America Has No Enemies In Asia!

“Popular rumors from Asia are very alarming . . . . Analyzed and compared facts are not.”

By RALPH TOWNSEND
Formerly of U. S. Consular Service in China. Author of Ways That Are Dark and Asia Answers.

Price 15 Cents
IT IS unfortunate that we now have so many writers and speakers telling us which side America should take in some foreign conflict, and so few emphasizing the common sense of not taking any side.

IN THIS war-mongering, individuals employing the disguise of certain “peace” organizations are the worst. It is a daily experience to note that when one of these “peace” speakers shows up to discuss foreign trouble, he is careful to tell us just how to get into it—on the side he favors—and not how to stay out of it altogether.

HEREWITH are a few facts of the sort average Americans should know—and don't. They are commonly avoided by many editors because organized publicity has made them unpopular.

IN PUBLISHING this I am not affiliated with any organization.

THE MOTIVE is not commercial. Since eye-opening observations in the Orient first interested me in that field, and disclosed some of the chronic trickery of politics there repeatedly duping Americans here, I have contributed a great deal of my time without remuneration of any sort to the cause of judging Asiatic events by specific facts rather than sensational publicity.

THIS BOOKLET is prompted by the favorable reception of a previous one urging neutrality. Individuals and groups all over America ordered copies for personal distribution or supplied costs with lists of names to which copies were to be sent. I mailed many at my own expense, and from patriotic recipients everywhere came orders for mailings to others. Such response from persons in all businesses and professions, in all walks of life, testified to approval of sober facts rather than pretexts of hate—upon neutrality rather than partisanism—upon keeping needed trade rather than futile boycotts for spite—upon a national policy of sane defense rather than insane offense.

RALPH TOWNSEND.

San Francisco, September, 1938.
In 1929--

In 1929 Soviet troops entered Manchuria. There was undeclared war between Chinese and Soviet armies. U. S. Secretary of State Stimson timidly urged peaceful settlement. Comrade Litvinoff of the Soviet Union angrily told him in diplomatic language that the war was not America’s business, to shut up, stop meddling. Friends of Soviets in America put on mysterious pressure. Stimson hastily backed down, saying he didn’t mean to call any nation an aggressor.
When Soviets invaded Manchuria and fought Chinese in 1929, U. S. papers kept the affair rather hushed up. Compare this with their violent sensationalism two years later, in 1931, when Japanese fought in the same area.

When the Soviets fought in Manchuria, the League didn't send a delegation to gather evidence—didn't imply anybody was an aggressor. It hastened to do both in the case of Japan in 1931-32. The same Litvinoff (known also as Finkelstein) who told the U. S. to stop meddling and shut up in 1929 called for League and U. S. condemnation of Japan in 1937. Both the League and America hastily obeyed.

Red publicity and diplomatic machinery are strong enough in America, Britain, and France to define the "aggressor" always in favor of Moscow. Above item hints how League decisions are arranged. Chinese got no League or U. S. backing when fighting Soviet reds—got plenty as soon as they fought Japanese, who are anti-red.
Book at top was published by a leading red writer in 1933. It pictures Chinese civilians allegedly killed by Chiang Kai-shek's party. Chiang was fighting reds then.

Book at right published in 1938 typifies new emphasis, though author of it is not known as red writer. It pictures Chinese civilians assumedly killed by Japanese. The U. S. public is expected to forget that the same charges now made against Japanese Government were made against Chinese Government prior to its present red alliance.

Different Emphasis

While Dictator Chiang Kai-shek of China fought Chinese reds, who variously controlled about an eighth the population of China, red writers in America reviled Chiang as a fiendish butcher. As soon as Chiang made peace with the reds and allied with them, publicity here began to describe Chiang as a kindly, fatherly leader, horrified at Japanese bombings.
Soviet Aims

The Soviet Union has long sought control of China. It has backed the Communist faction within China. Japan opposes the prospect of a red China. This makes Japan an enemy of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union wants American aid against Japan. This partly explains why reds were eager to see conflict between China and Japan. Such a war, it was hoped, would ally America and Moscow. Warrant for this statement may be found in writings of bolshevik leaders, too lengthy to quote here.

Bear in mind that it was a Chinese Communist faction, directly allied with Moscow, that kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek to force him into war with Japan. Concerning this bolshevik scheme to have America fight Japan for Moscow’s convenience, the following statement of red strategy is informing:

“Our salvation would be more readily assured if the imperialist powers (meaning, in this case, America and Japan) became embroiled in a war. If we are forced to tolerate such scoundrels as the capitalistic thieves, each one of whom is whetting his knife against us, then it is our immediate duty to turn these knives against each other.”


Why any ally of Moscow, such as China, is always sensationalized in America as a victim of “aggression” is explained in the following statement of red philosophy:

“Every war which the Soviet League will wage will be a defensive and a just war, regardless of whoever starts it.”

The Soviet aim to get a "capitalist" nation as an ally for convenience in attacking any opponent of the Soviet Union is informingly set forth thus:

"... we can form a military alliance with another bourgeoisie (capitalist country), so that we can crush a third bourgeoisie by means of this ... In this form of national defence—a military alliance with bourgeois states, it is the duty of the comrades in such a country to help this alliance to victory."

—From a speech by Bukharin at the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern, 1922, quoted in Red Militarism, by Peter Garwy, 1928.

The gentle kindliness of the Soviet theory, and the degree of sincerity in red publicity in America voicing pained horror at Japanese bombings, may be estimated from the following:

"Revolution is founded on intimidation—it kills individuals, it intimidates thousands. Thus a conscious minority dynamically converts itself into a majority by slaying its main opponents and terrorizing the rest."

—From Leon Trotsky, formerly commander of the Soviet armies. Quoted from page 191 of China in Revolution, by H. F. MacNair. Recent statements by ruling Soviet officials show that such aims are still part of the Soviet creed.

From the plainest of evidence it is clear that reds do not object to loss of life as such—they merely sensationalize that which may aid in stirring resentment against their enemies, and aid in gaining an American alliance against anti-red nations on the pretext of fighting for "democracy." The "democracy" the reds have in mind of course means the Soviet variety.
American Peace by Parley Chiefs
Sure After Quick Action by
on Two Measures—Hull
First Major Step.

Harold B. Hinton
With Photostat Times, N. Y.
Dec. 13, 1936.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK IS PRISONER
OF MUTINOUS SHENSI TROOPS,
DEMANDING WAR ON JAPAN

Tokyo Sees Danger in Chinese Rebellion;
Officials Anxiously Await Next Move by Foe

By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

TOKYO, Sunday, Dec. 12.—The sealing of Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek by anti-Japanese rebels in China is considered
here to have thrown the whole Far Eastern situation into confu­
sion, the outcome of which it is impossible to foresee. Official quar­
ters said the Japanese Government, was most gravely concerned
about immediate developments and possible future consequences
of General Chang Hsueh-liang’s rebellion. Official comment, how­
ever, was withheld until the situation becomes clearer.

Chang Hsueh-liang, who took command on the heels of

Seven Months Before War Broke—

For years before the present war Chinese reds con­
tantly demanded that Dictator Chiang Kai-shek make war
on Japan. Moscow utterances meanwhile show leaders
there hoped for such a war.

