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Legacy of Tiananmen: The Sino-Japanese Relationship Post 1989

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Submitted to International Studies Program, Trinity College
Supervised by Professor Jeffrey Bayliss
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Abstract

This thesis explores Chinese Communist Party's political use of history as a function to conduce patriotism and to legitimize Party rule. The research initially focused on how anti-Japanese sentiments have grown in China since the Tiananmen demonstrations in 1989 and after the establishment of a new educational system in 1991. It then explores the impact of CCP's bias referral to conservative Japanese textbooks and views of history. These studies suggested that under the Patriotic Education Campaign and CCP's representation of Japanese right wing textbooks in China, the state has established methods to control the anti-Japanese sentiments to take focus away from domestic issues, overall contributing to the current unstable Sino-Japanese relations.

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Introduction

On a hot afternoon, I heard my usual ringtone. Annoyed from the heat and exhaustion from unpacking, I noticed that it was a call from my father who lives in Japan. We caught up on our daily lives, telling him that I was already tired of preparing for the last year at Trinity College, but also on how much I missed being home. Laughing, but also concerned with his daughter, my dad updated me on his personal news. Usually our calls consist of ten to twenty minute conversations about my school and about his work. Since my father and I do not have many mutual interests, we do not speak on entertainment but sometimes on news that has caught both of our attention. This day's phone call lasted more than an hour. We spoke about the recent events on the Senkaku Island ship collisions.

On September 7th a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a Japanese Coastal Guard boat. The accident drew public attention due to its location: the collision took place over the water where fishing rights have been disputed for many years. The Japanese side arrested the Chinese captain after he failed to leave the area. A couple weeks later the Japanese media (and some western media) covered the news of wide spread anti-Japanese demonstrations in Mainland China. The Chinese premier Wen Jiaobao asked for the release of the captain in a threatening manner. Later the Japanese government released the captain, fearing a larger impact on the Sino-Japanese relationship. China demanded an apology from the Japanese, but the Japanese counter-claimed on the damage done to their patrol boats during the collision. During this incident China cut economic transactions and canceled large-scale tour group trips bound for Japan. "I'm really glad you are not studying abroad

right now,” my father said in a heartbreaking manner. Sadly, part of me was relieved that I was not there too.

I spent my junior year in college studying abroad in Beijing. I also was fortunate to spend a summer in Shanghai during the summer of my freshman year. Like many other students believe, I knew that studying Chinese would open more career opportunities post-graduation. Since freshman year at Trinity, I prepared extensively to go abroad. Because of its similar writing system and script as Japanese, Chinese was a relatively easier language for me to start. “Easy” definitely would be an exaggeration, but Chinese soon became my favorite subject.

Studying abroad in Beijing opened up my eyes. Having only lived in industrialized countries, I never knew the real living conditions in a developing country. The media often focuses on the economical development of China, but rarely writes on the reality: that is, in fact China still suffers from a cleavage in society between the rich and the poor, while the people lack significant political freedoms.

Studying in China was not as easy as I initially thought it would be. Not only were the classes at Beijing Foreign Studies University challenging, but also cultural differences caused uncomfortable experiences. Part of me knew that these experiences were due to the language barrier. However, I knew that China was not as welcoming to foreigners as I thought, especially a Japanese student like myself. When asked about my background by curious Chinese locals, I was quick to answer “Japanese”. Several times I got the confused look due to my western appearance, but I also felt a negative vibe in the air. The negativity always saddened me: I knew that

many of these Chinese locals never visited Japan but developed negative feelings about my country because of past and current struggles that both countries still face. I knew that Japan have apologized for the past atrocities numerous times- however, China has yet to accept these apologies. I realized that at times apologies might not be enough to establish good international relations.

In an international relations class, I wrote on the future of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. I argued in my paper that former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama seemed to work on bettering the future by cooperating on environmental issues and launching a collaborative research on history.¹ However after hearing about the recent anti-Japanese demonstrations in the mainland of China, I felt betrayed. Once the demonstrations settled down, I was curious as to why Sino-Japanese relations failed to stabilize over the past several years. I discerned that there are fundamental reasons behind the growing anti-Japanese sentiments, and decided to study and pursue research on this matter.

I concluded that there are two significant reasons behind the failing Sino-Japanese relations. The first deals with the Chinese Communist Party's new patriotic education. Since the Tiananmen democratic movements, the CCP has been afraid of losing power. In order to legitimize party rule once again, CCP has established a Patriotic Education Campaign which focuses on victimization of the people during the war times against Western and Japanese powers. By focusing so much on the atrocities committed by the Japanese military, and by re-establishing anti-Japanese

¹ Overview of Japan-China Summit Meeting (Outline) ." *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. N.p., Apr. 2010. Web. 18 May 2010. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/summit_meet1004.html>.

sentiments, CCP has successfully taken focus away from domestic issues and raise patriotism in the Chinese society. The patriotism and the anti-Japanese sentiments contribute on the current insecure Sino-Japanese relations.

