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RESIST

Newsletter #170

A call to resist illegitimate authority


November 1984

U.S. Ready to Intervene in Gulf War

JOE STORK
MARTHA WENGER

This article, which is reprinted from MERIP Reports, July-September 1984, outlines the history of U.S. involvement in the Iran-Iraq war. While we recognize that this article is a bit more "technical" than the material which usually appears in Resist, we felt it important to cover a subject which has been given little coverage in either the mainstream or the left press. As with the conflicts in Central America, this is another region where the U.S. is using the promise of military weapons and support to bend the political tide in its favor. Unlike response to intervention in Central America, there is little vocal opposition to or familiarity with U.S. involvement in this war. We urge everyone to learn more about the conflict in the gulf. For more information we recommend the special July-September issue of MERIP. Single copies are \$4.50 and can be obtained by writing the Middle East Research and Information Project, Box 1247, NY, NY 10025. Subscriptions to MERIP are \$18/year. — Eds.

The current phase of the war between Iran and Iraq has prompted a level of U.S. military intervention in the Gulf region that is new and unprecedented in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and holds the risk of a more direct combat role on Iraq's



USS Midway battle group in the Indian Ocean.

behalf. Since early 1983, the stalemate in the war appeared to be working in Iran's favor. Its greater weight in terms of population and economic resources gave it the edge in a strategy of attrition. Beginning in the fall of 1983, Iraq threatened to counter by attacking Iran's oil exporting capacity. This campaign finally began in March and April 1984, with missile attacks against oil tankers near Iran's Kharg Island loading facility. Iran's measured response — "an eye for two eyes," as one U.S. official put it — forced a two week halt in this phase of the war, although Iraq resumed these attacks at

the end of June. Iran, meanwhile, has had several hundred thousand combatants, perhaps half a million, poised along the southern front for another "final offensive." Most observers believe that whatever the differences within the Islamic Republic leadership there will indeed be one more major offensive. If this offensive fails, the war will nevertheless go on, at least at the level of continued border clashes, for as long as the two major protagonists, Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, remain in power.

Continued on Page Three

THE PLEDGE OF RESISTANCE

If the United States invades, bombs, sends combat troops, or otherwise significantly escalates its intervention in Nicaragua or El Salvador, I pledge to join with others to engage in acts of nonviolent direct action at U.S. federal facilities, including U.S. federal buildings, military installations, congressional offices, offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other appropriate places. I pledge to engage in nonviolent civil disobedience in order to prevent or halt the death and destruction which such military action would cause for the people of Central America.

Name (Print) _____

Signature _____

Address _____

City/State _____ Zip _____

Tel. _____ Do you need nonviolence training? _____

Name of affinity group _____

THE PLEDGE OF WITNESS AND SUPPORT

If the United States invades, bombs, sends combat troops, or otherwise significantly escalates its intervention in Nicaragua or El Salvador, I pledge to join others in protesting that military action by nonviolently vigiling at U.S. federal facilities and other appropriate places. I also pledge to support those who engage in acts of nonviolent civil disobedience in order to prevent or halt further death and destruction in Central America.

Name (Print) _____

Signature _____

City/State _____ Zip _____

Tel. _____ Do you need nonviolence training? _____

Name of affinity group _____

_____ Please contact me concerning pre-invasion vigils and actions.

_____ I would like to volunteer to work on the EMERGENCY RESPONSE NETWORK.

_____ Suggested donation of \$2 or more to help meet the expenses involved in organizing this pledge. (Make checks payable to EMERGENCY RESPONSE NETWORK.)

Please mail this pledge to:

EMERGENCY RESPONSE NETWORK
American Friends Service Committee,
2160 Lake Street, San Francisco, CA 94121 (415) 752-7766

letters

Combatting Homophobia

Dear Friends:

A few issues ago you published a gratuitous editorial that, after a few paragraphs of waffling and foot-shuffling, came down against supporting gay rights struggles within the military. I was not the only one to write in protest of the implicit homophobia of those remarks. I see from the July/August issue's page 2 article "We Are Everywhere!" that indeed your thinking is changed. That last paragraph deserves to be carved in stone for all future generations of strugglers.

