the neoliberal presidencies of Perez and Caldera, they were not particularly organized. There were no piqueteros, urban subsistence movements, coca grower federations, or powerful indigenous organizations. However, what these social movements lacked in organization, they made up for in intensity, frequency, and spontaneity. According to Silva (2009), "Decentralized, uncoordinated strikes, marches, demonstrations, and disturbances, in which each group protested for its own specific grievances, occurred almost daily."⁹⁰ Although national labor unions, such as the CTV, sporadically provided resources and facilitated horizontal mobilization, the majority of social movements were not particularly organized. For example, the notorious Caracazo took place only days after Perez's implementation of the Great Turnaround in response to increasing gas prices and transportation costs. Despite the lack of an overarching social movement organization, hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans of all classes rioted and looted over the span of a week.

While these movements were largely uncoordinated and spontaneous, they incorporated many different members of Venezuelan society and the anger caused by neoliberalism served as a sufficient framing mechanism. Since so many Venezuelans of such different economic backgrounds were constantly protesting neoliberalism, the movements acquired some degree of associational and collective power that had significant impact.⁹¹ The policies of Perez and Caldera were the primary framing mechanisms and the ways in which horizontal linkages were formed. These social movements helped force Congress to shorten Perez's term by six months and assisted in the electoral victory of Hugo Chavez in 1998. Due to this lack of coordination and the strong power of the Venezuelan legislature, relative to other South American countries, neoliberal politicians were generally ousted by legitimate political means. Congressional actions or electoral defeats were the main ways neoliberal politicians lost their power, as opposed to resignations or successful coup d'états. However, the frequency, size, and intensity of social movements, despite their lack of coordination, were essential to the ousting of these politicians.

In 1998, Hugo Chavez was elected president of Venezuela on the campaign promise of a 21st century form of socialism. Central to Chavez's policies were the use of the vast oil reserves to benefit the poorest members of Venezuelan society. He used oil revenues to increase social services, expand education and health services, and increase employment among the popular sectors. He also enacted a variety of policies that have made Venezuela into a more direct democracy and made popular sector grassroots organizing a fundamental pillar of his organization. Throughout his administration, he was accused of being a dictator because of his controversial relationship with the opposition and the private media. Despite these accusations of totalitarianism, Chavez was one of the great motivators for other anti-

neoliberal politicians in the region, such as Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, and the Kirchners. He provided an alternative to neoliberalism and enabled other countries in the region to do the same.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the anti-neoliberal social movements in four South American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. It has argued that a country's history of national populism, the implementation of socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies, international economic crises, and framing across different horizontal groups is crucial to the formation, sustainability, and success of a social movement. In all four of the countries examined, national populism led to the advancement of social, political, and economic rights of the popular sector throughout the first half of the 20th century. However, once these countries adopted neoliberal policies in the late 1980s, a variety of socioeconomic exclusionary policies – such as privatization, a decrease in social services, increasing poverty, and rising prices – alienated many members of the popular sector, and in some cases the middle classes, from the formal economic system. Political exclusion policies – such as an increase in the power of the executive and decreasing the role of political parties and labor unions – compounded these economic policies, as they restricted the masses from voicing their grievances through legitimate political channels and motivated them to turn to social movements to achieve significant political reform. Finally, social movement organizations – such as indigenous groups, community organizations, and labor unions – transformed these demonstrations from regional or class specific protests to nationwide movements that incorporate many different groups of people. The ability of these organizations to form ties across multiple organizations and classes greatly determined the

sustainability and success of these movements. In these four countries, social movements were crucial to the election of anti-neoliberal politicians. These presidents have enacted a variety of reforms to dampen the effects of neoliberalism, increase the power of the central government, and improve the standard of living of the poorest members of their countries.

¹ This quote refers to a common protest chant used in the street of Buenos Aires during the 2001 protests and Venezuela throughout the 1990s. The phrase can be translated to “Enough is enough” and referred to the desire of the social movement actors for a complete overhaul of the governments of these countries. Similar chants and desires were also apparent in Bolivia and Ecuador.

² Auyero 2001.

³ Silva 2009, 56.

⁴ Cavallo and Cottani 1997, 17.

⁵ Cavallo and Cottani 1997, 17.

⁶ Silva 2009, 62.

⁷ Rodríguez-Boetsch 2005, 302.

⁸ Silva 2009, 72.

⁹ Silva 2009, 72.

¹⁰ Silva 2009, 72.

¹¹ Auyero 2006.

¹² Silva 2009, 89.

¹³ Dinerstein 2001, 7

¹⁴ Silva 2009, 94

¹⁵ Silva 2009, 59

¹⁶ Silva 2009, 60.

¹⁷ Treisman 2004, 401.

¹⁸ Friedman 1999, 136-137.

¹⁹ Rodríguez-Boetsch 2005, 303.

²⁰ Silva 2009, 62.

²¹ Silva 2009, 62.

²² Silva 2009, 62.

²³ Silva 2009, 65.

²⁴ Silva 2009, 65.

²⁵ Auyero 2002, 151.

²⁶ Auyero 2002, 161, 165.

²⁷ Silva 2009, 62.

²⁸ Silva 2009, 67.

²⁹ Auyero 2002, 167.

³⁰ Silva 2009, 73.

³¹ Silva 2009, 77.

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- ³² Silva 2009, 78.
³³ Silva 2009, 79.
³⁴ Zibechi 2006.
³⁵ Yashar 2005, 155.
³⁶ Yashar 2005, 156.
³⁷ Yashar 2005, 158.
³⁸ Yashar 2005, 158.
³⁹ Rice 2012, 69.
⁴⁰ Silva 2009, 110.
⁴¹ Well, 2003.
⁴² Silva 2009, 124.
⁴³ Silva 2009, 134.
⁴⁴ Silva 2009, 108.
⁴⁵ Silva 2009, 108.
⁴⁶ Rice 2012, 79.
⁴⁷ Hylton and Thomson 2006, 162.
⁴⁸ Silva 2009, 115.
⁴⁹ Hylton and Thomson 2006, 164.
⁵⁰ Silva 2009, 120.
⁵¹ Hylton and Thomson 2006, 168.
⁵² Silva 2009, 128.
⁵³ Yashar 2005, 64.
⁵⁴ Silva 2009, 131.
⁵⁵ Hylton and Thomson 2006, 164.
⁵⁶ Silva 2009, 138.
⁵⁷ Silva 2009, 144.
⁵⁸ For more information on the CONAIE, see Collins (2006), Rice (2012), Silva (2009), Yashar (2005), Zamosc (2007), Organization's website: conaie.org.
⁵⁹ Yashar 2005, 92.
⁶⁰ Yashar 2005, 91.
⁶¹ Yashar 2005, 96.
⁶² Silva 2009, 154.
⁶³ Silva 2009, 158.
⁶⁴ Silva 2009, 161.
⁶⁵ Silva 2009, 175.
⁶⁶ Rice 2012, 62.
⁶⁷ Silva (2009), Zamosc (2007).
⁶⁸ Zamosc 2007, 14.
⁶⁹ Silva 2009, 170.
⁷⁰ Silva 2009, 176.
⁷¹ Silva 2009, 181.
⁷² Collins 2006, 199.
⁷³ Collins 2006, 198.
⁷⁴ Jochnick and Garzón 2006, 187.
⁷⁵ Silva 2009, 156.

