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RESIST

February-March, 1978 — 324 Somerville Ave., Somerville, MA 02143 #121
a call to resist illegitimate authority

WAR RESISTERS IN EXILE

Jack Colhoun

Introduction: After ten years, Amex-Canada Magazine has ceased publishing. Begun as a newsletter of the Union of American Exiles in 1968, Amex-Canada played a central role in the struggles of deserters, draft resisters, and others against the Indo-China war. This article is excerpted from a much longer history of the organization, published in the Nov.-Dec. issue of Amex-Canada (P.O. Box 189, Station P, Toronto, Ontario M5S 2S7, Canada).

When the first American war resisters left the United States for exile in Canada during the mid-1960s, they did so as individuals opposed to the Vietnam War but unwilling to go to jail for refusing to fight in Vietnam. No coordinated exile movement existed to serve the needs of newly arriving war resisters, let alone to provide political program for expressing a continuing opposition to the war. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, local immigration aid groups developed to help the new arrivals find housing, jobs, and landed immigrant status. At the same time, exile groups were formed which, in addition to helping new arrivals, attempted to find political means by which to express the exile community's continuing opposition to the Vietnam War.

After an initial period of exile community activism, with increasing political harassment and repression from Canadian police and politicians, the driving force of the exile movement began to wane and American war resisters became more involved in Canadian life. Many joined organizations of the Canadian left and nationalist movement, and many others phased out of political work to concentrate on building a new life in Canada. Others were never highly politically conscious or politically motivated.

In fall 1971, AMEX reflected the political and social trend of assimilation into Canadian life. At that time, however, AMEX embarked on a six-year campaign to win unconditional amnesty for all war resisters. First, it was necessary to develop support for the amnesty campaign in the exile communities in Sweden, France, and Great Britain. This international exile support evolved simultaneously with the creation of a broad, cross-class amnesty coalition in the U.S. AMEX played a leading role not only in bringing the National Council for Universal, Unconditional Amnesty (NCUUA) into being, but also in devising political program for the new amnesty coalition.

THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND U.S. STRATEGY

Banning Garrett

President Carter's record \$126 billion defense budget reflects the administration's emphasis on strengthening U.S. conventional military capabilities for fighting in Europe and for rapid intervention in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and East Asia, while slowing the pace of modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Carter's "real growth" budget, for fiscal year 1979 beginning October 1, is designed to help implement a new U.S. global strategy approved in a secret Presidential Directive, PD 18, which places increased reliance on conventional military forces in an era of rough equality of nuclear forces with the Soviet Union.

PD 18, signed by Carter August 25, was based on the conclusions of a major intragovernmental review of the global balance of power and U.S. strategy and capabilities, Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 10. PRM 10 is the key to understanding the assumptions behind most of President Carter's important foreign policy decisions.

PRM 10 concludes that the balance of military power — both conventional and nuclear — between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is essentially equal and that the U.S. has significant advantages in virtually every other measure of national power — economic, technological, political and diplomatic. In addition, the study characterizes the Soviet Union as facing growing internal problems of labor, steel and energy shortages, a slow-down in economic growth, a looming political succession crisis, and a continuing conflict with China. PRM 10 describes the current period of U.S.-Soviet relations as one of both "cooperation and competition."

PRM 10 concludes that if there were a major nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, neither side "could conceivably be described as a winner." At a minimum, the study predicts, the U.S. would suffer 140 million people dead and the Soviet Union 113 million, and nearly 75 percent of each country's economy would be destroyed. PRM 10 describes this situation as a nuclear standoff: both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have the ability now — and in the foreseeable future — to inflict unacceptable damage on the other even after sustaining a first strike. In short, U.S. strategic forces are sufficiently powerful to deter any nuclear attack on the United States by the Soviet Union.

These conclusions of PRM 10 are incorporated into PD 18, which commits the U.S. to continue maintaining strategic forces capable of inflicting "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet Union in response to a Soviet first strike. In his directive, Carter judges that to inflict such damage, the U.S. must be able to destroy some 70 percent of the Soviet Union's "recovery resources," meaning the economic, political and military facilities critical to the functioning of society. Carter goes a step further, directing that a reserve force of nuclear weapons be maintained for use after a nuclear exchange to ensure that the Soviets suffer greater damage than the U.S.