The second reason behind the failing Sino-Japanese relations is due to CCP's referral to the right-winged Japanese history textbooks as universal. Although not much of the various narratives are known in China, Japan has been working on recognizing and even apologizing to the past atrocities. Events such as the Nanjing Massacre are present in majority of the textbooks and are also widely known in the Japanese society. However the CCP continues to only present right-winged views in China, which at many times foster the anti-Japanese demonstrations.

The first chapter will focus on events that led to anti-Japanese sentiments in China. The chapter begins with the Sino-Japanese War period to the current Chinese Communist Party rule. Throughout history, Sino-Japanese relations have not remained stagnant; domestic factors and international changes have made for a complex relationship. The chapter will also summarize many of the historical events such as the Nanjing Massacre, comfort women and Unit 731 that helped propel anti-Japanese sentiments within China. The chapter will conclude by discussing the recent anti-Japanese embedded education campaign, which will segue into the next chapter.

Chapter Two will argue that the controversial Patriotic Education Campaign is the main source of antagonistic feelings on the Chinese side in Sino-Japanese relations. Because anti-Japanese sentiments have been present since Sino-Japanese Wars, the CCP was able to use the anti-Japanese sentiments in their educational

system to achieve support from the people. Through textbooks, mass media, the Internet and memorial sites the anti-Japanese sentiments have grown across the nation.

Chapter Three will argue that Chinese government has presented to its people the existence of only right-winged textbooks in Japan. It will be shown that this is caused by the CCP's desire to maintain the anti-Japanese sentiments in the population. Chinese demonstrations are quick to criticize Japan's portrayal on the many debated historical events, but these demonstrators often seem unaware of the vast variety of narratives among the different textbooks and their portrayal of history. This chapter will refer to the right-winged representations of historical events that the Chinese communities reflect on, which continues to contribute to insecure Sino-Japanese relations.

Chapter 1

China: The Road to an Anti-Japanese Nation

Chinese and Japanese diplomatic relations were not always unstable. In fact, for many years, Japan looked up to China as a strong leader, until shocking events in the Opium Wars led to China's defeat against Western powers. Then the First Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894 between Meiji Japan and Qing China over the control of Korea, putting an end to a good Sino-Japanese relation. Following Japan's victory, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed in 1895: a treaty that recognized the independence of Korea from China, but not permitting freedom from the Japanese interference in Korea's domestic affairs. Japan took possession islands, including Taiwan, and opened many Chinese trade ports to the Japanese. In 1915, Japan, using its position as one of the Allied countries during World War I, issued the 21 Demands to the Chinese in order to strengthen its position China. The demand included superiority over Manchuria and Shandong province under the Japanese military. In the same year, the Chinese population began its first boycott of Japanese products as a result of these unreasonable 21 Demands. This marked the beginning of modern anti-Japanese sentiments within China.

Later, in 1919, another boycott occurred involving the general public, including a large number of the student population. Some local chambers of commerce cut economic ties with Japan; some workers refused to work at Japanese-owned factories while student activists punished people who were involved with, selling or consuming Japanese products. During the rise of the Chinese Nationalists (also known as Guomindang or KMT), the Japanese army fought against them in

Jinan, the capital of Shandong province. This armed conflict in 1928, later known as the Jinan Incident, again resulted in Japanese victory, allowing the Japanese to occupy a large amount of land in Northern China. The incident sparked another anti-Japanese boycott, but this time the KMT government mobilized the population to cut economic deals with Japan.

The Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II were the hardest times in China. Although the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party formed the National Front against the Japanese army, China suffered a great amount of casualties, including women and children. China also withstood many atrocities, such as the Nanjing Massacre, use of comfort women and stationing of Unit 731 to conduct biological and chemical warfare research. Today, the memory and interpretation of these atrocities has become a critical element in Sino-Japanese relations ever since the Chinese Communist Party started to lose power in the late 80s.

In late 1937, the Japanese army attacked and entered Nanjing. In order to capture the city, the Japanese army initiated a month-long terror, now known as the Nanjing Massacre. The Japanese army roamed the streets, burglarizing, killing and raping women; the invading forces also burned the majority of the city. Unarmed Chinese prisoners of war were used as live targets for the Japanese Army's rifle and bayonet practices. Nanjing's population of one million people during prewar times decreased to less than two hundred thousand by the end of the month-long atrocity.

Another issue that raises public attention in China is the use of comfort women by the Japanese military. Comfort women worked in Japanese military brothels before and during World War II. It has been proven that many women from

China and Korea were tricked or abducted by the Japanese soldiers and forced into prostitution as a form of sexual slavery. The exact number is still unknown, but Chinese scholars estimate that there were up to 410,000 of these women in China.

Another controversial historical issue is the existence of a violent and inhumane Japanese military unit, Unit 731. Unit 731 was a Japanese medical unit that was located in northeast China under commander Shiro Ishii. This unit researched and developed chemical and biological warfare techniques. For research purposes, the medics carried out experiments on humans, mostly Chinese prisoners, including vivisections without anesthetic. The victims, which included women and children, were called “maruta” or “logs,” and were exposed to many lethal diseases, such as the cholera and other infections, for medical studies.

