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RESIST

Newsletter #179

A call to resist illegitimate authority

October 1985

The Summit and the Peace Movement

FRANK BROADHEAD

How should the peace movement organize for the November Summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev? Does the Summit hold out the hope of a significant step toward peace? Or is it simply a charade, a posturing by the leaders of the two leading nuclear powers to soothe restive allies and quell fears at home? And does it make any difference? Should our assessment of the "sincerity" of Reagan and Gorbachev affect how we organize for peace in the fall of 1985?

It is clear that we can't avoid the Summit. Already the mass media are framing the statements and actions by both governments in terms of how they will affect the Summit. Like it or not, we will have to have a "position" on the Summit. Even by the time of this writing, in early September, many national peace and disarmament organizations have laid plans to focus their disarmament work for the fall around the Summit. The Summit seems certain to function as a whirlpool, drawing our work and energies towards it, and throwing off to the periphery that which can't be related to the Summit.

While at the time of this writing it is too early to confidently predict the outcome of the Summit, and while the plans of peace organizations to organize around the Summit are still being formed, I would like to make

some observations about the direction that this work is taking. For I believe that the Summit contains many traps for the peace movement. It also appears that many old divisions within the peace movement are reemerging around the Summit. And, particularly in the relation of the peace movement to the mass media, there are some new steps being taken which I believe need to be carefully examined.

I would like to use one of the several statements which have been made so far by national peace organizations to discuss some of the strategic differences which are implicit in organizing for the Summit. I hope to do this not in terms of some "correct line," but in the spirit of asking questions and contributing to a discussion. I am also aware that much of the real work around the Summit will be done by local organizers, and that it is their work that will determine whether the peace movement will be able to use the occasion of the Summit to move forward. But we have learned over the years that how issues and problems are framed at a national level can greatly help or hinder the work of peace education, and can strengthen or weaken the effectiveness of local work.

The Directors' Forum Strategy

Perhaps the most ambitious strategy for the Summit conceived so far grew out of the Directors' Forum, an informal coalition of some two dozen arms control and peace organizations, mostly Washington-based. In a nutshell, the

strategy of the Directors' Forum is to *raise expectations*. The Reagan administration has maintained that the Summit is simply a "get acquainted" meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev, and it has attempted to dampen any hopes that significant steps toward peace and disarmament might emerge from the meeting. The strategy coming out of the Directors' Forum is to work with the media and, at the local level, to educate people about what *could* be accomplished at the Summit if there was a will to do so.

It is evident that part of the "raising expectations" strategy necessarily implies giving legitimacy to the Summit. It would not be possible to maintain the position, at least publicly, that the Summit is a fraud and that Reagan is a hypocrite, for example, if we want to "raise expectations" around the Summit. Such a view is certainly far from the stance of the Directors' Forum, whose statement calls the Summit "an opportunity for increasing mutual security." "All Americans and indeed the entire world should applaud this forthcoming meeting of the two superpower leaders," says the introduction to the statement. "They alone are in a position to break the deadlock and to make real progress in negotiating limits on the arms race in offensive and defensive weapons, deep reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two countries, and the lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union."

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I think this position of "applauding the Summit" raises some real problems. By granting the "sincerity" of Reagan and the Reagan administration we fall into the trap of the "Search for Peace," a strategy which has served this and earlier U.S. presidents well in quelling domestic discontent and the worries of the Allies about U.S. intervention and the relentless march of the nuclear build-up. I would like to defer a discussion of the "search for peace" for a few moments and comment here only on the dynamics of truth and "sincerity" in our own movement.

While part of the "raising expectations" strategy undoubtedly includes a residual hope that (if *enough* people agitated for concrete steps for peace) something good might come out of the Summit, I believe that most peace activists share my skepticism that the Reagan administration has the least intention of moderating its arms build-up. If this is so, then the "raising expectations" strategy can only be seen as manipulative. We will raise expectations only to have them dashed. In this process, presumably, we will be in a position to capitalize on the disappointed hopes that we have raised. This is an ancient strategy, and one that I have never liked. It sets up a poisonous dynamic between leaders who "know" that our demands are unrealistic, and naive followers who are not yet ready for the truth.