Carter says more bluntly in his directive than previous presents that the U.S. will not aim at building a "disarming" first strike capability against the Soviet Union — as long as the Soviets also reject this capability. But he also directs that the U.S. accept nothing less than equality of strategic forces with the Soviet Union.

The administration study apparently concludes that current U.S. forces and planned programs for modernization of strategic weapons are sufficient to achieve Carter's goals without increasing spending. The FY 1979 budget asks for \$9.8 billion for strategic forces, an increase of \$500 million over this year but no real growth after accounting for inflation. PD 18's policy guidelines appear to be behind the administration's budget decision to slow development of the MX mobile missile — a potential first strike weapon — while speeding development of the air-launched cruise missile. Secretary of Defense Brown argues that the cruise missile is a second strike weapon that will strengthen U.S. retaliatory capabilities in light of Carter's decision to cancel the B-1, and which will bolster political perceptions of the strength of U.S. nuclear forces relative to Soviet capabilities.

Since nuclear weapons are no longer seen as giving the U.S. leverage in managing international crises in an era of strategic parity with the Soviet Union, PD 18 says the U.S. must give increasing significance to conventional, non-nuclear military forces.

PD 18 calls for strengthening U.S. conventional capabilities, noting that in future crises, there will be a tremendous advantage to the side which can get its troops to the trouble spot first: the other side will have to face the political as well as military risks of trying to dislodge the forces already there. President Carter directs the Pentagon to significantly increase the strategic mobility of U.S. forces for both a "quick hit in remote places" and for rapid reinforcement in Europe. Carter wants several "light divisions," stationed in the U.S., to be readied for possible use in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and East Asia. These forces are to be backed by selected naval and air force units able to operate without the need of foreign bases. These mobile intervention forces are expected to be able to beat the Soviets to the Persian Gulf despite Moscow's obvious geographical advantage.

The Carter defense budget does not separate out expenditures for mobile interventionary forces for the Persian Gulf and areas other than Europe. Much of the cost of beefing up these forces is included in NATO-oriented expenditures.

Increased U.S. dependence on oil imports leads Carter to rank the Persian Gulf and the Middle East with Europe and northeast Asia as areas of vital interest to the U.S. where Washington would risk military confrontation with the Soviet Union. In areas other than those judged of critical interest to the U.S., PD 18 says Washington should try to rely on other countries to preserve U.S. interests. One official said this policy was illustrated by the Zaire crisis last spring when the French, Moroccans, Egyptians and others came to the aid of the Mobutu regime. The same thing is now happening in the Horn of Africa, the official said, where others are intervening instead of the U.S.

PD 18 places the biggest emphasis on strengthening U.S. forces for NATO. Carter commits the U.S. to 5 percent per year real growth in NATO-related spending, which comprises about 40 percent of the entire defense budget. Brown told reporters that the bulk of the increases in the FY 1979 budget are for NATO, but, he added, "I don't think it is possible to segregate our budget into a NATO and a non-NATO part... an aircraft that is in the U.S. today can be at an airbase in Britain or West Germany tomorrow."

The Carter budget emphasizes procurement of new conventional weapons for use in Europe, including increased funds for the A-10 close support aircraft, for an improved cargo plane to support rapid deployment of troops to Europe, for a new combat helicopter, for the new F-16 fighter, and for production of the new XM-1 main battle tank. While the Army and Air Force got real budget increases in this military buildup, the Navy's ship building program was cut back, including cancellation of an additional aircraft carrier.

Overall, Carter directs in PD 18 that the U.S. maintain at least as favorable a global military balance of power with the Soviet Union as exists now — a commitment that should provide continued pressure for real increases in defense spending. Efforts by critics trying to cut the defense budget will likely have to challenge the priorities and policies of PD 18 and even the assumptions of PRM 10. Likewise, those who want an even bigger increase in defense spending will probably challenge PRM 10's assessment of the balance of power and Carter's nuclear strategy, claiming that the Soviets are striving for and achieving strategic and conventional military superiority over the U.S. They will likely step up charges specifically that U.S. ICBMs are increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike and call for stepped up development of the "invulnerable" MX mobile missile, a program which could cost up to \$50 billion over the next decade.

This article is excerpted from the January 30, 1978 issue of International Bulletin, (PO Box 4400, Berkeley, CA 94704. \$12 for a 12-month subscription.)

