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Will the Palestinians Survive the Peace Process?

ROBERT VITALIS

Note: Most of the information contained in this article is culled from material published in the mainstream Israeli press and translated in such publications as ISRA/Counter-Source (formerly israelleft), the dispatches of Israel Shahak, and the English language edition of Aj-Fajr. For the historical background and more detailed discussion of the issues raised here, see Noam Chomsky's invaluable study, The Fateful Triangle, Boston: South End Press, 1983. This is part one of a two-part article.

June 1986 will mark the nineteenth year of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. In May 1986, Israelis will celebrate the thirty-eighth anniversary of independence. Thus one-half the history of the Jewish state is the history of Israeli domination of the occupied territories, a period long enough for a mythology of the occupation to have developed; for control, domination and exploitation to have been institutionalized; for racism and hatred to have taken hold; and for a new generation of Palestinian nationalists to have emerged.

Since 1973, Palestinian nationalism has come to focus on the demand for an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. The dominant factions within the PLO—the representatives of the Palestinian people and their aspirations for statehood—have joined what Chomsky calls the international consensus on an acceptable resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict—namely a negotiated political settlement based on two states: Israel within her pre-1967 borders and Palestine in what is now the occupied territories.

According to Yehoshua Porath, the Israeli scholar and historian of the Palestinian national movement, the fear that Israeli leaders would no longer be able to avoid a political settlement with the PLO led the state to launch a war in the Summer of 1982 (with full US support) in an attempt to destroy the PLO as a political force.

For some months prior to June 1982, the Israelis had applied what they called the "iron-fist" in the occupied territories. Uri Avnery called it "a reign of terror" directed at Palestinian mayors, union activists, journalists, student leaders and other segments of Palestinian society.

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the nationalist movement in the occupied territories. A major weapon in this campaign consisted in the systematic use of The Emergency Regulations, a set of laws passed during the time of the British mandate which the government still considers to be in force. These laws served the Israelis from the beginning of the occupation in 1967 as the legal basis for "enlightened" and "relatively benign" practices (as the occupation is commonly characterized) such as collective punishment, administrative detention, and deportation (harassment and violence are practiced without recourse to colonialist legislation).

Israel's real objective in the Lebanon war was related to the real objective of the iron fist—namely to destroy the support for the PLO among the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The regime hoped to promote an alternative leadership in the occupied territories. According to Likud's plan, this non-PLO, "moderate" Palestinian constituency would eventually negotiate some form of "autonomy" for the Palestinians within "greater Israel."

Though the Palestinians suffered a grave setback, the Israelis succeeded neither in destroying the PLO nor in weakening its influence in the occupied territories. By 1985 Israel was again at war with the PLO, with the full cooperation of the US, under the guise of what is labeled the "peace process." Not surprisingly, by the summer of 1985 the Israeli government of Shimon Peres had raised the iron fist once more against the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

A PLO Inching Toward Jordan

Since the defeat in Beirut, Arafat's promotion of an alliance with Jordan has dominated the PLO's agenda. Opposition to the plan within the military wing of Fatah, Arafat's own organization, turned into an armed rebellion by mid-1983. With Syrian backing, the Fatah rebels fought Arafat loyalists in Eastern and Northern Lebanon. Some elements of the PLO opposed to the Jordanian alliance and critical of Arafat have retained their official ties to the organization. Disagreements also exist within the majority tendency in the PLO leadership which supports the Arafat position, involving the timing and terms of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian approach to negotiations.

To simplify the issue: two opposing views have emerged on strategy. The majority on each side supports a negotiated end to the conflict, but divides over the means to achieve it. One position sees an alliance with Jordan, in a diplomatic front with Egypt and the United Staeas, as a means of at least "saving the land" from Israel. The second challenges the assumption that the PLO is strong enough to survive such an initiative and argues that the proper course is to form a front with Syria against US interests, until such time as the balance of forces changes. The success of the Southern Lebanese in driving out the Israelis is held as an example for the resistance.