But there are apparently those who can't overcome their homophobia so successfully, namely the letter-writers whom you've answered so eloquently. The enclosed check will make up for one month of canceled pledges. It is sent with the hope that many more Resist supporters will respond in a similar fashion.

Eric Gordon
NY, NY



ILLEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
Funding social change since 1967

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Gulf War

Continued from Page One

This prescription would seem to fit the objective of the United States as formulated recently by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, who told a congressional committee that "a victory by either side is neither militarily achievable nor strategically desirable."¹ Since last fall, though, Washington's strategic desire to see no victor in the Gulf war has required a greater U.S. political and even military intervention on Iraq's behalf. "We want to keep Iraq in the field and get the war ended," was how one State Department official characterized Washington's definition of neutrality.²

Washington's neutrality has been extremely flexible from the beginning of this war. Iraq relied heavily on Western intelligence evaluations of Iranian military capabilities when it invaded Iran in September 1980, and leading Iranian counterrevolutionary figures such as General Gholam Ali Oveissi visited Washington and Baghdad in the weeks prior to the war.

Once full-scale war erupted, U.S. military involvement in the region, if not with the combatants themselves, became significant. Four days after the Iraqi invasion, on September 26, 1980, the CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia dispatched an urgent but vague message that the kingdom's leaders wanted U.S. military help. High level Carter administration officials met to assemble a series of options and debate which one they would like the Saudis to request. Defense Secretary Harold Brown and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski saw the crisis as an opportunity to transfer to Saudi Arabia 40 F-14 fighter planes from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Eisenhower, already in the Arabian Sea, a similar number of F-15 fighters from U.S. air bases, and to send several hundred U.S. military technicians to operate Hawk anti-aircraft missiles there. In the view of some military officers, the war gave the U.S. leverage to extract more intimate Saudi collaboration with the long-term build-up of U.S. military forces in the region.

Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie took a more cautious tack, arguing that a major military intervention in the Gulf would undermine assertions of U.S. neutrality in the war and violate the mutual nonintervention pledge the administration had made in

a meeting between Muskie and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko on September 25. The debate was complicated by intelligence reports that Oman and Saudi Arabia were about to allow Iraq to launch attacks from their airfields.

On September 28, Brown, Brzezinski and Muskie agreed that USAF Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACs) should be sent immediately and were assured by Pentagon officials that F-14s from the USS Eisenhower could reach Saudi Arabia in less than two hours if needed. General David Jones, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, happened to be in Saudi Arabia at the time. He was directed to get a formal Saudi request for the AWACs and to dissuade them and the Omanis from allowing Iraq to use their facilities.³

By October 9, four U.S. Air Force (USAF) AWACs were providing 24 hour-a-day coverage of Iraqi and Iranian battle movements northward as far as Dizful and scanning Iran's oil terminal on Kharg Island and its oil fields along the Gulf Coast. U.S. military personnel screened all the intelligence gathered, passing on to the Saudis only what the U.S. considered necessary for their defense. Another carrier battle group joined the USS Eisenhower in the Arabian Sea, and within three weeks the number of U.S., French, British and Australian warships in the area had doubled from 30 to 60. A U.S. ground radar station flown in to Saudi Arabia enabled "all American units there to talk to each other, to talk to the fleet centered on two aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea and to communicate with American military headquarters in Europe." The official number of U.S. military personnel there had jumped from around 400 to around 800 in the weeks since the war began.⁴

The dispatch of the USAF AWACs led directly to the Reagan administration decision in early 1981 to sell five AWACs to Saudi Arabia as the centerpiece of an integrated regional air defense system built to U.S. specifications to host any eventual intervention by the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force. The AWACs agreement, according to military analyst Anthony Cordesman, provided each Saudi air base with the "service facilities, refueling capability,

parts and key munitions in place to accept over-the-horizon reinforcements for [70] USAF F-15 fighters. No conceivable improvement in U.S. airlift or USAF rapid deployment and 'base basing' capability could come close to giving the U.S. this rapid and effective reinforcement capability."⁵ An added advantage was that the Saudis paid for it all.