INTERVIEW WITH TWO JAILED TEN MONTHS IN GRAND JURY PROBE



GRAND JURY REPRESSION OF THE PUERTO RICAN AND CHICANO MOVEMENTS

*An interview with Maria Cueto and
Raisa Nemiken*

Liberation News Service

Introduction: A recent Resist grant went to the Alamosa (Colorado) Committee to Stop Grand Jury Repression. This is one of a series of defence committees that are attempting to combat the government's use of grand jury investigations to gather information about the Puerto Rican and Chicano movements.

The grand jury was initially formed to investigate bombings by the FALN, a group which calls for Puerto Rican independence. But one of the first targets of the grand jury was the National Commission on Hispanic Affairs of the Episcopal Church (NCHA). Two employees of NCHA, Maria Cueto and Raisa Nemekin, refused to testify before the New York Special Federal Grand Jury, and were jailed in March, 1977. They were released in late January, when a federal judge ruled that there was no legal basis for holding them in jail until the current grand jury expires in May, since they had

committed no crime and had demonstrated that they would not testify no matter how long they were kept in jail.

The following interview was conducted by LNS on January 27, 1978.

COULD YOU BEGIN BY DESCRIBING WHY YOU BOTH MADE THE DECISION NOT TO COOPERATE WITH THE GRAND JURY?

MARIA: Raisa and I were working with the church at the time — with the Hispanic Commission of the Episcopal Church. And we took the position of refusing to testify because we felt that it was a betrayal of the Hispanic communities we had been working with.

Basically we had been doing community outreach type work. A lot of our work involved seeking resources for groups that were trying to get together clinics or alternatives in education...

RAISA: ...Agricultural cooperatives, cultural programs.

MARIA: Even at one time we did research into the whole question of how grand juries were using their powers to abuse people in communities...

In any case, it had taken us a long time to develop trust working with the Hispanic community. And we felt that if we did cooperate with the FBI or grand jury that we would be betraying that trust.

We also believed that this was an effort on the part of the Justice Department and the FBI to attempt to destroy the Puerto Rican independence movement and the Chicano movement — to discredit them — implicating, harassing, and intimidating — everything you can think of.

WHAT KIND OF HARASSMENT DID YOU EXPERIENCE FROM THE FBI?

MARIA: Well, it escalated from their first visit [November, 1976], which was just looking for information on Carlos Alberto Torres [who had been a member of the Hispanic Commission and was being sought by the Chicago grand jury]. After that, up until we were subpoenaed and incarcerated, they began following us to meetings, they harassed other commission members throughout the country. And they began visiting the Episcopal Church's headquarters, almost on a nightly basis, going through their files.

RAISA: So we discussed what it meant and we decided at that point, for the reasons Maria stated, that if we were subpoenaed we would refuse to cooperate with the grand jury and we would go and serve our time.

MARIA: Of course, the Administration of the Episcopal Church took an opposing position. They handed over all the files from the inception of the Commission back in 1970, up to the very last day when we were incarcerated.

HOW DID YOU BOTH FIRST BECOME INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY WORK AND SUPPORTIVE OF THE PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AND THE CHICANO MOVEMENT?

MARIA: I come from Phoenix, Arizona. But I did some work in East Los Angeles. And I think that's essentially where I first became aware of the problems in the community. I was a student at the time and I worked out of a parish there that was involved in community work — welfare rights, police brutality and those kinds of issues.

With reference to the independence of Puerto Rico, living in Phoenix, of course, you don't hear about it every day. In fact you hardly hear it ever. I think that part of my education was here. Because to understand about the issues the Puerto Rican people have here, you have to understand also what is happening in Puerto Rico. And when you start seeing what is happening there, you begin to realize that there is an imposition there, and they should be independent, and they should determine their own destiny and they have a right to struggle for their rights.

RAISA: My experience was a little more recent and came about through my work with the Hispanic Commission. The group was made up of people through out

the country in both the Chicano and Puerto Rican movements, so I became aware of what both movements were doing to bring about their self-determination.

MARIA: Those were our interests — to bring together some kind of understanding between the two movements. A lot of the Chicanos who were part of the Commission had no idea what the Puerto Rican struggle was all about. . . . And a lot of the Puerto Rican people had very little idea even as to what a Chicano was. So it was an educational process that we all underwent together.

DO YOU AND THE COMMITTEE TO END GRAND JURY REPRESSION HAVE A POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF THE FALN?

