Zaire: Redeeming What?  
by Diana Johnstone

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For the sake of 'authenticity', General Joseph Mobutu, who rose to the presidency of the former Belgian Congo in 1965 with CIA blessings, at one point renamed his country Zaire and himself Mobutu Sese Seko, 'Mobutu the Redeemer'. What precisely he is supposed to redeem is clearest at this point to the world's major international bankers, who are acutely concerned over Zaire's foreign debt, now estimated at over three billion dollars. For some time, financial circles have been worried that Zaire might become the first nation to default completely on its debts - a dangerous precedent for other poor countries. Much of the wit of Chase Manhattan Bank President David Rockefeller's Trilateral Commission has been expended on developing projects to forestall the nightmare of debt repudiation - notably the expansion of the International Monetary Fund which is now underway. Meanwhile, US banks last year lent Mobutu still more money to enable him to keep paying interest on previous loans, a matter he had been neglecting.

Whatever is going on in Zaire, the banks' concern to get their money back is bound to be a factor that counts.

The Great Petroleum Illusion
Zaire's plunge toward bankruptcy in the past few years has a lot to do with the 1973 petroleum crisis, and especially the contradiction between the illusions it created and its actual effects on non-oil-producing Third World countries. The actual effect on the balance of payments of costlier fuel and fertilizer was disastrous to poor countries. But the rhetoric of the moment, presenting the oil producers as the vanguard of a rising Third World, at last demanding and getting - just prices for its raw materials, raised hopes and illusions, further nourished in Africa by more rhetoric about Afro-Arab brotherhood.

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of academic programs of mutual interest, cooperative faculty research, and exchange of scholars and resources." As pointed out by a recent State Department document, NUI, just as other institutes of higher education in Iran, was nationalized in September, 1975.2 Concerning the administration of these institutes, the same document stated that "the security forces of Iran clear potential faculty members before they are allowed to teach and are involved in the maintenance of campus order, and are alleged to be involved in the selection of students." The "Program of Cooperation" between NUI and CUNY proposed that a center to coordinate the cooperative programs between NUI and all other American universities be established at Queens College, a senior college within CUNY, under the direction of its president, Professor John Moyne, chairman of the Computer Sciences Department of Queens College, and Joseph Murphy, then President of Queens College, were both signatories of this document, which Moyne wrote after consultation with the Iran desk of the State Dept. having first made contact with NUI. A Center for Iranian Studies now exists at Queens College; courses in Intro to the Persian Language, Iranian Civilization, and Religion and Mystical Thought in Iran are now being offered. The individuals teaching these courses were appointed on the decision of Moyne. It goes without saying that affirmative action guidelines were not observed. Moyne made it clear to faculty members in the Linguistics Department of Queens College that research funds would be readily available, and, without peer review, awarded one grant for the study of Persian phonology. The "Program of Cooperation" provides that NUI "shall pay $100,000 within one month of the signing of the agreement into a separate account at Queens College and that any time the amount is reduced to $20,000, the Institute shall deposit an additional $100,000." While these facts illustrate the sordidness of the agreement, larger issues are, of course, involved.

The "Program of Cooperation" provides that the center at Queens will, among other things, "maintain a list of graduate Iranian students in the United States with a view of employing them for the National University of Iran," "Resistance against the Program of Cooperation" has taken the form of a single-issue coalition, the Ad Hoc Committee to Abolish the Program of Cooperation between NUI and CUNY. It includes members of the Iranian Student Association, the student government, the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran (CAIFI), the SVP, YSA, and concerned faculty and students. Charles Cairns and Michael Harrington act as co-chairpersons, and Paul Sweezy, Noam Chomsky, Victor Gobbaum, and several departmental chairpersons are sponsors. This committee has expressed the quite reasonable suspicion that the Center, so described, would constitute an institutional cover for SAVAK, whose presence on the Queens campus has already been observed, and that acceptance of the Shah's money would serve to legitimize and abet his regime. It is instructive to consider the defense of the agreement which has been offered.