From the perspective of the Palestinians and the attainment of their national rights, this "Jordanian option" is hardly auspicious (the same is true of the "Syrian option"). Though King Hussein asserts support for the right to statehood, post-Beirut diplomatic maneuverings have permitted him to weigh Palestinian demands beside Jordan's historical claims to the West Bank. From the US perspective, Hussein's involvement in the peace process will strengthen his resolve to act honorably on the Palestinians' behalf, that is, to turn his back on the second of two rights reaffirmed by all Arab states in Rabat (October 1974): the recognition of the PLO as sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. No Palestinian, other than those directly beholden to the Jordanian regime, feels secure in entrusting his or her future to Hussein. In any case, both Israel and the US reject the right of the Palestinians to an independent state, thereby significantly predetermining the outcome of any Israeli-US sponsored peace process.

Arafat has pushed the Jordan option forward, relying on his considerable personal power within the PLO, which derives from his widespread support among the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the diaspora communities. Nonetheless, the decision to forge ahead has exacted a significant toll on the unity of the PLO. Arafat knowingly increased the chances of a permanent fissure in November 1984, when he convened the Palestine National Council (usually described as the Palestinians' legislature in exile) in Amman, Jordan. Most of the major resistance groups as well as many independents refused to attend. It is this body which ratified Arafat's independent initiative, resulting ultimately in the signature of the Arafat-Hussein agreement in February 1985.

Some see in this Amman meeting and the February agreement a reflection of wider changes, both in the regional balance of forces and in the PLO, where the power of the commando organizations has given way in part to pro-Jordanian West Bank leaders and other more conservative elements. According to Rashid Khalidi, "like it or not, we are now in a different situation. The Palestinians have changed socially and their position vis-a-vis the Arab countries and vis-a-vis what they can do to Israel has changed." Anotehr Palestinian scholar, Naseer Aruri, describes the changes a bit more starkly, "It may be that now the last organized presence of Arab revolutionaries has finally decided to join forces with the "moderate" Arab regimes, which have decided to submit to Washington's terms."

Correction: The photos of the Philippines in Resist Newsletter #182 are credited to Rebecca Ratcliff of Grassroots International.
Mothers in the Peace Movement: A Response

KATE CLOUD

Women in the disarmament movement—where have we been and where are we going? How should we look at the contributions of women peace activists? Have certain women activists in the disarmament movement actually encouraged our own marginalization by claiming “a special relationship to peace”? How should feminist analysis and criticism be presented and what are the implications for future political work?

These are some of the questions raised for me by Karen Kahn’s article, “Gender Ideology and the Disarmament Movement” (RESIST, Dec. ’85). In her introductory paragraphs, after referring to the Women’s Pentagon Actions, Greenham Common, the Seneca Peace Encampment and Women’s Action for Nuclear Disarmament, Kahn states her premise:

I argue that by justifying their resistance in terms of “women’s special relationship to peace”, women activists laid the groundwork for their own marginalization. By exploiting a very traditional gender ideology they implicitly gave support to an understanding of gender and politics which refuses to see women as serious political thinkers and organizers. Moreover, because the ideology failed to address the real issues underlying women’s resistance to nuclear weapons and militarism, women activists were unable to sustain powerful grassroots support.

Kahn says that certain disarmament activists exploited a damaging cultural stereotype—the idea that women are endowed with a superior morality by virtue of their mothering and/or connection with nature. She refers to these women as the “moral mothers.” These “moral mothers” allegedly obscured feminist analysis and damaged the credibility of feminist work within the movement.

Kahn’s criticism touched me personally, since I have chosen to speak out on the issues of war and peace from the perspective of my role as mother and parent.

In the late ‘70s, I was looking for political direction and trying to involve myself in various feminist and progressive efforts. As a working mother and single parent, I found that home and job responsibilities kept limiting my participation. Many of my activist friends were vaguely sympathetic but few were interested in my difficulties or insights as a parent. My solution was to seek out other mothers who wanted to work for political change.

