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


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CHINA IN THE WAR

MICHENER (CARROLL K.)

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PROBABLE GAINS FROM THE WAR

China stands to gain far more than she might lose by the war. The balance is almost wholly in her favor. In it are to be reckoned her hope of release from the staggering indemnities inherited from the Boxer trouble, probable relief from foreign restrictions that keep her import duties at an unprofitable level, restoration of sovereignty over territorial concessions wrested from her in her greatest hours of weakness, more generous cooperation in developing her natural resources, and a more certain guarantee of her democracy and her political integrity.

Participation in the war gives China a

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CHINA IN THE WAR

BY CARROLL K. MICHENER

IT is generally conceded that at the beginning of the Great War the political integrity of China, the commercial Open Door, and the general peace of the Far East, were most threatened by two aggressors—Japan and Russia. The first two years of the war emphasized this danger. Two notable recent events, however, have put a radically different complexion on Far Eastern affairs, and placed the future of China on a more promising basis than it has ever stood before. These events are the democratization of Russia and the alignment of China with the Allies in their war against Germany.

The significance of these happenings in their relation to the affairs of the Far East seems to have been more or less overlooked in our intense preoccupation with the nearer aspects of the war. But their effect must be far-reaching, and eventually will be apparent, not only as shaping China's destiny, but in the solution of the Orient's complex problems.

The effect of the changes in Russia as they touch China is, of course, subject only to speculation, but the probable results of China's entrance into the war seem so obvious as to warrant pretty liberal estimation. Both, it may be safely said, will have their share in lifting China to a more powerful and honorable place among her sister nations.

PROBABLE GAINS FROM THE WAR

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Participation in the war gives China a double leverage for the attainment of the

last-named of these potential benefits. It will operate both internally and externally. The recent monarchical restoration of General Chang Hsun served to emphasize the lack of cohesion that threatens China within. It was followed by continued rumblings of southern secession, which persisted up to the moment of declaring war on Germany. At any time China might have burst into the flame of a civil strife between the radical South and the reactionary North. The facing of a national enemy should be, as always, a powerful agent for quieting this internal dissension and for putting China's quarreling patriots shoulder to shoulder. The external safeguard of the Chinese democracy resides, of course, in the benevolent protection assured by the family of Allied nations.

RUSSO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT

The danger to China's integrity from predatory neighbors has been acute for over a century. Though most of the European powers have had their share in a policy of plundering that seemed certain a decade and a half ago to result in the "break-up of China" that more than one authority on Far Eastern affairs predicted, Russia and Japan always have been the most threatening to her political entity. Both are imperialistic. The Russo-Japanese war was an incident that outlined China's danger to the full, though on the surface it may have seemed a negative sort of protection to her. Out of that comparatively indecisive struggle grew recognition between Japan and Russia of the compatibility—in spite of the similarity of their imperialistic aims. They found that coöperation, rather than altercation, was what would best advance their mutual interests.

At the beginning of the Great War, then—just ten years after the siege of Port Arthur—Japan and Russia had come to an agreement that held the utmost danger for China. Between them they had parcelled out Manchuria and Mongolia, and agreed upon harmonious means of exploiting their spheres of influence. Russia retained in ef-

fect what she had fought for in 1904—generous commercial advantage in China and a sea outlet in the Eastern hemisphere. Japan insured what in effect she fought for—and which nominally had been very largely wrested from her by the treaty of Portsmouth—an outlet on the continent of Asia for her surplus population, and plenty of commercial elbow-room.

