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


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A SELECTION OF LEADING ARTICLES

FROM THE

Peking & Tientsin Times



January 1st to April 23rd, 1926.

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
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TIENTSIN PRESS, LTD.

A SELECTION OF
LEADING ARTICLES

FROM THE

Peking & Tientsin Times



January 1st to April 23rd, 1926.

PREFACE.



This selection of leading articles from the *Peking & Tientsin Times* has been printed in response to requests from many of our readers. It was obviously impossible to reprint all the leaders that have appeared in the paper since January 1st. Many of them are no longer of any interest in view of events which have happened since they occurred. It is hoped that this selection will enable friends in China and abroad to gain a clearer idea of the problems which confront the civilized Powers in China, at the present day.

The articles are reprinted in the exact form in which they originally appeared. In one or two cases the Editor might have made slight alterations in the light of fuller knowledge of the events treated, but it was considered best to leave the articles exactly as they were written, any value they may possess being due to the extent to which they accurately interpreted the situation on the dates on which they were first published.

THE EDITOR.

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THE PROTEST TO AMERICA.

(Tientsin, January 5, 1927).

THE Note cabled to the American Secretary of State by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Southern Government emphasizes the difficulty of enforcing any policy in China which will satisfy the rival factions at present contending for the control of the country. The British Memorandum to the Treaty Powers repeated the suggestion, already made to the American Government on May 28 last, that the so-called Washington surtaxes (of 2½ per cent. on ordinary imports, and 5 per cent. on certain specified luxuries) should be granted immediately, and without conditions. Had that proposal been acted upon in May the Canton Government would only have received the proceeds of these surtaxes from Canton, Swatow, Kowloon, Lappa, Kongmoon, Samshui, Wuchow, Nanning, Kiungchow, and Pak-hoi, or about \$2,400,000 out of a total of \$30,000,000. If they were enforced to-day, with the Cantonese in control of Ichang, Shasi, Changsha, Yochow, the Wu-Han Cities and Kiukiang, the Cantonese share would amount to about \$7,200,000. Then, as now, Shanghai would remain the prize from the revenue point of view, producing about one million dollars a month. Its occupation, with that of Nanking, Chinkiang and Hangchow would give the South-erners \$19,800,000 out of thirty

millions, or approximately two-thirds of the new surtaxes. As we pointed out when the purport of the British proposals first became known, their application would make Shanghai the richest prize in China.

This is recognized by the Nationalist Government, which raises the objection that "every treaty port will become a fresh object of militarist plunder . . . while Shanghai—which has been on the eve of passing to the National control without much fighting—must now become a theatre of bloody struggle, involving perhaps permanent injury to the foreign trade, since the millions to be collected there—forty per cent. of the surtaxes—are to Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tsung-chang, like raw meat to the beasts of prey." It is suggested, further, that Marshal Chang Tso-lin would "receive new substantial revenues" and also a gilt-edged security which would enable "him to float a loan to save his inflated currency from the collapse inseparable from the reckless prosecution of wars of revenge and feudal ambition."

As there is not the remotest possibility of these surtaxes being immediately and unconditionally enforced, owing to the opposition of the French and Japanese Governments, these objections are not strictly relevant. They are of interest, however, as revealing the

type of mentality with which we have now to deal in China. The Nationalist Government has, without treaty sanction, been collecting the equivalent of the Washington surtaxes at Canton from October last. It has now announced its intention of enforcing the same taxation at Hankow. At Canton a very high percentage of the import trade is by transshipment from Hongkong, and Canton is therefore the port of original entry on Chinese soil. But at Hankow a very large proportion of the imports of foreign-goods must have been landed and paid duty at Shanghai, being drawn upon as required from stocks in that city. If, therefore, the Washington surtaxes came into force unconditionally, and it was stipulated—as it would be imperative that it should be stipulated—that they could only be collected once on each article, Shanghai would not only benefit from imports consumed locally, but from a high percentage of cargo destined for consumption in the interior, and especially in Yangtze ports. The levy of the Washington surtaxes “on all goods entering the port” at Hankow would therefore mean double taxation, for under existing conditions it is scarcely thinkable that the Chinese authorities in Shanghai would allow a rebate equivalent to the surtaxes, on goods leaving Shanghai for Hankow.

The Nationalist Government which claims to be recognized as the Government of all China, claims for itself the right of levy-

ing these surtaxes wherever it has control, and yet admits that were they universally enforced, two thirds of the proceeds would go to its political enemies. On a strictly mathematical basis, therefore, it can only claim recognition as the Government of one-third of China. With amazing inconsistency it maintains, in effect, that it must be allowed a free hand in the illegal collection of surtaxes “on all goods” entering ports under its control, but that the legalization of this levy, and its universal enforcement, would constitute a departure from strict neutrality, and assistance to its enemies. The only kind of neutrality of which it appears to approve is one which allows it to impose illegal taxation, and prohibits the same privilege to those opposed to it. Obviously the Northern militarists would regard this policy as grossly partial to the South, and proceed to levy the same taxes, wherever possible, on the pretext that what was permitted to the Cantonese must also be conceded to them. It happens that in Canton and Hankow, the Customs Houses are on Chinese territory outside the Concessions, whereas in Shanghai, Tientsin, and Dairen, they are so situated that no direct Chinese interference is possible. But it is difficult to see how the Treaty Powers could condone the levy of these surtaxes on the trade of their nationals at Hankow, Canton, and other ports under Cantonese control, and, because of the mere accident that the Customs Houses in Shanghai, Tientsin and Dairen are beyond

the reach of the local militarists, prevent the latter from obtaining additional revenue by the same method.

The British proposal is, in fact, more favourable to the Cantonese authorities to-day than it was when it was urged upon the American Government in May of last year. It will be still more favourable, if Shanghai should pass into their hands, always provided that they do not paralyse foreign trade by pursuing the policy of fomenting anti-foreign and labour disturbances, and boycotts. After what has recently happened in Hankow it is rather strange to read of the concern expressed by the Nationalist Government lest "permanent injury to foreign trade" should result from the struggle for Shanghai. Hankow has now been in its hands for several months, and the latest telegrams scarcely suggest that the safeguarding of foreign trade forms one of the objects of the Nationalist Government.

The outstanding fact of the pre-

sent situation in China appears to be that any concession, political or financial, that may be offered to the nation as a whole, will be regarded by one faction or the other as partial to its enemies. The Nationalist Government objects to the immediate and unconditional enforcement of the Washington surtaxes throughout the country, yet levies them in cynical disregard of treaty obligations, wherever it is in control. It objects to the reopening of the Tariff Conference, "because it involves consideration of issues which only a Central Government representative and competent to speak and act in the name of the Chinese nation, can negotiate in conference with the interested governments." Yet it persistently blames the "imperialism" of the Treaty Powers for the withholding of Tariff autonomy. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald assumes that Canton has commonsense. It seems time that some evidence were produced to warrant that assumption.

THE HANKOW OUTRAGE.

(Tientsin, January 6, 1927).

THERE are limits even to the policy of patience and conciliation, with which the British Government has been endeavouring, for the past eighteen months, to placate the anti-British elements in this country. A former

British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, who cannot be accused of lack of sympathy with Chinese aspirations—the Rt. Hon. J. Ramsay MacDonald—in an article which appeared only a day or two ago, has defined those

limits. A "mere policy of scuttle" he tells us," will not put us right with the Cantonese. *"The old conditions in China impose upon us obligations which must remain until we are relieved of them by negotiation."* It must have been clear to most of our readers for some weeks past that the extremist elements among the Cantonese—who, so the *Manchester Guardian* tells us, are not "even seriously connected with Russian Bolshevism"—have been endeavouring to force matters to an issue at Hankow. They have continuously and truculently, violated the British municipal regulations. They have endeavoured by mass-meetings and parades to work up animosity towards the British. They have openly advocated measures which, if applied, without resistance, would compel every Briton to leave the neighbourhood. And now matters have reached a climax. And we are witnessing the results of a policy of patience and conciliation when applied to a people who have always interpreted every concession, and every act of forbearance as symptomatic of weakness or of fear.

The situation has been growing increasingly menacing for several days past, at Hankow. While papers at home have been sneering at the "alarmist" and "panicky" reports which have been telegraphed from that city, and the British Government has been assuring inquirers that adequate steps had been taken for the protection of

its nationals, the Cantonese extremists have been working, without concealment, to bring about a crisis which would compel the British Authorities to take action. Acting, we suppose, under the instructions of the Home Government, the local British authorities have displayed amazing forbearance under intolerable provocation. They even went to the length of permitting armed Cantonese troops to enter the Concession and seize motor cars which were alleged to be the property of Marshal Wu Pei-fu or his subordinates; and of tolerating the parading of inoffensive Chinese through the main streets by strike "pickets." Then for a time, there was a stiffening of our attitude. Marines and Volunteers were stationed on the Concession boundaries to prevent the incursion of rioters or soldiers, and there was a slight improvement in local conditions. During the past few days, however, there has been incident after incident, in which bloodshed was only averted by the exemplary patience displayed by the Naval landing parties and the volunteers. British Marines and Bluejackets have been stoned, assaulted, and beaten by the Chinese mobs, and yet, up to the present have refrained from using any weapon but a bayonet. Communist meetings have been held by Cantonese cadets on the British Bund, and there have been repeated attempts on the part of Cantonese troops to land in, or march through the streets of the Concession.

Matters appear to have reached a head on Tuesday, following a series of incidents the previous afternoon. The fury of the mob was worked up by the assertion of agitators that several Chinese had been killed or wounded by British Marines, and a Society was formed to disarm the British forces and take back the Concessions. As usual, the local Chinese authorities did nothing. Indeed we are told that representatives of Government Departments participated in the meeting at which mob action was decided upon. Crowds began to assemble on the Bund and outside the British Police Station early in the afternoon. The British Consul-General—whether rightly or wrongly still remains to be seen—relied upon assurances of Chinese military protection, with the result that no Marines were landed, and the barricades at the entrances to the Concession remained unguarded. Within a few minutes of the assembling of the mob, these barricades had been swept away. Two hours later the mob invaded the Concession. The Customs House and Municipal Offices were occupied, and some British shops were closed down and their inmates driven out. It is impossible from the telegram received at the time of writing to say whether order has been restored. But it is clear that the situation remains most critical, and that the evacuation of the British Concession may become necessary at any moment.

It is pathetic to read more than

a month after the despatch of an urgent appeal for adequate protection, that "the British force available was quite inadequate to deal with the situation," and that what, in effect took place, was that the whole foreign population of the British area had to be left at the mercy of a Chinese mob to avoid the use of force. There are, we believe, only three British warships,—a gunboat, a destroyer and a sloop,—with a total complement of about 250, and about fifty additional Marines, at Hankow. America, with less important interests to protect, and those that she has less seriously menaced, has a larger naval force than Great Britain at Hankow to-day.

It now remains to be seen whether the British Government will share the former Prime Minister's view that "the old conditions in China impose upon us obligations which must remain until we are relieved of them by negotiation." The original British Concession at Hankow, consisting of some sixty-two acres, was leased to the British Government in perpetuity, in 1861, and extended by a grant of an additional area of 53 acres, on the same terms, in 1896. Its forcible occupation either by an anti-British mob with the connivance of the Cantonese authorities, or by the Cantonese authorities themselves, is an act of hostility and provocation which cannot be tolerated without most disastrous consequences to British interests in China. If this outrage be condoned, the Chinese will naturally draw the inference that "a mere

scuttle" has become the policy of the British Government, and that the oft-repeated pledges of its spokesmen that the lives and property of British subjects in China will be adequately protected, are all moonshine. The Cantonese have not shown the slightest disposition to control or repress the anti-British agitation since their advent at Hankow, and no self-respecting Briton will desire to remain there if it is made clear that surrender to the mob is to become the policy of the British Authorities from now onwards. We ven-

ture to suggest that any resumption of conversations between the new British Minister and the "Minister for Foreign Affairs" of the Canton Government will be impossible until this outrage has been redressed, and apologized for. British prestige could only be reduced to a lower ebb than it is to-day by conversations with a representative of the Southern Government, either in a Concession forcibly occupied by a Chinese mob, or in a foreign hotel in the French Concession at Hankow.

AFTER HANKOW?

(Tientsin, January 10, 1927).

IF a Liberal, instead of a Conservative, Ministry were in office in Great Britain, to-day, and the course of events in Hankow had been the same, the first thing that would happen on the reassembling of Parliament would be the moving of a Vote of Censure by the Conservative Party. For, as the *Times* puts, it, the complaint against the Government to-day is not that it protects its nationals, but that it does not protect them effectively. We are constantly being told that the Home Government is much better informed of the situation in China than most Britons living in this country. Either this is a grotesque exaggeration, or, being better informed, it has deliberately chosen to

neglect its responsibilities in the hope, somehow or other, of muddling through. The situation at Hankow has been dangerous ever since the irruption of the Cantonese on the Yangtze. It has been critical for at least six weeks past. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs admitted, in the House of Commons, on November 29, that he had received a cable from Hankow stating that the "situation was very grave indeed; and that they are in daily expectation of an incident which will involve bloodshed, having serious consequences, and that our naval forces at present there are not considered adequate for the protection of British subjects", and added that the matter was under

the consideration of His Majesty's Government, including the Admiralty. On that date there were *five* British warships—two Destroyers two gunboats and a sloop—at Hankow. On the 4th inst., when the long expected crisis occurred, this force instead of being increased, had been reduced to a Destroyer, a gunboat and a sloop, or *three* vessels in all. On December 1 Sir Austen Chamberlain told another questioner that there was not the least reason for supposing that "the shipping facilities at Hankow would not be adequate to evacuate all British residents, if that became necessary." When the crisis occurred the only vessels immediately available appear to have been the Poyang and the Loongwo, neither of which was provisioned for the trip, and each of which had to carry about six times the number of passengers for which there was accommodation. It is plain, then, that the well-informed Government between November 29 and January 4, withdrew a Destroyer and a gunboat from Hankow, and made absolutely no provision for the evacuation of the British community in the event of serious trouble. It also showed extraordinary laxity in other directions. If it knew that the position at Hankow was critical, and that at any moment it might be necessary to evacuate the British community or resort to force, it was its obvious duty to withdraw all British subjects from points further up the river. Either the evacuation of Hankow or a collision there with the Can-

tonese, would certainly expose them to dire peril; and their continued presence up-river would, moreover, seriously prejudice any naval operations that might be necessary to recover control of the British Concession, or to protect the lives and property of British subjects in the lower Yangtze ports. It is understood that Sir Ronald Macleay, before leaving for home, advocated the withdrawal of British subjects from Western China, where it would be impossible—especially during the low water season—to protect or rescue them, and where they would be exposed to immediate peril in the event of trouble occurring at Hankow. A very strong case for a vote of censure upon the Government in power could be made out, if the Opposition did not consist largely of Members whose one desire seems to be to see their fellow-countrymen in China persecuted, humiliated, and outraged.

To Englishmen throughout the Far East the spectacle of their Consulate-General at Hankow unable to fly the British Flag, of British women and children without money and without adequate clothing, arriving at Shanghai in overcrowded vessels, of British Volunteers and merchants disarmed and unprotected, gathered in the Hongkong Bank and A.P.C. offices and unable to leave because of the supervision of Chinese pickets, is too shameful to be discussed in temperate language. But from the Chinese point of view the grossest outrage of all is the desecration of the Cenotaph,

the local Memorial to our dead. To a Chinese the mere threat of the desecration of his ancestral tombs is sufficient to coerce him into almost any line of action, however foolish and undesirable, that his persecutors may desire. The damage to and defacement of the Cenotaph, in Chinese eyes, was a far graver affront than would have been the tearing down and destruction of the British Flag.

We can only guess at the feelings of the British community at Hankow regarding what they must inevitably look upon as a betrayal by their Government. The fact that only one of them in addition to the Consul-General attended the meeting with Mr. Chen seems a sufficient indication of their exasperation and complete lack of confidence in their own and the local Chinese authorities. The American community seems to share their views, judging from its attitude after hearing Mr. Chen's belated assurances that "the Nationalist Government could control the situation." And Japanese reports suggest that a general evacuation of Hankow is now contemplated. Kiukiang has already been evacuated, the situation there having become intolerable; and it may be hoped that it has proved possible to remove all foreign residents from Kuling, the adjacent hill-station, where only a few days ago General Chiang Kai-shek and his staff were reported to have established their headquarters.

It is not surprising that Britons

and Americans in Hankow alike regard the assurances of the spokesman of the Nationalist Government as humbug. We wonder, when people in Europe and America will be disillusioned. General Chiang Kai-shek tells a newspaper representative that the elimination of Christian missions is not part of the programme of his Government, and this assurance is complacently accepted in spite of the record of the Nationalist forces wherever they have been. Canton, Swatow, Changsha, and numerous Protestant and Catholic mission stations in Kwangtung, Hunan, and Kiangsi reveal the truth, which is not consistent with General Chiang's pledges. Ill-informed writers in Europe and America rhapsodise over the efficiency and progressiveness of the Canton Government. Hankow and Kiukiang supply the truth, even if one can ignore the extraordinary evidence of "efficiency" and "progress" that could be produced from places like Canton, Wuchow, and Swatow!

The policy of patience and conciliation has been put to the supreme test at Hankow, and has been found wanting. It cannot be adopted elsewhere—at Shanghai, for example—without results too terrible to contemplate. And there is some reason for believing that it does not really commend itself to the more stable elements among the Chinese themselves. There is much significance in the *Daily Mail* report of a meeting between the Kuomintang officials and the Chinese Chamber of Com-

merce at Hankow, at which the latter frankly stated that the resumption of business was impossible while the British and Americans refused, and advocated the return to the old conditions of British administration. It is to

be hoped that Britons and Americans alike will persist in their refusal to resume business until the *status quo ante* has been restored, and they have satisfactory guarantees of protection from their own authorities.

A DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

(Tientsin, January 14, 1927).

WRITERS and speakers in Europe and America who are constantly urging the surrender of foreign rights and privileges in China, may make out a very plausible case to those who read or hear them, but when it comes to any actual attempt to grant any of the concessions for which a noisier elements in China have been clamouring for the past eighteen months or two years, the difficulties of dealing with a nation which has no central government, and which is in the throes of civil war, become immediately apparent. The American, British and Japanese Judges who investigated the May 30 incident all referred to the Mixed Court rendition question as one of the causes of local unrest. The rendition of that Tribunal appeared in the demands of the Student and Street Unions, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and the Waichiaopu, and was vociferously supported in Canton. With the best will in the world the system of judicial administration in a city

the size of Shanghai cannot be changed overnight. But after considerable negotiation between the Consular Body and the local Chinese authorities (the Peking Government having no authority whatever in the district) a provisional arrangement for the handing over of the Court was reached, and the transfer of the tribunal took place on January 1. Immediately, local Chinese organizations began to agitate against the transfer. Telegrams were broadcast throughout the country announcing that the jurisdiction of the Court would never be recognized, and asking "why could not the foreign nations wait a little longer and hand over the Court to the proper authorities, instead of handing it over to Sun Chuan-fang? Who the "proper authorities" are is not specified, but presumably the Nationalist Government is intended. It was, of course, impossible for the local Consular Body to hand over the tribunal to an authority actually at war with the authority

controlling the Shanghai area. Yet it is now considered a grievance that rendition has taken place, and the very elements who are constantly charging the Treaty Powers with procrastination, or bad-faith in the fulfilment of their pledges, are criticizing them for settling a definite time and date for the transfer. It happens that Marshal Sun Chuan-fang was in control when the transfer was effected. But if the Cantonese should occupy Shanghai during the next few months, we shall doubtless find the adherents of Marshal Sun, and of the Northern Militarists, shrieking denunciations of the Treaty Powers for action prejudicial to their interests.

The same difficulty is experienced with almost every other "right" for which the Chinese are clamouring. Kuomintang agents have been entering the Foreign Concessions at Hankow, and seizing property alleged to belong to their political enemies, and would doubtless have seized their persons, also, had they been discovered. One of the evil effects of "foreign imperialism," so they maintain, has been the immunity of Chinese political agitators of the opposite camp, within the Foreign Concessions. But let the British Authorities in Tientsin comply with a request from the local authorities to effect arrests within an area which was only handed over to their municipal control on condition that warrants issued by the Chinese authorities would be executed "without further inquiry" and the British

Government is accused of conniving at murder, of contravening international law, and of violating the rights of Chinese citizens.

Similarly, when the British Government proposes the unconditional grant of the Washington surtaxes, the Southern Government, which has been claiming and exercising the right to collect these surtaxes wherever it has acquired control, denounces the proposal as marking an attempt to furnish Marshal Chang Tso-lin with a "gilt-edged security", enabling him "to float a loan to save his inflated currency from collapse." In all the instances referred to, what the protesting parties really want—though they would then raise the roof with protests against "foreign imperialism"—is "foreign intervention." Cantonese sympathisers in Shanghai should be protected from the jurisdiction of the local Chinese authorities by Foreign Police or sailors. Kuomintang agitators in Tientsin should receive the same protection. The right of the Nationalist Government to collect and appropriate to its own use the Washington surtaxes should be unconditionally conceded. But the Foreign Powers should, at all costs, prevent the Northern militarists from exercising the same privilege. Nearly every protest emanating from or inspired by the Nationalist Government is, in effect, a demand for foreign intervention in its favour. And it accompanies the demand by a campaign of in-

timidation and violence which can only be construed as a deliberate attempt to compel foreign intervention against itself.

The predicament in which the Governments anxious to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese find themselves would be ludicrous were it not so very dangerous. You have on the one side a party which, while it has made rapid progress during the past few months, does not possess effective control over one-third of China, which is doing everything it can to embarrass and humiliate the foreigners, and which yet claims that it alone is to be regarded as representative of the Chinese nation. On the other hand, are a group of militarists

who, whatever their shortcomings—which are glaring enough—have discountenanced mob violence and the wholesale repudiation of treaties, and who, between them, still control two-thirds of China. The Powers, whose only interest is to see a peaceful and united China cannot placate the Southerners, without acts of deliberate hostility to the Northern Militarists. To concede the pretensions of the Nationalists would not merely mean to take words for deeds, but to ignore the realities of the situation. Yet each day makes a policy of strict neutrality and non-intervention more difficult, and more perilous. What is the end to be?

LLOYD GEORGE'S LATEST.

(Tientsin, January 24, 1927).

THE Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George has made a belated and adroit attempt to repair the harm done by his unfortunate speech at Bradford on December 4. But we do not think that anyone familiar with the facts of the situation will find his latest effort convincing. When he committed the Bradford blunder he and everyone else who had been following the China situation in the Home Press should have realized that a situation of the utmost gravity had developed at

Hankow and other cities on the Yangtze. The British community at Hankow—which has never had the reputation of being panicky—had sent an urgent appeal for adequate protection to the Home Government. The official spokesman of the latter, while repeatedly and most solemnly affirming the Government's desire to avoid any hostile or provocative action in China had, as a precautionary measure, detailed certain naval reinforcements for service in the Far

East. It must have been obvious to anyone with the slenderest knowledge of the situation in China that the despatch of a few additional Cruisers and Destroyers must be for protective duties only; even Mr. Lloyd George, who has more than once posed as an authority on strategy, could hardly imagine that Great Britain was going to make war upon "an empire of 400,000,000 civilized people" with fleet of two or three score vessels, none of them more powerful than an armoured cruiser. Yet for the obvious purpose of making political capital out of our troubles in China—ignoring the truth, and showing utter indifference to the peril of his countrymen and countrywomen in this part of the world—he made a speech sneering at "panicky appeals for aid"; deprecating the despatch of "men-of-war, aeroplanes and all the mechanism of war" to China; alleging that their despatch produced "the danger of the inevitable incidents which would provoke bloodshed"; and scoffing at the notion that "the Reds were inciting Chinese to rebellion and bloodshed". In his whole speech there was not a word of sympathy for or any evidence of concern regarding, those of his own blood who were in peril as a result of the Bolshevized-nationalist agitation in South and Mid-China. His countrymen out here, on the contrary, were told with an appearance of smug satisfaction

that they (and other foreigners) had a "black record", and were "suffering from the results of their own greed." "Let the Washington decision be carried out before we decide about sending flotillas to bombard their cities", said the ex-Prime Minister, who evidently imagined, with others of his ill-informed countrymen, that the implementing of the Washington surtaxes would give satisfaction throughout China.

