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### The Conflicts of Euro-Islam: The issues of immigration and integration of Muslims into European Society

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The Conflicts of Euro-Islam:  
The issues of immigration and integration of  
Muslims into European Society

A Senior Thesis Presented by

Shayla Campbell

To the International Studies Department:  
Professor Vijay Prashad

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the major  
in International Studies

May, 2012

## ABSTRACT

Islamophobia is on the rise and is now a sentiment that has transcended almost every European country. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent bombings in Madrid and London, anxiety and fear of the “other” has been heightened. This fear has been harnessed by political parties in many European countries, most notably Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and France. These countries all have supported political parties that have formed an anti-Muslim platform. The main claim is that the “Islamic identity” is incompatible with the “European identity”. Despite these xenophobic attitudes, the immigration population still inhabits European countries and continues to grow. An intense debate has ensued about the immigration and integration policies within many European countries. Immigration policies in general are being reexamined in the rise of this discourse.

My thesis examines the issues and questions surrounding the conflict of foreigners in Europe. Through my research I have found that the issue of Muslim immigrants in Europe is particularly problematic and complex. My paper seeks to outline the immigration and integration policies in Europe and to compare the difference in circumstances in Southern and Northern Europe. I have focused on Spain as a sample country for Southern Europe, and Denmark as a sample country for Northern Europe. While my findings and conclusions are by no means true for all Southern or Northern European countries, there is evidence of general trends for each region. My thesis is framed by this comparison but what it really analyzes is why countries have such a challenge with the successful integration of immigrants. I look towards historical imperial legacies, 20<sup>th</sup> century migration trends, geographical location, the legal systems, and the construction of national identities.

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the academic and moral support of many people. As I reach the culmination of my undergraduate academic career I must share my gratitude for my parents Glenn and Suzi Campbell who have encouraged me to be fearless and curious for nearly twenty-two years. Without the foundation they have provided me I would not be asking the questions about the world that I am today.

Secondly I would like to recognize my advisor of three years and my thesis reader, Professor Vijay Prashad. He has shown me a new lens in which I now look at the world; it is not one of broadly accepted truths but rather a lens of critical examination. He has given me a skill that I do not only apply to my academic endeavors but one that I will use as I leave Trinity College and relate to the world.

I would also like to recognize Professor Janet Bauer, without her patience and compassion I would not have been able to even formulate my thesis statement.

Special thanks also goes to Professor Zayde Antrim who has provided a wealth of information and an extensive understanding of the Islamic civilization which has been a backbone of this research project.

While my learning experience was brief with both Professor Seth Markle and Professor Joaquin Chavez, I am most grateful for their insights and shared knowledge.

I would also like to thank my professors at the Danish Institute for Study Abroad, especially Jakob Lindgaard, for truly introducing me to this topic and presenting it in such a way that has inspired me to work towards a solution.

Lastly, I would like to thank my philosophy Professor, Drew Hyland. Though he may not have taught me about globalization or immigrant integration, he taught me about life and the human condition, which may have been the most valuable lessons I have learned at my time at Trinity College.

## CHAPTER ONE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAM AND EUROPE

### 1.1 Ancient traces of the Euro-Islam Relationship:

Henri Pirenne was a Belgian philosopher who lived from 1862-1935. One of his most interesting works appeared posthumously in 1937, *Mohemet et Charlemagne (Mohammed and Charlemagne)*. The “Pirenne thesis” suggests that the fall of the Roman Empire cannot be attributed to the broadly recognized idea that Germanic tribes triumphed over Constantinople. He asserts that this major shift in Europe was the result of the rise of Islam across North Africa, Spain, and Portugal, which destabilized the Mediterranean Sea and thus weakened the Roman Empire. Accordingly, Pirenne argues that, “without Islam, the Frankish Empire would have probably never existed, and Charlemagne, without Muhammad, would be inconceivable.”<sup>1</sup> Some modern intellectuals reference “Pirenne’s thesis” to illustrate the historically mutual relationship between Europe and Islam because the rule of Charlemagne unified much of Western and Central Europe and provided a foundation of fortitude in future centuries.<sup>2</sup> It is undeniable that European and Islamic nations have been engaged in the historical borrowing of culture, technology, and social constructs. Since the growth of Islam in the 700’s both states have coexisted while inevitable contributing to one another.

An excellent example of this is seen in the founding of the Bayt al hikma in 9<sup>th</sup> century Baghdad by the caliph Al-ma mun. Bayt al hima, or “house of wisdom”

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<sup>1</sup> Conservapedia

<sup>2</sup> Tibi

focused on translating Greek and Indian texts of philosophy, astronomy, medicine, and mathematics. This included the work of Grecian intellectuals such as Aristotle, Plato, Pythagoras, and the Indian intellectual, Chakara. This movement marked a revival of Greek culture and thought. The Islamic civilization was the first to unravel the ways of the Greeks. These transcriptions were later used by Italian academics who transmitted the Arabic text into Italian. Once translated into Italian, the information was accessible throughout Europe and greatly influenced all Western thinkers of the time.<sup>3</sup>

Bassam Tibi believes that neither civilization, Europe and Islam, would be at the capacity they are today without enrichment from the other, but he does not neglect the detrimental aspects of the relationship and references to Jihad conquest, crusades, and the era of colonialism. He sums up the relationship as one of a “century-long mutual “Threat and Fascination””.<sup>4</sup> A captivating observation is that the Golden Age of Islam overlaps with the Dark Ages of Europe.

## 1.2 The Age of Imperialism:

This relationship between Europe and Islam took a sharp turn with the coming of the “Age of Imperialism” and European colonialism. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century mercantilism began to sweep through Africa. Many European nations sought access to and control of foreign markets. A common goal was to circumnavigate the continent of Africa, and along the way many European powers set up ports along the coasts. This planted the seed for the slave trade and ultimately, colonialism.

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<sup>3</sup> Antrim, 10/20/12

<sup>4</sup> Tibi



European colonialism officially began after the Berlin Conference of 1885, which specified the allocation of African lands to different European powers. Great Britain and France were the knights of the colonial era and conquered many African states throughout the continent and extended their imperialistic rule to the East, to include India, Pakistan, Lebanon, among many more.<sup>5</sup> The period of colonialism had momentous effects in the Muslim world. European colonists “re-carved” Arab territories to advance colonial pursuits and to make the regions more governable. Because these new divisions only had European interests in mind, they often exacerbated existing “ethnic, linguistic, and religious tensions as in the case of Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestine, and Malaysia”<sup>6</sup>. To cause further disruption, the colonial commanders commonly eradicated century-old institutions such as the Sharia court of law and the system of waqf. Both were essential pillars of Islamic society but were replaced with Europeanized structures of law and government. It has been suggested that actions such as these, “planted the seeds for future fundamentalist reaction against governments in a number of Islamic countries which, due to the abolition of the Shari‘a courts and the adoption of European legal codes, were now no longer seen as following and implementing Islamic law.”<sup>7</sup>

The era of colonialism is often blamed for the birth of the concept of the “other” that provided the logic behind asserting European power in the global south. As Europeans encountered people and civilizations from other regions they began to develop ideologies and opinions about these people previously unfamiliar to

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<sup>5</sup> Moss

<sup>6</sup> Afsaruddin

<sup>7</sup> Afsaruddin

them. This became a topic of interest to many scientists and intellectuals of the time. New disciplines and sectors of science emerged as people attempted to rationalize and categorize the differences between Europeans and the “others”—Africans, Asians, and Arabs, American Indians, etc. The study of natural history and the “naturalists” began to classify the human and use the term “homo sapiens”. Distinguishing factors in classifying different “types” or “varieties” were not just based on skin color, but also included habits, shape of the head, stature, language, and location of origin, along with many others. Thinkers such as Hume, Bernier, Voltaire, and Gobineau wrote that Africans were inferior to whites from a scientific position, or what is now seen as an early anthropological position. The Age of Exploration gave rise to the term race, racism, and some of its implications in society today. In part, the xenophobic attitude towards Arabs and Muslims seen today in Europe has roots in the ideologies created during this era.