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- ⁷⁶ Jochnick and Garzón 2006, 187.
- ⁷⁷ Yashar 2005, 145.
- ⁷⁸ Yashar 2005, 145.
- ⁷⁹ Yashar 2005, 148.
- ⁸⁰ Silva 2009, 159.
- ⁸¹ Silva 2009, 180.
- ⁸² Silva 2009.
- ⁸³ Silva 2009, 191.
- ⁸⁴ Silva 2009, 197.
- ⁸⁵ For more information on the Great Turnaround, see Crisp (1998) and Naím (1993).
- ⁸⁶ Silva 2009, 203.
- ⁸⁷ Silva 2009, 201.
- ⁸⁸ Silva 2009, 205.
- ⁸⁹ Silva 2009, 221.
- ⁹⁰ Silva 2009, 209.
- ⁹¹ Silva 2009, 218.

Chapter 4

Chile and Peru: Where National Anti-Neoliberal Social Movements Failed

The last chapter examined the role of social movements in the ousting of neoliberal presidents in favor of ones who were more dedicated to enacting more humane capitalist policies in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. However, not all South American countries experienced this high level of nationwide social movement organization that achieved drastic political gains. Chile and Peru are two of these countries. Although they experienced both the negatives and the positives of neoliberalism similar to other South American countries, they did not experience as intense, frequent, or effective anti-neoliberal social movements. There were examples of strong, violent, and disruptive social movements during the neoliberal era in these countries, but they could not compare to the nationwide movements of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. By looking at the four factors covered in Chapter 3 (history of national populism, existence of socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies, the effects of economic crises, and social movement organizations' abilities to frame their grievances and form horizontal brokerage ties), this chapter will attempt to explain why similar nationwide anti-neoliberal social movements were not as successful in Chile and Peru. In Peru, totalitarian political exclusionary policies not only prevented the popular sector from using formal political channels to voice their grievances, but the policies also barred them from forming any type of social movement or collective action. Due to these strict policies and a history full of ethnic and regional tensions, local organizations were either unwilling or unable to form ties with one another and form national movements. In Chile, Pinochet's dictatorship responded to any possibility of collective action with violence and used terror to prevent anyone from opposing his policies. After he left office, drastic socioeconomic and political *inclusion*, along with a fear of a return to violence

and the weakness of traditional social movement organizations, discouraged mass anti-neoliberal collective action because people felt that they could voice their grievances through formal political channels as opposed to resorting to the streets.

Peru: From Dictatorship to Inclusionary Neoliberal Democracy

Like Chile, a dictatorship was responsible for the implementation of many of Peru's neoliberal reforms. Due to this lack of democracy, reforms were often implemented rapidly with little consent, and any form of opposition was immediately silenced. However, neoliberal policies were implemented with little national resistance both before and after Alberto Fujimori's time in power (1990-2000) so authoritarianism was a necessary but insufficient explanation. The other primary explanation for the lack of successful nationwide collective action was the fact that social movement organizations – such as labor unions, shantytown organizations, and peasant unions – were unable to create strong relationships with one another and frame their grievances against the government in a national setting.

History of National Populism

Peru has had two distinct periods of national populism in its history. The first, which spanned from the 1920s to the 1940s, incorporated rural workers, students, and labor unions into the political process while the second, which spanned from 1968-1975, helped these groups form horizontal ties and strong social organizations. The *Alianza Popular Revolucionario Americano* (APRA – American Revolutionary Popular Alliance) was one of Latin America's first populist political parties and incorporated many members of the popular sector throughout the first half of the 20th century.¹ The APRA had strong socialist tendencies and incorporated many union members, students, and peasants into its political

infrastructure, preventing the possibilities of strong oppositional social movements and ensuring a solid electoral base for decades. The second period of national populism, which is important to understanding the state of social movements during the neoliberal era, took place under the military government of General Juan Velasco (1968-1975). Through an intense ISI reform and a strong central state, Velasco increased the state enterprise from 1% of GDP at the start of his regime to 20% by the end, nationalized many foreign firms, expanded existing public companies, protected domestic industry, and expanded social services.² Along with these economic policies, Velasco also enacted radical land reforms that largely benefited rural peasants and indigenous people. Similar to Ecuador, haciendas and latifundistas dominated rural Peru throughout its history. Under this system, one individual or family owned large tracts of land, and peasants and indigenous people were forced to work in slave conditions on land that was not theirs in order to survive. In order to silence any elite opposition and build a strong support network among the popular sector, which included the vast majority of Peruvians, Velasco enacted a series of land reforms in 1969 that virtually destroyed the land-owning elite and redistributed large tracts of land to indigenous people and peasants.³ Although the amount of land that was actually redistributed to individuals and families as opposed to associations is still disputed, the fact that the government was willing to work for the majority of Peruvians at the expense of the elites is significant.

Along with these land and economic policies, Velasco's populist government was also important because of his associational and identity politics. Shortly after the 1969 land reform, Velasco created SINAMOS (*Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Nacional* – National System for Support of Social Mobilization) to unite labor unions, shantytown organizations, and peasant unions and encourage mobilization and coordination among these

groups.⁴ These three groups constituted a large portion of the Peruvian population, and although participation in SINAMOS was generally high, it did not translate to a significant national movement under Velasco or subsequent heads of state. One explanation for the lack of national success of SINAMOS, especially as opposed to CONAIE in Ecuador or the Coca Growers Federation in Bolivia, is because of the overwhelming degree of political incorporation. According to Yashar (2005), “SINAMOS sought to mobilize various organizations as a means of generating support for the government and channeling participation into legal and state-sanctioned channels... While SINAMOS preached participation, it was hierarchical, tied to the military government, and therefore as much about control as about political mobilization.”⁵ Due to these ties to the military government, SINAMOS did not enjoy the same amount of autonomy as other national movements. Velasco’s identity politics are also important to understand future weaknesses of anti-neoliberal national social movements. His most significant identity policy was abandoning the term *Indian* and replacing it with *peasant*.⁶ Although the word *Indian* and *indigenous* have racial undertones in Peru, the country has the largest population of indigenous peoples in Latin America.⁷ Moreover, the struggle over indigenous rights to land has been a central part of Peruvian history since the Spanish Conquistadors first came to Peru in the 16th century.⁸ Nonetheless, this action of rebranding indigenous peoples as peasants had a drastic effect on the Peruvian population. Although it was meant to form horizontal brokerage ties between the indigenous and other members of the popular sector, it largely impeded the formation of a national indigenous organization. Despite these identity policies, Peru’s history of national populism was similar to other countries in the region because it combined a strong central state with policies that benefited workers and the popular sector. However,

Velasco's identity politics would also prove to have drastic consequences for the country's history of social movements.

Socioeconomic and Political Exclusionary Policies

One of the many differences between Peru and the four countries examined in the previous chapters is that a totalitarian dictator was the head of state of Peru for much of the neoliberal era. Although politicians in the other countries enacted a variety of political exclusionary policies that either empowered the executive or weakened labor unions and political parties, these countries were still democracies. Peru, under the leadership of Fujimori, was not a democracy and he did not have to find loopholes or evasive political maneuvers to enact his policies. The political exclusionary policies were so intense under Fujimori that they could not even voice their grievances through social movements or collective action, let alone formal political processes. Ironically, Fujimori's election was an example of the openness of Peru's political institutions.⁹ He was elected as a relatively unknown political outsider in 1990 after there was vast disapproval of former President Alan García's management of the country's economy. Although he ran on a mildly populist campaign, he enacted a series of draconian neoliberal policies within his first years in office to deal with the country's dire economic situation and improve the country's relationship with international financial institutions. These policies led to the widespread socioeconomic exclusion of many members of the popular sector. However, his political policies were a key determinant in the success of national anti-neoliberal social movements throughout his presidency and in the years following.

Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, much of Peru was in the midst of widespread violence and political instability due to the insurgent actions of two armed revolutionary groups: Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) and MRTA (*Movimiento Revolucionario de Túpac Amaru*). These two groups, especially Shining Path, engaged in open violent clashes with the Peruvian government throughout rural Peru and eventually made it to the urban areas by the 1990s. Fujimori exploited this sense of insecurity and used his close ties with the military to violently marginalize any potential Shining Path activities. However, he also used these counterterrorism tactics to implement his economic policies, silence any opposition, and prevent the spread of social movements. According to Silva (2009), “Fujimori and his supporters used the extralegal authoritarian concentration of state and military power to ram through a neoliberal structural adjustment program and to fight the Shining Path and MRTA.”¹⁰ These policies included imprisoning or killing labor leaders in the event of a demonstration or strike, imposing martial law on a vast proportion of the country, and disbanding all political parties. Not only was there no way for Peruvians to voice their grievances through legitimate political channels, but there was also no political associational space. Although neoliberalism existed both before and after Fujimori, this lack of political associational space made the formation of horizontal brokerage links impossible and greatly impeded the ability of social movement organizations to effectively frame their grievances to gain a large national following.

Another example of Fujimori’s repressive and totalitarian policies was his 1992 *auto-golpe*, or self-coup. Peruvian political parties have historically been fragmented and candidate-centered.¹¹ This weakness of political institutions made it virtually impossible for citizens to play an active role in the political system or for anyone to provide any sort of

substantial opposition to Fujimori's regime. Moreover, the fact that Fujimori was a political outsider with essentially no political experience and a seemingly insurmountable socioeconomic crisis meant that he would not be able to accomplish his goals via democracy. According to Levitsky and Cameron (2003), "A political amateur, he had no real party behind him, no program ready for implementation, and no team to staff the government. His supporters held less than a fifth of the seats in the congress...He was opposed, moreover, by leading sectors of the political, economic, and religious establishment."¹² Since democracy would have likely been the end of him, Fujimori turned to violence and totalitarianism in the form of an *autogolpe*. On April 5, 1992, he dissolved the congress, purged the judiciary, and severely censored the press. The combination of the *autogolpe* with the counterinsurgency policies throughout Peru severely excluded the majority of those most affected by neoliberalism.

In terms of socioeconomic exclusionary policies, the lower and working classes suffered while the elites greatly benefited in the midst of drastic economic growth. The international community lauded Fujimori for his economic stabilization programs that produced unprecedented amounts of macroeconomic growth so recently after such a dire economic crisis in the late 1980s. In fact many Peruvians to this day hold Fujimori in high regard because of his ability to stabilize the country politically and economically.¹³ He defeated Shining Path and oversaw a large degree of economic growth. However, similar to Argentina, macroeconomic growth and the prosperity of the elite came at the expense of the poor. By 1992, wages had lost 2/3 of their 1979 value, the minimum wage had plummeted, prices of basic goods increased substantially, unemployment in the formal and employment in the informal sectors both increased, and poverty was consistently above 50% nationwide.¹⁴

These socioeconomic exclusionary policies were similar to the other countries examined, but because of macroeconomic growth, the totalitarian power of Fujimori, and control of the press made social movements impossible for the popular sector and undesirable for the middle classes.

Framing

Although Fujimori closed virtually all political and social movement channels, his presidency was not the only reason for the lack of a substantial national social movement against neoliberalism. Both prior and after Fujimori's presidency, social movement actors were unable to frame their issues in a national setting incorporating themselves with each other. Prior to Fujimori's presidency, the most powerful example of anti-neoliberal collective action was the Shining Path. During the 1980s, the Shining Path formed associational collective power among peasants and shanty dwellers because of their anti-government positions. However, its insurrectionary nature and inability to associate with other social movement groups prevented it from forming horizontal linkages with other organizations or even other Shining Path cells. Although there were violent aspects of all of the other social movements analyzed, Peru is the only country examined with an overtly insurrectionary guerilla movement. Due to this violence, it was easy for the state to violently repress them without having to resort to democratic legitimization while also damaging the efficacy of its message. Instead of being a social movement organization or a national movement, Shining Path was labeled a "terrorist" group and delegitimized as a social force. Despite this delegitimation, they still gained a significant amount of power in both the urban and rural landscape. However, because of its violent nature and ideology of completely destroying the Peruvian state, it did not look to make ties with other organizations. According to Silva

(2009), Shining Path's "...sectarianism, intolerance of reformism, and emphasis on armed conflict and indiscriminate violence inhibited the development of an anti-neoliberal episode of contention in Peru. These characteristics drove a wedge between the Shining Path and other popular sector organization, 'merely' demanding reform of neoliberal capitalism."¹⁵ The influence of the Shining Path and its inability to effectively frame themselves as legitimate opposition to the government weakened the associational power of the social movement organizations, even before Fujimori's regime.

Even after Fujimori's resignation, social movement organizations were unable to form a significant national anti-neoliberal movement. Fujimori was forced to resign, but not because of the strength of the opposition, civil society, or mass social movements. He was forced to resign amidst corruption charges that had little to nothing to do with his neoliberal policies. Therefore, although a neoliberal president was forced out of office in Peru, it was not due to mass social mobilization. After his resignation, democracy and stability largely returned but neoliberalism was not defeated. Fujimori's regime had a profound effect on both the social and political institutions of Peru. For example, Alejandro Toledo was elected president in the aftermath of Fujimori's resignation. He was elected on a populist, anti-neoliberal platform but, once in office, he continued to institutionalize IMF structural adjustment programs.¹⁶ Although there were a variety of anti-neoliberal social movements during this time due to the extensive socioeconomic exclusionary policies and the openness of political and social institutions, these movements were largely regional in nature. During this time, the indigenous identity became more of a point of pride and unity throughout Peru, but it was largely divided between Amazonian indigenous communities and Andean indigenous communities.¹⁷ Although Toledo's administration even tried to forge horizontal

linkage ties to the different organizations, a significant national indigenous movement has still not formed in Peru. Bolivian indigenous communities faced these same tensions but they were still able form a national anti-neoliberal movement. However, largely decentralized and often politically incorporated regional movements and an overall fear of a return to violence among the entire nation discouraged national anti-neoliberal movements.¹⁸ Fujimori's most important effect of Peruvian political parties was that he made them much more candidate-centric.¹⁹ Due to the fact that candidates are so important to political parties, these candidates have to be well known among the various Peruvian communities. This closer relationship between voters and candidates leads to more political incorporation and less of an inclination to resort to social movements. Another explanation for a lack of national anti-neoliberal social movements in post-Fujimori Peru is because of the violence of the Shining Path. According to Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, nearly 70,000 Peruvians were killed during Fujimori's regime.²⁰ Not only was Peru recovering from a totalitarian regime, they were also recovering from mass atrocities. This period was a traumatic effect in Peru's history and transitional justice was more important than anti-neoliberal contention.²¹ Moreover, since Shining Path was the closest thing to a national anti-neoliberal movement, many Peruvians were wary of a return to violence if another national movement arose.

Although Toledo's neoliberal policies continued throughout his presidency and neoliberal contention remained local, Alan García won his second presidential term in 2006 and preached neoliberalism with a human face. During his presidency, he was able to achieve a certain degree of macroeconomic growth, approval from international financial institutions, support from the middle class and the right wing; but he has also worked to alleviate poverty, increase social spending, and work with instead of against Coca federations. Although his

policies are still regarded as neoliberal, they have also attempted to incorporate the working classes.²² Unlike Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, Peruvian heads of state have not been as antagonistic to neoliberalism and the United States.

