Trinity College Digital Repository

Resist Newsletters

Resist Collection

1-31-1985

Resist Newsletter, Jan. 1985

Resist

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/resistnewsletter

Recommended Citation

Resist, "Resist Newsletter, Jan. 1985" (1985). *Resist Newsletters*. 179. https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/resistnewsletter/179





Newsletter #172

A call to resist illegitimate authority

January 1985

The Pentagon's Plans for the Philippines

ERIK GUYOT

he crumbling hold of the Marcos Government combined with the strategic importance ascribed to the Philippines make this country one of the major "hot spots" for U.S. policy makers. Yet, while news of U.S. military intervention in Central America and Lebanon fills the headlines, the Pentagon is quietly laying the groundwork for possible military intervention in America's largest ex-colony.

Over the past year there has been a flurry of activity both in Congress and the Administration aimed at containing the Philippine crisis. Since last January, a steady stream of U.S. military and intelligence officials from the Philippines have brought back alarming reports on the rapid growth of the rural insurgency. This fall, House Democrats called hearings to determine how to "pull the rug out" from under these 10,000-15,000 armed guerrillas. For the past four months high-level representatives from the State Department, the Pentagon, Treasury, CIA, and other intelligence agencies have been meeting bi-weekly to formulate the U.S. response to the opposition movement in the Philippines.



JOINT U.S.-PHILLIPPINE MILITARY EXERCISES, MAY, 1983

Despite this activity, however, U.S. policy has been marked by considerable flux and turmoil. Different branches of the Reagan Administration are pulling at Philippine policy in opposite directions. While the State Department has pressured President

Marcos to make limited political reforms so as to create political space for the pro-U.S. elements of the opposition, at the same time the Treasury Department has called for an austerity program which would further polarize

Continued on page Two

Continued from page One

Philippine society. When Reagan symbolically cancelled a scheduled visit to the Philippines last fall, it appeared as though the U.S. was gradually distancing itself from the unpopular regime. But, then the great communicator torpedoed the State Department's carefully constructed distancing effort during the presidential debate when he declared that he would not countenance "throwing them [Marcos] to the wolves and then facing the communist power in the Pacific."

Throughout the bureaucratic infighting over U.S. policy one actor has consistently had the last word on the Philippines. Other agencies may quarrell over different "reform" programs, but the Pentagon has held to the bottom line position of protecting its military bases in the Philippines. This outlook is evident during Congressional testimony: State Department officials equivocate about "non-interference," Pentagon officials are as blunt as is their program to transform the Philippine military into an effective counterinsurgency force. One assistant Secretary of Defense had no qualms in referring to \$85 million worth of night vision devices and fire control equipment as "move, shoot, and communicate items" which would "bolster counterinsurgency capabilities."

U.S. Bases - U.S. Interests

The Pentagon's real estate in the Philippines — Clark airbase and Subic naval base — encompass an area of approximately 25,000 acres, about twice the size of Manhattan. These two bases are unquestionably the largest and most important U.S. military bases overseas. Clark airfield serves as the headquarters for the 13th Air Force and boasts the most sophisticated gunnery and air combat practice range in Asia. Subic Bay, forward operating port for the U.S. carrier Task Force 77, is the largest naval supply base in the Western Pacific and is widely believed to be the main depot for U.S. nuclear weapons in the region.

The array of training, intelligence, storage, and repair facilities at Clark and Subic, plus the 15,000 military personnel which service them, make the bases the fulcrum of U.S. military power in the Pacific. For conventional warfare capabilities, the bases are crucial for projecting power to the Southeast Asian mainland and the Middle East. During the Vietnam war, Clark served as a major airlift and refueling center for the U.S. airwar. Currently, any major projection of force into the Middle East ultimately depends upon logistical support from Subic Bay. Sustained military action in the Middle East by the much heralded Rapid Deployment Force would rapidly draw down the limited supplies positioned in the Indian Ocean and would require convoys of the material from the Philippines. Carrier task forces from subic are regularly deployed in the Persian Gulf region during Mideast flare-ups such as: the Iranian crisis, the Iraq-Iran war, and the North and South Yemen border war.

