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RESIST

June/July 1982 — 38 Union Square, Somerville, Mass. 02143 — Newsletter #149

a call to resist illegitimate authority

ABOUT THOSE STAMPS

We've heard from several of you recently about our last mailing, the one with the stamps thoughtfully already placed on the return envelopes. The letters expressed concern that this was a costly, if not profligate, method of fundraising. Believing that where there's smoke there's fire, we felt we owed all of you an explanation.

Resist does all of its fundraising by direct mail. Whether it's the pledge letter, or those intermittent appeals, or this newsletter, our hopes go out in the mail and return (we hope) in those little white envelopes. Every mailing costs something what with postage, printing, and labor costs, and every mailing is a gamble: weighing these costs against the average amount of return and, most importantly, the *rate* of return.

Now, as any mailing mogul will tell you, the summer is a dry time for fundraising. However, even though funds may dry up political doings and thus funding requests do not. (In fact they tend to multiply — something about the heat we think.) So it was imperative that our last mailing until fall be a success. Our resident mailing mogul suggested the stamped envelope gambit: apparently people are loathe to throw out perfectly good stamps. Well it worked. Even the concerned letters we received had checks tucked into their folds. So with the explanation out of the way, we'd like to thank you for making this our most successful mailing ever, and for insuring that the summer, if dry, will certainly not lack for heat.



EXPORTING REAGANOMICS

COLIN DANBY

A recently-leaked document clarifies the nature of Reagan's Carribean Basin Initiative (CBI). Made available to the editors of *Counterspy*, this note from the State Department to the new Honduran government sets forth a series of steps Honduras is expected to take in exchange for US assistance under the plan.

The Honduran Economy

Honduras relies on exports of primary, unprocessed commodities for virtually all its foreign exchange. Bananas, coffee, timber, and meat are the principal exports. Banana production is largely controlled by United Brands and Standard Brands, two US-based multinationals. United Brands, which used to be called United Fruit, has had an overwhelming influence on Honduran history over the last seventy years, and controls vast amounts of Honduras' best land.

Having little industry, Honduras must import manufactured goods, transport equipment, and machinery, which together make up more than half of its imports (Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Annual Supplement 1981, p. 33).

It is a characteristic of the modern world economy that prices of primary products decline with respect to the prices of processed goods, so that a country like Honduras is inevitably faced with increasing balance of payments deficits, and mounting indebtedness as funds are borrowed to cover them. Furthermore, prices of commodities like coffee and bananas are unstable, producing periodic short-term crises.

Honduras' trade deficit doubled between 1975 and 1980, by which point exports covered only 80% of the imports bill. Foreign borrowing to cover trade and budget deficits more than doubled. These long term problems, together with a sharp drop in export prices, produced a crisis in 1980-1981, in which foreign investment dried up and around \$275 million in private capital fled the country (*Business Latin America*, 17 June 1981, p. 189). International credit was reduced, a major Honduran bank failed, and the government was forced

continued on page 2

to draw heavily on its foreign exchange reserves, which dropped from \$238 million in early 1980 to \$107 million in October 1981 (IMF statistics).

The pattern that produced this crisis has been disastrous for the Honduran people over the long term. Their per capita income is the second lowest in Latin America. Income distribution is appallingly skewed: 80% of the people share 27% of the national income. Most landholdings are too small to support a family, while the largest 445 farms occupy 22% of Honduras' farmland. Three quarters of the children under five are malnourished (Mario Posas, "Honduras at the Crossroads," Latin American Perspectives, Spring and Summer 1980, pp. 45-46).

Impact of the CBI

Such serious structural problems are not easily solved, but Honduras must clearly try to build an integrated economy, in which it can produce more of the manufactured goods it needs, instead of importing them. Yet the State Department note specifically bids Honduras to:

Shift investment incentives under the industrial promotion legislation to favor production destined for the world market; grant no further incentives to new import substitution industries, including those for the CACM [Central American Common Market]; and gradually reduce incentives for existing import substitution industries.

