Securitizing Immigration in the Age of Terror

Anthony Messina

Trinity College, anthony.messina@trincoll.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/facpub

Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons
Securitizing Immigration in the Age of Terror

Anthony M. Messina

World Politics / Volume 66 / Issue 03 / July 2014, pp 530 - 559
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887114000148, Published online: 09 July 2014

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887114000148

How to cite this article:
OF the numerous subjects preoccupying scholars within the ever-expanding field of immigration studies, few have attracted greater attention in recent years than the “securitization” of immigration. What is meant by this phrase? As interpreted by the Copenhagen School of security studies, securitization is said to be the process by which ostensibly nonsecurity issues, such as immigration, are transformed into urgent security concerns as a consequence of securitizing speech acts. Adherents of this school typically distinguish between “state security,” which is primarily concerned with territorial sovereignty, and “societal security,” which focuses on “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats.” The general process of securitization is said to commence

*I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful criticisms and practical suggestions.

1 See, for example, Adamson 2006; Aradau 2001; Bilgic 2013; Buonfino 2004; Burgess and Gutwirth 2011; Croft 2012; Diez and Squire 2008; Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich 2008; Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich 2010; Faist 2006; Freedman 2004; Ginsburg 2010; Guild 2009; Guild and Baldaccini 2006; Huysmans 2006; Kaya 2012; Ross 2004; Rudolph 2006; Tirman 2004; van Munster 2009; and Watson 2009.

2 The Copenhagen School of security studies is a school of international relations theory inspired by Barry Buzan’s 1983 book, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde have also been prominent contributors to this school.

3 Waever et al. 1993, 23.

*World Politics* 66, no. 3 (July 2014), 530–59
Copyright © 2014 Trustees of Princeton University
doi:10.1017/S0043887114000148
whenever elite actors inject “low politics” public policy issues into the domain of “high politics” by adopting the rhetoric of existential threat. In this context, Lazaridis describes the securitization of immigration as “a ‘top down’ process, in which various political, societal and security elites present migration as [a] . . . threat to fundamental values of . . . societies and states.” Indeed, Wæver goes so far as to argue that “by definition something is a security problem when elites declare it to be so.” Although elite “securitizing moves”—that is, mostly premeditated initiatives that usually take the form of rhetoric (for example, a speech, a report, or legislation)—must be supported by objective evidence, the securitization process is ultimately intersubjective. Thus, in order for a securitizing actor to mobilize her/his target audience, the latter must accept the legitimacy of the former’s claims. If and once such claims are widely accepted as valid by the public, decision makers purportedly are then at liberty to transfer the affected issue out of the realms of conventional politics and policy-making and into the domain of emergency politics, where it can be expeditiously resolved. In this sense the securitization process is the antithesis of the methods and procedures by which elites normally seek the public’s support for their preferred policies.

The four volumes reviewed here are among the latest contributions to a growing literature that applies securitization theory to the research area of immigration studies. As such, they represent four somewhat different and not altogether compatible research streams. The first, Lazaridis’s edited volume Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe, mostly accepts the core assumptions of classic securitization theory as they have been applied to the contemporary politics of immigration. Among these assumptions are that security issues have ascended to unprecedented heights on the respective domestic and international agendas of Western governments since September 11; post–September 11 political and policy-making elites have rhetorically associated immigrants with numerous cultural, economic, and physical safety threats and, in so doing, precipitated or inflamed widespread popular insecurities; and in a post–September 11 environment immigration-related issues have been liberated from the established norms and rules of public policy-making, thereby facilitating the implementation of increasingly restrictive immigration and asylum measures.

---

4 Wæver 1995, 46–86.
5 Lazaridis 2011, 2.
6 Wæver 1995, 54.
7 Balzacq 2005.
8 Hampshire and Saggar 2006.
A second stream, as represented by Chebel d’Appollonia’s *Frontiers of Fear*, adopts a broader view of the key dimensions of, and particularly the collateral damage precipitated by, the securitization of immigration in the United States and Europe. Although implicitly inspired by the core tenets of securitization theory, *Frontiers of Fear* nevertheless works within a historical, and hence a pre–September 11, framework. Central to her framework is the observation that elite and popular anxieties about immigration’s negative effects predate September 11 and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe and, thus, immigration has long been “securitized.” Nevertheless, in an echo of classic securitization theory, Chebel d’Appollonia (p. 8) argues that the aforementioned events have transformed otherwise reasonable immigration-related concerns into security fears, thereby precipitating a “security escalation.”

Yet a third current, as reflected in Bourbeau’s *Securitization of Immigration*, also accepts many of the central tenets of securitization theory as these have been applied to immigration politics and policy. However, in a departure from the orthodoxy that simply takes the securitization of immigration as a given, Bourbeau aspires to isolate and identify the empirical indicators of the phenomenon. Specifically, Bourbeau (p. 7) employs “a combination of indicators offering a nominal measurement, a degree measurement, and within-case analyses using two categories of indicators: institutional indicators and security practices indicators” in comparing the processes of securitization of immigration in Canada and France. This allows Bourbeau to conduct a systematic examination of the role of political elites, the media, and contextual factors in the process of securitization in those two countries.

Finally, a fourth stream in the recent literature is ambivalent and, occasionally, skeptical about the purported causes, immediate effects, and long-term implications of the securitization of immigration. Although it largely assumes that public policy within the major immigration-receiving countries has been securitized, *Immigration Policy and Security*, coedited by Givens, Freeman, and Leal, nevertheless does not necessarily or fully subscribe to the notion that securitization is a premeditated and sustained elite-driven strategy. Indeed, unlike the Lazaridis volume, tensions are evident among the contributors to *Immigration Policy and Security* between those who view September 11 as a critical turning point for the politics of immigration and the formulation and execution of state immigrant and immigration policy (Waslin) and those who are skeptical or guarded about its ultimate implications and practical effects (Boswell; Hampshire). Put somewhat differently, the volume’s diverse chapters straddle the boundary between accepting and contesting the
Conclusion that contemporary immigration and immigrant policy has been securitized.