Professor Moyne has pointed out that "It can be easily shown that more people die each year throughout the world from the use of tobacco than from any deeds of the Shah of Iran. Yet we have grants from the Tobacco Institute that might help to improve the image of the Institute." (Therefore, Queens College should accept money from the Shah.) Note that the analogy between the Shah of Iran and the Tobacco Institute can only be maintained if the intentions of these two are ignored; while the Shah of Iran commits murder, the Tobacco Institute does not. People can choose to avoid the harmful effects of tobacco; the Shah is not so obliging. (Defenders of the Vietnam war used an argument with a similar structure: More people die in traffic accidents every year than in Vietnam; therefore, the war is relatively acceptable and protest against it is misdirected.) In response to Moyne's argument, it has been necessary to stress that the question of intention is crucial. One might take money from a source if won through a lawsuit, while rejecting money from a source if offered as a bribe. Conservative "realists" respond that money is good, therefore rejecting it is wrong; a straightforwardly amoral view.

Certain liberal proponents of the "Program of Cooperation" (who are often of an elitist turn of mind) have argued that accepting the Shah's money would serve ultimately to bring about his downfall. By educating Iranian students, they argue, the "seeds of democracy" would be planted in their minds, a revolutionary act. This argument makes the incredible assumption that the Shah is not acting in his own best interests, and that the people of Iran do not know exactly what human rights are being denied them. It furthermore neglects the well-documented fact that the American "democracy" has stood by silently while the human rights of Iranians in the United States have been denied by SAVAK, the CIA, and other groups. While Iranians might learn much from observing this, it is hardly the sort of lesson these liberals have in mind.

It would seem that it is only by rejecting the Shah's offers that American universities can express solidarity with the Iranian people. The services which the Shah is asking them to provide can only serve to increase his power. Iranian students in the U.S. and expatriates, for example Reza Baraheni, who spent 100 days in the Shah's prisons, have shown great courage in speaking out against any complicity with the Shah's fascist regime. Their heroism should be contrasted with the venality of those American
academics who beg for scraps stolen from the people of Iran.

1. This quotation, and the figures in the following paragraph, are taken from the Wall Street Journal of April 11, 1977.
3. "The Program of Cooperation with the National University of Iran".

Zaire (continued)

For copper-producing Zaire, the illusion was confirmed by a coincidental jump in world copper prices, which went from 427 pounds sterling per ton on the London metal exchange in 1972, to 727 pounds sterling in 1973, then soared to 1,350 pounds sterling in the first half of 1974.

This set off visions of eternal wealth that encouraged the Mobutu regime's extravagant inclinations and incidentally enabled it to get plenty of foreign credit.

But by December 1974, copper prices had dropped back to around 500 pounds sterling, and have stayed there since.

While payment on the foreign debt represented only 4.7% of the country's export income in 1970, 7% in 1972, 11% in 1973 and 13% in 1974, it jumped to over 20% in 1975 and is estimated at 26% of anticipated export income this year. But that income is uncertain. Copper production has gradually increased in the seventies from about 400,000 tons annually to close to 500,000, but it is not clear how much of this is actually exported, what with Zaire's dependence on Angolan and Indian Ocean ports - the country being in practice virtually landlocked, despite its 25 miles of Atlantic coast.

Non-mineral exports have been declining, as has agricultural production in general. The sad state of the national economy, aside from copper production, is widely blamed on disastrous mismanagement by the Mobutu regime.

'Zairianisation' and 'Mobutism'

Mobutu's regime has been marked in recent years by a great deal of mystifying rhetoric, indicating much movement backward and forward in time - backwards toward cultural 'authenticity' and forward with the 'revolution'.

In November 1973, Mobutu undertook the 'Zairianisation' of the economy, in order to 'end exploitation' and assume total independence, decreeing that only Zairese could own agricultural or forestry enterprises. Zairese were also en-couraged to take over most commercial enterprises. This of course allowed Mobutu to reward his faithful followers and make a lot of new owners happy. By all accounts, it was disastrous for the economy, since the new owners did not necessarily either know or care how to manage their enterprises, frequently taking advantage of the shortages created by their own mismanagement to raise prices without inhibition. The disorganization of the domestic market led peasants to return to subsistence farming, making it necessary to increase food imports, while export crops such as coffee, palm oil, and cotton declined.

Mobutu visited China in January 1973 and again in December 1974 and was apparently impressed by the sight of an entire nation directed by the thoughts of one man. Back home, he proclaimed 'Mobutism' to be the authentic doctrine of Zaire, and put his ruling party, the People's Revolutionary Movement, to work giving the people courses in the thoughts of Mobutu.