MARIA: The Committee has taken the position that the people have the right to struggle at whatever level they feel they have to struggle at. We work with the church. We struggle from that level. Other people struggle from different levels. We do not condemn or condone the actions of the FALN.

HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH AND WHAT EFFECT HAS IT HAD ON THE WORK THE HISPANIC COMMISSION WAS DOING IN THE COMMUNITY?

RAISA: The administration of the Episcopal Church in essence abandoned us, as well as abandoning and betraying the Hispanic community.

MARIA: They failed to see the scope of the investigation and to understand how it would hinder the ongoing work in the communities. . . . The Hispanic Commission itself has been restructured now so that it's main goal is theological development — there's no community outreach.

SO THAT THE GRAND JURY HAS HAD THE EFFECT OF CHILLING COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES?

MARIA: Yes. It's definitely had that effect. And understandably. . . . People become afraid of really getting involved in the community because they see that by association they can be called before the grand jury just like we were. So it's had its effect, and it's going to keep having its effect. And we have to keep fighting against that. But it's going to be hard to reverse.

RAISA: The grand jury system has been used previously to carry out the same type of destructive effect on the Black movements and the Native American movements.

HOW DOES THE CHICANO MOVEMENT TIE IN WITH THE GRAND JURY'S SUPPOSED PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING THE FALN BOMBINGS?

between the Puerto Rican and Chicano movements.

MARIA: I think it's obvious from the many Chicanos who have already been subpoenaed — the Lucero brothers from the Crusade for Justice in Colorado; Ricardo Romero from Colorado and Pedro Archuleta from Tierra Amarillo, New Mexico — that they're trying to destroy both movements. They know that there is solidarity between the Chicano movement and the Puerto Rican independence movement.

DO YOU KNOW OF OTHER INSTANCES OF THE FBI HARASSING PEOPLE ACTIVE IN THE COMMUNITY WHILE YOU WERE IN JAIL?

RAISA: That's a very good point. While we were in jail, the New York Committee Against Grand Jury Repression began to help educate individuals about what the grand jury was doing as well as advocate for our release. Certain people like Julio Rosado and Luis Rosado were very intimately involved in the development of that. And as soon as the New York Committee got to the point where it was beginning to develop and progress, they were subpoenaed. [They have been in jail since late August for refusing to cooperate with the grand jury.]

The same thing happened in Chicago. People like Roberto Calvero and Jose Lopez also were involved in a committee there against grand jury repression and they were called in at very critical points of the development of the committee.

So the grand jury is being used very effectively in terms of stopping any kind of advocacy on our behalf, at the same time as it's being used in other ways to chill the churches and other organizations from doing that sort of work in the community, as well as the Puerto Rican and Chicano movements themselves.

IS THERE ANY WAY TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF GRAND JURIES?

MARIA: Unless there is more pressure put on them, the grand juries are going to continue at the same pace as now or at a faster pace. Every two months there's somebody being subpoenaed or the FBI is participating in the harassments on the outside.

RAISA: There are several bills now pending in Congress — the Eilberg Bill for one — restricting or limiting some of the scope of the grand jury. But that's being fought very strongly since the grand jury is such a good tool. It's implemented by the U.S. Attorney and it's totally controlled by them... And the FBI likes it, because they can use it as a scare tactic or as propaganda to make it seem that you're really doing something [criminal].

MARIA: It's the only way they have to put people away, "legally," without giving them a trial or charging them with anything or putting them through the legal due-process that is supposed to be given you as a citizen.

The thing is, the U.S. Attorney has control over the grand jury. The 23 people that are sitting there — they

don't even know what's happening... The U.S. Attorney will tell them, "We're investigating the bombings of Fraunces Tavern, the FALN and all other bombings that are taking place." He describes to them a bloody scene. Then, the first thing he'll ask us is, "Did you see the person who took the bomb and placed it at Fraunces Tavern?" I mean, I come off looking really nasty if I don't want to answer that kind of question.

Then he asks, "How much money did you give to the FALN?" Again, I come off looking really nasty if I don't answer that question...

If you say, "I don't know anything about that," then you have answered the first question and you have to answer all the other questions they ask you... or else they will be able to cite you for criminal contempt.

WHAT ARE YOUR PLANS NOW AND DO YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR WHAT PEOPLE SHOULD BE DOING TO FIGHT THE GRAND JURY?