In 1979, I joined with four other mothers to form a collective writing project. We decided to write a support book for parents concerned about nuclear issues. Over the next five years, we explored ideas about war and militarism, science and technology, conflict resolution and political action and change. We focused on these issues from the perspective of our responsibilities to our children and future generations. We spoke and corresponded with many parents, mostly mothers, who supported and encouraged our work. Our efforts resulted in the book, Watermelons Not War.*

I had also participated in WAND’s Mothers Day Demonstration in Washington, DC (1979) and both Women’s Pentagon Actions (’80, ’81). I asked myself: am I one of Kahn’s “moral mothers”? Have some of us been claiming a “special relationship to peace,” thereby encouraging our own marginalization within the disarmament movement? Are some women “exploiting” the mother role to the detriment of real feminist work?

“Gender Ideology and the Disarmament Movement” stresses the importance of gender analysis in disarmament work, and raises some serious criticisms of certain women peace activi-

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Mothers in the Peace Movement

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vists. In response, I want to speak from my own experience about several issues concerning women's political work in disarmament and in general. Do women speaking as mothers have an authentic voice in the disarmament movement? How should we look at the contributions of women peace activists? What is feminist criticism and how can criticism and analysis serve to build unity among women?

Mothers for Peace—Moralizing or Moral Effort?

Have women speaking as mothers had a destructive impact on feminist disarmament work? The argument goes something like this: Patriarchal culture defines women's role and place in relation to reproduction and nurturing. Within this role, we are expected to produce babies, care for children and men, and confine ourselves to the domestic arena. A cluster of traits goes along with this role—among them passivity, fearfulness, and inability to understand the serious and important issues of the political arena. When mothers speak out about peace, we evoke all the trivializing stereotypes associated with the motherhood role. By speaking out as mothers then, we are accepting a limited definition of ourselves as women, and inviting our own marginalizations by serious political leaders.

According to Kahn:

As such, there is little difference between those activists who proclaim that women's special relationship to peace is based upon motherhood, and those who argue that it is based upon women's relationship to nature. In either case, motherhood becomes the primary metaphor through which the general public, whether inside or outside the disarmament movement, understand's women's resistance...

. . . When women are viewed as "moral mothers" within the movement, they are not respected as competent political actors. Their role is primarily seen as symbolic; women carry the moral banner of the movement, while men do the real work, arguing over scientific facts, missile technology, and arms control. Moreover, having entered the political arena as mothers, women are seen as having only one interest—their children's survival; having achieved this, they are expected to retreat back into the domestic arena...

When we speak out as mothers, our political competence is frequently called into question. Having felt the sting of trivialization and patronization at times in my work with disarmament activists, I can really appreciate Kahn's description of the oppressive stereotypes that surround the role of mother. Mothers are often treated as if we had nothing to offer in the political arena beyond platitudes about peace. However, these attitudes can best be challenged by women who do speak out and act as mothers when they have something to offer, politically or morally.

Motherhood does not confer moral superiority on anyone. As Kahn and others have pointed out, the belief that mothers (or women) have the key to peace allows women to avoid the responsibility of looking at our own complicity in war and violent activity; it also implies that men are incapable of understanding and changing their own violent behavior. There is a difference however, between claiming moral superiority and claiming that women who are mothers have a unique and valuable perspective to offer.

Intimate relationships and involvement with children, whether one is a biological parent or not, frequently leads adults to questions and concerns about the future of younger generations. The experience of "mothering" tests and teaches us, and sometimes brings insights previously unavailable to us. Caring for a helpless infant, nurturing growing bodies and minds, mediating squabbles and stopping fights . . . learning to control our own anger and selfishness, learning to accept and encourage growth and change, learning to be alert for danger, learning to make peace. Many of the values associated with motherhood—loving, nurturing, protecting, resolving conflicts—are precisely the values that must be developed if we are to end the arms race. We live in a world of fanatic hatreds and uncontrolled greed, a world threatened by terminal contamination, a world dominated by leaders who could blow us all away someday in a fit of moral and political righteousness. Under the circumstances, shouldn't we welcome any special insights mothers have to offer about peace?