Chile

Chile was not only Latin America and the world's first neoliberal experiment, it also experienced a much longer and much more unique neoliberal era than many of the other countries examined in this study. Similar to Peru, many of Chile's neoliberal policies were implemented under the rule of an authoritarian dictator. However, whereas Fujimori ruled Peru for only about 10 years, Pinochet controlled Chile for nearly 15 years and was very active in the government and economy for years after he ceased being president. The social movements that existed during the Pinochet regime were often violently repressed and unable to form brokerage ties with other movements. Although a plebiscite was responsible for the peaceful transition of power to democracy, Pinochet's fall did not lead to an end to neoliberalism. Neoliberal policies continued after Chile's redemocratization but there has been a noticeable lack of national social movements against neoliberalism because of social movements organizations' lack framing mechanisms and an overwhelming degree of socioeconomic and political inclusion under the Concert of Parties for Democracy coalition that was in power in Chile from 1990-2010.

History of National Populism

Compared to the other countries examined, Chile's history of national populism is much less extensive and resonant today. Chile was the first South American country to democratically elect an openly socialist president but the populist era was much less

powerful in the country. Throughout the first half of the 21st century, Chile's abundant natural resources made its economy incredibly dependent on international actors, most notably American multinational corporations. Although this dependence on international actors is not different from other South American countries, the fact that the same type of populist movement never emerged in Chile shows the extent of the role of the United States in the Chilean economy. Nonetheless, there were still attempts to organize a populist movement. For example, coalitions of socialists, communists, radicals, and leftists acquired some political power under a populist platform in the 1940s. Due to the cessation of imports after World War II, Chile was able to foster domestic industrialization, implement ISI, raise employment in the state sector, increase wages and purchasing power, lower taxes, and increase subsidies.²³ However, this "populist" era "...produced no structural changes in the Chilean economy or society. Chilean governments were unable to institute basic economic and social reforms because the members of the coalition had irreconcilable differences over domestic and foreign policy."²⁴ Further dependence on economic aid and investment from the United States characterized Chile throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

Although not explicitly an example of a populist movement, Salvador Allende's brief presidency (1970-1973) is nonetheless important to the understanding of historical incorporation of the popular sectors. In the modern day, many regard Allende as a strong politician with a feasible way to democratically implement a nonviolent form of socialism to benefit the majority of Chileans. Despite this image, Allende constantly faced strong opposition from powerful actors, a working class with a variety of irreconcilable interests, and a series of economic crises. Although Allende was democratically elected, he had to deal with constant opposition from the elite classes, the judiciary, the media, multinational

corporations, and the United States. According to Keen (2000), "...the Chilean oligarchy and its North American allies were formidable, unrelenting opponents. Although the upper class lost much of its economic base due to the nationalization of large industries and expropriation of large land-holdings, it retained control over much of the mass media, the judiciary, a majority in Congress, and the armed forces."²⁵ Along with covert and overt threats from these powerful actors, Allende also had to confront a diverse working force. Although Allende ran as a candidate of the working class, different members of the working class had different demands. For example, copper miners, who earned higher wages, had demands that were contradictory to natural gas miners and campesinos. Therefore, although Allende had their support, he had difficulties mobilizing these sectors in the face of such staunch opposition.²⁶ This inability to mobilize his supporters, combined with an acute economic crisis in 1972, culminating in a number of employers' strikes. These strikes (which were subsidized by the CIA) became national and forced Allende to make significant concessions and abandon some of his socialist policies.²⁷ This staunch opposition, lack of unity and mobility among his supporters, and an economic crisis sufficiently weakened Allende's government that he could not prevent the September 11th, 1973 military coup. Despite these limitations, many regard him as a heroic character to this day throughout Chile and Latin America. During the first year of his presidency, inflation rates drastically decreased, worker incomes rose, public spending increased, price controls were established, standards of living increased, unemployment dropped, and the dormant economy became more diversified.²⁸ Even as late as the spring elections of 1973, Allende's party's vote rose to 44% from 36% in 1970.²⁹ Many regard Allende as a president who was dedicated to fighting for the Chilean working class and peasantry and not for the interests of the Chilean oligarchy

and its North American allies. Although his presidency did not last long, it is still an important period in Chile's history. Nonetheless, because Chile did not have the same type of populist movement as many other South American countries, the peasants and working class did not have a set period to reference in the framing of their grievances against governments during the anti-neoliberal period.

Socioeconomic and Political Exclusionary Policies

The exclusionary policies under the Pinochet regime, especially in his first few years in office, included draconian economic stabilization policies and extensive human rights violations. Similar to Fujimori, Pinochet used state-sponsored terrorism to close all formal political channels to voice grievances but also to severely restrict any forms of associational power in his first years in office. He wanted to make sure that his government was immune to both political and social forms of opposition. Along with his close relationship to the armed services, Pinochet also implemented a number of political exclusionary policies through the creation of the *Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional* (Directorate of National Intelligence, DINA). This intelligence organization made sure that any form of opposition was silenced, arrested, and killed. According to Carlos Huneeus (2007), "The DINA battled left-wing groups, opposition organizations, and Catholic Church bodies. Its members acted not only in Chile but also abroad, creating a climate of terror among opposition groups and fear among the regime's supporters, and becoming a symbol of the military of the military's regime's repressive character."³⁰ The DINA had the power to kidnap, arrest, and kill without justification and were under no obligation to report their activities to any organization. Moreover, agents of the DINA were not well known to the public so there was a constant terror of the unknown. According to Chile's *National Commission for Truth and*

Reconciliation Report, nearly 3,000 people were killed for political reasons and thousands more were imprisoned and tortured.³¹ Most of those killed were peasants, labor workers, public employees, or students.³² Since so many people were detained, tortured, and killed for simply expressing opposition views to the Pinochet regime, collective action was virtually impossible, especially in the first few years of Pinochet's regime when the violations were particularly heinous. Similar to Fujimori's Peru, Chile's formal political *and* social institutions were completely restricted. In other countries, the restriction of political channels prompted people to resort to the social movement to voice their grievances. In Chile, social movements were just as restricted as formal political channels because of the constant state of fear.

Along with state-sponsored terrorism, Pinochet also implemented a variety of political exclusionary policies that drastically restricted formal political institutions. As mentioned early, Pinochet's economic team, the Chicago Boys, were appointed and unknown to the public and implemented a series of economic reforms without the public's support. Moreover, there was little to no transparency in his legal practices because he simply used the military or the DINA to silence his opponents and did not need to rely on any sort of legitimation for his actions during his first years in power. Along with these strong man-tactics, Pinochet also enacted a variety of authoritarian reforms – such as a highly centralized government, the dissolution of Congress, the stacking of the courts, the banishment of political parties, and the purging of state institutions and universities.³³ Throughout the first few years of Pinochet's reign, Chileans lived under a constant state of terror and had no political rights. However, macroeconomic growth was unprecedented between 1977 and

1981 and many were willing to live in a authoritarian society if it meant such economic growth.