U. S. papers rarely mention that it was Chinese reds,
allied with another faction, who kidnapped Chiang to force
him into war on Japan, threatening his life. The photostat
below, from the Voice of China, published in English in
Shanghai, shows the sentiment of pro-war Chinese. This
was published after the July 7, 1937, incident, but before
serious fighting began and while peace was still possible.
To stir hatred of Japan, U. S. papers avoid mentioning such
pro-war clamor in China, representing the Chinese as hav­
ing done all possible for peace.

The military council now in session in Nanking
will make its ultimate decision,—a deci­
sion which, if it is to be acceptable to the
people of China, must be for war.
Trade Facts

Of all the popular sensationalism promoting baseless hatred and inviting trouble for us abroad, none better illustrates falsities to which ignorant or intentionally misleading writers resort than the charge Japan has “slammed the door” against our products in areas of Japanese control.

Typical is an article in the May 7, 1938, Saturday Evening Post by Carl Crow. Crow asserted Japan has slammed the door against U. S. products in Manchukuo, presenting a horrifying account of how our sales there are declining.

Strangely—very strangely—Crow did not include specific figures on our sales there. Actually, U. S. Dept. of Commerce tables show our sales in Manchukuo increased at the time Crow says they fell. And nobody has accused our Government of juggling figures to be pro-Japanese.
Bulletin No. 839 of the U. S. Dept. of Commerce gives data on our Far Eastern trade very different from assertions so often heard. Page 36 of this accurately compiled bulletin, universally accepted as correct, presents figures which refute hate-stirring sensationalism such as in the Saturday Evening Post article shown opposite.

Sales of U. S. goods in Manchukuo increased by about a fourth from 1933 to 1934—right after Japan’s occupation. In 1935 our trade slumped all over that part of continental Asia. But it slumped only 29 per cent in Japanese-controlled Manchukuo, while slumping 44 per cent in China, where there was no Japanese control.

From 1936 to 1937 our trade gained 6 per cent in China. But in Manchukuo it gained 353 per cent—fifty-eight times as much as in China. Our 1937 sales in Manchukuo more than doubled our 4-year average from 1926-30 there, when Manchukuo was under Chinese war chief rule, and which was a boom period for U. S. exports.

If the Japanese are bent on “slamming the door” against our products, it is strange they have not done so long ago in Japan, where their privilege has never been questioned. Instead, Japan ranks as our third largest customer, buying about six times as much from us as China buys.
Not Suspected at the Time

In 1904-05 U. S. papers lavishly favored Japan. Many Americans didn't know then that such press praise for Japan was partly stirred by organized forces here working for revolution in Russia. Above item appeared 12 years later, in 1917.

Backing Japan to defeat the Czar from without aided revolutionaries seeking his overthrow from within. Such facts show how newspaper campaigns of hate or praise may be influenced by interests not suspected at the time. U. S. papers on the whole favored Japan as long as Japan opposed Czarist Russia, but turned anti-Japanese after 1917 when Japan became a potential enemy of revolutionary Russia.
America’s Legal Position

Except as an educational interest in an important event of our time, the question of who started the present war in China is not legally or logically our concern.

Whichever side was the aggressor in China, neither side is aggressing against us. That is the important point.

Our obligation to remain neutral is exactly the same under international law, whether blame for the war lies mainly with China or with Japan.

Agitator Deceptions

Organized groups seeking to embroil us abroad have created much confusion on this point.

They refer glibly to the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Treaty, without quoting the exact texts. They have thus generated the notion that these agreements call upon America to intervene against “aggressor” nations.

There is nothing in either agreement to define an “aggressor.” Nor is there any reference to hostile action by signers even if the “aggressor” could be otherwise defined.

On the contrary, the very clear aim of the Kellogg Pact is to limit the scope of a war if one should occur—not to spread it by dragging in nations not originally involved.

The Nine Power Treaty, which deals with China, says nothing about aiding the Chinese if they are involved in war. It is not a military alliance.

Our Treaties for Peace Only

No known treaty to which America is a party commits us to take sides in foreign conflicts.

Every established principle of our foreign relations prescribes for us a course of strict neutrality when we are not attacked and when no nation of this hemisphere is attacked from without.
The Kellogg Treaty

Here is the wording of the two significant portions of the Kellogg Treaty of 1928, exactly as obtained from our Department of State:

"ARTICLE I

"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

"ARTICLE II

"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

Are these words foreign propaganda?

Our war agitators invariably refer to anything which points out the common sense and legality of our neutrality as "foreign propaganda."

If the text quoted is foreign propaganda, remember that it came from our own Department of State, that it was endorsed by our government, and that it has been reaffirmed by every President of the United States since America signed it.

Remaining portions of the treaty, those not quoted here, deal only with methods of ratification, where copies shall be kept, etc. America and a few other nations signed the treaty on August 27, 1928. Later it was signed by governments of practically all the civilized and semi-civilized world. China and the Soviet Union signed it.
Four Points to Note

(1) The Kellogg Treaty does not mention the Orient.

(2) It does not make us the supposed guardian of China or any other backward country.

(3) It does not involve us in the disputes of other nations. We did not promise to intervene if others should fight. We did not guarantee what others would do or not do.

(4) America's signature on the Kellogg Treaty spoke for America only. We simply said we would not go to war if we could stay out of war. That was all.

Making America an Aggressor

America's Kellogg Treaty promise has been kept. There is no reason why America should not continue to keep it. No nation is molesting us.

Any nation which goes to war or intervenes with pressure when not attacked is an aggressor nation.

Eager to aid foreign factions they favor by dragging in America, agitators scheme to convert what are now local wars into a World War.

That is one of the things the Kellogg Treaty was designed to prevent.

Shouting about violations of the Kellogg Treaty by others, agitators seek to twist its meaning to have America become a violator.

Partisanism Dangerous

Any partisan action on the part of America, regardless of which foreign faction may be aided or opposed, is in direct violation of the moral and legal status of American neutrality.
It is in direct defiance of the wish for peace by the overwhelming majority of Americans.

Partisanism in foreign wars is not defensive action. It is looking for trouble—crossing oceans to find trouble.

Who's Who Among Agitators

Notice that agitation to involve us abroad is always aimed at getting our help for one of the allies of Moscow. China is allied with the Soviet Union. So is the Madrid-Barcelona faction in Spain.

Every outstanding organization agitating for American intervention or partisanism is controlled by known sympathizers with Moscow. This can be proved by checking the background of ringleaders.

Misuse of words has become so general that anything advertised as a peace talk is almost certain to be an argument for America to meddle in some distant war. Anything labelled as a plea for tolerance is equally certain to be a blast of warlike hatred against one of the nations which Reds don't control and which Reds want America to help crush.

Check this next time you turn on the radio to hear a "peace" plea or a "tolerance" plea.

Rarely Mentioned...

Sensational papers seeking trouble with Japan by talk of territorial aggression are careful not to mention the Soviet Union's 1923 seizure of Mongolia, a huge area of Chinese territory. The Soviets still have it.
The Nine Power Treaty

Besides misrepresenting the Kellogg Treaty agitators seeking to embroil us in Asia refer with equally obvious deceptions to the Nine Power Treaty.

The Nine Power Treaty was signed Feb. 5, 1922, by America, Belgium, Britain, China, France, Italy, Japan, Holland, and Portugal. It deals particularly with China, but not in the way that agitators claim.