To say that women who are mothers have a great deal to contribute to disarmament work is not to say that mothers are wiser or better than others. Furthermore, affirming the peace-making potential of mothers does not suggest that a mother's only role is peace-making, or that women should confine ourselves to observations about peace and love and leave the economics and technology to the men. Just as women must challenge the assumption that motherhood is the only valid role for women, we must also challenge the idea that we have to deny our insights as mothers in order to be taken seriously by other activists. We need the support of feminists in each of these challenges.

"Real Issues" and Real Herstory

Someone unfamiliar with the work of women peace activists might assume from Kahn's article that we have never really addressed militarism's relationship to the violence and impoverishment of women's lives. In her conclusion, Kahn states:

All of these issues—women's relation to the state, technology, the economy and violence—have been touched upon by women in the disarmament movement, but they have remained hidden behind ideological statements equating women's nature and motherhood with a desire for peace. Rather than a feminist analysis we have seen the rejection of that which is thought to be male—technology, violence, the state—and the valorization of that which is thought to be female—motherhood, nature, children . . .

. . . In failing to address these issues the disarmament movement has never been able to gain the wholehearted support of working class women or women of color, who have never responded to the "motherhood" ideology exploited by white, middle class women activists. . .

This is a misrepresentation of the work of women peace activists and the disarmament movement in general. In fact, feminist issues have been raised within the disarmament movement in a variety of contexts and forums. Certainly the Women's Pentagon Actions addressed all the connections. Kahn refers to as women's "real interests in maintaining peace," sometimes in excruciating detail. One of the clearest messages of the Women's Pentagon Actions was that disarmament work is only one of the many political struggles (including racial justice, economic equity, reproductive rights, etc.) which must complement each other in the development of the grassroots support
needed for meaningful change.

In our collective's work on *WNW!* we made connections between state violence and the everyday violence in our lives. Our book discusses the economics of the arms race and the nuclear industry and the science and technology of nuclear processes and alternative energy sources. Although *WNW!* was written primarily as a support book for parents, it does not shy away from making some essential feminist connections and calling for radical change. Were those elements of *WNW!* taken less seriously or devalued because we also spoke, as mothers will, about our fears and hopes for children and future generations?

For years, many community activists have been incorporating feminist understandings about militarism and women's lives into their organizing work. Mainstream disarmament groups are also making more of these connections, often at the insistence of women peace activists. I agree with Kahn that we all have a long way to go in deepening our feminist analysis, especially in terms of the relationship between state violence and the escalating violence against women. My objection is to her assertion that the "real political interests of women" have only been "touched upon" by the disarmament movement. This ignores the work of many women (and men) who have raised and supported discussion of women's political interests in achieving and maintaining peace.

It is also misleading to suggest that the disarmament movement failed to gain the support of low income women or women of color because these women were turned off by an "ideology of motherhood." Many working class women and women of color do support disarmament work. In fact, women of all backgrounds often develop political ideas about war and peace based on their own experiences as mothers.

There are many examples of women who have entered the political arena as a result and extension of their parenting—the Argentinian Mothers of the Disappeared, the mothers of Love Canal, the mothers who oppose the drafting of their sons, etc. Contrary to Kahn's assertion that "women are not attracted to the disarmament movement as frightened mothers," many women have in fact been drawn to disarmament work in response to their fears about the future of their children. These women have heightened public awareness of important issues and challenged many restrictive stereotypes about the role of mothers and women. They have offered ideas about the world which combined political protest and action with an unashamed affirmation of the caring and nurturing aspects of motherhood.

Who's Marginalizing Who?