However, this economic growth did not last long into the 1980s and Pinochet enacted a variety of political liberalization reforms in order to legitimize his presidency. The period of Pinochet's military regime was to correct the failure of Chilean democracy under Allende. In order to found a new democracy, there needed to be a period of military rule to impose order and create favorable conditions for a lasting democracy. In a speech that Pinochet gave shortly after the coup in 1973, he said:

To rebuild is always slower and more arduous than to destroy. Because of this, we know that our mission will not be as temporary as we would have liked, and thus we provide no deadlines and set no dates. Only when the country has achieved the social peace necessary for the true economic development and progress to which it is entitled and Chile shows no faces with reflections of hatred will our mission have ended.³⁴

However, as economic crisis hit Chile in the 1980s, Pinochet became more politically liberal and implemented a new Constitution and enacted a number of plebiscites. The Constitution of 1980, which was approved by a plebiscite, did not grant significant political freedoms but was still a drastic liberalization. In the wake of the constitution, political parties were not explicitly legal but also were not quite illegal either.³⁵ This liberalization opened up certain avenues of political associational space and produced a number of movements against the government in the wake of the Latin American debt crisis. However, despite these liberalizations, the military still largely controlled the government and the media and the

Constitution enacted a number of policies that greatly protected the interests of property holders, making it nearly impossible to dismantle the market society.

Although the political exclusionary policies were more overt during the Pinochet regime, socioeconomic exclusionary policies were still frequent. Pinochet's draconian neoliberal structural adjustment policy was called "The Brick" and involved a comprehensive privatization and liberalization program. Some of these policies included market liberalization, deregulation, public service layoffs, reduction in social spending, privatization, tying domestic inflation to international trends, and few state subsidies.³⁶ Similar to other neoliberal policies in other countries, these policies led to rapid macroeconomic growth at the expense of the working classes and popular sector. However, much of this growth was due more to the terrible economic crisis Chile was in right before the coup as opposed to Pinochet's concrete policies. For the working classes and popular sector, wages dropped, poverty increased, standards of living plummeted, and income inequality skyrocketed in the first part of Pinochet's regime. Despite political liberalizations, economic crises in the 1980s exacerbated the already marginalized lives of Chile's working class and the socioeconomic exclusionary policies began to affect the Chilean middle classes as well. For example, in 1985, 49% of the population of greater Santiago lived in poverty and nearly 45% of the Chilean population in total.³⁷ Many of these exclusionary policies continued throughout the 1980s but Pinochet's power prevented any substantial national movements during this time.

Framing

Although there was a certain degree of mass anti-neoliberal mobilization in the 1980s in response to the severe economic crises after Pinochet implemented a variety of liberal

political reforms, these movements' achievements were limited due to the power of the Pinochet regime. After Pinochet stepped down in 1989, the new government of the CPD was able to continue enacting neoliberal policies throughout the 1990s and 2000s without facing many significant mass mobilizations. They were able to achieve this balance due to the historical power of political parties in Chile's history, Chilean people's fear of a return to violence, and a fairly weak or decentralized collection of traditional social movement organizations.

As mentioned above, Pinochet's political liberalizations in the 1980s granted a certain degree of political associational power to social movement organizers. Although there were a number of social movements against neoliberalism and the Pinochet regime during this time period, such as the labor movements of 1984, they were generally regionalized or specific to one social movement organization. Through the use of institutional violence and terror, Pinochet prevented the formation of significant horizontal linkages between different social movement groups. Moreover, many of his economic policies had already severely limited the power of labor unions and shantytown organizations. Another limitation of collective power building during this time was the presence of violence. When peasants or workers protested, they often did so violently and Chilean authorities responded with more violence. Even when the protests were not violent, repression was the main tool of the Chilean government. For example, Chilean officials burned alive two unarmed, nonthreatening youths in public in a shantytown.³⁸ This violence scared many of the middle class away from protesting with the working class and eventually brought mobilization against Pinochet in the 1980s to a close. Although the Chilean people were ultimately responsible for expelling Pinochet from power through a plebiscite in 1988, this action was not the direct result of a national social

movement. Moreover, Pinochet's departure did not end Chilean neoliberalism, as it continued throughout the new democratic period.

One of the major reasons for the survival of neoliberalism after the return of Chilean democracy was the CPD's policy of socioeconomic and political inclusion.³⁹ The CPD (*Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* – Concert of Parties for Democracy) was the political coalition that gained power after the return to democracy and held the presidency until 2010. Throughout the CPD's time in power, it has stressed neoliberalism *along with* political inclusion. Chile, like many other Latin American countries, has a history of strong political parties. They have typically formed strong relationships with labor unions, shantytown organizations, and just normal civilians. These actors, who are typically the leaders of social movement organizations, were incorporated into the formal political process and social movements were not as appealing. Due to these actors' strong role in the new democracy, a more humane form of neoliberalism was implemented. "Successive governments of the CPD consolidated a market economy *and* introduced or expanded significant protection from the market for many Chileans who had suffered far more profound socioeconomic exclusion during the dictatorship."⁴⁰ These policies included more spending on welfare and higher taxes while maintaining privatization and capital liberalization. Along with these economic inclusionary policies, the government also actively addressed its authoritarian past. For example, they addressed the human rights violations of the Pinochet regime in the 1991 National Truth and Reconciliation Report. Although Pinochet was given the title "Senator for life" after he stepped down, the fact that the government took a step toward uncovering the truth after the return to democracy is no minor action. In the wake of Pinochet's regime, many people were more concerned with holding the

dictatorship accountable and returning the country to its strong democratic roots and economic policies were not quite as important. Moreover, the CPD created a number of government agencies to address the needs and grievances of a variety of social groups and movements.⁴¹ Similar to SINAMOS in Peru, these organizations attempted to incorporate the popular sector into the government so that people would turn to their government instead of the streets in the case of frustration. Because the government became the primary social movement organization in post-Pinochet Chile, social movement organizations were unable to frame grievances against the government because people could do so directly with the government.

Another explanation for a lack of framing in the post-Pinochet, neoliberal Chile was because of the legacy of terror that Pinochet left. Similar to Peru, many Chileans did not want to take to the streets during the CPD years because they feared that instability would lead to a return to violence and totalitarianism. Although Pinochet was no longer in power in the 1990s, he was still a “Senator for life” and the armed forces, although weakened, still played a strong role in Chilean politics. The ever-looming presence of these two actors throughout the 1990s discouraged mass social movements because of this fear of the unknown. Moreover, Chile was able to avoid the worst effects of the economic crises of the late 1990s and the degree of inclusion in the government gave them hope that formal political channels would be able to sufficiently represent their issues.

A final reason for the weakness of social movement organizations in the 1990s and 2000s was the weakness or regional nature of typical social movement organizations, such as labor organizations and indigenous movements. Labor organizations were decimated during the Pinochet dictatorship and, even though they were incorporated under the CPD, did not

acquire more power with the return of democracy. Although labor organizations have attempted to organize social movements demanding more workers' rights, they have been unable to form horizontal linkages with other organizations and attract participation from other sectors of the population. According to Silva (2009), "The mechanisms for political, socioeconomic, and postmodern movements' inclusion have sufficed to maintain relative social peace in the face of serious problems with Chile's development model."⁴² Another kind of social movement organization that has played a large role in anti-neoliberal collective action in South America has been indigenous organizations. In Chile, the Mapuche movement is the closest resemblance to an indigenous national movement. However, the population of indigenous people in Chile is much lower than that of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Moreover, there are a variety of indigenous communities throughout Chile and they are not particularly unified but have rather formed more regional movements and organizations. These movements have focused on their individual grievances and have not really attempted to form ties with other indigenous organizations or frame their land grievances in a larger neoliberal context.⁴³ Due to these regional over national commands and the fact that a national indigenous identity is simply not as strong in Chile as in other South American countries, the Mapuche movement has failed to become a national anti-neoliberal indigenous movement.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined some of the reasons why national anti-neoliberal social movements were largely nonexistent in Chile and Peru during the same time period that these movements were overthrowing neoliberal politicians in neighboring countries. It has argued that totalitarian governments and an inability of traditional social movement organizations to

frame their grievances in a national context and forge horizontal brokerage ties prevented social movements from becoming national or substantial. In Peru, the framing abilities of social movement organizations were weak prior to the dictatorship of Alberto Fujimori and those weaknesses were only exacerbated by severe political exclusionary policies. Even after a return to democracy, national social movements did not appear, despite the maintenance of neoliberal policies. A fear of a return to violence, a weakened social movement organization apparatus, and the adoption of neoliberal policies with more of a social conscience can help explain this lack of formative national social movements.