The major thrust of the note is that Honduras should do everything possible to attract foreign investment, and limit government intervention in the economy to a minimum. What forms will new foreign investment take? There will probably be little further direct investment in agriculture, in fact the banana companies have recently moved away from direct control of production, relying on their monopoly of distribution to ensure profits.

New, unfettered investment in industry will be a mixed blessing, as Honduras found out last year when Texaco, which owns the country's oil refinery, shut it down after the government refused to grant it a 207% increase in the price it could charge for gasoline (Multinational Monitor, March 1982, p. 6). Unregulated foreign investment, especially in a country as poor as Honduras, can only encourage this kind of extortion.

A major area of new foreign investment under the CBI will likely be in assembly industries, which use cheap third world labor for the final assembly of items like pocket calculators and brassieres. Such industries do not use locally-produced materials or sell their products locally; their only contribution to the local economy is the extremely low wages they pay their workers. These industries profit from the poverty in third world countries that lets them pay such wages, and have a strong interest in governmental policies that suppress labor organizing.

Besides demanding that Honduras submit to the tender mercies of multinational corporations, the State Department's note asks that government spending on health and education be restrained, and that price controls on milk, eggs, bread, and medicines, which inflation has threatened to put out of reach of most of the population, be eliminated.

Honduras is now the major US ally in Central America, and receives a prodigious amount of military aid. It is on the front line of the US war against Nicaragua, and its troops cooperate with El Salvador's army in slaughtering refugees. Yet the CBI will not strengthen Honduras' economy, but rather aid the multinationals that exploit it. The administration has characterized the CBI as an extension of "supply side economics," which Americans have learned means putting the interests of big business ahead of the interests of the people. For Hondurans this policy is quite familiar, and can only exacerbate their problems.

Colin Danby writes on Central America for Resist.



The purpose of the NEWSLETTER is to support and report on Resist's grants and fund raising activities. It also publishes short articles of general interest to the left. Subscriptions to the newsletter are \$5 per year.

ISRAELI ARMS TRADE

Cozying Up to Latin Armies

RONALD SLAUGHTER

During the summer and fall of 1978, unmarked transport planes landed in Nicaraguan airports after evening curfew to provoke as few questions as possible. Inside the planes were military supplies much needed by Somoza to beat back the popular insurrection. But the supplies did not come from the Nicaraguan's traditional ally in Washington. Unwilling to prolong the bloodshed openly by sending further arms shipments, the Carter Administration could sleep easily knowing that Israel had picked up where the United States had left off in shoring up the Somoza dictatorship.

The arms business in Latin America has until recently been the special province of the major powers, particularly the United States. But the last decade has brought important changes in traditional relationships. Israel, led by the country's main arms manufacturer, Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd., has begun to make major inroads in the region's weapons trade. While its exports have not yet challenged the vast arms transfers of dealers such as the United States and France, Israel has nonetheless made its presence felt and promises to become an even more formidable rival in the very near future.

Most remarkable about the Israeli arms industry is its rapid growth. Less than 20 years ago, the country produced virtually no weapons and was dependent on foreign suplies for its own substantial war effort. Since then Israel has become a major arms exporter. According to the respected Stockholm International Peace Reasearch Institute, Israel is surpassed only by Brazil among third world weapons exporters and ranks eleventh worldwide. South Africa is the largest recipient of Israeli arms followed by Argentina.

Total sales in 1976 — domestic and foreign — equalled \$270 million. Yearly increases followed: 1977 — \$400 million; 1978 — \$450 million; 1979 — \$600 million. Significantly, about 50% of these totals stem from exports. By all estimates, total sales during the 1980s will approach the two billion dollar mark. Exact sales figures are a closely regarded secret and therefore difficult to determine. Israel Aircraft Industries (I.A.I.) does not publish an annual report.