The Age of Imperialism is also responsible for the first wave of substantial immigration into Europe from the Asian and African regions during the decolonization period during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Most countries that had colonies granted access to their ex-colonial subjects as “citizens of the former colonies, with certain sets of rights associated with their status.”<sup>8</sup> The end of colonial rule also caused “several million civil servants who had been working for the colonial administration, as well as soldiers and European settlers, to emigrate from the former colonies.”<sup>9</sup> The sentiment towards the incoming ex-colonials

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<sup>8</sup> Triandafyllidou, Gropas, 376-8

<sup>9</sup> Schmelz

differed in each country and, as expected, some were much more congenial than others. In the case of Dutch colonies, for example Indonesia, all Indonesian's were granted Dutch citizenship and regardless if they immigrated to the Netherlands or not, they were still classified as Dutch citizens. The UK approached the situation with more prudence, which has been attributed to their greater number of former colonial subjects and an undertone of racism. While most colonial powers offered some sense of citizenship or access in the post-colonial period, eventually "the receiving societies tried to minimize and finally end the regulations that gave post-colonial migrants (relatively) easy access to the country."<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps the most consequential wave of migration was the movement of laborers. The flow consisted of a South to North movement of foreign workers to compensate for the post-war labor demands. The Second World War left behind a shortage of domestic labor during the time of European reconstruction and industrial growth, specifically in mining, textiles, and auto industries<sup>11</sup>. Many of the migrants were from the Mediterranean countries, including, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal. Many former colonial powers recruited labor forces from their former colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. Migrants "Immigrants from former colonies were able to take advantage of the open policy towards labor migration and special rights (including in some cases full citizenship rights).<sup>12</sup> In the 1970's industrial growth had become stagnant and processes of deindustrialization reduced the labor market, especially in the fields that provided the low-skilled and

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<sup>10</sup> Van Amersfoort

<sup>11</sup> Van Amersfoort

<sup>12</sup> Triandafyllidou, Gropas, 1

physical jobs held by many migrants. This, combined with the oil crisis, created a precarious economic situation caused a halt in labor recruitment and guest worker programs, and “after 1973, all countries ended or sharply reduced labor migration.”<sup>13</sup>

Guest worker programs were intended to be temporary, with the expectation that men would come to Europe for a few years, make money, save money and then return home. “While many of these immigrant workers indeed returned to their country of origin after some years, a considerable fraction eventually settled in the receiving societies and brought their families over, thereby raising important social and political challenges for integration that EU Member States continue to face today.”<sup>14</sup>

Asylum seekers have also contributed to the immigrant, and specifically Muslim immigrant, populations in Europe today. The 1990’s brought on an asylum crisis in many EU countries that caused an over flow of refugees from North Africa and the Middle East. There has been an attempt by many EU countries to restrict the inflow and aid to refugees, but according to agreements in the Geneva Convention, they are obligated to certain quotas. Asylum seekers have been one of the largest group of Muslim immigrants in the past 20 years.

### 1.3 The Impact of Globalization and the Digital Age:

The processes of globalization in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century have transcended

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<sup>13</sup> Hansen, 26

<sup>14</sup> Triandafyllidou, Gropas, 1

and transformed every aspect of society. While the term globalization has a variety of implications, in the relation to Europe and Islam it can be defined as “process whereby individual lives and local communities are affected by economic and cultural forces that operate worldwide.”<sup>15</sup> Globalization has effectively “divided the world into a ‘center’ (USA) and a ‘periphery’, enabling the former to impose its values on the rest.”<sup>16</sup>

While globalization has injected Western influence into Islamic states, it also has mobilized Muslim ideologies to reach a global scale. According to recent UN statistic, Islam is the world’s second largest religion (21%) and exponentially growing. Since 1989, in Europe Islam has increased 142.35%, and has an average annual growth rate of 6.4%. This is compared to the 1.46% annual growth rate of Christianity. The growing access to technology has contributed to this expansion. This has allowed Muslims who have immigrated to Western countries to remain informed and involved with the Muslim communities in their home countries. Technology has also delivered Muslim ideas and movements into Europe. Many networks have been created that provide a platform for opinions, updates, and collectivity to Muslims abroad. Interconnectedness has increased the capabilities of terrorist organizations through global communication strategies. While globalization has increased the mobility of good, labor, and ideas, it has created an immeasurable degree of boundless information exchange that impacts social and political systems.

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<sup>15</sup> AlSayyad, Castells, 21

<sup>16</sup> Abushouk

## CHAPTER TWO: SPAIN

### 2.1 Immigration & Identity in Spain:

Of all the European countries, Spain arguably has the most intricate relationship to Islam. Al-Andalus was the Muslim territory along the Iberian Peninsula established by the Umayyad caliphate in the 8<sup>th</sup> century. Dr. Ghazanfar describes, the capital city, Cordoba, as “Europe's largest [center]—the city of books, of patrons of great literary figures and of men who were explorers of knowledge. There existed no separation between science, wisdom, and faith; nor was East separated from the West, nor the Muslim from the Jew or the Christian. It was here that the European Renaissance began and flourished beyond.”<sup>17</sup> While there was synergy within the state, on going tensions ensued with Christian kingdoms boarding the north. This led to the eventual decline of the Muslim state in Spain, beginning with the conquering of Toledo in 1085 and the consequent fall of Cordoba in 1236. Despite the elimination of Islamic hegemony in the region, there still are existing vestiges of the Muslim state in Spanish culture and society.<sup>18</sup>

Islamic heritage can be found throughout Spain in both tangible and in tangible ways. Presumably, the province of Andalusia has the most illustrious echoes of Islam in the architecture of many mosques and now-converted churches. Islamic architecture has been key in maintaining the Muslim legacy. With Byzantine and Sassanid influences, it is very striking compared to more traditional European-

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<sup>17</sup> Ghazanfar

<sup>18</sup> Antrim, 11/13/11

styled buildings. Today there are about 200 mosques in Spain, 50 of them in Andalucía, but this is only a fraction of the 1,600 that once stood in Cordoba alone.<sup>19</sup> There are many other Islamic traces in Spain, “From architecture to cuisine to the most common vocabulary — including the ubiquitous *olé*, a distant relative of Allah — the country's Muslim past is deeply woven into its present.”<sup>20</sup> There are many other things within Spanish culture that is reminiscent of the Islamic Golden that that is not even recognized as such because it has become so engrained throughout the centuries.

While Spain has a deeply historical relationship with Islam there have been contemporary developments that have continued to shape the Muslim population in Spain today. Migration in Spain has followed a slightly different model than most of the Northern European countries. Until the 1980's Spain was better characterized as a country of emigration, not immigration. Spain has had a more recent influx of Muslim immigrants, in part due to Spain's economic boom of the 2000's. This led to demands of labor in almost every industry. Though this influx of Muslim immigration occurred almost 50 years later in Spain than it did in Northern European countries (Germany, France, UK) it still follows the trend of immigration driven by labor shortages. “While it is certainly true that Spain is a country of ‘recent’ immigration, it is also a fact that the sheer speed and volume with which migration flows have increased over the past decade have transformed Spain into

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<sup>19</sup> Ghazanfar

<sup>20</sup> Abend

one of the largest receivers of immigrants in the world.”<sup>21</sup> (see Figure 1) The immigrant population “leapt from about 500,000 in the mid-1990s to approximately 5 million by 2009”<sup>22</sup>. Of the 5 million immigrants around 25% are from Muslim countries. While Spain has a very large inflow of Muslim immigrants there are still a number of native Spanish Muslims, second-generation Muslims, and Muslim converts, but still 90% of the Spanish Muslims are foreign nationals. An estimated 1-1.4 million Muslims live in Spain today.<sup>23</sup>




Figure 1<sup>24</sup>. This illustrates the acute increase of migrants into Spain after 2000.

Spain has an issue in finding a balance between regionalism and nationalism and the Spanish constitution seeks to find a hybrid between the two ideologies.

<sup>21</sup> Davis

<sup>22</sup> CRS (2011), 27

<sup>23</sup> CRS (2011), 28

<sup>24</sup> Davis



Plurality in Spain is not a new concept and dates back to the times even before the Umayyad caliphate. Nationalism has not existed in Spain as it has in other European countries such as Italy, Germany, and Denmark (all of which have politically organized behind a nationalist conviction). The greatest expression of Spanish nationalism was embodied by a “climate of national Catholicism that would resist secularization until the 1960’s.”<sup>25</sup> Instead, regional sentiments have proved dominant and have formed distinctive identities around language, territory, social structure, local economies, and overarching culture.