"55-45 Percent Neutrality"

Under Reagan, the AWACs-centered military construction proceeded apace, mainly in Saudi Arabia but also in Oman and Bahrain. The U.S. also endorsed the efforts of the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to integrate the Gulf states' air defenses into a single network. Policy in the Gulf war continued to be one of professed neutrality. The temptation to lure Baghdad away from the Soviet Union, which had cut off arms supplies to Iraq, was tempered by a concern not to alienate Tehran any further, since Iran remained the "strategic prize" in the region. One White House official candidly described the resulting balance recently as a "55-45 percent neutrality" in favor of Iraq.⁶ Early on, in March 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig told Congress he noted "some shift" in Iraq's policy reflecting a "greater sense of concern about the behavior of Soviet imperialism in the Middle East."⁷ Several weeks later, the State Department lifted a freeze on the sale of five Boeing passenger aircraft to Iraq, and Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper met top Iraqi officials in Baghdad. In 1982, the administration removed Iraq from the list of countries officially regarded as supporting "international terrorism," paving the way for credits and exports.

In April 1982 the administration allowed Iraq to purchase between six and twelve L100 transport aircraft "for civilian use."⁸ When Iran turned the tide of the war in June-July 1982, the State Department announced that the U.S. was prepared to hold joint military exercises with states in the region.⁹ Early in 1983, by which time Iraq was staring bankruptcy in the face, the administration granted some \$400 million in credit guarantees for

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Gulf War

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the export of U.S. wheat and other agricultural commodities to Iraq. This not only supplied Iraq with badly needed foodstuffs; more significantly, it demonstrated political and financial support to other prospective creditors, including Arab and European governments and international banks.

The fall of 1983 posed again, as in September 1980, the question of direct U.S. military intervention in the war, or at least more explicit backing for Baghdad. Against a background of reports that Iraq was losing the war of attrition, the National Security Council decided in October to continue an official policy of "military neutrality" while informing U.S. allies in Europe and the Gulf that an Iraqi defeat "would be contrary to U.S. interests."

Five Ways to Tilt

This further "tilt" towards Iraq took five different forms. First, the U.S. encouraged its allies to make major weapons deliveries to Iraq. Ironically, at the same time the Soviet Union had resumed arms supplies to Iraq which it had cut off when Iraq invaded Iran. Washington dropped altogether its reservations about the French decision to "loan" Iraq five Super Etendard jet fighters equipped with Exocet anti-ship missiles for Baghdad's planned tanker war, and carefully ignored a major French airlift of weapons in October. Second, Washington encouraged Iraq's Arab allies to resume financial assistance to Baghdad. High level State and Defense Department emissaries toured the Gulf in October, December, February and again in April. Washington also endorsed the participation of U.S. banks and construction companies in several schemes to increase Iraqi oil exports by building new pipelines through Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Third, Washington began pressuring allies and clients — including Israel, South Korea and Great Britain — to halt all military related sales of weapons or spares to Iran, and by June the administration was bragging through its favored columnists that supplies to Iran had "dried up."¹⁰

Fourth, the Reagan administration played along with the Iraqi tanker war talk. In response to Iranian statements that it would permit no oil exports

from the Gulf if its own exports were cut off, Reagan warned on October 20, 1983, that "the free world" could not "stand by and allow anyone to close the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf." More recently, after Iraqi and Iranian warplanes had hit some dozen tankers in the Gulf, Reagan backed Iraq even more explicitly. He declared that "the enemy's commerce and trade is a fair target," while Iran's attacks against the ships of third party allies of Baghdad, and Tehran's refusal to negotiate a settlement, placed its tactics "beyond bounds."¹¹