Also important are the string of U.S. ASAT (anti-satellite) tracking stations; C3I (Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence) facilities; and Anti-Submarine warfare stations in the Philippines. These facilities form an integral part of the U.S. monitoring system which enhances U.S. nuclear warfighting capability by allowing selective "counterforce" targetting of Soviet missiles and submarines. While removal of these facilities would not hurt U.S. deterrence capabilities, it would reduce U.S. first-strike capability. In addition, the strategic significance of these bases makes them a magnet for Soviet attack in the advent of a nuclear war: SS-20 missiles in Eastern Russia are targetted at these bases.1


Although strategic concerns have been paramount in determining U.S. policy towards the Philippines, economic interests are also considerable. Direct U.S. investment in the Philippines totals more than \$1.3 billion and last year's trade with the Philippines was \$4 billion. U.S. business interests are most apparent in the so-called "export processing zones" or reduced tax enclaves for foreign textile and semiconductor sweatshops, and immense U.S. banana and pineapple plantations. Due to the expansion of pineapple plantations such as Dole's 18,000 acre holding, one of every three cans of pineapples on supermarket shelves are from the Philippines.

Finally, the military and economic importance of the Philippines is increased by its role in providing "stability" for "America's New Frontier" — the Pacific Rim. Stretching from Australian and Micronesia up through Southeast Asia, China, South Korea, and Japan this dynamic area is the fastest growing region of U.S. trade, having outstripped Europe four years ago. Due to its location on the South China Sea, Pentagon officials point out that the Philippines controls both the vital sea lanes to mineral rich Southeast Asia and oil supply routes to Japan.

Following the assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino Jr. on August 21, 1983, Washington focused its attention on the urban unrest sparked by the killing. The assassination stripped away whatever remaining legitimacy the Marcos government had, pushing a large segment of the middle classes and business classes into active opposition for the first time. Soon a loose working coalition between the popular opposition and the pro-U.S. elite opposition developed. In response, Washington sought to split that coalition and isolate the left through a two-tracked program.

The first track consisted of pressure on Marcos from the State Department and Congress to set up an "independent" commission to investigate the assassination. Although the stated purpose of the commission was to bring Aquino's killers to justice, its primary aim was not justice per se but to diffuse the increasingly militant assassination

Continued on page Six



Nicaraguan Elections: Whose Sham?

MARTIN DISKIN

n November 4th, the Nicaraguan people went to the polls to elect a President, Vice-President, and a ninety-six member National Assembly. The Reagan administration has professed great support for elections in certain places, but not in Nicaragua. United States support for democracy in Nicaragua is expressed by its creation, financing and training of the contras whose constant attacks on the civilian population have "neutralized" numerous women. children, and agricultural workers. The U.S. has sabotaged diplomatic peace initiatives, and has engaged in an economic boycott ostensibly to convince the Nicaraguans to hold an election. When an election was announced, Washington did its best to prevent it from occuring. It started a campaign of villification and other efforts, including bribery, to prevent participation of Nicaraguan parties. Who's shamming here?

The Nicaraguan election represents the fulfillment of a promise. Not, according to Kirkpatrick, a promise made to the OAS about creating a liberal, mildly reformist regime after overthrowing Somoza in 1979. Rather, it was the promise made by Daniel Ortega in a speech to the Nicaraguan people on August 23, 1980. At that time he said that elections would occur within five years. He further stated that preparations would be begun in 1983. Both promises have been kept.

The election came a bit earlier than stated, primarily for defensive reasons. Because of the mounting hostility from the United States, the Sandinistas may have felt that scheduling it two days before the American election might deter any American aggression because of the presidential campaign here. Also, it might be a bit harder to invade Nicaragua after they held a valid election.

The U.S. fostered attack on the Nicaraguan elections had such little ef-



Nicaraguan voters await the opening of the polls

fect that a more insidious and provocative effort was begun. The leaked story about MIG's arriving in Nicaragua represented the next stage of hostility against a country that dared hold an election not approved by Washington.