In Chile, the repressive dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet restricted all political and social associational space so that the prospects of forming any sort of social movement against his government was impossible during his first years in power. The responses to neoliberalism in Chile and Argentina are often compared because they have similar histories, demographics, and economies. Both countries also experienced authoritarian military regimes in the late 1970s. However, Argentina returned to democracy around 1983 while Chile suffered through the dictatorship of Pinochet until 1990. Therefore, Argentina underwent most of its neoliberal reforms under a democratic government where social movement activity was not as oppressed. Conversely, Chile underwent the brunt of neoliberalism under Pinochet, where most forms of collective action were illegal until the mid 1980s. Despite a political liberalization in his later years, national social movements were still virtually impossible to form because of the control of the military over the government and the seemingly omniscient DINA. Although Pinochet's fall led to an increase in democracy, neoliberal policies still continued. In the other countries examined, democracy did not end political exclusion, as presidents would routinely find ways to circumvent the

democratic process. These exclusionary policies pushed people into the streets. However, because of a large degree of political incorporation and inclusion, along with a fear of a return to violence and the weakness of national labor and indigenous organizations, national social movements did not accompany the return to democracy.

Although Peru and Chile are two examples of countries that did not experience national anti-neoliberal social movements that replaced free market politicians with blatantly anti-neoliberal figures, they have still found ways to survive in the post-neoliberal era. Neoliberal policies are still prevalent in both Peru and Chile but what differentiates these policies from those under Fujimori and Pinochet is that these policies have more of a social conscience. Social spending, poverty, standards of living, wages, and public sector employment are all features that contemporary governments in these countries have had to acknowledge. Although these heads of state have not been as outspoken against neoliberalism or international institutions, they have also realized that the well being of the popular sector is crucial to the well being of their nations. Another explanation for these more humane neoliberal policies could be the aspect of timing. For example, democracy returned to Peru in 2000. This year was the height of neoliberal social movements across South America and Peruvian politicians may have realized that intense neoliberalism could seriously jeopardize their prospects for ruling a stable country. Therefore, they saw the importance of combining neoliberalism with certain social policies. Because they do not exist in a vacuum, these new democracies recognized what was needed to keep the public on their side. However, the fundamentals of free market neoliberalism still exist in these economies to this day and the achievements of the working class and indigenous organizations have

been limited compared to the achievements of Argentines, Bolivians, Ecuadorians, and Venezuelans.

¹ Rice 2012, 91.

² Silva 2009, 231.

³ Yashar 2005, 231.

⁴ Silva 2009, 233.

⁵ Yashar 2005, 233.

⁶ Yashar 2005, 231.

⁷ Rice 2012, 87.

⁸ Mariátegui 1928.

⁹ Levistky and Cameron 2003.

¹⁰ Silva 2009, 240.

¹¹ Levistky and Cameron 2003, 1.

¹² Levistky and Cameron 2003, 7.

¹³ Levistky and Cameron 2003, 8.

¹⁴ Silva 2009, 240.

¹⁵ Silva 2009, 244.

¹⁶ Silva 2009, 246.

¹⁷ Greene 2006.

¹⁸ Silva 2009, 247.

¹⁹ Levistky and Cameron 2003.

²⁰ *Comisión de verdad y Reconciliación*, 2003.

²¹ Theidon 2006.

²² Silva 2009, 248.

²³ Keen 2000, 329.

²⁴ Keen 2000, 329-330.

²⁵ Keen 2000, 335. For more information of the role of the CIA in Chile before and during Allende's presidency, see Gustafson (2007) and CIA's Chile Collection (<http://foia.state.gov/searchcolls/cia.asp>).

²⁶ Keen 2000, 333.

²⁷ Keen 2000, 335.

²⁸ Keen 2000, 334.

²⁹ Keen 2000, 335.

³⁰ Huneus 2007, 50.

³¹ USIP 2000.

³² Huneus 2007, 6.

³³ Silva 2009, 249.

³⁴ Event held by the military government in the presence of ambassadors and authorities from the judiciary on October 11, 1973. Huneus 2007, 141.

³⁵ Silva 2009, 250.

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- ³⁶ Huneus 2007, 163.
³⁷ Silva 2009, 251.
³⁸ Silva 2009, 255.
³⁹ Silva 2009, 259.
⁴⁰ Silva 2009, 259.
⁴¹ Silva 2009, 263.
⁴² Silva 2009, 264.
⁴³ Rice 2012.

Conclusion: The Anti-Neoliberal Project Today

This thesis has examined the causes of national social movements against neoliberalism in a number of South American countries. After the hegemonic economic and political ideology conquered most of Latin America and the world in the 1980s and 1990s, a number of South American countries – especially Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela – experienced widespread and long-lasting social movements calling for substantial economic and political reforms. In each of these countries, millions of citizens took to the streets to protest socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies that have been characteristic of the neoliberal project. In some cases, indigenous groups were the main social movement organizers while labor unions were essential in other countries. Where neither labor unions nor indigenous organizations were strong, community organizations or networks based on different identities were crucial to the formation of collective action. In these four countries, national social movements caused the resignation, overthrow, or electoral defeat of multiple neoliberal presidents. They were also essential to the installation of heads of state that were willing to challenge the hegemonic discourse in favor of a more nationalistic and humane form of capitalism. However, not every South American country experienced this kind of social movement. This paper has argued that four factors help explain why national anti-neoliberal social movements were successful in some countries and failed in others: a history of strong national populism, the implementation of socioeconomic and political exclusionary policies under the mantra of neoliberalism, the existence of acute economic crises that weakened the appeal of the neoliberal project, and the existence of social movement organizers who framed their grievances in a national context and formed horizontal linkages with other social movement organizations to create strong and sustainable movements. They are all interrelated, especially since social movements do not happen in a

vacuum. A history of national populism is necessary because it provided the popular sector with an alternative ideology to the hegemonic neoliberal discourse and helped establish the policies of the anti-neoliberal regimes. Socioeconomic exclusionary policies are necessary because they formed the grievances of the popular sector against neoliberalism and the governments in charge. Political exclusionary policies forced the popular sector and, eventually the middle classes, to take to the streets to voice their grievances, as most formal political channels were restricted. Economic crises forced people to see the inherent weaknesses and flaws of neoliberalism and severely weakened the governmental capacity of the neoliberal state. In many ways, these economic crises made people realize that neoliberalism could and should have been overthrown. Finally, effective framing was essential to mobilizing both people and resources and making these movements national and sustainable.