Fifth, the administration ordered further planning for U.S. military intervention in the event of an Iraqi collapse. After the Marine barracks in Lebanon were bombed in late October, Defense Secretary Weinberger told a congressional committee that proof of Iranian involvement would justify U.S. military aid to Iraq. Washington announced in February that its warships in and near the Gulf had orders to shoot any aircraft approaching within five miles. On February 26, 1984, the guided missile destroyer USS *Lawrence* fired on an Iranian P3 patrol plane when it flew within two and a half miles of the *Lawrence*.¹² As Iran claimed success in taking Iraq's Majnoon Islands oil field, a "high-ranking administration official" told the *Philadelphia Inquirer* that the administration was prepared to send ground troops to the Gulf.¹³ In late March the *New York Times* reported from Baghdad that "Western European diplomats assume that the United States now exchanges some intelligence on Iran with Iraq,"¹⁴ and Saddam Hussein seemed to confirm this in early May when he told a Kuwaiti newspaper that "we have benefitted from the AWACs in Iraq."¹⁵

When the State Department's Richard Murphy visited the Gulf in April, he was accompanied by Rear Admiral John Poindexter, head of the Crisis Pre-planning Group within the NSC. Murphy's and Poindexter's message to the ruling families was that any U.S. military intervention on their behalf against Iran would require a public invitation and full U.S. access to their bases. Their mission was to obtain Gulf states' permission to store additional ammunition, fuel and weapons for use by a U.S. intervention

force. U.S. military commanders had long maintained that the new Central Command (as the Rapid Deployment Force is now called) required land-based facilities and headquarters in the Arabian Peninsula, and the escalating war against the tankers represented another opportunity to secure Saudi acquiescence.

There are signs, though, that the administration remains divided over how far to escalate U.S. intervention behind Iraq in order to consolidate the U.S. military presence in the region. Some officials complain about Saudi resistance to a larger U.S. ground presence there, while others favor a more cautious approach. "Arab reluctance will save us from our own impetuosity," was how one State Department official put it.¹⁶ European governments have also warned Washington against indulging its impulse to "bash" Iran.¹⁷ As a result, the U.S. contented itself to send Saudi Arabia new "improved" AWACs able to track ships as well as aircraft, 400 largely symbolic Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and, more significantly, a USAF KC-10 aerial tanker. This was not needed to refuel the AWACs or Saudi F-15s. Several smaller KC-135s already there were handling this task. The KC-10, though, would enable U.S. fighter bombers based on carriers in the Arabian Sea to attack Iranian targets in the northern Gulf.

The latest crisis has also forced Kuwait to re-evaluate its military ties with Washington. That country had until now declined to join the U.S.-sponsored air defense network based around the AWACs. A U.S. Central Command survey team visited Kuwait in June, and at the end of the month the administration announced Kuwait would buy millions of dollars worth of military equipment and would tie in with the Saudi air defense system.¹⁸ Regular flights of USAF C-48 cargo jets into Gulf airports suggest that some degree of pre-positioning of military equipment and supplies has been going on.¹⁹

At the same time, Washington has stepped up its tacit intervention on Iraq's behalf by providing U.S. warships as tanker escorts, starting in the third week of May. Officially, the escorts are for tankers chartered by the Navy's Military Sealift Command to

provide fuel for U.S. forces at sea and abroad. The Pentagon asserts that only four U.S. warships have been operating in the Gulf, but observers there believe there may be as many as 12.²⁰ The escorts are operating only in the southern, Arabian side of the Gulf, thus threatening to repulse Iranian but not Iraqi attacks; there have been no sightings of U.S. tanker escorts in the vicinity of Kharg Island.