It is also an impractical strategy, because good organizers will reject it: fighting against the manipulation of the truth by the government, they are not likely to be enthusiastic about manipulating the truth in their own work. The "applauding the Summit" strategy therefore leaves this latter group without guidance. What is "really going on" with the Summit will have to be figured out at the local level, as the national body has abdicated its responsibilities to help us understand what the Summit is about.

Let us return to the main body of the Directors' Forum statement. The campaign to "raise expectations" will be focused on a short list of disarmament demands which, the statement correctly points out, could be accomplished at Geneva with the stroke of a pen. The statement calls on Reagan and Gorbachev to take the following steps:

1. Refrain from undercutting or

abrogating the SALT agreement on offensive weapons;

2. Reaffirm their commitment to the ABM Treaty;

3. Agree to a moratorium on testing ASAT weapons;

4. Bar encryption (or coding) of data radioed back to Earth during weapons tests;

5. Refrain from deploying any new MIRVed missiles, such as the MX;

6. Agree to a halt in nuclear tests pending the negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban; and

7. Agree in principle to an interim arms accord, which could include reductions in both launchers and warheads.

Now some comments are in order on these demands, because — while they are certainly vital steps towards peace — what is stated and what is unstated raises some well-known issues of disarmament strategy.

First, the statement assumes that what we want are bi-lateral agreements: "The President and the General Secretary, by agreeing in Geneva to one or more of the following steps. . . ." Thus the statement maintains the bi-lateralism that became dogma in the early days of the Freeze movement. While now, just as then, there is a certain safety against the charge of being a "communist dupe" which is inevitably directed against advocates of unilateral initiatives by the United States, a dogmatic bi-lateralism necessarily contributes to the marginalizing of unilateralists, both pacifists and nonpacifists alike. At times it even functions as a kind of anti-communism within the peace movement: "We are not suspect and unpatriotic unilateralists, but responsible *bi-lateralists*," etc.

Furthermore, there is a price to pay for the rejection of strategies or demands based on unilateral initiatives. During the campaign against the Euromissiles — the deployment of U.S.-controlled cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe — we often found ourselves estranged from our allies in the European peace movements, who called for unilateral initiatives towards disarmament. And we soon found ourselves in a trap, in which we had to adjust our bi-lateral-agreement strategies to the practical necessity of working to put a unilateral halt to the funding and deployment of the cruise or the MX.

More broadly, a bi-lateral framework makes our disarmament strategies hostage to the agreement of the Soviets: we commit ourselves to disarming only if the Soviet Union takes similar steps. In essence, bi-lateralism is locked into an acceptance of deterrence.

Finally, in relation to the forthcoming Summit, bi-lateralism is impractical. We would be speaking more truthfully and with greater clarity if we were calling on President Reagan to match the *unilateral* halt in nuclear testing by the Soviets, and in *unilaterally* refraining from going ahead with the test of anti-satellite weapons. We are not taking advantage of the alleged opportunity given us by the Summit for peace education if we refrain from educating people that the security of the United States and the rest of the world would be greatly furthered if President Reagan took the steps listed above *on his own*. As Daniel Ellsberg noted in a recent article in *Nuclear Times*, we have to face the hard job of helping people to understand that the new weapons systems now being developed and deployed dangerously increase our insecurity, and that they are the opposite of deterrence.

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ILLEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
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Resist staff: Ken Tangvik
Meredith Smith
Nancy Moniz

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JACK SPENCE


Last June and July, the author joined the sixth national delegation of Faculty for Human Rights in El Salvador and Central America on a fact finding tour of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. He teaches Latin American Politics at the University of Massachusetts-Boston.

Guatemala may be having a presidential election in November. In early September, a rise in transit fares triggered widespread street protests. Riot police put these down, and five hundred troops invaded the national San Carlos University, violating its legal autonomy. Rumors of a coup were fed by the unrest.

In June these tensions were not far beneath the surface. Even in the swank, dark paneled club with panoramic views of the city, where leading members of the private sector had invited our delegation to a filet mignon lunch, the self assured, confident picture of the private sector being presented to us had evident cracks. Guatemala's currency, the quetzal, had been flying high for years, maintaining parity with the dollar. Now it was falling like a stone. Businesses depending on imports faced increased costs and the businessmen complained that the weak quetzal depressed the enthusiasm and aspirations of their managers. In January a manager could buy a color TV with one month's pay, but now could hardly get a black and white for the same price.