Perhaps the greatest regional sentiment exists in Catalonia. Even though Catalonia is not an independent state, the shared history, identity and culture of the Catalan people brands Catalonia as a nation. While Andalusia is the historical Islamic capital, the Catalanian region has become the core region of the Muslim population today. Barcelona, the capital and largest city in Spain, has a very concentrated Muslim population. While about 70% of Muslims throughout Spain have Moroccan origins<sup>26</sup>, the main Muslim communities in Barcelona have origins in Pakistan. Within the city, there is a particular district, Ciutat Vella, where the Muslim population has settled.<sup>27</sup>

## 2.2 Integration Policy and Policy Making in Spain:

Since the first wave of immigration in Europe in the 1950’s, countries have realized the importance of implementing integration programs. When Spain’s

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<sup>25</sup> Payne, 479

<sup>26</sup> CRS (2011), 28

<sup>27</sup> Enterría

migrant pattern was inverted from the long-standing emigration trend to immigration in the 1970's, there was a need to create legislation regarding the immigration—at that time in Spain there was none. Spain was scheduled to enter the European Community (an early model of the EU) in 1986, and the legislation needed to mirror aspects of other European immigration policies, such as the “German typology”<sup>28</sup>. At this time most of the immigrants were laborers, with the exception of some refugees, so immigration law essentially became labor law. “In 1985, Spain's first law, the *Ley de Extranjería*, or the *Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain*, approached most immigration as temporary phenomenon, and focused primarily on control over migrants already in the country. Immigrants were broadly conceptualized, first and foremost, as workers who required regulation by the Ministry of Labor.”<sup>29</sup>

What resulted was client politics. The state condoned undocumented migration to aid support the certain “business sectors suffering from low productivity and threatened by outside competition. But while tolerated, the 1985 legislation consigned migrant workers to illegality, excluding them from social services and labor protection... Overall then, immigration and integration policies pre-2000 were ‘defined by government officials as a delicate balancing act. They feel that they must maintain enough control over illegal flows to prevent the number of foreigners (especially from Third World countries) from growing too rapidly and provoking a xenophobic backlash, while simultaneously supplying a low-cost labor

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<sup>28</sup> Davis

<sup>29</sup> Perez

force that is adequate to keep the economy growing and attracting foreign investment”<sup>30</sup>

The party division between the Socialist Party and the Partido Popular (PP) began to affect legislation in 2000. The Socialist Party (PECI) and various other parties supported the *Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Integration (Law 4/2000)*. It was monumental for its policy shift that included integration, but more importantly its ideological shift. Not only was there a coalition of parties supporting it (this excluded the Partido Popular) but also it recognized two key aspects of immigration. First, that it was not a temporary labor issue, people were migrating to Spain and staying. Secondly, due to the permanence of the immigrants it focused more broadly on the process of integration.<sup>31</sup> But, upon winning the majority, the PP amended Law 4/2000, criticizing it for its leniency and discord with the rest of the EU’s conservative policies and passed Law 8/2000 which retracted progress made toward integration efforts.

The Partido Popular maintained a similar position in the new 2003 integration, plan called the GRECO plan, that focused on four objectives: 1. Global, coordinated design of immigration as a desirable phenomenon for Spain, as a member of the European Union; 2. Integration of foreign residents and their families as active contributors to the growth of Spain; 3. Admission regulation to ensure peaceful coexistence within Spanish society, and 4. Management of the shelter

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<sup>30</sup> Davis, 7

<sup>31</sup> Perez

scheme for refugees and displaced persons.<sup>32</sup> The GRECO plan was progressive for two reasons and almost was as if the PP was leaning towards a compromise. First, the plan was more stimulating because it provided funding. Second, it recognized the responsibility of *regional* governments in the integration of immigrants. But, GRECO still fell within the PP's restrictive stance. Upwards of 500 million euros were budgeted for the integration portion of the policy, and were used "on operations to enforce border control, the creation of internment centers and asylum processing. In reality, actual integration policies made up only about 10 per cent of the total GRECO budget"<sup>33</sup>. The policy still did not acknowledge the permanence of immigration and still focused on the return to countries of origin.

After the Socialist government came to power in 2004, a new approach to the immigration and integration puzzle emerged. The PEI instated a regularization measure that legalized approximately 700,000 migrants sustaining the 'no integration without legality' approach. The PP and many EU members fiercely criticized this. There may have been altruism in this decree but the additional 118 million euros collected the following year were also agreeable with the new socialist led government.<sup>34</sup> The Socialist party has also created a department within the government exclusively assigned to integration issues. It cites the Spanish Constitution, as well as international human rights laws, and EU stipulations. Perhaps most significant is the departments emphasis on the role of "autonomous communities in integration efforts. To that effect, the Socialist government began

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<sup>32</sup> Perez

<sup>33</sup> Davis, 7

<sup>34</sup> Davis, 10

dispensing money to the autonomous communities towards reception, integration and additional educational funding in 2005.”<sup>35</sup>

### 2.3 A Two-Fold Divide in Spain:

Unfortunately, the two major political parties have been unable to establish solidarity over the issue of immigration and integration. The Partido Popular has maintained a conservative and security-centered ideology in terms of rhetoric “but in terms of application it can be more aptly described as a market-based approach which allowed the incorporation of increasingly large numbers of irregular migrant into the informal economy.”<sup>36</sup> While the Socialist Party granted citizenship to many informal immigrants, the PP would rather maintain their illegal status as to avoid providing the group with welfare services.

As the opposition party, the PP has proposed a new integration policy with strong influences of Sarkozy’s French Immigration and Integration law, under which immigrants must ““obey the laws, to respect Spanish customs, to learn the language, to pay his taxes and to work actively to integrate himself...In return, Spanish society would give the immigrant ‘the same rights and privileges as a Spanish citizen’ and to respect his or her ‘beliefs and customs as long as they are not contrary to any Spanish laws’.”<sup>37</sup>

The Socialist Party tackled the issue very differently. It has adopted a philosophy “inspired by worker and human rights—‘no integration without

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<sup>35</sup> Davis, 11

<sup>36</sup> Davis, 23

<sup>37</sup> Davis, 9

legality”<sup>38</sup> This was best displayed in the massive regularization of 700,000 irregular workers. The PEGI has taken a platform that supports these workers by providing necessary welfare services in exchange for their incorporation into the formal economy. The Socialist Party also has provided more sufficient funding to the autonomous communities to support their integration programs. The one consensus between the two parties is that the autonomous states play a vital role in the integration of their immigrant populations, “based on the territorial organization of the Spanish state, and its political and administrative decentralization.”<sup>39</sup> Despite their reservations in providing funding, the PP is explicit in both 2000 laws and the GRECO plan, “in their recognition that it is the development and implementation of integration policies at the local level that will have the greatest impact on integration”<sup>40</sup> The one area that the two parties can agree on is that immigration controls are within the domain of the national government and integration policies are in the domain of the autonomous regions.

There has been a high degree of dysfunction due to the incoherence between the autonomous regions and the central government in Spain. The policies of immigration and integration are disconnected and have been assigned to different sectors of the state. Historically, the immigration policies were in the hands of the national government and the integration policies were left up to the regional leaders. The set of entry laws were inconsistent with the demands for labor, which caused erratic migrant trends that were resolved by numerous regularization

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<sup>38</sup> Davis, 23

<sup>39</sup> Perez

<sup>40</sup> Perez

programs. (“Between 1985 and 2005, six exceptional regularization processes were implemented in Spain”<sup>41</sup>). “In contrast to entry policies, regularization programs—which, in practice, have been the primary avenue for conferring legal status—have come as the result of bottom-up pressures exerted in great measure by social actors as well as by regional and local governments.”<sup>42</sup>

The autonomous states have little or no control over the entry quotas but are accountable for the integration of large number of migrants, which have caused local plans to “be reactive in nature, focusing on preventing serious problems (marginality, violence, insecurity, exploitation, etc.)”.<sup>43</sup> This has caused regions to default to a ‘bottom-up’ approach and is mainly supported by civil groups. Their efforts can be seen in “policymaking by explicitly demanding that public administrations develop integration schemes” and also by being the “frontline providers of basic services for immigrants since the very beginning of their settlement in Spain during the mid-1980s.”<sup>44</sup> With little or no national guidance and the growing demands of migrants, the autonomous states have fulfilled the void and have developed integration initiatives. “This has resulted in great variety in the form, content, involvement of relevant actors and implementation of local and regional policies. Above all, diversity in policymaking processes has led to considerable inequalities across regions and cities, particularly since more empowered autonomous communities tend to develop their own policies, but

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<sup>41</sup> Bruquetas-Callejo, 17

<sup>42</sup> Bruquetas-Callejo, 23

<sup>43</sup> Bruquetas-Callejo, 24

<sup>44</sup> Bruquetas-Callejo, 25

others do not.”<sup>45</sup> Autonomous states with a strong sense of pride and identity tend to be more structured in general which streams into more structured integration plans. An example of a strong regional community that fervently promoted integration policies is Catalonia, which will be elaborated on in the following section.

This variance between a national perspective and a regional perspective is ingrained in Spanish society has become evident in many ways. The two domains often have different motives and objectives. In terms of the immigration and integration issue, “The two separate spheres follow divergent logics: the national government endeavors to restrict the entrance of migrants, while the autonomous communities and municipalities seek to make irregular migrants visible so as to develop policies that improve their living situation. Although the policy areas operate separately from one other, developments in the sphere of integration are hierarchically determined by those in migration.”<sup>46</sup> The Spanish have tackled a treated the immigration/integration issue as if it were two distinct matters, while in reality the two issues need to be addressed simultaneously; immigration policies need to be created and enforced in tandem with integration policies.