The past atrocities of Nanjing Massacre, comfort women and Unit 731 still remain to cause problems on the current Sino-Japanese relations. Different portrayals of the wartime atrocities are present in the Japanese side, which continue to raise attention on the Chinese side. However, the majority in Japan does recognize or have some knowledge on these issues, but there is a lack of understanding of this on the Chinese side, contributing to the growth of anti-Japanese sentiments.

After many casualties from the atrocities and the wars, the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949 with the establishment of People’s Republic of China. The Communist Party under Mao Zedong defeated both the Japanese forces and the Chinese National Party, successfully unifying China under one political party. But the fifty years of war

– the Sino-Japanese War, World War II and the Chinese Civil War – did end Japan and China's diplomatic relations.

Although the Japanese brought hardship to the Chinese, Chairman Mao was fast to look at the brighter future. In 1972 during a joint communiqué announcing the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between China and Japan, former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka apologized to Mao for Japan's wrong doings.

Tanaka stated:

*"The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding 'the three principles for the restoration of relations' put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China."*¹

After his apologies, Mao "assured him that it was the "help" of the Japanese invasion that made the communist victory and this visit between communist and Japanese leaders possible."² Mao stated that there was no reason for the Japanese to apologize, because China was able to unify under the Chinese Communist Party due to Japan's militarism and invasions. Mao Zedong and Tanaka Kakuei shook hands firmly. It had seemed that both sides were looking forward to reestablishing a new diplomatic relationship with open-mindedness.

In 1978 China initiated what is now called the Open and Reform Policy. Although it is true that Mao Zedong did unify China under the Communist Party, among the Chinese population, Deng Xiaoping is considered the true key figure of

¹ "Joint Communiqué of the Government of Ja." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Beijing. 29 Sept. 1972. Web. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html>>.

² Li, Zhisui. *The Private Life Of Chairman Mao*, pg. 568, par. 2, 1994 Chatto and Windus.

today's success of China. Deng brought much economical change to China by launching the Open and Reform policy and Special Economic Zones. These changes had a long term impact and helped lift millions of Chinese out of poverty, and transforming China into its current state as a leading global nation.

In the same year, President Deng visited Japan, touring Japanese electronic factories and even enjoyed time on the bullet train. Within China, Japanese movies started to hit the theaters, allowing the Chinese to enjoy Japanese entertainment during their leisure time. It seemed that Sino-Japanese relations were going in a positive direction because "the Chinese government sought to downplay discussions of Japanese atrocities in state-sponsored academic research and public education venues from 1949 through the 1980s, focusing instead on the popular resistance movement led by the Communist Party."³ Uplifted by the successful economical change initiated by President Deng, Japan felt that Deng was capable of letting go of the past and fostering a new, and stronger diplomatic relationship between the two Eastern giants. Unfortunately this did not come true.

The year 1985 marked the 40th anniversary of the end of the World War II. While the Japanese see August 15th as a day to mark their loss, for the Chinese it is a day to commemorate victory of the Sino-Japanese War. During the 40th anniversary, China constructed many memorials to honor those who were lost and to remember the past events. The Nanjing Massacre Memorial in Nanjing and Unit 731 Memorial in Harbin were all built within three years. Almost all the memorials standing today in China were made around 1985. The 40th anniversary and the war memorials

³ CHINA'S HISTORY ACTIVISTS AND THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN: *History in the Making*, James Reilly, *Asian Survey* Vol. 44, No. 2 (March/April 2004), pp. 276-294

reminded the Chinese population of these past historical events. While anti-Japanese sentiments were suppressed during the Mao era, the foundation had already been present since 1915. By bringing up and taking advantage of past atrocities, the Communist Party's conservative members slowly regained power in 1985. The shift in power and official re-rise of anti-Japanese sentiments occurred in 1986 as a result of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Yasukuni Shrine.

A year after the 40th anniversary marking the end of the World War II and the Sino-Japanese War, Prime Minister Nakasone made plans to visit Yasukuni Shrine, a historical shrine that commemorates the spirits of war victims. What angered the conservative Chinese party members, however, was the fact that this shrine also commemorates the spirits of Sino-Japanese war criminals and symbolizes an interpretation of Japanese conduct during the wars that does not admit any wrongdoing on the part of the Japanese. The conservative Chinese party members stated that the Sino-Japanese wars brought two hundred thousand casualties in China, and that the Japanese soldiers killed children by boiling them in hot water and showing off their dead bodies after spearing them with their swords.⁴ These statements made by the conservative party members shocked and angered the younger generation. Immediately thousands of students gathered in Tiananmen Square and demonstrated against Japan and Nakasone's visit of Yasukuni Shrine. Like today, demonstrations in China were banned and could not be held by individuals or by independent organizations. But after discovering the populist anger against Japan, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) knew that anti-Japanese

⁴ Suzuki, Toshiyuki. いま嫌いな国中国 [*The Country We Hate: China*]. Japan: 星雲社, 2005. Print.

sentiments could be a tool to strengthen their own domestic authority. As a result of these demonstrations, Nakasone's planned visit to Yasukuni Shrine was canceled.