What has precipitated the securitization of immigration? The consensus among scholars in the field, including most of the contributors to the collected works considered in this review article, is that the phenomenon is inextricably linked to the political and social conflicts precipitated by the arrival and permanent settlement of ethnically, culturally, and/or religiously distinctive minority populations within the immigration-receiving countries. It concerns, in particular, the objective (for example, employment, housing, and welfare) and subjective (for example, cultural homogeneity, societal values, and/or national identity) challenges that immigrants pose for the policymakers and the so-called natives of these countries. According to Bigo, a leading voice of the Paris School of security studies, the securitization of immigration is fueled by three distinct but intersecting forces. First, politicians fear they are losing symbolic control over their country’s territorial boundaries. Second, security professionals, with their socially learned dispositions, skills, and ways of acting, find themselves newly interested and invested in immigration matters. Finally, many alienated citizens experience a sense of “unease” as a consequence of their inability to cope with the challenges and uncertainties of contemporary life. Although the practice of conflating immigration with security is often said to predate the events of September 11, 2001, a claim to which we will return below, most securitization of immigration scholars either implicitly or explicitly agree that the post–September 11 period is witness to a “‘problematization’ and ‘securitization’ of . . . [immigration] that is new in its scope and scale.” In short, September 11 is viewed as a critical juncture in and a major accelerant of the process of securitizing immigration in Europe and the United States.

Recent scholarship on the securitization of immigration has indeed been prolific and, on the basis of current trends, it will undoubtedly continue expanding. Nonetheless, within this expansive literature there has hitherto been little agreement on the scope or a specific definition of security as it pertains to immigration-related issues. Dissensus also

---

9 See Alexseev 2005; and Bigo 2001.
10 In contrast to the Copenhagen School, the Paris School of security studies conceptualizes securitization not as a speech act but as a process of defining meaning through a technological as well as a technocratic discourse.
11 Bigo 2002.
12 See, for example, Weiner 1992–93.
reigns with respect to the degree to which these issues have become securitized. On the one side are those, including most of the contributors to the volumes under review, who argue that the conflation of immigration with terrorism and the framing of immigrants as societal “enemies” in public discourse has been ubiquitous across post-September 11 Europe and the United States and, consequently, unambiguously signals the securitization of immigration. On the other side are those who reject the supposition that the concept of security has social aspects, protest that although immigration can be securitized, it is typically so to different degrees within and across countries; or deny that immigration-related issues have been securitized in political elite discourse and/or public policy.

Against the backdrop of this debate and the significant “focusing event” of September 11—that is, an extraordinary event that dramatically underscores the failure of policy, thus increasing its salience among decision makers and the general public—this review essay asks in which specific ways and to what extent immigration-related issues have been securitized in the United States and Europe. In addressing these questions it will execute three tasks. First, it will critically assess the four major dimensions across which contemporary immigration purportedly is securitized: on one side, rhetorically addressing immigration-related issues through political elite discourse, public opinion, and the mass media; and on the other, considering the policy processes through which immigration is purportedly securitized. Second, this article will identify the strengths and weaknesses of securitization theory as it has been applied to immigration. Finally, it will draw conclusions about the veracity of the central claims of the securitization of immigration literature and, specifically, its implicit causal story, a story that is said to unfold in the following manner within and across the immigration-receiving countries:

precipitating focusing event(s) → strategically-motivated elite securitizing speech acts → public receptivity to securitizing speech acts → securitization of public policy / liberation from established rules and resolution of policy dilemma(s) outside of normal decision-making procedures → linkage between immigration and security is institutionally embedded and vigorously defended by security "professionals."
In executing the aforementioned tasks, this article follows Bourbeau’s recommendation not to conflate the politicization of immigration with the securitization of immigration.22 As Bourbeau (p. 43) distinguishes between these concepts, the politicization of immigration extricates the subject from restricted networks and/or bureaucracies and injects it into the public arena; the securitization of immigration, by contrast, involves “integrating migration discursively and institutionally into security frameworks that emphasize policing and defense.” While the politicization of immigration is a neutral and an occasionally positive process, the securitization of immigration tends to be neither neutral nor constructive.

**Political Elite Discourse**

There is probably no single “fact” on which most of the authors in the collected volumes under review and other securitization scholars explicitly agree other than that political elite discourse has securitized immigration-related issues in recent years, especially since September 11. Although opinions diverge somewhat about the specific motives inspiring such discourse, the conventional wisdom is that numerous mainstream politicians and extreme right political actors have rhetorically exploited September 11 and other terrorist-related events in a deliberate and calculated manner. As Phizacklea (p. 7) summarizes this perspective in her concluding remarks in *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe*: “In the face of an increased securitization-migration nexus (a securitization which becomes ever more elaborate technologically) migrants are cast as a cultural/criminal/terrorist threat and, in these recessionary times, a threat to economic stability.” According to Toğral (p. 219) in his contribution to the same volume, the elite-driven “‘war on terror’ has not only linked migration to terrorism, it has also consolidated the place of migration as a threat to cultural identity.” Hampshire (p. 118) further argues in his essay in *Immigration Policy and Security* that the “government-led securitization of migration . . . has been used to legitimize extra-ordinary policies, especially in the field of asylum and migrants’ rights.” Moreover, in Faist’s view, elites have elevated immigration to the status of a “meta-issue,” or an overarching concern in which the boundaries of immigration as an external and internal security threat have become substantially blurred.23

---

22 For an example of politicizing immigration-related issues, see Messina 1989, 126–49.
23 Faist 2002.
Given this general consensus, two critical and interrelated questions can be posed. First, is there concrete and compelling evidence that Western political elites have deliberately and systematically plotted to securitize immigration-related issues? Second, if elites indeed have attempted to securitize immigration-related issues, what are their primary motives?

In response to the first question it is not unfair to conclude that most of the evidence of elite securitizing moves alluded to or presented in the collected volumes is anecdotal, episodic, unsystematically gathered, and/or difficult to compare across national cases. Moreover and more importantly, it is unclear if the aforementioned evidence, as scant as it is, supports the argument that elites have conducted a series of purposeful and sustained campaigns to convince the general public that immigrants constitute an omnipresent security threat and one that requires the urgent implementation of extraordinary policy measures.