What is known is that Israel has already successfully penetrated the Latin American market, and to such an extent that this market is largely responsible for the colossal growth of the Israeli armaments industry. This penetration is due primarily to a vigorous campaign to export armaments in place of developing other kinds of trade relations. Said one observer, "It would not be an

exaggeration to state that by now the economic value of Israel's export of military equipment to Latin America has by far surpassed the other more conventional items in trade relations."

Resales Spark Displeasure

A key question raised by the new Israeli initiative centers on U.S. reaction. While falling short of placing any serious obstacles in Israel's way, the government has nonetheless expressed concern over the incorporation of U.S. technical data packages into Israeli weapons for sale to a third country. According to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, the U.S. government has the right to review all retransfers of weapons containing U.S. components.

U.S. displeasure was brought to light in 1976 when a leading arms industry journal, Aviation Week and Space Technology, commented on the problem saying, "...U.S. industry, State Department and Defense Department officials are becoming increasingly concerned over Israeli use of Foreign Military Sales credits not only to obtain U.S. weapons for its inventory but also to import technical data packages that eventually may be exported in competition with U.S. products."

Two examples of Israeli military hardware that reflect this concern are the Defense Ministry's Shafrir infrared guided air-to-air missile and I.A.I.'s Westwind aircraft. The Shafrir is considered by industry experts to be a copy of the AIM-90/G and AIM9-L missiles manufactured by the U.S. corporation, Raytheon.² The missile does in fact contain various technical components developed and manufactured in the United States. To the dismay of the U.S. government and arms manufacturers, Israel has exported the Shafrir to both Argentina and Chile.

The Westwind is marketed as an executive jet as well as a military air reconnaissance plane. The craft's basic design is patterned after a U.S.-built plane to which the I.A.I. bought the rights in 1967.³ In addition, the Westwind is powered by an engine manufactured by another U.S. firm, the Garrett Corporation. Again to U.S. vexa-





tion, the military version has been exported to a number of Latin American countries while the executive jet model has captured 12% of the U.S. market.

Stealing The Young Lion

Conflicts between the United States and Israel have surfaced repeatedly over the selective application and enforcement of the Arms Export Control Act. The issue first arose in 1977 when Israel sold 12 Super Mystere fighters to Honduras. The rebuilt French fighters were powered by U.S. engines made by the Pratt and Whitney Corporation. Obviously a violation of the act, U.S. officials questioned Israel but eventually allowed the sale to proceed.

Later that year, the United States and Israel again locked horns in what was to become a major confrontation between the long-time allies. Israel had negotiated a \$150 million sale of 24 of its advanced Kfir combat fighters to Ecuador. The Kfir — Hebrew for young lion — was developed from plans Israel arranged to have stolen from the Zurich plant licensed to build the French Mirage. Seeking to put an end to constant fighting in the Middle East, France had invoked an embargo on offensive arms in 1967 to countries involved in the conflict, and extended it to all military materials to Israel in 1969. The Kfir was among Israel's first major weapons projects.

The Israelis fitted their model with General Electric J-79 engines, thereby giving the United States the right to veto any foreign sale. The Carter Administration blocked the deal. Despite their earlier assurances to Carter that the Kfir was not intended for export, Israeli leaders were stunned. I.A.I. officials claimed Carter's action resulted in the loss of a potential \$3 billion market, with over \$1 billion lost in Latin America sales alone.⁵

The Carter veto did not appear to be part of a campaign to safeguard U.S. technology, but to be motivated by political considerations. His Administration had sought to limit the proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems into Latin America. The Shafrir missile and the Super Mystere deals had already circumvented the policy's aims, yet, not viewed as major advances, they were allowed to proceed. Carter's approval of the Kfir sale would have opened the floodgates to further sales of the most advanced weaponry.