A few days later "David Lloyd George", who has become a regular contributor to an American syndicated news service, produced an article on China. From it we learn that the entire foreign population in China, would not greatly exceed 100,000. (The latest available figures are over 336,000). He waxes enthusiastic over the capture of Foochow; lays emphasis upon the fact that most foreigners live "within sight of navigable waters", where "it ought not to be difficult for the combined naval forces of all the Powers to afford adequate protection to those small communities"; extols the Canton Government as "an able body of men", which "rules with firmness the territories it holds," men far "too sagacious to provide an excuse for intervention by the Powers"; and informs his readers that "Hankow is settling down to a quiet life since General Chiang effectively occupied the city."

And with impudent inconsistency he admits that "public opinion in their own countries strictly demands that everything possible be done to afford protection to those who live within reach of the guns of a fleet"—against the reinforcement of which he had protested at Bradford.

A few weeks passed, and the course of events in Hankow bore out the "panicky appeals for aid" from Hankow. The Nationalist Government with its Russian and Russian-trained agitators, descended upon the Wu-Han cities, and, from Borodin and Sun Fo downwards, engaged in an intensive campaign for the fomenting of hostility towards the British, and the incitement of the labouring masses against their employers. On January 4 the British community had conclusive proof that Hankow had not settled down to "a quiet life," and that adequate protection could not be afforded by the available naval forces. The British authorities on the spot, relying upon "the able body of men" which "rules with firmness the territories it holds" withdrew the naval landing parties, and a few hours later found the Concession overrun by a howling mob, which defaced the Cenotaph, and attacked every foreigner who appeared in the streets. It became necessary hurriedly to evacuate British women and children, who presumably, should have comfort-

ed themselves in their misery with the reflection that they were "suffering from the results of their own greed" and acclaimed Mr. Lloyd George's sneer at those who suggested that the Reds were inciting the Chinese to rebellion and bloodshed. For the past fortnight the remaining members of the British community have found it necessary to suspend business and take shelter in a building on the Bund. And from all parts of the interior have come stories of hardships and outrages endured by Britons who have been endeavouring to obey the orders of their Government to leave their homes.

The British Government, awake at last to the fact that it has not concentrated forces sufficient to protect the lives and properties of its Nationals in China, has ordered strong Naval reinforcements, including a detachment of 1,000 Royal Marines, to proceed immediately to the Far East, and is holding four Battalions of Troops ready for immediate despatch, if required. In addition, therefore, to the despatch of "men-of-war, aeroplanes and all the mechanism of war," military protection of British subjects is contemplated should it be required.

And now comes Mr. Lloyd George with a self-satisfied smirk and asks his followers to "give the Foreign Secretary the utmost help against the attack of evil counsellors" — referring, pre-

sumably to those who anticipated what was coming and urged that the necessary precautions should be adopted in good time. With typical audacity he pretends that at Bradford he was merely following the traditional policy of Bright and Cobden "namely, whilst *doing the utmost to protect British lives and property* to extend to China full recognition of her national rights and to make justice instead of force the basis of our trading arrangements there." It is unfortunate that he should have ignored the necessity of protecting British lives and property, and protested against the necessary measures for doing so, at Bradford. It is, of course, merely grotesque to pretend, now that facts have proved too strong for him, that because the British Government has continued, since January 4, to carry out the policy to which it had repeatedly committed itself, the ex-Prime Minister has been vindicated. Had his Bradford

speech been adopted as the policy of the present Government all orders for Naval and military reinforcements would have been countermanded, and the British communities would have been left to bear the consequences. Mr. Lloyd George would then, presumably, have invented some additional reason why his fellow-countrymen should receive no assistance or protection. In common with Viscount Grey we prefer the more helpful contributions of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald to the discussion of the Chinese question, to the mischievous, ignorant, and irresponsible utterances of a former Premier who, having seen that China was appearing in the headlines of the newspapers, and knowing little and caring less about the issues involved, considered it an opportune moment to embarrass the Government and defame his fellow-countrymen in the Far East.

MR. MACDONALD ON CHINA.

(Tientsin, January 25, 1927).

MR. Ramsay MacDonald has publicly recognized the obligation of whatever British Government may be in power, to protect the lives and property of British subjects in China. He has also

declared that though the past must be liquidated, this cannot be done by riotous crowds, and that "nothing could justify our Authorities if they simply walked away from the Settlements which past Chinese

Governments have allowed us to control, and where our people have taken up their abode under the security they believe the Treaties gave us." After all the nonsense about the British position in China that has been talked and written, in British Labour circles, it is refreshing to find the Leader of the Labour Party frankly recognizing the Government's obligations to its nationals. But it would appear that even to-day the former Prime Minister does not fully appreciate the peril in which British interests in China have been placed by recent events in Hankow. He seems to place a quite pathetic confidence in Mr. Eugene Chen, and to believe that this plausible and verbose person really exercises some control over the mob-elements in South and Mid-China. We wonder whether it would come as a surprise to him to learn that the gentleman who talks so grandiloquently about "my Government" doing this, and "my Government" doing that, was born on the other side of the Globe, claimed British citizenship until a few years ago, and, according to a Chinese news agency recently explained away an order attributed to him on the ground that "*through an error of the translator* the proclamation was made to read that all anti-foreign or anti-Christian movement should be suspended." We believe it to be a fact that Mr. Chen cannot

speak any Chinese at all except a little Cantonese colloquial, and that he could not write out the simplest Chinese proclamation in his own hand. He occupies his present position because of his fluent knowledge of English, and is the temporary mouthpiece, and not in any sense the master, of the Nationalist Government.

It is strange to find Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who recognizes that the British Government must shoulder certain elementary obligations, expressing doubts whether the precautions now being adopted may not "produce the very situation that will in time be used as a need for their employment." For nearly every day is bringing its tale of wanton outrage against British subjects, and wanton destruction of British property, in the territory over which the Nationalist Government claims control, and it is daily becoming clearer that the so-called Government in South China having deliberately stirred up the masses against the British, has lost control of them. This is the only logical explanation of what has occurred during the past few weeks—of the looting of Kiukiang, and the overrunning of Hankow, of the destruction of the A.P.C. installation of Siangtan, and of such incidents as the invasion of Mr. T. V. Soong's office by the mob, and the detention of the British Postal Commissioner at

Hankow, and of other Postal officials at Changsha and Kiukiang. For if one supposes that these successive outrages have been organized and carried out under the orders of the Nationalist Government, it is no longer a question whether the need for the employment of British armed forces *will* arise. It *has* arisen. Acts of war have been committed which cannot be ignored. And wherever there are important British communities in Nationalist territory, a repetition of these outrages must be expected at any moment.

There is another point about Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's latest letter to the *Daily Herald* that deserves attention. It appears that he has advised "the Labour movement to keep in touch with Mr. Chen, as well as their own Government, and to plead in the strongest terms for both sides to negotiate before using force." Now Mr. Ramsay MacDonald himself has held the important positions of Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He must know, even though no such crisis as this arose during his term in office, the extreme difficulty of negotiations with an unreasonable or hostile Government. He must surely recognize the embarrassment that might be caused to the officials actually entrusted with this responsibility by the Government, by the intervention of irresponsible third

parties. What, for instance, would he have thought if during some of the complicated negotiations for which he was responsible as Foreign Secretary, the British Unionist Party had endeavoured to establish independent relations with a political faction in one of the countries concerned? It has been a tradition in British political life for many years past, to support the Foreign Policy of the Government of the day—as Mr. Baldwin put it when in Opposition—"provided that they practise a continuity of foreign policy for this country and a policy which will maintain the honour and integrity of this country. I can promise this Government, as I could promise any other, that until such time as we are convinced that they are departing from that continuity we shall support them as we should support any other Government, regarding, as we do, the unity of the country in the face of the world, in its foreign affairs, as of far more importance than any temporary advantage which we might snatch by factitious partisan opposition."

Mr. MacDonald, unlike Mr. Lloyd George, does not appear to have endeavoured to use the present crisis in China for purposes of "factitious partisan opposition." But his advice to his followers to keep in touch with a Chinese official with whom the representatives of His Majesty's Government

are actually conferring, if followed, may produce serious consequences both for British and for Chinese interests. The *Daily Herald* has published ludicrously garbled accounts of the Hankow incident, presumably because Mr. Chen and his propagandists on the China Information Bureau keep in touch with British Labour

and spoon-feed it. Mr. MacDonald has been taken into the confidence of the Government regarding the position in China. If he does not trust it, let him openly say so. If he does, he is not helping British or Chinese interests by allowing his Party and its organ, to be bamboozled by Mr. Eugene Chen's specious propaganda.

ON THE BACK OF THE TIGER.

(Tientsin, January 26, 1927).

THERE is a familiar ring about the statement issued by "the Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs" on Monday last. Many of its phrases such as "these words are used advisedly," "in a very real sense", "it is historically true", "in terms of" and "the medievalism of the Mandarinate", have appeared, *ad nauseam*, in the columns of the ephemeral journals of which its author has from time to time been editor. It has been concocted, of course, in the hope of influencing opinion abroad, which, even in England, is prone to accept any statement, however, far-fetched, which reflects upon Britons in this country. Great Britain is arraigned in pompous language, for depriving China of "her independence" in the "opium wars" and the world is asked to believe that it is "the

old iron of defeat in her flesh" that is prompting "Nationalist China" to indulge in every form of hostility towards the British and their interests in this country. Even to-day there are many people in Europe and America who fail to realize that Mr. Eugene Chen with his white spats and his faultlessly creased trousers is merely the marionette of the sinister Borodin and his agents, and that his carefully turned phrases, and venom, towards the Empire of which but a few years ago he claimed to be a citizen, are totally alien to Chinese thought.

"In a very real sense, it is historically true to state that the British having defeated China in the opium wars, deprived her of independence," writes Mr. Chen. That, however, was not the view adopted by the original sponsors

of the Revolution, some of whom, at any rate had a life-long knowledge of China, and could speak and write Chinese. In one of the first of the Manifestoes drawn up by the Republicans in 1911, and signed by the late Dr. Wu Ting-fang, we read:

"The foreign Powers individually and collectively have stood hammering at the door of China for centuries pleading for the diffusion of knowledge, a reformation of national services, the adoption of Western sciences and industrial processes, a jettisoning of the crude, out-of-date and ignoble concepts which have been multiplied to keep the nation without the pale of the great family constituting the civilized world. They have failed.

"We are fighting to be men of the world; we are fighting to cast off an oppressive, vicious and tyrannous rule that has beggared and disgraced China, obstructed and defied foreign nations, and set back the clock of the world."

And this is what Dr. Sun Yat-sen had to say in the first official Republican Manifesto, which was countersigned by Dr. Wu Ting-fang, and issued on January 5, 1912:

"Prior to the usurpation of the Throne by the Manchus the land was open to foreign intercourse and religious tolerance existed, as is evidenced by the writings of

Marco Polo and the inscription on the Nestorian tablet at Sianfu.

"Dominated by ignorance and selfishness the Manchus closed the land to the outer world and plunged the Chinese people into a state of benighted mentality, calculated to operate inversely to their natural talents and capabilities, thus committing a crime against humanity and the civilized nations almost impossible of expiation."

And he then proceeds to set forth a list of alleged crimes and oppressions which, if true, would have convinced any reader that no self-respecting foreigner could possibly have lived in this country without special immunities.

In 1911-12 the founders of the Republic regarded the "hammering at the door" of the Foreign Powers as praiseworthy. To-day, the self-constituted spokesmen of the Chinese people pretend that it was an act of imperialism which justifies economic reprisals, not to mention attacks by frenzied mobs upon foreigners and their property.

Mr. Eugene Chen of Trinidad tells us that Great Britain has nothing to fear "when China under National leadership and rule recovers her lost independence"; that she will not revert to the "methods of barbarism of Chang Tsung-chang" "or reintroduce "the feudalism of Chang Tso-lin." We might find this state-

ment more reassuring if we were convinced that China was trying to regain her independence under National, and not under Soviet leadership, and if there were any indications that we were soon to enter upon this Utopian phase. At present it is useless to ask Britons who are compelled at short notice to flee from their homes in the interior to believe that they can trust to the protection of the Government which has been hounding the mob on against them. And it is plain that the British Government, for one, does not share the view that "to-day the effective protection of foreign life and property in China does not and cannot rest on foreign bayonets and foreign gunboats."

Within a few days of the despatch by the Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sarcastic cable to the *Daily Mail* regarding the refusal of the British community in Hankow to resume business, which contained a declaration to the effect that it was the duty of the Nationalist Government to protect the lives and property of British subjects and other foreign nationals in Hankow and other parts of China under its control, a general strike compelled British residents to leave Changsha, and a mob attacked and set fire to, the A. P. C. Installation at Siangtan. Within a week of Mr. Chen's warning to British merchants and bankers that their refusal to resume

business "may make for the permanent injury of British trade and property in Hankow," General Chiang Kai-shek was telling a gathering of Chinese merchants at the Ningpo Guild that they must "beat down the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank" or they would never be able to open their own banks. The Nationalist authorities have encouraged irresponsible agitators to organize so-called trade unions by the score in every city they have entered, have prompted them to make the most preposterous demands of their employers, have permitted them to have recourse to wholesale violence and intimidation, and while withholding protection from British employers, have pretended that it is a grievance that the latter do not resume business. Chinese employers have also suffered, and have had the consolation of learning from the lips of General Chiang Kai-shek that if the pickets make arrests or commit unlawful acts, they should not be regarded as enemies, but should be given proper guidance and advice. Doubtless the Chartered Bank Compradore, who was seized and carried off for the offence of speaking to a "British Imperialist" would consider this very helpful advice.

The plain truth is that high-sounding phrases, and pompous perorations from the gentleman who represents "my Government" at Hankow, fail, and must continue

to fail, to restore confidence among the British and other foreigners until there is conclusive evidence that the members of the Nationalist Government are capable of acting up to their responsibilities, as well as talking or writing about them. The Chinese have a very apt proverb to the effect that it is difficult to dismount from a tiger. And at present it is an untamed tiger with whom foreigners have to deal in Mid-China, whose savagery seems only to be increased by the protestations of its rider that it is a nice tame domesticated pussy-cat

from whom those it encounters have nothing whatever to fear. Whether Mr. Chen wants to dismount and cannot do so for fear of the effect of his white spats on the beast, or whether he is enjoying his ride in spite of his carefully creased trousers, we do not know. But it is the tiger, and not Mr. Chen, with whom we really have to reckon at the moment. And even when it is advertised to represent "the real spirit of awakened China" a tiger on the rampage is hardly a promising party to any serious negotiations.

THE OUTLOOK.

(Tientsin, February 2, 1927).

THE policy of patience and conciliation is about to be put to the supreme test. The British Government, in what must be regarded as a final effort to satisfy the aspirations of the Chinese nationalists, has offered a series of concessions which, as the *Times* remarks, are "too generous, perhaps, to satisfy the hardly tried British community whose enterprise and example have been of infinite value to China in the past." These concessions have been offered simultaneously in Peking and in Hankow, so that there can be no question of partiality to North or South. To the "hardly tried Bri-

tish community" the only really satisfactory feature of them is that they appear to command the unanimous support of all political parties in Great Britain. We must derive what comfort we can from the reflection that a policy of conciliation, even when pushed beyond the limits of prudence, is better than no policy at all. It is at least calculated to bring matters squarely to an issue, instead of allowing them to drift on, steadily getting worse and worse, for months on end. Seldom if ever has any publicly announced foreign policy of a British Government received such unanimous endorsement from all

parties in the State. The new British proposals have been publicly commended by Liberal and Labour politicians, and by newspapers of all shades of opinion. That does not, in itself, show that they are wise, for the ignorance of things Chinese of most British politicians, is notorious. It does, however, indicate that in the event of the British concessions being interpreted as a sign of weakness, and encouraging the Chinese extremists to indulge in further excesses, the Government will have the whole nation behind it in protecting the lives and property of British subjects in this country.

There is some difference of opinion at home regarding the advisability of sending out so large a military force for the protection of Shanghai even in the Labour Party. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald takes the view that the despatch of this expedition is provocative. Mr. J. H. Thomas, however, in the course of a most courageous speech at Newton Abbot, stated that he did not feel any apprehension on this subject. He did not know whether it was necessary to send troops or not; that was a matter for the Government of the day, with fuller knowledge, and fuller responsibility. But he did not hesitate to say that if troops had to be sent to protect British nationals, he would infinitely prefer them to send a big army, rather than an handful of soldiers. The egregious

Mr. Cook is reported to have denounced British policy in China, but he can no longer be considered a really serious factor in domestic politics. There is no indication, as yet, that British Labour, or any considerable section of the British electorate, is willing to take its instructions from Moscow.

The most curious feature of the present situation in the Far East is the apparent rapprochement between Tokio and Moscow. Since January 18 Baron Shidehara has made a series of platitudinous speeches on the subject of Japanese policy towards China. They contain no concrete proposals, but reveal a marked divergence from the British point of view, particularly in connection with the Washington surtaxes and the necessity for military precautions at Shanghai. In spite of what has occurred at Hankow, Kiukiang, Foochow, and other places under the control of the Nationalist Government, the Japanese Foreign Minister naively pretends that there is no cause for apprehension. His speeches have been greeted with professions of approval both at Hankow, and at Moscow, and have resulted in the fatuous interview with the "Acting Russian Ambassador" at Tokio which we print this morning, and which professes to see an identity of policy on the part of Russia, China and Japan. It would all be very amusing were there not good grounds

for believing that it conceals some deep-laid scheme, the details of which will only gradually become known. There are, however, various straws which suggest the direction of the wind. It seems to be an established fact that wherever riotous mobs have been turned loose upon the British, particular pains have been taken to avoid any incidents with the Japanese. They are reported to have been told, while the mob was actually over-running the British Concession at Hankow, that under no circumstances would an attempt be made to recover the Japanese Concession by mob violence. It is significant also, that at this particular juncture, when labour in the Wu-Han cities is in a state of ferment, and no industry can be conducted with any confidence, the Japanese Government should have advanced a sum of two million yen to the Hanyehping Iron Works. Japan obtained a virtual monopoly of the iron output of the Hanyehping Company as a result of the ultimatum presented to China in May, 1915. This Company has suffered from political disturbances and mismanagement, and, as a Japanese contemporary puts it, "at one time it looked as though the Government had decided that to make any further monetary advances to the Hanyehping Works would merely be throwing good money after bad, but the fact they have now decided to take the risk

is a clear indication of the great value they place on making sure of an uninterrupted supply of iron ore from a source which they could, if necessary, control by military means, in the event of their being cut off from other sources in wartime." It might also, at this juncture, be susceptible of the interpretation that for reasons best known to itself, the Japanese Government is subsidizing the Nationalists at Hankow. That would certainly be the construction placed by the Japanese Press, on the news that two million dollars had been advanced by the British Government to any undertaking under official control, in the Wu-Han area.

The first reactions to the latest British proposals can hardly be considered promising. On Monday the Waichiaopu forwarded a formal protest against the despatch of British troops for the protection of Shanghai, containing what, in the circumstances, are ludicrous assurances regarding the ability of the Chinese Government to maintain order within and without the Settlement. Late the same night a Mandate was issued dismissing the Inspector General of Customs, on the ground of his refusal to collect the Washington surtaxes until all of the Treaty Powers had agreed. Sir Francis Aglen is, it is true, a servant of the Chinese Government, but, as such, he has no jurisdiction over the nationals

of Powers enjoying extraterritorial rights, and whatever Peking might tell him to do, he could not enforce taxation upon the Japanese, while their Government instructed them not to pay it. His arbitrary dismissal, while he is absent from Peking endeavouring to make satisfactory arrangements for the continued functioning of the Customs in Mid-China, seems to indicate a belief that following upon the communication of the British proposals, no further respect need be paid to any British rights or interests. The removal

of Sir Francis Aglen at this juncture may have most serious consequences, as confidence in the entire issue of Domestic Bonds depends upon his control of the security, and service. It may also imperil the unity of the Customs administration, already threatened by the attitude of the Nationalist authorities. Coming immediately after presentation of the British proposals, it can hardly be regarded as indicating any real wish on the part of the Peking Government to retain British friendship and co-operation.

THE BRITISH PROPOSALS.

(Tientsin, February 5, 1927).

AS the British proposals to the Chinese authorities at Peking and Hankow are certain to be frequently referred to during the next few weeks, we are reprinting them this morning as a special Supplement, in a form in which they can be kept handy for future reference. It may not, however, be out of place, here, to indicate more fully than the text discloses, the scope of the British concessions. The proposals are seven in number. The first reads:

(1) His Majesty's Government are prepared to recognise the modern Chinese Law Courts as competent Courts for cases brought by British plaintiffs or complainants, and to

waive the right of attendance of a British representative at the hearing of such cases.

Under Sec. II, sub-sec. III of the Chefoo Agreement of 1876, and (by the operation of the "most favoured nation" clause) by virtue of Art. IV of the Sino-American Treaty of 1880, a properly authorized official of the plaintiff's nationality was to be allowed to attend the trial of a defendant or accused, to be treated with the courtesy due to his position, to be granted all proper facilities for watching the proceedings in the interests of justice, to have the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to

protest against the proceedings if dissatisfied. This privilege was reciprocal; that is to say while it could be claimed by the British authorities in the case of the trial of a Chinese on claims brought, or crimes alleged, by a British subject, it could also be claimed by the Chinese where a British subject was the accused or defendant. Since the establishment of modern Chinese Courts the exercise of this right by Foreign Consular officials has been stubbornly resisted. It has been enforced in some important cases (notably at the trial of the murderer of Mr. and Mrs. Gumpert in Tientsin and of the alleged assailant of Mr. Bessell at Peking), but the claim has in almost every recent case been opposed by the Chinese, and has led to constant friction and delay.

(2) His Majesty's Government are prepared to recognise the validity of a reasonable Chinese Nationality Law.

This proposal is apparently designed to meet Chinese objections to dual nationality on the part of persons of Chinese descent, born, or naturalized, in a British Colony. As great care is exercised before British protection is accorded to persons in these categories, it may be doubted whether the Chinese have had any reasonable grievance in this connection.

(3) His Majesty's Government are prepared to apply as far as practicable in the British Courts in China the modern Chinese Civil and Commercial Codes—apart from

procedure Codes and those affecting personal status—and duly enacted subordinate legislation as and when such laws and regulations are promulgated and enforced in Chinese Courts and on Chinese citizens throughout China.

The application of this proposal may prove to be extremely difficult in practice, for no Chinese Civil Code has yet been promulgated, and the only substantive Civil Laws which were brought to the notice of the Commission on Extraterritoriality, were the Law of Mortgages (of Oct. 1915) and Regulations relating to the Examination of Title Deeds (Jan. 1914). As regards Commercial laws, the same authority states that: "there is as yet no unified commercial status in China. The Ordinance for the General Regulation of Traders, and the Commercial Associations' Ordinance, which fall within the general category of commercial law, are the only general rules in force together with certain special commercial laws." It is difficult to see how many of these special commercial laws could be enforced without relinquishing British jurisdiction, which, of course, is out of the question while the present chaos in the judicial administration continues.

(4) His Majesty's Government are prepared to make British subjects in China liable to pay such regular and legal Chinese taxation not involving discrimination against British subjects or British goods, as is in fact

imposed on, and paid by Chinese citizens throughout China.

If the proviso at the end of this proposal be strictly adhered to, British subjects will have little to fear from their liability to Chinese taxation. All kinds of taxation laws have been promulgated in Peking and the Provinces, most of them without any legislative authority. An Income Tax Law, authorizing the imposition of income tax ranging from $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent to 5 per cent, on a graduated scale, on incomes of between \$500 and \$500,000 per annum, was promulgated in January 1914, and was supposed to come into force on January 1, 1921. It has remained a dead letter, and it is scarcely possible that the British Government will tolerate the singling out of its nationals for the imposition of this or any other tax to which Chinese citizens may be legally liable, but which, in a actual practice they never pay.

(5) His Majesty's Government are prepared, as soon as a revised Chinese Penal Code is promulgated and applied in Chinese Courts, to consider its application in British Courts in China.

This proposal need occasion no apprehension. The present Chinese Penal Code is "admittedly defective," and is undergoing revision. The new draft is stated to meet "most of the criticisms of the Provisional Criminal Code made by the Commission at its sessions." It is, however, Chinese procedure

that is most objectionable, and that, we take it, could never be adopted in any British Court. As long ago as February, 1919, we suggested that the logical solution of the extraterritorial problem would be found in the administration of Chinese laws in the Foreign Courts in this country.