The military government, with its "populist" programs, had messed up the economy, we were told. We later heard that private sector figures had tried to engineer a coup, but that they had also been quite successful in wringing substantial benefits from the current government.

The business moguls spoke enthusiastically about the coming election, as they handed us copies of an American Heritage Foundation tract about why the U.S. should provide balance of payments and military aid to Guatemala. They and the U.S. em-



bassy saw the election as the path to aid, but had misgivings about the candidates. Sandoval Alarcon, head of the paramilitary right wing MLN "party" formed during the U.S. sponsored 1954 overthrow of the progressive Arbenz government, was a staunch anti-communist, but was a "man of the fifties." Vinicio Cerezo, of the Christian Democrats, was not to be trusted despite his pledge of "no reforms." Jorge Carpio, medio tycoon, had the best public relations, but no experience and no program. But the election was to be a "great thing."

We asked about trade unions and the famous Coca Cola plant trade union. The union had illegally taken over the plant, the business leaders said, after a perfectly legal closing of the plant due to bankruptcy. The owners had been threatened with violence. Unions in general were violence prone and disruptive of a tranquil investment climate. But, they conceded, the unions were not very strong in Guatemala because they could only organize by shop.

After lunch I decided it was time to carry a message to the Coca Cola workers from an American friend who had helped occupy the bottling plant for a few nights during the workers' takeover last year. This had been the second major battle at the plant in five

years. During 1978-80, the workers had battled for union rights. The plant cafeteria now has large photos of 8 workers who were picked off by death squads during the struggle. An international campaign against Coca Cola eventually forced Coke to dump the repressive American owner.

The head of the union, Rodolfo Robles, greeted me. Work was out for the day. A class for some forty workers on trade unionism was just breaking up, and he and five members of the steering committee recounted the most recent battle with Coke and the military government.

On February 17, 1984 the owners suddenly announced that the enterprise was a failure, and closed the plant. The workers immediately occupied the premises. The owners then offered about 6 months severance pay. The workers demanded that the money be used to keep the factory in operation. Both owners soon thereafter left the country, and the workers sued them for closing a plant without proper legal notice. But the courts, unable to summon the defendants, rejected the claims.

For the first few days all 478 workers occupied the plant on a 24 hour basis, while the police surrounded the plant. The workers then approached Coca

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Cola International. As days stretched into payless weeks, and weeks into months, about one hundred workers had to drop out. Of the remainder, eighty were organized into work teams to find work to support the families of all. The rest divided into two teams, each occupying the factory for 24 hours shifts.

Again, they organized an international campaign to get Coke to reopen the plant. After 3½ months, Coke recognized the union, and agreed to 2½ months back pay, to set up a small trust fund for the survivors of the 8 martyrs from 1978-80, and to start looking for a new owner.

It took ten more months for the plant to be reopened. According to the business leaders at the aforementioned lunch, the U.S. embassy was frantically asking business associations to find an owner if they wanted to improve Guatemala's human rights profile in the U.S., but no one wanted to touch the deal because of the "violent" union. Finally, the Porra family agreed to operate the franchise.

But the Porra's and Coke refused to negotiate any compensation for the months of closure. The eventual agreement included a 45 hour work week (5½ days), a minimum salary of 150 Quetzales per month (my rough estimate of costs for a family of six for just corn, beans, rice, cooking oil and cooking fuel in June was about 60-70 Q's per month, with rent another 30-40). The Union won an office and a small conference room, subsidized lunches, and small life insurance and retirement benefits.

But the Porras agreed to hire only 265 of the workers putting the remaining 85 on a first-hire waiting list, with no requirement that anyone be hired. As of June, 32 had been hired. I asked whether seniority determined the list of 85. At a union meeting to discuss the negotiations, the bargaining team was authorized to accept the offer. Then 85 volunteers stepped forward to place themselves on the waiting list. They had been out of work almost a year.

It was late afternoon now. They gave me a detailed tour of the plant, explaining each detail of production. In the cafeteria, they told me about each of the eight pictured martyrs. We toured the truck and auto shop area that was filled with familiar Coke trucks, and then went to a lively soccer

game on a field in the back. Finally they took me to see the shrine for assassinated workers near the field.