The Israeli reaction was bitter and the government openly expressed displeasure with the Carter decision. At a 1979 press conference in Paris, I.A.I. president Gabriel Gidor remarked, "There's a joke going around that the French industrialists are plugging Carter for reelection because he's brought them so much business." With the presidential election close, Gidor also noted that he expected export restrictions on the Kfir to be eased, saying, "After all, you (United States) have an election every four years."

Gidor's prediction proved correct. Concerned about his re-election and yielding to pressure from the Israeli lobby, Carter lifted the ban, okaying negotiations on possible sales of the Kfir to Mexico. Much to the delight of the I.A.I., Reagan's victory makes the potential for Kfir exports to Latin America now look very good. Last February, the Reagan Administration released the Kfir from all third country export restrictions.

Rights Push Spurs Sales

While Gidor's quip masked genuine Israeli anger, he conveniently chose to ignore that it was the same Administration's human rights policy which opened the way for Israeli penetration of the Latin American market in the first place. Carter's policy imposed a selective arms ban on a number of consistent human rights violators. Israel openly undermined this effort, replacing the United States as a leading weapons supplier to right-wing dictatorships, including among others the governments of Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and pre-Sandinista Nicaragua.

In becoming a partner in right-wing oppression, Israel reaped strong international criticism and earned the nation a reputation as an arms profiteer with little regard for moral and political consideration. As one arms analyst put it, "They will sell to anybody." Israel exhibited a classic case of this mentality in 1978 when it sold combat fighters to Argentina while negotiating to sell similar aircraft to Chile. The two countries were at the time on the verge of war over territorial rights to

ISRAELI ARMS TRANSFERS TO LATIN AMERICA 1970 - 1980

COUNTRY		ARMS DELIVERIES
Argentina	26	Dassault Mirage-5 Fighters*
, a gorana	22	0
	50	Gabriel Missiles
		Shafrir Missiles
Bolivia	6	Arava (STOL) Transports
Chile	150	Shafrir Missiles
	1	Radar System
	2	Reshef Class Fast Patrol Boats
Colombia	3	Arava (STOL) Transports
Dominican Republic		9-mm Uzi Submachine Guns
Ecuador	10	Arava (STOL) Transports Ammunition Rockets Explosives
FISalvador	17	Arava (STOL) Transports
Libalyadoi		Fouga Magister Trainers*
	18	
	200	80-mm Rocket Launchers
	200	9-mm Uzi Submachine Guns
		Ammunition
		Spare Parts
Guatemala	11	Arava (STOL) Transports
		RBY Mk Armored Cars
	15,000	5.56-mm Galil Assault Rifles
	4	Field Kitchens

islands in the Beagle Channel.

Despite U.S. concern over Israel's weapons policy, an open rift never developed between the two countries. Aside from the Kfir deal with Ecuador, the Carter Administration was actually quite tolerant and never undertook steps or voiced any criticism which could have forced Israel to change its ways.

Tested in Battle

A look at specific weapons sales reveals just how extensive Israel's trade relations with Latin America really are. The country has made sales to at least 15 nations. (See chart.) Its main export items fall into two broad categoties: (1) a variety of aircraft and, (2) various missiles, armored cars and small arms. According to the Israelis, marketing success is based on their weapons' sophisticated quality, low cost and, as sales brochures proudly argue, "battle tested capability."

Among the aircraft, the country's most successful export has been the Arava (STOL) which is described as a short takeoff and landing transport able to carry troops or cargo to primitive landing fields. The rough terrain in many Latin American countries and lack of adequate airfields have made the Arava an attractive buy. Fifty have already been sold to Latin America. (See chart.)