Washington's current view appears to be that any escalation of the tanker war should be handled initially by the air forces of the various Gulf states. "The feeling here is that they should get bloodied first," said one U.S. official.²¹ With 300 modern fighters (185 of these belonging to Saudi Arabia), these forces should be more than a match for Iran's 60 to 70 vintage Phantoms and handful of F-14s. The lack of a direct Iranian response to the loss of a Phantom in a June 5 dogfight with Saudi planes over the middle of the Gulf has encouraged the Pentagon in this view. As in the June 5 incident, U.S. involvement in any such confrontation would be considerable, with the AWACs providing intelligence and flight guidance and the aerial tankers

providing refueling. Pentagon officials reportedly gave "mixed reviews" to the "Peninsula Shield" military exercises held by the Gulf Cooperation Council in late 1983. "The maneuvers showed us how far the Gulf states have come, but also how badly they need us," was one U.S. official's verdict.²² Other U.S. regional allies outside the Gulf are also involved. In late June, Saudi defense officials met with Jordan's King Hussein, Pakistan's dictator Zia ul-Haq and the Egyptian chief of staff to discuss the war.²³ All three countries provide pilots, officers and military technicians to the Saudi and other Gulf military establishments.

There are two scenarios which pose the danger of direct U.S. military intervention against Iran. One involves the likely consequences of an Iranian attack on U.S. warships in the Gulf, especially in their tanker escort function, or against Saudi oil installations. This sort of incident would probably shift the balance in Washington decisively in favor of those who would like to repair the post-Lebanon prestige of the U.S. at Iran's expense. Iran's very cautious behavior in the tanker war so far makes such a development

unlikely but possible.

Prospects for such escalation depend much more on the outcome of the ground war, and particularly of the long-awaited Iranian attack on Basra. If Iraqi defenses hold, officials in Washington expect that increased oil exports through new pipelines after another year or so will enable the Saddam Hussein regime to repair its economy and political base.²⁴ On the other hand, if Iran scores a significant breakthrough, Washington expects its long-awaited "invitation" from Riyadh to intervene directly. This would involve sending between two and four USAF F-15 squadrons to be based in Saudi Arabia. From there an air offensive against Iranian air bases and troop concentrations would enable Iraq to hold its own in the land battles. "I feel confident that within minutes, we could certainly stabilize that situation border-wide," one U.S. military official said in May.²² This would represent the penultimate step in the "incremental" policy of escalation that Washington has followed for the last year of this war. Do those U.S. officials who talk of an intervention lasting "minutes" remember that this war was supposed to be over in a few weeks when Iraq sent its forces over the border in September 1980?

Joe Stork and Martha Wenger are editor and assistant editor of MERIP Reports.

Footnotes

1. *Christian Science Monitor*, June 14, 1984.
2. *Newsday*, May 20, 1984.
3. *New York Times (NYT)*, October 12, 1980.
4. *NYT*, October 8, 1980.
5. Anthony Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 325.
6. *Middle East Policy Survey (MEPS)*, May 11, 1983.
7. *NYT*, March 20, 1981.
8. *Washington Post (WP)*, April 14, 1982.
9. *WP*, July 17, 1982.
10. Federal investigators also cracked down at home, and in late



Effigies of Saddam Hussein in Teheran

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Grassroots Report: CAPA

Last February Resist gave CAPA a \$488 grant for the production of a slide show.

Rachel Wyon and David Truscello

We are teaching people of all ages. People who never had the opportunity to go to a school. We do this because we consider education a right that we will not wait to exercise. That is why in the midst of this conflict, in spite of the suffering, we are offering classes beneath the trees, teaching students as our territory is bombarded with mortars and bombed by helicopters sent by your government.


ANDES representative

— Marta Alicia Rivera

at the MTA Conference on Civil and Human Rights, January, 1984.