(6) His Majesty's Government are prepared to discuss and enter into arrangements according particular circumstances at each port concerned for the modification of Municipal Administration of British Concession, so as to bring them into lines with the administrations of Special Chinese Administrations set up in former Concessions, or for their amalgamation with former Concessions now under Chinese control, or for the transfer of police control of Concession areas to the Chinese authorities.

This proposal as it stands is the most objectionable of the whole series. Even Sir Austen Chamberlain's stipulation in his Birmingham speech that the British communities would be assured of some voice in Municipal matters, makes it little more palatable. We have witnessed, in Tientsin, the progressive deterioration of the former German, Austrian, and Russian Concessions since they passed under Chinese police control. Our columns have frequently contained complaints regarding the disgraceful condition of the roads and Bund in the former Russian Concession. The ex-German Bund has also been allowed to fall into disrepair. And only a few weeks ago we published details of the scand-

alous transaction by which the supply of electricity in the ex-German area—with current obtained from the B.M.C. Power station—had been farmed out to the Pei Chen Electric Co., Ltd. The ex-German area has been purchasing current in bulk from the B.M.C. at about seven cents per unit, and retailing it at 25 cents, and the enormous profits derived from this arrangement are now, apparently, to go into private hands, instead of being used for the upkeep of roads and public works in the area. The administration of “former Concessions now under Chinese control” in Tientsin has been characterized by graft and inefficiency, and similar methods applied to the British Concession would have disastrous results on property values and Municipal Bonds. There is as yet, no mention of the withdrawal of Foreign Garrisons from North China. But if this is contemplated, and Tientsin is to continue to be the objective of rival armies, we can scarcely look forward to the immunity this area has hitherto enjoyed while hordes of Chinese soldiery have swarmed into the Chinese city, and robbed, looted and blackmailed the unfortunate population. The value of land and buildings in the British area (if one estimates the total rental assessment at approximately ten per cent of the capital value) is in the neighbourhood of *four millions sterling*. The assets of the

Municipality (which include the Electric Power Station, the Waterworks, the Grammar School, numerous buildings, and land to the value of nearly £400,000,) exceed £1,100,000, and there are loans outstanding to the extent of over £300,000. If these properties, assets and liabilities are to become the sport of whatever militarist temporarily controls the city, foreign and Chinese residents alike will soon have cause to rue the British Government's decision. Whichever of the three suggested solutions is eventually chosen, we sincerely trust that it will not be the one that will bring the British Municipal Area “into line with” the special Chinese Administration set up in the ex-German area.

(7) His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the principle that British missionaries should no longer claim the right to purchase land in the interior, that Chinese converts should look to Chinese Law and not to Treaties for protection, and that missionary educational and medical institutions will conform to Chinese laws and regulations applying to similar Chinese institutions.

This proposal means the abrogation of Article VIII of the Treaty of Tientsin, in so far as it applies to Chinese converts, and the relinquishment of “most favoured nation” claims under Article XIV of the Sino-American Treaty of 1903 permitting Missionary Societies “to rent and lease in perpetuity, as the property of such Societies, buildings or lands in all parts of

the Empire for missionary purposes." Acceptance "in principle," of the submission of "missionary educational and medical institutions" to "Chinese laws and regulations applying to similar Chinese institutions" may well have far-reaching and disastrous consequences on missionary activities. Many such institutions have been built and equipped with trust funds, designated for specific purposes, and it seems incredible that a Theological College, for instance, could conform to Chinese laws and regulations and still retain its special character. If the Chinese were in a reasonable frame of mind this particular concession might not be really dangerous. But they

—or perhaps we ought to say their Russian mentors—are not. Many of them are engaged in a deliberate and intensive campaign to root out Christianity, and destroy or confiscate all mission educational and medical institutions. Would the British Government, we wonder, accept in principle, a law that Sundays and other Christian festivals were to be given over to communist or anti-Christian demonstrations in all schools and colleges? On the face of it the British Government appears to have given away, in principle, much more than it could possibly have intended, had it considered the possibilities of abuse of this particular proposal.

THE CUSTOMS CRISIS.

(Tientsin, February 8, 1927).

THE sudden dismissal of Sir Francis Aglen, Inspector-General of Customs, while he was actually at sea, *en route* from Shanghai to the North, raises issues of very grave importance. Marshal Chang Tso-lin is said to have been extremely annoyed at the visit of the Inspector General to Hankow and Shanghai, and his conversations with Mr. Eugene Chen at the former port. But the actual pretext for his dismissal is his refusal to collect the Washing-

ton surtaxes on the instructions of the Peking Government. It will be remembered that the British Government in its Memorandum of December last, suggested that the levying of these surtaxes should be conceded unconditionally. The Japanese Government strongly protested against this proposal, as also did the Nationalist Authorities at Hankow. Nevertheless the Peking Government issued instructions that the surtaxes were to be levied throughout China from

February 1. It is understood that on further consideration most of the Treaty Power Legations, with the exception of Japan, decided to offer no objection to the imposition of these additional duties. The practical question, therefore, became to whom the collection of the surtaxes should be entrusted. The Customs Administration was obviously the authority best qualified to undertake the collection, but the Inspector General found himself in an extremely difficult position when ordered to use it for this purpose. In the first place he had already been "ordered" and had refused, to collect the equivalent taxation in the South. Secondly, the Nationalist Government had intimated that if the Surtaxes were collected by the Maritime Customs the entire revenues of the latter in the ports under its control would immediately be seized. In other words, the present Customs Administration would be completely disintegrated. The Southern Government was already collecting the additional import duties by machinery of its own creation, and the logical solution, although it might have led to much inconvenience and delay to importers, was for the Northern militarists to do the same.

The Inspector General of Customs is a servant of the Chinese Government. Within reasonable limits he is bound to obey its

instructions. And he has done so, in the past, to an extent that has caused considerable hostility in Foreign Official circles, and in South China. It was no part of his actual duty as Inspector General to undertake the service of Domestic Loans. He did so against the wishes of the Diplomatic Body, and even went further, at a time when China was in a state of civil war, and undertook the service of additional loans, the benefit from which was confined exclusively to the Peking Government and the militarists who controlled it at the time. A distinction, however must be made between the obligations he voluntarily assumed in connection with the Domestic Loan service, and his duties as Inspector General. Though a servant of the Chinese Government he is charged with certain definite duties to some of the Foreign Governments. The Maritime Customs Revenues form the security, not only for the Boxer Indemnity, but also for the Russo-French, and Anglo-German Gold Loans (for paying off the Japanese Indemnity) of 1895, 1896, and 1898. The seventh Article of the Loan Agreement of 1896, and the sixth of the Agreement of 1898, stipulate that "the administration of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs shall remain as at present constituted during the currency of this Loan." The redemption of the 1898 Loan

will not be completed until March, 1943. And until that date the Inspector General owes it to the Chinese Government as well as to the British and French Governments, to do his utmost to maintain the Customs Service intact. His responsibility is the heavier when, as at present, there is only a nominal Central Government, with no authority outside Peking, which issues instructions calculated, if obeyed, to wreck the whole Customs Service.

Even if the Powers chiefly interested in the maintenance of the Customs Service are unable or unwilling to secure Sir Francis Aglen's reinstatement, the issue will not be settled by the tacit recognition of his successor. Mr. Edwardes, who has been appointed Acting Inspector General, will be confronted with precisely the same difficulties as his former Chief. He may be quite as capable as Sir Francis Aglen of maintaining the service of outstanding Foreign and Domestic Loans secured on the Customs revenues—if the latter are forthcoming. But he will be helpless if the Nationalist Authorities carry out their threat to seize all the Customs Houses under their control, and impound their collections. And if the pre-Boxer loans collapse abroad, and the Domestic Loans go to pieces in China, the national credit will receive a blow from which it may never recover. With the exception of the 1896

Gold Loan, what were formerly regarded as China's gilt edged securities on the London Market have depreciated to approximately fifty per cent. of their par value. Some of the unsecured loans have dropped below twenty. The Domestic Loan market, in which there have been violent fluctuations, has, on the whole maintained a higher level than the London Market. The total amount of Domestic Bonds secured on the Customs surplus is in the region of \$250,000,000. There has, of course, been considerable speculation in them, but a very large proportion are believed to be held by the Chinese Banks, and the disruption of the Customs Service, and a drop of these Bonds to the level of, say, the Vickers' or Marconi issues would certainly bring about a serious financial crisis in this country. Marshal Chang Tso-lin and his adherents may at the moment be preening themselves upon the blow they fancy they have struck at British interests by the Inspector-General's summary dismissal. But Britain's stake in loans secured on the Customs is not much, if at all, greater than the Chinese stake in the Customs surplus, and if Marshal Chang Tso-lin disrupts the Customs Service, and ruins a large number of the Chinese Banks, he will soon have little reason to feel satisfied with his latest exploit.

We have not received any details of the Inspector General's ac-

tivities in Shanghai and Hankow, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that the main purpose of his journey to Mid-China was to devise some scheme whereby the unity of the Customs service should be maintained, regardless of the surtax question and the civil war. Whether this was his mission, and if so, how far he succeeded in his task, we do not know. If only the collection of the Washington surtaxes were at issue, and the Inspector General had proved obstinate or unreasonable on this point, there would be no cause for alarm over his dismissal, however much one might regret this arbitrary treatment of one who has spent practically all his life in the service of the Chinese Government. There are other members of the Service over which he has presided, who could step into his place, and acquit themselves worthily of its many responsibilities, including Mr. Edwardes, who has only recently officiated in the Inspector General's absence. But if Mr. Edwardes, or anyone else who ac-

cepts the post, has to disrupt the Service to satisfy the Northern Militarists, Marshal Chang Tso-lin's high-handed action will have disastrous effects throughout China. The Treaty Power Ministers are understood to be absolutely unanimous in their opposition to Sir Francis Aglen's dismissal, and to the adoption of any course likely to lead to the break-up of the Customs. Unfortunately, however, protests without action, are likely to prove ineffective. The policy of concessions to Chinese nationalism has created a widespread belief among the Chinese that the Powers, one and all, are now afraid to stand up for their Treaty rights. And it is a sad, but incontestable fact, that the British Memorandum of December last, which was intended by the Government to be a gesture of friendship and goodwill, first gave the Northern militarists the idea of imposing these surtaxes, and thus led directly to the present Customs crisis.

NATIONALISTS AND HOSPITALS.

(Tientsin, February 17, 1927).

"THE Nationalists treat foreign missionaries with every consi-

deration. The medical missionaries are more popular now, as their

services are greatly appreciated." This is the statement attributed to Mr. O. J. Todd, Chief Engineer of the International Famine Relief Commission who was reported, in the same interview, to have said that "the talk of anti-foreignism among them (i.e. the Nationalists) is pure bunk." Whatever view the Chinese radical may take of the evangelical and ordinary educational work of the foreign missionary, one might have expected him to appreciate the work done by mission hospitals and medical schools. Millions of dollars have been invested in these institutions by China's well-wishers in Europe and America. Many of them have been equipped with the latest scientific apparatus for the cure and diagnosis of disease. They are staffed for the most part with fully qualified foreign doctors, who at a fraction of the salary they could earn in their professional capacity, wage constant war, in the face of almost overwhelming odds, upon disease of every kind, and annually save to China hundreds of thousands of her citizens who would otherwise die, or be incapacitated by lingering and painful diseases. It would, indeed, in spite of the fanatical anti-foreign hatred—which Mr. Todd describes as "pure bunk",—not be surprising to learn that the Nationalists "greatly appreciated" the services of foreign medical missionaries. But they

don't. And it is sheer nonsense to ask the public to believe that they do.

In Canton and other cities in Kwangtung, hospital after hospital, some under missionary, some under secular, control, has been compelled to close down by the activities of the labour unions, and the deliberately fomented insubordination of its staff. The latest to suffer in this manner is the only hospital for the insane in South China, the John Kerr Hospital and Asylum, which has found it absolutely impossible to carry on under existing conditions, and has consequently had to relinquish the care of upwards of four hundred mental patients.

"The medical missionaries are more popular now." So it would seem when one reads Dr. J. H. Foster's restrained narrative of what has occurred at the Institution in which he is Associate Professor of Medicine—the Yale Mission Medical College at Changsha. Dr. Foster, who has had to leave for America, states that when he left Changsha the private residence and offices of Jardine Matheson & Co., had been confiscated for use as Chinese Labour Headquarters; the Asiatic Petroleum Co.'s offices had been looted, and threats made to confiscate all oil in stock at its installation; and Messrs. Butterfield and Swire had been compelled to close down. "The talk of anti-foreignism. . .


is pure bunk." Changsha was occupied by the Cantonese forces in July, last. It has therefore been under "Nationalist" control for about seven months. At first there was little sign of hostility towards foreigners. But in October a Soviet Consul appeared on the scene, and then, foreign missionaries and others began to realize what it means to be treated "with every consideration." Intensive agitation among the labour classes followed. The first trouble experienced by the hospital was with its coolies. The agitation then spread to the domestic servants of the Staff, then to the nurses in the training school, and finally to the students. Such of the "demands" as could be granted, were conceded, only to result in the presentation of a new and more unreasonable list. The nursing pupils, girls of about eighteen years of age, formed a Union of their own, and one of their first demands was for the dismissal of Miss N. D. Gage, Dean of the School, and President of the International Nursing Association. They further demanded that the school should be operated by a kind of Soviet Committee, composed of representatives of the Faculty and of the students, that no student could be dismissed without the consent of the Union, that the Union should have the power to dismiss any of the Faculty of whom is disapproved, and that one of the

Doctors be dismissed because, it was alleged, he had been impolite to the nurses. An attempt to close the Nurses' School brought threats of a labour strike. At the end of December the Yale Mission withdrew its financial support, and the Hospital was taken over by the "Government." The Chinese Dean of the Medical School was forced to flee, and the "Government" threatened to confiscate all the Mission property, valued at about three million dollars. The Medical School had to be closed in January after further demands, including one for the provision of a new, and modernly equipped gymnasium before China New Year had been added to the students' list.

In Hunan, in Kwangsi, in Kwangtung, in Hupeh, in Fukien, in Kiangsi, the advent of "Nationalist" control has meant the closing down or crippling of nearly every big mission hospital. Mr. Todd professed surprise at reading "reports in the Press about the Wuchow Hospital" which appeared to him to be "pure propaganda . . . spread with ulterior motives." Perhaps that would be a fitting description to apply to the authenticated narrative of Dr. G. W. Leavell in a signed report, extracts from which appeared in these columns some time ago. The experiences of Mission Hospitals and other institutions in territory under "Nationalist" control suggest that if Chinese appreciation

and consideration take these peculiar forms, indifference or even open animosity would be preferable. It is a curious form of appreciation that compels hospital after hospital to close its doors, or submit to virtual confiscation, and scores of experienced doctors, nurses, and professors to withdraw from the locality in which they have been labouring for the benefit of the Chinese, and solely for the purpose of saving life, and al-

leviating suffering. Perhaps Mr. Todd, who was only recently in Hankow, could enlighten us as to the evidences of the popularity of medical missionaries in that centre. Can he there, or anywhere else, point to a Mission Hospital which has benefited from the "appreciation" of the "Nationalists," and found itself able to work with greater efficiency since the advent of "Nationalist" control?



THE HANKOW AGREEMENT.



(Tientsin, February 22, 1927).



IT is officially announced that an agreement was signed by Mr. O'Malley, and Mr. Eugene Chen, at Hankow, on Saturday evening. At the time of writing no information regarding the details and scope of this agreement is available. Presumably it deals mainly, if not entirely, with the future status of the British Concession. We hope, however, that it embodies very definite undertakings in

regard to the further participation of the "Nationalist" Government and its agents in anti-British agitations and propaganda. The circumstances in which the agreement has been signed are not such as to inspire confidence. We are not accustomed, even in these days when the voice of the pacifist, the crank, and the communist, resound throughout the land, to the relinquishment of long-established

Treaty rights as a direct result of deliberately fomented mob violence. It is all very well to scoff at British "prestige" as a worthless asset. It has been the asset on which our entire trade in China has been built up in the course of the past century; it is the foundation of Great Britain's position in India, and throughout her Asiatic and African possessions. It has enabled a mere handful of conscientious British officials to transform India, the Malay States, and to come nearer—Hong-kong—into prosperous, well-governed, and, on the whole, law-abiding possessions of the Empire. The whole fabric of Occidental relations with the Far East has been erected on that prestige, and it is scarcely too much to say that the position of the European and American races in Asia depends upon its maintenance. Any concession to mob violence, any display of weakness when confronted with the malevolent activities of Moscow, therefore, may have far-reaching, and indeed, incalculable consequences, so far as British interests in Asia are concerned.

We have said that the circumstances in which the Hankow agreement has been signed do not inspire confidence. It is concluded with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of a so-called "Nationalist" Government, who, in association with his colleagues has for

months past been engaged in waging a provocative and mendacious campaign against the British Government, and the British nation, unparalleled in modern history. It has been signed while, in open defiance of our Treaty rights, the British Concession at Hankow is under Chinese control. It has been signed within a few days of a statement by Mr. Rodney Gilbert in a Shanghai contemporary that, at Hankow "foreigners still have to be amused when spat upon, and to control themselves when hit with brickbats." It has been signed when another British Concession, at Kiukiang, remains in the occupation of Chinese soldiery, who have looted British properties, and made it unsafe for British residents to live ashore. It has been signed at a moment when events at Shanghai, aimed, according to one of the leading Kuomintang propagandists who has recently disclosed his plans to a Hankow gathering, "to devise measures whereby a direct clash may be brought about against the armed influence of the Imperialists," threaten to develop into riot and bloodshed. It is to the representative of the "Government" responsible for spreading the audacious lie that the Hankow Concession was taken over "to deal with the Hankow massacre of January 3 committed by the British Marines," and responsible also for

the state of affairs referred to above, that the representative of His Majesty has conceded additional responsibilities and relinquished further safeguards. He has done so, of course, on instructions from Home. But by any logical test that one cares to apply, by any reasoning based on past relations with Chinese extremists, the Hankow agreement can only be justified as a pure gamble. The rights which have been given up have been conceded to a "Government" which, though vociferous in its professions of power and authority has, as yet, given no evidence that they are more than professions: to a "Government" which all available evidence suggests has fomented, and now finds itself unable to control, class warfare and xenophobia in their most virulent forms.

Though the circumstances in which the agreement was signed arouse distrust, and afford little ground for optimism, and though the entire history of occidental relations with China seems to us to refute the suggestion that a policy of concession to violence is wise, or fruitful, we must hope that the Hankow agreement will prove an exception to the general rule. Its value is likely to undergo an acid test almost immediately, not only in Hankow, in Kiukiang, and in other places over which the "Nationalists" at present claim control, but at Shanghai, where the mob-spirit is now being foment-

ed by "Nationalist" agitators. The "Nationalists" have had the clearest possible warning that mob violence will not be tolerated in the Foreign Settlement at Shanghai, and the presence there to-day of some five thousand British troops, and seven or more British warships, is ocular proof that this warning must be taken seriously. The purpose for which these forces have been sent to Shanghai has repeatedly been stated by spokesmen of the British Government, and though, unquestionably, the utmost restraint will be used, there can here be no question of British forces withdrawing to hand over the Settlement or any part thereof to a howling mob. The position in the Foreign Settlement is, anomalously enough, being rendered more dangerous by the restraint exercised by all the Treaty Powers. For whereas agitators are summarily dealt with in the Chinese City—thirty to one hundred having been executed during the past two days,—there appears to be no interference with agitators, and little attempt to repress intimidation, in the Settlement itself. Refugees are crowding into the latter, and though some of the strikers have resumed work, the Postal Service is still paralysed by the activities of pickets outside the main Post Office. Forbearance seems to be carried rather far when the employes of so vital a public service are allowed to be intimidated in

this manner, in the heart of the Settlement. If there is any satisfaction to be derived from the Shanghai situation at all, however,

it is that the first two days of an attempted General Strike have passed without any really serious disorders.

PUBLIC EXECUTIONS.

(Tientsin, February 28, 1927).

ARTICLE 33 of the Provisional Criminal Code of the Republic of China stipulates that "Sentence of death shall be executed by strangulation within the precincts of the prison." The death sentence may be imposed, according to the same Code, for treason, arson or inundation, homicide, highway robbery, rape, and piracy. The "Regulations Relating to Criminal Procedure" further provide that after sentence of death has been passed, "the Procurator in charge of the execution of the sentence shall forthwith transmit the record to the Ministry of Justice" and that when the sentence has been confirmed by the latter, the execution shall take place within three days after the receipt of such confirmation, "On the execution of a death sentence

the Procurator and a Registrar shall be present in person. On the execution of a death sentence nobody except with the permission of the Procurator or the Governor of the Prison, shall be admitted to the place of execution." The Code and the Regulations quoted above are supposed to form part of the laws of the Republic.

Hardly a week passes now in Peking or Tientsin that a number of condemned men are not paraded through the streets to the place of execution, and there either shot or decapitated in the presence of enormous crowds. The offences for which they have been sentenced are usually made known, and do not always come within the category of those punishable with death. Nor does it appear that the condemned men have, as a rule,

been tried by a competent Court, or that the sentence of death has been confirmed by the Ministry of Justice. Robbery, and speculation in, or the manipulation of, military notes now appear to be treated as capital offences. And executions, instead of taking place by strangulation, in the presence only of persons admitted to the prison by the order of the Procurator or Governor, are conducted with the utmost possible publicity, and, frequently, with the most shocking barbarity. The condemned men, tightly bound, are paraded through crowded thoroughfares in carts, under military escort. They are reviled by, and often revile, the spectators. Arrived at the place set apart for their execution, they are surrounded by a mob which watches the process, and applauds or shows its disapproval of the skill or lack of skill of the executioner. Decapitation with a single sweep of the sword is greeted with vociferous approval; a clumsy stroke on the part of the executioner, requiring a further blow or blows to complete his odious task, is met with open disapproval. But a few weeks ago we recorded the loathsome scenes that occurred in Peking when a Chinese chaff-cutter was experimentally used for the execution of an alleged murderer, with such shocking results that the other condemned persons shrieked their protests against being dealt

with in the same barbarous manner.

It may be that all or most of the condemned men richly merit their fate. As few, if any, details regarding their trials are published, and here, as in the case of the actual execution, no attention whatsoever appears to be paid to the so-called laws of the Republic, this is a matter on which it is impossible to form a reliable opinion. But it seems high time to enter a protest against the brutalising effect of treating these executions as a public spectacle, and pandering to the blood-lust of the mob. It is reported that one of the "sights" witnessed by the *Empress of Scotland* tourists in Peking was a public execution. Apart from the questionable taste of those who attend such a spectacle from morbid curiosity, it can hardly redound to the credit of the Peking Government that one of the outstanding memories of a brief visit to the Capital must have been ocular evidence of the contempt in which the law is held in this country.

There was, of course, a time when the hanging of condemned criminals was regarded as a spectacle in Great Britain. That has not been the case since 1868, for from then onwards all executions have been carried out within the precincts of a prison. The decapitation in public of 28 alleged criminals, such as took place in

Tientsin on Saturday, in the presence of enormous crowds was a loathsome and degrading proceeding, which would never to be tolerated by any really civilized community. If the men deserved death, and had been legally sentenced thereto, the executions should have been carried out according to law, and not in circumstances which prompted the victims to curse at and revile the mob on the way to the appointed place, and inspired the crowd to treat the extreme penalty of the law as a display of public theatricals. The outrage committed upon a foreign photographer who was present, by Chinese soldiery, suggests that these gentry were ashamed of the barbarity of the whole proceedings, and anxious that no pictorial record thereof should be preserved. There are persons with a craving for the morbid in every community, but we doubt whether, in any civilized country a crowd of twenty to thirty thousand persons could watch, unmoved, the gruesome

spectacle of the decapitation, accompanied by serious bungling in several cases, of 23 fellow-beings. Most Chinese, as we know, are accustomed to sights and sounds which would be considered revolting in the West. That, however, does not appear to be a sufficient justification for public spectacles of this character which, instead of arousing loathing for the criminal and his crime appear calculated rather to pander to man's most savage instincts. A mob that will gloat over the barbarous spectacle that was witnessed in Tientsin two days ago, is just the type of gathering that would revel in other gory and lawless acts. Public executions may have a salutary effect in the midst of riot or commotion, when drastic action is required to restore order. But they are unnecessary and likely to do more harm than good, when carried out in surroundings which suggest a public fete rather than the expiation of crime.