In the context of Guatemala, the long struggle of the Coke workers is heroic. The urban labor movement was repressed until the liberal presidencies of Arevalo and Arbenz during the 1944-54 era. Workers won a national minimum wage, the eight hour day and the right to organize. By 1954, from a base of near zero, some 10% of the economically active population belonged to unions. The U.S. sponsored '54 coup targeted trade unions. Most active unions were destroyed in short order, their leaders assassinated or jailed. Twenty years of repression later, only 1.6% of the active labor force were members of unions.

But the union movement grew in the 1970's as did many other forms of popular mobilization. Repression did not stop, but unions in many sectors were formed, and in many cases struck for better working conditions and in the mid-70's there were monthly conflicts. The high point came in 1977 when tungsten miners from an isolated village called Ixtahuacan, after four years of struggle for better working conditions and union recognition, marched two hundred and fifty miles to the capital city. Nothing like this had ever happened. Before they reached the capital, the government, trying to head off protest, forced the company to accede to the demands, but the miners marched on, fortified by the support they had received along the way. A spontaneous demonstration of

100,000 greeted them in Guatemala City, a city of 1 million. But in the next three years the ongoing repression escalated sharply. Four of the miners' leaders were assassinated, and one was tortured to death while his wife was forced to watch.

It was in this context of mobilization and repression that the earlier Coca Cola battle was waged, at the cost of eight workers' lives. By the early 80's, the repression gained the upper hand. The Coca Cola workers estimated that by 1979 there were 600 burgeoning active unions in the country. Now there is an official list of 117 unions, but the majority of those exist only as pieces of paper, they said.

The Coca Cola workers could not have won this most recent victory without impressive discipline, solidarity and courage. But the irony of their victory in 1984-85 is that in the prevailing climate of repression it could not have been won but for the fact that they were battling a famous multinational corporation, indeed, the very symbol of U.S. foreign investment. This generated the crucial international support.

Our visit to the U.S. Embassy found a more upbeat view of the human rights picture. Their statistics on assassinations are gleaned from accounts in the newspapers, all of which are right-wing. The trend was down. They pointed with pride to last year's constituent assembly election, anticipating the November presidential election.

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The military attache, snappy in his Ranger uniform, could hardly contain his enthusiasm for the Guatemalan military's "genius." Four years earlier the country had been on the verge of "going down the tubes" until able commanders had stepped forward and, making "hard decisions," waged an effective "counter terror" campaign based on "relentless patrolling."

Only the "sluggish" performance of the economy dimmed these bright views. But human rights improvements and elections would help cure this problem by bringing in much needed U.S. balance of payments assistance and foreign investment.

Other interviews of Church officials and academics revealed a grim picture. We interviewed one of the top Church officials in the country in our hotel dining room. He *whispered* answers to our questions for 90 minutes changing the topic to the fruit cup or the weather whenever a waiter passed by. He and the Archbishop in a later interview detailed recent human rights abuses including the assassination of two members of the Mutual Support Group, made up of families of the disappeared and assassinated. We learned that many disappearances and assassinations do not make the newspapers (or the Embassy statistics) because terrified families of, say a missing student, beg student groups not to publically denounce the crime.

The "hard decisions" mentioned by the military attache refer to the scorched earth campaign waged during 1980-83. Based on a count of orphans, the Church estimates that between 30 and 60,000 civilians were killed during this campaign in the highlands where the main guerrillas groups had gained considerable popular support. One of every seven Guatemalans was displaced. Despite the campaign, another analyst told us, contrary to the attache's account, that adding up military reports suggests that the guerrillas have had their territory of operation reduced, but had not suffered many military casualties.

The economy, during this repressive offensive, plunged downhill. The questazal, at 1 to 1 dollar for years, was 1.8 in November, and 3.1 in June. By the end of last year 44% of the economically active population was un- or underemployed (10.2% unemployed). By 1984, gross domestic product per capita had shrunk to the



level of 1971. Even by the estimate of one Embassy economist, it could not be expected to achieve the level of 1982 before the late 1990's.