Here are the significant portions of the Nine Power Treaty in the exact text received from our Department of State:

"ARTICLE I"

"The Contracting Powers, other than China, agree:

"(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

"(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

"(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

"(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."

Points to Note

In signing this treaty, America did not guarantee China's territory or anything else in China.

We said what WE would do, which was to respect China's territory. This we have done. We did not guarantee what OTHER NATIONS would do.
Writers even in what the public considers "reliable" magazines, such as the Atlantic Monthly, have persistently misrepresented this important point. They refer to our "guarantee" of China's territory. The word guarantee does not appear in the Nine Power Treaty, nor is it in any way implied.

**Our Promise to Discuss**

Only one reference appears in the Nine Power Treaty to action in the event violations should be charged. Each signer promised to discuss the matter—that is all. The exact wording is as follows:

**"ARTICLE VII"**

"The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned."

Notice that the text says there shall be "frank communication" between signers. "Frank communication" is a long jump from armed intervention or warlike boycotts.

**Our Promise Kept**

America promised to discuss matters if any government accused another of violating the Nine Power Treaty. Nobody can say we failed to keep that promise. We have had discussion and almost nothing else but.

With thousands of barrels of ink used for sensational articles about our Nine Power Treaty obligations, it is unfortunate that so few publications have seen fit to quote the exact words of that treaty.

**Quoting it correctly would not serve the publicity aims of those who want to see America embroiled in Asia.**
Who Wanted the China War?

As previously emphasized, America’s legal position respecting the war in China is the same, regardless of which side was the aggressor.

There is no more justification for us to be involved in the present strife between China and Japan than in the late war between Bolivia and Paraguay.

For us, as neutral spectators, the question of who started the China war has been sensationalized out of all proportion to its proper significance.

Legally, the question has no significance for America. We are not the world’s judge, jury, or umpire.

But because of the publicity emphasis given the “aggressor issue”, an inquiry into evidence is in order. The purpose of such an inquiry here is not to show that this or that nation was responsible for the conflict. Rather, the purpose is to show the difference between rumors and realities, and thereby call attention to some of the absurdities of agitators now seeking to involve America.

Opinions Abundant—Facts Scarce

Much of what has been asserted by popular writers about the China war can not be proved at all, and has no basis of reputable testimony.

Some of the commonest statements heard daily from prominent people are known by every careful investigator to be untrue.

Conservative investigators are not ashamed to say “We don’t know” when queried on various points. As in the case of the World War, full information on various points may not be available until long after the strife. Violent positiveness at this time is rather a mark of ignorance or dishonest propaganda than of knowledge and sincerity.
Demand for Sensationalism

A modern war is always a product of many complex influences. Foreign intrigues, secret treaties, secret assurances in return for outside aid, factional ambitions—all may be operative.

The mob mind can not sort and evaluate complex evidence. It wants issues summed up in one or two sentences, with all blame on one side and all right on the other. Circulation demands of modern newspapers and magazines have increased the market for sensational and inaccurate writing. Qualified scholars will not stoop to it.

Front Rank Men Seldom Heard

Far Eastern specialists of the front rank rating of Payson Treat, Herbert Gowen, J. O. P. Bland, W. E. Soothill, A. E. Hindmarsh, E. T. Williams, H. F. MacNair, Sir Reginald Johnston, H. G. W. Woodhead, K. S. Latourette, Paul Clyde and a dozen or so others have seldom been wanted as contributors to popular publications.

Such men aim at accuracy, not lurid excitement. They emphasize facts, not opinions. Their personal sympathies may lie with China or with Japan. But they are aware of too many pros and cons to permit broadside barrages of hate toward either.

To such men, the present war in China is a supreme tragedy for both belligerents, not an occasion for rabble jeers and campaigns of hate by those of us who happen to be more fortunate just now.

Neither the Chinese nor Japanese are fighting for fun. Hundreds of thousands of men, whatever their nationality, do not endure all manner of agonies and die in the mud for the tritely asserted causes so often voiced as “expert analysis.” It is as impossible to sum up the issues of the China war in a sentence or two as to do so with the American Civil War or any other great human upheaval.
What is Now Known

No detailed, authoritative work on causes of the present China war, with apparently unprejudiced inquiry into grievances of both Chinese and Japanese, has as yet appeared.

Only main features of evidence can be outlined here. Facts will be kept strictly separate from sentiment, rumors and opinions.

Did Chiang Kai-Shek Want War?

Accusers of Chiang make these charges:

(1) Years before the fighting of 1931-32 in Manchuria, China under Chiang’s dictatorship acquired the largest standing army on earth, numbering between 2,000,000 and 2,500,000 men.

(2) Chiang made anti-Japanism the basis of uniting under him China’s various “private” armies.

(3) Instead of accepting in a conciliatory spirit Japan’s withdrawal of troops from Suiyuan and other friendly gestures early in 1937, Chiang intensified his anti-Japanese program, believing Japan to be weakening.

(4) Chiang fostered such anti-Japanese societies as the Blue Shirts, a secret society composed largely of Chinese officers sworn to oppose Japan at all hazards, whatever Japan might do toward conciliation.

(5) Prominent Chinese, such as Wang Ching-wei, who advocated a policy of peace and friendly co-operation with Japan, were killed or injured by Chinese groups which Chiang did not suppress and which seemed to have Chiang’s sanction.

(6) Immediately preceding conflict last summer, Chinese troops entered and began to fortify the zone bordering the Japanese area of Shanghai. By an agreement of 1932, this zone was to remain demilitarized.

[19]
(7) Serious fighting last summer began in two areas where Chinese troops had no right under treaties to be—on the north side of Shanghai and at Tientsin.

(8) Chiang overruled the efforts of local Chinese officials to effect a peaceful settlement of the original July 7 skirmish in North China.

(9) Chiang mobilized China’s troops on a large scale at a time when Japan was offering no threat of war, and was attempting peaceful settlement.

(Comments on these charges will be offered presently by the writer of this booklet.)

**Did Japan Want War?**

Accusers of Japan make these charges:

(1) That the Japanese are a war-mad people, longing to conquer the world, and desire to make China the first step in this objective.

(2) That Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910 and military aid in the establishment of the Manchukuo government, 1931-32, prove Japan’s aims.

(3) That the Japanese government is actuated by a program set forth in what is called the Tanaka Memorial, a memorandum of Japan’s avenue of conquest allegedly submitted to the Emperor years ago.

(4) That Japan without provocation attacked in China in the summer of 1937 because of the fear that China might become stronger if Japan waited, and also because of the belief that England and the Soviet Union were then unable to come to China’s aid because of European affairs.

(5) That a sort of religious fervor has been so cultivated in Japan, with military emphasis, that average Japanese are burning with the desire to die for Japan in wars against all the rest of creation.
(6) That there is a military dictatorship in Japan to which the general population is in subjection, and that this military clique drags the rest of the people into war at will.

(7) That leading Japanese financiers and industrialists are in league with the Japanese military commanders in order to conquer new territory for "slave labor", supplies, and markets.

(Comments on these charges will be offered presently by the writer of this booklet.)

Did Chiang Want War?

The following are comments by the author of this booklet:

China's Army Totals

It is correct to say that China's armies during years prior to the present war in China were the largest in the world. Mr. Hallett Abend, long New York Times correspondent in China, with an exceptional record of accuracy, quoted 2,500,000 as the total of China's troops in the year 1930. This figure appears on page 65 of his book, Tortured China.