THE WHISPERING GALLERIES OF ASIA'

(Tientsin, March 8, 1927).

LORD Meston, who can speak with exceptional authority in regard to Asiatic psychology, recently wrote a timely warning regarding British policy in the Far

East. "We have not realized," he said, "that every blunder, every hesitance, every weakness on our part in China goes ringing down the whispering galleries of

Asia, and weakens our whole position in the East." It is to be regretted that this warning has not been heeded by the British Cabinet at home. The Hankow agreement was concluded on instructions from the Foreign Office without insistence upon what almost every Briton in the Far East regarded as the indispensable preliminary, namely, the return of the British Concession to its lawful authorities. And now we are told that the British Concession at Kiukiang is to be handed over unconditionally to the "Nationalist Government." In many respects this is a more disgraceful surrender than that at Hankow. For the Kiukiang Concession was not only overrun by a mob including "Nationalist" troops, but the residences of the foreign community were broken into, systematically looted, and used as dwellings and offices by "Nationalist" soldiers and officials; and, according to the latest advices, the foreign residents who remain are still living on board of a steamer anchored alongside a British Destroyer in the river. We understood it to be the policy of the British Government to negotiate, but not to yield to violence. The unconditional handing over of the Kiukiang Concession at a time when foreigners are still unable to return to their looted homes, even though a sum of forty-thousand dollars has been paid as compensa-

tion, is a surrender to violence such as we have never witnessed in China since the early days in Canton.

We do not propose here to discuss the probable effects of the Hankow and Kiukiang settlements in India or other parts of Asia, but to confine our attention for the moment to the possible consequences in China. As we all know, China to-day is in the throes of a revolutionary civil war. The extent to which genuine nationalism plays a part it is difficult to gauge. An overwhelming majority of educated Chinese desire to see China take her place on a footing of equality with the other nations of the world. The extremists fatuously expect to achieve this object by violence, outrage and confiscation. The moderates, who now seldom dare to raise their voices, favour its attainment by orderly and evolutionary methods. The latter seek to repress, the former to foment, mob violence and every other form of excess. The extremists owe their inspiration and encouragement to Bolshevik agents, Russian and Chinese. As to the extent of Soviet influence, there has been, and is, considerable difference of opinion. Sir Charles Addis, who has not been in China for several years, tells us that the anti-foreign movement is not due to Russian interference, and suggests that if every Russian in China were

thrown into the Yellow Sea, it would not affect the national movement. That is not the view of the responsible officers of the Bank with which he has for so many years been associated. At the annual meeting of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, last year, the then Chairman, Mr. G. M. Young, stated that "for the moment the excitement engendered by the unfortunate 'Shanghai affair' and the instigation of Bolshevik agents, backed by Bolshevik money, have shaped the movement into a blind crusade against the foreigner and foreign rights in China." At this year's meeting of the same institution, the Chairman referred to the "intensely bitter attack supported by boundless misrepresentation and calumny, for which there could be no other explanation than that it was the work of political instigators not concerned with the real of even the imaginary interests of China but solely bent on doing harm to Great Britain"; and Mr. Pearce, who seconded his remarks, added that the news that a Note had been sent to the Soviet Government would be welcome "to those trading out here who knew only too well by experience and first-hand information the poisonous propaganda which had been instilled in the minds of the Chinese." No-one in their senses can believe that the coolies at Hankow and Kiukiang who were incited to

attack the British Concession, knew or cared anything about "unequal treaties", extraterritoriality, or "sovereign rights." As in Russia, so in China, since Soviet agents have been permitted to enter this country, the mob has been used as the tool of unscrupulous agitators, who have appealed to its avarice and latent suspicion of foreigners to provoke riot and bloodshed. It is sheer nonsense for Sir Charles Addis, Mr. Lloyd George, and certain British Labour politicians to pretend that the "Reds" are not behind the present disturbances. They have admitted so, in numerous speeches and articles in Moscow. And the particular form of agitation now proceeding in China is totally alien to Chinese character and tradition.

Well, we have this Bolshevized revolutionary movement, of which the Chinese merchants and bourgeoisie generally disapprove though they are often coerced into sullen-silence, spreading Northward and Eastward through China, and bringing in its train, outrages, persecution and flagrant violations of the treaties. It has made it necessary to withdraw most foreigners from the interior. It culminated in deliberately provoked mob attacks upon the British Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang, necessitating the hurried evacuation of women and children, and exposing to daily humiliation, risk

and insult all foreigners who dared to remain. And to the moderate elements among the Chinese, who suffer as much from, and are even more fearful of the consequences of, Red excesses, it must surely have seemed that the limits of British patience had been overstepped, and that after more than eighteen months of provocation the British Government would put its foot down—heavily. To these Chinese, even more than to the British residents in this country, it must have caused absolute amazement to learn that instead of demanding the unconditional return of these Concessions, or evacuating them indefinitely, the British Government had deputed a diplomatic official to “negotiate” with Mr. Eugene Chen, a former British subject who has little or no influence in the councils of the Kuomintang, and no authority whatsoever over the extremists who actually control that party. The idea of Mr. Chen’s impertinences being widely published in papers abroad, and of his declarations forming a basis for serious discussion, must appear absolutely ludicrous to well-informed Chinese. Their amazement must have been even greater on learning the terms of the Hankow and Kiukiang settlements. For these agreements cut the ground completely from under the feet of those Chinese who really believe that their country’s salvation, and full restoration of

its sovereignty, can best be achieved by conciliation, goodwill, and moderation. They appear to prove beyond all dispute, that the way to recover China’s sovereign rights is not gradually and peaceably, and with calm consideration of realities, but immediately, violently, and by unscrupulous distortion of the truth. The logical inference from these agreements is that violence, not negotiation, offers the only solution of China’s international problems, and the moderate of to-day is therefore strongly tempted to throw in his lot with the extremists, as the quickest way of bringing matters to a head.

A British diplomat of long experience once declared that the Chinese were a people who would yield everything to force, and nothing to reason. The Chinese moderate might be tempted to-day to use this phrase as a *tu quoque* to his British friends, though it would, of course, involve ignoring our Government’s long-sustained efforts to find reasonable bases of settlement with a nation which for years past has been without the semblance of a responsible government. Hankow and Kiukiang have established precedents which will seriously jeopardize any satisfactory settlement of the future status of the British Concession at Tientsin. Already there is a disposition in Chinese official circles to ignore the special conditions which prevail in this port, and to

claim that what has been yielded to force on the Yangtze represents the absolute minimum in the negotiations now pending with Chinese authorities who have not been unfriendly, and have consistently discountenanced rioting and mob-violence. One can only hope that this very natural disposition to exploit our mistakes at Hankow and Kiukiang will eventually yield to considerations of self-interest. The decline in property values and municipal securities which has occurred since it first became known that the status of the Concession was to be altered, should constitute a warning to those who are inclined to disregard local conditions. Whatever may be the objects of the 'Nationalists' in the Yangtze, it is difficult to believe that the less excitable, and more friendly Chinese in this part of the country, desire to achieve the ruin of the area now known as the British Con-

cession. Most of the property in this area is Chinese. Chinese residents and institutions can hardly have failed to appreciate the benefits of the orderly and efficient municipal administration in which they have had a generous share. Gratitude it may be too much to expect when baiting the British has become so popular a sport. But self-interest, or perhaps we ought to say, the interests of their fellow-citizens, will, we hope, prompt those entrusted with the negotiations on behalf of the Peking Government to enter upon the Tientsin negotiations with an absolutely open mind, regardless of what has occurred elsewhere, and with the single purpose of devising a system which will work smoothly and efficiently, and maintain for this particular area the high standard of municipal administration for which it has justly been noted in the past.

"A SERVANT WHEN HE REIGNETH!"

(Tientsin, March 9, 1927).

HANKOW was occupied by the Cantonese early in September last. It has therefore been under their control for a full six months. Statistics revealing the results of this occupation, from the industrial and commercial point of

view, are never likely to be available, though the Customs returns, when printed, will reveal the effect upon imports and exports. But they will only partially reveal the losses caused by the activities of the extremists, and the tyranny of

the newly organized Trades Unions. Many businesses and industries have been ruined or brought to a complete standstill. Communication with the Upper Yangtze has now been completely suspended. And it seems to be merely a question of time before all foreigners operating business or factories will be compelled to close down. The terms demanded by the spokesmen of the so-called Unions are so preposterous that no business or factory could concede them and continue to work at a profit. And the incessant demonstrations, processions and strikes, with the "holidays" they entail, have introduced elements which make it utterly impossible for the business man or factory manager to enter into contracts of any kind. But it is not only in business firms, banks and factories that there is continuous agitation and unrest. The menace has spread to the domestic life of foreigners and Chinese. The servant class, which in comparison with other workers, is generously paid, and enjoys all kinds of privileges and perquisites, has entered the fray. Ludicrous demands in respect of wages and conditions of employment have been put forward which, if conceded, would make the servants masters of the household. And, as recorded in our last issue, the Unions now claim—and attempt to enforce—the right to arrest and carry off to their headquarters,

members of a foreigner's family who undertake a portion of the household work.

In the Book of Proverbs we read that "For three things the earth is disquieted, and for four which it cannot bear: For a servant when he reigneth; and a fool when he is filled with meat; for an odious woman when she is married; and an handmaid that is heir to her mistress." A servant when he reigneth! Is not this one of the most disquieting features in the situation wherever the Cantonese have acquired control? There are Trades Unions in every civilized country, and in Great Britain, especially, they have attained enormous power, which has at times been seriously abused. But their history has been a long struggle for recognition, and for the privileges that they now enjoy. And though action may sometimes be necessary to check their abuse of power, no-one familiar with conditions in England would wish to see their legitimate activities curtailed. Some of them, of course, have come under the influence of extremists and agitators, but most Trades Unionists favour constitutional and lawful methods, and would be the first to recognize the folly of what is occurring in China, at Soviet instigation, to-day. Only the coal-miners, under the misguided leadership of Cook—and Moscow—have endorsed the theory that where an industry can-

not pay its way the Government must step in with a subsidy to enable it to continue.

In the Wu-Han Cities, as in Canton and elsewhere where the Nationalists claim authority, scores of so-called trades-unions, with no traditions behind them, and no appreciation of the elementary laws of economics, have sprung into existence under the leadership of professional agitators. And they have signalized their formation by demands in respect of wages and conditions of work which, if conceded, would completely paralyse trade and industry, and throw millions of normally peaceful and industrious men and women out of employment. In addition to wage-increases out of all proportion to the cost of living, they have virtually attempted to establish a labour dictatorship in businesses, banks, factories and homes. Employers generally, foreign and Chinese, have evinced a willingness to consider any reasonable demands in respect of wages. But Foreign employers, at any rate, have resisted, and continue to resist, demands which subordinate them to the Unions, with the result that wholesale intimidation and lawlessness is being resorted to by the latter. One can imagine how long a factory, in which expert and technical knowledge is required, could continue to run if the Unions could dictate to the management in re-

gard to the employment and dismissal of its workmen, methods of operation, etc. Or how long a bank would remain open if its business were subject to the whims of its subordinate clerical staff and messenger coolies. Add to this the right claimed by employees to extravagant bonuses several times a year, to strike or go off to participate in demonstrations whenever they feel inclined, without loss of pay, to holidays amounting in the aggregate to one day in three or four throughout the year, and to lodging expenses, food allowance, marriage allowances, bonuses for deaths and marriages in the family, medical expenses, travelling allowances, free clothing and insurance, etc., and one gains some idea of the obstacles now encountered by foreign employers in the Wu-Han cities. If these demands and the accompanying intimidation, continue it will merely be a question of time until the fruits of more than sixty years of foreign enterprise in Hankow have been destroyed.

It will be said, of course, that this is merely a temporary state of affairs; that a reaction against the extremists will sooner or later occur; and that a reasonable spirit will then prevail. The wish is unquestionably father to the thought. The practical question is whether that reaction, if it ever comes, will come in time to prevent the complete ruin of long-

established and formerly prosperous, businesses and factories, Canton has experienced what it means when a servant reigneth. for upwards of two years, and there is as yet no sign that the tyranny of the worker is coming to an end. The Chinese merchants there, still endeavour to carry on, because they have no alternative. But foreign concerns in China will not continue operating indefinitely under these conditions. And though the professional agitator may aver that this is just what he

is seeking to bring about, Chinese business interests can hardly endorse such a policy. They know that the real interests of the foreign merchant are identical with their own, and that the suppression of foreign enterprise would affect the prosperity of the nation for many years to come. To take but one example: what would be the result of the withdrawal of all foreign coastal and river shipping, when China possesses neither the materiel, nor the personnel, to replace it?

MADAME BORODIN.

(Tientsin, March 11, 1927).

THE Soviet steamer *Pamiat Lenina*, which arrived at Shanghai on February 24, and sailed for Hankow on the 27th, presumably loaded with seaweed and, according to Soviet officials, intending to load a cargo of tea at her destination, was seized, the following day, in the vicinity of Pukow, by Marshal Chang Tsung-chang's Russian troops. On board of her they found Madame Borodin, wife of the notorious Bolshevik adviser to the "Nationalist" Government, and three Russian passengers, who have since been stated by the Soviet Embassy to be "Diplomatic Couriers." Madame Borodin has now been sent to Tsinanfu under a heavy guard.

What has happened to the "couriers" is not definitely known at the time of writing, but it is reported that they were summarily executed, on the ground that they were engaged in subversive propaganda. As soon as news of the seizure of the vessel and its passengers became known in Peking the Soviet Embassy addressed a strong protest to the Waichiaopu, in which it was alleged that the *Pamiat Lenina* had been commandeered for the transport of troops and munitions. The Embassy professed ignorance as to the fate of the "couriers", and protested "in the most energetic manner against this outrage, violating all the principles of International Law." The

usual warning in regard to the responsibility of the Chinese Government for the life and property of Soviet Citizens, together with the reservation of the right to claim damages, followed. A day or two later the Soviet Embassy issued a formal denial of the story that arms and ammunition had been found on the vessel.

If this fate had befallen a British vessel engaged, not in transporting the wife of a professional agitator, or "diplomatic couriers", but in ordinary commerce as provided by the treaties, and any protest had been lodged, or any action taken, with a view to recovering the vessel and its passengers the wild men and the official press at Moscow would, by this time have been declaiming against the "imperialistic" British for daring to assume that their vessels were immune from seizure in a civil-war zone. And if any British or other national connected with a hostile faction had been found on board, Comrade Borodin would quite probably have urged the application of the new "Penal Code for Imperialists", which is to be applied "irrespective of nationality, residence, sex, etc.," and includes the death penalty for participation in "counter-revolutionary plots." The Soviet authorities, however, who have no treaty rights permitting inland navigation, calmly assume that a vessel flying the red flag with

sickle and hammer, is free to go up and down river unmolested, even when carrying members of the family of notorious Bolshevik agents, and several "diplomatic couriers." We should be interested to learn under what principle of international law, a vessel belonging to a State openly hostile to one of the contending factions in China, can claim the right to pass to and fro between the territories occupied by the rival armies, without being searched or commandeered. It would also be most interesting to learn why it was necessary to send three "diplomatic couriers" to Hankow, and on what ground immunity can be claimed for persons who, even if acting bonafide in this capacity, were carrying messages to authorities who have openly identified themselves with the faction which is making war on the Northern militarists. There is something very fishy about these "diplomatic couriers." It would be most interesting to know the contents of their baggage, and their "diplomatic pouches."

If Marshal Chang Tsung-chang's Russians have made any interesting "finds" on the *Pamiat Lenina*, it is a great pity that the nature of their discoveries has not been revealed. If it is true that the "couriers" have been executed Marshal Chang should disclose his reasons for this drastic action without delay. The summary ex-

cution of Chinese, such as occurred during the abortive General Strike at Shanghai, or of foreigners, such as is now reported to have been carried out in the case of the *Pamiat Lenina's* Soviet passengers, is not regarded with favour in foreign circles. And if there is any justification for the "couriers'" executions, it should be made known immediately.

As to Madame Borodin, the limits of audacity appear to have been reached when the intervention of British officials on her behalf is invoked. The British have had nothing whatever to do with her arrest, and the application to a "high British authority" to intervene on her behalf seems to be part and parcel of the impudent and unfounded assumption that Marshal Chang Tsung-chang is in some way or other controlled or supported by the British Government. We shall probably hear, soon, that the British are showing barbarous indifference to the fate of a woman who is detained by one of their protégés; on the other hand, if British officials unnecessarily intervened it would be hailed as proof of their control over the Shantung Warlord. It seems necessary here to state what must obviously be the official British attitude. It is not the custom of the British Government, even under the intensest provocation, to seek revenge upon women or children. But it has its hands quite

full enough at the moment protecting the persons and properties of its own nationals, of both sexes, without assuming the role of protector of Bolshevik agitators who fall into the hands of their Chinese enemies. Mrs. Borodin has been described in an American monthly by a close friend, as "the Russian-American wife of the Soviet representative in Canton." She and her husband have been actively engaged in an agitation which has imperilled the lives, and led to the destruction of property, of hundreds of British men and women, in different parts of China. And to an avowed enemy of Bolshevism in China, such as Marshal Chang Tsung-chang, British intervention on her behalf would appear not only impertinent, but crazy. It was only a fortnight before the occupation of the British Concession at Hankow by a mob of hooligans that Comrade Borodin was haranguing a crowd at Hankow and telling his audience that the most important part of their task—"the overthrow of the British"—remained to be done, "as well as *their allies*, Chang Tso-lin and the Fengtien party." If it were true that the British Government is allied with the Northern Militarists, it might, in spite of the mischief done by Michael Borodin, *alias* Michael Grusen-berg, *alias* George Brown, recommend that his wife receive the same treatment as was accorded to

her husband by the British authorities—namely, deportation to Russia. As it is, however, the British Government has no more justification for interference than Marshal Chang Tsung-chang would have had for intervening in the Glasgow Police Court in August

1922. We fancy that there would be quite a simple method of securing Madame Borodin's release, if her husband chose to take it, and that would be an offer on his part to escort her back to Russia—and stay there.

AN OLD LIE REAPPEARS.

(Tientsin, March 14, 1927).

HARDLY a mail reaches us from home now that does not bring papers which repeat the time-worn lie that there is a notice outside the Public Garden in the International Settlement at Shanghai which reads "Chinese and Dogs not admitted." The same lie is frequently repeated in the Chinese Press, some writers even having the audacity—and mendacity—to state that they have actually seen the notice. And it is used an infallible argument for raising prejudice against the British Government, and British interests in China by extremist orators in Great Britain, whether speaking in Hyde Park, or addressing political gatherings at which an attempt is made to exploit the China crisis for political ends. We need not here refer to many of the numerous cases in which this statement has appeared in the Labour and other papers in

England and elsewhere. Two examples will suffice. The first is culled from a letter on "Foreigners in China" which appeared in the *London Review of Reviews* of December last, signed by "H.P." It reproduces what purports to be a copy of a letter received by the correspondent "from a Chinese holding a high commercial position in Hongkong. He is a Christian, and his mother worked for many years with the Presbyterian Mission in Canton." This Christian Chinese states that:

The root of the trouble is the high-handed action of the foreigners, and haughty treatment of the Chinese by foreigners in China. You remember the story of the Shanghai Public Gardens whereby they put up a notice at the door, "No dogs and Chinese are allowed." Naturally these small things rouse resentment among the Chinese generally.

The second example is taken from the "Hands Off China Sup-

plement" of Jan. 28, 1927 of the *New Leader*, a weekly Labour journal. This Supplement has been boomed by the *Daily Herald* and the *New Leader*, is offered at cost price to those who will undertake its distribution in bulk, and has been printed to "distribute in thousands", by the Independent Labour Party Publications Department. In an article headed "The Conquest of China" the authorship of which is not revealed, we find the following:

In one of the Treaty Ports.—Shanghai—there is a park displaying at the entrance the disgraceful sign, "Chinese and dogs not admitted."

Let the Liverpudlians or the Novocastrians ask themselves what they would say and do if they saw exhibited in their public parks the sign "Britons and dogs not admitted."

When they have answered that question they will understand why China is in a ferment—they will appreciate that the trouble will continue until the Chinese have regained their inalienable right to manage their own affairs in their own way.

This is the lie, repeated in various forms, that has been given such worldwide publicity, that it is now difficult, if not impossible, to overtake it.

The park in regard to which this fiction has been created, is the Public Garden on the Shanghai Bund, on the foreshore opposite the British Consulate, and at the junction of the Whangpoo River, and Soochow Creek. Originally known as the "Consular Flats" it was new land "formed by the accumula-

tion of mud from the river round the wreck of a small vessel which sank near the present bandstand." The history of the Shanghai Recreation Fund states that "the ground which now forms the garden is an accretion to the beach ground of the original Consular Lots, and consequently, by the fifth Article of the Land Regulations of 1854, was ceded for public use." It was originally laid out as a Garden in 1862, with a sum of Tls. 10,000 voted by the Recreation Fund Trustees, whose funds were derived mainly from the sale of the original Race Course, and its transfer to a cheaper site. "In 1864 H.B.M. Foreign Office agreed to the land being made a garden, with the following reservation—that it should revert to H.M. Government if it ever ceased to be used as a public garden." The Garden is now under the control of the Superintendent of Public Parks. Its total area is just $4\frac{1}{2}$ acres. On exceptionally hot days, and band days, it is frequently visited by over five thousand persons. There is not now, and never has been, any notice outside this Garden reading "Chinese and Dogs not admitted," nor has any such notice been posted outside any other park or garden under the Shanghai Municipality's control. The other public parks are the Public Recreation Ground—purchased out of part of the proceeds of the sale of the original Race Course,

and the one slightly further out which succeeded it; Jessfield Park, with an area of about 48 acres; and Hongkew Park, with an area of 44 acres. The Recreation Ground purchased with funds derived from the sale of a former Race Course and Park, which had been purchased by private subscription, is administered under a Trust which provides that it shall be used as "a public park and recreation ground for the use and recreation of the foreign population at Shanghai." The Public Garden, as already stated, was handed over by H.M. Government for public purposes, and from 1862 onwards has been reserved for the use of non-Chinese. The other two parks have been acquired for the use of the foreign community at a cost of approximately Tls. 100,000 (£14,000)—a little more than half of the amount invested in schools for the Chinese. Hongkong Park was visited by nearly 355,000 persons in 1925, and Jessfield Park by 218,000. Chinese have not, up to the present, been admitted to these open spaces, with the exception of servants in charge of foreign children.

On October 5, 1925, the American Consul-in-Charge at Shanghai addressed a letter to the Municipal Council, on behalf of the *Dearborn Independent*, inquiring whether the expression "No dogs or Chinese admitted" appeared on any public signboard in Shanghai. The reply

of the Municipal Council was as follows:

Council Chamber, Shanghai,

October 13, 1925.

Sir.—I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of October 5, addressed to the Chairman of Council, relative to an enquiry by the Editor of the *Dearborn Publishing Company* as to whether the expression "No dogs or Chinese admitted" appears on any public signboard in Shanghai.

In reply, I have the honour to inform you that no such notices are posted in any parks or in any other places under the Council's jurisdiction, furthermore, careful investigation reveals the fact that no such notice has ever appeared in the International Settlement.

For your information, I have the pleasure in handing you herewith three photographic reproductions of notices posted in the various parks and gardens. The Council would, accordingly, greatly appreciate it, if when replying to the *Dearborn Publishing Company*, you would emphatically point out that such statements as these are entirely false, unfounded and unwarrantable and that their publication is strongly objected to by the Council and the Foreign Community of Shanghai.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

E. S. B. ROWE,

J. E. Jacobs, Esq.,

Secretary.

American Consul-in-Charge.

Attached to these letters were facsimiles of the Regulations posted outside the Public and Reserve Gardens, Hongkew Park, and Jessfield Park. They are similar in terms, and the quotation of one set will suffice for our purpose:

PUBLIC AND RESERVE GARDENS.

REGULATIONS.

1. The Gardens are reserved for the Foreign Community.
2. The Gardens are opened daily to the public from 6 a.m. and will be closed half an hour after midnight.
3. No persons are admitted unless respectably dressed.
4. Dogs and bicycles are not admitted.
5. Perambulators must be confined to the paths.
6. Birdnesting, plucking flowers, climbing trees or damaging trees, shrubs, or grass is strictly prohibited; visitors and others in charge of children are requested to aid in preventing such mischief.
7. No person is allowed within the band stand enclosure.
8. Amahs in charge of children are not permitted to occupy the seats and chairs during band performances.
9. Children unaccompanied by foreigners are not allowed in Reserve Garden.
10. The police have instructions to enforce these regulations.