The Anti-Election Campaign

The efforts to discredit and undermine the election began even before the February 1984 announcement of the November date. In December of 1983. after the first announced intention of holding elections, a list of nine points, stated as "requirements for authentic elections" was published by a coalition of opposition groups, the Coordinadora. This coalition included four conservative opposition parties (the Social Christian party [PSC], The Liberal Constitutionalist Party [PLC], Social Democratic Party [PSD], and the Nicaraguan Conservative Party [PCN], not legally recognized), the private sector council (COSEP), two small trade union federations, the Catholic Church hierarchy, and the opposition newspaper, La Prensa. Among the points were demands concerning conditions for campaigning such as access to the media, abolition of censorship, and relaxation of emergency restrictions on freedom of assembly. These demands were almost completely met. In addition, however,

the list included points that implied a thorough overhaul of the political system as a precondition for participating. They demanded a separation of the FSLN (the Sandinista party) from the state, particularly with regard to the Army, the police, television, and mass organizations such as the CDS's (Sandinista Defense Committees). They also called for a repeal of certain laws that nationalized private property. Most provocative to the Sandinistas, however, was the demand that the government negotiate directly with the leadership of the contras. The Sandinistas had already declared an amnesty for the vast majority of contra fighters but had refused to negotiate with the contra leadership that had made no bones about its open support for the Somoza regime. This point was immediately and definitely rejected.

In late July, the Coordinadora named Arturo Cruz and Adan Fletes as their candidates for president and vicepresident. Cruz, who has lived outside of Nicaragua for the last ten years, served as Nicaragua's ambassador in Washington for several months, and at that time was an officer of the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington. Immediately on arriving in

Continued on page Four

Nicaragua

Continued from page Three

Participating Parties and Share of the Vote-1984

	#of votes	% of	
Party	(President)	Valid Votes	Assembly Seats
FSLN	735,967	67.0	61
PCD	154,327	14.0	14
PLI	105,560	9.6	9
PPSC	61,199	5.6	6
PC de N	16,034	1.5	2
PSN	14,494	1.3	2
MAP-ML	11,352	1.0	2
Null	71,209		nenced an T ikenflowning
Total	1,170,142	100.0	96

Managua on July 22, 1984, he announced that the Coordinadora would not participate in the election unless the December 1983 nine points were agreed to. He further stressed the demand that the contra leaders be included in a dialogue as a "basic condition." Three days later, on the deadline for registration of parties, after conversation with the American ambassador, he stated that the coordinadora would boycott the elections. Cruz's actions convinced many people that his sole purpose for returning to Nicaragua was to discredit the electoral process. Although he was not an official candidate, Cruz traveled through Nicaragua holding campaign rallies. At some of these rallies, supporters of the coordinadora and FSLN youth clashed.

Still, the coordinadora publicly demanded a postponement of the election. A round of negotiations began in Rio de Janeiro at a meeting of the Socialist International, mediated by Willy Brandt. Although it appeared that an agreement was close, negotiations abruptly ended with a government announcement that the elections would continue as planned without the coordinadora. In those discussions, the Sandinistas considered a postponement of the election to permit the coordinadora to enter the race. By this time the coordinadora had dropped its demand that the contras be included and appeared to be offering to mediate a cease-fire of the contras in return. However many observers are convinced that the coordinadora had no intention of participating in the elections since its December 1983 declaration. Further, although Cruz may personally disapprove of the contras, the parties he represented would never have agreed to support or arrange a cease fire. Cruz himself called the *contras* "our esteemed fellow citizens who chose the route of war," after a onehour meeting with Secretary of State George Shultz on October 30, five days before the election.