In the complex debate over U.S. policy in Central America, it is often difficult to get back to basics. "CAPA — Educators in Support of ANDES" has been working to provide basic information about the effects on education of the U.S. maintained war in El Salvador, and about the efforts of the Salvadoran opposition forces organized under the umbrella of the FDR-FMLN to prepare their people for participatory democracy in spite of the government.

CAPA — Comité de Apoyo Pro-Alfabetización (The Literacy Support Committee) was formed two years ago by a group of people from various nations who wanted to help inform people internationally about the literacy campaign organized and promoted by the National Association of Salvadoran Educations (ANDES 21 DE JUNIO). The literacy campaign, begun in 1981, is making it possible for the Salvadoran people to "read about their own reality in order to write their own history." ANDES has taken its work to the refugee camps and cooperatives of Central America and the areas of El Salvador controlled by the FDR-FMLN. Currently, about 25,000 people are involved in literacy and post-literacy classes as learners or popular



volunteer teachers. (Support committees like CAPA are spreading the news of the success throughout France, Sweden, Canada and the United States.)

In Boston, CAPA has completed many support projects. It has produced a slide show about the literacy campaign and uses it as an educational tool in schools, teachers' unions and churches. It has sent speakers to teachers' conferences and conferences on peace issues. It has helped organize a tour of North American teachers to Nicaragua. And in January of 1984, CAPA helped anchor the East-Coast ANDES tour of Marta Alicia Rivera, the union's representative in the United States. The tour of Marta Alicia successfully carried the Salvadoran teachers' urgent message of peace to unions and churches, schools, and media in cities from Boston to Burlington VT, and from New York to Washington.

As a result of the tour, CAPA and ANDES have developed relations with the Massachusetts Teachers' Association and the Boston Teachers' Union. Both unions lent their support to the ANDES tour. And the BTU (AFT Local 16) approved a resolution supporting the efforts of ANDES and their literacy work, donating \$1,000 to purchase educational materials to be sent to ANDES in Nicaragua through Oxfam America's

Tools for Peace Campaign.

On June 21, 1984, Boston area teachers and students and their friends celebrated together with members of CAPA to commemorate the 20 years of organized struggle of the Salvadoran teaching profession under the leadership of ANDES. The event, which included Latin food, local musicians, breakdancers from Chelsea and Mission Hill middle schools, and the CAPA slide show, was a fund raiser for the CAPA sponsored Educators Tour to Nicaragua. At this event CAPA announced its new name: "CAPA - Comité de Apoyo Pro-ANDES — Educations in Support of ANDES". This name reflects the fact that ANDES is becoming increasingly recognized throughout North America and Europe where many ANDES solidarity committees have been set up, similar to CAPA. The name also indicates more accurately the work of CAPA, which supports both the Literacy Campaign and the very important union work carried out inside El Salvador. During its 20 years of struggle, ANDES has won the respect and recognition of the people of El Salvador, but it has also been targeted by the government and repressed severely. Since 1979, 323 teachers have been murdered, 68 teachers have been captured and are now disappeared, and many teachers have been arrested,

Continued from Page Five

with three currently in prison. Even today, with new "democratic" government of Jose Napolion Duarte elected in May of 1984, ANDES continues to be harassed. Its union offices have been searched and files were taken illegally by government forces; the homes of union leaders are under surveillance; and almost 5,000 teachers are unemployed.

With its 20th anniversary, however, members of ANDES 21 DE JUNIO both in El Salvador and in exile celebrated the many gains of the past two decades: significant salary increases, health insurance for teachers and their families, retirement after 30 years of service, economic aid for families of teachers who were victims of the repression. The most recent victory, in April of this year, is a salary increase of 110 colones (about \$40) per month for all teachers and administrative employees of the Ministry of Education. This increase is particularly meaningful because wages have been frozen for the past several years.