#### 2.4 Catalonia, the pioneer:

Catalonia has a very tumultuous history that can attributed to the regions desire to maintain an independent identity and Spain’s desire to incorporate the

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<sup>45</sup> Bruquetas-Callejo, 23

<sup>46</sup> Bruquetas-Callejo, 19



state into a unified nation. The greatest suppression of Catalonia occurred under the Franco regime. One of the most important characteristics to the region is the Catalan language and this specific issue alone has been a source of huge contention. The early struggles towards Catalonian nationalism has led to a legacy of social activism and the emergence of strong political factions within the region. In fact, social and cultural integration has been a notion in Catalonia since the 1950's.<sup>47</sup> Catalonia spearheaded the integration movement by creating an integration strategy in 1993<sup>48</sup>—years before integration was mentioned in national legislation.

In the 1980's the *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) party, led by President Jordi Pujol, constructed a Catalan national project (*Fer Pais*) that included an integration proposal. *Fer Pais* was “couched in an overtly civic and inclusive language which invited both autochthonous and immigrant communities to take part. This was symbolized by the definition the Catalan government used to define what it was to be Catalan, which ‘is anyone who lives and works in Catalonia, and wants to be Catalan’ (Pujol)”<sup>49</sup>. Assimilation was very important to this approach. As previously mentioned, the Catalan language was a key attribute of society and was the spoken language. Assimilation also stressed the philosophy of equality—equal rights and equal responsibilities. This meant that newcomers had full access to welfare state services and also an effort was made refrain from immigrant-specific services.<sup>50</sup>

This *Fer Pais* sentiment was developed in the 1980's—a very different era of

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<sup>47</sup> Davis, 12

<sup>48</sup> Bruquetas-Callejo, 23

<sup>49</sup> Davis, 12

<sup>50</sup> Davis, 13

migration. “Immigrants in this context refer to any ‘newcomer’ to Catalonia, but in the early days this was more directed to non-Catalan Spanish citizens, as their numbers were far higher than non-Spanish immigrants.”<sup>51</sup> While Pujol’s same philosophy still exists today, the acceptance and actual implications look very different. In reality, the Catalanian government originally created a plan that was geared towards inter-Spain migration. This is not to say that this plan sought to exclude foreigners, but the fact is the foreigner population (which was mainly European) was relatively politically inconsequential. “While the model was always sold as one that did not problematize people as a priori ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’, the line became blurred when applied to Muslim immigrants as opposed to Andalusians.”<sup>52</sup> While the CiU’s 2001 immigration plan has maintained the original philosophy by “underscoring Catalonia’s support of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, right to health care, education, housing, right of association, protest, meeting and labor rights” it also “insisted that ‘foreign citizens’ understand and accept that while Catalonia forms part of the Spanish state, it also constitutes a nation with its own identity”<sup>53</sup>. Despite the recent evolutions of the policy due to new migrant situation, Catalonia is still a paragon for regional integration policies. It has even been argued that the early “national plan showed striking similarities to the former plan in its institutional structure, particularly in terms of instruments promoting interdepartmental cooperation and social participation”<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>51</sup> Davis, 12

<sup>52</sup> Davis, 15

<sup>53</sup> Davis, 14

<sup>54</sup> Bruquetas-Callejo, 21

## 2.5 Post 11-M:

The Muslim population in Spain has already been described as both a historical and contemporary dimension. In 2004, the relationship between Islam and Spain reached a new level. On March 11<sup>th</sup> Muslim extremists killed 192 people and wounded 1,800 by bombing four commuter trains the *Cercanías* transportation system. Muslim extremism, terrorism, jihad, Al Qaeda—these were all phrases that had entered everyday conversations after the World Trade Center attacks of 2001. These phrases were now being applied to Spain as the global community shifted their attention to Europe. The terrorist group responsible for the bombings was linked to an Al Qaeda-affiliated, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. Authorities have been able to issue a profile of those involved in the attacks: “most were first-generation immigrants, and many, but not all, had belonged to jihadist groups well before coming to Spain. A few were well-educated, but most were not, and were employed in construction, small business, and other occupations typical of immigrants in Spain. Some had no jobs, and obtained money through petty theft and other criminal activities. Many were over 30 years old and were married.”<sup>55</sup> Violent extremism is a campaign supported by a minute fraction of the Muslim population in Spain. Experts have estimated that Islamic radicals account for only 300-1,000 of the 1-1.4 million Muslims living in Spain.<sup>56</sup> In response to Muslim extremism and terrorism, Spain has significantly amplified the integration of immigrants and Muslims into society.

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<sup>55</sup> CRS (2011), 27

<sup>56</sup> CRS (2011), 26

While Islamic terrorism has been a prevalent concern in the past decade, Spain has been confronting the threat of domestic terrorism for over 40 years. The ETA (Basque Homeland Freedom) is the armed organization that has led the Basque National Liberation Movement in “a bloody campaign for independence for the seven regions in northern Spain and south-west France that Basque separatists claim as their own.”<sup>57</sup> This movement has killed over 800 people and has catalyzed extensive counter-terrorism legislation and procedures. Through the involvement with the ETA, the Spanish government has become well versed in effective responses to extremism and terrorism.

As previously demonstrated, Spain has had limited success with the creation and promotion of integration policies. The events of March 2004 changed this quickly. Since 2004 the Socialist Party has held power centralized under the Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. Prime Minister Zapatero has emphasized the importance of a stimulated integration program and, “has been careful to note that he does not see a military solution to the problem of terrorism, preferring to focus on law enforcement cooperation and by pursuing an ‘alliance of civilizations’ with the Muslim world.”<sup>58</sup> The government has pursued efforts that simultaneously promote immigrant integration and counters Muslim extremism. This follows the logic that if Muslims are being actively integrated and included in society, they are less likely to be drawn to marginalized groups, such as Islamic Extremists.

Zapatero and the Socialist Party have instated drastic policy changes to the

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<sup>57</sup> BBC

<sup>58</sup> CRS (2005), 39

Partido Popular rule. As previously mentioned, one of the highest contested policies was the legalization of many illegal laborers. In terms of security and integration the government sees the inclusion of immigrants into a legal framework very important. The documentation of citizens is seen as an imperative counter-terrorism tactic. There has also been a substantial expansion of government factions working exclusively with immigration and integration, as well as budget increases for these kinds of programs. "Over the period 2007-2010, the Ministry's Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration was allocated about €2 billion (approximately \$2.64 billion) for programs related to immigrant education, employment, housing, social services, health, women, and youth."<sup>59</sup> Examples of other government-sponsored initiatives include a 'Permanent Immigration Observatory', which monitors and analyzes the temperament of immigrant communities and generates policy suggestions, and also a 'Foundation for Pluralism and Co-Existence' which "promotes societal dialogue and recognition of minority religious groups in Spain (Muslims, Jews, and Protestants), and funds selected integration projects".<sup>60</sup> Another very crucial development was the conglomeration of the two major Muslim associations in Spain (FEERI and UCIDE) into a single political liaison, the Spanish Islamic Commission (CIE). The CIE is constantly under criticism for its insufficient representation of Spanish Muslims and some of these unsatisfied communities have proceeded to "create their own federations, some of them with a marked regional character"<sup>61</sup>. Despite the lack of centrality of these smaller federations, this

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<sup>59</sup> CRS (2011), 29

<sup>60</sup> CRS (2011), 29

<sup>61</sup> Bravo

movement shows that the Muslim community seeks formal partnerships with the Spanish government.

Another significant issue that needed to be addressed after the 2004 attacks was the number of ‘informal’ mosques. Spain has a relatively small number of mosques for the large Muslim population. This revealed that many Muslims worship in informal, unmarked prayer rooms, sometimes referred to as ‘garage mosques’.<sup>62</sup> “Experts estimate that there are hundreds of such ‘garage mosques’, headed by imams whose professional qualifications and political ideologies are unknown. Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid Farkhet, a key figure in the March 11 attacks, led prayers at one of these informal prayer rooms. These characteristics have made it difficult for Spanish authorities to monitor Muslim places of worship for jihadist supporters.”<sup>63</sup> Almost immediately following the attacks, measures were taken that would boost the cooperation between the State and the Muslim community. Because registration of religious institutions with the state is not mandatory the government (specifically, the Registry of Religious Entities at the Ministry of Justice) was limited in providing accurate information about mosques, their location, and affiliation. This has been a project of the newly established ‘Foundation for Pluralism and Co-Existence’. “In order to encourage the inscription of mosques and religious associations in the Registry, the Government initiated a policy of funding projects made by religious communities.”<sup>64</sup> This is a perfect example of the dual approach that encourages Muslim inclusion and also helps to monitor and curb extremism.