Meanwhile, among the authentic cultural spectacles, there was the Muhammed Ali-George Foreman heavyweight boxing championship fight held in October 1974 in Zaire . . . at 3 o'clock in the morning. Not that it is an authentic Zairese custom to stay up all night to watch prize fights, but the hour suited the New Yorkers who were watching direct on television, six time zones away.

Radicalizing the Rhetorical Revolution

But copper prices were sinking, debts were increasing and the 'red carnation' revolution in

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National Violence Against Women

With over 200 rape crisis centers already existing in this country, with shelters for battered women being organized rapidly, and with women protesting advertising which depicts brutalized women, the phrase, "Violence Against Women" is becoming more commonplace. What this signifies is a change in women's consciousness—a growing awareness that we, as women, experience oppression in our daily lives, and that it is maintained by the threat and reality of physical violence. Redefining violence and weaving together forms of violence into a total system of social control are implicit in the adoption of the term, 'violence against women'. From this new analysis flow new organizing strategies; if we conceptually link all forms of violence against women, then our fight, too, must be against the whole web.

Organizing against violence against women is marked by the simultaneous emergence of rape crisis centers throughout the country in the early 1970's. These centers opened with dual goals of service to victims and community education. Original centers had an express political analysis; the intention was to counter the sexist and racist myths that shroud the issue of rape. Conscious attempts were made to locate the cause of rape at the crossroads of societal forces, not within individual psychopaths, and to promote a vision of a society free from such forms of dehumanization. In addition, abuse of victims by institutions was exposed for two major reasons: to change the quality of treatment received and to raise questions about the fundamental nature of criminal justice, medical and mental health systems. Many rape victims and their advocates were radicalized by the experience of seeking assistance from existing institutions.

Much of this critical, holistic approach to understanding the nature of rape in our society has been diluted. A National Center for the Prevention and Control of Rape has opened as a wing of NDMH; LEAA has given huge amounts of money for professionals to study minute aspects of "the problem", and rape has become a favorite theme of television and movies. While these developments are undoubtedly a result of a large, organized movement against rape, they also signify some degree of co-optation of the issue.

In the summer of 1974, a small group of anti-rape organizers began a national alliance and newsletter, Feminist Alliance Against Rape (FAAR). Their stated purposes were for "communication nationally and internationally and for more solidarity among our projects," and for maintaining "feminist control of the rape issue". Additionally, their initial mailing stated, "Our ultimate goal is an end to rape. This will not happen without major social, political, and economic change..." The newsletter has been a vehicle for centers to exchange a range of experiences, from mobilizing support against professionals moving into anti-rape work, to discussing community alternatives to prison for rapists, to analysis of the role of the media in promoting rape.

Within the last two years, the movement against wife abuse in this country has gained tremendous momentum. The number of shelters for battered women has grown from three or four to over twenty, with hundreds of other groups seeking the necessary funding to open. A broad spectrum of women, crossing race and class lines, have been reached. Many of these women, for the first time, have been able to see their own suffering, degradation and isolation in a social and political context. In realizing that their experiences are common to many women, they have been able to gain the necessary self-respect to focus their anger toward working for broad-based change.

Until Betsy Warrior published the first edition of the national directory of groups, "Working on Wife Abuse" about a year ago, very
few women working on the issue even knew of the existence of other groups within their geographical area or with similar goals. Now that groups are able to correspond, it is clear that we are all sending hundreds of letters asking overlapping questions. How have different groups dealt with issues of structure and process, small funding vs. compromise and "strings", sensationalism in the media presentation of the problem, "rip offs" by professionals and government agencies, etc.? At a national conference of wife abuse held in Milwaukee last fall, many activists were able to compare notes. Out of a series of ad-hoc meetings, the idea for a National Communications Network Newsletter (NCN) emerged. Initially, the newsletter was envisioned primarily as an instrument for information exchange, and its production responsibilities would be rotated.

Currently being organized is a drive to merge these two publications (FAAR and NCN) as well as the numerous other newsletters that deal with issues of violence against women. One publication making theoretical and practical links between all forms of violence against women—including topics such as increasing repression of women in prison, sterilization abuse, and sexual harassment at the workplace—is an important step in the history of our movement. Organizers need to be informed, to learn from the victories and errors of other groups, and to lend each other support as the fight continues on many fronts. In addition, the publication would establish a network that could be mobilized quickly to support or oppose events, legislation and policy decisions that arise. Criteria could be developed, for example, on media coverage of violence against women, or on accepting funding from government agencies so that the incidence of individual groups being bought off would be lessened.