A visit to a government housing project, Campamento Temporada Betania, brought home the meaning of these statistics. The 368 families have moved into the city to escape military activity, or to find work since losing their land. Each family of 6 to 10 lives in one 10x13 windowless room. Smoke from a wood cook fire in an adjoining lean-to fills the room. Infant mortality, according to a health worker, is 100 per 1000, above the national average of 67 (it is 22 per thousand in Cuba, 17 in the U.S.). There is a common, and open, latrine. The mother of one family of eight I interviewed made do on about 80 quetzales a month, earned in irregular mason work hours from the city by her husband. His pay covered beans, rice, corn, and fuel (not eggs or meat) and the low six quetzal rent with about 15 quetzales to spare. (A cheap pair of tennis shoes is Q17.) This family had petitioned for four years for the privilege of living in this project with its rents at 20% of market rates.

None of the leading presidential candidates in the much heralded election has a program to address these problems. Any program would require radical change. In the last five years some 300 Christian Democrats slightly to the left of center have been assassinated. Of the major candidates, the one farthest to the left (which puts him right of center) is running on a platform of no reform.

Should the election come off, it may be sufficient to gain from Congress the

military assistance and financial aid the Reagan administration and the Guatemalan business leaders so clearly desire. But the election will be largely irrelevant to the short lives of the residents of Temporada Betania. And it holds out little hope for the Coca Cola workers struggling to rebuild, once again, the trade union movement in the face of massive state repression.



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
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A second deficiency of the statement concerns its scope. Even after some three years of "Deadly Connections" conferences, and even though the Summit itself will take up "regional concerns," the disarmament strategy represented by the statement still treats the issue of nuclear weapons in a vacuum. It returns us to that moment in 1982 when the great June 12th demonstration could not address the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which as much as anything going on that day had a finger on the trigger of nuclear war. It was largely in response to this failure, and to the lack of understanding which this failure grew out of, that disarmament activists developed the concept of the "Deadly Connection" and held dozens of conferences across the United States to discuss the connections between intervention and nuclear war. Indeed, many of the signatories of the Directors' Forum statement are on record as opposing U.S. intervention in Central America, the Middle East, and in Asia and the Pacific Ocean, and some have done "Deadly Connections" work themselves. Thus the statement shows that, whatever our collective intellectual understanding of how to prevent nuclear war, when the chips are down and the coalitions are formed a substantial and important part of the peace movement will still accept — and even enforce — the separation of "disarmament" from "anti-intervention."

These are old arguments. Yet I think there is something new here as well. I think that the division of the peace movement into "disarmament" and "anti-intervention," and the rejection of unilateralism in favor of bi-lateralism — and, indeed, the stance of "applauding the Summit" — are strongly reinforced by the recent surge of interest within disarmament organizations in the media. Partly as a result of the failure of the Mondale candidacy, I believe, and more generally as a result of the decline of media enthusiasm for the Freeze, many people are turning to media analyses and media consultants in an attempt to help the peace movement regain some initiative.

One study by Daniel Yankelovich Associates on the attitudes of U.S. citizens towards war and peace issues has been very influential in disarmament organizations. WAND is currently carrying out a large-scale study in an



Bas, Greece

attempt to make its strategy more effective. And a "Peace Media Project," initiated by some Washington, D.C.-based groups last April, approached many media consultants and people in the news industry for insights into how the peace movement can improve its acceptability — and thus its access — to the media, and how it can use the media to reach the American people more effectively.

There can certainly be no quarrel with gaining a better understanding of how the media works and how we can use it more effectively. But I think this work also raises many questions. While there is not the space to go into all of them here, I think one of the outcomes of this focus on the media has been to place an additional conservative pressure on our work, giving an imprint of "science" to the view that in order to "reach people" we must appear "more responsible," so that the media "will take us seriously." This focus on the media has so far not addressed the issues of media bias and the concentration of ownership of the media by corporations that have their own interests. It assumes away the voluminous evidence that the U.S. media functions as a "Free World propaganda system," and takes for granted the media's own claims to be a neutral marketplace of ideas and information. It places a premium on playing

by the rules rather than changing the rules. It is unrealistic. And we end up "applauding" charades like the Summit, unable to speak the truth because we will be marginalized.