A friend told me recently that she has always been uncomfortable with feminism. This woman, a mother and a community activist, feels that some of her strongest values—home and family—are frowned upon by upholders of the "correct" feminist line. Many women who support the goals of women's liberation do not identify themselves as feminists because they are convinced that their life choices and priorities will be judged harshly by feminist critics. I think feminism will gain more grassroots acceptance when we get beyond the widespread perception of feminist criticism as judgemental attack.

One long standing problem with feminist political criticism and left criticism in general is the tendency of criticism to split and divide us, instead of leading toward greater understanding of our common interests. Unfortunately, "Gender Ideology and the Disarmament Movement" is an example of a criticism that creates further distance between feminists and those who have the potential of being our closest allies. Kahn's discussion of gender analysis isolates some women and blames them for promoting an ideology that "failed to address the real issues underlying women's resistance to nuclear weapons and militarism." The tone and choice of words is often disrespectful and alienating, slighting the efforts of many dedicated peace activists, especially women who have spoken out as mothers and women who are white and "middle class." Some examples:

"The valorization of that which is thought to be female—motherhood, nature, children..."

"Women are not attracted to the disarmament movement as frightened mothers."

"The 'motherhood' ideology exploited by white, middle class women activists."

"They (white, middle class women) played on the 'moral mother' image."

"as a cultural category, motherhood is heavily laden with symbolic baggage which does not allow for a thorough analysis of the historical conditions presently shaping women's lives."

(All emphasis mine. KC)

The practice of motherhood is heavily laden with some very real "baggage" which cannot be separated from an analysis of the conditions that shape women's lives. Kahn's negative phrasing in reference to mothers only serves to perpetuate the marginalization of mothers in disarmament work, and trivializes mothers' contributions. Why "valorization" and not celebration? Why did she choose the term "exploit" which implies selfish use for personal gain? This kind of criticism does nothing to encourage solidarity among women in the disarmament movement, or elsewhere.

I wish Kahn had begun her analysis by acknowledging the contributions of women who have spoken out as mothers or "carers" on the issues of war and peace and the environment. By acting in solidarity with other women (not all of whom were mothers), these activists demonstrated that women do indeed have something special to offer the disarmament movement. The women who left homes and families for an extended stay at Greenham Common certainly challenged traditional assumptions about women's role and place. The "moral mothers" of Women Strike for Peace, who brought worldwide attention to the Strontium 90 in children's bones, can surely be credited with addressing a "real issue." Some protested in pearls, others with memorable flair, like the WPA's dramatic protests and civil dis...
Palestinians

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Escalating the Peace Process

Through the second half of 1985, the American Press reported each lurch, fit, gasp and start of the peace process, poring over the public pronouncements of Hussein and Peres in order to determine if the thing had lurched once more. Rather less attention was given to the strong, unambiguous signs of US and Israeli pressure on Hussein to drop the PLO and enter into direct negotiations. These included secret contacts—and approved of it. As Israeli sources reported, the target of the mission was the Israeli port of Ashdod. The hijacking of the Achille Lauro tragery, the conservative Jerusalem Post (2 October 1985), he “dismissed as total nonsense suggestions the attack was aimed at torpedoing the peace process.” The peace process is a strategic which seeks to eliminate the PLO and to legalize joint Israeli-Jordanian control over the occupied territories. Hussein, in Washington at the time and busy gazing at the carrot (27 million dollars in US arms) which the administration dangled before him as an incentive to quicken his pace, said nothing in defense of the PLO, nothing in criticism of the Israelis. His reserve was no doubt steeled by the voice of Rabin reminding him that PLO targets in Jordan might be next.