By order,

N. O. LIDDELL,

Secretary.

Shanghai, September 13, 1917.

The question of the admission of Chinese to the Public Parks in Shanghai has been under the consideration of the Municipal Council for some time past, and the Chinese have been invited to appoint a Committee to discuss the matter. Those who urge that all public spaces should be thrown open unconditionally to Chinese might be reminded of certain considerations which they overlook, or of which they are in absolute ignorance. In

the first place the Settlement was originally an area set apart from foreign residence and trade. The enormous influx of Chinese into the area, for the greater security and prosperity obtainable under a foreign municipality, has raised the density of population of the Settlement to upwards of 150 per acre, and the price of land to a figure which precludes any but the wealthiest of residents from owning or occupying a residence with a garden of any kind. Secondly, communicable diseases are much more prevalent among the Chinese than among foreigners, owing to their ignorance, of, or indifference towards, modern sanitation and hygiene. Smallpox, cholera, typhoid, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and tuberculosis claim numerous victims among the Chinese population every year, and some of them often assume epidemic form. Venereal diseases are rampant, and it is estimated that between thirty and forty per cent. of the Chinese population suffers from Trachoma. The latest available health reports show that 42.7 per cent of the deaths of foreigners in Shanghai are caused by acute communicable disease, that the death-rate among non-Chinese during the past five years has ranged from 16.4 to 19.3 per thousand (against 12.6 for London) and that 32.9 per cent. of the foreign deaths were of children under fifteen. It is impossible to doubt that these percentages would

be very greatly increased if the foreign community—which includes over 7,000 children,—had no open spaces where they were not constantly exposed to infection in some form or another. Thirdly, it may be pointed out that until quite recently the Chinese have shown no desire to possess, or make use of, public parks. Had they done so, they could easily in so wealthy a community, have raised funds, and acquired parks, for their own exclusive use. The nearest equivalent to a public park in the Native City (except the East and West gardens, for entry to which a small fee is charged) is the picturesque Willow Pattern Tea House (Woo Sing Ding), which as the Rev. C. E. Darwent said, presents “a fine study of Chinese life—dentists, doctors, toy-sellers, cooks, jugglers are all busy. Near the pool are three bird markets, with really fine shows of birds from the South.” The Chinese idea of public parks, or recreation grounds is, indeed, usually very different from that of the foreigner, and to throw them open unconditionally would simply mean that the Chinese would hencefor-

ward have a monopoly of parks, etc., which would never have been brought into existence had it not been for foreign enterprise, and the recognition of foreign needs. The argument that the Chinese residents in the Settlement pay most of the taxes out of which the parks, and other public institutions are maintained, is by no means conclusive. Far and away the greatest proportion of the annual expenditure of the Municipality goes to the benefit of the Chinese. It would not be necessary to spend nearly £400,000 per annum on policing the Settlement, £100,000 per annum on the Public Health Department, £50,000 on the Fire Brigade, £15,000 on the Volunteer Corps, £300,000 on Public Works, and about £100,000 on Administrative expenses, annually, if the interests of some 30,000 foreigners alone were concerned. Only one in thirty five of the foreign community came under the notice of the police in 1925; the proportion of Chinese was one in ten. And it could easily be shown, statistically, that other Municipal Departments devote far more than 80% of their energies to the welfare and security of the Chinese population.

AN ANNIVERSARY.

(Tientsin, March 17, 1927).

ON March 16, 1927, following the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the Chinese and the German Governments, a de-

tachment of some 300 City Police marched through the foreign Concessions to the German Concession, and formally took possession of the same in the name of the Chinese Government. "Whereupon the Chinese flag was hoisted, and an additional force of Chinese policemen was despatched to police the district, while the original policemen were instructed to wear the Chinese police uniform." Twelve days later (on March 28) the Ministry of Interior forwarded to the Waichiaopu, the "Rules of Procedure Governing the Assumption of Control of German Concession." Rule No. 2, read: "The original Municipal Council of the Area shall, under the direction of the Chief of Bureau, deal with all matters pertaining to self-government." This system, if it was ever applied, which we do not believe to have been the case, was altered as a result of a petition from the Ministry of Interior to the President of the Republic, dated August 14 "praying for the establishment of Bureaux for the Municipal Administration of the Special Areas at Tientsin and Hankow, requesting permission to appoint Chiefs of Bureaux, and submitting Regulations." The Regulations attached to this petition say nothing about a Municipal Council, or self-government, but place all municipal matters under a Chief of Bureau (in the case of Tientsin, General Yang I-teh) who

was to be assisted by Departmental Chiefs, Members of the Bureau (whose functions were not defined), Advisers, Secretaries and Clerks. That no form of self-government was envisaged is plain from the stipulation that "in case, within the municipality, it should be necessary to continue certain public works, the Bureau will draw up plans, and submit them, through the Civil Governor, to the Ministry of Interior for approval."

China declared war on Germany on August 14, 1917. On September 8 of the same year the Allied Powers addressed a collective Note to the Chinese Government, offering it certain concessions, and making certain recommendations. Among the latter we find:

"An understanding with the representatives of the Allied Governments, in the interests of foreign trade of China, and with regard for the interests of the Allies, to organize in the form of International Concessions the former German and Austro-Hungarian Concessions in the ports of Tientsin and Hankow."

To this Note the Chinese Government replied on October 5, the paragraph in its answer dealing with former enemy Concessions reading:

"The Chinese Government is now arranging to have the old German and Austrian Concessions

at Tientsin and Hankow thoroughly reorganized, so as to enable the nationals of the different Powers residing therein to enjoy all commercial advantages *as well as a system of local self-government with the object of securing such a perfect organization as to constitute the said areas into Model Voluntarily Opened Sino-Foreign Trade Marts*. Attention will moreover be paid to the end of the war, in order to prevent the said areas reverting to the status of special Concessions."

Yesterday a reception was held at the Office of the Bureau of the First Special Area (the ex-German Concession) to celebrate the tenth anniversary of its establishment. It was largely attended by Chinese and foreign guests. But we could not help feeling that it was a very pathetic performance. For it was, in effect, a celebration of many years of bad faith on the part of the Chinese Authorities. The arrangements which the Foreign Legations were told were being made in October, 1917, which included "a system of local self-government" have never been carried out. The area still remains under the autocratic control of Chinese officials who are in no way responsible to the residents. The latter have no voice in the municipal administration. No accounts are published. And it is common knowledge that on more than one occasion large sums raised by mun-

icipal taxation have found their way into the Tupan's Yamen, or vanished with a Bureau Chief whose political affiliations rendered a hurried flight advisable. A scheme for an Advisory Council was agreed upon locally, as long ago as December 1920, but was then lost in the pigeonholes of one of the Government Departments in Peking. Early in 1923, a barefaced attempt to confer the "sole right for doing the necessary fittings and repairs to Electric and Water Installations in the First Special Area" upon a concern known as the "Tientsin Engineering Co.," aroused so much opposition that a meeting of foreign residents was held, at which the claim to a voice in the Municipal Administration was again put forward. But nothing was done. The First Special Area Bureau still continues to function without any direct responsibility to the taxpayers. And though the policing, on the whole, appears to be fairly efficient, and it is true, as Mr. Ho said yesterday, that peace and order have been maintained, it cannot seriously be pretended that the Bureau has succeeded in developing the area into a "Model Voluntarily Opened Sino-Foreign Trade Mart." No accounts of receipts and expenditure are published, and in any "perfect organization" we should have some satisfactory explanation of so curious a transaction as the recent

transfer of the "right for electric lighting transactions" to a private Chinese concern. Continuous internal strife and constant changes in the personnel of the senior Chinese officials, may explain, but do not justify, the long delay in repairing the Bund, and the shocking condition of some of the roads. Had there been a Municipal Council this work would have been undertaken, regardless of the periodical civil wars. Moreover internal strife and economic unrest neither explain nor justify the great increase in number of disorderly houses in the area, and of other resorts which would never have been tolerated by any Municipality on which the foreign ratepayers had an effective voice.

At yesterday's ceremony, the Representative of the Civil Governor—who is absent on a military expedition in Mid-China—urged that an attempt should be made to "make these Special Areas the most favourable and desirable places in which to reside and do business, in order to convince our foreign friends that Chinese can administer municipal affairs as well as they are administered in the Concessions." Little progress has actually been made towards the realization of this object since the former German Concession passed under Chinese control. For that, of course, the present offici-

als, who have only been in office a few months, cannot be held responsible. But it is to be hoped that if the twentieth anniversary of the handing over of the ex-German Concession is similarly celebrated, those foreigners present who are familiar with the history of the administration will not feel, as they were bound to feel, yesterday, that however well-intentioned this celebration, it was, in actual fact, a celebration not of success, not of the vindication of China's claims that she can administer municipal affairs as well as they are administered in the foreign Concession, but of ten years of continuous failure to fulfil solemn pledges, and of the flouting of public opinion. The system adopted, which has deprived ratepayers—Chinese and foreign alike—of any voice in the municipal administration, is difficult to reconcile with the persistent clamour for Chinese representation on the Shanghai Council. It tends, moreover, to arouse serious apprehension in regard to any change of status in the present Foreign Concessions in this port. For any such change must form a subject of agreement between the Chinese and foreign authorities concerned, and if China's solemn undertakings are to be ignored for ten years or more the future can hardly be faced with confidence or hope.

THE "PAMIAT LENINA."

(Tientsin, March 19, 1927).

THE Soviet Government, which has been responsible for the arbitrary confiscation of British property to the value of over £180,000,000 sterling, which has also been responsible for the murder, and illegal imprisonment of many scores of British subjects against whom no offence of any kind could be charged, is now becoming absurdly indignant over the seizure by Marshal Chang Tsung-chang's troops of a small Soviet steamer, and the detention of the interesting passengers who were found on board. Note after Note has been addressed to the Waichiaopu, demanding in each case, the immediate, and unconditional release of the steamer and its passengers. Special exception has been taken in each communication, to the arrest the alleged Soviet "Diplomatic Couriers", no fewer than three of whom were on the vessel, bound for Hankow, when she was captured. Protests relating to alleged breaches of "international law", and describing the seizure of a Russian steamer and its passengers as an "utterly unlawful and unjustifiable outrages" come strangely from the Embassy of a Government which glories in its own persistent defiance of every

canon of international law, and regards confiscation of foreign property as a virtuous and not an outrageous act. We need not here repeat the story of the seizure of the *Pamiat Lenina*, as forwarded by the Soviet Consul at Shanghai after a visit to Nanking. But there are one or two details in the Soviet protest which seem to call for some comment. It is alleged by the Soviet Embassy that the three passengers who were seized in addition to Madame. Borodin were Diplomatic Couriers, bound for Hankow, and possessing "diplomatic passports and mail-lists issued by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs"; that in spite of their protests the official seals of the Soviet Government were torn off, and the contents of the mail "consisting of a limited number of trunks" examined; and that "it was found that the mail in question *contained only books and periodicals in the Russian language.*" Does it not seem just a trifle curious that three "Diplomatic Couriers" with special passports, and sealed trunks of mail, should be proceeding to Hankow with nothing but "books and periodicals" in these trunks? It is stretching our credulity rather far to ask us to

believe this "cock and bull" story. If innocuous books and periodicals were all that the Soviet Government was sending to Hankow not even one Diplomatic Courier—much less three—was necessary as an escort. Then the handcuffing of the prisoners is described as an "unheard of barbarian indignity." Really, really! When we think of the number of respectable and inoffensive Chinese and others who have been subjected to this "unheard of barbarian indignity" at the instigation of Moscow agents we find it difficult to work up any indignation over the treatment of the "Diplomatic Couriers."

Two statements have now been issued from the Chinese side, dealing with the *Pamiat Lenina* incident. The first, received from Nanking, and "obtained from an authoritative Chinese source" was thoughtfully held up overnight by our local censor, who apparently finds life too strenuous to handle telegrams received in the early evening until next day. The second is a statement issued from Ankuochun Headquarters on the same day. The Nanking statement contains allegations of a very grave nature against the Soviet Government and its agents which, if proved, would more than justify an immediate breach between Peking and Moscow. It is to be hoped that the suggestion that these allegations are the result of machinations of "White" Russians

will be refuted by the production of conclusive evidence. If quantities of "anti-foreign propaganda and literature in the Chinese, Russian and English languages", and documents "containing schemes for action in the Yangtze Valley and in an around Shanghai which would endanger other than Chinese interests" have been found in the coal bunkers and in the "diplomatic pouches", an inventory, and *precis* of their contents should be published far and wide with the least possible delay. The nature of the "important Soviet documents" found among Madame Borodin's possessions, and a list of the "Chinese compradores" and "wharf coolies", should also be given wide publicity. The *Pamiat Lenina* incident, if the Nanking version be correct, will develop from an affair of local, into one of international, importance. It might well force a decision, once and for all, as to the possibility of Britain's maintaining diplomatic relations with so unscrupulous and mischievous a Government as that of Moscow. It may be hoped, then, that the Nanking authorities will offer the fullest possible information regarding their discoveries, to the "other than Chinese interests" concerned.

The Ankuochun statement does not contain details of the *Pamiat Lenina's* more interesting cargo, though it refers to "the presence of materials of Red propaganda on

board the steamer", and has a good deal to say about the pernicious activities of the Moscow Government and Comrade Borodin in "flagrant violation of an international agreement solemnly entered into by the Soviet Government." It adds, sarcastically, that "the fact that the Soviets have engaged in similar pursuits in other countries with whom they had also entered into agreements, needs only to be incidentally mentioned here." It throws no light on the actual status of the couriers, who, according to the Nanking statement, were travelling under ordinary, and not diplomatic passports. It is difficult

to believe that the Ankuoch would thus flout and defy Soviet, unless it actually had conclusive evidence of illegal activities on the part of *Pamiat Lenina* and its passengers and crew, in its possession. If the evidence alleged to have been obtained, should prove to be inconclusive or faked, relations between Moscow and Peking will be strained to breaking point. However the evidence is conclusive there will be an end to the long series of evasions and lies by which the Moscow Government has endeavoured to conceal its intolerant activities in this country.

THE MENACE TO SHANGHAI.

(Tientsin, March 21, 1927).

LITTLE or no cable news has reached us regarding the Shanghai situation for the past forty-eight hours. Wireless messages, however, received from London, indicate that the crisis for which the British Government, and in a lesser degree other governments, have been preparing, is at hand. The Shantung forces defending Shanghai have collapsed on the Sungkiang front. They have also, apparently, met with reverses in the Nanking region. And the latest message to hand at

the time of writing states Marshal Chang Tsung-chao's army is retreating along the tire front, and that the Canto are now only eighteen miles distant from the Model Settlement. The British Defence Force manned its positions round the Settlement ready to repel invasions either by the defeated Shantungese, or the victorious Cantonese. But there is something to a panic in the Native Settlement where disorder and looting were feared as the retreating troops

pour in. Houses are closed, and the streets deserted, the Chinese having fled to the Settlement or gone into hiding, until the Shantung forces have departed. Marshal Chang Tsung-chang's troops are reported to be seizing all available junks and lighters, preparatory to a flight by water. The Cantonese forces were expected to occupy Shanghai, at the latest, sometime to-day.

We do not wish to exaggerate the dangers of the situation. But it is no use blinking at facts. We have at Shanghai a densely populated area, containing in all a population of over a million and a half, and including an International Settlement, a French Concession, a Native City, and extensive suburbs. There are no clearly defined boundaries to the Settlement and Concession, and of the foreign population of over 37,000, upwards of seven thousand reside outside the foreign areas. Of the Chinese population, over 1,100,000 reside within the International Settlement and the French Concession, and this number has probably been considerably augmented during the past week or two, by refugees from Nanking, the Native City, and the surrounding country. Bolshevik and Kuomintang agitators have for weeks past been endeavouring by every means in their power, including intimidation, and assassination, to bring about a General Strike within the

foreign areas, the result of which would be to throw hundreds of thousands of workers out of employment, and paralyse the entire social and business activities of the community. The large foreign forces now concentrated at Shanghai would, presumably, be able to maintain some of the essential services, such as the water, electricity, and gas supplies. But if a strike on the scale for which the agitators are working, can be brought about, rioting of a serious nature must be regarded as well-nigh inevitable. Many of the workers are without any means of subsistence other than their daily earnings, and a general strike will not only mean a rapid rise in the price of foodstuffs, but considerable difficulty in replenishing and distributing supplies. Inasmuch as it is part of the Cantonese (and Bolshevik) policy to attribute the blame for all China's sufferings, whatever their real origin, to foreign and especially British, "imperialism", it is to be feared that a few days of idleness and semi-starvation will bring the deluded workers into conflict with the foreign population. Shanghai is faced with a graver crisis than it has ever experienced since the port was opened to foreign trade. It seems, indeed, as if nothing short of a miracle can avert serious bloodshed, if the "Nationalists" pursue in this region the pernicious policies which they have adopted

at Hankow, Kiukiang, and elsewhere.

The position in which the Foreign Authorities concerned, now find themselves is one of the utmost difficulty. There is no desire on the part of any Foreign Power—other than Soviet Russia—to interfere in China's civil war. The Foreign troops and warships that have been concentrated at or within reach of Shanghai, are not intended to be used to assist or attack, and Chinese faction. They have been assembled for the single purpose of protecting the lives and property of their nationals. But it is questionable how they will be able to perform this task without coming into open conflict with Shanghai's new masters. The protection of their nationals and the latter's property involves not merely resistance to physical violence, but protection also from starvation and systematic persecution. If continuous and barefaced intimidation such as has been practised at Hankow and elsewhere, be tolerated in Shanghai, there will soon be no alternative to the evacuation of the foreign population. As no redress for any outrage committed by Bolshevik agitators or Labour organizations is obtainable where the "Nationalists" are in control, it may soon become necessary for the Foreign Authorities to proclaim and administer martial law in the Settlement and Concession.

They cannot maintain order, or protect their nationals, indefinitely, while the murder of loyal Chinese employes goes on at the instigation of organizations under "Nationalist" control. And it will be impossible to repress these and other forms of intimidation if there is no tribunal before whom the offenders can be sent for trial.

A most disquieting feature of the situation is the triumph of the extremist element in the Kuomintang on the eve of the occupation of the Shanghai region. These men can, unfortunately, point to the fact that uncompromising hostility to the foreigner, accompanied by mob violence, has produced results which it might have taken months to obtain by a more cautious policy. And there is very grave danger that they will override the counsels of those who realize what is actually at stake—for China as well as for the Foreign Powers—at Shanghai, and provoke a local conflict that will lead to war. For though a war is the last thing on which Great Britain or any other Treaty Power wishes to embark with "Nationalist" China, the despatch of the Shanghai Defence force, and of the largest Fleet that Britain has ever concentrated in the Far East, is not bluff, but a clear intimation that the British Government is determined to defend the vital interests of its nationals in China. It

has endured a lot at the hands of the Cantonese and their Bolshevik masters. It is still ready to deal with them in a conciliatory spirit. But any attempt to repeat at Shanghai the excesses of Hankow or Kiukiang will be met with unflinching resistance. It will be

well for China if, so far as Shanghai is concerned, General Chiang Kai-shek's policy prevails. It the extremists get their own way, the occupation of the Shanghai district may prove to be the death-knell of the Cantonese movement.

"NATIONALISTS" AND THE MISSIONS.

(Tientsin, March 23, 1927).

ALTHOUGH certain missionary spokesmen in Europe and America are still asking their audiences to believe that all is well with China, that the "Nationalist Government" is an organization that makes for progress and efficiency, and that there is no Bolshevik influence whatsoever behind it, the National Christian Council, whose pernicious anti-foreign activities have come in for so much criticism during the past two years, has at last become perturbed over the future of missionary institutions in "Nationalist" territory. For it appears that these institutions instead of finding themselves in the earthly paradise which we were led to believe would follow the spread of "Nationalist" authority, are now confronted with the alternatives of closing down indefinitely, if not

for ever, or themselves becoming hotbeds of Communist propaganda. The "Nationalist" Government recently gave notice that all schools which were not surrendered to Chinese management by April 1 would be considered as abolished. To avoid confiscation, Mission schools must hand over control to a Chinese Principal, and a Board consisting of a majority of Chinese; they must agree to the teaching of Kuomintang doctrines as part of the regular curriculum; they must accept the ruling of Party Headquarters in regard to memorial ceremonies, holidays, and mass movements. It is further demanded, we are told, that sums ranging from \$500 in the case of a Primary School, to \$20,000 in the case of a University, college or professional school, shall be deposited in an approved bank.

Moreover, religious instruction or exercises may not form a part of the curriculum.

So much for the schools. Our columns recently have contained a number of accounts of the closing down of Missionary Hospitals, culminating in the seizure of the long-established C. M. S. Hospital at Hangchow by a frenzied mob. This is a particularly glaring instance of ingratitude. No institution had a greater claim upon the affections of a community than this Hangchow Hospital, with which the name of Dr. Duncan Main was associated from its foundation until a few months ago. There was no more popular foreigner in China than he. His motto was "keep smiling" and he lived up to it on every possible occasion. He used to be followed round the streets of Hangchow by children to whom he distributed sweets from his pockets, as long as the supply lasted. In addition to the Hospital he was responsible for the establishment of tuberculosis sanatoria and a leper asylum. Yet the Cantonese had no sooner occupied Hangchow than they permitted a gang of hooligans to raid the C.M.S. Hospital, tie up and expose the doctors, and use the chapel for their meetings. These are the fruits of forty-six years of devoted service to China by Dr. Main. What has happened at Hangchow makes one wonder whether such a sentiment as gratitude finds any

place in the hearts of the Chinese.

Although no detailed statistics of Protestant Missions have been published for several years—the various organizations which one might have expected to undertake this work apparently being too much occupied with political issues—it is understood that there are to-day between 6,000 and 8,000 Protestant Missionaries in this country, of whom at least two-thousand, and probably over 3,000, are normally stationed in what is now "Nationalist" territory. Millions of dollars have been invested in the purchase of property, and the erection and equipment of educational institutions, hospitals, churches, etc. The upkeep of these missionary institutions involves an enormous annual outlay, equivalent, according to some authorities, in American missions alone, to the entire profits on American commerce with China. Yet wherever the "Nationalist" Government has acquired control the usual policy adopted has been to make life impossible for the foreign staff, and after driving them out, to take possession of the property, with the added audacity, in some instances, of demands for continued financial support from abroad. Buildings erected and equipped by funds subscribed by Christian communities in Europe and America, for the purpose of spreading Christianity and inculcating Christian ideals in China, are now being

used for purposes which are the very antithesis of this religion and these ideals. And it appears to be the deliberate policy of the "Nationalist" Government to confiscate them, and to ensure that they shall never again be used for the objects for which they were originally erected.

It is hardly surprising, in these circumstances, that even the National Christian Council is becoming dubious concerning the possibility of continuing missionary work in "Nationalist" territory. A Shanghai paper states that "all foreign mission bodies conducting schools and universities in Nationalist territory are considering the withdrawal of their forces and the cessation of all activities, unless recently promulgated and allegedly confiscatory regulations of the Cantonese Government are amended." Hundreds of missionaries, with their families, and what belongings could be saved in their hurried flight have already had to leave the Southern and Western provinces. And though it was hoped that their evacuation was only temporary, it now appears doubtful whether they will ever be able to return. And it can hardly be denied that a large measure of responsibility for what has happened rests upon the shoulders of those self-appointed spokesmen of the Protestant Missions who have joined in the clamour for the abrogation of the

so-called "unequal" treaties, and, on every possible occasion sought to embarrass and obstruct their Governments in efforts to uphold treaty rights. The missionaries who have been advocating, and leading their constituents to believe, that the correct policy to pursue is to submit unreservedly to Chinese jurisdiction, have now had ocular demonstration of what that policy involves. As interpreted by the Cantonese it appears to mean the complete elimination of foreign influences in the churches, educational institutions and hospitals for the establishment of which the Christian Churches of America and the West have been responsible, and the use of their buildings and equipment for purposes of a definitely anti-Christian character.