In addition to continuing to do education work and raise funds and materials for ANDES, CAPA is currently developing a new slide show of the teachers' tour to Nicaragua (August '84), and helping to promote the November 6 referendum on U.S. policy in Central America. CAPA is also embarking on another major tour project. The North American teachers who visited Nicaragua laid the ground work for a U.S. tour of representatives of the Federation of Central American Teachers Organizations (FOMCA). The formation of FOMCA in 1982, brought together the teachers' unions of El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala,

Nicaragua, Honduras, and Panama. Its fundamental objective is to promote education and to defend the rights of educators in Central America in the face of repression supported by the U.S. government and the direct U.S. intervention.


Although modelled on the East Coast ANDES Tour of last winter, the FOMCA tour will require greater fundraising, outreach, and logistical coordination because it is a national tour involving a number of teacher representatives. But it is important that as many as possible in the United States involve themselves in the decisions their country makes about war and peace in Central America. The FOMCA tour is an ambitious project to aid that involvement by providing access to basic information through meetings with Central American teachers themselves.

If you would like to help, or would like more information about the tour project, or about CAPA's work, please contact Rachel Wyon, c/o CAPA 1151 Mass. Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138.

The Central America Teachers Organizations support the work of ANDES and its 20 year struggle for justice for the teachers and for all trade unions in El Salvador. The National Teachers' Platform for 1984-85 ends with two demands that CAPA would like to emphasize to the people of the United States: *To search for a negotiated political solution to the conflict between the government of El Salvador and the FDR-FMLN;* and *To cease immediately the intervention of the U.S. government in El Salvador.*

March 1984 claimed to have halted an attempt by a Minnesota firm, E & F Marketing, Inc., to ship \$7 million in M-60 tank parts to Iran. (*Wall Street Journal*, March 28, 1984)

11. *WP*, June 1, 1984
12. *WP*, February 29, 1984.
13. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 24, 1984.
14. *NYT*, March 29, 1984.
15. *Financial Times*, May 12, 1984.
16. *MEPS*, June 18, 1984.
17. *WP*, May 31 and June 6, 1984.
18. A Kuwaiti request for Stinger missiles was rejected by Washington as not "suitable" to Kuwaiti defense needs. How those needs differed from Saudi needs was not made clear. The real reason may be that the inventory of Stingers had been completely depleted, and the Kuwaiti request could only be met by delving into U.S. stocks. (*Washington Post*, June 20, 1984) The Kuwaitis responded by entertaining an offer from the Soviet Union for some \$2-300 million worth of air defense weapons systems.
19. *London Times*, June 8, 1984.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *NYT*, May 27, 1984.
22. *MEPS*, January 13, 1984.
23. *NYT*, June 27, 1984.
24. The major new pipeline option now under consideration would run 540 miles from Iraqi oil fields to the Jordanian port of Aqaba. Washington has lent critical political and economic support to this project. Politically, the U.S. has passed on to Baghdad "verbal assurances" that Israel would not attack the pipeline, which would run close to the Israeli border at its terminal point. Economically the administration persuaded an initially reluctant Export-Import Bank to guarantee \$425 million in U.S. commercial loans for the project. Iraq expects to raise another \$500 million from European sources. The project includes a \$570 million contract for Bechtel Corporation, the corporate nest of Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Ex-Im Bank support was reportedly clinched by an Iraqi agreement to order \$100 million worth of U.S.-made steel pipe instead of cheaper West German or Japanese steel for the pipeline itself. (*New York Times* July 16, 1984)
25. *Newsday*, May 20, 1984.