Mr. H. G. W. Woodhead, Editor of the China Year Book, is likewise conservatively careful. On page 242 of his Adventures in Far Eastern Journalism, published in 1935, he estimated the total of China's troops at 2,250,000. Differences in estimates arise partly because some of the Chinese troops have recurrently deserted the army for a time to operate as bandits, then rejoined.

Possibly the earlier estimates included the "private army" of Chang Hsueh-liang, who ruled Manchuria practically independent of China before the Japanese occupation. Professor A. E. Hindmarsh of Harvard states that the army of "independent" Manchuria numbered 350,000 men in 1928.
China’s War Supplies

Writers in the San Francisco Chronicle and similar publications have declared that China is without arsenals for the manufacture of weapons. The 1933 China Year Book, pages 544-46, gives a list two pages long of Chinese arsenals at that time, five years ago. As far back as 1909 the Encyclopaedia Britannica listed six arsenals of importance in China, some capable even then of turning out heavy guns.

Every standard work of reference gives similar information for writers and speakers who might by chance wish to offer facts, rather than pursue the usual course of concealing them.

Before the Japanese took Mukden in 1931, the Chinese arsenal there ranked as one of the largest in the world, reputedly employing at its peak some 20,000 men, including many foreign technicians. Such facts are familiar to every informed student of the Far East. Newspapers commonly avoid such facts. The vogue is to picture the Chinese as fighting with little better than sticks and ancient swords.

Just before the present conflict began, red publications in both America and China carried awesome accounts of China’s military might. They claimed China was ready to fight Japan, that China could win, and stated they would like to see the war start at once. But the minute it began the same organizations launched publicity picturing China as a quaintly peaceful nation, totally unprepared, pounced upon without warning by a tremendously armed foe.

By the plainest of evidence it is apparent that China actually spent far more on armies between 1927 and 1937 than did Japan. It would have been impossible to equip more than two million soldiers with the quality of arms and munitions to be seen everywhere in China without spending far more than Japan, whose regular troops numbered only one ninth as many as China’s.
No Proof of Blame

That China has led the world in militarism, both in numbers of troops and in proportions of taxes diverted to military purposes, is not open to intelligent dispute.

But China’s excessive militarism is not in itself proof that Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Dictator, was planning all along to attack Japan. In the interest of fairness, there is need of strict separation between surmise and evidence.

Chiang did not create China’s colossal militarism. He inherited it. When he became dictator in 1927, various military chiefs ruled sections of China as their own domains. Each had his huge army. Chiang improved his own army till it was the best in China. A deadlock ensued. Chiang could not prudently disband his own army in the face of rival threats. Nor could he coerce others into disbanding without renewing civil wars. Nobody trusted anybody else, for the excellent reason that in preceding years practically everybody in China had betrayed everybody else.

Chiang’s Unification

Unable to disband these millions of armed men, assuming that he wished to, Chiang set about unifying them under his central regime.

In his unification methods Chiang is open to criticism. From the first anti-foreignism was the main creed of his party. On his way to power, Chiang’s anti-foreignism was mainly anti-American and anti-British. When his armies took Nanking in March of 1927, his soldiers under Chinese officers went from one foreign consulate to another, and from one foreign home to another, killing, torturing, plundering. The British Consul was shot point blank in his own yard. Mr. J. K. Davis, the American Consul, narrowly escaped with his life.
Anti-Americanism

Numerous Americans who lived through those days in China lost mothers, sisters, fathers or brothers in killings which resulted from openly proclaimed Chinese official policy.*

The same Chiang Kai-shek group which perpetrated this program of anti-American killings and property destruction is now shouting its friendship for America to get our aid against Japan.

There was no valid excuse for this 1927 campaign to drive Americans from China. Our residents there were in legitimate business. Most of them were in philanthropic work—maintaining schools and hospitals—to which wealthy Chinese usually give nothing. Americans had donated more than 80 million dollars in American money for hospitals and schools, and were giving from five to ten million dollars annually to support these.

Our total of residents in China was only about an eighth the total of Chinese residing in America. America had always befriended China. We had never taken a single acre of territory there. So far as this writer can learn we had no mining or railway concessions. American influence had saved China from being parcelled out among European powers back in the 19th century. America had given back indemnity money levied on China after the massacres of 1900 when the Chinese Government had ordered all Americans and other foreigners in China slain.

Chinese Politics

For decades in China it has been the fashion to blame foreigners for the distress brought on partly by overpopulation and partly by Chinese civil wars and official cruelties.

* Consult Tortured China, 1930, by Hallett Abend, N. Y. Times correspondent in China; also Within the Walls of Nanking by Alice Tisdale Hobart, later author of Oil for the Lamps of China; and Ways That Are Dark—The Truth About China, by Ralph Townsend, 1933.
Probably less than five per cent of China's population can read, though the number of Chinese graduates of American universities is large. Mass ignorance makes anti-foreignism a natural choice of corrupt politicians.

After America and England bombarded Nanking to rescue foreigners and showed a firm resolve to defend the Shanghai Settlement, Chiang's party found that anti-American and anti-British policies did not pay. So Chiang's party moderated that tack and began to seek U. S. aid. Chiang wanted aid to help him subdue rival claimants for the dictatorship. He promptly got U. S. backing, for reasons too devious to relate here, despite just having finished a campaign of anti-Americanism in which much American property was burned and in which a number of Americans were killed.

When U. S. and British backing became assured, Chiang's party shifted the anti-foreign emphasis to Japan. The Anglo-Japanese alliance had expired. Bolshevist publicity against Japan had been effective in America. Thus isolated, at that time not having either Italy or Germany as theoretical allies, Japan was the ideal target — much better than America or England — for traditional Chinese anti-foreignism.

**China's Anti-Japan Campaign**

It seems to this writer that there was no justification for the new anti-Japan policy in China. Chinese businessmen by the thousands were well-treated in Japan. At that time Japan had not occupied Manchukuo, then called Manchuria.

Japan in 1922 had voluntarily handed back to China the former German concessions of railways, etc., in the Chinese province of Shantung, which Japan had taken from Germany in the World War. Japan's return to China of these properties was a generous gesture, very exceptional in the history of international dealings. It was particularly significant on the part of Japan, which is a relatively poor country and in need of outside resources.
Just why the Japanese returned the Shantung properties to China, this writer can not say. Japanese papers at the time were full of arguments that Japan should take the lead in cultivating Chinese good will, and thus open trade relations with China which would be more valuable than the Shantung concessions. This sentiment seems to have been strong, for a little later, in 1929, the Japanese Government appropriated 72 million yen to establish scholarships for Chinese students to study in Japan as “good will” guests. Also, the Japanese opened a number of good will hospitals in China, financed in Japan, for the benefit of poorer classes of Chinese.

Certainly the anti-Japanese campaign in China did not originate with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. It was provably under way years before that event.

The Manchurian Conflict

During the Japanese conflict with Chinese in Manchuria, between 1931 and 1933, Chiang Kai-shek never once took the field against the Japanese. That conflict was largely between the Japanese and Chang Hsueh-liang, war chief who ruled Manchuria as his own province, independent of Chiang’s regime in China Proper.