JAPAN'S OVERLORDSHIP

Enlargement of these advantages through the Russo-Japanese *rapprochement* had been observed by the other powers prior to the Great War, and it is doubtful if the process could have gone to much greater length without an accounting. The war, however, and the alignment of Japan and Russia in the Entente group, removed all restraining fingers. In wresting Kiaochow from Germany Japan took liberties with China's sovereignty that seemed to evidence a feeling on her part that she was free to go almost as far as she liked. This apparent sentiment was demonstrated further in the famous twenty-one demands, and not many months ago in the concessions insisted upon as indemnity for a petty clash between Japanese military police and Chinese resident troops in northern China. Japan has taken over in full Germany's former interests in China, and such of the twenty-one demands as met with compliance have given her vastly increased commercial and political influence over her neighbor. The result may be summed up, so far as China is concerned, as the conversion of China into what gave ominous promise of a future vassal state, and as the virtual overthrow—so most observers in the United States have viewed it—of the Open Door policy.

RUSSIAN POLICY

With imperialistic Japan in full agreement with imperialistic Russia, and the aims of both in the Far East being carried out energetically by Japan during the fortuitous "open season" occasioned by the occupation of the rest of the powers in the world war, the Russian revolution offered curiously new possibilities. Would the sudden change from autocracy to democracy effect changes in Russia's policies that would reach as far as China? Could the pronouncement of the infant Muscovite democracy that it would continue the war for liberties and not for conquests be taken as an indication that the new Russia would strive no further for em-

pire in the East? Might China not only be safe from further territorial aggression by her neighbor on the north, but even regain from the sister democracy what the old autocracy had taken while China was in the throes of her own emancipation? These questions, of course, are not yet answered, but they offer hopeful possibilities. They are questions to which China's entrance into the war may insure the most satisfactory answers.

China at war with Germany on the side of the Allies is an astoundingly different figure from anything she has ever before presented to the modern world. Even though her participation in the war may be only nominal, her position would be hardly less strong for that. It is the outcome of the boldest and most farseeing bit of statecraft the young republic has written into her history. In a word, she places herself and her destiny at a council table the nature of which insures to her by moral force alone the justice and security she might otherwise have gained only by recourse to arms against nations with which she now is allied.

WRITING OFF BOXER INDEMNITIES

The world at large scarcely realizes, perhaps, what a revenge is wreaked upon the Chinese people through the staggering indemnities exacted in punishment for the fanatical outburst of 1901. Though originally the Boxer indemnity reached a total of only \$335,000,000, it has grown through deferred interest payments to almost twice that sum. Many millions of the debt have been paid, but the sum owing to-day is about \$550,000,000, which is an exceedingly heavy burden for a nation whose annual budget runs to scarcely more than \$200,000,000.

Although Germany took small part in the relief of the Boxer-besieged legation at Peking, her troops arriving after everything was over except the looting, her portion of the indemnity was larger than that of any other nation except Russia, whose troops did least in the restoration of order. Germany's share was \$110,000,000, most of which is unpaid. Here, then, is an opportunity for China to be rid promptly of one of the dangerous drains upon her financial vitals. Declaration of war against Germany at once strikes off a debt of at least a hundred odd millions. As for the rest of the indemnity, is it a vain hope that the reward of the Allies for China's enlistment in their cause should be complete remission of payment, or

at the very least an indefinite deferment as to both principal and interest?

The example of the United States in converting her share of the indemnity into a fund for the education of young Chinese in schools and colleges of America has been looked upon in late years by the other powers with a respect almost amounting to jealousy. China counts upon this shrewd example, doubtless, to bring equal, if not greater, concessions from the nations that now are her allies. And if the chancelleries of Europe understand China—as they must pretty well at this advanced stage of diplomatic experimenting upon her—they understand that it is not the money alone that irks China; that probably the money is the very least of the burden. It is the ignominy undeservedly inherited from old China that stings the young Chinese. The Boxer indemnity for them is loss of “face”—a badge of servitude as bitter as the shameful queue of the Tartars.

DISCRIMINATIONS AGAINST CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY

Increasing the weight of the indemnity burden, the restricted import duty imposed upon China by the meddling powers has been another financial incubus. Though the 5 per cent. impost was fixed over a decade ago, and even then was inadequate to meet China's revenue needs, she never was able to get the unanimous consent of all the powers to increase it. China hopes, by entering the war, to remedy not only this but other financial disabilities, and to gain release from the more irksome of the fiscal supervision imposed upon her by creditor nations.