Although Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela experienced successful national anti-neoliberal social movements, a number of other South American countries did not. Peru and Chile are among these countries. Peru did not experience national anti-neoliberal social movements in part because of a decade of totalitarian rule that virtually silenced all attempts at collective action and also because of the incorporation of the popular sector after the return to democracy. Chile did not have a significant history of national populism and experienced a similarly repressive neoliberal dictatorship that closed all political associational space. Moreover, once the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet ended, the new democratic government continued to implement neoliberal policies but incorporated much of the popular sector and enacted a number of social policies that benefited the lower and middle classes.

In the four countries examined that experienced successful national anti-neoliberal social movements, a head of state that promised and fulfilled various anti-neoliberal reforms was elected: Nestor Kirchner in Argentina in 2003; Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005; Rafael Correa in Ecuador in 2006; and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1999. Kirchner was president until 2007 when his wife, Cristina Fernandez Kirchner, took over. Evo Morales and Rafael Correa are still the heads of state of their respective countries and it appears that they will remain in charge for the better part of this decade. Chávez served as the Venezuelan President until his death on 5 March 2013. These five presidents have been some of the world's most polarizing figures of the past decade because of their policies that have benefitted the working and middle classes of their countries, often at the expense of the elite classes and foreign interests. Although their public approval ratings have been consistently high, many of the executives have come under increasing domestic and international criticism for their policies, especially in the wake of the recent international economic crisis.

Kirchnerismo in Argentina

After a severe economic crisis destabilized the country and caused the resignation of multiple presidents, Argentina experienced some of the highest rates of economic and political development during the first decade of the 2000s. Although Nestor Kirchner was elected nearly two years after the worst of the crisis, he was elected during a time of great instability and when there was still a large degree of discontent among the popular sector. In order to help his country sustainably grow and prevent a return to the social movement-caused unrest, he enacted a variety of political and socioeconomic inclusionary policies. The most well known of these policies was the reopening of human rights trials regarding crimes against humanity committed during the military dictatorship (1976-1983).¹ Although this

action was not in direct response to the neoliberal era, it was widely popular among the majority of Argentines. Another significant political inclusionary policy was the protection of popular assemblies and the *piqueteros*. These groups were the most vocal and powerful social movement organizers during the neoliberal era and Kirchner wanted to make sure that they were protected and treated well so that they would not be tempted to reorganize against him. This protection allowed the organizations to slowly fade in importance over time, and eventually they ceased to be major social movement organizations.² These are just a few examples of political inclusionary policies that improved the relationship between the government and the Argentine population and increased the popularity of Kirchner.

Along with these political inclusionary policies, Kirchner also implemented a number of inclusionary socioeconomic policies aimed at decreasing poverty and income inequalities. In a speech given shortly after his election in 2003, he discussed what was necessary to the fulfillment of these goals:

It's a matter of...allowing a new Argentina to be born with social progress, where children can aspire to live better than their parents based on their own efforts, capabilities, and work. To achieve this, we must promote active policies that allow for development and economic growth in the country, new job creation and a better and more just distribution of income. It is understood that the state plays a main role in this.³

Many of Kirchner's policies resembled Perón's populist policies of the 1950s, especially the nationalization of the airline and postal industries. Although elites and the international community have criticized many of these policies, Argentina's Human Development Index

(HDI) score increased every year of Kirchner's presidency and currently has the second highest HDI score in Latin America.⁴ Along with this domestic economic growth, Kirchner was also instrumental in strengthening Argentina's ties with other Latin American countries to reduce the region's dependency on the US and the IMF for financial aid. Nestor Kirchner's wife, Cristina Fernandez, took over the presidency in 2007 and expanded many of Nestor's policies and the country's growth continued.

Despite the many economic and political successes of the two Kirchner administrations, mass social movements against Cristina's policies have increased in frequency over the past year. In the fall of 2012, two massive demonstrations against the Kirchner government consumed Buenos Aires. Both movements, one in the middle of September (13-S) and the other in early November (8-N), featured hundreds of thousands of protesters calling for reforms to Kirchner's policies.⁵ These movements had many of the characteristics of the Arab Spring, as bloggers were some of the main social movement organizers and much of the information regarding the movements were spread via social media. Many different members of Argentine society attended these movements to voice their displeasure over growing inflation rates, corruption within Kirchner's administration, increasing poverty, and an increasing sense of insecurity and violence in the streets.⁶ Although these protests were nationwide and well attended, they did not create the same amount of social unrest as those in 2001 and Kirchner remains in power. These movements show that the contemporary leftist form of Latin American politics is by no means perfect. However, Kirchner's response has shown that the Argentine government has a greater capacity to address the grievances of its citizens without being forced to enact further unpopular policies to satisfy the demands of outside actors.

Cocaleros in Bolivia

In 2006, Evo Morales became the first indigenous president of Bolivia. The former leader of the national coca growers federation was elected on a mandate of increasing the rights of indigenous peoples and enacting policies that would make the country less dependent on the international community for financial aid. Since taking office, Morales has nationalized a number of industries, including the hydrocarbon industry, increased royalties on foreign companies, enacted land reform focused on empowering peasants and indigenous communities, and confronted the US and the IMF on multiple occasions.⁷ Due to an incredibly close relationship with Hugo Chávez, Morales has been able to legalize coca production and prevent many US proposed drug interdiction efforts without risking international aid. This antagonistic relationship with the US and other western financial institutions has prompted many outsiders to question the legitimacy of Morales' government. However, Morales' approval ratings have remained consistently high throughout his tenure, as was apparent in the public support for a new constitution in 2009 and his reelection with more than 60% of the vote during that same year.⁸

Despite these high approval ratings, the Morales administration has come under increasing domestic political pressure since his 2009 reelection. In late 2010, Morales announced an end to natural gas subsidies that led to a drastic increase in fuel prices. Prices increased by more than 80% as the government could no longer afford to pay for the extensive subsidies.⁹ Hundreds of thousands of Bolivians took to the streets to protest these measures in a fashion similar to the El Alto movements of the early 2000s. However, Morales was able to quickly respond to these movements and enact a number of reforms to dampen the effects of these subsidy cuts; the protests ended fairly quickly.¹⁰ There have been

a number of other protests against Morales' policies over the past few years, most of which have had to do with economic or indigenous policies. Despite these protests and Bolivia being one of the poorest South American countries, Morales remains in power and enjoys a relatively high degree of popular support because of his emphasis on enacting policies that benefit the majority of Bolivians.

A Sense of Stability in Ecuador

During the same year that Morales was elected president of Bolivia, Rafael Correa was elected president of Ecuador on a similar anti-neoliberal mandate. Similarly to Kirchner and Morales, Correa was elected amidst political instability and his policies were aimed at stabilizing the country and ensuring that his presidency would not end in a similar fashion to the neoliberal politicians that had preceded him. His campaign included severing ties with the US and the IMF, increasing ties with Latin American trading partners, using the country's oil reserves to the benefit of Ecuadorians, and increasing revenue for the social sector.¹¹ Since taking office, Correa has restructured Ecuador's foreign debt, helped found the South American development bank, enacted various land reforms, convened constituent assemblies, and reformed the country's constitution.¹² Many of these actions have improved the living standards of Ecuadorians and incorporated the powerful indigenous organizations that were so essential in the ouster of former presidents. According to Silva (2009), "Instead of bringing governments down, for the most part Correa turned popular sector mobilization that helped to elect him into a source of support against obstructionist traditional socioeconomic elites defending their privileges."¹³

Despite the sweeping campaign promises and initial successes of Correa's administration, the Ecuadorian economy and political climate have taken serious hits since the international economic crisis in 2009. Correa's social programs, combined with a drop in oil prices, pushed the economy into deeper debt and caused income inequality to increase between 2006 and 2008.¹⁴ Along with these economic struggles, the political climate has also had a high degree of instability. Correa has extensively used national referendums and plebiscites to enact controversial reform. Although this style of politics can be characterized as hyper democratic, it has also been criticized for allowing Correa to implement his policies without having to deal with opposition from other political institutions.¹⁵ This political instability came to a head on 30 September 2010 when members of the national police attempted to overthrow Correa. Although the coup was unsuccessful, it demonstrated the tensions still deeply embedded in Ecuadorian society. Correa has remained in power but the attempted coup had a profound effect on his presidency and his network of supporters. For example, CONAIE referred to Correa as a dictator and demanded his resignation in a letter published shortly after the coup.¹⁶ Although the CONAIE is not as powerful today as it was during the height of the neoliberal era, Correa's loss of their support represents the limits of anti-neoliberal governance.