The *China Press* states that the Rev. E. S. Lobenstine, a Secretary of the National Christian Council, is proceeding to Hankow "to open negotiations with the Nationalist Government officials in an eleventh hour effort for remedial measures." We should have thought that by this time the National Christian Council would have recognized the folly of dabbling in politics. We do not know what credentials Mr. Lobenstine has, but we venture to suggest that if any negotiations whatsoever are conducted with the "Nationalist" Government they should be carried on through the usual official channels, and not by

representatives of an organization that has no official status, and which cannot even claim to have a mandate from Protestant Missionary organizations—the largest Protestant Mission in China having some months ago severed relations with the National Christian Council. Mr. Lobenstine as Protestant “Nuncio” exposes himself to a well-deserved snub from the “Nationalist” Government, as well as from those Missions which have never been consulted regarding the proposed negotiations. The National Christian Council is in a

sorry predicament. It has been mainly instrumental in spreading the view that the Treaty rights under which mission work has been conducted for the greater part of a century are superfluous and out-of-date. It must be difficult, now, to admit that it is necessary to invoke the aid of the secular power to preserve properties purchased by contributions from Christians, and dedicated to Christian uses, from being confiscated and converted to communistic and anti-Christian propaganda.

“TRUST MR. CHEN!”

(Tientsin, March 26, 1927).

A SHANGHAI message, which we print this morning, states that non-British Foreigners in that city are widely signing a message to the British Government, stating that if British troops had not arrived when they did “women and children would have had to be evacuated, and the Settlement would probably have shared the fate of Hankow and Kiukiang.” To-day they might well add: “and of Nanking.” The fatuous and irresponsible nagging by spokesmen of the British Labour

Party could not have been more effectively answered than by the events that have occurred on the Yangtze and at Shanghai, during the past fortnight. Let us recall a few of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald’s gems of advice since the decision to send out the Shanghai Defence Force was reached by the British Government.

In a special interview accorded to the *Daily Herald* (whose columns have been plastered with such “slogans” as “Labour wants

not guards but negotiations" and "Labour's China Policy means mutual trust, not hostile acts") on January 19, the ex-Prime Minister, and former Foreign Secretary, said:

Let us get Mr. Chen to negotiate, and I am perfectly certain the whole thing can be settled in a most amicable and satisfactory way.

On Feb. 1, in the course of a speech to his own constituents, he stated:

I believe that the security of the women and children, who undoubtedly are living in risk in Shanghai, would have been greater than it will be with the Defence Force there.

And at the Albert Hall "Peace with China" Demonstration, which was held on Feb. 6, and advertised as urging.

PEACE, NOT PANIC

IDEALS, NOT IMPOSITIONS.

CONVERSATIONS, NOT CONCENTRATIONS.

DO NOTHING BUT NEGOTIATE.

he advised:

Let us say, then, that if that Hankow document is signed, saying no further security for Shanghai is required, the troops will be turned round and brought home.

These were the utterances of a former Prime Minister, who is on record as opposed to a policy of "scuttle," and who professes to be as concerned about the safety of his own nationals in China as any member of the present Government. The message now being signed in Shanghai answers these mischiev-

ous and ill-informed criticisms in one way: events at Nanking have answered it in another, and, incidentally revealed the extreme peril to which Shanghai would have been exposed, but for the presence of adequate military and naval forces.

The situation at Nanking has been critical ever since the 21st inst. when a portion of the Northern troops went over to the South. General Chu Yu-pu, who arrived on the scene during the day succeeded in defeating and disarming these men, but the foreign Consular Authorities then advised the evacuation of foreign women and children. On the 23rd 175 American women and children were sent down river, and from the telegrams received yesterday it would appear that more foreigners would have left had certain of the "veteran missionaries" not ignored the Consular warning.

Nanking is an enormous though not very densely populated, city, surrounded by a massive wall 30 to 50 ft. in height, and 32 miles in length. Only in the vicinity of Hsiakwan, the trading quarter in which the Shanghai-Nanking Railway station is situated, does this wall, which is of irregular shape, approach the river front. There are hills, within the wall, along the greater part of the Western side of the city, and behind these hills lie the British, American and Japanese Consulates. It was pre-

sumably on one of these hills, in the North-west corner of the City, and within reach of Hsiakwan, that the foreigners were concentrated, in readiness of evacuation, when the trouble began on Thursday. The exact sequence of events is not very clear from the cables and wireless messages received up to the time of writing. But it would seem that Cantonese irregulars suddenly began shelling the hill, killing a British Doctor, seriously wounding the British Consul-General, and inflicting other casualties among the Britons and Americans who were gathered there. The position became so serious that the British Cruiser, and the American Destroyers in port, put up a barage round the hill to enable landing parties to go ashore and rescue the foreigners. This task seems to have been only partially accomplished, some 31 foreigners being safely evacuated. But 17 British subjects, including the wounded British Consul-General and Marines, and 150 Americans, including 60 women and children, are still unaccounted for. A number of Americans are stated to have been killed and wounded, and a British Bluejacket on H.M.S. *Emerald* was fatally wounded. The British, American, and Japanese Consulates have been sacked, and the business quarter is reported to be in flames. This is the kind of "security" which foreigners receive from the Cantonese

following the signature of the "Hankow document."

The gravity of this Nanking incident scarcely requires to be emphasized. It demonstrates very clearly that the "Nationalists" in this region are completely out of hand, and are animated by a fanatical, Boxer-like hatred of the foreigner. Nanking is one of the most important centres of American educational effort in China. Most of the American residents there are engaged in mission or educational work. The attack upon foreigners and their property, the sacking of the foreign Consulates and of all Japanese residences, and the unprovoked murder of British subjects and American citizens are outrages which demand prompt and exemplary punishment. It is to be hoped that news of the Nanking outrage, coupled with the intimation of the Cantonese General at Shanghai that he intends to make that city the base for a "world revolution", will awaken Europe and America to the full gravity of the situation in China. We are faced with a fanaticism and savagery in some respects more dangerous than that of the Boxers. And it can, we fancy, merely be a question of time now before the Powers with substantial interests in this country recognize that intervention is essential, if China is not to be given over to lawlessness and chaos for at least another generation.

AFTER NANKING.

(Tientsin, March 28, 1927).

IN the issue of this paper for June 9, 1900, appeared a leading article which began as follows:

We have around us on every hand, evidences that the predictions which have been dinned into official ears for the past five months by Missionaries and the Press were not the vapourings of disordered fancy, and ill-considered sensationalism. There is no longer any need for us to insist upon the fact that the banding together of ignorant fanatics, and the circulation of falsehoods specially designed to feed and inflame the superstitious minds of the masses, constitutes a danger to peace and civilization. The thing is before us in a panorama of dislocated trade, panic-stricken natives, murdered and hounded foreigners.

The same words might well have been written, with equal truth, and equal foreboding, to-day. Not for five months only, but for some years past, warning after warning has appeared in these columns of the inevitable consequences of unrestricted Bolshevik intrigue among the Chinese. It, indeed, required no great prescience to foresee the probable consequences of "the circulation of falsehoods specially designed to feed and inflame the superstitious minds of the masses"; of the organization of armies equipped with Soviet arms, and drilled by Soviet instructors; of the lavish expenditure of money and energy for the sole purpose of fomenting animos-

ity towards the white races. The fruits of Soviet activities were soon brought forth in Canton, Swatow, and other cities over which the "reds" acquired control. And since the arrival of the "Nationalists" on the Yangtze outrage has followed outrage, although a credulous public in Europe and America, misled by the adoption of Bolshevik "slogans" by a number of Protestant missionaries, and ever ready to regard their own nationals as "a medley of adventurers" has discounted the extent of Bolshevik influence, and professed its readiness to believe that "Nationalist" spokesmen, such as Eugene Chen, really meant what they said when they denied that they were anti-foreign, and promised that their progress through China would be orderly and peaceable. The British Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang were overrun by mobs, instigated by "Nationalist" officials, and assisted by "Nationalist" troops, and agreements condoning these acts of violence were not only signed by a representative of His Majesty's Government, but actually cheered as a diplomatic success in the House of Commons. The "Nationalists" then proceeded to advance down river. At Wuhu, at Nanking, at Chinkiang, looting and outrage accompanied the Canton-

ese occupation. At Wuhu the Native Customs House and the Customs Club were looted, and several foreigners had narrow escapes. At Nanking, British, American, French, and Japanese nationals have been wantonly murdered, and every foreign residence and institution within the city, including the huge missionary colleges, and the foreign Consulates, has been sacked. At Chinkiang, another British Concession has been entered, and looting and shooting have occurred. Is it any wonder with this record of continuous and unprovoked outrage before him, and news coming in from other centres that the situation is daily growing more menacing, that, the American Minister should have instructed all American citizens in "Nationalist" territory to leave, as "the Cantonese have demonstrated their inability to protect foreigners?"

General Chiang Kai-shek, who heard of the Nanking outrage while on his way down river from Kiukiang, at first appears to have adopted a conciliatory attitude. But when he reached Nanking he apparently considered the situation so tense that it would be unsafe for him to land, and he accordingly proceeded straight to Shanghai, where, through a subordinate, he has had the audacity to assert that the Nanking affair is finished, all foreigners now being out, and "it

was merely an isolated incident." The Americans, who in this instance appear to have suffered the heaviest material losses, if not the greatest loss of life, are told that they "were drawn into it by the British" and warned not to allow themselves to be led into "a false position" otherwise they would find themselves as unfavourably placed in China as Britain. In other words, America must be taught that she cannot be permitted to use her warships or Marines for the protection of her citizens, even when they are being murdered in cold blood, their residences are being sacked, and their Consular authorities are driven out, and threatened with death. We scarcely think that the American Government will allow the impudent suggestion that it placed itself in a "false position" at Nanking to pass unchallenged.

Hitherto, wherever it has been possible to distinguish between them and other foreigners, Britons, only have been singled out for outrage and humiliation by the "Nationalists." At Nanking, however, American, British, French and Japanese nationals and property seem to have been treated with the same barbarity. And if it is to be hoped that the Governments concerned, instead of endeavouring to dodge responsibility for securing redress, will act in close cooperation in the negotiations that must now ensue.

The savagery displayed by the "Nationalists" wherever they go, their unwillingness or inability to fulfil their pledges in respect of foreign lives and property, and their connivance at every form of insult to, and intimidation of, foreigners, renders it almost certain that a general evacuation of all Yangtze ports will become necessary in the course of a few days. Arrangements have already been made to remove all Americans from Hankow, at short notice, and it is understood that most if not all foreigners have now left Wuhu, Nanking, and Chinkiang. It is amazing, but typical of the wrong-headed view of the situation now taken in England, that at such a moment, when Shanghai remains the only haven of safety for the foreign communities in Mid-China, "the suggestion is advanced in certain quarters that negotiations on a broader basis should be initiated, and the position of the Shanghai Settlement regularized (sic) on the lines followed at Hankow." Shanghai, at the moment, is in a state of siege, in peril from within as well as from without, and secure only because the largest

foreign forces ever assembled there are in control, and ready to take whatever action may be necessary to maintain order. It would be madness, at such a time, to entertain the idea of any such "regularization" as that which has occurred at Hankow, the effect of which would be to hand the control of the Settlement over to a Communist organization. There should be no suggestion of any modification in the status of Shanghai until full redress has been obtained for the Yangtze outrages, and the "Nationalists" have convincingly demonstrated their ability to maintain order, and repress intimidation. Another General Strike is threatened unless the barricades are removed, and pickets and agitators employed by the General Labour Union, are granted immunity from arrest. If these demands are complied with, arrangements should be taken in hand at once for the evacuation of all foreign residents. To "regularize" the position at Shanghai on the lines followed at Hankow will simply mean that life will become impossible for every foreign resident within the Settlement.

THE NEW BOXERISM.

(Tientsin, March 29, 1927).

IT has not been the practice of this newspaper, as our readers can testify, to indulge in an "I

told you so" attitude, when the warnings that have repeatedly appeared in these columns are shown

to be justified. Although, presumably, we are among what a former Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. David Lloyd George, described as "these miserable little rags, that were just published here and there along the coast of China", and "just written by purely irresponsible people" we may claim that in general—as is perhaps only natural, as we happen to be on the spot—we have shown a better appreciation of the realities of the situation than amateur journalists like Mr. Lloyd George, and other politicians who have simply used the Chinese question as a basis for political polemics. Fully a month before the British Concession at Hankow was overrun by a Chinese mob we were urging the British authorities not to trust to fair offers, and a policy of conciliation, for the protection of their nationals in that centre. Sometime before the outrage at Hankow we were urging in the most emphatic language, that adequate precautions should be adopted for the protection of Shanghai. To-day we venture, with a full sense of responsibility, but with equal earnestness to utter a further warning in regard to the situation in Mid-China and the North.

If the cables which reached us from Shanghai yesterday can be depended upon, it is quite plain that whatever his personal inclinations, General Chiang Kai-shek has surrendered to the Kuomintang

extremists. If, as is generally believed by the Japanese, he intended to make Nanking his headquarters, organize a new "Nationalist" Government there, and defy the communistic elements, his plan has completely failed. He did not dare to land at Nanking, which was already in the hands of the most violent of the extremists when he reached that city. On arrival at Shanghai he issued, through his subordinate, General Pai Ching-hsi, a message of defiance to the British, coupled with an insolent warning to the Americans. And on Sunday, in company with General Pai, he attended a mass meeting on the borders of the French Concession, at which resolutions were adopted demanding the immediate retrocession of the foreign Settlements, and advocating another General Strike. He has therefore openly identified himself with the extremists, and the advocates of violence, and the chances of a peaceful solution of the Shanghai problem, never very hopeful, have correspondingly diminished.

After what has recently occurred at Wuhu, Nanking and Chinkiang, and in view of the fact that a deliberate attempt is now being made to evict all foreigners from Hankow, it becomes necessary to consider what is to be the future policy of the Treaty Powers. The American Government has decided upon the evacuation of all of its nation-

als in territory under the control of the "Nationalist" Government, with the exception of Shanghai. That means the removal of all Americans from the Yangtze Valley, and from Chekiang, Fukiën, and Kwangtung. It seems probable that the British authorities, however reluctant they may be to damage British interests, will soon feel obliged to adopt a similar course, with the result that all white residents in South and a considerable portion of Mid-China, will leave the country, or be concentrated in Shanghai and Hongkong. This course will involve enormous sacrifice of property, and immense financial loss, and can only be justified on the ground that it is preferable to leaving foreign men and women and children at the mercy of the savages who now masquerade as the saviours of China from "foreign imperialism."

Shanghai, we presume, with the foreign forces already concentrated there, or available within a few days if required, can be held against any attacks that the Cantonese forces, or Chinese mobs, are capable of making. But is it the intention of the foreign Powers, eventually, to hold Shanghai, and no other centre? We are not yet actually threatened in Tientsin, or the Manchurian ports, and the local authorities have, as a matter of fact, evinced a genuine desire to protect the lives and prop-

erties of foreigners. But mob violence is a disease which has spread, and may continue to spread, over China, with almost incredible rapidity. Moreover, the withdrawal of foreign communities wherever they are menaced, leaving their homes and property at the mercy of looting rabble and soldiery is encouraging the spread of this dangerous malady. It was Wuhu, Nanking and Chinkiang—and but for adequate military precautions would have been, Shanghai—last week. It may be Tsingtao, Chefoo, and Tientsin next week or the week after. And foreigners in these centres ought to know where they stand: whether the most that their Governments can do for them is to evacuate them at an hour or two's notice, leaving all their property to be looted or destroyed, or whether arrangements are being made for a decisive stand elsewhere than at Shanghai, against this new form of Boxerism.

As long as Marshal Chang Tso-lin retains control in Chihli and Manchuria there is no reason to suppose that he will depart from the policy of affording all possible protection to foreign nationals and foreign property, and rigorously suppressing all attempts at mob violence. But if he does not receive assistance, material and moral, from the Treaty Powers, it is doubtful how much longer he can stem the tide of violence and

disorder. And the oft-expressed determination of the Governments chiefly concerned, not to intervene in China's domestic troubles, or to support any of the warring factions, makes it very doubtful whether such assistance will be forthcoming. There is the further difficulty that the mere fact that he was depending upon foreign aid would alienate the sympathies of a number of his countrymen. It seems clear that if the menace of what can best be described as Bolshi-Boxerism is to spread to North China the Foreign Governments concerned will have to choose between effective resistance at pre-determined points, or the humiliating and disastrous alternative of evacuating their nationals. The Foreign garrisons in North China—less than six thousand men in all, with no medium or heavy artillery, no aeroplanes, and inadequate transport—cannot conceivably perform the multifarious duties expected of them. These include the defence of the Legation Quarter, the protection of about one hundred miles of railway, and the defence of Foreign areas which could only be effectively protected by a cordon some thirty miles in length. Yet Tientsin must be held as long as the Legations are retained in Peking, and as long as there are foreigners in North China in need of succour and protection. And even if it is not at the mo-

ment necessary or desirable to rush military and naval reinforcements to this centre, it would, we think, be most desirable that the Governments chiefly concerned should leave us under no uncertainty as to their intentions. If the policy of "scuttle" with all the humiliation and loss that it involves, is to be followed here in the event of the trouble spreading North, it would be better and wiser for gradual evacuation to begin without delay. An intimation that Tientsin—like Shanghai—will be held with whatever forces may be required for the purpose, would do much to restore confidence locally, and quite possibly reduce the risk of trouble in this neighbourhood. But there are other places, also, where the risk of trouble has to be faced, and where, in fairness to the local residents, the intentions of the foreign authorities ought to be revealed. Hordes of demoralized soldiery are being sent back to Tsingtao, where the Japanese have important financial interests. Are Tsingtao, and Chefoo, to be turned over to the mob, in the event of trouble?

It is useless, to-day, to prate of conciliation, of patience, of negotiation. The only sane course is to face the fact that if Western civilization and Japan are not at war with China, a portion of the Chinese is openly at war with them. The issue can no longer be dodged.

If foreigners are to remain in China during the next few months or for whatever period may be necessary until the country recovers from this Bolshi-Boxer madness, it can only be by the exertion of force for their protection. If that force is not available, or will not be employed where and when required, every foreigner in this country must be prepared to leave at short notice, and to sacrifice everything that he possesses in China. The tide *can* be stemmed and something of what remains of foreign rights and interests preserved, but only by facing the facts, and acting as the facts demand. Concessions to violence, wholesale evacuation of foreigners, and the abandonment of their property, without protest or demands

for redress, have caused appalling loss, and intolerable humiliation. A continuation of this policy will end in disaster—will probably leave China in such appalling chaos that it will be unfit to live in for another generation. There is no suggestion of, or necessity for, conquering China. But it is necessary, if the policy of scuttle is not to continue as long as there are foreigners to be outraged, and foreign properties to be looted, to recognize that a state of war exists between China's extremists, and the civilized nations, and to cease to act as if friendly negotiations and further concessions, can settle the latter's accounts with the savages whom "Nationalist" China has enrolled beneath its own and the Soviet flags.

THE MENACE TO CIVILIZATION.

(Tientsin, April 4, 1927).

THERE have been several significant developments during the week-end. The most significant, perhaps, is the decision of the British Government to despatch another Infantry Brigade to the Far East, thus, according to home estimates, raising the strength of the Shanghai Defence Force to 22,000. The American Govern-

ment has simultaneously announced its decision to have another 1,500 Marines ready for embarkation, in addition to the detachment of the same strength which is due to sail this week. And it is understood that, if necessary, America can immediately embark several thousand troops for duty in China from Hawaii and the Philippines.

There is as yet no definite pronouncement regarding the demands of the Powers in connection with the Nanking outrage, but these military precautions suggest that the gravity of the situation has at last been recognized in America and Great Britain, and that *action*, and not mere verbal protests, may be expected if their demands are not unconditionally and promptly met.

"Japan will issue no more warnings, and will make no more protests, against the trend of affairs in China, but will take such measures as are necessary to meet given necessities", Mr. Yoshizawa, the Japanese Minister at Peking, is reported to have told a newspaper representative on Friday last. And it may be hoped that this, rather than the temporising policy urged by a section of the Japanese press, represents the views of the Tokio Government. The proposal to send a joint Commission to Nanking, said to have emanated from Japan, can only be regarded as an exhibition of flabbiness which will encourage the Chinese extremists to fancy that even a premeditated outrage as gross as that which has occurred at Nanking, can now be committed with impunity, and without any fear of reprisals on the part of the Powers who have been insulted and defied, Drastic demands, followed up, if necessary, by drastic action, constitute the

only remedy for the series of anti-foreign outbreaks in the Yangtze Valley. And the decision of the British and American Governments may, we hope, be interpreted as indicating that with or without Japanese co-operation, they will take whatever steps may be necessary to vindicate their honour, and exact redress for outrages upon their Flags, their nationals, and their property.

The evacuation of Americans and Britons from the interior appears now to have been almost completed, so far as the Yangtze Valley is concerned. Only at Hankow do any considerable foreign communities remain, and they are under warning to be ready for immediate departure. Japanese reports suggest that it may not be long before a general order to evacuate Hankow is issued, serious trouble being anticipated with the 200,000 unemployed, who have lost their work as a result of the activities of the Bolsheviks in the Wu-Han cities. Both the British and the American Governments have now, we understand, advised the withdrawal of their nationals from the interior in North as well as Mid-and South China, to the Coast. The loss and inconvenience caused by such a course can only be justified if it can be regarded as a precaution against the possible reactions of a stronger policy in dealing with the Cantonese. In spite of the daily list of outrages

and acts of provocation, the "Nationalist Government" has the audacity to describe the evacuation of Americans from the Yangtze region and elsewhere "as a measure dictated by panic and not by statesmanship;" while General Chiang Kai-shek, with the knowledge of what has occurred at nearly every port from Chungking to Shanghai has had the impudence to pretend that "wherever Nationalist forces arrived, missionaries were not only protected by the Nationalists, but the aspirations and aims of the Southerners were clearly understood and sympathized with, by most of the foreigners."

The smoke-screen behind which the "Nationalists" hope to hide their evil deeds, has already been started by Mr. Eugene Chen, who makes light of the whole Nanking affair; ascribes the responsibility therefore to "reactionary and counter-revolutionary elements"; and—in contradiction to General Kai-shek, who estimates that six Chinese were killed and fifteen wounded, by the naval bombardment—places the Chinese casualties at the rate of 100 killed and wounded for every single foreign casualty. There is no sign of real contrition in the statement issued from Hankow; no indication that anything is to be done to prevent a recurrence of such outrages in the future. The attitude of the "Nationalists" appears to be one

of cynical defiance, and it may safely be predicted that no satisfaction will be forthcoming for Nanking unless it is exacted by "such measures as are necessary to meet given necessities."

While anything in the form of unreasoning panic is to be deprecated, it is satisfactory to learn that the British and American Governments are now fully alive to the gravity of the situation in this country. "Trusting Mr. Chen" has proved a costly and disastrous experiment. It has led to the ruin of British interests in Hankow, and necessitated the evacuation, often at short notice, and with the utmost difficulty, of every other port on the Yangtze. It would be amusing, were it not so tragic, to read the views expressed by some of the Nanking victims on the policy of patience and conciliation, in the Shanghai papers, to-day. Nanking was one of the hotbeds of the advocates of treaty revision, and the relinquishment of foreign privileges and protection. Hundreds of missionaries who might have been removed to safety, in good time, had they acted upon the advice of their consular authorities, elected to remain behind, and suffered the consequences of their obstinacy and credulity. And through it appears that there are among the refugees a few who "are still stoutly maintaining their old policy of obstructing any move toward tightening

the reins by the Powers'', a Nanking University Professor is responsible for the statement that: "Strong military action against the Cantonese will be advocated by most of the Nanking exiles when they return to the United States, which most of them plan to do as soon as they can secure sailings."