The young China has chafed sorely at her inheritance of foreign police and law courts from those recent barbaric days when they admittedly were necessary. The outright concessions or long-term leases of land for trading purposes and as war indemnities, some of them dating back over half a century, are severe thorns to-day in the side of the young republic. What happened to the foreign concessions many years ago in Japan must happen in China eventually, but the powers have not been noticeably disposed to act on their own initiative. Their course would have been to wait until China was strong enough politically to compel restoration of her alienated soil to the sovereignty of her own flag. This political strength seems assured to her in the place she will hold at the war council-table of the Allies.

Particularly humiliating have been some of

the foreign colonies planted on Chinese soil. They have become more pernicious parasites on China's sovereignty than ever Japan had to deal with. Germany's seizure of Kiaochow was a flagrant example. Here as in all the foreign concessions, was planted a foreign flag, foreign courts, a foreign army. From the firm entrenchment of Tsingtau, Germany reached out by means of railroad enterprises until practically the entire province of Shantung was in her grasp. This was true to greater or less extent with all the foreign concessions, each of which was an open and spreading wound to China's sovereignty. The British entrenched themselves at Hongkong and Wei-hai-wei, the French in Kuangchowwan, the Portuguese at Macao, the Japanese in Formosa and Kuantung; and each of these and other nations had gained smaller slices of territory in nearly a dozen treaty ports up and down the coast and far inland.

FOREIGN TROOPS AT PEKING

Most exasperating to the young China of all the extra-territoriality, perhaps, is the presence, a decade and a half after the Boxer uprising, of thousands of foreign troops under the very eaves of the gilded roofs of the capital, guarding the legations and the line of approach to the sea. The world had almost forgotten this arrangement in the recent days when the dramatic burlesque of General Chan's attempted restoration of the Manchu dynasty suddenly called it to mind. It was rather surprising to read the news cables that chronicled renewed marches of protective foreign troops along the railway leading from Tien-Tsin to Peking. China would have all this remedied, either by tacit agreement now or by promised council after the war. She would have the flag of the republic flying over all of China, and her new law courts and police power governing the foreigner as well as the native within her gates.

THE KAISER'S MAILED FIST IN CHINA

Opportunity for the seizure of Kiaochow, which had long been contemplated, was afforded to the Kaiser by the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung province. The Berlin Government immediately instructed its minister at Peking to demand of the Chinese Government the cession of Kiaochow Bay and its adjacent territory. Before China had time to answer the German note, four German cruisers suddenly appeared in Kiaochow Bay and landed a

large detachment of marines. Since China could not fight she could do no less than sign the "murder convention." Though the murders were the pretext, the real reason for the seizure, of course, was that German trade expansion in China demanded advantages no less great than those other European nations had acquired long before the development of Germany's colonial policy.

Since the seizure of Kiaochow, China has had occasion often enough to observe the operation of the mailed fist. In treatment both of officials and individuals—particularly the common people who happened to be in the way—Germany has been ruthless and arrogant. What China considered the greatest humiliation visited upon her as punishment for the Boxer uprising against foreigners was Germany's demand of an imposing monument in a conspicuous place in Peking bearing a perpetual apology for the murder of the German ambassador. Though the German troops arrived late at the relief of Peking, they were not too late for bloodshed and looting. Order had been restored, but the German troops came inland to Peking in a procession of sabotage and murder according with the orders for "frightfulness" that had gone out from Potsdam.

INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

As for a direct cause of war China had, perhaps, less grievance than any other belligerent. Having no commerce under her flag on the high seas she has not suffered greatly as a result of the German submarine policy. She can point, however, to the loss of two hundred Chinese lives on board a British vessel torpedoed in the Mediterranean, and though China has not always valued the lives of her citizens highly or given even passable protection for them abroad, she no doubt feels that as direct causes of war go the loss of her two hundred would be ample.