The Parties

Seven political parties were represented in the election (see box), three to the right of the Sandinistas and three to the left. One of them, the Liberal Independent Party (PLI) announced near the end of the campaign that it was withdrawing from the election. Its presidential candidate Virgilio Godoy stated that free elections were not possible. Still, the vice-presidential candidate Constantino Pereira, and many PLI candidates for the National Assembly, as well as many regional party committees, continued to campaign and supported participation. Although the decision to withdraw was a party decision, the necessary step, that of submitting a letter of withdrawal to the Supreme Electoral Commission (CSE), was not done until after the ballots were printed and distributed to the regional polling centers. This hesitation represented a deep split in the party and insufficient unanimity to withdraw. When it still seemed that the PLI would not run, its vice-presidential candidate went on television and in the newspapers to say that he was not withdrawing and continued to seek votes. He told me that only by participating could he and his party have any influence on the process. Further, he felt that withdrawing would only encourage certain elements in the U.S. to believe they could invade.

The U.S. Role

United States diplomats were very active during the campaign. They included Langhorne Motley, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Harry Schlaudeman, special envoy for Central America. Ambassador Harry Bergold and his political officer, J. Michael Joyce, freely and frequently expressed the wish of the United States government that the opposition parties of the right refuse to participate as the coordinadora had done. However, this meddling did not stop with advice. In an interview with the presidential candidate of the Conservative Democratic Party (PCD), Dr. Clemente Guido, he told me that several of his party's leaders had been offered money by the U.S. embassy. When I asked him if these "persuasions," as he called them, matched the amount of money each party received from the national electoral commission, he said that since it was in dollars, it was much more than the 9 million cordobas. The U.S., on the one hand, created a barrage of invective toward the Sandinistas, insisting that they hold elections, but also tried to abort them by dirty tricks. Someone is shamming, indeed!

The Election

Ninety-three percent of the eligible voters in Nicaragua had registered in a four-day campaign last July. On Nov. 4th the procedure for voting consisted of presenting the registration card to verify eligibility; receiving a ballot, marking it inside a booth, and depositing it in a box; dipping one's finger in red ink; turning in the card; and leaving. The members of the election board (Junta Receptora de Votos)



Sandinista Candidate Ortega

were very well trained. Each voter was given verbal instructions stressing the maintenance of secrecy and the freedom to vote for the party of ones choice. The ballot was completely secret, sometimes behind a curtain or in a seperate room. In the eleven polling places I visited during the day, there were no disturbances. Voters freely expressed their ideas about the vote, including some strong opposition sentiments from people who were not voting.

Contrasting this election with the two rounds of voting I witnessed last March and May in El Salvador, there was a notably freer atmosphere in Nicaragua than in El Salvador. None of the pre-election conflict even vaguely matched the lethal violence that is a regular feature of politics in El Salvador. In Nicaragua, all parties of the opposition that wished to participate did so. In El Salvador, opposition groups' security could not be guaranteed against death squad activity, even by the government.

The election campaign was more focused on issues in Nicaragua. In El Salvador, it consisted of invective, insult, and threat. The voting public learned little in the Salvadoran campaign except that hatred separated the contending parties and candidates. In El Salvador, in part because each citizen must prove he or she voted on request from the police and the army by showing a stamp on ones ID card, people went to the polls in large numbers. Once there, their vote was hardly secret, since the ballot boxes were transparent and people were usually milling in the vicinity. Many voters in the lines in Nicaragua expressed a sentiment I did not hear in El Salvador when they said that this was the first free election they had attended.

Consequences

It was clear from observing this election that it was, as a delegation of the Latin American Studies Association stated in their report, "a model of probity and fairness." This seemed to be the overwhelming view of the numerous observers from Europe and Latin America. In short, the Reagan administration claim that this was a "Soviet style sham," although freely reported in the press, failed to convince any serious observer. This election gave a mandate of 63% of the vote to the FSLN as well as institutionalizing an opposition with more than a third of the seats in the National Assembly. Many points of procedure and policy have already been negotiated between the FSLN and other parties not only as a result of the election, but during the party summit held in October. More discussions continued during the national dialogue that included over thirty interest groups from all social sectors. The Sandinista social and political project, definitely socialist in nature, is being defined in a way reflecting the special attributes of that country. Although under great stress from the United States, Nicaragua has succeeded in taking the first step in building a new social system. For that, Washington believes it should suffer.