To be sure, and as chronicled in the works of Chebel d’Appollonia, Hampshire, Toğral, and others, political elite discourse about immigrants has often been inflammatory since September 11 and other, more recent terrorist events. There is no denying that numerous mainstream politicians and extreme right political actors have rhetorically linked domestic terrorist-related incidents to mass immigration and immigrant settlement; illiberal, intolerant, and incendiary statements by such politicians are abundantly represented within the contemporary public record across the major immigration-receiving countries. This said, not every contributor to the collected readings fully accepts the conventional wisdom, which suggests the existence of a pervasive, orchestrated, and sustained elite campaigns to securitize immigration. Boswell, for one, argues that “despite some initial attempts to link terrorism and migration, political discourse on migration control ... has remained surprisingly untouched by the anti-terrorist agenda.” Her analysis of post–September 11 elite discourse in Britain, Germany, and Spain leads her to conclude that, in contrast to the US, “discourse on migration control in Europe does not appear to have become securitized as a result of 9/11 or the subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London.” Perhaps even more persuasively, Bourbeau’s (p. 74) comprehensive catalog of the incidents when heads of state, heads of government, and interior and/or other relevant government cabinet

25 Boswell 2009, 93.
26 Boswell 2009, 105.
ministers executed securitization moves in Canada and France between 1989 and 2005 reveals that the securitizing speech acts of elites were sporadic: for example, despite the terrorist bombings in France in 1995 as well as the events of September 11, 2001, France’s prime minister, Lionel Jospin, made no securitization moves during his tenure in office from 1997 through 2002; similarly, although 80 percent of all elite securitizing moves in the Canadian case postdate September 11, they nevertheless were not executed “on a systematic and repeated-over-time basis . . . [and] have remained relatively low since then.” In short, while it is all well and good to underscore that political elites can and occasionally do make securitizing moves, it is quite another thing to assume, as securitization theorists often do, that such moves are calculated and/or sustained over time.

With respect to their motives, the securitization of immigration literature generally assumes that Western politicians engage in discourses that frame immigrants as an existential, material, and/or physical threat for self-interested political reasons and/or in order to enhance the legitimacy of their privileged position.27 As Boswell (in Givens, Freeman, and Leal, 94) describes this widely embraced perspective: “Securitization legitimizes the state in its attempt to introduce more restrictive measures”; furthermore, it “provides an opportunity for consolidating categories of collective identification and helps mobilize support for the relevant political community, generating greater loyalty or patriotism through the definition of a common threat.” As mentioned above, it is frequently asserted that such securitizing discourse is consciously intended to facilitate the transfer of immigration-related issues from the realm of conventional politics to that of emergency politics where they can be addressed and resolved outside of the normal policy-making procedures. As a result, it thus matters very much whether political elites act purposefully whenever they rhetorically link immigration to security, since in the absence of such evidence a central tenet of securitization theory—that is, focusing events inspire or facilitate strategically motivated elite securitizing speech acts—remains unproven.

What of the veracity of the claim that elite securitization discourse is primarily inspired by the aforementioned motives? The proponents of securitization theory in fact have not collected and/or presented much concrete evidence to support this thesis. Indeed, given its centrality to securitization theory, it is conspicuous how few securitization of immigration scholars have made even the slightest effort to establish empirically,

either through elite interviews or other data-collection methods, the motives that are assumed to drive elite securitization moves. Rather, in a classic example of argument by assertion many securitization scholars reflexively connect the fact of securitizing elite speech—that is, whenever it occurs—with the supposition that such speech is inspired by the ambition of elites to transfer immigration-related issues from the realm of conventional politics to that of emergency politics. In this context it is thus problematic that Bourbeau (p. 57) has discovered that the securitizing speech acts of Canadian officials during the mid-1990s were primarily inspired by the rather mundane impulse to parrot the rhetoric of other Western officials and, thus, were not deliberately designed to extricate immigration issues from the normal policy formulation and policy-making procedures. Although the Canadian example could very well be an outlier, it nevertheless underscores the fact that there is a paucity of hard evidence within the securitization of immigration literature, including the volumes under review here, which links illiberal elite speech to the explicit motive of wishing to transfer immigration-related issues to the realm of emergency politics.

Moreover, as is vividly underscored by the infamous 1968 “rivers of blood” speech by then British politician Enoch Powell and by then shadow prime minister Margaret Thatcher’s 1978 assertion that Britain “might be rather swamped by people of a different culture,” as well as numerous other historical examples, securitizing moves by both mainstream and maverick politicians are hardly a recent phenomenon.28 Prominent examples of elites rhetorically linking immigration to security litter the history of post-WWII migration to Europe.29 Indeed, Chebel d’Appollonia (p. 6) traces this phenomenon even farther back in time, when she asserts that “the current framing of immigration as a terrorist threat employs traditional rhetorical arguments dating from the late nineteenth century.” Irrespective of its precise starting point, the stark reality is that for most of the past half century or longer a minority of European and American politicians has employed inflammatory rhetoric about matters of immigration and/or prescribed illiberal immigrant and immigration policies. On this score the post–September 11 period seems little different from either the distant or the more recent past.30

---

28 For examples from the British and French cases, see Freeman 1979, 280–307; and Messina 1989, 103–49.
30 Berkeley, Khan, and Ambikaipaker 2006.
As noted above, securitization of immigration scholars generally contend that elites employ existential threat rhetoric to extricate immigration-related issues from the realm of normal politics and political discourse. Central to this project’s success is the public’s acceptance of the violation of rules that governments would otherwise be compelled to avoid in a nonsecuritized environment. Put differently, political elites who operate within a liberal democratic setting must garner the approval of a critical mass of the public in order to enact emergency measures to counter the purported threat(s) posed by immigration.