But above all the impelling motives and influences leading China into the struggle stands doubtless the initiative of the United States. The sympathy between these two nations because of like ideals and fortuitous policies of the United States that have bound them together in spite of an occasional error, is so well understood as to need no restatement. The leadership of America in political ideals has been particularly pronounced during the period of the war leading up to the United States' break with Germany. Utterances of the press and of official China in-

dicated throughout that the Far Eastern republic gave full endorsement to the war policies of the United States. President Wilson's note to neutrals at the time of the break with Germany was a cue that China picked up promptly. Without a "by-your-leave" to her self-appointed mentor, Japan, China broke off relations with Germany as the United States had done. There was evident at the same time a disposition to go even further, should the United States again take the lead. In fact, not long after America's declaration that a state of war with Germany existed the Chinese cabinet determined to follow suit. A quarrel with Parliament over the right of initiative in the matter blocked a formal declaration at that time, although all parties are said to have been agreed upon the wisdom of the war policy.

JAPAN'S RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA SHIFTED TO THE ALLIES

In the future relations of Japan and China as a result of China's participation in the war, there is a field for interesting speculation. From this viewpoint alone, China seems to have made a master play. There is no doubt that China has feared Japan more than any other nation. She has had cause for such fear. Japan's modern armies have humbled her in military encounter, and Japan's might everywhere and always has been made apparent to China; for many years her mailed fist, like Germany's, has been at China's nose. Since the beginning of the European war that fist has shaken more ominously, and, bowing to the inevitable, China long since began making the best she could of the situation. The Tsingtau affair added to her troubles because instead of being relieved of one of the foreign aggressors upon her soil she merely experienced a change of tenants. Japan promises to be even a sharper thorn at Tsingtau than was Germany. Not only at Kiaochow, but throughout China, commercially and politically, has Japan appeared to be administering an active tutorship leading further and further toward virtual suzerainty.

But now, of a sudden, China puts a totally new and interesting aspect on the case by her entrance into the war. In effect she transfers responsibility of maintaining political integrity from her own shoulders to the collective shoulders of the Allies. At one stroke she removes Japan as chief arbiter of her destinies, and substi-

tutes practically the entire civilized world. The Allies, who were too busily at war, and the United States, whose perplexities at home and abroad made her seem indifferent to the fate of China, now are brought back to their duty by a simple shuffling of the cards—China's new deal.

RESTORATION OF THE OPEN DOOR

America's foreign policy, so far as we can be said to have a policy concerning the Far East, has been centered about the Open Door. With Germany's commercial interests in China after the war governed by what doubtless will be the severe after-the-war commercial program of the Allies, Japan will be the greatest gainer. Her commercial future in China is assured. Removing Germany as a trade competitor in the Far East will relieve the commercial pressure sufficiently, perhaps, to restore automatically the Open Door which has appeared to be in great danger of being padlocked shut through the activities of Japan.

CHINA'S WEIGHT IN THE WAR

Curiously enough it will make no great difference, in the strategic gains that will result for China, whether she contributes much or little in waging the war against

Germany. Her aid will be largely in moral and potential force. Little if anything can be expected of China in a military way. She has no navy, and though there are in China upwards of half a million men under arms, they are neither trained nor equipped for warfare of the sort that is waged at the present day. As for men she has the greatest store of any nation in the world. Perhaps 100,000 already have been sent to France to replace in fields and factories the men needed at the front. Doubtless many hundreds of thousands more will go to fill similar industrial gaps in the ranks of the Allies.

China's natural resources are enormous. Her coal and iron should be of immediate use to the Allies. A single one of her iron mines, in Hupeh province, will yield, it is estimated, 5,000,000 tons of ore. There are foundries and smelters at Hanyang on the Yangtze River that turn out 500,000 tons of steel annually. China's annual output of coal is only about 6,000,000 tons, but she has coal resources of about 135,000 acres. The weight of China as a belligerent, therefore, even though she never fires a shot, and the ponderance of the questions she brings into due course of solution at the end of the war, are such as will bulk largely in the scales that shall weigh the world's peace.