Meanwhile the jubilation of Moscow over the defiance of the "imperialist Powers'', and the perversion of the Nanking outrage into an unprovoked bombardment by the British and American warships, continue. It seems amazing that in this, the Twentieth Century, the articulate portion of a whole nation, which claims to be civilized, and to be a European Power, can glory in savagery of this kind. It ought now to be clear to the most sceptical that what Soviet Russian wants in China is not to help the "oppressed masses'', not to assist her to win full nationhood, but to provoke incident after incident until the whole Far East is in flames. No-one, least of all the Chinese, would benefit from such a conflagration. But it is now the settled policy of Moscow to encourage the Chinese in the most reckless savagery, hoping thereby, not to improve the lot of the Chinese people, who will be the worst sufferers in the end; but to inflict a vital blow upon civilization. Reluctant though the civilized nations are to resort to

force to deal with the unprecedented menace of an enormous Asiatic nation overwhelmed with destructive frenzy, it is difficult to see how the challenge can much longer be ignored. Drastic action now may still avert the spread of this madness over those portions of China where the semblance of order and control is maintained. A few months, or even a few weeks hence, it may be too late to thwart the infamous schemes of Moscow without bloodshed and suffering on a scale hitherto unknown upon the face of the earth. The Soviet Revolution and its aftermath cost Russia millions of lives—and that in a thinly populated country which normally is entirely self-supporting in the matter of its food supply. In China, with an average density of population of 238 to the square mile, and dependent to the extent of millions of tons per annum, on outside supplies of cereals, a catastrophe too terrible to contemplate threatens the nation if the production and import of necessities of life are seriously affected. It there are 200,000 unemployed in the Wu-Han Cities within a few months of the inauguration of Bolshevik activities in that centre, what is going to be the situation as this blight spreads through China. Suffering such as has never before been recorded in history awaits the Chinese nation if this reckless madness continues, unchecked.

BRITISH INTERESTS IN TIENTSIN.

(Tientsin, April 7, 1927).

MOST of our readers must, we think, share in our bewilderment regarding the present policy of the British Government. As a precautionary measure it has warned all British subjects in the Interior to make for the coast, with the result that scores of men, women and children are arriving here daily, and must find accommodation of some kind or another until they are able, either to return to their homes in safety, or to secure passages elsewhere. The result is that already these refugees are experiencing difficulty in finding temporary residences in Tientsin, and we have received a request to appeal to the public for assistance. We trust that the Tientsin Women's Club or at any rate the British members thereof, will take up this question and see what can be done. At the same time that this exodus is taking place the British Authorities are, apparently, quite willing to enter into negotiations for the transfer of the control of the British Concession into Chinese hands. The authorities to whom this control would be surrendered are precisely the same authorities who are at present in control of most of the districts from which British subjects are being evacuated. Yet, on the one

hand, it is not deemed expedient to rely on the protection afforded by these authorities, and on the other, it is proposed to withdraw British control, and substitute that of the Peking Government. We do not for a moment doubt, as we have repeatedly stated, that Marshal Chang Tso-lin is quite sincere in his promises of protection to foreigners, and their property within his jurisdiction. But we do most emphatically urge that if certain factors in the situation render it inadvisable to rely unconditionally upon such protection in say, Tongshan or Kalgan, these apply, *a fortiori* to the substitution of this protection for the present system in the British Concession at Tientsin. It would, indeed, be difficult to imagine anything more illogical, and, if danger threatens, more suicidal, than the relaxation of British control in this Concession when it is filled to overflowing with foreign refugees who have come here for safety.

The Hankow agreement, the signature of which, it is amazing to remember, was greeted with loud cheers in the House of Commons, has furnished a most convincing object lesson of the danger of tampering with the exist-

ing administration of any Foreign "Concession in China. The safeguards it should have contained, and the guarantees that should have been exacted, are lacking, with the result that there is nothing, to prevent Tom Mann, the British Communist, or Roy, the notorious Indian seditionist, being nominated, and elected, as British members of the Council, when the first Council is actually elected. Relinquishment of foreign control over the Police has resulted in the virtual withdrawal of police protection, so far as British residents are concerned. British residents have recently been driven from the streets at the point of the bayonet. British banks, the British newspaper, and British factories, have been compelled to close down by barefaced intimidation. Strike pickets enter foreign homes and intimidate the servants. All this has been happening during the past fortnight, after the House of Commons had been told (on March 21) that: "in regard to anti-British propaganda, it was certainly understood between ourselves and the Southern Government that everything possible would be done to safeguard the interests of both sides": that "the same measure of protection would be afforded to British interests in Hankow and Kiukiang as was afforded in other Treaty Ports"; and that "our representative at Hankow was in

continual touch with Mr. Chen, and would see that British interests were protected."

It seems incredible that with this object lesson of progressive destruction of British interests before it, the British Government can contemplate, in Tientsin, action which might expose the Concession here to the same perils. We believe that so long as Marshal Chang Tso-lin remains in Peking there will be no repetition of the Hankow outrages here. But we find it difficult to believe that while engaged in what may prove to be a decisive struggle in Honan and Anhwei, he can really be anxious to assume additional and onerous responsibilities in an area which remains perfectly peaceful at present, and which, so far as he is concerned, can be protected just as effectively, and without causing serious apprehension among the residents, from outside.

There are other aspects of the matter deserving of most serious consideration. It seems, for instance, not to be generally realized that of the foreign population of the area, the British number only just over one-third. There are actually more Russians than British living in the area, nearly half as many Americans, and over 100 Japanese. The British Government has certain moral obligations to these residents as well as those of its own nationality, and can hardly justify any steps at this

juncture which withdraw or modify their protection. Further, assuming that the Southerners were to reach and occupy Tientsin, it may be regarded as certain that they would expect forthwith to assume the rights conceded to the Northern Government in any agreement that may now be signed, and to exercise them by substituting extremists for the Chinese nominated, or approved by Peking. After Hankow, to admit this contention would be wilfully to hand over the British Area to ruin. It is clear that any modification in the status of other British areas should be accompanied by safeguards which will not, as at Hankow, prove wholly illusory. The record of Hankow does not inspire confidence in the British Government's policy, in spite of the fact that it is stated to have been decided upon "after a careful examination of all the circumstances." And we suggest that a further examination might

reveal the irresistible logic of our contention that if the decision to withdraw Britons from the interior is justified, any abatement of present safeguards in this—the main—concentration centre, is not. Finally, if it be true, as suggested in recent cables, that part of the new British Brigade is destined for Tientsin and Peking, it seems pertinent to inquire whether it is anticipated that the necessary billeting and other arrangements can be made as speedily and as satisfactorily, with a Municipality which is not under British control. In Shanghai, we understand, it was necessary to use Municipal property for the accommodation of the British forces. This was possible where a foreign Council was in control. It might present very serious difficulties if a Chinese-controlled Council, obsessed with the importance of maintaining China's "sovereign right", had to be dealt with.

THE PEKING RAID.

(Tientsin, April 8, 1927).

THE sensational proceedings which took place on the premises owned by the Soviet Embassy in Peking, on Wednesday, might well have been staged for the special benefit of the large party of American tourists now in the Capital. But though the

spectacle of Marshal Chang Tso-lin's ferrets clearing out this warren naturally attracted and interested all who heard of and were able to witness it, it is well to emphasize that this was not a "movie" drama, but a most serious development—perhaps the gravest

that has yet occurred—in Sino-Soviet relations. Technically it is incorrect to describe what happened as a raid on the Soviet Embassy. It was a raid on certain property of the Embassy which could not by any canon of international law be regarded as immune by reason of diplomatic privilege. As is generally known, the person, the private effects, and the residence of a duly accredited foreign Envoy are, by international usage, regarded as entirely exempt from local jurisdiction, both civil and criminal. This exemption also extends to the wife and family, servants and suite, of the Envoy. Only in the case of offences committed by public ministers affecting the existence and safety of the State in which they reside, and if the danger is urgent, can the seizure of their persons or property be justified.

The head of the Soviet Mission at Peking at the moment is a *Charge D'Affaires*, Chernyk by name. The Embassy itself occupies only a fraction of the ground belonging to it. This plot contains the palatial residence and offices of the Ambassador, and several houses for Secretaries and other officials, all in a self-contained compound divided off by a wall from the larger property formerly used as barracks for the Russian Legation Guard. There are numerous buildings on this portion of the property, some of which are

used as offices for the Dalbank and the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, and others for purposes which have yet to be disclosed. The position is much the same as if that portion of the British Legation situated West of the Chapel, were leased out to banks, commercial houses, or private individuals, and shut off by a boundary wall.

The status and limits of the Legation Quarter are defined in Article VII, and Annex 14 of the Protocol of 1901, and the conditions for its administration and defence are further defined in a "Protocol Regarding the Legation Quarter" signed by the Ministers of ten of the Protocol Powers, on June 13, 1904. It is sufficient here to recall that the Quarter occupied by the Legations is to be considered specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive control, that Chinese have not the right to reside therein, and that the area may be made defensible. The administration and policing of the Quarter are undertaken by a Commission which derives its authority from the Protocol Powers. Soviet Russia is no longer among the latter; her representatives are not consulted in regard to any question arising out of the Protocol; and her Embassy plays no part in the protection or administration of the Quarter. The Soviet Government having abandoned its extraterritorial rights by

Article XII of the Agreement of May 31, 1924, Russians other than actual members of the Staff of the Embassy whose names and ranks have been communicated to the Chinese Government, and Russian property other than that in actual use by the Embassy for diplomatic purposes, are amenable to Chinese jurisdiction; subject, however, to the servitudes imposed by the Protocol Powers for the protection of the Quarter. If, then, the Chinese Authorities in the Capital secure evidence that the Embassy property, other than that in legitimate use by the Soviet Envoy, is being utilized for hostile or seditious activities, and for the harbouring of Chinese and Russian agitators, the only course open to them is to apply to the representatives of the Protocol Powers, for permission to search the premises, and to make such arrests or seizures as may be required in the interests of public peace. The small force of Legation Police who, by reason of the fact that Chinese are not permitted to reside in the Quarter, are virtually restricted to traffic duties, would not be adequate for a raid of this character. Moreover, as the matters at issue lie solely between the Chinese Authorities and the Soviet, there are obvious objections to a Police Force under the control of the Foreign Legations, assuming the responsibility for such a raid.

The Protocol Legations were

approached, and appear to have felt that there was no alternative to acquiescing in the Chinese authorities' request. They could hardly, indeed, reject it, and at the same time hold the Peking Government responsible for the maintenance of order in the Capital, if the latter produced convincing evidence that the Embassy premises were being used for the purpose of fomenting disorder. The blow was delivered swiftly, and apparently, with unusual efficiency. It came as a complete surprise to the occupants—Russian and Chinese—of the property. And it seems to have resulted in an immense haul of incriminating evidence. It may be assumed that the more important of the documents seized will take some time to sort and translate. But a number of Chinese communists—including one of the most notorious agitators—have been arrested, as well as a score of Russians. And it is stated that carloads of printed propaganda and Kuomintang flags have been removed from the premises. If this be true the Soviet Embassy will find itself in a very invidious position. If it protests against the raid, on the spurious pretext of diplomatic immunity, it will have to explain the presence of hostile propaganda and insignia in premises in respect of which this claim is made. If it does not protest it will still have to explain

the use of property under its control for the storage of seditious literature and Kuomintang flags. It cannot escape responsibility, either way, for a gross abuse of its diplomatic privileges. And it is difficult to see how the matter can end in any other way than by the summary expulsion of every Soviet official in Peking, North China, and Manchuria. Marshal Chang Tso-lin, it would seem, has established beyond all question, the complicity of the Soviet in the present disturbances in this country. And the only regrettable feature of the whole business is that we shall not now be regaled with the Tass Agency's accounts of the "indignation" aroused by his action in Moscow and elsewhere in Russia.

The activities of the Fengtien Authorities, yesterday, were extended to Tientsin. With warrants counter-signed by the French Consul-General, and accompanied by French Police, Chinese police entered and searched a number of Soviet institutions in the French Concession. These included the offices of the Dalbank, Chinese

Eastern Railway, Soviet Trade Mission, and Mongolian Central Co-operative, and the private residence of the Dalbank Manager. It seems hardly likely that serious incriminating evidence was unearthed at any of these places, as the inmates must have known of the Peking raid the previous night or early yesterday morning, and the Tientsin raid did not begin until the late afternoon. It was rumoured, however, that there had been much burning of documents in some of these offices earlier in the day. The element of surprise was lacking in Tientsin, and unless the local Bolsheviks are much more stupid than we take them for, they will have succeeded in destroying any inconvenient documents hours before the Chinese police appeared upon the scene. It is quite possible, however, that the Peking raid will have furnished some evidence of the activities of the Tientsin offices. And if it can be proved that these commercial organs have been used for subversive activities, it may be hoped that they will be shut down for good.

HANDS ON CHINA!

(Tientsin, April 9, 1927).

ONE of the most regrettable features of their recent raid on the premises of the Soviet Embassy at Peking is that it has deprived us of the daily fulminations of the Tass News Agency.

Except for a brief and vague cable from London, we have no information in regard to the reception of the news of the raid by China's disinterested friends in Moscow. The Moscow Government does not, as yet, appear to know whether it ought to gibber at the "Chinese Government," or the "Mukden Generals" or the "Powers" whose representatives permitted the entry of Chinese Police into the "inviolable Legation Quarter." The last phrase strikes one as peculiarly cynical when it is clear, even from the evidence so far available that the inviolability of the Legation Quarter has been ignored by the Soviet Authorities, who have allowed premises under their control to be used for the housing of Chinese communist agitators, and the storage of arms and ammunition, Kuomintang flags, and communist propaganda. Moscow, it appears, regards itself as alone entitled to violate the sanctity of the Legation Quarter, to harbour Chinese in violation of the terms of the 1901 Protocol, and to use the premises of the Soviet Embassy for the subversion of law and order in Peking. It claims the privileges, but does not recognize the obligations, of the ownership of property in the Quarter.

It might be recalled here that if the Soviet Embassy had had its own way there would have been nothing to prevent the Chinese

Police and troops from entering the Embassy premises without the formality of requesting permission from the Envoys of the Protocol Powers. In February, 1925, Comrade Karahan of glorious memory, indited a Note to "Their Excellencies the Representatives in China of the other Powers signatory to the Protocol of 1901" protesting against the use, "without even asking for the consent of the Embassy or so much as at all approaching this Embassy" of the Russian Glacis for "horse-jumping" by American marines. He demanded that in future "it will no longer be allowed to make use of the Russian glacis without formal permission from the Soviet Embassy." In the reply that was sent to him by Dr. Schurman, Comrade Karahan was informed that:

No communication having been made to the Senior Commandant on the subject of the participation of Soviet Military forces for the defence of the Legation Quarter since the establishment in the Diplomatic Quarter of the Embassy of the Union to this date, plans for its defence previously drawn up have not in any way been changed. As a result the Guard Commandant whose duty it is to defend the Glacis situated in front of the Soviet Embassy is in charge of it and may utilise it from a military point of view, in accordance with the agreement entered into with the other Commandants.

Previous to entering into occupation of the Embassy pre-

mises Comrade Karahan undertook not to introduce Red troops into the Capital, and assured the American Minister that he would behave like a good neighbour. Compliance with his demands in regard to the so-called Russian glacis would have meant that a considerable portion of the Western boundary of the Legation Quarter would have been left unprotected, and that Chinese troops and Police would have encountered no obstacle in a raid from this direction. That, of course, was what the Soviet Ambassador wanted at the time, when he was striving by every means in his power to break down the privileged status of the Protocol Powers. To-day, however, it is a different story. The sanctity of the Quarter must be preserved in order that the Soviet Embassy may continue to be used, unmolested, as the headquarters of communist activities in the Capital.

We may expect soon to hear that a furious protest—probably drafted by Karahan himself—has been addressed to Peking in regard to this “unheard-of outrage”, and that indignation meetings are being organized in various centres in Soviet Russia. The illogical nature of these proceedings, of course, will not occur to the mobs who have from time to time been mustered to clamour for “Hands off China.” The fact that what has been done by the Chinese

authorities in Peking with the permission of the Protocol Ministers, would have been done without any reference to them whatsoever, if Karahan had had his own way, will naturally not be emphasized. Nor will the incongruity of protesting against the exercise of China’s sovereign rights, and of appealing to “imperialistic and “unequal” treaties be stressed. The deluded “proletariat” will shriek as enthusiastically for a “hands on China” policy as it has clamoured recently for “hands off China” and with equal ignorance of the real issues. But the Moscow Government, we fancy, for all its bluster, will feel extremely uncomfortable. Its spokesmen have repeatedly denied that it has been interfering in any way in China’s internal affairs, and scoffed at the idea that the Soviet Government has played any part whatsoever in fomenting the anti-British and anti-foreign movement, among the Chinese. Here in the “inviolable Legation Quarter” proofs seem to have been obtained that its premises *because of their fancied immunity*, have been used as the headquarters of these and other subversive movements in the Capital. And proof will, we presume, shortly be furnished to the whole world, of Soviet complicity. Organized mass meetings, and threatening notes will come too late to prevent the revelation of the truth.

We must await with what patience we can, the revelations regarding the "finds" on the Embassy premises. There are also several other mysteries to be cleared up. We do not fancy that much of interest will have been found in Tientsin, where the raid was sadly bungled, taking place at least 24 hours too late, and with a previous publicity which, in any case, would have given the staffs of the various institutions warning

of what was to come. It was unfortunate, and of course, most improper, that the search of the Chinese authorities should have extended to the offices of the Soviet Military Attaché. But it also seems unfortunate, and most improper that these offices should have been situated in the midst of a nest of communist agitators. Had they been in the Embassy compound this mistake could not have occurred.

THE HONOUR OF JAPAN.

(*Tientsin, April 11, 1927*).

ON July 29, 1914, the German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, in the course of an interview with the British Ambassador at Berlin, made a supreme bid for British neutrality in the impending conflict. If England would only remain neutral, he said, Germany would undertake that she aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France, should she prove victorious in the war that might ensue. He refused to give a similar undertaking in regard to French Colonies; he refused also to enter into any undertaking in

regard to the observance of Belgium's neutrality. But though Great Britain at that time was not allied to France, and was under no obligation to go to her support in the event of war, the reply of the British Government was that:

"It would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover."

Later, in a speech explaining the incident to the House of Commons, the Prime Minister, Mr.

Asquith, asked "What are we going to get in return?" And he replied: "A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to say it, but it must be put on record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty, and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporized, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees."

Japan, it seems to us, is confronted with much the same decision today. On March 24, says a Japanese correspondent, at Nanking, "women were stripped of their clothing and disgraced, men brutally struck with rifles or shot mercilessly with revolvers, children scared and torn away from their mothers, all furniture and fixtures smashed and destroyed, and valuables stolen and carried away—all by Cantonese soldiers in uniform." A few days later a gallant Japanese officer, who considered himself responsible for the protection of his nationals, attempted suicide, after leaving a message stating: "I endured what we could not tolerate. The lives of the Japanese refugees could be saved, but I am ashamed that the honour of the Japanese

Navy was disgraced by the Southern soldiers." A few more days passed, and, at Hankow, frenzied mobs attacked the Japanese Concession, compelled the Japanese community, over a thousand in number, to seek refuge on any available vessel they could reach, set fire to Japanese warehouses, and captured five Japanese blue-jackets, and five civilians, whose fate is still unknown. And now, apparently, the Japanese Consul-General at Hankow has been officially informed by Mr. Eugene Chen—the value of whose promises is a matter of worldwide notoriety—that his Government has only to overlook these outrages, to refrain from co-operation with the Powers whose nationals have been similarly outraged, and not only will the "Nationalist Government" abstain from any demand for the retrocession of the Japanese Concession; it will also undertake to suppress all anti-Japanese agitation in China. Again we see "a promise—nothing more;" a promise which is offered by an authority which at this very moment is violating its own treaties and inviting the Japanese Government to do the same. For the implications of Eugene Chen's latest offer are obvious. Japan is to purchase immunity from further hostility by becoming a party to the concentration of Cantonese hostility upon other friendly Powers. And Sir Edward Grey's

words, once more ring true as applied to Japan: "It would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with the Cantonese at the expense of Great Britain and America, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover."

For, as in 1914, there is more at stake than the interests of any single nation; what are really at stake are the interests of civilization. And these cannot be vindicated by a nefarious bargain, the effect of which must be to make Japan a passive spectator of, if not an actual accessory to, violence and outrage upon nations

whom she is accustomed to associate herself as a civilized Power. Imagine the position reversed. Imagine Eugene Chen making the same offer, to the British Government, provided it would refrain from cooperation with America and Japan in securing reparations for "Nationalist" outrages in the Yangtze Valley. Is there a single Briton—other perhaps than that small section that looks to Moscow for guidance, inspiration, and subsidies—who would approve of such a pact? Is there a single reputable Englishman who would stand forward today, after all that has happened in China, and assert his willingness to let bygones be bygones, and to withdraw all claims for reparation and apology, on condition that in future the "Nationalists" confined their

violence and their savagery to Americans and to Japanese? There is not a man or a woman worthy of our race who would consider such a diabolical bargain, who would not quiver with indignation at the idea that such an offer would be seriously entertained. Anxious though the British Government is to avoid further military commitments in the Far East, and to settle, peaceably, its differences with the Cantonese, it is unthinkable to any decent Englishman that it would show its willingness to do so by conniving at outrages upon the nationals of other countries.

To Japan, the offer made by Mr. Eugene Chen is a gross insult. It is inconceivable that it could be regarded in any other light by any ^{se} respecting Government. To purchase worthless pledges of immunity at such a price would be to prostitute the honour of a proud nation, to incur a "disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover," to betray the interests, not only of Japan, but of every civilized nation. We do not for a moment believe that a people that produced a Nogi and an Araki, and that cherishes its honour as jealously as the safety of its nationals, would entertain so disgraceful a bargain. Differences of opinion there may be, between Japan and other Governments interested as to the methods to be employed in

securing redress for the Nanking and other outrages. But these differences cannot justify an abrupt repudiation of the accepted standards of international morality and decency. Japan cannot do this

thing and retain her own self-respect and the respect of the Powers with whom, sooner or later, she must associate herself in an effort to bring order out of chaos, in China.

GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(Tientsin, April 14, 1927).

RECENT reports from Mid-China indicate that the breach between General Chiang Kai-shek and his adherents on the one hand, and the communist elements in the Kuomintang on the other is widening. Drastic action, in the course of which fifteen "Red" unionists are reported to have been killed, has been taken at Shanghai, resulting in attacks upon every known Union centre, the rounding up of hundreds of "red" agitators, and the seizure of large quantities of arms and ammunition. Similar action is reported from Hangchow; and in Swatow and Canton the tension between the extremists and the moderates is such that a conflict may occur at any moment. In several up-river centres antagonism between "reds" and moderates appears to have developed, sometimes resulting in the former, sometimes in the latter, gaining the upper hand. Among those

arrested at Shanghai is the notorious communist Chen Tu-shu. General Chiang Kai-shek, himself, is now reported to be in Nanking, where it is proposed to hold a conference on Friday, and where, if he has his own way, the headquarters of the "Nationalist" Government will shortly be established.

What has occurred at Shanghai and Hangchow suggests that a definite rupture has taken place between the Wu-Han extremists and the Commander-in-Chief. But other events if correctly reported, do not appear to warrant the belief that General Chiang Kai-shek has finally broken with the communists—alien and Chinese—who are in control of the Party at Hankow, and certainly afford little ground for the assumption that General Chiang has in any way moderated his views towards foreigners, or seeks their friendship and goodwill. He is report-

ed, on hearing of the raid on the Soviet Embassy's premises in Peking, to have addressed to Comrade Chernykh a message of sympathy more effusive than that telegraphed by Comrade Eugene Chen, attributing the entire blame to the "imperialistic Powers," and ending a long tirade against them with an expression of "my friendly and sincere consolation." The inconsistency between attempting to drive out the Soviet agitators from the Kuomintang, and grieving over the trials of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, scarcely requires any emphasis. The latter, there is no reason to doubt, has been working in the closest touch with the Soviet agents in Hankow, and cannot view with approval the attempts now being made by General Chiang Kai-shek to eliminate their influence from the "Nationalist" Government. It seems possible that personal animosity or personal ambition, rather than any question of principle, has actuated General Chiang in his recent actions against the "red" unions at Shanghai and elsewhere. Obviously no military commander would willingly tolerate the grotesque pretensions and officious interference of these organizations, when they come into conflict with his own authority. But there is no reliable evidence, as yet, of any desire on General Chiang's part to conciliate the Powers whose rights have been trampled upon, and whose nationals have been outraged, by mobs and soldiery under "Nationalist" control.