Coalitions and small networks across the country are currently discussing the idea of a new network and publication. Ideas, guidelines and questions emerging from these discussions will be brought by representatives to a mid-summer meeting. Resist has granted partial travel funds for women from Boston and Washington D.C. to attend, while other groups are independently fundraising.

Zaire (continued)

Lisbon had opened the way to rapid decolonialization of neighboring Angola. According to some sources, Mobutu himself began to worry about the opposing ambitions of 'authenticity' and 'Zairianization' might start to nourish with their wealth. Just back from a trip to China and North Korea, Mobutu in January 1975 announced the 'radicalization of the revolution'.

Mobutu said that in China and North Korea he had seen a system where there was no economic crisis, inflation, or unemployment. Without adopting the ideology of those countries and without becoming communist, Zaire will be inspired by their economic structures, adapting them to Zairese conditions', he said, announcing that he had declared 'war on the bourgeoisie in this country.

'From now on, let it be known that we have completely changed our system', he proclaimed, adding: 'We are neither on the left nor on the right.'

Thus situated, Mobutu announced that People's Revolutionary cadres must turn over to the State all their businesses except in agriculture; said that the State was taking over big construction, production, distribution, and public transport firms; and announced creation of farm cooperatives to expand production and overcome shortages of foodstuffs. Youth would be trained to farm and the Army put to work in production, he promised.

This was just a lot of talk, and agricultural produce got scarcer as foreign creditors began jostling each other to get paid. In November 1975, Mobutu took a different tack and tried to remedy the situation by undoing some of the 'Zairianization' and letting foreign entrepreneurs back in. But by this time the people were discouraged and distrustful, and foreign capital was extremely wary, whereas the local parasites were largely concentrating their tender loving care on their own interests. Mobutu could announce any policy he wanted, but their was neither the competence, nor the responsiveness, nor the confidence anywhere to make the words mean anything.

The Katanga Gendarmes

The decolonialization of Angola gave Mobutu new worries. In September 1974 he flew to the Cape Verde Islands for a meeting with then Portuguese President General António de Spínola. The officially announced purpose of the meeting was to discuss the future of the 4,000 former Katanga gendarmes serving in the Portuguese Army in Angola. This is the force that last month went back into Katanga - now Shaba - province as the Congo National Liberation Front (FLNC).

The history of this national liberation
ZAIRE, continued
front, as its spokesmen in Europe tell it, is
plausibly peculiar.

Its origins are hardly promising: several
thousand gendarmes who served Moise Tshombe dur-
ing the 1960-63 secession of Katanga, subsequently
went into exile in Zambia and in Angola, where
the Portuguese welcomed them on condition they
serve in the Portuguese colonial army against
the Angolan nationalist groups.

In 1967, they were joined by new recruits
who left Congo-Kinshasa (none of the anti-
Mobutu opposition accepts the appellation
'Zaire') following various differences with the
Mobutu regime. One of them was a policeman who
had been educated by American Methodist mission-
aries, Nathanael Mbumba, who was spotted by the
Portuguese as a natural leader and put in com-
mand of the 'Katanga gendarmes'.

In the last years of Portuguese colonialism,
General Mbumba was in command of some 6,000 to
7,000 men assigned to fight against Holden Robert-
to's Angola National Liberation Front (FNLA).
This was congenial enough, since the only politi-
cal orientation of Mbumba's force at that time
was hostility to Mobutu, who was Roberto's spon-
sor and even relative by marriage.

Choosing sides
With the decolonization of Angola ap-
proaching, the future of General Mbumba's force
became a problem, as Mobutu's meeting with
Spinola indicates. But Spinola was soon out and
the left wing of the Portuguese Armed Forces
Movement (MFA) had its day. One of its main
figures, Admiral Antonio Alva Rosa Coutinho,
was sent to Angola as Governor. 'Rosa was our
deus ex machina, along with the MFA itself for
that matter,' FLINC spokesmen now say.