JAPAN, CHINA, AND THE FAR EAST

BY K. K. KAWAKAMI

THE year 1917 has been a year of puzzles and surprises. Within the first six months events as dramatic as they were unexpected followed one after another in such rapid succession that even the extraordinary three years that preceded them seem to have become comparatively commonplace. Since the dawn of the year we have seen the overthrow of the Romanoff dynasty, followed by the advent of the new Republic of Russia. We have also seen America breaking loose from her traditional foreign policy and determined to play an important rôle in the war of Europe. To China, however, credit is due for having furnished the greatest of great surprises. That country of eternal enigma has set the world agog by an attempt to revive the defunct Manchu dynasty, and this

at the very moment when Russia threw the imperial régime overboard.

JAPAN AND RUSSIA

In such sudden turns of events in Russia and China, Japan, responsible for the preservation of peace in the Orient, while the powers of the West are engaged in the titanic struggle, is perhaps more keenly interested than any other country. Japan realizes the seriousness of the responsibility she has assumed in the Far East, and watches with the gravest concern the developments of the situation in both Russia and China.

When I stopped at Tokio en route to Peking, the statesmen of Japan were frankly puzzled as to the course their country might be called upon to take, should disorganization

in Russia grow so disastrous as to compel her to drop from the ranks of the Entente powers and conclude a separate peace with Germany. Japan, though six thousand miles distant from Petrograd, is nevertheless Russia's next-door neighbor, and is in a position to bring pressure to bear upon the Muscovites once they are inclined to secede from the Entente camp. I was given to understand by the statesmen I interviewed that should Russia grasp Germany's hand and pursue a common course with the latter Japan would, if requested by her allies, throw her army across the Japan Sea and compel Russia to divert her forces from the European field of battle to the Far East. But what would be Japan's line of action in case Russia simply stopped fighting against Germany and took no aggressive steps against England and France? To this question I was unable to get any definite answer. All would perhaps depend upon the disposition of the powers with whom Japan is coöperating.

ACTIVE AID TO THE ALLIES

That the Terauchi Cabinet is willing to aid England and France more than is required in the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is indicated by the great activities of Japanese warships in the Mediterranean Sea as well as in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. To emphasize that willingness Japan has even sent a special embassy to America ostensibly for no other purpose than that of assuring the latter nation that she is ready to take care of the entire Pacific Ocean if the American navy finds it necessary to transfer its Pacific fleets to the Atlantic.

JAPAN'S ALTERED CHINESE POLICY

With the woe and weal of China, Japan's concern is more direct. The slogan of the Terauchi Cabinet with regard to that unfortunate country has been "Hands off China!" The cabinet was indeed organized to reverse the Chinese policy followed by its predecessor, the Okuma ministry. The Okuma Cabinet, perhaps misled by the ill-advised counsel of the so-called China experts, made grave blunders in its dealings with China. It resorted to doubtful means in preventing Yuan Shih-kai's enthronement. It presented to China the celebrated twenty-one demands in a manner objectionable both to China and the outside powers. Moreover, some of those demands should better have been withheld. To make the situation more intolerable, the same ministry reopened the

wound it had already inflicted upon China by presenting fresh demands on the occasion of the little fracas which took place between Japanese and Chinese troops at Cheng-Chia-tun, Manchuria. In fairness to Marquis Okuma, I am willing to concede that he believed his Chinese policy to be the best that could be found under the circumstances which he had to contend with. Yet judged from the results that policy was a grievous failure.

"WATCHFUL WAITING" IN CHINA

There is no doubt that the Terauchi Cabinet is enjoying the fruits of the Chinese measures for which Okuma and his colleagues had to shoulder all blame, for those measures, despite their marring features, accomplished certain aims which Terauchi himself would have been called upon to accomplish, had they been left unattained by Okuma.