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<sup>62</sup> CRS (2011), 29

<sup>63</sup> CRS (2005), 41

<sup>64</sup> Bravo

## 2.6 Conclusion about Spain:

Integration in Spain was viewed as a relatively inconsequential issue until recently. Even today, despite an intense increase in policy making, Spain lacks a coherent model of integration. The discord between the two widely supported political parties, and the constant struggle between regionalism and nationalism as made it difficult for newcomers to Spain to grasp what their duty is in terms of integrating themselves. In lieu of a national framework for integration, regional policies have emerged but fluctuate depending on the nature of the autonomous state. Catalonia has prevailed as a strong promoter of integration policies that have influenced other regional plans as well as early national plans.

It was the tragic events of the March 2004 Madrid bombings that finally provoked a development of proactive integration policy. In the past, the programs have mostly been reactive on the side of the regional governments responding to the disassociated national immigration systems. While post-2004 legislation has been mainly a response to the Islamic extremism of a small percentage of Muslim immigrants, the legislation does not frame the integration applied exclusively to the Muslim community. "Given that most immigrants to Spain are from Latin America, some assert that the issue is across-the-board 'immigration and integration' rather than 'Muslim immigration' or 'Muslim integration'."<sup>65</sup> The insufficiency of the Spanish integration model reflects Spain's identity issue and complicates the character in which immigrants are supposed to relate to as a national archetype.

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<sup>65</sup> CRS (2011), 28

## CHAPTER THREE: DENMARK

### 3.1 Immigration into Denmark:

19<sup>th</sup> century Danish nationalism established a strong sense of Danish identity within the relatively homogenous population of a mere 5.5 million. Denmark has hardly been considered a country of mass migration and historically experienced low immigration flows often from other Nordic and Western nations. However, since the 1970's the status quo has been challenged by a growing number of immigrant's mainly from Asian and African countries. This changeover began with the guest worker program, the consequential family reunification, and finally humanitarian migration and asylum seekers. "Today, non-naturalized immigrants and their descendants constitute six percent of the Danish population, whereas in 1980 they made up just one percent."<sup>66</sup> This acute increase of immigrants has created a heightened awareness of foreigners in Denmark. The solidarity of the welfare state seems to be threatened by the apparent inconsistencies between the Danes and the newcomers.

Compared to many other Northern European countries, Denmark has a rather mild colonial legacy. The first colony to be claimed by Denmark was in modern-day Estonia in the 13<sup>th</sup> century. Perhaps the most significant colonial territory was to the North when the Danish-Norwegian union took holdings of Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland. This has been one of the more significant colonial conquests because it still has prominent effects in both Denmark and

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<sup>66</sup> Hedetoft



Greenland today. In terms of the general trend of colonialism, Denmark set up various trade posts along Africa's Gold Coast, especially in present day Ghana, but mercantilism was the extent of a Danish imperial presence in Africa. Before the commencement of the Berlin Conference, Denmark had sold the majority of their trade posts to Great Britain and France. Denmark also had trade posts in India, and for a limited time had two small colonies. These, too, were sold off before the surge of colonial expansion.<sup>67</sup> For the most part Denmark was disassociated from many aspects of the 'Age of Imperialism' and thus, Denmark had no colonial subjects to whom they owed a degree of citizenship, economic support, or aid for development and modernization. This sets Denmark apart from countries like Great Britain and France, who also have a disputed discourse with foreigners, and especially Muslims.

Denmark sidestepped the first significant wave of immigration that occurred in Europe during the period of decolonization because, as just mentioned, they had no significant colonies. However, Denmark was involved in the second large wave of migration into Europe—labor migration. Like most of Northern Europe, Denmark experienced an economic boom in the 1960's and had a demand for labor that could not be fulfilled domestically. "From 1967 to 1970, around 18,000 foreign workers came to Denmark, primarily from Turkey, but also from Yugoslavia and Pakistan."<sup>68</sup> Denmark had a relatively brief guest worker program. In alignment with many other European countries, after to the oil shock crisis Denmark implemented a ban on labor-driven immigration in 1973. At this time there were approximately 22,000

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<sup>67</sup> New World Encyclopedia

<sup>68</sup> Jensen

immigrants living in Denmark. While labor-based immigration was suppressed, foreign workers in Denmark were allowed to reunite with their families, which prompted a low, but constant, flow of immigration through the 1970's. By 1981, the number of foreign workers and their relatives increased to 30,000.<sup>69</sup>

Denmark has recognized asylum seekers and accepted refugees throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The World Wars caused the first flow of refugees. Many eastern Europeans, Jews, and Germans, found refuge in Denmark. At this time many refugees integrated into Danish society smoothly. This seems to be attributed to cultural and religious similarities. A second wave of refugees was from Cold War conflict regions such as Vietnam and Chile, but the number of asylum seekers was relatively low until the Middle Eastern conflicts that began in the 1980's. Between 1956 and 1984 a total of 12,500 refugees migrated to Denmark. Comparatively, between 1984 and 1997 more than 73,000 refugees migrated to Denmark.<sup>70</sup> During the 80's refugees were generally from Iran, Iraq, Gaza, and the West Bank and the 90's brought refugees from Somalia and Bosnia.<sup>71</sup> The high volume of humanitarian immigration beginning in the mid-1980's is what really tipped the scale. Previously, most newcomers were from the EU or other western countries. These new refugees dramatically increased the population of those with "difference" or "otherness" within Denmark. Denmark in the 1990's faced the reality of a mixed population, new ethnicities, religions, customs, and social norms. In response to the obvious population transformation, the 1990's began a period aggressive reform.

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<sup>69</sup> Jensen

<sup>70</sup> Jensen

<sup>71</sup> Helqvist & Sebian

### 3.2 Immigration Policy Reform:

While the migrant population grew, so did the concern over the issue. From 1985 to 2000 the total number of foreign citizens in Denmark increased from 2% to 5%, which accounts of a quarter million people.<sup>72</sup> Compared to other neighboring European countries this figure is low, for example Germany's foreign population is 9%, and Sweden 6%.<sup>73</sup> The German population is 81 million, while the Danish population is only 5.8 million, thus Denmark has been hypersensitive to a change such as this one. Considerable attention was drawn to this issue by citizens, politicians, and the media. The political solution was two pronged; first, immigration laws were tightened and second, the integration policies were restructured. Through this new political agenda, a "more restrictive migration policy was introduced, addressing what in Danish context was defined as 'the failure of migration and integration policy', as a majority of the migrant population remains on social welfare, lacking the necessary structural possibilities to integrate into Danish society."<sup>74</sup> Denmark sees migration and integration as intertwined issues that need synchronized agendas in order to be effective.

The momentum of this issue grew significantly with the founding of the Danish People's Party (also known as Dansk Folkeparti, DF) in 1995. The Danish Peoples Party completely changed the state of affairs in Denmark. The DF's position is that Denmark has been too openhanded in terms of granting asylum and family reunification, and providing welfare services for newcomers. The party's platform is

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<sup>72</sup> Jensen

<sup>73</sup> Østergaard-Nielsen, 450

<sup>74</sup> Roskilde University

based on the preservation of the heritage of the Danish people, which is comprised by the monarchy, the Church of Denmark, the strong welfare system that promotes education and entrepreneurship, and the family. They also feel that in order to maintain their “Danish-ness”, strict criteria must be enforced that discourages non-Western immigration. In 2002, the DF said, “Denmark is not a country open for immigration, and the DF will not accept that Denmark develops into a multi-ethnic society”<sup>75</sup> The concept of multiculturalism is no longer an accepted method of integration, rather the DF insists that cultural assimilation is the only appropriate means of integration for admitted immigrants. “The leitmotif of the Danish People’s Party is a ‘Denmark for Danes’ policy, that is, an almost communitarian approach to policy making.”<sup>76</sup> One of the key tools that the DF uses to appeal to the Danes is drawing attention to the claim of a strong Danish identity. According to the Danish People’s Party, immigrants are threatening the Danish identity and the vitality of the welfare state and something must be done about it. “The DPP is led by Pia Kjaersgaard, a former social worker in an old people’s home. ‘We founded the party because of too many immigrants,’ she says... Denmark’s Muslim population are the party’s particular focus. There are many Muslims, it [the DF] says, who are unwilling to integrate and hostile to “Danish values” such as free speech.”<sup>77</sup>

The immigration and integration debate in Denmark became vehement in the November 2001 elections that coincidentally followed the 9/11 attacks. As soon as the Danish People’s Party emerged, the press played a big role and instigated the

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<sup>75</sup> Østergaard-Nielsen, 449

<sup>76</sup> Østergaard-Nielsen, 449

<sup>77</sup> Bolwby

issue. “The Danish press repeatedly used the ‘pressure cooker’ metaphor to explain how the lid had come off and allowed apparently very strong feelings to take center stage in migrant-related political debates.”<sup>78</sup> As soon as the DF took a staunchly conservative position and made it the focal point of their campaign, the opposition parties had no choice but to mobilize a competing position incorporate it into their platforms. The issue was politicized and helped the DF gain considerable support. They reveled in a notable victory that increased their constituency from 7% in 1998, to 12% in 2001. This made the DF the third largest party in Danish Parliament.<sup>79</sup> National support for the DF has caused an international reaction that has labeled Denmark as racist and xenophobic. Further, the new stricter immigration laws have been accused of breaching human rights. One contested law regards family reunification through marriage. There has been an age requirement of 24 years old of both persons in order to be married. There also was a point system implemented that was designed to hinder immigrants receiving citizenship through marriage. These new pieces of legislation are just two of the efforts of the DF to restrict immigration. The DF has been highly criticized by left-wing Danish Parties, many EU countries, and by the international community in general.