Beginning on election day, stories leaked from the Pentagon about alleged MIG's appeared to whip up the American people into a frame of mind sympathetic to further aggression. The defeated Democrats, apparently unwilling to oppose Reagan on the Central America issue both during and after the campaign, rushed to outdo each other in warlike statements. Sen. Tsongas said that if there were MIGs in the crates, "we would have to take them out."

The U.S. has given lip service to diplomacy only in order to hide its real military intentions. When Nicaragua agreed to sign the Contadora draft treaty on October 15th, the Reagan administration became the laughing stock of the international community as it suddenly discovered that the treaty was "deficient." When the U.S. loses a round in this way, it turns ugly. Nicaragua may now be in greater danger than ever because the U.S. is fast abandoning the pretense that it favors a negotiated settlement to the conflict or that it is willing to reach a political understanding with the Sandinistas.

Significantly, various solidarity groups, and many other concerned people, have begun mobilizing to prevent a possible escalation of violence against Nicaragua. Reminiscent of the pledge to resist illegitimate authority around which Resist was founded. there is a new pledge to engage in resistance if there is an escalation in Central America. Congress has proven a thin reed against administration manipulation. Perhaps in some new committee assignments (Senate Intelligence Oversight) the Reagan administration's desire to make war in Central America can be slowed down. But the real message that Washington may heed is that we will not permit another United States juggernaut to roll over a poor third world country trying to liberate itself. By resisting our government's perverse application of power, as we did in Vietnam, we might begin to give voice to the many Americans who were so poorly represented in the last election.

Martin Diskin, a professor of anthropology at M.I.T., is a long-time friend of Resist. He has written extensively about Central America including his latest book entitled, Trouble in Our Back Yard: Central America and the United States in the 1980's. Published by Pantheon Books, 1984.

Note: For an extensive analysis of the current situation in Honduras, we encourage Resist readers to contact the Christic Institute which recently published a tabloid entitled: *Honduras: A Look at the Reality.* Their address is 1324 North Capitol St. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 797-8106

HELP WANTED:

RED SUN PRESS, A COLLEC-TIVELY-RUN, HIGH QUALITY PRINT SHOP IS LOOKING FOR A PRESS OPERATOR AND A STRIP-PER, WITH AT LEAST TWO YEARS EXPERIENCE. MUST HAVE COMMITMENT TO ANTI-CAPITALIST POLITICS. CALL RED SUN PRESS, M-F, 9-5:30, 617-524-6822

Phillipines

Continued from page Two

protests. The commission Marcos chose, and especially its chair, retired justice Corazon Agrava, seemed well suited for the task. Its extreme reluctance to investigate too closely to Marcos for fear of the resulting political turmoil was well expressed in Agrava's bed time prayers: "I'm not asking you necessarily, Lord, to tell us who pulled the trigger or who was behind who pulled the trigger. But please, please, lead us to a conclusion that will bring peace and harmony to my Filipino brothers and sisters."

The second, and more important track, was pressure from the State Department for the elite opposition to participate in the May 1984 National Assembly elections. Immediately after the August assassination virtually every segment of the opposition had announced that it would boycott the upcoming elections rather than grant the Marcos regime legitimacy since the National Assembly held no real power and fair elections were impossible as long as Marcos ruled by decree.

But after years of claiming that demands for free elections in the Philippines would constitute undue intervention, the State Department began pressuring Marcos for some limited election reforms and launched an intense lobbying effort to persuade the elite opposition to participate. As to whether the election was intended to result in any real power sharing, State Department officials predicted that Marcos would allow the opposition to win at most 30-40 seats out of 200. Central to this two-track strategy was the perception that the U.S. could distance itself from Marcos and pressure him to make significant concessions to the elite opposition.²

Last Spring that strategy seemed to be working. In February, State Department officials were pleased to note that the Agrava commission "has contributed significantly to lowering the political temperature of the country over the past months." The unexpected success of the moderate opposition in gaining 60 seats despite massive fraud seemed to confirm that Marcos would continue the process of slowly opening up the political system to the elite opposition.