The political atmosphere in Angola at that
time, plus the influx of intellectual refugees
from Zaire, began to affect the thinking of Gen-
eral Mbumba's little army. They could relate to
the MFA. After all, hadn't those officers spent
years fighting for Portugal against African
nationalists, only to turn around, go home, and
liberate their own country from a fascist dic-
tatorship? Why shouldn't General Mbumba's
forces follow a similar course?

A few months before Angolan independence
(November 11, 1975) the Portuguese offered the
'Katanga gendarmes' three options: accept Mobutu's
promise of amnesty and go back to Zaire; be sent
to fight black nationalists in South Africa; or
join the Angolan liberation movement of their
choice - Mpla, FNLA, UNTIA. Spokesmen for the
group say Mobutu's past performance in dealing
with his old enemies made it impossible for them
to trust him. By this time they were too politi-
cized to go fight for South Africa. They natural-
ly chose to ally with the Mpla because it was
against Mobutu's friend Roberto.

They made themselves useful in a hurry. In-
stalled in Luanda, the Mpla was threatened by an
FNLA army advancing on the capital from the north.
It was General Mbumba's army that stopped it,
FLINC spokesmen say, 'We were the deciding ele-
ment in the beginning of the war,' before the
Cubans arrived, 'and the Mpla was grateful to us
and promised to help us go home.'

Liberation not Secession
So last March 8 the first contingent went
home, crossing into Shaba as the vanguard of the
'Congolese National Liberation Front'. The FLINC
insists that it is not a Katanga secessionist
movement but aims to liberate the whole country
from Mobutu, not to take power but to free the
people. Its spokesmen candidly announced plans
to open other fronts in other parts of the
country, in coordination with existing opposition
forces and movements, such as Antoine Gizenga's
Fodelico (Democratic Forces for the Liberation
of the Congo), which is located in the Kivu
region. A leading Zairese political exile,
Celphus Kamitatu Massamba, a former cabinet

minister and political associate of Gizenga
who founded a new clandestine party last year,
the African Socialist Front, said in Paris that
he hoped to promote the unity of all the left-
wing opposition groups to carry on a political
battle against the Mobutu regime to complement
the military efforts of the FLINC.

At first the 'liberation' reportedly pro-
ceeded with ease, as Zairese troops fled and
villagers welcomed their returning compatriots.
Mobutu turned to his friends abroad.

Coincidences
King Hassan of Morocco sent troops to help
save 'the Redeemer', and French President Valery
Giscard d'Estaing offered the planes to fly them
in. The US sent 'non-lethal' military equipment, which a State Department spokesman stressed had nothing to do with decisions by Morocco and France to aid Zaire. "Every country has the right to do what it wants," he said. Egypt was helping too, no doubt on an impulse that had nothing to do with President Anwar Sadat's talks in Washington a few days earlier. It was a great spontaneous burst of national independence occurring separately in several countries at once and all converging, quite by chance, on Zaire.

This was the version given by President Giscard at a particularly entertaining press conference on April 12 in which he justified France's interest in its 'friendly neighboring continent' and pointed with pride to the intervention in Zaire as an example of what so many of his French critics had been demanding: a truly independent foreign policy, not dictated by the Americans. What's more, Giscard boasted, he had talked with the American Secretary of State about Africa only a few days ago, and had not even told him what France intended to do in Zaire. There's real independence for you.

This was about on the level of seriousness of Mobutu's various 'revolutions'. Everybody knows that US policy since Vietnam is to avoid direct military interventions abroad and to persuade allies and regional medium-sized powers to 'share responsibilities' in security, that is counter-revolutionary, operations.

Responsibility is not only military. The involvement of Muslim countries, Morocco and Egypt, in Zaire may be a way of 'priming the pump' to get anti-Communist Muslim oil money pouring into Kinshasa to save it from the sin of non-payment of debts. On April 24, Zaire's Foreign Minister Karl I Bond was in Saudi Arabia, seeking guidance as to what, if anything, to do if asked. A few days later, the IMF granted Zaire $85 million dollars worth of fresh credits.

Words and Dependence

Meanwhile, on the verbal front, Mobutu was escalating anti-communist rhetoric and pointing to the Soviet Union as Zaire's main enemy. The Saudi rulers might respond to this. Like other military rulers, Mobutu might be an all-powerful tyrant when it comes to repressing his adversaries, but his verbal excesses are a reflection of his essential powerlessness. The State and the Army are not, as in European and Asian nations, the expression of the people's history and social texture, but the residue left by outside powers. Domestically, rhetoric is an attempt to find a shortcut to a social coordination that can be achieved only by historic struggles. African peoples are not fooled, and laugh behind the backs of their tyrants. But fear maintains the semblance of power.