A week after the bombing in Tunisia, four Palestinians compounded the crime of pirating a cruise ship by killing one of its American passengers. There are two possible explanations for this bungled action and senseless murder, neither of which exonerates the PLO and its leader, which place the tragedy in a context more in keeping with political reality and less in the fantasy being woven about the peace process. The first explanation assumes that Arafat knew about the operation and approved of it. As Israeli sources reported, the target of the mission was the Israeli port of Ashdod. The hijacking of the Achille Lauro tragedy, but all were quick to capitalize on it. Reagan made us proud to be Americans again by ordering the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner. (As an added payoff, he demonstrated the utility of the US aid program, which has turned Egypt into a client state.) Prime Minister Peres travelled to the US to address the United Nations. Newspapers reported that he was on a mission to convince the US that the PLO must be kept out of the Middle East peace process—as if the Reagan administration had ever argued otherwise. In an address to the American Enterprise Institute Peres struck an “objective” pose and explained that the PLO had ruled itself out of the peace negotiations. (“Arafat: We’ll Halt Terrorism When Peace Talks Begin,” Al Hamishmar, 1 October 1985). An important component of the peace process is the insistent voices of US and Israeli officials calling for peace talks “without preconditions” and attaching the demand that Palestinians first renounce terrorist violence to the familiar list of preconditions (no PLO, no self-determination, no Palestinian state).

The second explanation sees the operation as an attempt to wreck Arafat’s Jordan initiative by opposition elements within the PLO. A week after the tragedy, the conservative London Times (14 October 1985) reported on the position of Muhammed Abbas, the PLO figure responsible for the operation. Abbas heads a faction of the Palestine Liberation Front (the group split during the fighting against Arafat’s cadres in Lebanon; Abbas’s faction remained pro-Arafat). Abbas gained his seat on the executive council of the PLO in November in Amman, a result of Arafat’s need to show that the PLO executive represented more than just Arafat’s own Fatah grouping (recall that the major non-Fatah groups boycotted the session). Nonetheless, Abbas is reported to be openly opposed to Arafat’s contacts with Hussein, while Arafat’s own weakened position prevents his exerting more effective control.

None of the partners in the peace process wanted the Achille Lauro tragedy, but all were quick to capitalize on it. Reagan made us proud to be Americans again by ordering the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner. (As an added payoff, he demonstrated the utility of the US aid program, which has turned Egypt into a client state.) Prime Minister Peres travelled to the US to address the United Nations. Newspapers reported that he was on a mission to convince the US that the PLO must be kept out of the Middle East peace process—as if the Reagan administration had ever argued otherwise. In an address to the American Enterprise Institute Peres struck an “objective” pose and explained that the PLO had ruled itself out of the peace process. This of course is completely untrue. The promoters of the peace process ruled out PLO participation long ago.

The Jordanians joined in the criticism of the PLO, and announced that they had agreed to resume diplomatic relations with Syria. Contradicting press reports that this was some kind of rebuke to the Israelis, Shimon Peres announced his unhesitant approval (“International Forum is sole obstacle to talks with Jordan,” Jerusalem Post, 25 October 1985). Syria’s president Assad is at war...
with Arafat and the allied sections of the PLO, and thus eligible to join the peace process.

American support for drawing Syria into talks has had some interesting side effects. Syria appears to have been much more directly involved than Libya in the December 1985 attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports. Some Israeli reports go as far as to claim that the operation was actually carried out by Syrian agents. The Syrians support Abu Nidal since he is one of Arafat's greatest enemies. Nonetheless, the Reagan-Schultz war against world terrorism can't interfere with the peace process; the US demonstrated the ability to pick their targets for retaliation with at least as much political skill as Israel; and so US ships and television cameras went out stalking Col. Quadafi.

In Israel, Peres faces angry opposition to negotiations with Jordan from within his own Cabinet. The two largest political coalitions in Israel—Labor and Likud—share power in the current government of national unity. Vizak Shamir, a member of the Likud party and an outspoken critic of the peace process, is scheduled to become Prime Minister in September. His party remains steadfastly opposed to any negotiations with Jordan. Likud ideology claims all of the occupied territories as part of Greater Israel. Their own version of peace is "autonomy" for the Palestinians within Israel's expanded borders. The Likud's position gains practical strength from the presence on the West Bank of well organized, politically influential, militant Jewish settler groups like Gush Emunim and the fascist Kach party of Meir Kahane. In November, settlers threatened the state with civil war if it attempted to return any part of the territories to Jordan.