Is there empirical evidence of such support? Have the securitizing speech acts of political elites persuaded either a majority or a large minority of the public that immigrants pose an economic, sociocultural, and/or physical safety threat? Regrettably, the securitization of immigration literature—including the authors contributing to the collected works under review here—are mostly silent on these questions. Relatively few securitization scholars have bothered to investigate whether the opinion survey record provides longitudinal evidence of such acquiescence and, more importantly, whether the securitizing speech acts of elites (independent variable) have significantly influenced public attitudes (dependent variable). Indeed, if Karyotis is correct in assuming that “securitization [only] occurs when securitizing actors . . . succeed in convincing a relevant section of society that exceptional measures are needed in response to an existential threat,” then logically we should expect to discover two trends in the public opinion survey record. First, there should be abundant and unambiguous evidence that either a large minority or a majority of the contemporary public perceives immigrants as an economic, sociocultural, and/or physical safety threat. Second, the data should reveal that whenever elites rhetorically associate, however tangentially, immigration with terrorism following a major domestic terrorist event, a greater percentage of the public becomes insecure about immigration and/or the presence of immigrants.

As generally predicted by securitization theory, the shared experience of mass immigration has indeed precipitated popular insecurities across the immigration-receiving countries, including the public’s perceptions that immigrants negatively impact employment, national culture/identity, and/or physical safety. Numerous studies beyond those reviewed
in this article confirm the thesis that a critical number of citizens within the affected countries are insecure about the presence of immigrants.\textsuperscript{32} Although the foci of their insecurities vary across countries, and despite differences of perspective among the various income groups, social classes, and so on within each country, a substantial minority to a majority of the public within the respective immigration-receiving countries are undeniably receptive to the illiberal oratory of political elites on immigration-related matters.

Nevertheless, did September 11 and/or other terrorist events in Europe transform public opinion? More importantly, did the 1995 terrorist bombings in France, the attacks of September 11 in the US, the Madrid train attack of March 2004, the assassination of Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim in November 2004, and/or the London bombings of July 7, 2005, swell the ranks of those who feel especially threatened by immigration and settled immigrants? As might have been reasonably anticipated, and as correctly surmised by Likic-Brboric (p. 89) in \textit{Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe}, the disposition of national publics toward immigrants and immigration generally did not improve after September 11. Nevertheless, as Bourbeau has discovered in scrutinizing the available Canadian and French survey data, there is little if any evidence that public opinion was significantly transformed by the aforementioned trauma in either country. Instead, the survey evidence cited by Bourbeau (p. 118) “underscore[s] the enduring continuity in Canadian and French attitudes toward immigration.”

At least three other studies at least partially corroborate and expand upon Bourbeau’s findings. In their analysis of a Roper two-wave survey on popular attitudes toward Muslim religious rights taken before and after September 11 in Britain, France, and Germany, Fetzer and Soper, for example, discovered that although the events of September 11 influenced popular attitudes toward Muslims—that is, survey respondents were somewhat less inclined soon after September 11 to favor the accommodation of Islam in state-run schools—most of the public in these countries nevertheless “did not become markedly anti-Islamic.” Moreover, Britons and Germans were “far more tolerant toward Islam than reports in the popular press might suggest.”\textsuperscript{33}

In a second study Davis found that the disposition of Americans to acquiesce to the will of securitizing political authorities in the aftermath of September 11 was ephemeral.\textsuperscript{34} Informed by the results of several

\textsuperscript{32} See, for example, Ederven et al. 2004, 82–84.
\textsuperscript{33} Fetzer and Soper 2003, 256.
\textsuperscript{34} Davis 2007, 219.
surveys he conducted after September 11, Davis concludes that the willingness of Americans to trade liberty for security after September 11 was temporary and situational, eventually dissipating as the “reservoir” of political trust in the Bush administration eroded during the years following the attacks. As a result of his findings, Davis speculates that because Americans “now have the experience of anxiety and what might be expected when the government needs to provide for their safety and security,” any terrorist attacks perpetrated on American soil in the future will make the public less inclined to trade liberty for security than was true following September 11.

Finally, although executed seven years after September 11, a 2008 German Marshall Fund survey discovered that a majority of respondents in the US and six European countries rejected the premise that immigration increases the likelihood of a terrorist attack in their country: only 35 percent of Europeans and 40 percent of Americans viewed it as a possibility. French respondents were the most adamant, with less than a quarter (23 percent) linking immigration with terrorism.

In sum, although it is not unreasonable to presume, as securitization theorists have implicitly presumed, that more citizens would have become insecure about immigration and immigrants in the wake of September 11 and other, more recent acts of terrorism, there is no survey evidence indicating that this occurred. There are no longitudinal public opinion data to support the argument that elites have rhetorically framed a “convenient linkage” between national security and immigration that, in turn, has been embraced by a wider public. If elites made deliberate securitization moves after September 11, these appear to have had little influence on public opinion over time, although they probably did result in immigration-related issues becoming more politically salient.

How can these counterintuitive findings be explained? Given the wealth of evidence that numerous political elites within the immigration-receiving countries, especially leaders of extreme right political parties, did extensively engage in securitizing rhetoric after September 11, one plausible explanation for the null effect on public opinion is offered by Bourbeau. According to Bourbeau, for elite rhetoric to influence public opinion along the lines suggested by securitization theory, the relevant cultural and sociocultural contexts have to be favorable. Thus,

35 Davis 2007, 224.
37 Messina 2012; Ross 2004.
38 Regarding this general phenomenon, see Zaller 1992, 36.
whenever/wherever these contexts are unfavorable, elite attempts to securitize immigration in the public mind are likely to fail and frequently do. Central to this explanation is Bourbeau’s supposition that different contexts across countries and changing contexts within countries over time significantly circumscribe the influence that aspirant securitizing actors can have on public opinion. As he explains:

Securitizing agents cannot exclude themselves from environments in which they formulate their securitizing attempts. . . . To be sure, agents do have some autonomy; socio-historically and culturally produced knowledge enables individuals to construct and give meaning to contextual factors. However . . . their capacity to change, reproduce, and remodel the security realm is not unbounded. A security speech act does not constitute a securitization; it represents only an attempt to present an issue as a security threat. (p. 98)

To illustrate, Bourbeau (pp. 110–18) points to the reticence of most Canadians, for reasons linked to Canada’s long history as a country of immigration and the conspicuous absence of immigration as a salient issue in national election campaigns, to perceive immigrants as an existential security threat, including after September 11. As a consequence of their reticence, he concludes, the potential for Canadian political elites to securitize immigration successfully was and continues to be significantly circumscribed, a finding that, while not necessarily applicable universally, nevertheless probably applies elsewhere and especially to the traditional countries of immigration.