The Search for Peace


I would like to conclude by urging that we include in our peace work and in our preparations for the Summit some thought about how to respond to the peace theatrics of the Reagan administration. Rather than taking the Summit (and "Geneva," and the lip service to the "Contadora process," and our commitment to "constructive engagement") at face value, I believe we need to become more conscious of the "Search for Peace" as a tool of foreign intervention and the escalation of the arms race.

The Search for Peace is, in our era's Orwellian logic, an accompaniment of war or part of the preparation for war. While in some respects it is as old as warfare itself, it has assumed a special importance in the last two decades. It was during the Vietnam War, and the consequent erosion of automatic support for the U.S. imperial enterprise, that successive U.S. presidential administrations learned to hone to a fine art the appearance of searching for peace while escalating the war. Much to our sorrow we are still learning about the sustained duplicity which ac-

panied that war, of the coups that were organized each time neutralism raised its head in South Vietnam, and of the escalations in the bombing that were ordered each time that peace seemed about to break out. Seymour Hersh's recent study of Kissinger is only the latest of a string of excellent books which have documented how the Search for Peace was used as a camouflage to sustain the Vietnam War.

Both then and now, the Search for Peace depends on the cooperation of the Western media. Unlike the Soviet bloc media which is government controlled, and therefore regarded with suspicion by Soviet-bloc citizens, the privately owned Western media appear on the surface to be free of the taint of government control. This appearance of independence — jealously guarded by the owners of the media — renders it even more effective than the Soviet media as a propaganda system. While a serious reader can find volumes of facts and information which contradict the version of reality being put forward by Western governments, the headlines and front-page stories — not to mention the far more simplistic television network news — almost invariably support the positions of their own governments. Over and above the patriotic assumptions of writers, editors, and owners, and even discounting the boundaries of permissibility established by the giant capitalistic corporations that own the vast majority of media outlets, the Western media function as a propaganda system by putting certain questions on the agenda and keeping others off, by asking some questions and not others.

Regarding the Search for Peace, we need only remind ourselves that during the entire history of the U.S. engagement in Vietnam the media never framed the U.S. military mission in terms of an *invasion* of Vietnam. It accepted largely at face value the Johnson administration's claim that the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 was to halt a communist revolution. It treated sympathetically the Reagan administration's claim that its purpose in invading Grenada was to rescue students. No matter what degree of culpability its own news stories display about the responsibility of the CIA for suffering and death in Nicaragua, it cannot bring itself to describe our actions there as state-terrorism, reserving this epithet



for Iran, Libya, and other officially sanctioned enemies. It automatically follows the Reagan administration in dismissing the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing as a "propaganda stunt."

Thanks to Strobe Talbot's book *Deadly Gambits*, and to the work of other authors, we know quite a bit about the Reagan administration's commitment to arms negotiations. Talbot, the Washington bureau chief for *Time* magazine, clearly shows that the Reagan administration treated the Geneva negotiations about "intermediate range" nuclear weapons as a problem of "alliance management." "The object of making a proposal and undertaking negotiations," he writes, "was damage limitation, public relations, and getting the new NATO missiles deployed with a minimum of anguish and recrimination inside the alliance" (p. 62). He describes something of the massive propaganda campaign which the Reagan administration carried out in Europe in an attempt to appease the Centrist politicians who were alarmed by the massive peace demonstrations. He makes it evident that the "zero option" proposal put forward by the United States was deliberately intended to fail, in order that the deployment of the missiles could go forward. He describes negotiator Paul Nitze's concern that "a breakthrough was required not so much for the sake of arms control, for which he was no great enthusiast, but for the sake of American political and military interests, particularly in NATO. He was not so much concerned about East-West relations as West-West relations" (p. 115). He cites Richard Burt's assertion that, as Talbot puts it, "the principal purpose of the various official advertising campaigns on behalf of U.S. policy should be to do everything

possible to make sure that deployment went ahead on schedule." (p. 164).

In short, the purpose of arms control negotiations under Reagan was, and I believe still is, to serve as a cover by which the arms build-up can forge ahead. At no point was the "sincerity" of Reagan and his arms control negotiators challenged by the mainstream media in the United States. But just as was the case during the Vietnam War, in retrospect we learn that the negotiations were a fraud, that they were designed to raise hopes for peace and to make it appear that they were dashed only because of the intransigence of our official enemies.