Things soon went awry, however. Public pressure on the Agrava commission forced it to probe closer to Marcos than intended, yet it was widely criticized as a whitewash for not implicating Marcos himself. Marcos' refusal to share power with the opposition in the National Assembly and his continued use of decree making powers appeared to vindicate the position of the boycott movement. By September, the main political arena was not the National Assembly and its handful of opposition members, but the "parliament of the streets" and its thousands of demonstrators.

U.S. Policy at Cross-Purposes

Marcos's refusal to share power brought the divergent aims of the various branches of U.S. policy making bureaucracy more sharply into conflict. The State Department's policy of opening up the political system a bit and building the base of the elite opposition rested upon reversing the political polarization fueled by the economic crisis. Thus the State Department pushed for the accelerated disbursement of last year's \$50 million in economic assistance to bail out the Philippine financial system.

Since the State Department views the Philippine crisis as primarily economic and political in origin, not military, it looked favorably upon the plan of Rep. Stephen Solarz for a massive economic aid package to the Philippines. This proposal by the influential chair of the House Asian and Pacific Affairs sub-committee for a "Shultz Plan" would pump billions of aid into the Philippines provided Marcos opened up the economic and political system to free competition.

In contrast, the Treasury department, more attuned to the interests of the U.S. financial community, has prescribed a tough IMF austerity program to insure payment of the Philippines' \$30 billion foreign debt. Skeptical of Marcos' intentions to fully comply with the IMF program, at one point Treasury took the almost unprecedented step of vetoing a \$150 million World Bank agriculture loan to the Philippines. While State lobbied hard for the sorely needed fertilizer and pesticide funds, Treasury prevailed and the U.S.'s symbolic vote against the loan sent shock waves throughout Manila.

A clear example of the Treasury Department's austerity program and the State Department's process of political "normalization" working at cross purposes came last June. Key elements of the IMF program that Treasury backed were a devaluation of the peso and increasing consumer taxes. In exchange the IMF would provide the Philippines with a \$630 million bridging loan and its stamp of approval needed to unlock \$.16 billion in private bank loans. To fulfill the tax requirement, Marcos secretly filed two decrees raising taxes which immediately caused an uproar in Manila. Less than one month after the elections which supposedly signalled the end to Marcos' use of decree making powers. the President had subverted the process towards "normalcy" to comply with the pending IMF agreement. A similar situation occured in October, when barely 7 days after the IMF agreement was signed, new gas taxes demanded by the IMG touched off a massive transit strike throughout the Philippines.

Meanwhile, Pentagon officials argued before Congress that although economic and political reforms were important, "there is a military element to the Philippine government's response which is essential and cannot be ignored." Thus while Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage praised Chairman Solarz's New York Times Op-Ed piece on the "Shultz Plan" as "very helpful" he strenuously objected to Solarz's proposal to shift some of the \$85 million in military aid to economic aid.

The 98th Congress did change the figures on the Administration's aid package of \$180 million in combined economic and military aid by setting military aid at \$40 million and economoc aid at \$140 million. That Congress blocked \$45 million of the Pentagon's military aid request was due to a concerted lobbying effort by anti-interventionist and Philippine human rights groups. For while Solarz was maneuvering for basically cosmetic shifts in U.S. aid, he was also fighting off an amendment by Rep. Tony Hall of Ohio to cut all military aid to the Philippines. Despite intense opposition from Solarz and other congressional leaders, the Hall amendment had surprising strength garnering 149 votes.

Although this year Pentagon officials received 'only' \$40 million in military aid (roughly two-thirds the level sent to El Salvador last year), the prospects for further increases look good. For one, the mechanics of a \$900 million rent agreement for the U.S.

Phillipines

Continued from page Three



military bases (split 50-50 economic and military) mean that a decrease in military aid one year automatically causes an increase in subsequent years. Moreover, the bottom line assessment both in Congress and the Reagan Administration is that since the U.S. military bases must stay any threat to the bases must be crushed.

The dispute between Congress and the Administration is over tactics: representing cold war liberals, Rep. Solarz believes in primarily economic and political solutions to "pull the rug out" from under a growing insurgency; the Pentagon wants a military solution. Thus Congressman Solarz's Op-Ed piece was indeed "very helpful" to the Pentagon since it was the first salvo by the mainstream media in raising the spector of the New People's Army.