Another plausible explanation for the lack of a post–September 11 effect—and one that can readily be applied across the relevant country cases—derives from insights generated within the general scholarly literature on public opinion. Within this literature Yankelovich observes that “public opinion develops slowly over a long period—at least 10 years for a complex issue.” In doing so it winds through seven distinct stages, the last of which results in citizens endorsing a course of action, accepting its costs and trade-offs, and living with the consequences of their beliefs. Immigration, it could reasonably be presumed, is just such a complex and multifaceted issue. If so, it is probable that September 11 had little if any influence on the trajectory of public opinion because the most disruptive and disturbing implications of mass immigration and immigrant settlement had long ago been factored into the thinking of most Europeans, and particularly those within the traditional immigration-receiving countries. Indeed, along these lines McLaren

39 Yankelovich 1993, 1.
observes that popular “fears related to the religion and culture of new immigrants were apparent in Europe before the attacks of September 11, July 7, and the Madrid train attack of 2004,” although her conclusion that these “incidents have heightened [the public’s] fears even further” seems to be contradicted by the above cited-survey evidence.\(^{41}\) Sniderman and Hagendoorn similarly argue that the “strains between Muslims and West Europeans . . . were not a product of 11 September 2001—quite the contrary, they provided the basis for reactions to it.”\(^{42}\)

**Role of Mass Media**

Bourbeau’s aforementioned argument that history and culture circumscribe attempts by elites to securitize immigration does not, of course, preclude the possibility that the latter will nevertheless try to mobilize popular support for their preferred policies. It is in this context that the securitization of immigration literature frequently characterizes the mass media as either implicit or explicit allies of political elites and, in any event, key intermediaries in the securitization process by providing a communication transmission belt between securitizing agents and their target audience.\(^{43}\) Within this literature “media frames,” in particular, are represented as lenses through which the public can either be persuaded to perceive immigration and terrorism as routine policy challenges best dealt with through normal law enforcement and political channels or, alternatively, crisis policy areas requiring the formulation and execution of extreme measures.\(^{44}\) According to Karyotis, the “tendency to report migration news from the perspective of dominant political actors, such as the government and the police,” routinely results in the media playing a critical role in popularizing the security rhetoric of elites.\(^{45}\) In the Greek case he observes that

the media adopted mostly nationalistic standpoints [in response to mass immigration], with shallow, xenophobic representations of migration. These included publishing misleading newspaper headlines, which attributed criminal acts to migrants, despite the lack of evidence. Furthermore, any crimes committed by foreigners received prime-time coverage, complete with ominous music, reenactments and special effects.\(^{46}\)

---

\(^{41}\) McLaren 2008, 15.

\(^{42}\) Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, xii.


\(^{44}\) Triandafyllidou 1999.

\(^{45}\) Karyotis 2011b, 10.

\(^{46}\) Karyotis 2011b, 10.
In the case of Italy, Triandafyllidou argues similarly that the discourse on immigration in the press routinely reproduces national identity dimensions in ways that emphasize the differences between “Italians and immigrants and re-define the conception of the Italian nation along exclusionary lines.”

How well and to what extent does the media’s coverage of immigration-related issues reflect the purported securitization agenda of elites? Tsoukala reports in her chapter in *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe* that the representation of asylum seekers and immigrants in the French and Greek media during the 1980s and 1990s “repeatedly highlighted the prevalence of negative stereotypes” (p. 182). She further argues that the media’s coverage of immigration reflexively echoed the policy agendas of political elites and that it subsequently adapted its coverage whenever the elite agendas changed. Specifically, as France and Greece moved closer to the late 2000s—that is, after September 11—their respective media’s representation of asylum seekers and immigrants shifted in a manner that reflected the “strict rational criteria that incorporate[d] [the] vested interests and needs of the host society” (p. 192). In response to the then unfavorable demographic and structural changes occurring within the domestic labor market and in order “to protect certain domestic interests that are consensually accepted as vital for the well-being of [the] host societies,” the press in each country eventually discarded its previously prevailing discourse framing immigrants as an economic and a demographic threat but nonetheless continued to reproduce the “image of ‘foreigner’ as a source of key social threats, thereby fueling widespread fear and anxiety over security and identity related issues” (p. 192). As a result of the aforementioned shift, according to Tsoukala, there is now a duality of press discourses within France and Greece: desecuritizing discourse (that is, discourse promoting some streams of immigration as economically useful) and securitizing discourse (that is, discourse suggesting that most immigrants continue to threaten to the dominant sociocultural order).

Bourbeau’s more persuasive answer to the question of whether the media’s coverage of immigration issues reflects the securitization agenda of elites sharply dissents from Tsoukala’s, however, and in so doing casts serious doubt on the media’s purported role as a unitary and significant securitizing agent. His content analysis of nearly nine hundred newspaper editorials in Canada and France between 1989 and 2005 found little

---

47 Triandafyllidou 1999, 67.
48 Tsoukala 2011, 192.
empirical evidence that the media are important securitizing agents in the two major countries of immigration. Rather,

Canada’s biggest national newspaper, The Globe and Mail, made securitization moves only following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Canada’s biggest francophone newspaper, La Presse, made almost no securitizing moves throughout the years. . . . Similarly, editorialists of France’s newspaper Le Monde have not argued for the securitization of migration for the entire period this study covers. Finally, editorialists of Le Figaro are the only ones who have made several securitizing moves in a forceful and repeated way. (p. 96)

If Bourbeau’s results can be replicated in other country cases, then it is reasonable to conclude that the media’s response to precipitating focusing focusing events does not automatically follow or necessarily reflect the securitizing cues of political elites. At the very least his findings suggest that while the media can be a securitizing agent, its potential to be so is irregular and, ultimately, its coverage of immigration-related issues sheds little, if any, useful light on the larger securitization process (p. 96).