Japan’s investments in Manchuria, consisting mainly of the South Manchuria Railway, had begun early in the present century. Enlightened Chinese then were appealing for foreign capital and technical talent to develop the country. There was nothing illegal in such investments. American capital was being invested in Canada and elsewhere. Investors in China did not then foresee the long period of Chinese civil wars which would devastate the country and make the masses ripe for anti-foreign policies by Chinese politicians.

Japan’s return of the Shantung concessions to China and other good will gestures may have placated some of the better elements in China. But they failed to halt the anti-foreignism which was the main political expedient of many
Chinese politicians and racketeers. The failure of Chinese officials to halt anti-Japanese campaigns, often resulting in violence, aroused bitterness in Japan, coming as they did on top of Japanese good will gestures which had meant considerable sacrifices to Japan.

Anti-Japanese agitators in China did not propose to buy Japanese properties. Their slogans called for confiscation.

The Lytton Commission, not favorable to Japan, nevertheless listed more provocations endured by the Japanese before going to war in Manchukuo in 1931 than we endured before fighting Spain in 1898 or Germany in 1917.

The precipitating incident of September 18, 1931, was trivial. Insight into preceding irritations may be gained from the Lytton Report, particularly the Supplement to it.

Comparisons

When the Chinese launched an official program of killing Americans and other foreigners in 1900, we fought back with troops sent to China. We fought back until the Chinese agreed to peace and guarantees against such outrages in the future.

When the Chinese repeated their official program of killing Americans and other foreigners in 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek first came into power, we again sent troops to China and fought back. We fought back until the Chinese officially took steps to halt such outrages against our citizens there. This course was in accord with what successive American presidents have defined as our obligation to insist on respect for civilized principles.

It is hardly logical for us to be so severely critical of the Japanese for fighting now as a result of conditions which caused America to fight in China on two occasions within the last 38 years.
The magnitude of military operations is far greater in the warfare in China now. But the principle involved in provocations leading up to the conflict is the same as that when America fought in China in 1900 and in 1927.

Anti-Japanese Violence

It is commonly supposed by uninformed Americans that anti-Japanese agitation in China, during years preceding the present conflict, was a matter of boycotts and press criticism. It was not. The writer of this booklet offers an illustrative instance of which he had direct knowledge:

In Foochow, a South China city, there were some hundreds of Japanese. They were there as tea buyers, wholesalers, and other legitimate occupations, entitled to the same protection Chinese business men received in Japan. In one house lived a Japanese school teacher and his wife.

Chinese secret societies threatened the life of the school teacher—not, so far as any one could learn, on complaints that he had committed any offense—but because it was planned to kill him as a demonstration of “Chinese patriotism.” The Japanese Consul asked the Chinese officials to provide guards for the teacher’s home. Chinese guards were sent.

A few days later, mysteriously, the guards suddenly left their posts without notice. At once a gang of “Chinese patriots” burst into the home and shot both the Japanese teacher and his wife. In this case, the charge of the Japanese was not that the Chinese officials had ordered the killings, but that they had connived at it or permitted it by abruptly withdrawing the guards without notice at a time when it was known a gang contemplated the crime.

Chiang’s Predicament

Anti-Japanese agitation from 1928 to 1937 was waged considerably by Chinese elements — particularly Chinese

[28]
Chinese and Japanese at dedication of a new Japanese hospital in China, attended by the writer of this booklet, then in the American Consular Service. Between 1929 and 1936 Japan donated a number of hospitals to China, also opened clinics for poor Chinese, all as part of a policy to gain Chinese good will. In all, Japan’s policy toward China has probably been as creditable as the average of other nations.

Communists—who hated Chiang. If he could be entangled in a losing war, reds might hope to gain power in large areas of China in consequence of wartime disorganization.

When Chiang Kai-shek undertook to subdue anti-Japanese lawlessness, his enemies in China shouted that he was pro-Japanese. Yet to compromise with the anti-Japanese elements and officially sanction their violence would invite war with Japan. Chiang was in a hard position. Finally he yielded to the factions clamoring for war.
In June of 1936 a South China faction revolted with the announcement that its aim was to force Chiang to attack the Japanese. Then in December of 1936 the Chinese Communists, in an alliance with another faction, kidnapped Chiang and announced he would be killed unless he agreed to war on Japan. War came seven months later.

**The point is not that Chiang Kai-shek himself provoked the present war. But it is a matter of plain evidence that provocations from the Chinese side were numerous.**

### Chiang’s Kidnapping

From Madame Chiang Kai-shek’s book on the kidnapping of her husband, plus other evidence, it seems plain that Chiang had to choose between risking his dictatorship in civil war or joining the movement to make war on Japan. The Blue Shirts, an organization of anti-Japanese officers in the Chinese army, might join the factions against him if he refused to side with the factions seeking war on Japan.

**Chinese businessmen and the more stable variety of educated Chinese generally seem to have opposed war. The common coolie and farmer classes dreaded war. But these pro-peace elements were shouted down by the radicals.**

Meanwhile, red propagandists spread the word that aid from America could be expected if war could be started.

While affairs were thickening, after Chiang was kidnaped by reds in December of 1936, Chinese radicals were shouting that China, with nine times as many ready troops, could win against Japan.

### When Conflict Came

Probably no foreigner knows positively who began the shooting on the night of July 7, 1937. This was in itself unimportant. It became serious when the Chiang Kai-shek central government of China, under pressure from pro-war elements, refused to recognize the negotiations of local
Chinese officials at the scene of the incident. The local officials seemed ready to settle it peacefully. Chinese radicals in Nanking and Shanghai were shouting that the local officials were sell-outs to Japan, and that Chiang should not accept their settlement. This meant war.

**Treaty Provisions**

It is correct to say that serious fighting began in two places where Chinese troops under existing treaties had no legal right to be. The two places were Tientsin and North Shanghai.

The treaty whereby Chinese were not to move armies into certain areas near Tientsin was not an agreement between China and Japan alone, but between China and several powers, including America. This treaty dates back to the settlement of the Boxer massacres of 1900. Foreign powers insisted on keeping the route from Peking to the sea always open for foreigners to leave in times of danger.

**Evidence of Violations**

The agreement providing that China was not to move troops within a certain distance of the Japanese occupied corner of Shanghai was an agreement between China and Japan alone. It dates back to 1932, when the Japanese agreed to withdraw troops after the battle of Shanghai if the Chinese would agree to keep soldiers away from the zone just north of the city where they would menace Japanese civilian residents. So many massacres of foreigners have occurred in the past when ignorant Chinese soldiers suddenly ran amuck that the Japanese insisted on that arrangement. American and British officials signed the agreement as witnesses.

Photographs published in American newspapers of the early fighting at Tientsin and Shanghai, while published with hotly anti-Japanese captions, nevertheless showed that the warfare began in areas where China had agreed not to move troops.
Civilian Killings at Tungchow

What roused Japan more than anything else after the July 7, 1937, affair, was news of the slaughter at Tungchow, near Peiping, of some 200 Japanese subjects—men, women, and infants. American papers gave this event either very obscure notice or no notice at all, though it was of great importance in launching the war.

The Tungchow massacre was perpetrated by Chinese soldiers apparently excited by reports that the Japanese had been routed and were in retreat from China. Tungchow was not a theatre of conflict, and the Japanese families there were set upon without warning and slain. Indignation among Japanese in Japan ran high, and from that time on—July 29—a full size war with China was considered inevitable.

Points of Law

From the standpoint of international law, the Chinese case in respect to origins of the war is not very good.