At the end of 1986, CCP Chairman Hu Yaobang invited Nakasone to visit China in order to show his support for Japanese-Chinese diplomatic relations. But soon after, Hu Yaobang was forced to resign from his position due to student demonstrations: this time, for democracy. Because he failed to punish these students, Hu Yaobang was blamed and was attacked by the conservative party members. Hu Yaobang's resignation exacerbated the Japanese-Chinese diplomatic relationship.

In 1989, thousands of people filled Tiananmen Square, demonstrating for democracy. It was widely thought that the start of this large demonstration was due to Hu Yaobang's death in the same year.⁵ Students who wished to commemorate his death all gathered in Tiananmen Square, later resulting in a larger demonstration for democracy. To this day the true number of casualties due to the incident at Tiananmen Square is unknown. Less widely recognized, however, is the fact that the outcome of the massacre eventually led to the rise of officially sponsored anti-Japanese sentiments. After the Tiananmen Square incidents, the CCP became afraid of losing power due to the democratic movements.⁶ The CCP realized the need to take focus away from democracy, and have chosen to use anti-Japanese sentiments to sway patriotism and to legitimize Party rule once again.

⁵ Zhang, Liang. *The Tiananmen Papers*. Ed. Andrew J. Nathan. New York Times, 8 Apr. 2001. Web. Path: <http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/l/liang-tiananmen.html>.

⁶ McGregor, Richard. "5 Myths About the Chinese Communist Party." *Foreign Policy* Jan. 2011: 1. Web. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/5_myths_about_the_chinese_communist_party>.

Deng Xiaopin blamed the events in Tiananmen on the past Chinese education system. Deng and later his successor Zhang Zemin, stated that the students from the Tiananmen incident were terrorists and claimed that they were betrayers to the nation. Deng Xiaopin and Zhang Zemin both attacked the past Chinese education system and called for a new one. Deng stated:

"I have told foreign guests that during the last 10 years our biggest mistake was made in the field of education, primarily in ideological and political education—not just of students but of the people in general. We did not tell them enough about the need for hard struggle, about what China was like in the old days and what kind of a country it was to become. That was a serious error on our part."⁷ This nationalistic re-evaluation of the past educational curriculum eventually led to a more nationalistic portrayal of history in the new education system, which helped to raise patriotism and anti-Japanese sentiments in China.

Although CCP's new educational system started in 1991, the Japanese Emperor's visit to China in 1992 was a success. At the Chinese-hosted banquet, Emperor Akihito stated:

"In the long history of relationship between our two countries, there was an unfortunate period in which my country inflicted great sufferings on the people of China. I deeply deplore this."⁸ The Emperor gave his words and intended to apologize the Chinese nation for the past.

⁷ National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China, Zheng Wang, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 783-806

⁸ *Those Other apologies by Japan*. Times Online, 22 Apr. 2005. Web.
<<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article384210.ece>>.

But the Emperor's visit and brief apology did not contribute to bettering the diplomatic relationship. In 1995, the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II and the Sino-Japanese War again stirred the Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments through China. The media was full of anti-Japanese articles and documentaries. After the death of Hu Yaobang, the change in Deng's political stance and the beginning of concerted use by the CCP of anti-Japanese sentiments for the party's benefit, the Chinese Communist Party lost its foothold on bettering relations with Japan. Through the power of the CCP's ideological and political indoctrination and repressing China's wartime conduct, anti-Japanese sentiments quickly permeated the Chinese population, with the aim of contributing to legitimizing CCP rule once again but also causing the insecure Sino-Japanese relations.

Today, even if one does not agree what CCP presents, it is impossible to write or create anti-government threads, because the government oversees Internet usage. After the Tiananmen incident, speaking of democracy became dangerous in China⁹. While the Chinese people suffer from lack of freedom, the people do have the freedom to express their everyday frustrations regarding anti-Japanese sentiments because the government seems supports it.¹⁰ However, it is also true that the Chinese government continues to fear demonstrations and revolutions for the people's freedom and democracy. In order to contain these movements, the Chinese government has successfully established an anti-Japanese embedded educational

⁹ Kristof, Nicholas D. "Answering Your China Questions." *The New York Times* 3 June 2009. Web. <<http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/03/answering-your-china-questions/>>.

¹⁰ *Anti-Japan protests spread in Chinese cities*. Japan Today, 31 Oct. 2010. Web. <<http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/anti-japan-protests-spread-in-chinese-cities>>.

system in order to distract the population from such thoughts and encourage anti-Japanese protests as a way to deflect internal criticisms. Through the new educational system created under Deng Xiaopin, the Chinese people have gradually accepted and adopted anti-Japanese sentiments in their lives. This is the primary reason for the current unstable Sino-Japanese diplomatic relationship.