MARIA: Our immediate plan is to continue seeking support for the rest of the people who are still in jail and to stop illegal grand juries such as these. We believe that a lot of what helped us was the pressure that was put on the judges that handled our case, the assistant U.S. attorney, the U.S. Attorney and Griffin Bell.

RAISA: Demonstrations, pickets and importantly, education — educational outreach in reference to the grand jury so that people will be prepared for what can come down on the individual, and be more prepared to deal with any position that person takes. Hopefully that position will be noncooperation with the grand jury. That's very important.

MARIA: We feel that as a result of what's happened to us, and the position that we've taken, and the fact that we've been released — that this is encouraging for anybody else that may be subpoenaed.

You know, it's not easy to do time, you don't want to go to jail and spend umpteen months in there. But if your principles are strong... then your position is strong. And we think it's encouraging for others who may be subpoenaed in the future.

DO YOU FEEL THAT THE GRAND JURY AND THE FBI HARASSMENT HAS AT ALL HAD THE EFFECT OF STRENGTHENING THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE CHICANO AND PUERTO RICAN MOVEMENTS?

MARIA: We definitely believe that. And I think they'll become stronger... We think, for example, that our release had to do with the pressure that was applied from the community at large across the country... So that the issues are becoming clearer to many. It's confirmed to a lot of people that the FBI really is what it is — a monster that's trying to destroy human beings' self-determination.

AMEX-Canada (continued from page 1)

During our six-year amnesty struggle, AMEX was involved in surfacing a military deserter at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, whose arrest brought the amnesty question to the floor of the convention hall. In 1976, we were involved in winning fifteen minutes of prime time TV during which to nominate a draft resister for vice president. From exile, AMEX has battled three presidents — Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter — over the amnesty issue. We watched Nixon go off to his own exile in San Clemente with an unconditional pardon in his pocket after years of opposing amnesty for war resisters. In the aftermath of the Nixon pardon, President Ford declared a punitive, conditional amnesty. AMEX led a call for a boycott of this phony Clemency Program. The boycott was successful. Although Ford refused to grant another amnesty, we helped keep the issue alive until the 1976 election campaign during which the grassroots of the amnesty coalition pressed the leading Democratic presidential candidates. AMEX helped focus the amnesty campaign on candidate Jimmy Carter. From the time of Carter's nomination in July 1976 until his inauguration in January 1977 we led the attack against the class and race discrimination of Carter's proposed draft resister-only pardon.

When Carter announced his unconditional pardon on January 21, 1977, AMEX hosted an amnesty conference where the amnesty movement blasted Carter for not including deserters, bad paper vets, and civilians with antiwar charges and records. On April 5, 1977, the Carter Administration announced the details of its program for some deserters and limited categories of vets with less-than-honorable discharges. AMEX led NCUUA in attacking the second step of the Carter pardon program.

In 1971, at the beginning of AMEX's struggle for amnesty, we were often told by supporters and critics that there would never be an unconditional amnesty. At some point in the post-Vietnam War period, it became likely that there would be some form of limited pardon, but we believed it would benefit white, middle-class draft resisters at the expense of working class and minority war resisters. If the possibility of winning a broad unconditional amnesty existed, we believed it would result only from widespread grassroots political campaigns. It was our goal to build such a grassroots movement, to force such a presidential action. Six years later, AMEX can take satisfaction in our part in the amnesty struggle even though we didn't win our goal of universal and unconditional amnesty.

During the course of our political work in exile, AMEX helped forge a new antiwar alternative: going into exile. From exile, we were able to lead a popular movement through which we explained to the American people the reasons for our resistance and our amnesty demand. We helped to maintain the amnesty discussion for six years, and the popular debate about the Vietnam War for two years after the liberation of Vietnam, and

more than four years after the signing of the Paris Ceasefire Agreement. AMEX was instrumental in developing exile as a part of the antiwar movement.

After a frustrating initial period of political stalemate between the nonleft and left forces in NCUUA, we did learn that it was possible to work in a cross-class coalition without making basic political compromises. We came to view NCUUA through the perspective of the leftist legacy of united front work. At the founding of NCUUA, AMEX and our allies established a politically satisfactory statement of purpose. Had we insisted on a more politically advanced level of unity, we would have forced the nonleft out of the coalition. However, had AMEX not waged a persistent struggle to force NCUUA to implement its statement of purpose, the amnesty coalition would have discarded many of its most progressive points of unity. Over our years in NCUUA, AMEX also fought to raise the overall level of NCUUA politics. Over these years of internal political struggle, members of the Steering Committee, the National Office, and many grassroots organizers came to follow our leadership. At various times, NCUUA came to depend not only on our political guidance but also on our technical skills.