The New People's Army (NPA) is the fastest growing insurgency in Asia, if not the world. Numbering approximately 10,000 armed regulars, the NPA can call upon another 10,000 irregular forces and an estimated 200,000 active supporters. (For comparison, FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador number some 9-12,000.) Although the NPA is formally the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, most of its members are drawn from the rural poor and tribal minorities. Pentagon officials such as Armitage frankly acknowledge that economic injustices and abuse by the Philippine military are the main source of NPA popular support. As for arms, the Pentagon admits that the NPA receives "no apparent external support" and that its indigenous nature "is one of the most troubling aspects of the insurgency."

Over the years NPA activity has increased so that it now operates in 53 of the Philippines' 73 provinces and effectively controls 20% of all Philippine villages. In the past, the NPA took advantage of the Philippines' rugged terrain and numerous islands by operating in small, highly mobile units. Now activity has been stepped up to include larger sized units of up to 100 guerrillas. Some sources predict that within two years, the NPA will have achieved rough parity with the Philippine military. Pentagon officials also warn that if present trends continue, "the balance of power could favor the insurgents within the next several years."

The Pentagon's Counterinsurgency Program

U.S. policy entered a new phase and focused on the countryside when Washington was jolted by alarming reports on the NPA's growth. In August, Admiral William Crowe Jr., CINCPAC commander of all U.S. forces in the Pacific, returned from a fact finding tour of the Philippines. Crowe, perhaps one of the most influential shapers of U.S. policy for the Pacific, was reportedly "very distressed" with the poor performance of the Philippine military.

At Admiral Crowe's insistence, a high-level interagency task force was established in August to map out a response to the insurgency. The task forces' representatives from the State Department, Pentagon, Treasury, and intelligence agencies are expected to soon forward their classified report to the National Security Council. Some observers point out that the emergence of similar interagency groups in the early 1960s preceded the decision for massive U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

The type of military aid currently sent to the Philippines and the U.S. efforts with the Salvadoran military suggest the basic contours of the Pentagon's counterinsurgency program. As in El Salvador, the Pentagon seeks to "professionalize" the Philippine military by removing the so-called political generals who are "affected by bad habits of corruption" and replacing them with combat seasoned Jr. officers. Thus, last month's removal of Philippine Chief of Staff Gen. Fabian Ver, because of his role in the Aquino assassination, and his replacement by the West Point-trained Fidel Ramos was probably well received by the Pentagon.

Until recently, the Philippine military relied on strategic hamletting to contain the NPA and the Muslin seperatist Moro National Liberation Front, subjecting some 500,000 Filipinos to that process. Now, however, the Philippine military no longer has the capacity for such troop-intensive programs, but instead conducts large-scale sweeps. The main components of U.S. aid — aircraft, light armored vehicles, and amphibious vehicles - are geared towards providing the mobility and firepower necessary for these sweeps. U.S. military analysts are probably watching El Salvador's new air war with 700 man mobile helicopter battalions and its applicability to the Philippines.

Another aspect of the counterinsurgency program U.S. military officials want the Philippines to implement are "training programs to sharpen counterguerrilla warfare skills." Not long after the U.S. had, in its words, "relayed our concerns," Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile unveiled a new four-point counterinsurgency plan.

If these new efforts by the Philippine military fail, the U.S. may seek closer coordination with its personnel at Clark and Subic. In the mid-1970s Green Berets from Clark engaged in small scale "civic actions" in guerrilla areas. Back then, Clark airfield also provided logistical and air support for the Philippine military. In addition, the annual joint U.S.-Philippine maneuvers have been stepped-up in recent years.

The mere presence of the U.S. bases in the Philippines would make direct U.S. military intervention relatively easy logistically. Direct intervention, should it occur, would likely begin with incremental steps, but with the position of the U.S. bases, it could escalate rapidly. Given the Reagan Administration's propensity for gunboats over diplomacy, the temptation for military

Continued on page Eight

San Diego County Draft Resisters Defense Fund, PO Box 33544, San Diego, CA 92103.