Israel has also become a prime supplier of advanced

Haiti 600 9-mm Uzi Submachine Guns 106-mm Rifles Honduras 12 Dassault Super Mystere Fighters* 4 Arava (STOL) Transports Westwind Reconnaissance Plane 106-mm Mortars 14 RBY Mk Armored Cars 106-mm Rifles 5 Fast Patrol Boats (unconfirmed) Mexico 10 Arava (STOL) Transports Nicaragua 2 Arava (STOL) Transports Rifles **Ammunitions** Patrol Boats Radios Panama 1 Westwind Reconnaissance Plane Paraguay 6 Arava (STOL) Transports Peru **Parachutes** Radio Equipment Ammunition Small Arms **Bombs** Venezuela Rockets **Tactical Communications Equipment**

Sources: DMS Market Intelligence, Foreign Military Markets: South America-Australasia, 1981, p. 9; various issues of The Weekly Report on Strategic Latin American Affairs; and World Armaments and Disarmament—SIPRI Yearbooks 1969/70 and 1971–1981.

combat fighters to the region. Its first sale was in 1975 when I.A.I. sold six Fouga Magister trainers and 18 Dassault Ouragan fighters to El Salvador. Outmoded French models, the planes were overhauled and fitted with Pratt and Whitney motors. They represented a serious upgrading of Salvador's World War II vintage fleet. Precipitating something of a small arms race between historical adversaries, Honduras reacted by purchasing 12 Super Mystere fighters from Israel. These sales introduced the first supersonic aircraft to Central America.6

To date, Argentina has been the single largest buyer of Israeli advanced combat fighters. With Reagan's removal of export restrictions on the Kfir, Israel will no doubt be central to a dramatic rise in more sophisticated aircraft in the region. Accordingly, Israel is believed to be currently negotiating possible Kfir deals with Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela.⁷ No deliveries have yet been made on the plane.

In the second category of arms sales, Israel has sold the Shafrir missile to Argentina and Chile. Argentina has also purchased the equally sophisticated Gabriel sea-to-sea missile which can be fired from a small patrol boat. Armored cars have been sold to Guatemala and Honduras. An assortment of small weapons, including such items as the renowned Uzi submachine gun, mortars and explosives have been sold to a number of countries.

Tailor-Made Aid To Right

In addition to Israel's general willingness to sell weapons to repressive regimes, the country has particularly focused military assistance to governments involved in active counterinsurgency. This has been particularly evident in Central America. A U.S. journalist recently returned from Guatemala reported discussions with Guatemalan military police who had participated in a two-week urban counterinsurgency course taught by Israeli advisers. It is unknown whether the advisers represented the Israeli military or were working as private citizens.

Perhaps the most publicized example of this type of aid was the secretive 1978 deliveries to the embattled Somoza regime. Speculation had it that Israel was repaying an old debt by violating its usual cash-only policy and extending loans to Nicaragua. The Somoza family had offered diplomatic and military support to the fledgling Israeli nation in 1947. Despite its own cutoff of military aid, the U.S. government raised no objections to Israel's efforts to help the dictator. As a State Department official explained: "If Somoza goes we would prefer to see him go peacefully. We would not like to see him toppled in an armed revolt." It is worth noting that the militarily victorious Sandinistas have refused to repay Somoza's arms debt to Israel.

Under the Reagan Administration, this willingness to look the other way, if not openly facilitate the matter, will surely encourage future Israeli efforts to come to the aid of besieged governments in the region. El Salvador and Guatemala, both facing serious internal chal-

^{*}Indicates rebuilt planes from the Israeli Air Force.

lenges, have recently negotiated significant arms purchases from Israel, including weapons such as armored cars and specially designed Arava transport planes tailor-made for counterinsurgency operations.

It is clear that both the United States and Israel now stand ready to provide military assistance to suppress popular liberation movements. Moreover, in instances such as the current Salvadorean crisis, Israel has become a crucial ally of the United States. If Congress is reluctant and unresponsive in providing further increases in military aid, the Reagan Administration can be comforted in the knowledge that Israel is ready and willing to supply governments with the necessary arms.