The same cast of characters that unsuccessfully Searched for Peace during the first term of the Reagan administration are guiding the U.S. strategy toward the Summit. There is no indication that they have changed their views; and their commitment to Star Wars, to continued nuclear testing, and to going ahead with the testing of anti-satellite weapons can only be viewed as a sign of their determination to continue the arms build-up which they have started. By refraining from denouncing the Reagan administration's approach to the Summit as fraudulent, the peace movement will further legitimize — and render more effective by being unchallenged — the Search for Peace as a tool for engineering a consensus behind U.S. foreign policy. We need to understand what is going on with the Summit and, rather than applauding it, we must try to prevent it from succeeding in its purpose of legitimizing the continuation of the arms race.

Frank Brodhead is a member of the Resist board and an author who writes for several progressive publications.

GRANTS

Conference of Black Organizers, c/o Georgia Citizen Coalition on Hunger, 136 Marietta St., N.W. No. 220, Atlanta, Georgia 30303.

The National Black Organizers Educational/Training Campaign was organized by an independent network of Black organizers from several peace and justice groups. Their conference last May was the first successful effort to bring organizers and organizations within the Black community together around the impact of the U.S. military and militarism on the Black community. More than 50 organizers and activists from seven southern states and some northern states gathered in Charlotte, NC, reflecting struggles and constituencies involving issues of housing, counter-military recruitment, labor, racist violence, communication, education and research, law, peace, civics, culture, anti-apartheid, anti-intervention/liberation support and religion. Some 33 organizations were represented, and of these 33, some 19 were represented by women or included women in their delegations. This conference marked the first stage of their campaign, spearheading increased support and participation by many segments of the black community in a national effort. Since then, the National Black Organizers Campaign has held local forums, follow-up training workshops, a tour of the South by the national coordinators, and another large national conference in September. Resist's grant of \$600 went towards the costs of this recent national conference.

AMES (The Association of Salvadoran Women), P.O. Box 40311, San Francisco, CA 94140


AMES is a voice, a tool, a collective means through which Salvadoran women can work for equality and justice currently lacking in their homeland. AMES was legally constituted in September 1979 at an assembly honoring activist Isaura Gomez and her 12 year old daughter, both assassinated by Salvadoran security forces. Since 1979, over 10,000 women in El Salvador have

joined AMES. Chapters have been opened in the U.S., Canada, Nicaragua and Europe. As a broad-based democratic organization composed of Salvadoran women without regard for religion, education, or social class, their membership includes homemakers, peasants, students, professionals, laborers, market vendors, and refugees. AMES provides Salvadoran women with the organizing, leadership, and media skills essential to the participation in community projects, events and decisions. By necessity, their advocacy must currently focus on securing the basics of survival — drinking water, food, housing, medical care and fair wages. Ultimately, they seek to transform El Salvador into a society which honors human rights, equality for women, and the well-being of its children. In the U.S. and Canada their goal is to educate North Americans about conditions in El Salvador, especially as they affect women and children, in order to create active opposition to U.S. intervention in El Salvador. Resist's grant of \$600 went towards the publicity for a film, "For a Woman in El Salvador," which AMES will use in its organizing efforts.

ADAPT (American Disabled for Access Public Transit), 4536 East Colfax, Denver, CO 80220.

ADAPT is a national coalition of severely disabled people, most of whom live on a benefit income of \$350 per month. Members of this coalition are veterans of several national actions and protests in the struggle for their right to ride public transportation. Led by disabled community organizers from the Atlantis Community in Denver, they have learned to define their issues, strategize actions to win them, carry out public protests, talk to the press, resort to civil disobedience and go to jail, thereby overcoming their personal and public images as objects of pity to become people of power. During October 1985, the American Public Transit Association (APTA), which represents all transit districts in

the U.S. and which has denied people with disabilities access to buses, will hold its convention in Los Angeles. ADAPT is planning to bring 300 disabled protestors to LA to push for their demands for accessible public transit. They are demanding that APTA go on record calling for 100% accessibility for all public transit systems; that APTA serve notice on all bus manufacturers that its members will buy only wheelchair accessible buses; that APTA urge the federal government to reinstate the regulation mandating that all public transit be accessible to all people. A Resist grant of \$300 will be used to assist ADAPT in paying telephone bills incurred in organizing this national action.



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