It has been argued that the success of the Danish People’s Party is an indicator of a trend of dissatisfaction with the integration of immigrants that existed in Danish Society prior to 1995. The support of the Danish People’s Party is also coupled “by a large part of the Danish electorate [that] felt the formulation of a real

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<sup>78</sup> Østergaard-Nielsen, 448

<sup>79</sup> Østergaard-Nielsen, 449

migrant incorporation policy had been too long in the making. Admittedly, policymakers have shrugged off the issue of migrant integration as something that would solve itself because Denmark was a particularly open and tolerant country with a long standing international reputation of humanism.”<sup>80</sup> For the past two decades the Danish integration policy has been framed by multiculturalism. The majority of Danes, politicians and citizens, have recognized major flaws and a general failure of the multicultural approach to migrant integration. This has been attributed to the claim that multiculturalism undermines national social cohesion and, in turn, compromises cultural values.

### 3.3 The Construction of the Danish Identity:

The construction of the Danish identity, while extremely historical, has been amplified in recent years. The recent influx of immigrants has precipitated a strong reaction in Denmark. It seems as though the anxiety around the growing foreign population is fueled by fear of the Danish identity being diminished or even lost altogether. This, in part, can explain the xenophobic propensities that have emerged in Denmark. The Danish identity is closely tied to the welfare state, the Danish language, and the social cohesion of the society. These factors have not been exclusively threatened by the increase of foreigners, but more broadly by the consequences of globalization.

The Danish national identity is a social construct that has been brewed overtime but has had a persistent egalitarian undertone. A historical memory

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<sup>80</sup> Østergaard-Nielsen, 449

reflected on with pride is the Battle of Dybbøl. This was a battle fought during the Second Schleswig War with Germany over the greatly disputed region of Southern Jutland in 1864. While the Germans conquered the Danes in this battle, the defeat helped forge the national identity. The Danes have commemorated this day, April 18<sup>th</sup>, and celebrate a war in which they lost. What they celebrate is the elimination of all German speaking regions of the Danish Monarchy and the resilience of the soldiers who fought an unwinnable battle in the name of their Danish identity and pride. The annual tribute portrays that Danes are willing to sacrifice in order to maintain their sovereignty and selfhood. The loss of this war also germinated the nationalist renaissance.

After Denmark lost the Second Schleswig War, they shifted their focus under the motto “what is outwardly lost is inwardly won.”<sup>81</sup> The period following the war can be categorized as resurgence in nationalism. N.F.S. Grundtvig was a very prominent figure in this movement. He was, among many things, most prominently the leader of the Danish education reform and founder of folk high schools—‘folkelig højskole’, loosely interpreted as ‘a school that would be of and for the people’.<sup>82</sup> “His vision was to create a unique school that would serve Danish people of all social standings, especially the farmers...and would give dignity to each person who attended. He wanted to awaken in each person a pride in Danish culture, and a love of learning that would continue for the person's entire life.”<sup>83</sup> The folk high school system is still very prominent in Denmark today and still upholds Grundtvig’s

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<sup>81</sup> Jensen

<sup>82</sup> Valvo

<sup>83</sup> Valvo

vision. In modern day Denmark, many young people still attend folk high schools. During my time studying in Copenhagen, I had an opportunity to visit a folk high school where some of my fellow American students had housing. Folk high schools are often situated outside of cities in more of suburban environments. In addition to dorm style living, students eat together at set meal times and share cooking and cleaning responsibilities. There are a number of intramural activities that are often mandatory to preserve the cooperative spirit. In my opinion, folk high schools have a role in the larger “Danish picture”. This type of communal and cooperative living is engrained in many young Danes during very formative years of their life. While there are a few exceptions, the opportunities for non-Danes to live in folk high schools is limited and therefore many young foreigners will never have the same cooperative foundation as young Danes.

Folk high schools represent a microcosm of the larger Danish welfare state. The philosophy behind the welfare state is not a new one and for the most part emerged out of the cooperative movement in Denmark in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the same movement that gave birth to folk high schools. The cooperative movement was very closely linked to the modernization and growth of the agricultural industry in Denmark. Cooperatives initially only included dairy farmers but soon grew to almost every agricultural field. “Regardless of the size of a particular farm, all farmers had only one vote at the general meetings—making the co-operative movement a shining example of Democracy at work”<sup>84</sup>. This agricultural cooperative is representative of two important current trends. Firstly, the egalitarian approach

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<sup>84</sup> Jensen



to industry has proved successful as seen through the excessive agricultural exportations; Denmark produces food to supply three times their population.<sup>85</sup> Secondly, “The egalitarian attitude seen here in the co-operative movement is very much a part of the Danish national identity which rests on a firm belief that no one is better or more deserving than anyone else.”<sup>86</sup>

All “western” countries are welfare states to some degree. “There is a wide range of mixtures of arrangements for securing the weak citizens a minimal amount for their necessities. The weak inhabitants can be taken care of by the state, the local authorities, the family, labor market organizations, charity organizations, ecclesiastical institutions, private insurance etc.”<sup>87</sup> The Danish welfare state is considered “big” because of the many services provided, for free, by the state. Danes have the right to free public health, education, pensions, childcare, and job training. The robust system is fueled by relatively high taxes (at an average income tax of at least 50%). When comparing it to other nations (see Figure 2), Denmark has mastered the welfare state model. Despite the high taxes, Denmark has still managed to have the lowest unemployment rate and the highest average per-capita income.<sup>88</sup> Denmark has also stood out in more ways than just the economic realm. Denmark has been coined “the happiest country in the world”, with all the other Scandinavian countries following close behind. A scientist who developed the poll commented, “The Scandinavian countries do really well. One theory why is that they

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<sup>85</sup> Encyclopedia of the Nations

<sup>86</sup> Jensen

<sup>87</sup> Kærgård, 2

<sup>88</sup> Stinson

have their basic needs taken care of to a higher degree than other countries. When we look at all the data, those basic needs explain the relationship between income and well-being."<sup>89</sup> There seems to be a correlation to strong welfare systems and general happiness among citizens.

How Denmark, other nations compare

	Denmark	France	Germany	Italy	U.K.	USA
<b>Total area (sq. mi.)</b>	26,777	399,806	221,842	187,175	152,124	3.7 million
<b>Population</b>	5.5 million	62.8 million	82.4 million	58.1 million	60.6 million	300 million
<b>Major religions</b>	Evangelical Lutheran, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Muslim	Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim	Protestant, Roman Catholic, Muslim	Roman Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim	Anglican, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist, Muslim, Hindu	Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, Jewish, Muslim
<b>Major languages</b>	Danish, Faroese, Greenlandic, German, English	French	German	Italian, German, French, Slovene	English, Welsh, Gaelic	English, Spanish
<b>GDP</b>	\$256.3 billion	\$2.2 trillion	\$2.9 trillion	\$1.8 trillion	\$2.3 trillion	\$13.2 trillion
<b>Average per-capita income</b>	\$47,390	\$34,810	\$34,580	\$30,010	\$37,600	\$43,740
<b>Unemployment rate</b>	4.5%	9.1%	7.1%	7.0%	5.4%	4.6%
<b>Taxes (% of GDP)</b>	NA	22.7%	11.0%	21.3%	28.3%	11.2%
<b>Government budget balances</b>						
<b>Revenue</b>	\$147.0 billion	\$1.2 trillion	\$1.3 trillion	\$832.9 billion	\$973 billion	\$2.4 trillion
<b>Expenditures</b>	\$138.9 billion, including capital expenditures of \$4.6 billion	\$1.2 trillion	\$1.3 trillion	\$925 billion	\$1.0 trillion	\$2.7 trillion <sup>2</sup>
<b>Debt (% of GDP<sup>1</sup>)</b>	28.6%	64.7%	66.8%	107.8%	42.2%	64.7%

1 = 2005 results; 2 = includes capital expenditures Sources: World Bank, CIA World Fact Book (2006 estimates)

Figure 2<sup>90</sup>

The Danish welfare system has been accepted as an anomaly. The obvious question has been raised: why has it worked so well? The most prevailing answer is that the “welfare state was designed on the basis of a culturally similar citizenry, and the Danish economy has successfully adapted to a variety of international challenges by

<sup>89</sup> Levy

<sup>90</sup> Stinson

taking advantage of institutions built around a powerful sense of civic solidarity.”<sup>91</sup> It is commonly contended that the success of the welfare state is attributed to the homogeneity that has defined Danish cultural, language, morals, religion, ethnicity, and familial tendencies.