When serious fighting began the Japanese garrisons were where they had a legal right under treaties to be. The Chinese soldiers at the same time were where they did not have a legal right under the treaties to be.

So far as this writer has learned, not a single American newspaper or magazine has so much as mentioned this paramount consideration in all the millions of words printed in regard to the war.

Omissions of all reference to a point so vital in the question of war guilt indicates something gravely missing in the alleged honesty of American journalism.
Defining the Aggressor

The League of Nations sessions at which Japan was called the aggressor were dominated by Soviet Commissar Maxim Litvinoff, known also as Finkelstein. He dominated the Brussels Conference likewise.

Note that no group sent a delegation to gather evidence on causes of the conflict. Such would have put on paper evidence which the Moscow ring against Japan very much wanted to keep off paper.

The League blundered badly in 1931 when it sent out the Lytton Commission to gather facts. The Lytton Commission findings showed an embarrassing array of Chinese provocations. The League didn't make that mistake again in 1937. Directed by Comrade Litvinoff it took action for China, Moscow's ally, without any inquiry—a procedure as high-handed as would be a judgment without evidence in an ordinary court case.

League pronouncements are important for publicity effects. They impress persons who suppose the League an impartial body—unaware that every government instructs its League delegates according to its own schemes. Under such conditions there can be no disinterested verdict.

League publicity to sensationalize China as a victim of aggression was backed in America by publicity to picture the Chinese as particularly peaceful people. This was hardly in accord with the evidence. For decades the Chinese have fought constantly among themselves. As a nation they have never shown ability either to get on with others or even to get on with one another. Rated by frequency of civil wars and totals of slaughter, China's record is one of the bloodiest known to history. By specific comparison, past or present, China's record is far more strife-ridden than Japan's.
The Odd Spectacle

Thus we have an odd spectacle. A nation experienced two revolts within six months to force its government into war. Its dictator was kidnapped and held prisoner to force him into an agreement for war. Its soldiers were on demilitarized ground when war began. For years its radical students paraded constantly with banners calling for war. Its politicians who advocated peace were beaten or shot. But that nation, China, when it finally got the war its radical factions clamored for, was declared by organized pro-red publicity in America to have been jumped on without provocation.

Did Japan Want War?

Japan’s Army

Standard American references list the total of Japan’s regular army just prior to present hostilities at 257,000 men.

Thus Japan’s standing army strength was about one-ninth of China’s standing army strength. According to Walter Duranty, N. Y. Times correspondent, the Soviet Union as far back as 1936 had 400,000 troops stationed in the Vladivostok area, fronting on Japan’s Korean border. Elsewhere, according to the Soviet Union’s own figures and neutral estimates, the Soviet Union had an additional standing army of nearly 1,000,000 men.

So on her Chinese border Japan faced about nine times her own army strength in man power and on her Soviet border about five times her own strength in armed man power. China and the Soviet Union were potentially in a military alliance. Japan faced about 14 times her own strength in combined hostile forces.

Meanwhile America and Britain were unfriendly and diplomatically on the side of the Soviets. But during this critical period, from 1933 to 1937, Japan increased her army
by only 27,000 men. Japan’s army remained one of the smallest among world powers, while her two neighbors, the most militaristic in the world in numbers of troops, strained every resource to increase their strength month by month.

**Facts and Generalities**

Each of the foregoing statements can be substantiated. Such facts do not bear out the sensational charges, in American newspapers eager for a U. S. Soviet alliance, that Japan’s policy has been one of “mad dog militarism” challenging America and the rest of the world. No other nation in history, facing for years a situation so critical, has kept its armed forces so small in relation to the potential threat of such a combination of power at its very borders.

> It is very significant that newspapers which constantly refer to Japan’s creation of a “mighty military machine” very carefully avoid stating the exact size of that “mighty military machine.” The same papers are equally careful, in their sensationalism about helpless China being jumped on by a “foe armed to the teeth,” to avoid comparing the size of Japan’s army prior to the fighting with the size of China’s forces.

A hate campaign which must rely on concealment of important facts must be weak from the standpoint of specific evidence. The drive to stir needless hatred of Japan bears all the indications of being a repetition of the 1917 war propaganda technique.

The question for thinking Americans is this: Will our next conflict be a bona fide defence of this country against a real enemy or a framed-up conflict to gratify propaganda liars here at home?

If there is any sound reason for us to view Japan as an enemy, the war-mongers have not yet produced it. Instead, their concealment of so many known particulars plus their
Rarely Mentioned...

It is rarely mentioned that in 1922 Japan voluntarily returned to China Shantung concessions won from Germany in the World War. The hate campaign against Japan calls for avoiding all facts which might subtract from the publicity picture of Japan as fiercely grabbing everything in sight, madly bent on world conquest.

sensationalizing of obvious hokum, plus the fact that ring-leaders in the hate campaign are known Soviet sympathizers, all tend to show that the drive to stir trouble with Japan proceeds from the hope of getting America to fight for the Soviets in Asia.

The Tanaka Memorial

Much publicity has been given in America to what is called the Tanaka Memorial. This is allegedly a plan of Japanese ambitions of conquest, beginning with China and leading to war with America. It came to American attention through Chinese publicity sources, with a statement that it was a scheme submitted to the Emperor of Japan by an official named Tanaka.

There are many specific facts which do not bear out charges that the Japanese are bent on conquest in the manner outlined in what Chinese assert to be the Tanaka Memorial.
Voluntarily, Japan returned to China in 1922 the Shan-tung properties won from Germany in the World War. Japan’s relatively small army, one-ninth the size of China’s prior to the present conflict, would hardly indicate adequate preparation to fight China alone, not to mention America and the rest of the world.

Japan’s peace offer to China in January of 1938, with a view to ending the present war, did not demand an inch of Chinese territory. The main demand was that anti-Japanese violence and agitation of the sort causing the massacre of Japanese civilians at Tungchow be suppressed.

If the Japanese were looking for conflict with China, as the Tanaka Memorial says, there were numerous provocations between 1927, the date Chinese claim the Tanaka Memorial was drafted, and 1937, the date present fighting began. In 1927, in fact, the British Government, now allied with Moscow against Japan, appealed to Japan to send troops to China to help defend British lives against Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-British drive. If Japan wished to attack China, that was a splendid opportunity—with British approval. At any time prior to 1937, Japan could have attacked Chiang when he was less well equipped with imported foreign arms. During years prior to 1937, too, Chinese militarists repeatedly sought Japanese aid, promising all sorts of concessions in return for aid resulting in victory over other Chinese factions. These were refused by Japan.

Altogether, the evidence does not support the theory of the Tanaka Memorial. There is no evidence that the Japanese fight on less provocation than America or any other country. Japan’s territorial gains per war have been no more, when war came, than those of America, Britain, France, and other powers. So far as specific evidence goes, there is no more reason to suppose the Japanese plan to attack us than there is to entertain the same suspicion respecting other nations.
Besides such external evidence, there are discrepancies within the alleged memorial which tend to discredit it. On page 1 it purports to describe an interview participated in by Prince Aritomo Yamagata, Japanese statesman, after the Nine Power Conference of 1922. But Yamagata was dead at the time of the supposed interview, and was dead even before the Nine Power Treaty was signed—a fact confirmable in the Encyclopaedia Britannica or any other standard reference.