The Vietnam War did not result from Washington's good intentions turned sour, nor was it an aberration of policy. The war was fought to maintain U.S. hegemony over the global economy, to protect the interests of world capitalism at the expense of Third World peoples.

With respect to the theory of united front work, AMEX functioned as the leadership substitute for a communist party in exposing bankrupt political lines, supplying politically principled lines, and creating program for the coalition. In the process, AMEX won many new supporters and made our share of enemies; but we were able to steer an unwavering course for NCUUA, preventing the coalition from making basic political compromises. We believe we provided strong leadership for a democratic rights struggle which would otherwise have been led by liberals.

A liberal-led amnesty movement, we believe, would not have focused on developing grassroots support, but would rather have emphasized congressional and Democratic party lobbying. Whatever public education work the nonleft did would have been based on the notion of postwar reconciliation and forgetting the war. In contrast, AMEX led the struggle to make NCUUA commit itself to public education, agitation, and organizing around amnesty which would put the war itself, and its aggressive and unjust nature on trial, along with the men who planned it from their Washington offices. From the beginning of our work, we saw amnesty as an antiwar instrument with which we could educate Americans about the nature of U.S.

new form of war resistance.

imperialism: The Vietnam War did not result from Washington's good intentions turned sour, nor was it an aberration of policy. The war was fought to maintain U.S. hegemony over the global economy, to protect the interests of world capitalism at the expense of Third World peoples. It was a battle to insure easy access to the critical raw materials of Indochina and its Southeast Asian neighbors — tin, tungsten, rubber, oil, etc. It was a war to end all wars of national liberation in the Third World, wars waged by colonized peoples to regain control over their natural resource and national destinies. It was a war to preserve markets for American-made goods, and access to the unorganized, "cheap" labor of the Third World.

Due to the nature of the war itself, the Washington decision-makers were stuck with a war that was hard to sell to Americans once it escalated after the mid-1960s. Ruling class families thought the war was important enough to wage, but not with their own sons. As draft calls began to mount, middle class families became uncertain whether they wanted their sons to fight this war. By taking advantage of the many loopholes in the Selective Service System, middle class sons were channeled into deferred college courses and occupations, leaving the brunt of the draft quotas to be filled by working class and minority sons. Viewed in this context, the amnesty question could be utilized to illustrate class and race oppression in the U.S.: Not only were working class and minority sons bearing a disproportionate share of the fighting, but they were also refusing to fight the war in epidemic proportions, and now needed amnesty.

Despite the fact that AMEX focused especially on the working class and minority forms of resistance — deserters and bad paper vets — we were never able to develop as much support for amnesty among these sectors of society as we hoped. These forms of resistance had been aimed at the Achilles heel of the military arm of U.S. imperialism. If the U.S. were not able to count on working class and minority sons to fight similar wars in the future, Uncle Sam would be in a terrible fix. An unconditional amnesty for all Vietnam-era deserters and bad paper vets would set a more dangerous precedent than a draft resisters amnesty. Although during the war years public opinion polls detected less support for the war among the working class and minorities than among middle-class professionals, the middle-class-led antiwar movement was unable to build strong support bases in these communities.

The amnesty movement was also unable to transcend this major characteristic of Vietnam-era American politics: It was not able to win strong support from minority communities and groups, trade unions and other working class organizations, the women's movement and the left. In this regard, the amnesty movement was able to gain support in the form of organizational statements on amnesty, and pro-amnesty news reports in organizational publications when amnesty periodically became frontpage news in the



corporate-owned media, but was generally unable to accomplish even that during periods of political lull. Part of the blame for this rests with AMEX and the amnesty movement for not developing closer ties with these constituencies, due to a lack of personnel to assign to these tasks. But more fundamental was that these constituencies had vastly different political priorities. Nonetheless, despite these crippling shortcomings, the amnesty movement was able to wage its campaign for more than four-and-a-half years.