### Possible Evolution of Public Policy

As mentioned previously, many if not most securitization of immigration scholars concur that immigration-related public policies have become more illiberal in the contemporary age of terror. However, among these scholars there is less agreement on whether or not September 11 and other, related terrorist events have precipitated a significant departure from the immigration policy status quo. Put in the form of a question: have the aforementioned events redirected the trajectory of contemporary immigration-related policies?

In contrast to the tenuous claim that Western political elites have conducted a series of calculated and sustained rhetorical campaigns to convince the general public that immigrants constitute an omnipresent and urgent security threat, the assertion that state immigrant and immigration policies have become more illiberal after September 11 and subsequent terrorist-related events in Europe is supported by abundant evidence.49 Of the works reviewed here Chebel d’Appollonia’s Frontiers of Fear provides the most comparative and comprehensive coverage of how states have reconfigured their immigration-related policies in the contemporary age of terror. Its third chapter in particular exhaustively details the numerous “security packages” and “exceptional measures”

49 Diez and Squire 2008; Frederking 2012; and Haubrich 2003.
that American and European governments adopted to enhance homeland security after September 11, including their implementation of a “zero-tolerance approach to immigration offenses, tougher controls on borders, and even extraterritorial controls beyond borders” (p. 77). Chebel d’Appollonia is hardly alone in documenting the insular and exclusionary trajectory of post–September 11 immigration and immigrant policy. On the respective policy fronts of protecting asylum seekers and refugees (chapters by Brown and Bean, Salehyan, and Thielemann), securing national borders (chapter by Mitsilegas), and implementing domestic immigration and immigrant rights policies (chapters by Jupp, Luedtke, and Waslin), virtually all of the contributors to *Immigration Policy and Security* concur that public policy has become more illiberal in the contemporary age of terror. Although the most onerous effects of this trend seem to have been visited upon immigrants and/or prospective migrants, as Salehyan helpfully and somewhat surprisingly points out in his chapter, it has *not* especially discriminated against Muslims.

The scholarly consensus on the negative policy fallout of September 11 and subsequent terrorist events in Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, the US, and elsewhere extends deeper. Most scholars also agree that the changes directly linked to the securitization of immigration have precipitated general policy failure. Thus, in the contemporary age of terror new or reconfigured public policies have eroded general civil liberties (Mitsilegas); circumscribed immigrant rights (Hampshire); damaged the national macroeconomic interest (Brown and Bean); retarded the progress of European integration (Luedtke); and, according to Chebel d’Appollonia (2012, 249), severely compromised national security and even imperiled democracy itself. In his contribution to *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe*, Karyotis (p. 22) cites three specific ways in which securitizing immigration has been a “counter-productive management strategy.” First, securitization “as a response to perceived threats to the identity of the host nation” has paradoxically persuaded many productive economic migrants to return to their country of origin and inspired others, contrary to the preferences of policymakers, to settle permanently in order to secure their continued access to the domestic labor market. Second, securitizing immigration has increased the risk of public disorder by reproducing a “criminal-migrant discourse” and, in so doing, poisoned immigrant-native citizen relations. Finally, “justifying restrictive policies with reference to the threat of terrorism . . . has [had] the unfortunate effect of blurring all types of migrants and incorporating illegal migrants, labor immigrants and asylum-seekers into a single policing-repression scheme.”
As Chebel d’Appollonia concisely summarizes the consensus on policy failure among securitization of immigration scholars: “The securitization of immigration has proven ineffective in achieving its prescribed goals” and “worse . . . the policies that have been introduced have aggravated the problem that they were supposed to address” (p. 5).

Somewhat curiously and importantly for assessing the value of applying securitization theory to the phenomenon of immigration, there is a third point on which most scholars concur—that the securitization of immigration and immigrant policy long predates September 11 and the so-called war on terror. Karyotis, for example, argues that the recent focusing events that inspired securitization did not precipitate “the insecurities, uncertainties, ambiguities, and complexities that characterize migration policies at both the domestic and European level . . . [but] rather they strengthened and legitimized the security logic that has dominated asylum and immigration policies in Europe since the late 1970s.”50 Moreover, according to Chebel d’Appollonia:

Neither the United States nor European countries dramatically changed their policy options in the aftermath of 9/11. Rather, they simply strengthened existing measures or implemented reforms. Interestingly, the “new” threats were not perceived as an incentive for policy innovation, but rather as the posteriori legitimization of previous, failed policies. (p. 7)

In his chapter in Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe, Nagtegaal too concurs that the conflation of security with immigration is an “old phenomenon,” provocatively arguing that “the way states deal with refugees in the first decade of the twenty-first century does not deviate from refugee policies executed since the early twentieth century” (p. 119).

Assuming that post–September 11 state immigrant and immigration policies are indeed less liberal than previously and/or are counterproductive, to what extent have state immigration-related policies been transformed? To what extent do they represent a radical departure from the policy status quo?

According to Boswell, “while there may be some evidence that securitization has occurred in a number of cases . . . there is no reason to expect politics to be driven exclusively by an interest in encouraging public unease or introducing more stringent security measures.”51 Indeed, she offers three fairly persuasive reasons for why states and political parties of government would normally be circumspect about promoting securitization:

50 Karyotis 2011a, 13.
51 Boswell 2007, 592.
The first reason . . . is that securitization can create unfeasible [public] expectations about the state's capacity to control migration. By depicting migration policy as part of a counterterrorism strategy, states are effectively raising the stakes of migration control. If they fail to deliver on targets of migration control, they expose themselves to quite serious accusations about their capacity to provide security. . . . Pursuing a strategy of securitization may also jeopardize other goals of the state, such as ensuring a sufficient supply of migrant labor to guarantee the conditions of economic growth. . . . The third reason why European states appear to have resisted the securitization of migration control relates to the cognitive constraints. . . . Governments need to offer coherent and credible accounts of the causes and nature of the terrorist threat and the sorts of interventions that can best respond to them.52