In September the Draft Resisters Defense Fund (DRDF) submitted a proposal to us on behalf of the Project on Youth and Non-Military Opportunities (YANO). Project YANO was initiated by a coalition of groups with a long history of anti-military activity. Among these groups are San Diego CARD, San Diego National Lawyers Guild Chapter, the DRDF and the San Diego Peace Resource Center. Because of their anti-military activities, these groups had encountered difficulties in gaining acceptance for their work in high schools. The purpose of project YANO is to increase the effectiveness of their outreach work in high schools and to young people. Some of the goals of project YANO are to challenge the presence of military recruiters and Selective Serive personnel in high schools; to educate young people on issues of draft registration, poverty draft, militarism and the Solomon amendments: and reduce the effectiveness of the poverty draft. Additionally, those at project YANO hope to promote networking among community and student groups. Some strategies for obtaining these goals are to gain equal access for counter draft and recruitment materials in schools, and to institute a campaign against high school use of Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery Test. Project YANO will use Resist's grant to produce a brochure on nonmilitary opportunities for youth, including Solomon alternatives.

Great Speckled Bird, PO Box 4532, Atlanta, GA 30302.

The Bird, Atlanta's progressive monthly, is back in print and looking better than ever! The Bird was originally established in 1968, the impetus for its founding growing out of mounting opposition to the Vietnam War and the recognition that the southern "establishment" press did not cover subjects that challenged the local business elite. For seven years the Bird was the voice for anti-war, civil rights, feminist, gay and environmental concerns in Atlanta. And once again, the Bird is pitting itself against the establishment press and the local business community. Numerous community organizations. a progressive city council and a strong civil rights tradition are the ingredients which make it possible for the Bird to fly again. In the first several issues — which are published monthly — the Great Speckled Bird printed articles on "Abortion Bigots Hit Feminist Clinic" (Sep. '84), "Arab Rights Attacked on West Bank" (Sep. '84), 'Is El Salvador Spanish for Viet Nam?" (Aug. '84), and "Inside the Democratic Convention" (Aug. '84), as well as articles on numerous, and controversial, local issues. Resist wishes the Bird many successful years in print and hope the headliner which they purchased with our grant makes their work go a little smoother.

Federation for Progress, PO Box 2132, Gary, IN 46409.

The Gary chapter of the Federation for Progress (FFP) and its affiliates: Calumet Women United Against Rape, Calumet Unemployed Workers Center, Gary Welfare Rights Organization and Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament have won the reputation in Gary of being grassroots fighters and winners as a result of thir struggles with local utilities, the welfare department, against home foreclosures and for their strong stand for peace and justice. FFP has called successful demonstrations that have won the support of local labor unions, women's groups and others working for social justice. Resist's grant helped FFP set up their office and produce a brochure about their work.

Giveus	the word.W	Ell send you the Bird.
The Great Speckled alternative newsp to you. 15 issues	BIRD Atlanta's aper will be sent of log Send the BIRD Y Send the BO Box 4532 Atlante Ge 30302	
'Heres my 10 (cesh c Send the BIRD to 1	his address.*	alas music persented, ve a a depute between Commenced range
ADDRESS	ZIP	The sector of the sector of the sector

Phillipines

Continued from page Seven

intervention will increase as the strength of the opposition movement continues to build.

(Next month, the Philippine opposition)

Erik Guyot is the Co-Director of the Congressional Liaison Unit of the Philippine Support Committee. For more information please write to: Philippine Support Committee, 1346 Connecticut Ave. NW, Room 533, Washington, DC 20036. 1. A comprehensive analysis of the U.S. bases is provided in "U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines" available for \$2.50 through Philippine Support Committee, or Asia Resource Center, P.O. Box 15275, Washington D.C., 20003.

2. For a thorough analysis of the Philippine elections see "U.S.-Sponsored Elections in El Salvador and the Philippines," Walden Bello and Edward S. Herman, (World Policy Journal, Summer 1984).