After all has been said in favor of Okuma the fact remains that his Chinese policy has created a situation which needs to be mended by his successor. It is to this task of amelioration that Terauchi has been invited to address himself. And the new policy which Terauchi has inaugurated in response to this call is a policy of "non-interference." Translated into President Wilson's striking language, Terauchi's policy in China is "watchful waiting."

True to its professed intentions, the present cabinet has long since withdrawn Japanese troops from Cheng-Chia-tien. It is even rumored that Terauchi is contemplating the removal of Japanese soldiers from Hankow, where they have been stationed ever since the first Chinese revolution of 1911. But the most noteworthy evidence of this non-interference policy is the attitude consistently taken by Count Terauchi and his Foreign Minister, Baron Motono, in the political crisis in China apparently occasioned by the question of China's participation in the European war.

CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR

This last-named war question is, of course, quite independent of the question of what governmental form China should adopt. But in China all foreign questions are, to the jeopardy of the nation's welfare, ruthlessly exploited by opposing factions for the manipulation of internal politics. Viewed in this light, the powers would have done well to advise China to let the war question alone.

Unable even to take care of her own affairs, China is in no position to tamper with such questions. I fail to understand those Americans who are very boastful of their successful efforts to induce China to sever diplomatic relations with Germany. Do they not know that they were playing with fire which might consume China's own tottering structure?

To clear the atmosphere befogged by indiscriminate writings, it is essential to understand Japan's position with regard to Chinese participation in the war. It was in 1915, when Yuan Shih-kai was still enjoying dictatorial power, that the idea of drawing China into the war was broached by England. At that moment Japan could not see her way to support the idea, for the obvious reason that Yuan was eager to go to war merely to fortify his own position as a step towards the imperial throne he had been coveting. Japan was convinced that Yuan's accession would soon be followed by more rebellions, and was anxious to prevent such a consummation. England herself eventually adopted the same view of the situation, and the matter of Chinese participation in the war was for the time dropped.

When in March last America severed diplomatic intercourse with Germany and advised China to follow suit, the political situation in China had so radically changed that Japan was now willing to let China act in consonance with the American advice. The dictatorial Yuan had been dead for several months, and in his place an amicable gentleman in the person of General Li Yuan-Hung was occupying the presidential chair. Thus Japan's main reason for objecting to China's taking part in the war was removed.

As soon as America advised China to break off treaty relations with Germany, the government at Peking asked Japan's opinion on the question. The Terauchi Cabinet, through Foreign Minister Motono, replied at once that it was reluctant to give any advice that might be interpreted as an interference with China's own affairs, but that China would perhaps lose nothing in breaking with Germany, especially when America had already taken that course and was eager to have China line up with her. China further sought Japan's opinion as to the advisability of asking the consent of the powers to the increase of the customs tariff on the imports to China. In reply to this Japan expressed herself ready to accede to such a demand, provided, of course, other powers

would act likewise. I have reason to believe that Japan even suggested that China at once notify the powers with a view to securing the desired revision of the tariff.

Such has been Japan's unequivocal attitude towards China's war question. He speaks ill-advisedly who tells Americans that China hesitated to follow the example set by the United States and close the doors against Germany because she was fearful of Japan's objection to such a step.

Both the American and the Japanese press have discussed with a great deal of animation the American note presented to China on June 7, urging upon President Li Yuan-hung the necessity of establishing a government capable of restoring peace and order before China could decide upon war.

I am inclined to believe that Japan will not long be permitted to follow a policy of non-interference in China. If the chaotic situation in China persists, even after the termination of the European war, other powers are certain to intervene, or at least clamor for the restoration of order. The American advice to China given in March and June has already sounded a warning in the ears of the Japanese. Should European nations, after the war, each essay to take a hand in Chinese affairs, might not Japan also be obliged to deviate from her present policy?

REPUBLIC OR MONARCHY IN CHINA?