General Chiang Kai-shek's posi-

tion is undoubtedly a difficult one. He has repeatedly professed that, in contrast with the Northern militarists, he acts under orders of an Executive composed mainly of civilians. He owes most of his military success to Bolshevik assistance, not only in the supply of instructors, military advisers, arms, munitions etc., but also in the direction of that insidious and far-reaching propaganda which has enabled him to occupy, without resistance, cities and even provinces which could easily have been defended by the forces originally available for the purpose. And now, just as matters between himself and the Wu-Han extremists have come to a head, the "Nationalist" forces have suffered a crushing defeat on the North bank of the Yangtze, and may be compelled to evacuate Nanking and Chinkiang. The extremists have provided most of the driving power in the campaign which brought the "Nationalist" forces into and down the Yangtze Valley. Agitation, propaganda and intimidation have produced greater "victories" than any military operations. Anti-foreign slogans have time and again rallied waverers to the "Nationalist" cause, appealing as they do to the innate prejudices of the Chinese people, and temporarily distracting attention from the defects of the Kuomintang organization, and the sufferings of Chinese who have been subjected to the tyranny of the mob and of the labour unions. Shameless and unscrupulous mendacity have been employed in

order to focus hostility upon the foreigner, and to delude the ignorant masses into believing that "imperialism" and "unequal treaties" are the causes of China's many troubles. If the anti-foreign crusade were abandoned, enthusiasm for the "Nationalist" cause would soon wane. Neither among the masses, nor among the student elements would it be possible long to sustain enthusiasm, or to exact sacrifices, for a struggle against other Chinese factions. To drive out, or humiliate, or outrage the foreigner is an essential part of the "Nationalist" programme, without which the main incentive for continuing the present struggle would be lacking. And whether he approves of this disgraceful feature of the "Nationalist" campaign or not, General Chiang Kai-shek, having hitherto whole-heartedly identified himself with it, will probable hesitate to substitute a policy of conciliatoriness. Friendship and reason, recognition of foreign rights and property, the protection of foreigners from violence and outrage, make no appeal to mob passion. The advocacy of confiscation and looting, and of destruction of foreign interests stimulates the hatred which provides fuel for the present conflagration.

To be suspected of goodwill towards foreigners, or a desire to gain and retain their friendship, is a crime in "Nationalist" circles—a crime likely to lead to the early downfall of the suspect.

It is easy, then, to understand General Chiang Kai-shek's present predicament. A definite rupture with the Wu-Han extremists will involve him in war with his former colleagues and supporters at the very moment when a Northern victory has altered the entire military situation on the Lower Yangtze. Any show of goodwill to foreigners would at once be seized upon by the extremists, and exploited far and wide as evidence of treachery to the "Nationalist" cause. General Chiang cannot hope to retain his position and authority and simultaneously wage war upon Hankow and Peking. It seems inevitable that he will have to make terms with, and secure the support of, one or the other—or disappear. But if he again submits to Hankow a conflict with the Western Powers can scarcely be avoided. For with the ^{Han-}~~Han~~-^{kov}~~kov~~ "Government" as at present constituted, no satisfactory negotiations are possible. It is bent upon bringing about a day of reckoning. And that day cannot much longer be postponed.

LIES AND SEDITION IN HANKOW.

(Tientsin, April 15, 1927).

A PERUSAL of the latest issues of the *People's Tribune*, which describes itself as "the organ of Chinese National opinion," makes it quite clear why the American and British owned newspapers in Hankow have been suppressed. A journal that lies so persistently and flagrantly as this Nationalist "organ" would become the object of general ridicule if even a small percentage of its readers had an opportunity of discovering the truth. Its lying, moreover, is neither consistent, nor artistic. On March 24th *Tribune* reported that "official telegrams to the Central Executive Committee from General Chen Chien, Sixth Revolutionary Army, report the capture of Nanking Tuesday evening" (i.e., March 22). It was added that Nanking had been entered by the "Nationalists" on Tuesday evening, that reports received indicated that Nanking had been practically evacuated before the arrival of the Revolutionary forces at Hsiakwan, that large forces of Northerners had crossed the river on the 21st, and that they had created a reign of terror in Nanking, killing and looting indiscriminately. Such are the "facts" regarding Nanking re-

ported in the *Tribune* on the morning of March 24, by which time, according to its own statements, the Revolutionary forces had been in occupation of Nanking for at least 36 hours. That day came the first news of the Nanking outrages, which were featured in the next issue of the *Tribune* (March 25) under the heading "Northern Troops Loot Consulate Offices in Nanking, Say Reports." A sub-heading stated "Staffs Taking Refuge Outside Walls Under Protection of Nationalist Forces." The previous day's "official" reports are explained away with the naive statement that "The report published yesterday that the city had been taken by the Nationalist troops has proven premature. The Nationalist troops are just outside the wall." By some oversight it is not stated which part of the wall. The statement, however, is made that "All the Northerners still outside the walls when the Southern troops arrived at Hsiakwan Tuesday (i.e. the 22nd), have been either killed or taken prisoner and disarmed. Hsiakwan, as reported yesterday, is in full possession of the Nationalist troops, which are preparing to lay siege to

Nanking. Now Hsiakwan, the business suburb on the water-front, was also the scene of systematic violence and looting by Chinese soldiery. The Bridge House Hotel, and the International Export Company's premises are both in Hsiakwan, and both were entered and looted. Does the *Tribune* seriously suggest that these outrages were committed by Northern troops forty-eight hours after the "Nationalist forces" had occupied Hsiakwan and killed, or disarmed and taken prisoner "all the Northerners still outside the walls?"

The *Tribune* is filled from cover to cover with anti-foreign, and especially anti-British articles, many of them, we regret to say, culled from British or American papers or contributed by Americans or Britons. Prominent position for instance is given to an alleged description of British prison-life supplied by the United Press, from which we learn that in England, "Jailers, armed with rifles in addition to a 'sap'—a solid rubber truncheon hanging from the trouser belt, watch the gang with alertness. Any slacking is the signal for bringing the 'sap' into play." Anyone familiar with the stringent British prison regulations will, of course know that the statement that warders are permitted to assault lazy convicts with a "sap" or any other implement, is a barefaced lie. We characterize it as such, and ask why the United Press

thinks fit to circulate a falsehood of this type? It is characteristic of this type of journalism that a paragraph beginning "the working hours are not long", is headed "Long Hours."

Pride of place for virulent falsehood, however, must be accorded to the traitor, Tom Mann, who having reached Hankow from Moscow, *via* Canton, and thus escaped arrest and deportation, announces that he has been "sent to China by the revolutionary workers of England to encourage the Chinese people to fight British imperialism to the bitter end." To deal in detail with his scurrilous and lying contribution to the *People's Tribune* would occupy more space than we can afford, but a few typical passages—sufficient, we should think, to justify drastic action on the part of the British authorities—may be quoted here:

The peace Treaty of Tientsin (1858) opened the doors to the imperialists for the import of Christianity and Opium into China. One of the paragraphs of this Treaty even forbids the Chinese to call the foreign robbers by their true names, namely—barbarians. . . .

In 1863 the infamous Colonel Gordon became the head of the counter-revolutionary army. . . .

After the world war Great Britain actively supported the counter-revolutionary movements in China, just as it has supported and instigated the counter-revolutionary movements in Russia. British money and British ammunition were supplied to Wu Pei-fu and Chen Chiung-ming and other militarists

who tried to crush the nationalist revolutionary movement. In the great Railway-men's strike (Peking-Hankow) in 1922, the British imperialists were behind the atrocities of Wu Pei-fu, who executed the leaders of the strike. . . .

Upon our arrival at Hankow we were shocked by the news that the British imperialists have actually bombarded Nanking at the time when that city was passing into the hands of the national revolutionary troops. The telegraph also brought the news that British airplanes and British gunboats bombarded thousands of peasant families in the Hui Fang district of Kwangtung province, killing upward of one thousand people.

Compared with these atrocious lies, the publication of which at this juncture by a renegade Briton should expose him to the maximum penalties laid down by the Order in Council, the effusion of Earl Browder, American communist and ex-convict, in the same issue of the *Tribune*, reads more like a Sunday school lesson. But it is shameful,

nevertheless to think that hyphenated Britons and Americans like Tom Mann, Earl Browder, and the Prohmes, not to mention certain missionaries who ought to know better, are engaged at a critical time such as this when the lives and property of their fellow-country men and women are in hourly peril, in vilifying their nationals and their Governments, and inciting the Chinese extremists to further excesses. It seems high time that the American, as well as the British, Governments devised effective methods for dealing with those of their nationals who openly engage in inciting the Chinese to further anti-foreign outrages. These activities would not for a moment be permitted in their native lands, and in China, as long as extraterritoriality remains in force, they deserve and should receive swift and drastic punishment.

HANKOW & NANKING.

(Tientsin, April 18, 1927).

AS a book of nursery rhymes is not included in our reference library we are unable to quote, with certainty, from the historic poem describing the arrival of the animals in the ark. We cannot, for instance recall whether when

"the animals went in five by five," "the chimpanzee was the last to arrive", or "some were dead and some were alive." But to the best of our recollection when they received orders to enter in fives they did so. Not so the Hankow

Consuls! It is difficult to imagine anything more servile, more undignified, than the acceptance by the Consuls of the five aggrieved Powers of Eugene Chen's orders that they were to wait upon him at his office at half-hour intervals. Comrade Eugene, indeed, must now be kicking himself that he did not carry his arrogance a step further and enjoin twenty-four or forty-eight hours intervals for the presentation of the Powers' demands, for there is every reason to suppose that we should then have learnt that "the animals went in one by one" at the prescribed intervals, humbly asked to be allowed to present the Notes forwarded to them by their Governments, and backed out bowing, with humble apologies for their intrusion. The Hankow Consuls walked into a trap which any feeling of self-respect—any consideration for the interests of their respective governments—should have enabled them to avoid. They were the representatives of Governments whose nationals had been outraged and murdered, whose property had been wantonly looted and destroyed by "Nationalist" troops. The identic Notes with the delivery of which they were entrusted made demands which, though studiously moderate, were of a punitive character, and were accompanied by threats of further action in the event of failure to comply promptly and satisfactorily with their terms. That Con-

sular officials entrusted with such a duty should have followed each other meekly to the office of Comrade Chen, like shamefaced school-boys, would seem incredible—if it had not actually happened. It was one of those clumsy blunders which encourages the Chinese extremists to believe that they can continue to affront and defy the Powers without any fear of the consequences. The duplicate notes which it was intended to present to General Chiang Kai-shek, could not be handed to him on the date fixed, as he had already left for Nanking, but the Foreign Consuls at Shanghai appear to have visited General Pei Chung-hsi, General Chiang's representative, in a body, and delivered the Notes in each other's presence.

Having presented their demands at Hankow in this apologetic manner, the Governments concerned could hardly have expected that they would receive a favourable reply. And they have not. The reply to Great Britain, summarized in a wireless message which appears to-day, is impudent and unsatisfactory. Only the obligation to make reparation for the damage done to the British Consulate at Nanking is recognized. In regard to other injuries to the persons, and damage to the property of British subjects, reparation is to be conceded only where it can be proved that these injuries or losses

have not been caused by the Anglo-American bombardment of Nanking, or by Northern rebels and *agents provocateurs*. The guilt of the "Nationalist forces" is not admitted, and a "cock and bull" story about the rounding up and capture of approximately 30,000 Northern troops in Nanking city is put forward. It seems strange that Northern troops should, for the purpose of looting and outraging foreigners, don Southern uniforms, with sandals in place of boots, and acquire, overnight, a Hunanese, in place of a Northern, accent. In an effort to confuse the issue, it is suggested that an International Commission of Inquiry should be instituted to investigate the circumstances of the bombardment of Nanking on March 24 by British naval forces, as well as what Comrade Chen describes as "other outrages" committed by the British armed forces at Shameen and Wanhhsien. The reasons why a Commission of Inquiry in regard to the Shameen incident cannot be considered were fully explained by the British Delegation at Canton in July last year. The Wanhhsien incident has nothing whatever to do with the "Nationalist" Government. It occurred in a territory over which, at the time, the latter had no control, and it would be just as sensible to inquire into this incident in association with the "Nationalist" authorities, as to

invite them to participate in an investigation of the holding up of the Japanese motor-ship *Chouan Maru*, in Tientsin.

This proposed International Commission, and the evasion of the demand for a written apology and guarantees from the Commander-in-Chief of the "Nationalist Army", are merely attempts to procrastinate. As a matter of fact the said Commander-in-Chief no longer takes the slightest notice of any orders issued from Hankow, so that what he does or does not do it entirely beyond Comrade Chen's control. It is noteworthy that while there is a grudging expression of regret regarding the attack on the British Consulate at Nanking, no regret appears to have been expressed for the murdering and outraging of British subjects, and the destruction of their property.

Chen repeats his usual humbug about not contemning "the use of any form of violence and agitation against foreign lives and property." This glib liar, as recently as March 26, told a member of the staff of the *People's Tribune* that the evacuation of Hankow was "entirely unnecessary and furthermore mischievous". He asserted that "Wuhan is the safest place in the whole Yangtze Valley. The idea of any conflict occurring in this section, with the government functioning here, was beyond the range of probability."

Within a week of his making this statement the Japanese Concession was invaded by a mob, Japanese premises were burnt, and most of the Japanese community had to be hurriedly evacuated. The final paragraph of the Chen note, as usual, attributes "the present troubles between Nationalist China and the Powers to the inequitable treaties" and audaciously proposes that delegates should be appointed to negotiate for the settlement of the issue between the two countries. The British Government, if we may judge from Sir Austen Chamberlain's recent statements in the House of Commons, does not regard the moment as propitious for negotiations of this character with a "Government" which has proved, on every occasion on which it has been put to the test, unable or unwilling, to fulfil any obligations or promises, into which it may have entered.

It will be remembered that in addition to the parade of Consuls at half-hourly intervals, to present the Five Powers' demands to Chen at Hankow, duplicate notes were handed to General Chiang Kai-shek's personal representative at Shanghai. It seems probable, in view of the open breach that has now occurred between the faction that acknowledges General Chiang's leadership, and the Wu-Han communists, that his reply will be of a more satisfactory character. In that event, the

problem confronting the Powers will be considerably simplified. The quarrel, it will be plain to the whole world, will be between them and the Chinese communists, and not, as the Wu-Han extremists would like to pretend, between the outraged Powers and China's "Nationalists." The moderate elements of the Kuomintang, who follow General Chiang's instructions, appear to have gained control of the situation in Shanghai, Hangchow, Canton, and other centres. If General Chiang offers satisfactory reparations, apologies and guarantees, it will be open to the Powers to limit whatever sanctions they decide to apply to the Wu-Han communists. It will be necessary completely to evacuate Hankow, after which it will be a comparatively simple matter to blockade the Yangtze in the region of Wuhu or Anking, completely isolating the Wu-Han "Government" until sufficient foreign forces are available for the occupation of Hankow. Eugene Chen's name does not yet figure in the list of persons proscribed by the Central Control Committee of the Kuomintang at Nanking. But his days now appear to be numbered, and we may look for the disillusionment of those credulous politicians in Europe and America who have regarded his impudent and verbose notes as proof of his leadership of "Nation-

alist" China, and of the ability of Mr. Chen of Trinidad to control the Cantonese armies, and the forces of disorder which Borodin and his Chinese friends have unloosed in Mid-China.



AN INFAMOUS CONSPIRACY.

(Tientsin, April 21, 1927).

WE printed yesterday a translation of a portion of a document found during the recent raid on the premises of the Soviet Embassy in Peking which, if authentic, reveals in all its nakedness, the dastardly character of Soviet intrigues in China. We trust that at the earliest possible date photographic reproductions of the original, with definite evidence as to the circumstances in which it was found, will be published by the Chinese authorities in Peking. For years past the Soviet Government has impudently maintained the pretence that its own activities and those of the Communist International at Moscow are separate, and that it is in no way responsible for the latter. This fiction was exposed in Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's own Note on the notorious Zinovieff letter, when he stated that the British Government "cannot accept the contention that whilst the Soviet Government undertakes obligations, a political body, as powerful as itself, is to be allowed to conduct a

propaganda, and support it with money, which is in direct violation of the official agreement." In spite of the former Prime Minister's official declaration in regard to the Moscow Government's responsibilities for the Third International, certain British labourites still profess to see a distinction between the acts of the Soviet Government and that body. As recently as the 4th inst. a Labour member asked Sir A. Chamberlain whether a statement he had made referred to the Russian Government or the Third International, to receive the reply: "I am unable to distinguish the responsibilities of the Russian Government for action which they carry out through their different organization."

The document of which we published a partial translation—a portion of it having been destroyed by fire—does not appear to be dated, but that it is of recent composition can be determined by the fact that it refers to the Seventh Plenary Session of Executive

Committee of the Communist International, and also to the effect of the overrunning of the British Concession at Hankow. It is marked—as it might well be—“very confidential,” and purports to contain instructions to the Soviet Military Attache “which you will carry out,” and which appear to have been drawn up by the Executive Committee mentioned. The first paragraph directs that every attention “must at present be paid to lend the revolutionary movement in China an exclusively nationalistic character.” This is to be done by carrying on propaganda in favour of the Kuomintang, “events at Hankow and the position taken up in consequence of them by England” being used as proof of the success of the nationalistic policy of that party, and of the weakness of the European Powers. The next injunction is to “stir up anti-foreign disturbances in the territory occupied by the troops of Chang Tso-lin,” obviously for the purpose of embroiling him with the Foreign Powers. Further, he is to be discredited by stigmatizing him as a mercenary of international capitalists and imperialists, who hinders the Kuomintang in its work of liberating China from foreign control. The next paragraph is missing, and then we come to No. 5—surely the most infamous injunction ever issued to an official of a Foreign Embassy, either by his own Government, or by “a political body as powerful as itself.” It reads as follows:

The mass of the population must by all

means be stirred up against the Foreigners. To this end it is necessary to cause the Foreign Powers to resort to repressive measures during public disturbances. *In order to provoke the intervention of Foreign troops, do not shrink before any measures, such as looting and wholesale massacre of Foreigners. In case of collisions with Foreign troops use these facts for propaganda.*

Here we see the nefarious plan actually adopted at Nanking enjoined upon an official of the Soviet Embassy, in advance. “Looting and wholesale massacre of Foreigners” was attempted as soon as the “Nationalist” forces entered the city, and but for the “repressive measures” adopted by the American and British warships, it is doubtful whether any foreign resident would have escaped alive. Sir Austen Chamberlain was unable to say definitely in the House of Commons that the Nanking outrages had been caused by the anti-British propaganda of agents of the Soviet Government. If proof of the genuineness of this document is submitted to him he will now be able to tell Parliament that what occurred there was part of a deliberate plan, foisted upon the Chinese from Moscow, and to which an official of the Soviet Embassy was an accomplice. It is not surprising that the Soviet Embassy has been withdrawn from Peking. Had the staff remained Marshal Chang Tso-lin would, in our opinion, have been fully justified in ordering the immediate arrest of the Military Attache for participation in a conspiracy for the massacre of For-

eigners in China, with the avowed object of embroiling this country with the Foreign Powers. Never, we fancy, in modern history has a Government which professes to be civilized, and to be actuated by humanitarian motives, instructed one of its officials to foment the looting and massacre of innocent foreigners within the territory of another State. The discovery of this document alone would have justified a raid not only upon the office of the Soviet Military Attaché, but also upon the Embassy offices. For it reveals an offence committed by the Envoy (or one of his staff) of a Foreign Government affecting the existence and safety of the State in which he resided, and constituting a danger of extreme urgency to the Government to which he was accredited.

The remaining paragraphs of the document reveal the malicious cunning of the Bolsheviks. For fear of arousing antagonism among the Chinese, strengthening Marshal Chang Tso-lin's position, and creating dissensions in the ranks of the Kuomintang, attempts to carry through a communistic programme should temporarily be abandoned. Borodin, it is stated, has received instructions to refrain from strong pressure upon the capitalists, in order to retain the sympathy of the bourgeoisie. As regards Japan, every effort is to be made to isolate her from the other Powers. To abandon anti-Japanese propaganda might arouse suspicion, but strict care must be exercised to see that

no Japanese suffer in any rioting, as Japan is "the party able to move the largest number of troops into China."

The criminal plans of the Moscow dictators have been carried through in some instances, and have gone astray in others, but this has been due, we take it, to the lack of discipline among the tools employed to create disturbances. Both at Nanking, and at Hankow, the instructions to refrain from making the Japanese "suffer" have been violated. But this is not surprising when one considers the fact that Hunanese troops were used in the former case, and an undisciplined mob in the case of Hankow. Chinese soldiers, or a mob, whose greed has been aroused by prospects of loot, and whose lust for blood has been deliberately stimulated, are not likely to exercise the discrimination enjoined by Moscow in the frenzy of murder and pillage. And to this extent Moscow's plans have gone astray. Otherwise they seem to have been carried out with a reasonable measure of success if one can use such a word to describe the shameful outrages which have occurred at Hankow, Chin-kiang, Nanking, and other Yangtze ports. The course of events, indeed, may be regarded as circumstantial evidence of the genuineness of the document from which we have quoted. But it is imperative that that genuineness should be established beyond all doubt. And it is for this reason—as also in the interests of civilization—that we urge the Ankuochun

authorities, if they are able to do so, to produce conclusive proof with the least possible delay. By doing so they will brand the Soviet as a pariah among the nations—not only as a fomenter of disturb-

ances, but as an accessory before the fact in the murder of helpless men and women, whose only offence is that they are foreigners in a strange land.

HOSTES HUMANI GENERIS.

(Tientsin, April 23, 1927).

THE Ankuochun is now permitting the publication of photographic reproductions of certain of the documents seized on the premises of the Soviet Embassy, among them being the "infamous instructions" issued under the injunction "very secret" to the Soviet Military Attaché. A facsimile of this document, which is stained and burnt round the edges, and partially destroyed, appeared in a Peking contemporary yesterday. And it is understood that as the investigation proceeds further disclosures will be made, and every facility given to the public to judge of the genuineness of the evidence. The mass of documents found will take some time to sort and translate, and the task is not expected to be completed in less than two months. Meanwhile hardly a day passes without fresh disclosures of

Bolshevik villainy. Yesterday we printed a summary of the list of subsidies paid by Moscow to the Chinese Communist Party, and to Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang's Army and the Second and Third Kuominchun—amounting in all to nearly \$814,000 for the six months ending March, 1926. To-day we are told that receipts have been discovered proving that Li Tachao, the notorious Chinese communist who was arrested during the raid, and is at present awaiting trial, was paid \$200 per month for his communistic activities, and that a detailed plan for the overthrow of Gen. Chiang Kai-shek was among the documents seized in the Military Attaché's office. Certain of the Foreign Legations interested in Soviet activities in China are reported to have sought for and obtained permission to inspect the documents that have

already been translated, and to take photographs for transmission to their respective Governments. It appears to have been a most fortunate "accident" that the Chinese Police exceeded the stipulations in the warranted countersigned by the Doyen of the Diplomatic Body, and visited the Military Attaché's office, in addition to private premises within the old Legation Guard Compound.

It seems a pity that passports were issued to the Soviet Embassy Staff before the criminal nature of the Military Attaché's activities was revealed. Diplomatic immunity is not, and was never intended to be, extended to officials of a foreign State who are actively engaged in conspiracies against the Government to which they are accredited, who are engaged in subsidizing and directing the activities of its enemies, and who seek, by the most unscrupulous and infamous methods to embroil that country with other friendly nations. If proof exists—of which there now appears little doubt—that the Soviet Military Attaché and other officials of the Embassy were engaged in such activities, not a passport, but a warrant for their arrest, should have been issued by the Peking Government. The precipitate flight of the Soviet Embassy officials can now be understood. But the whole civilized world would have rejoiced

if the Peking Government had arrested, and tried as common malefactors, those of the Embassy staff against whom it had proof of complicity in anti-government, and anti-foreign conspiracies in this country.

It will be interesting to see the effect of the Peking revelations in Europe. America, wisely as it has proved, has steadfastly refused to enter into any official relations with these enemies of the human race at Moscow. Every Government which has been inveigled into the recognition of the Soviets has had cause to regret doing so. To Moscow a Treaty of recognition, imposing mutual obligations on both parties, is merely a means to an end—the furthering, regardless of the most solemn undertakings to the contrary, of internal disorder, communism, and world revolution. To the British and Chinese and the Japanese Governments, Moscow has given most solemn pledges to refrain from hostile activities directed against them. To China this pledge was given in two separate agreements, the Sino-Russian Agreement signed in Peking on May 31, 1924, and the Mukden Agreement of September 30 of the same year. In each case the undertaking read:

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually pledge themselves not to permit, within their respective territories, the existence and/or activities of any organiza-