Despite the flaws in Correa's presidency, he remains one of the most popular South American heads of state and the country's economic and political institutions have stabilized since the 2010 crisis. In 2013, Correa was elected to a third presidential term with nearly 60% of the vote.¹⁷ According to CNN Español, Correa had an 80% public approval rating in 2012, by far the highest in Latin America.¹⁸ Moreover, Ecuador's HDI score is one of the highest in Latin America and has been steadily increasing since 2009.¹⁹ Similar to the

Kirchners and Morales, Correa has been an incredibly controversial leader. Constant accusations of totalitarian tactics, widespread popular support, and economic stabilization has characterized Correa's regime. Despite a variety of high profile criticisms against his administration, he has continued to implement nationalist policies aimed at benefiting the popular sectors. These policies have gained him widespread support among these constituents and allowed him to win three consecutive elections.

Hugo Chávez in Venezuela

The most well-known and controversial anti-neoliberal politician in South America was Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez. The polarizing figure was elected president in 1999 and held that office until his death in March 2013. Antagonism with the west and Venezuelan elites, policies aimed at benefitting the popular sector, and countless accusations of totalitarian policies characterized Chávez's presidency. Through widespread socioeconomic and political inclusionary policies aided by the country's vast oil reserves, Chavez cultivated the support of the vast majority of Venezuelans living in poverty during his administration. One of the most common ways Chávez used his popular support to his advantage was through the popular mobilization of his supporters against his often violent and powerful adversaries. During his presidency, Chávez won more elections than any other elected official in the world.²⁰ Since 2004, poverty has been cut by 70%, Venezuela has the lowest degree of economic inequality in South America, and the Venezuelan economy grew by 5.5% in 2012.²¹ Although the consistently high global oil prices can partially explain these economic developments, "...the creation of worker cooperatives, the expropriation of companies occupied by workers, the implementation of price controls, the further

expropriation of land, and the provision of health and educational services and subsidized groceries...”²² were important political and socioeconomic inclusionary policies.

Despite these policies that benefited the popular sector, Chávez still faced large amounts of international and domestic criticism and resistance. The most notable instance of domestic resistance took place in 2002 in the form of an opposition-led coup attempt. This manufactured coup included the Venezuelan oligarchy and members of the military; the CIA and the Spanish government have also had alleged ties to this operation.²³ These actors were able to take control of the presidential palace, temporarily dissolved Chávez’s government, arrested Chávez, and installed their own leader, all without the support of the people. In response to these actions, the people of Venezuela and the portion of the armed forces that did not betray Chávez mobilized to protect him and restore him back to power; they were ultimately successful and Chávez returned to power within a few days.²⁴ Along with this coup, Chávez also had to deal with national strikes of energy workers in his first years in office. However, both the coup and the strikes were unable to unseat Chávez from power due to his strong relationship with the poor. Along with these domestic criticisms, Chávez also experienced widespread international condemnation for violations of human rights and destroying Venezuelan democracy. Multiple international human rights organizations accused Chávez of silencing the opposition, arbitrarily imprisoning people, and using the police or armed forces to execute his political policies. According to the Political Terror Scale (PTS), Venezuela has a score of 3 out of 5, which means that “...there is extensive political imprisonment...execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.”²⁵ Despite these domestic and international condemnations and instances of armed resistance, Chávez held

high levels of political approval until his death of 2013 because of his ability to represent the views of the nearly 80% of Venezuelans living in poverty and incorporate them into his community organizations.²⁶ During his presidency, these people not only supported him, but they also defended him.

Conclusions

The current political and economic situations of the four countries that experienced successful national anti-neoliberal social movements shows both the successes and failures of the politicians who came to power in the wake of this era. Presidents in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela enacted a number of leftist reforms aimed at dismantling the neoliberal power structure and increasing the state's capacity to provide for its people. Many of these policies were socioeconomic or political inclusionary policies that strengthened the ties between the popular sector and the administration in power. After what the popular sector accomplished during the late 1990s and early 2000s, these new presidents knew that they risked further social discontent if they did not address popular sector grievances. In order to represent the interests of the popular sectors, these presidents often have had to enact policies that have antagonized American and western interests. Despite the large degrees of popular support for these administrations, they have faced a number of obstacles since taking power. Evo Morales and Cristina Kirchner have had to deal with a number of national social movements against their policies while Rafael Correa and Hugo Chávez experienced overt challenges to their authority in the form of attempted coups. However, in each instance, the presidents remained in power largely due to socioeconomic and political inclusionary policies. These policies incorporated the main social movement organizers into formal political channels and prevented a return to mass mobilization.

Social movements were essential to the overthrowing of neoliberalism throughout South America. The popular sectors in each of these countries showed their governments that they would face widespread social unrest and collective violence if they did not represent the interests of the majority. This period of anti-neoliberal social movements is important for developing countries around the world not only because it represented a way to challenge the existing international hegemons, but also because it showed the risks the governments of these countries faced if they put the interests of international economic interests over the interests of their people. Since the fall of these presidents, these countries have experienced economic growth and the standard of living for the most impoverished has drastically increased.²⁷ Although these governments have not been flawless, they have done a better job listening to their people because they fear that if they do not listen to their citizens, instability may return. As neoliberalism has faced increasing challenges around the world in the wake of the international economic crises and the collapse of many European economies, the study of social movements can provide valuable insights into the possible future of the global neoliberal project.

¹ Gaudin 2006, 79.

² Gaudin 2006, 80.

³ Vilas 2006, 245.

⁴ United Nations Human Development Index, Argentina.

⁵ *La Nación* (2012).

⁶ *Global Voices* (2012).

⁷ Silva 2009, 143-144.

⁸ Silva 2009, 145.

⁹ *Reuters* (2010).

¹⁰ *Reuters* (2010).

¹¹ Silva 2009, 191.

¹² Silva 2009, 192-193.

¹³ Silva 2009, 194.

¹⁴ Kennemore and Weeks 2011, 277.

¹⁵ Kennemore and Weeks 2011, 277.

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- ¹⁶ *The Alleged Coup d'état, Democracy, and the Indigenous Organizations*, Marlo Santi, President, CONAIE, 6 October 2010.
- ¹⁷ *Ecuador Times* (2013).
- ¹⁸ *CNN Español* (2012).
- ¹⁹ United Nations Human Development Index, Ecuador.
- ²⁰ Moncada (2013).
- ²¹ Moncada (2013).
- ²² Flores-Macias 2012, 107.
- ²³ Stone (2009).
- ²⁴ Stone (2009).
- ²⁵ Political Terror Scale: Venezuela.
- ²⁶ Gindin 2006, 86.
- ²⁷ United Nations Human Development Index.

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