Many fear the presence in Israel of Kahane because he embodies—in extreme form—more widely held racist attitudes which are a product of the occupation and now serve to maintain it. Thus the Van Leer Research Institute in Israel tried to suppress the results of a poll it conducted in the Spring of 1985 when it revealed that 40% of Israelis between the ages of 15 and 18 agreed with Kahane's view of Arabs (Kahane's regular synonyms for Palestinians include "animals," "roaches,"—the last also popular with the Likud—"dogs" and the like.). The Israeli press uncovered the findings and published them in early June.

Israeli journalists like Yehuda Litani ("Israeli Plan for the West Bank Hasn't A Chance," Ha'aretz, 7 November 1985) cite precisely these factors when discussing the likelihood of support for the peace process within Israel. Yet more important, Litani challenges "the basic principles underlying the plan" which continue the status quo under a different name. Dani Rubinstein calls them "non-options" (Davar, 6 November 1985). Likud calls for "autonomy." Shimon Peres proposes—in the words of the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz—a "joint Israeli-Jordanian condominium," a solution that most appropriately recalls the era of British and French colonial rule.

Asher Maniv identifies the crucial flaw in Israeli designs, namely the refusal to negotiate a settlement with the PLO. "There is still no suitable substitute for the PLO—and none in sight." Nonetheless, "like so many politicians [Peres] will fall victim to his own propaganda." (Jerusalem Post, 29 October 1985). That propaganda includes the "leadership vacuum" in the territories and the desperate search for "moderate Palestinians" who will support the peace process. In the time honored Israeli tradition, Peres is now trying to create these facts in the territories with the use of the iron fist and the cooperation of King Hussein.

Part II of this article will be published in the next issue of the Resist Newsletter. Robert Vitalis is a graduate student at M.I.T. and an activist who recently spent several months in the Middle East.

The Resist Pledge System

The most important source of Resist's income is monthly pledges. Pledges help us plan ahead by guaranteeing us a minimum monthly income. In turn, pledges receive a monthly reminder letter (in addition to the newsletter) which contains news of recent grants and other Resist activities. So take the plunge and become a Resist pledge!

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Kate Cloud is a Resist board member.
companies doing business with the South African government, asking them to pull out of South Africa; a public rally/vigil to collect signatures on a giant postcard to be sent to the South African president asking for the release of political prisoners. The Anti-apartheid Committee is the only on-going group in the Lehigh Valley involved solely in Anti-apartheid work, and LEPOCO has a long history of peace and justice work in the area. The committee now feels that it is important to initiate an education program explaining the current situation in South Africa because of widespread misconceptions about South African realities. They recently sent out hundreds of letters to area high school teachers about their South Africa Education Campaign. Teachers will be encouraged to hold classroom activities on the subject. Curriculum resources will be made available through the LEPOCO Peace Library to assist the teachers. They will also be presented with a packet of information assembled by the committee including: fact sheets, lists of locally available resources and contacts, status of divestment legislation in state, county, and local government, and an introduction to resources in the LEPOCO Peace Library. The classroom programs will include slide presentations, music, poetry, excerpts of speeches and fact sheets/charts. Resist's grant of $390 went towards the costs of the educational program.

KWANZAA, P.O. Box 583, Burlington, VT 05402.

KWANZAA is a collective of working class identified black, Native America, third world, Jewish and white residents of Vermont dedicated to the perpetuation of multicultural education through workshops and performing arts. They have been sharing their programs with schools and the general public since the Winter of 1981. KWANZAA evolved out of the Black Lesbian Coalition whose purpose involved educating women about racism. The BLC came together because of the isolation felt being non-white in Vermont. When they expressed their non-white selves...