A “memorial” containing such absurdities may make good publicity to seek entanglement of America abroad, but it can hardly gain the credence of thinking people.

Red Plans for War on Japan

In this booklet Chinese reds tell of plans to start war on Japan to “unify China” and also regain Manchukuo. On page 41 Mao Tse-tung, red chief, says: “It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories.” This was published in English in America two months before fighting began. Chinese reds did not talk of war to regain Mongolia, taken by Soviets in 1923. (See map page 14). By calling for war on Japan, an anti-red nation, they could count on favorable publicity in U. S. papers. Red publicity connections are so good here that any ally of Moscow is called a victim of aggression, even if it announces in advance its plan to attack—as in this case.
FOREIGNERS FLEE FROM ALL YANGTSE POINTS;
MORE BLOODSHEET FEARED AS RED FLAME SPREADS;
1,500 MORE MARINES TO GO AT ADMIRAL'S CALL

CONFERENCE AT WASHINGTON

Cabinet Calls Army and Navy Chiefs in Consultation.

GENERAL OUTBREAK FEARED

But Army Is Not to Go Yet and Avoidance of Intervention Is Sought.

BORAH A SOURCE OF WORRY

Administration Believes He Seeks to Include China in Senate Committee Inquiry.

Noted 6th Marines Revived for China

The Weather

Former 6th Marine Brigade, Recruit Camp, Parris Island, S.C., was reorganized for China.

Man From Many Stations Hurry to New York City, Cal. Spyder, a Veteran Fighter, to Command.

NOW BEING CONCENTRATED

JAPANESE A NANNING HERO

Unarmed Navy Officer Rescued of His Countrymen.

OTHERS SAVED 4 BRITISH

Tokio Views Situation Calmly, but Is Sending More Warships to Relieve Anxiety.

REFUGEES TELL OF ESCAPE

Attack on Scenery Hill and the Rescue by Naval Barrage Is Related by Cora's Wife.

Chinese in Field Battle At Month of Taung

SHANGHAI ATTACK PLANNED

Labor Army, Well Armed, Prepares Drive at the Foreign Settlement.

AMERICANS IN DEFENSE LINE

Butler Posts Marines With Machine Guns—Chang Kai-shek Reaches Shanghai.

MISSION BOARDS GET RESCUE LISTS

All Americans atanking Are Reported Accounted For in Cabins From Shanghai.

RELATIVE'S WAITING DETAILS

Advice About Dr. Fishbein's Conflicting, but His Safety Seems Assured.

Adviser received yesterday at the end of the recent Washington State legislature, President Roosevelt and Deputy Secretary of State Whitney met with him to learn details of the situation in China. As to the Japanese people are not to send a present with the Britisher, and his article is evidently entirely accurate. Subsequently a Japanese party ran out four creations of the British month's report, but the Japanese press was watching the Chinese town, and a majority of the text is in the abstract. The first edition today with the Chinese have no knowledge of the reports. The American and British aircrafts of the type are to contain three battleships. The American and British cruisers of one type are to contain three battleships. The American and British cruisers of one type are to contain three battleships. The American and British cruisers of one type are to contain three battleships. The American and British cruisers of one type are to contain three battleships. The American and British cruisers of one type are to contain three battleships. The American and British cruisers of one type are to contain three battleships. The American and British cruisers of one type are to contain three battleships. The American and British cruisers of one type are to contain three battleships. The American and...
Opium

When Chinese civil wars became chronic after the World War, cultivation of opium was revived on a tremendous scale throughout China to raise funds for Chinese militarists. Anti-opium edicts were now and then announced, but opium remained a chief source of official revenue over most of China.

Above picture was taken about seven miles from the writer's home near Foochow, China, in 1932.* It shows poppies planted by public orders of Fang Shun-tao, then No. 1 Chinese official there. U. S. papers seeking trouble with Japan avoid such facts, shouting Japanese "introduce" opium into China. In territory of Chinese population they control, Japanese require licenses for opium shops. British in Singapore and other British territories of Chinese population have the same requirement, which U. S. hate campaigners against Japan don't mention. Both British and Japanese adopted licensing system for Chinese after futile suppression efforts.

* See Ch. VIII, Ways That Are Dark—The Truth About China, by Ralph Townsend, 1933. In bookstores, libraries, or from G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, 2 West 45th St., New York City, price $3.00.
Night Maneuvers by Tokio Soldiers, in Area Forbidden by Treaty, Started Fighting Which Has Lasted a Year

BY JACK FOSTER
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

On the night of July 7, 1937, a body of Japanese troops was holding maneuvers on the sandy stretches near Marco Polo Bridge, whose white stone lions look indifferently down at the murky Yungting River, 10 miles southwest of Peiping.

There was no honest reason why they should be there, on Chinese soil. The maneuvers had been going on for over a week. They should have ended days before. Furthermore, the Boxer Treaty strictly forbade foreign troop movements in this area.

Nevertheless, marching around in

Falsities Stirring Hate

It is very odd that so many newspapers repeat from day to day hate-stirring falsities after conscientious persons have called attention to errors.

Completely absurd is the second paragraph of the item above. Article IX of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 expressly provides that in the future foreign powers, including Japan, would be privileged to keep troops in the area cited. The text of this is readily available. What explains the misrepresentation?
In 1927

Chiang Kai-shek’s party was in its first red alliance and busy against British in China. Britain appealed to Japan to send Japanese troops to help save British lives and property. Later Britain became a diplomatic ally of the Soviet Union. Red publicity against Japan in America is designed to draw America into the British-French-Soviet alliance dominated by Soviets.
BLAMES THE SOVIET FOR EVENTS IN CHINA

British Envoy Here Declares Reds Incite "Ignorant Coolies" to "Violence and Pillage."

SEES PLAN TO CONTROL ASIA

(N.Y. TIMES, MAR. 26, 1927)

He Hints in Worcester Speech That Cantonese, Like Turks, Are Using Bolshevism as a Tool.

Special to The New York Times.

SHANGHAI, Saturday, March 26 (AP).—A check-up from all accounts which had reached Shanghai up to 10 o'clock this morning indicated that thirty Americans were still unaccounted for at Nanking. It was impossible to tell their fate.

Hopes of ultimate rescue of those alive, however, were brighter as the Cantonese leader had changed his attitude under the threat of another Anglo-American bombardment.

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 25.—The State Department received a cable tonight from Clarence E. Gauss, Consul General at Shanghai, stating that two shiploads of refugees from Nanking will arrive at Shanghai tomorrow.

According to the Consul at Nanking, many of the refugees are destitute and will require assistance.

REFUGEES SPEEDING FROM DANGER ZONE

(N.Y. TIMES, MAR. 26, 1927)

Group That Left Nanking Before Latest Outbreak Arrives Safely at Shanghai.

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, March 25.—The safe arrival at Shanghai of forty-nine

Compare Britain's official attitude toward reds in 1927, when British were their target, with Britain's attitude in 1937-38 when Japanese have been the target of reds.
Text of the Message by Admiral Hough at Nanking
Which Resulted in the Decision to Shell the City

By FREDERICK MOORE.

SHANGHAI, March 25.—The message from Rear Admiral H. H. Hough, at Nanking, to Admiral C. S. Williams, Commander-in-Chief at Shanghai, which resulted in the third ultimatum and the liberation of the foreigners follows:

I do not believe that the details of the situation are completely understood by the Commander-in-Chief.