And rhetoric covers the more organic links that tie these rulers to the foreign states they attempt to imitate without the means. Revolution, Socialism, Authenticity, Islam... great projects are proclaimed as small deals are sought.

Mobutu has brought Zaire to the verge of bankruptcy, and there are signs that his American backers consider him expendable - if an appropriate replacement can be found. That is the problem. The foreign intervention that seems to aim at saving Mobutu could turn out to be a way to scout for talent to replace him and to influence the internal balance of forces so as to get the new chosen leader safely into office.

J. P. STEVENS BOYCOTT

(INS) The New England J. P. Stevens boycott got a big boost in April when the Harvard Coop, one of Cambridge, Massachusetts' largest department stores, cleared its shelves of Stevens products.

The national boycott was launched in 1974, after workers at seven southern plants voted in the Textile Workers Union (now the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union). The giant textile manufacturer has refused to bargain in good faith, continuing to profit from low wages paid to non-unionized workers, and from low taxes and energy costs.

Organizers of the New England boycott first approached the Harvard Coop management in March, according to the Boston Phoenix, and shortly afterwards $2800 worth of Stevens goods were withdrawn from sale. However, the store's Board of Directors stopped short of expressing public support for the boycott.

A boycott organizer, Mike Schippman, said that the Coop's refusal to publicly support the boycott was "disappointing, but... there's no Stevens stuff at the Coop now. J. P. Stevens is going to hear about that."
APRIL GRANTS

The Somerville Voice
14 Irving Street Somerville, MA 02144

Resist's grant will go toward printing the first issue of the Somerville Voice, a monthly community and labor newspaper which is being initiated by members of the New American Movement, as well as other activists in Somerville. Community papers have played an important role in political outreach and organizing in many neighborhoods in Boston. The Somerville Voice will encourage more frequent and extensive political writing about local events. They also hope, over the course of several years, to develop a more broadly based political organization within the city.

PBB Action Committee
18643 Joy Road Detroit, Michigan

In the summer of 1973, the Michigan Chemical Corporation inadvertently mixed 700 pounds of Firemaster, a fire retardant containing polybrominated diphenyls (PBB), into cattle feed. The Michigan Farm Bureau then recalled the PBB contaminated cattle feed statewide. Since then, the two corporations and agencies of the state government have denied, suppressed, and distorted information of the original mistake and its continuing effects on the health of Michigan residents, as well as on the Michigan farm economy. The PBB Action Committee has been active in trying to expose the systematic corruption, as well as to have the PBB contaminated food products taken off the market. They are demanding that free medical care be provided for victims of the PBB poisoning, and that all farm families receive full compensation for their loss of income from the Michigan Chemical Co. and Farm Bureau Services. Resist's grant will help them to continue this work.

Black and Proud Liberation School and Coop Farms for Survival P.O. Box 11235 Jackson, Miss. 39213

As part of its program of self-reliance and its attempts to exist outside the racist and capitalist system with which it is surrounded, the Liberation School runs a cooperative farm in addition to the school, their clothing cooperative, and pan-African work-study groups. This newly-established farming coop will further insure the independence of the group in its struggles. Resist's grant to the school will allow the group to add a truck to the farm equipment already acquired. The truck is needed to transport work teams and equipment to the fields and to haul and distribute the harvest.

Protestant Guild for the Blind Strike Fund
7 Greenough Ave. Cambridge, MA 02139

The Protestant Guild for the Blind is a private school and vocational training center for students with multiple handicaps, including combinations of blindness, deafness, mental retardation, epilepsy, and cerebral palsy. Since February 13, thirty eight workers at the school, who are members of Local 254 of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), have been on strike. They were all fired after a sick-out which had been called by the workers to protest the unwillingness of the Guild to negotiate with the Union, even under Federal mediation. The Guild workers elected to join SEIU last September in attempt to end discriminatory policies directed against nonwhites, women, and disabled employees. Demands include a standardized wage scale, increased sick and vacation benefits, limited class size, and a union shop. Resist's grant was to support the strike fund.