Chapter 2

China's Patriotic Education Campaign

The end of the Cultural Revolution brought the most challenging times for the Chinese Communist Party. In the 1980s, the CCP faced what was called the “three belief crises”¹¹. The three included the crisis of faith in socialism, crisis in belief of Marxism and crisis in trust of the Party by the population. Because the three Communist ideologies had lost credibility over time the CCP was no longer able to gain mass support from the population. The crises were not only evident domestically but spread internationally as well. The CCP feared that they were losing power to rule the country. However, since instituting drastic changes in the educational system, the CCP has been able to quell these crises, and has largely reasserted power and built support from within the population. The new educational system was named the Patriotic Education Campaign.

Since the Tiananmen incident, the CCP became aware of the democratic movements within the population. Afraid of losing power, the leaders needed to construct a campaign to “shift the focus of students’ youthful energies away from domestic issues back to foreign problems... to redirect protest toward the foreigner as an enemy, as an external Other”¹². To shift focus away from domestic problems, major revisions in the history textbooks were needed to emphasize on the international problems. After suppressing the pro-democratic movement in Tiananmen, the party reflected back on the past educational system, and concluded

¹¹ National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China, Zheng Wang, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 788

¹² Callahan, William A. *Critical Asian Studies*. London: n.p., 2006. 179-208. 22 Apr. 2011.

that the previous system did not focus enough on ideological and political education-the old system failed to emphasize on the past struggles brought by the invaders and how China came to be after the difficult times.

Shortly after the Tiananmen incident, leaders Deng Xiaopin and Jiang Zemin launched China's new Patriotic Education Campaign. This campaign focused on educating the nation, especially the youth, about China's humiliating history and experiences due to the Western and Japanese incursions. Furthermore, the new educational system also concentrated on explaining the CCP's success in achieving national independence during the civil war while legitimizing the Communist Revolution. The Patriotic Education Campaign was officially established in 1991 in two documents announced by the CCP: the first titled "Notice about Conducting Education of Patriotism and Revolutionary Tradition by Exploiting Extensively Culture Relics;" the second "General Out-line of Strengthening Education on Chinese Modern and Contemporary History and National Conditions"¹³.

The CCP stated that the objectives of the new Patriotic Education Campaign "are to boost the nation's spirit, enhance cohesion, foster national self esteem and pride, consolidate and develop a patriotic united front to the broadest extent possible, and direct and rally the masses' patriotic passions to the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics."¹⁴ But in fact this educational campaign's objective was not to educate the youth on the past, but more to

¹³ CPC Central Committee 1991 and Ministry of Education 1991 quoted in National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China, Zheng Wang, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 789

¹⁴ Xinhua News Agency, 2005. <http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-03/16/conent_2705546.htm> translated by Zheng Wang author of *International Studies Quarterly*

legitimize the CCP rule by conducting patriotism through anti-Japanese sentiments.

In 1992 the official People's Education Press published a new history book for both middle schools and high schools. The new history textbooks presented history through a victim's point of view by using a victimizing narrative while also concentrating the core ideologies on patriotism. Histories of class struggle during Taiping Rebellion and the Nationalist Guomindan era were now replaced by historical contexts that only focused on foreign invasions and oppressions. Generally speaking the textbooks shifted from focusing on the CCP and Guomindan political conflict to one that emphasized more so on China's humiliating foreign invasion periods¹⁵. The humiliating past events especially focused on the international and ethnic conflict between China and Japan, fostering anti-Japanese sentiments.

From elementary school, students in China received historical education through the textbooks written in the victimizing narrative, allowing anti-Japanese sentiments to develop. For example, one particular Chinese middle school textbook had seventy pages worth of history on the gruesome events from the Manchuria Incident till the end for World War II. The same textbook also had more pages written on the Sino-Japanese War: in fact, many Chinese history textbooks contain more than half of the content on the battles between Japan and China.¹⁶ Developed since 1991, a specific textbook written by the Modern History Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social sciences "began to publish a greater percentage of

¹⁵ National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China, Zheng Wang, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 791

¹⁶ English translation by author. Suzuki, Toshiyuki. *いゝま嫌いな国中国* [*The Country We Hate: China*]. Japan: 星雲社, 2005. Print.

articles documenting Japan's historical atrocities in China. By the year 2001, studies documenting atrocities had come to dominate the journal."¹⁷ Within the textbook's contexts, the majority of them presented the victimizing narrative to conduce patriotism and demonize the Japanese, in order to facilitate the spread of anti-Japanese sentiments.