That a stable government will not easily be established in China goes without saying. The political chaos will not end with the fiasco created by General Chang Hsun's fatuous attempt to resuscitate the Manchu dynasty dead for six years. What will be China's ultimate form of government no one can tell. Such influential men as Tuan Chi-Jui, Hsu Shi-Chang, and Feng Kuo-Chang no doubt see in a constitutional monarchy the best form of government for China, but even they realize that the Manchu dynasty cannot be restored. Where, then, shall they look for the imperial timber? On the other hand, Sun Yat-Sen and his Southern associates believe in out-and-out republicanism, which will never be accepted by the Northern leaders.

To an unbiased observer, it would seem that China's only hope for rehabilitation lay in mutual concessions on the part of the radical South and the conservative North, thus finding a common ground upon which to establish a government.

BENEFITS TO CHINA

By CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER

(Judge of the United States Court for China)

PARTICIPATION in the war was a subject of controversy in China long before it was actually undertaken, and indeed was one of the causes leading to the crisis which incidentally made possible the short-lived Manchu restoration of last July. Those who favored such participation argued that it would give China a recognized place at the peace conference and enable her to secure two important and long-sought concessions, *vi.*: (1) the remission, or at least suspension, of the so-called "Boxer" indemnities, and (2) a substantial increase of customs duties.

As to the first, our own Government long ago recognized the justice of the claim by remitting its entire share of the Boxer indemnity; and this was done not as a mere act of generosity, but as one of justice. In other words, our representatives became convinced after investigation that the sum exacted from China by the powers in 1900 was more than reimbursement for losses actually suffered by them, and amounted to a fine imposed upon a then helpless nation.

As to the second concession sought, it will no doubt surprise the ordinary reader to learn that China must obtain the consent of the Powers in order to increase her customs duties. This is because that branch of her public service, while technically Chinese, is really administered by foreigners (*i. e.*, non-Chinese) in order to insure payment of interest on China's foreign loans. Indeed, it would hardly be inaccurate to say that the Chinese customs service is a creation of foreigners. The late Sir Robert Hart devoted his life to it; and while the treaties require that the Inspector General shall be a British subject for some years to come, representatives of other nationalities, including our own, have contributed materially to its upbuilding and successful administration. Men like Morse and Merrill, now retired, as well as Carl and Bryant, still in the harness, have worthily represented our country in a branch of China's governmental service which has been honestly and efficiently administered, and which, with the "Salt Gabelle," or monopoly, similarly operated, af-

fords an important, if not the principal, source of China's public revenues.

But the control of the Powers extends to the fixing of the amount of duty, and at present this is only 5 per cent. Considering that the gravest obstacles of the Chinese government in recent years have been financial ones, it is not strange that its officials have looked to the customs as a source of relief and have regarded the present limitation as not only entirely too low, but as framed in the interests of foreign exporters rather than in those of the Chinese people. Moreover, those foreign representatives who have been most insistent upon retaining the so-called indemnity are also the ones who oppose an increase of duties; and to the Chinese, it seems the extreme of injustice to be forced on the one hand to pay these heavy exactions and on the other to be denied the full benefit of a legitimate source of revenue to meet them.

As to these points, therefore, China's case appears to be entirely just and reasonable and at the same time quite in line with traditional American policy. To what extent she will participate actively in the war which she has now voluntarily entered remains to be seen; but it is not unlikely that her most effective contribution will be labor. I may cite as an earnest of this the fact that the ship which brought me recently from China to America carried nearly a thousand Chinese laborers for the western front, entraining at Vancouver for the rail trip across Canada and thence transshipping to France. Large-limbed and brawny, these coolies were the pick of Shantung Province; and it is safe to say that for trench digging and all the heaviest work of warfare each is better fitted than the average soldier. It is interesting to note also that the plan works well for the coolie, affording him better wages, food, and clothing than he would have at home and insuring provision likewise for his family in China. This augmentation of Allied resources has now been in progress for months and may prove a not inconsiderable factor toward that victorious outcome of the war for which we of America are hoping.

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