Boswell specifically observes that while many European governments were highly motivated to reduce irregular immigration during the early 2000s, several were also simultaneously making concerted efforts to bolster public support for implementing expansive labor migration policies, therefore diminishing any incentives they may have had to securitize immigration. In echoing Freeman’s theory of client politics, Boswell suggests that political elites, and particularly those in government, by default are adverse to securitizing immigration for fear of compromising the flow of migrant labor that is so crucial to the interests of a subset of their national business community.53

Indeed, the elevation of immigration to the status of a metaissue within the immigration-receiving countries, whatever its precipitating cause or causes, only seems to further destabilize a policy equilibrium that, until recently, prevailed across Europe and the US and one to which mainstream political elites and political parties have traditionally adhered and, presumably for self-interested reasons, wish to preserve.54 Founded upon the premise that each of the three dimensions of contemporary immigration policy—labor immigration policy, immigrant incorporation policy, and border control policy—could be formulated in relative isolation and far from public scrutiny, elites could make decisions taken along one policy dimension of immigration without circumscribing decisions made along other dimensions. Contrary to a central core supposition of securitization theory, it could be reasonably argued that as a consequence of September 11 and other terrorist-related events, the platform on which elites craft and implement immigration and immigrant policy has now become more rather than less politically contested and politicized. Moreover, elite policy-making

53 Freeman 1995; Boswell 2009, 102.
54 Boswell 2009, 102.
prerogatives may also have become more circumscribed. With regard to
the former point, Roe persuasively argues that “in the context of liberal
democracies, legislation is invariably marked by a greater semblance of
oversight” than is typically assumed by securitization scholars; more-
over, “the extent to which securitization necessitates a lack of openness
and deliberation has been exaggerated.”55 With regard to the lat-
ter possibility, Freeman, Givens, and Leal helpfully underscore the fact
that “the attack on the Twin Towers clearly derailed what would almost
certainly have been a major expansion and liberalization of American
immigration law that the Bush administration had promised President
Vincente Fox of Mexico” (p. 3).

Scrutinizing the Securitization of Immigration Literature

In which ways then is contemporary immigration and immigrant policy
securitized? Our above review of the collected works and other perti-
nent scholarship suggests that the securitization of immigration para-
digm rests on two fairly solid pillars. First, as observed earlier, some
mainstream politicians and most extreme right political actors within
the immigration-receiving countries unquestionably have rhetorically
linked domestic terrorist-related incidents to immigration since Sep-
tember 11. As Freeman, Givens, and Leal note, “immigration every-
where has become a higher-priority item on the public agenda and
everywhere it has come to be linked to possibilities of terrorist attacks”
(p. 9). Boswell similarly observes that the “terrorist attacks on the U.S.
and the subsequent bombings in Madrid and London provided an op-
portunity for governments, politicians, and the media to correlate ter-
rorism with immigration.”56

Nevertheless, this pillar has at least two conspicuous cracks. The first
problem springs from the tendency of securitization of immigration
scholars to impute the motives for so-called elite securitizing moves.
The suppositions that Western politicians have adopted rhetorical dis-
courses that frame immigrants as an existential, material, and/or physi-
cal threat for self-serving political reasons and/or in order to enhance
the legitimacy of their privileged position have not been adequately
documented within the securitization of immigration literature. Few
securitization of immigration scholars have provided, either through
elite interviews or other data-collection methods, empirical evidence
concerning the motives that purportedly inspire elite securitization

55 Roe 2012, 250.
56 Boswell 2009, 93.
moves and, instead, have repeatedly resorted to argument by assertion. Along these lines it is necessary to document that political elites act *purposefully* whenever they rhetorically link immigration to security, since in the absence of such evidence a central tenet of securitization theory—that is, focusing events inspire *strategically motivated* elite securitizing speech acts—remains unproven.

Yet another problem with the aforementioned perspective is the reality that elite securitizing speech is not an especially recent phenomenon. As almost all securitization of immigration scholars readily acknowledge, numerous examples of elite securitization discourse are liberally sprinkled across the past four decades, if not even farther back in time. For securitization theory this fact raises awkward and unanswered questions concerning what is ultimately “normal” and “extraordinary” securitizing speech, an important boundary that, insofar as it exists, signals if and when an elite campaign has been launched to transfer immigration-related issues from the realm of normal to that of emergency politics.\(^{57}\) For example, if elite securitizing speech is more or less a constant feature while securitizing measures on matters of immigration vary within the immigration-receiving countries, then how can we be confident that the former is a *necessary* and *strategically inspired* prelude to the latter? Similarly, if elite securitizing speech is not especially new in the long history of mass migration to Europe and the United States, then when and how is it *directly* connected to recently inspired strategies to formulate and implement “extraordinary measures” on immigration-related questions?

A second pillar of the securitization of immigration literature is that September 11 and subsequent terrorist events in Europe have precipitated numerous changes and/or revisions in state immigrant and immigration policies. The claim that contemporary state immigrant and immigration policies are now more exclusionary since September 11 and subsequent terrorist-related events in Europe is well documented. This said, to the degree that policy continuity rather than discontinuity on immigration generally prevails across the immigration-receiving countries since September 11—that is, post–September 11 terrorist events have accelerated but did not spark the recent illiberal turn in immigrant and immigration policy—then the assumption of many securitization theorists that political elites have gained greater policy-making autonomy as a result of domestic acts of terrorism is thrown into doubt.\(^{58}\) In short, if the immigration-receiving countries have not

---

\(^{57}\) Roe 2012, 25.

\(^{58}\) Bourbeau 2011, 134.
significantly altered their policies in the aftermath of terrorist acts but, rather, have “simply strengthened existing measures or implemented reforms,” then why do we need securitization theory to explain the latter phenomenon? With regard to the public’s role in the securitization process, the opinion survey evidence, as we have seen above, generally does not support the assumptions of securitization theory. Although numerous citizens within the affected countries are undoubtedly insecure about the presence of immigrants, several studies convincingly demonstrate that contentious issues pertaining to the presence of immigrants were already “securitized” for many if not most of the public within the immigration-receiving countries well before September 11 and other recent acts of domestic terrorism; that is, a substantial percentage of the public already perceived immigrants as negatively impacting employment, national culture/identity, and/or physical safety. Especially problematic for securitization theory and its claim that elites rhetorically framed a “convenient linkage” between national security and immigration after September 11—which has been received, comprehended, and broadly embraced by the public—is the fact that there is scant evidence of change in the opinion survey data over time. Rather, if anything, the survey evidence demonstrates the very opposite—that elite securitization moves after September 11 appear to have had little if any influence on public opinion, especially over the medium to long term. If September 11 and subsequent terrorist-related events did not precipitate or expand the public’s insecurities about immigration and immigrants, then what ultimately does securitization theory usefully explain?