Another aspect of Israel's counterinsurgency-oriented activities in Latin America comes under what is dubbed "Special Assistance." With Israeli guidance, local militaries have begun providing a variety of social services to the civilian population. These include youth programs; the construction of schools, community centers, public health facilities and roads; and agricultural projects.

The assistance programs are directed by a special agency in the Israeli Ministry of Defense called the Department of International Relations and Cooperation. The projects are carried out under the joint command of Israeli military-defense personnel and the various Latin American military establishments. Since the program's initiation in the 1960s, it has been utilized in at least seven countries including Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and El Salvador.

In establishing programs of this type, Israel seems to be following a pattern set by the United States in its own counterinsurgency efforts. By cleaning up the military's image in the eyes of the people, it is hoped the local populace will not cast their lot with revolutionary groups.

In a study of the Israeli programs, Edy Kaufman addresses their military objective saying they are designed to help "in building a positive and constructive image of the armed forces in their respective nations." Kaufman adds that Israel gains certain benefits by developing close and continual ties with the various militaries. "For Israel policy-makers, conscious of the strategic importance of the Latin American military, this was an effective and respectable way of maintaining their presence close to the location of political power," he comments.

Kaufman's statement points up the crux of the matter: Israel has chosen the military as the focal point of future relations with the region. The pattern of arms sales and other military activities in Latin America suggests that this is indeed the case. Thus, Israel, with U.S. blessing, is prepared to fulfill its role as a junior partner of imperialism in aiding the forces of repression in the region and in encouraging the proliferation of more deadly and sophisticated weapons.

Footnotes

- 1. Business Week, April 2, 1979, p. 40.
- 2. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Israel Arms Exports Spur Concern," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, December 13, 1976, p. 14.
- 3. Louis Kraar, "Israel's Own Military-Industrial Complex," Fortune, March 13, 1978, p. 73.
- 4. Ibid.
- 5. Benjamin F. Schemmer, "IAI Goal: \$100-Million in Sales to DOD," *Armed Forces Journal International*, August 1979, p. 12 and Kraar, p. 73.
- 6. Cynthia Arnson, "Arms Race in Central America," *The Nation*, March 10, 1979, p. 267.
- 7. DMS Market Intelligence Reports, Foreign Military Markets: South America-Australasia, 1981, p. 10.
- 8. Information on the Special Assistance programs is taken from Edy Kaufman, "Israel's Foreign Policy Implementation in Latin America," in Michael Curtis and Susan A. Gitelson, eds., *Israel in the Third World* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976).

Ronald Slaughter is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at Atlanta University. This article originally appeared in the Jan/Feb 1982 issue of NACLA's Report on the Americas.

THE RESIST PLEDGE SYSTEM

The most important source of our income is monthly pledges. Pledges help us to plan ahead by stabilizing our monthly income. In addition to receiving the newsletter, pledges get a monthly reminder letter, containing some news of recent grants. If you would like to learn more, drop us a note. Or — take the plunge! — and fill out the handy form below.

Yes, I	would	like	to	be	a	Resist	pledge	for
--------	-------	------	----	----	---	--------	--------	-----

□ \$5/month	□ \$50/m	onth
□ \$10/month		(other)
□ \$25/month		
☐ I enclose my check	for \$	
Name		
Street		
City	State	Zip

POLAND AND SOLIDARITY

John L. Fisher, Northampton, MA:

As a longtime supporter of Resist and as someone who very sincerely shares with you the basic thoughts in opposition to the system of capitalism and in favor of a genuine socialist society, I consider it necessary to express herewith my great disappointment and shock about your article with reference to "Solidarity" of Poland. It remains just incomprehensible — that not from the mouth of any of our worst reactionaries — but from Frank Brodhead comes the statement, "It is to movements like Solidarity, not those like the Sandinistas, that we must look for lessons on the way forward."