I agree with the British senior officer present that unless our nationals are promptly released, and delivered at the Bund, drastic action must be taken in order to save the lives of those remaining in the city. There are wounded ashore who cannot receive attention and should not be neglected further, including the British Consul General.

I believe that radical action would preserve lives and further delay would defeat this possibility.

I believe that the shelling of military points, avoiding injury to the civil populace as much as possible, would at this time have excellent effect upon the port and along the river.

I have just received an evasive and insolent reply from the local army commander.

I consider that if concrete action is not taken firmly and immediately here the lives of the remaining British and Americans may be lost and all British and Americans must promptly evacuate the Yangtze Valley in order to save their lives.

Unless otherwise instructed and unless the situation radically changes I will jointly with the British late this afternoon shell the salient military points and military yamen.

I am sending a final warning by a Chinese military orderly.

Chang Kai-shek's arrival is problematical and we do not consider that under these conditions he is strong enough to control the situation even if he so desires or should arrive in time to save the remaining lives.

Hough.

WASHINGTON, March 25.—Admiral C. S. Williams's reply to Rear Admiral Hough's message asking permission to shell Nanking follows:

Use your own judgment in handling the situation.

Williams.

The British Commander-in-Chief sent a similar message to the commanding officer of the cruiser Emerald at Nanking.

Facing a similar situation, America's attitude in 1927 was as stern as Japan's in 1937.
Red Publicity Power

Readers who seek a balanced perspective of foreign affairs will do well to ponder all implications of the following facts:

When Bolivia and Paraguay were warring not long ago, not a single American paper sought to name the aggressor. There were no mass meetings—no protests. Why? The distinction of that war was that neither side was an ally of Moscow. It is only in conflicts between red and anti-red forces, as in China and in Spain now—that our press is suddenly interested in naming the “aggressor”. The “aggressor” is always the anti-red side. There was no political or publicity capital for reds in the Bolivia-Paraguay war. Hence lack of sensationalism concerning it here.

U. S. papers kept quiet during years of pro-red Mexico’s closing of churches and expulsions of priests, but raised a mighty wail over far less restrictive religious measures in anti-red nations.

Confiscation of hundreds of million dollars worth of U. S. oil and other properties by pro-red Mexico stirred very little objection in most U. S. papers. But temporary occupation of obscure American mission property by Japanese in China—worth at most a few hundred dollars—stirred violent blasts of fury. Japan is an anti-red nation.

There was more furore in Washington over news later that Mexico was selling the oil to Japan and Germany—anti-red nations—than there had been over Mexico’s confiscation of it from American owners. U. S. criticism of the oil seizure became crusty only after learning who’d get the oil.

The minute France began to go red in a big way under Leon Blum two years ago, U. S. papers began to praise
France to the skies, though France had done nothing else
to account for this mysterious sudden torrent of American
press eulogies. Certainly France had come no nearer pay-
ing long-standing debts. Meanwhile U. S. papers carefully
avoid mentioning that Japan, an anti-red nation, is the only
world power to pay all debts to us at all times, with never
a dollar of default or delay. France is an ally of Moscow.

Japan’s bombing of the Panay was sensationalized
with all sorts of war talk. China’s equivalent bombing of
the S. S. Hoover at sea, and China’s bombing of the Inter-
national Settlement at Shanghai, killing and injuring Amer-
icans, were neatly hushed up. China is an ally of Moscow.

Nothing much was said in America about Austria’s
debt as long as it was Austria’s debt. The moment Austria
was merged with Germany and the debt could be charged
to Germany, an anti-red nation, U. S. papers let loose a
mighty howl. Yet the amount owed, and the principle in-
volved, were the same in both cases.

Sensationalism to involve America in Asia claims the
issue there is “democracy”. But neither Japan nor China
is a democracy. There was never a popular election in
China during all the 4,000 years of that country’s history.
Chiang Kai-shek, present dictator, got his power by fighting
for it. Japan, a constitutional monarchy much similar to
that of England, with control over taxes and appropriations
by an elected Diet, is not a democracy in the correct sense
of the word. Nor is Japan in any sense fascistic, having
no dictator and retaining control of finances and most other
agencies of government by elected representatives.

Papers seeking to entangle America in Asia avoid
calling Chiang Kai-shek a dictator—calling him “generalis-
simo”—which conceals the fact that China is the world’s
second severest dictatorship.
Affairs are not yet ripe in America to praise the Soviet Union direct in average papers. Instead, they praise every military and diplomatic ally of the Soviet Union. If U. S. backing can be achieved for Moscow’s allies, that is nearly as good as direct backing for Moscow. Hence the avoidance of “red” applied to Moscow allies and substitution of “democracy”—which sounds better to American ears.

Readers may judge for themselves the extent to which American papers play this publicity game deliberately or as dupes of a publicity machine such as was created to drag us into war in Europe in 1917.

“Territorial aggression” is not a real issue, in evidence of which papers attacking Japan on that point avoid mentioning the Soviets’ 1923 grab of Mongolia. American papers backed Japan, whatever territory Japan took, as long as Japan was an opponent of the Czar, then turned anti-Japanese after 1917—as soon as Japan was viewed by strong forces here as an opponent of the “New Russia.”

Anything which can be construed as an “atrocity” is sensationalized regarding all anti-red nations—and concealed or played down regarding any ally of Moscow. Britain’s recent bombings of Indian civilian villages and France’s bombings of North African villages are not discussed in average U. S. papers. England and France are allied with Moscow. Chiang Kai-shek killed thousands of Chinese civilians in his civil wars. Doubtless his bombings were not intended to do so. But as in Japan’s case, any air attack on military objectives in crowded China brings serious civilian tolls. The point is that the same events headlined against anti-reds are kept quiet if involving any Moscow ally.

Such publicity examples reveal trends in current sensationalism. Linkage with alien politics is plain. It is indeed a spectacle of hypocrisy that those seeking to embroil us abroad refer to principles of “civilization” and “honor”, when their efforts are based so largely upon deception and outright lying.
America's Position

In pointing out that we have no cause to hate Japan, there is no intended suggestion that anybody in America should be pro-Japanese.

Being pro anything in foreign strife invites trouble. Our partisanship either way is unwarranted. There has been nothing in Japan's relations with us to deserve our hatred of Japan. Nor has there been anything in China's relations with us to deserve our support of China.

Past favors to China brought us no thanks, as proved by repeated anti-American campaigns led by Chinese officials for political motives. They now plead all sorts of esteem for us—now that they want our aid again. But it was this same group of Chinese who came into power on an anti-American program, when that was expedient in 1927.

Talk of "aiding democracy" and "resisting dictatorship" was proved publicity bait by schemers to entangle us for their own aims in the past. It would be so again if Americans once more succumbed to the same bait. It is well to remember that both after 1898 and 1918 we were scorned and hated by the people our intervention was allegedly designed to aid. And it is particularly absurd to talk of "aiding democracy" in China, where democracy never existed.

America is now in the peculiarly fortunate position of having no country as an enemy. Why spoil this good fortune? On a basis of facts, as distinct from minority hate propaganda, we have no cause to quarrel with the Japanese. They want our good will. By avoiding partisanship we can keep on reasonably friendly terms with both Chinese and Japanese. Doing so will be to our advantage and contribute to world stabilization. Very plainly, the choice for cordial relations is ours.

We Have No Enemies in Asia!