Finally, it is also problematic for securitization theory that the media’s role in the process of securitizing immigration is, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, insignificant. The paucity of concrete evidence for the view that the media reflexively echo the securitizing cues of political elites raises doubts about the veracity of the claim that they play a critical role in facilitating communication between securitizing agents and their target mass audience and, in so doing, “popularize” the former’s security rhetoric. It is, of course, undeniable that the mass media frequently frame immigrants as a security threat. Moreover, the possibility that whenever the media link terrorist events to immigration and immigrant settlement, the securitization agenda of at least some elites, and especially anti-immigrant political actors, is reinforced and to some extent legitimized cannot be easily dismissed. Nevertheless, in

59 Chebel d’Appollonia 2012, 7.
60 See, for example, Oates 2006.
the absence of hard evidence that the media’s immigration frames influence more of the public to become illiberal and/or insecure—rather than simply making public discourse on immigration-related issues uncivil—it is safer than not to conclude that the media’s role in the securitization process is more modest than many securitization of immigration scholars typically claim.

Conclusions: Securitizing Immigration?

According to Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, securitization scholars are dedicated to discovering “who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions.”61 Given these ambitions, how much light does the securitization paradigm ultimately shed on the post–September 11 politics of immigration? This question cannot be satisfactorily addressed, let alone comprehensively answered, until securitization of immigration scholars first undertake a hitherto neglected task: that is, segregate the numerous public policies that have been spawned and justified primarily by the so-called war on terror from those that have purportedly been crafted to advance an anti-immigrant/immigration agenda. Along these lines the uncontestable fact that Western governments have adopted numerous “security packages” and “exceptional measures” in responding to real or imagined terrorist threats, acts that in turn have imposed significant burdens on immigrants or would-be migrants, does not, of itself, constitute objective evidence of securitization. Rather, following the logic of the Copenhagen School, in order for securitization to occur, elite discourse must conflate immigration with terrorism and deliberately exploit the public’s fear of immigrants for the strategic purpose of transferring the affected issue(s) out of the realms of conventional politics and policy-making and into the domain of emergency politics.62

As measured against this standard, it is far from clear that all of the aforementioned links in the securitization chain are equally strong or even exist with respect to immigration. As we’ve argued above, there is little evidence that mainstream political elites have conducted a series of deliberate and sustained campaigns to convince the general public that immigrants constitute an omnipresent security menace. Moreover, there is a paucity of evidence that connects illiberal elite speech—either before or after September 11—to the explicit motive of wishing

61 Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 32.
62 Boswell 2009, 93.
to transfer immigration-related issues to the realm of emergency politics. Similarly, there are no longitudinal public opinion surveys indicating that elite securitizing speech acts have swelled the ranks of citizens who view immigrants as an economic, sociocultural, and/or physical safety threat. Indeed, there is no support for the supposition that elites have rhetorically framed a “convenient linkage” between national security and immigration that, in turn, has been widely embraced by the public in the affected countries. Moreover, if Bourbeau’s findings from the Canadian and French cases are eventually replicated in other country contexts, then the mass media’s coverage of precipitating focusing events appears to be uneven across national settings, and, in any event and more importantly, it does not reflexively echo the purported securitization agenda of political elites.

Instead, the paucity of empirical evidence to support the securitization paradigm as it has been applied to immigration appears to validate Boswell’s view that reports of immigration being securitized either before or after September 11 may very well be exaggerated. This said, to the extent that immigration-related issues are now included in a new “security continuum” within the immigration-receiving countries, two negative, pre–September 11 trends have in turn become more deeply embedded and, despite the aforementioned shortcomings of securitization theory, justify that scholars continue to focus on the security implications of contemporary immigration. First, immigration has been reinforced in the popular mind as a phenomenon that imperils the quality of life. Along these lines, it is especially troubling and politically pertinent that more than half of all citizens within nineteen European Union countries view ethnic minorities as posing some level of cultural and/or economic threat. Second, the immigration-security nexus undoubtedly reinforces the public’s long-standing reservations about the wisdom of the original decision of post-WWII governments to permit permanent mass immigrant settlement and, in its wake, the multiculturalization of their respective societies. However, unlike its earliest detractors, many of the contemporary critics of mass immigrant settlement are not xenophobes, overt racists, or petty nationalists. Rather, their central concern is that the immigration-receiving societies have now become too diverse to sustain the mutual obligations that underpin a secure society and a generous welfare state; that is, mass immigrant

65 Ederveen et al. 2004, 82.
66 Feldblum 1999; Freeman 1997; Leiken 2005; Rubin and Verheul 2009.
settlement has created a precarious trade-off between national social solidarity and ethnic and cultural diversity. Although this concern has been summarily dismissed in the empirical work of numerous American and European scholars, the ongoing potential of immigration to feed currents of popular insecurity nevertheless underscores its political salience within and across the immigration-receiving countries. As a result, the major challenge for scholars of contemporary immigration going forward is to gain and share important insights into the aforementioned currents without either overestimating their importance or misrepresenting the larger objective realities within which they are embedded.

REFERENCES


67 According to Goodhart 2004, 30, this trade-off paradoxically presents an “acute dilemma for progressives who want plenty of both social solidarity—high social cohesion and generous welfare paid out of a progressive tax system—and diversity—equal respect for a wide range of peoples, values and ways of life.”

68 See, for example, Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010; and Gesthuizen, van der Meer, and Sheepers 2009.


Roe, Paul. 2012. “Is Securitization a ‘Negative’ Concept? Revisiting the Norma-