Apparently you remain completely unaware of the fact that upholding Polish Solidarity is playing right into the hands of the Reagan administration and/or the right wing leadership of our own trade unions. All elements adhering to anti-socialism, from the emigres in the capitals of the Western world to all bankers, business executives, military brass to the CIA will be delighted with such writing! And where on earth did you get this news and these descriptions from? Didn't you ever hear who supported and widely financed Solidarity? And why didn't you mention it? Didn't you ever hear that anti-socialist and even fascist inclined elements had infiltrated Solidarity? And why didn't you ever mention it? Apparently you wrote without being aware of the groups within Solidarity who had hardly any ties with the Polish working class but were dedicated to subvert and destroy socialism in Poland. The KOR organization and men like Mr. Z. Bujak, to give examples, are well known in Europe - not for upholding workers rights, but for efforts to help bring back the old order, re-establish "free enterprise" and destroy any ties with the Soviet Union and the bloc of socialist nations!

It certainly is one thing to be critical of what had happened in Poland — and there can be no denial of considerable wrongs — but it is entirely different and unacceptable when you praise generously the organization "Solidarity" led by men who would not hesitate for a moment to stand basically with Mr. Haig and Mr. Reagan and against the land of Lenin.

Today, it seems, the workers and people of Poland are gaining much more of an understanding of who are their friends and who are their enemies. The CIA might very well still finance by covert actions "Solidarity" and/or similar groupings, but Poland — together with its socialist allies now well on the road of improvement — will hopefully overcome its tremendous difficulties which came in the first place from powerful hostile forces.

Long live the socialist republic of Poland!

Frank Brodhead Replies:

To paraphrase Bertold Brecht's comments on the East German workers' uprising of 1953, John Fisher is suggesting that the Polish government should abolish its working class and elect another one. For it is Fisher's views, and not those expressed in Resist, that give aid and comfort to the Reagan administration's position on Poland.

The official spokesmen for both East and West maintain that a social movement critical of Polish state socialism must of necessity support the return of capitalism. More generally, both are united in preventing the emergence of regimes or movements — whether it is Solidarity or the Sandinistas — which are not aligned with one camp or the other.

Solidarity presents a problem for the American left. Before the declaration of a "state of war" on December 13th it clearly had the support of the vast majority of the population. It was born in a national labor struggle, drew its activists primarily from the industrial working class, and organized itself on the basis of a regionallystructured trade union movement. Its statements and programs, available for all who wish to know them, are clearly pro-working class and anti-capitalist in character. Its founding statements, the "Twenty-one Demands" and the Gdansk Agreement of August, 1980, include demands for free and independent trade unions, the right to strike for public employees, what we would call "First Amendment Rights", pay increases, adequate day care and maternity leaves, and a five-day week. When the Polish government proved reluctant to honor this and other agreements Solidarity sustained the unity of the working class in an effective but non-violent way. When the government failed to initiate any programs to rescue the nation from its economic crisis, Solidarity evolved practical proposals for worker self-management as a means of enlisting the experience and support of the working class in the arduous tasks of national reconstruction - something the government was completely unable to do. And when Jaruzelski's regime staged a coup and packed the new government with generals, the Polish people organized themselves to oppose this repressive and illegal act around the remnants of Soli-

John Fisher's charges against Solidarity — that it has received financial and other aid from abroad, and verbal support from Poland's official enemies, that it has "extremists" in its midst, and that it has been infiltrated by outside agitators — are exactly those that the Reagan administration has leveled against the regime in Nicaragua. Yet, as in the case of Nicaragua, we need to evaluate Solidarity on the basis of its class character and political program. We also need to support the workers' movements of all nations, even those in the lands of Lenin.

GRANTS

NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THIRD WORLD JOURNALISTS (PO Box 7617, Philadelphia, PA 19101).