These anti-Japanese teachings were possible due to the fact that the Chinese Ministry of Education maintained direct authority over the educational content and teaching methods, thus allowing CCP to successfully utilize state institutions in furtherance of its own message, spreading their style of 'patriotism' potentially mixed with anti-Japanese sentiments. In the teaching guidelines on the Chinese Modern and Contemporary History Textbook Volume 1, an official narrative of modern Chinese history is written as the following:

*"Chinese modern history is a history of humiliation that China had been gradually degenerated into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society; at the same time, it is also a history that Chinese people strived for national independence and social progress, persisted in their struggle of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism, and was also the history of the success of New-Democratic Revolution under the leadership of the CCP."*¹⁸

Since the start of the new educational campaign, although the Chinese Ancient History and World History became elective courses, both modern and contemporary Chinese history became required courses, where it became mandatory for the students to take up to 99 hours of this course for two semesters.¹⁹ The anti-Japanese

¹⁷ CHINA'S HISTORY ACTIVISTS AND THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN: *History in the Making*, James Reilly, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (March/April 2004), pp. 276-294

¹⁸ Ministry of Education 2002. "Lishi Jiaoxue Degang [Teaching Guideline for History Education]. Beijing: People's Education Press

¹⁹ National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China, Zheng Wang, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 792

based educational system became the primary course within history education in Chinese schools nation wide.

For the students seeking for more opportunities within academics and careers that require post-secondary education, the study on modern and contemporary Chinese history had become important. While college entrance exams were, and still are today, limited for those who are more fortunate, high school students who wish to attend universities must study the required subjects and contents carefully in order to score well on the competitive university exams. In China, candidates who hope to attend universities have a choice of taking the nationwide exam either in the humanities or sciences/engineering categories. Before the issue of the patriotic educational campaign, history was only tested for humanities major. However after the campaign launched, modern and contemporary Chinese history became included in the politics section, a section in which both categories of majors are required to be tested on. In order to advance in society, students must be educated well under the anti-Japanese embedded educational system. Essentially the patriotic education campaign spread quickly in the nation, thus allowing CCP to educate “the Chinese youth with detailed information about China’s traumatic and humiliating experience in the face of Western and Japanese incursion.”²⁰

While numerous Chinese history textbooks focused on the “humiliating” events in the past, many of them omitted certain historical events or sought to

²⁰ National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China, Zheng Wang, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 791

portray the event in a misleading manner. Misleading portrayals of histories are present in Japanese history textbooks issued by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform. But unlike in Japan, the Chinese government began to force all schools to use certain textbooks and to teach the lessons according to a certain plan. This made ideological orthodoxy, whether based upon legitimate or misleading thoughts and information, a much simpler goal to achieve in the Chinese system.

For example, a Chinese history scholar Weishi Yuan, in an article titled “Modernization and History Textbooks,” criticized China’s history textbooks on the portrayal of the 1900 Boxer Rebellion. The textbooks wrote, “the 1900 Boxer Rebellion as a ‘magnificent feat of patriotism’ without describing the violence committed by the rebels or their extreme anti-foreign views.”²¹ Weishi Yuan argued that such current Chinese patriotic educational system has helped to foster blind nationalism and anti-foreign sentiments especially among the youth. Although his essay was published in a national Chinese newspaper, the China Youth Daily, as a weekly supplement, due to the content for his work the government was fast to close it down.²² The CCP has dictated which histories are to be taught to the students, and the majority of the times this history only focuses on atrocities done by the Japanese, feeding and encouraging the growth of anti-Japanese sentiments.

The Patriotic Education Campaign was not directed only towards the youth but was also used to control the members of the Party. Since the CCP saw a collapse of the Communism ideology after the Tiananmen incidents, “patriotism” had now

²¹ National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China, Zheng Wang, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 791

²² Ibid.

become the core tool for the ideological education of the party-state system.

Regardless of the position, the 60 million members of the CCP are all required to be familiar with CCP documents and leaders' speeches. In order to coordinate the work of the patriotic education, local governments and party agencies are required to set up what is called the "leading groups". The CCP leadership used the patriotic education within their government in order to ensure both the membership and the identity of the ruling party. In 2001, Jiang Zemin, during the 80th Anniversary on the founding of the CCP, listed the major accomplishments of the Party:

*"We have thoroughly put an end to the loose-sand state of the old China and realized a high degree of unification of the country and unparalleled unity of all ethnic groups. We have abrogated the unequal treaties imposed upon China by Western powers and all the privileges of imperialism in the country. The feudalistic segmentation of the country has gone forever on this land of China. ... We have forged a people's army under the absolute leadership of the Party and built a strong national defense. ... We have thoroughly ended the history of humiliating diplomacy in modern China and effectively safeguarded State sovereignty, security and national dignity."*²³

Many of the historical events stated above, such as the times during the Sino-Japanese Wars and the World War II, can be connected to the national humiliation that is said to have come by the Japanese invasions. But as previously stated, the CCP leaders fail or avoid to talk about the failures and chaos which have been caused by the Party themselves. Historical events such as the famine in the 1950s, Mao's Cultural Revolution and the incidents in Tiananmen Square are never mentioned in the textbooks. Due to the party's control over education, the patriotic education emphasized on victimization of the Chinese population, and successfully

²³ Jiang Zemin (1996), translation by Xinhua News Agency.

fostered anti-Japanese sentiments, which in turn helped to and legitimize the CCP's rule.