The Danish identity, when defined by “homogeneity and equality, have come to be seen as obstacles to integration. Immigrants are now seen as an unwelcome presence because cultural assimilation has been more difficult than originally expected.”<sup>92</sup> While there is an obvious historical context to the strong identity, the sense of nationalism has been enhanced within Denmark in recent years. This has resulted in a hardening of the Danish identity, which has proven to create an even larger obstacle for integration. As previously mentioned, the Danish identity is one of the strongest weapons of the DF and they often exploit it to invoke their constituents.

#### 3.4 The Social and Economic Standing of Immigrants:

The shortfall of immigrant integration has had various consequences in Denmark. “Issue of migrant ‘otherness’ and ‘compatibility’ loom large in Danish migrant discourse, but a more important factor is, as formulated by one Danish researcher, that there is ‘money between Danes and immigrants’”.<sup>93</sup> What seems to be a changing trend is that migrants are no longer accused of taking jobs away from Danes, but rather not working at all. This is been attributed to a serious lapse in the

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<sup>91</sup> Hedetoft

<sup>92</sup> Hedetoft

<sup>93</sup> Østergaard-Nielsen, 451

Danish integration policy, “When immigration to Denmark increased in the 1990’s it was left to the social security system to sort out the issues. Migrant integration policy became social policy, and migrants became clients in the Danish welfare system.”<sup>94</sup> In some cases, the generous welfare system has blocked the incentive for immigrants to take lower paying jobs, because, often, more can be gained from collecting unemployment than working a low-skilled job. This lack of involvement in the workplace hinders migrant integration even more.

Unlike some Southern European countries that have experienced a more recent influx of immigration, Denmark’s immigrant population is mostly second-generation. Thus, satellite cities, or ghettos, have emerged and immigrants have established themselves outside of Danish society. Communities have recreated aspects of their countries of origin (for example ‘bazaars’) within Denmark that conflict with what is considered “Danish”. Many of these communities have become fully self-sufficient, in the sense that they do not need to leave them in order to survive. Satellite markets, schools, places of worship, and community organizations now exist that are often exclusively used by first or second-generation immigrants. The immigrants did not intentionally create these external communities; they were a result of a shortfall in integration.

In 1999 a new law was passed that delegated the responsibilities of integration to municipalities. According to the ‘Ministry of Immigrants, Refugees, and Integration’, municipalities have been given the task to “secure the related

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<sup>94</sup> Østergaard-Nielsen, 451

religious and cultural life on equal footing with other citizens and to contribute to newly arrived foreigners quickly becoming self-supporting and acquiring an understanding of Danish society's fundamental values and norms.”<sup>95</sup> Two aspects of this goal have been highlighted as critical. First, is being part of a *Danish* community. “Ghettos of any kind are by definition against the Danish self-perception of a cohesive community.”<sup>96</sup> Secondly, immigrants must be encouraged to immediately participate in the collective community, that is they must adopt the egalitarian ideal. A popular slogan has become: “*yde for man kan nyde*” —“you have to contribute before you can enjoy”.<sup>97</sup>

### 3.5 The Danish Cartoon Fiasco:

In September 2005 the Danish Newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published a series of editorial cartoons that depicted the prophet Muhammad, the most important figure of the Muslim religion. This immediately was protested by Muslims throughout the Islamic world and escalated to violence and death threats towards the artist, Kurt Westergaards, who created a particularly controversial image dubbed ‘the bomb in the turban cartoon’. Despite the uproar and demand of an apology, the *Jyllands-Posten* refused to retract the cartoons and in fact defended them. The cultural editor for the newspaper, Flemming Rose, published an article in the *Washington Post* commenting on the issue in February 2006:

“The modern, secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They demand a special position, insisting on special consideration of their own religious

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<sup>95</sup> Østergaard-Nielsen, 452

<sup>96</sup> Østergaard-Nielsen, 452

<sup>97</sup> Østergaard-Nielsen, 452

feelings. It is incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of speech, where one must be ready to put up with insults, mockery and ridicule...The cartoonists treated Islam the same way they treat Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and other religions. And by treating Muslims in Denmark as equals they made a point: We are integrating you into the Danish tradition of satire because you are part of our society, not strangers. The cartoons are including, rather than excluding, Muslims.”<sup>98</sup>

In defense of the cartoons, Rose contends that this kind of mockery has at some point targeted many other demographic groups and by excluding Muslims only enhances their “difference”. This outlook on the situation does not necessarily consider the fact that Muslims are *already* separated from society and their difference is apparent. Critics of the cartoons have labeled them xenophobic and representative of the racism towards the Danish minority. After much delay, in 2010 the *Jyllands-Posten* issued an apology to anyone they may have offended by the publishing of the cartoons but the crisis has ensued. There has been an assassination attempt of Kurt Westergaard and an attempted bombing of the *Jyllands-Posten* offices in Copenhagen. To this day, Danish Muslims remain bitter about the publication of contemptuous depiction of Muhammad and Danes remain defensive of the rights to free speech.

### 3.6 Conclusion on Denmark:

Denmark has been unable to successfully integrate immigrants into society to the degree in which both parties are satisfied. The fortitude of the Danish identity has been recognized as an inhibitor of integration. The Danish identity is not necessarily defined by specific attributes, but rather it has a historical context of

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<sup>98</sup> Rose

communitarianism that is impossible for a newcomer to immediately relate to. Homogeneity and equality are seen to be the fixatives of the Danish identity. These aspects went virtually unchallenged until the influx of immigrants in the 1970's. The acute increase of Middle Eastern migrants in the 1990's instilled a sense of anxiety and fear of losing the solidarity of Danish society. For some Danes there are ineluctable differences between the native Danish population and the recent newcomers. These societal inconsistencies include language, ethnicity, morals, and religion. In the past decade religion has become the paramount issue that is associated with the immigration debate.

Political and social factions have emerged to combat this reordering of Danish society. The Danish People's Party has established themselves as anti-immigration agency and has gone so far as to explicitly classify Muslims in Denmark as particularly problematic. Despite claims of racism and xenophobia, the DF has gained a lot of support in recent years and has been in a position of power and influence in parliament. Immigration and integration are seen as dually important issues and are both seen as integral parts to a solution. In the past decade the approach has been to limit immigration and enhance integration. The immigration policies have been tightened and are now some of the strictest in Europe. The integration policies have transformed from a multicultural framework to assimilation based policies. Danes have been relatively clear in that they are not interested in Denmark becoming a multi-ethnic, multi-religion, multicultural nation. What this has resulted in is the formation of satellite communities that are commonly denoted as ghettos. This has exacerbated the issue of integration.

## CHAPTER 4: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Through the observations of the immigration narratives throughout Europe, connections and general trends can be made identified. A nations colonial involvement has more of an impact in modern society than is often recognized. Nations with a colonial past have had cultural and economic engagements with the Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and other colonized regions. Regions that were colonized often were inhabited by a number of European citizens from the patriarchal countries. These citizens were exposed to “exotic” and unknown cultural customs, religions, ethnicities, languages, fashions, and the list could go on. Europeans would travel to and from the colonies bringing with them accounts and artifacts that were intriguing. Eventually, the Europeans became accustomed to these notions of the colonies and, in a sense, the culture of the colonies had a place in European society. The period of decolonization, though, had a much more significant effect. Former colonial subjects were often granted some degree of citizenship in the country of the colonial power. European nations not only had the cultural influence of the colonies but the populations to match. Some countries even “welcomed” former colonials but this sentiment was most likely insincere and provoked by “colonial guilt”.