NATWJ is a group of Black, Hispanic and other minority journalists who work to disseminate information about Third World struggles against US imperialism to the mass media. They publish a newsletter, the Alliance Report, and do outreach through events like community forums and press briefings on US foreign policy and South Africa, the Middle East and Palestinian question, "Atlanta to South Africa, the Reagan policy," El Salvador, Angola, repressive legislation in the US and the CIA, and Grenada and the Caribbean Basin Plan. Press briefings are attended by major publications, and members of NATWJ have appeared on radio and television. With the grant from Resist, NATWJ will initiate a subscription campaign using the recent issue of their newsletter which focusses on the struggles in South Africa. It includes articles on a new weapons system being developed in South Africa with the assistance of the United States and the recent Congressional hearings to prove "foreign communist backing" of the liberation movements in Southern Africa. Subscriptions to Alliance Report are available from NATWJ for \$3.00 per year.

WALTHAM CONCERNED CITIZENS (94 Prospect St., Waltham, MA 02154).

According to Jennifer Rose, a founding member, the goal of Waltham Concerned Citizens is to educate the public on a variety of issues relating to militarism in the world, the country and the community. Waltham would be a likely target in the case of a nuclear war because it is the home of Raytheon, a corporation which produces nuclear weapons hardware. Waltham Concerned Citizens formed in November 1981 when a local activist mailed to all people in Waltham whose names were on the various mailing lists of Boston-area peace and disarmament groups. The original intent of the organization was to focus on militarism in the community including nuclear weapons production, ROTC (at Waltham High), the draft, counter-recruiting, and foreign policy. They have since narrowed their focus to the threat of nuclear war feeling this will be the most acceptable issue in their conservative community. Activities so far have included publication of a brochure detailing the possible effects on Waltham of a nuclear war, and a series of presentations and lectures to educate the community on the issues of nuclear disarmament. A challenge to the local civil defense director on the purported feasibility of evacuation plans for the community and his response to this challenge has been the focus of a continuing debate in local newspapers. Resist's grant will help the organization with the cost of translating their brochure into Spanish and expenses connected with an exhibit at their local library.

MICAH (Michigan Interchurch Committee on Central American Human Rights, 4220 W. Vernor, Detroit, MI 48209).

In 1981 MICAH gave 167 presentations to churches, college classes, community groups and high schools on the subject of human rights in Central America. Presentations included showings of the films "El Salvador: Another Vietnam," "El Salvador: Revolution or Death," and lectures by MICAH activists. MICAH has done extensive outreach to local media and has been successful in making Central America an important issue in the Detroit community. They have received extensive press coverage of their campaign to pressure Representative Broomfield, ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to support a complete cut-off of military aid to El Salvador due to human rights violations. A Voice of the Voiceless, MICAH's newsletter, is an important resource used by many activists in Detroit's human rights network. An indication of MICAH's standing in the national human rights community is the invitation they received to participate in the religious delegation which toured Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras in August 1981. Resist's grant will be used for the purchase of a slide projector.



BERKELEY RESISTANCE (2057 Berkeley Way, Berkeley, CA 94704).

Preparations are beginning for a militant joint action by draft resisters and peace activists on the West Coast. Following a weekend of workshops and nonviolence training (June 18-20 in Berkeley), a contingent of resistance affinity groups will participate in the June 21 blockade and legal demonstration against the Livermore nuclear weapons labs. Livermore, along with a similar facility in New Mexico, has developed every single nuclear weapon in the US arsenal. These labs have invented the atomic, hydrogen and neutron bombs, resulting in a US arsenal of over 31,000 nuclear warheads with the equivalent explosive force of 1 million Hiroshima bombs. A pre-blockade resistance gathering is being organized by Berkeley Resistance. The organizers welcome all who are committed to draft resistance. Draft prosecutions will probably begin early this summer. The pre-blockade gathering will enhance solidarity and networking among draft resisters from around the country. It is hoped that resistance affinity groups established for the gathering and blockade will provide tight communities of mutual support once prosecutions begin. Resist's grant will support the general costs of the gathering.