GRANTS

Black New York Action Committee,
1878 Adam Clayton Powell Jr. Blvd.,
New York, NY 10026

The Black New York Action Committee is a small Harlem-based collective consisting of Black people from all walks of life. There are professionals, workers, students and retirees among the membership. The organization has been in existence since 1976 when a group of Black activists came together out of a desire to respond in some way to the New York City fiscal crisis taking place at that time. The impact of this crisis upon Black, non-white and poor people was devastating and they felt that a clear analysis was necessary. Much of their early practice consisted of educational and agitational activities around the state-appointed Emergency Financial Control Board and the Municipal Assistance Corporation. These agencies had, in essence, usurped the governing authority in New York City. As the committee worked in the Harlem community, they were increasingly convinced of the need to become involved, as an organization, in those struggles going on around day-to-day needs of the people, and where there was no struggle, to help initiate it. Those areas of concern were housing, education, drugs, health, police brutality, etc. They also saw that the rebuilding of Harlem and communities like it would require a number of skills and a lot of information for community people. Their answer to these needs is the Fannie Lou Hamer Institute, a cultural and educational center which they hope will meet these needs as they build it. One of their activities through the Institute is the "Reels In Focus" Film and Discussion Series. They hope to do two things with this series. First, they offer educational and informative experiences for neighborhood people. Second, the dialogue that develops from these film showings helps them to get an understanding of neighborhood people's political level and concerns. This in turn helps them to better understand how to proceed with organizational efforts. Resist's grant of \$400 went toward the purchase of a 16mm projector for the film series.

Vermonters Organized for Clean-Up,
P.O. Box 190, Williamstown, VT
05679

Presently, there are 27 communities in Vermont that have toxic waste stored, buried or otherwise kept unsafe and the government and industry have shown little or no interest in dealing with these serious health hazards. Recently, several activists came together from a grassroots organization to address this problem. Vermonters Organized for Clean-Up has been organizing informational forums in towns where the hazardous waste is located and they have pushed to get the sites fenced off. They have also successfully initiated and established citizens' action toxic waste organizations in these towns by providing leadership training and organizing skills. Some of the long range goals of the group are: to uncover more toxic waste existing in the state; to create an awareness of the hazards of disposing toxic chemicals in landfills; to create awareness and to disseminate information on health hazards due to environmental pollution and toxic waste specifically; to create awareness on household hazardous waste and to develop a state-wide pick-up system; to gather information from the EPA and universities and to organize and disseminate this material; to establish a workable organization of citizens that will be a pressuring wedge to force the government to act and make industry comply with existing pollution laws; to publicize routes of trucks carrying hazardous waste; to make haulers display their placards on their trucks so that people can know what is being hauled; and to foster basic human rights and build strength in persons to demand respect. Resist's grant of \$300 went towards the purchase of a copier so that requests for information can be fulfilled rapidly and efficiently.

Central America Solidarity Coalition,
1016 N. 9th St., Milwaukee, WI 53233

In January, 1979, a group of Milwaukeean who were knowledgeable about the conflict in Nicaragua formed a group called the Committee to Aid Nicaraguan Democracy (CAND). The committee's goal was to educate the public about the nature of the Nicaraguan revolution, and to support the Nicaraguan people through the provision of humanitarian aid. Throughout 1979, many successful educational events were held, the Committee's membership grew, and several shipments of medical supplies and materials for the literacy crusade were sent to Nicaragua. In 1980, CAND members saw the need to expand the committee's area of interest to El Salvador. The group thus became the Committee to Aid Nicaraguan Democracy/Committee in Solidarity with the people of El Salvador (CAND/CISPES), and they included El Salvador in their educational work. In 1982, the membership decided that a regional perspective was essential to convey the nature of the conflict in Central America. They then became the Central America Solidarity Coalition (CASC). Their goal is to halt United States intervention in Central America and they work toward this goal by: building informed solidarity in their community for the peoples of Central America; encouraging elected representatives to work for a new foreign policy which would grant the right of self-determination to the nations of Central America; and providing humanitarian aid to the Central American people. Recently, CASC decided that they needed to replace their brochure with one that is up-to-date. The brochure will be used for educational outreach, membership-building and fund-raising. Resist's grant of \$260 helped pay the production costs of the new brochure.