The Spanish empire extended their influence through territories along the Ivory coast, in North Africa, across the Middle East, and all the way out to the East Indies beginning in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, but by the time of decolonization in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, Spain had few colonies left. Thus, Spain’s “colonial guilt” is not as prominent as countries such as Belgium or Great Britain. Despite Spain’s absence in



the later colonial period, there was a great deal of cultural accumulation that has contributed to the Spanish cultural identity as still exists today. Further, based on Spain's geographical location there has been more exposure to these African and Middle Eastern regions. What resulted was an overlap, or spill over, of certain aspects such language, architecture, and religion. These kinds of cultural contributions are true for many Southern European countries, such as Italy and Greece.

Denmark on the other hand, had a very small colonial legacy compared to other European nations. This is very telling of the homogeneity and uniqueness of culture and identity in Denmark. Danes did not go and resettle in Africa and return home to share their experience. Denmark has no colonial guilt; they do not feel as if they "owe" anyone a piece of their society. The lack of a colonial past in Denmark, and in fact throughout Scandinavia, has largely contributed to a notion of cultural and social exclusion that has become evident in their parts of their societies. Further, Denmark does not have the geographical circumstances of many Southern European countries that have exposed the nations to unconventional cultural experiences. These cultural attributes tend to be much more "exotic" than in South Europe, especially if a nation had no exposure through colonialism.

Another important factor that contributes to a countries integration model is the age of the immigration movement into the country. Northern Europe experienced an economic boom in the 1960's that brought a significant amount of laborers and immigrants. Following this labor migration, family reunification

contributed greatly to the foreigner population. Countries, such as Denmark, that started immigration in the 1960's are now dealing with a second generation of immigrants. This means immigrants have had time to establish themselves within or outside of society. The longevity of this issue has caused various outcomes. One consequence is the formation of satellite cities. Within these satellite cities informal economies, informal places of worship, and informal educational institutions have been established. A positive implication of second-generation immigrants is that some have been very successful in establishing themselves within the Danish society. This includes holding political positions, positions in higher education, and managerial positions in prominent firms. There also has been discourse addressing the immigration and integration for close to 20 years now. Legislation has been passed and revised multiple times as a solution is sought out. Countries that have second-generation immigrants are much more adept in the discourse immigration and integration policies, but this does not mean that they have created more effective policies.

Denmark fits this mold in most respects as it is has been a country active of immigration for over 35 years. Spain, on the other hand, experienced an economic boom in the 2000's, which has caused the majority of the migrant population in Spain to be fairly new, and mostly first-generation. Because of this, many of the aspects mentioned in the above paragraph do not apply to Spain and other countries with a majority of first- generation immigrants. While immigrant *communities* have been established (many prominent examples can be seen in Barcelona) they are not necessarily considered satellite cities. There also has been less of a chance for

immigrants, especially migrant workers, to establish themselves in elite circles of society.

Spain has not developed coherent migration and integration policies and to this day there is still a lot of confusion and inconsistencies within the system. There are many structural differences between countries that have first-generation and second-generation foreigners, but the line can't necessarily be drawn north and south in Europe. What can be deduced is that countries that experienced an economic boom in the post-war period tend to have more second-generation foreigners than those countries that did not.

While both Spain and Denmark are "constitutional monarchies" the true projections of their government and political systems are very different. As explained, Denmark has a very strong welfare system and is socialist in some ways. They have a functioning democracy and a strong sense of pride towards their royal family. The parliament has an assortment of parties, many of which have contrasting views, especially in the context of the immigration debate. Denmark's divide on the issue remains within the Parliament. While the emergence of the Danish People's Party has bisected the Parliament, there was never a failure to draft legislation and closely monitor the progression and changes of the integration issue.

Spain has a centralized national government and is divided into autonomous states, all which have their own parliament and regional government. In some cases there is a remarkable chasm national government and the autonomous states, which has hindered the effectuation of a sound integration policy. The issue of immigration

is in the hands of the national government. They have the sole power to set and adjust immigration laws and regulations. The issue of integration has been delegated to the autonomous communities. It is apparent that the processes of immigration and integration are reliant on each other and, further, successful integration of foreigners is nearly impossible without a corresponding immigration structure. In Spain, the integration policies have generally been reactive and are guided by the immigration policies. The Spanish national government has constantly adjusted immigration policies to cater to the changing needs in labor, and in turn the states have constantly adjusted integration policies to cater to the changing number of migrants.

While all the above-mentioned aspects have considerable gravity, there is one other feature that seems to have the most weight in determining immigration and integration affairs. The sense of national identity is perhaps the most important indicator. The different structures of governance and leadership are truly representative of the nation's conception of their national identity. It is difficult to say which is a function of which. Is the fragmented government in Spain a result of strong identities of the autonomous states, or have the states developed strong regional identities because of a lack of a national identity? In Denmark it seems like the national identity is consistent with the strong political foundation of the welfare state. Is it possible that importance of the welfare state has been emphasized within the immigration and integration debate and has potentially depicted the national identity to be more predominant than it actually is? The key question about the Danish identity is if it has been created on the foundation of Danish heritage and

inflated by the deeply rooted homogeneity of the country, or has the identity been mostly fabricated as a means of comparison to the ‘newcomer’ or ‘other’.

The largest impediment in my research was commenting on integration through the lens of lived experience. Obviously, each individual will have their own account and opinion about how open the country is to the integration of newcomers. I had to keep in mind that each account was from the view point of one individual with their own personal history that effected their opinion. While reading many of these kinds of reports was insightful, I was unable to use them as fact and used them more to understand the general essence of the situation. This is why is examining this issue from the policy angle was most effective. To fill in for the commentary on the lived experience I used information from certain studies and institutions that have had the opportunity to conduct very extensive research on the effectiveness of these integration policies based off of the lived experience of migrants. The Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), first established in 2004, is an “on-going monitoring and assessment tool”<sup>99</sup> that has studied and evaluated 31 countries in many main aspects of integration. MIPEX scores and ranks countries on their overall integration by focusing on 7 key strands: Anti-discrimination, Access To Nationality, Long Term Residence, Political Participation, Education, Family Reunion, and Labor Market Mobility. The MIPEX is strongly endorsed by many policy makers who support the research and in turn use the MIPEX findings to adjust their own policies.


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<sup>99</sup> MIPEX

When comparing the diagram of Denmark's MIPEX rating to Spain's, it is evident that Spain's integration has been assessed higher than Denmark's. Spain's overall MIPEX score is 63, ranking it in 9<sup>th</sup> place, while Denmark's overall score is 53, ranking it 15. (see Figure 3 & Figure 4) I believe that the MIPEX compliments my research and conclusions about the comparative success of Spain's integration. At present, despite the internal political rift in terms of the integration policy, Spain has fared well with integration of newcomers. Denmark, on the other hand seems to have reached a sense of stalemate since the emergence of the far-right policies, greatly supported by the Danish People's Party. While integration is an ongoing conversation within Parliament, considerable progress still needs to be made. Further, I believe that the fact that Spain has been able to react so swiftly in response to the recent surge in immigration and score so highly, while Denmark has much more experience with this issue and still falls short, is very telling.


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Figure 3. Denmark's MIPEX



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Figure 4. Spain's MIPEX



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## CONCLUSION

Migration is a human experience that has been present in within society since the beginning of time. It is not a new phenomenon, nor is it at all unfamiliar. The question is then raised, why has immigration caused such turmoil in the past 50 years? Globalization has undoubtedly increased the mobility of *everything*, including people but the problem is not caused by globalization alone. The rise of Islam has been ascribed as especially problematic to the issue of immigration. Islamic extremists have instilled a false sense of incompatibility of Islamic culture and European culture. While many recognize the rarity of such extremists, the tragedies in Madrid, London, and of course, New York City have severely tainted the global image of Muslims. Astonishingly, it has been observed that post-11M there was virtually no backlash against the Muslim community in Spain. But, on the contrary, in many countries, including Denmark, there has been a call for a barrier between the European world and the Islamic world. Political factions have emerged, discrimination has been heightened, and culturally controversial material has been published (two prominent examples are Theo van Gogh and Ayaan Hirsi Ali's movie Submission, and Kurt Westergaards's Muhammed cartoon). I originally intended for my thesis to address the issues of Muslim integration in Europe, its difficulties, and then draw my project to a close with a possible solution. Through my research I have learned quite a few things that complicated my intentional thesis. First, there is a very fine line between a general immigrant issue and a Muslim immigrant issue. Each country is different and within each country there have been different

sentiments about this throughout time. Secondly, the problems impeding successful integration are not easily identified. There are problems at the policy level, and there is a whole different set of problems at the societal level. There is no way to measure or control the level of integration on the individual level. The third realization I made was that a single solution is impossible to produce. Each country, each community has a different historical narrative that has a lot to do with the experience of immigrant integration. The issue of Muslim integration, and integration as a whole does not have one congruent solution and to propose one would be naïve.



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