In conclusion, AMEX discovered that a small group of dedicated activists, working within a community lacking widespread political consciousness and commitment to amnesty work, could lead the exile movement in progressive directions. As we grew with that movement, we remained acutely conscious of the special possibilities of our role as American exiles. It was never easy to decide our course of action at particular times, but we were able to make detailed analyses of what could and should be done within the concrete political and logistical realities of the day, and attempted, as Marxists, to apply dialectical materialism to our work. By working together over a long period of time, we were able to insure consistency and to develop a collective discipline that grew naturally from our longterm political and personal relationships. Once we had made a strong commitment to AMEX's amnesty work, the collective organism of the organization took on a life of its own, making it impossible for AMEX's work to stop before we had done all that was possible from our exile base in Toronto. We discovered in the process that AMEX could make a significant contribution to the antiwar movement and to the evolution and promotion of a new form of war resistance. We hope our most important legacy will be a contribution to the right of future generations of Americans to resist unjust wars against Third World national liberation movements, should the need arise.

GRANTS

MASSACHUSETTS COALITION FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (PO Box 17326, Back Bay Station, Boston, MA 02116).

MassCOSH is a statewide organization uniting unions, working people, pro-labor professionals, and community groups in a program to improve job health and safety conditions in Massachusetts. One of MassCOSH's activities is the publication of a bi-monthly, 16-page newsletter called *Survival Kit*. Resist's grant will help publish an issue of the newsletter.

THE ALAMOSA (COLORADO) COMMITTEE TO STOP GRAND JURY REPRESSION (PO Box 1071, Alamosa, Colorado 81101)

As reported elsewhere in this newsletter, the FBI has launched a broad attack on the Chicano and Puerto Rican movements by using grand jury investigations into bombings as a way of harassing movement activists. Alamosa has become one of the centers of Chicano resistance in Colorado, and one of the Alamosa Committee's members has been jailed by the grand jury. Resist's grant will go for general support.

COMMITTEE TO END STERILIZATION ABUSE (CESA), (Box A244, Cooper Station, New York, NY 10003).

CESA has campaigned around the issue of forced sterilization for over three years. The cut off of Medicaid funds for abortion has heightened the danger that poor women will be victims of sterilization abuse. Resist's grant will go for general support.

THE MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH AND INFORMATION PROJECT (MERIP), (PO Box 3122, Columbia Heights Station, Washington, DC 20010).

MERIP Reports has consistently published some of the most useful and clear-sighted information about the situation in the Middle East. Resist's grant will help support a circulation drive to increase subscriptions.

PHILIPPINE LIBERATION COURIER (PO Box 24737, Oakland, CA 94623).

The *Philippine Liberation Courier* is one of the most useful sources of information on the Philippines. It is published by the International Association of Filipino Patriots, an organization supporting the national liberation struggle in the Philippines. Resist's grant will help support a subscription drive aimed at making the PLC self-sufficient.

PEOPLE UNITED FOR INTEGRATION AND QUALITY EDUCATION (PO Box 92271, Milwaukee, WI 53202)

People United is an organization working to support quality, integrated education in a school system which was ruled by the courts to be intentionally segregated. People United grew out of the struggles for integration, and is now attempting to ensure that court-ordered desegregation be carried out. Our grant will go to support a "Speak Out" for "Equality in Phase III."

ENLISTED PEOPLES RIGHTS ORGANIZATION (EPRO) (PO Box 2016, San Diego, CA 92212).

EPRO, formerly the Center for Servicemen's Rights, publishes the GI newspaper *Up from the Bottom*, and is active in counseling and organizing in the San Diego area. Our grant will go to help with the costs of an issue of the paper.

CLARIDAD (PO Box 318, Cooper Station, New York, NY 10003).

Claridad is the weekly newspaper of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party. Resist's grant will be used to help support a subscription campaign.

THE NEWSPAPER (113 Monroe Street, Lynn, MA 01901).

The *Newspaper*, "Lynn's only anti-imperialist, socialist voice," is now eight years old. The paper covers and analyzes local and community politics, tenant and labor issues, women's issues, and national and international economic trends. Resist's grant is for general support.

YOUTH LIBERATION (2007 Washtenaw Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48104).

One of Youth Liberation's most successful publications has been their pamphlet *How to Start a High School Underground Newspaper*. Resist's grant will help support a fifth printing of this agitational classic.

IDEES, (PO Box 134, Central Station, Jamaica, NY 11435).

Idees is an inter-university and community publication put out by students and other members of the Haitian community in the New York region. Its aim is to promote discussion of Haiti's problems among Haitian exiles and immigrants. Resist's grant is for general support.