The Patriotic Education Campaign has also direct connection to the recent buildings of museums and public monuments all over the nation. In March 1995, one hundred sites were selected by the Ministry of Civil Affairs to be the national level "demonstration bases" for patriotic education. Among the hundred, forty included battlefields, museums, memorial halls and monuments of martyrs for China's past conflicts or wars with foreign countries. The remaining 24 sites were made to commemorate the Civil War between CCP and the Chinese Nationalist Party. However, only 64 percent of these bases were actual memorial sites of the past wars and conflicts. Among the 40 sites built for the conflicts of China and foreign countries, "half are in remembrance of the anti-Japanese War"²⁴. By building memorial halls and monuments based on anti-Japanese Wars, the CCP has been successful not only in teaching the youth about the past, but also in spreading their version of patriotism and allowing the younger generation to imbibe anti-Japanese sentiments.

After being selected as "demonstration bases" by the government, these sites become eligible for receiving financial support for constructions or for renovations. For example, the Chinese People's Memorial Hall of Anti-Japanese War was first built in 1987 and then was renovated in 1995. Many of these demonstration bases host visits from schools, armies and government agencies, and this particular memorial has received more than 9 million people since its first opening. Because

²⁴ National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China, Zheng Wang, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 790

the hundred demonstration bases have also encouraged the local governments to follow the CCP's pursuit, the estimated number of memorial sites are said to be over 10,000. Chinese schoolchildren nation wide visit these memorials as a part of their school curriculum.

The anti-Japanese slant embedded in patriotic education has also been fostered and generated success in deflecting internal criticisms from the CCP, through the use of new approaches and the new media. While previous campaigns used empty political slogans and preaching, the new educational campaign "was carried out in a much more practical and sophisticated way of selling the CCP's ideas and agenda"²⁵, especially to the younger generation.

The increasing access to the Internet also helped the CCP to pursue their goals. In order to win social status and respect but also to release stress under limited freedom, many people in China have begun to advocate their views on Internet chat rooms and private discussion forums. A recent phenomenon on the Internet reflected the extreme anti-Japanese popular nationalism of China. Known as the "fenqing (indignant young people) culture", this culture uses "cyberspace to make unbridled insults against the Japanese people, culture and government, accusing those Chinese who have connections with Japan of being hanjian (Chinese traitors)."²⁶ The fenqing culture does not represent the entire Chinese population, but seems to be more popular among the younger generation.

²⁵ National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China, Zheng Wang, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 791

²⁶ He, Yinan. *History & Memory*. Vol. 19. N.p.: Indiana University Press, 2007. 43-74. *JSTOR*. Web.

In 2001, a Chinese actress's fashion stirred anger on the Internet. In a fashion photo shoot her dress resembled the Japanese military flag, and went viral over the Internet. Although later she apologized on national TV for this incident, an audience splashed human waste on her during her performance. This audience member was immediately arrested, but later received much credit from the other anti-Japanese members on the Internet and from tabloid magazines. While it may seem that these anti-Japanese supporters are idiosyncratic, the core problem is the fact that while the government controls the usage of Internet and the media, they do not put a stop to anti-Japanese behaviors online.

In 2004, government ministries and CCP departments issued a document named "Opinions on Strengthening and Improving the Work of Patriotic Education Bases" where it asked both government agencies and educational institutions to communicate more with the youth and to improve their teaching methods, while trying to make entertainment a medium of education. In the same year, a new patriotic education project titled "*Three One Hundred for Patriotic Education*"²⁷ was established. Under this project, hundred songs, hundred films and hundred books, under the common theme of patriotism, were selected and recommended to the people by the Ministry of Education. Many of these materials included the brutal battles that were fought between Japan and China during the wartimes. For example in 2009 "the Chinese Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department and State Administration of Radio, Film and Television named a Nanjing Massacre themed film *City of Life and Death* one of 10 recommended films to commemorate the 60th

²⁷ National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China, Zheng Wang, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), pp. 796

anniversary of communist rule”²⁸. Such anti-Japanese -themed films have been funded by the Chinese government and been screened in government agencies and schools; also shown in commercial movie theatres, these films have generating lucrative profits.

China’s anti-Japanese slanted Patriotic Education Campaign has been successful in directing hate beyond China’s borders, especially targeting Japan. The new education system uses academic publications, historical sites, and media reports in order to distribute humiliating historical evidence of the atrocities caused by the Japanese during the occupation period. The victimizing narrative used in these documents and sites have made the younger generation aware of the past but also created a climate for the frustrated population to vent their anger towards Japan, thus growing the anti-Japanese sentiments among the nation. “Chinese feelings of hatred for the Japanese are rising without interruption”²⁹, writes Hong Kong’s *Sing Pao Daily*. Beijing has created the “new generation of Japan-haters”³⁰ and has successfully legitimized the CCP rule.

²⁸ *Nanking Massacre movie has strong opening in China*. JAPANTODAY, 27 Apr. 2009. Web. <<http://www.japantoday.com/category/entertainment-arts/view/nanking-massacre-movie-has-strong-opening-in-china>>.

²⁹ “Netizens Call for a Restoration of Respect for the Chinese People” (“Wangmin hu taohui Zhongguoren zunyan”), *Sing Pao Daily* (Hong Kong), 1 November 2003. <<http://www.singpao.com/20031101/international/470629.html>>.

³⁰ Ibid.

Chapter 3

Portrayal of Japanese Right-Wing Views in China

The second factor, which has contributed to a rise of anti-Japanese sentiments, and thus to the instability of Sino-Japanese relations, is the Chinese Communist Party's reflections on Japanese right-winged textbooks and views on history. Anti-Japanese demonstrations in China spread the news in 2005 and even as recently as the end of 2010. Both demonstrations erupted due to historical controversies, such as textbook depictions of the Nanjing Massacre or on the comfort women, in which Japan and China have been quarreling over for decades.

Although the Peace Friendship Treaty was signed in 1978, portrayals of many historical events, such as Japan's wartime atrocities, still differ in Japan and China. In many cases in both Japan and China, history is manipulated by ruling élites, and differences in representation of history continue to cause international problems. In Japan, manipulation of history is caused by organizations such as the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, a conservative organization that continue to promote a revisionist view of Japanese history. However, such organizations are not established under the Japanese government. Unlike in Japan, textbooks in China continue to be state-approved. By using the state-approval system, the CCP maintain the anti-Japanese sentiments in order to help further entrench party discipline and control, while not enough information regarding Japan's varieties of history narratives is represented in China.

Many demonstrations in the past protested against the views of the right wing or conservative Japanese. Politicians of Liberal Democratic Party of Japan from

time to time emphasized the fact these views are not the majority of the public and are not representative of the Japanese government. However due to the CCP's control of mass media, the Internet and information in general, the Chinese public is unaware of the vast variety of historical narratives presented in Japan. This ignorance has led to the growth of anti-Japanese sentiments among the population, raising patriotism and thus contributing to legitimize CCP rule.

This chapter will quote many examples from the right-wing textbooks that the Chinese communities reflect on, while comparing portrayals of other Japanese history textbooks and official, government views that the mainstream Chinese society is unaware of. First however, the chapter will start with explaining the past Japanese history textbook controversies and also introduce the controversial organization, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, that has been targeted by the Chinese media.

Struggles over the national narrative on history textbooks existed since pre-war Japan. During the occupation period after World War II, significant amounts of information on the Americans and of the war were changed or blotted out by the Japanese bureaucrats due to the US occupation orders: these orders were established to pertain any information that was judged to foster a militaristic mindset. By 1946 the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, also known as the GHQ or American occupiers, imposed standards on Japanese textbooks, which ensured that the textbooks did not encourage emperor-worship or militarism: the government screening process still continued even after the American occupation ended.

Unlike in China, where the state determines the textbooks, every four years Japanese public and private schools are allowed to select one history textbook from a list of several books authorized by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, also known as MOE or MEXT. Japanese textbook companies submit their work according to the prescribed criteria by the Ministry of Education. Prior to their approval, the Ministry then allows the companies to revise the drafts before becoming available for the people. In 1965 Ienaga Saburo, a well-known historian, filed a law suit against the Ministry of Education, pointing out that the Ministry's objections and the issue of correction on Inegana's textbooks were politically motivated, unconstitutional and illegal act. The Ministry rebutted by stating that Ienaga's textbook contained too many illustrations on the atomic bomb aftermath, or about the disabled veterans, all considered to be the 'dark side' of the war.

Ienaga filed a lawsuit again in 1982, this time brining much attention to East Asian communities because the Ministry of Education recommended drastic changes on Ienaga's textbooks as a condition for approval. Such changes were revising the term "aggression/invasion" into "advancement" to describe the events in northeast China during 1930s³¹. Pressures from both China and South Korea succeeded in making the ministry back down on these revisions. In a different lawsuit in 1997 against the Ministry, Ienaga finally enjoyed his victory: the court requested, "that the Government refrain from intervening in educational content as

³¹ Schneider, Claudia. *The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective*. N.p.: SAGE, 2008.109. Web. <<http://ann.sagepub.com/content/617/1/107>>.

much as possible”³². However, the Chinese and the South Koreans paid little attention to Ienaga’s victory. Since the 1982 lawsuit, both countries had more reasons to become vocal on the history issue. Although apparently there was no such request by the Ministry for textbook revision in 1982, “for the Chinese and South Korean governments, it became part of the ‘history card’—a tool available for shaming, pressuring, and gaining leverage on the Japanese government.”³³

History activists such as Ienaga fought against the Ministry for three decades to show understanding and international harmony in the treatment of historical events in the neighboring Asian countries, but not much credit is given to such figures. What also contributed to the biased portrayal of the Japanese textbooks in China was the founding of the *Atarashi Rekishi Kyokasho wo Tsukuru Kai*, also known as the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform.

The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform was founded in December of 1996. A right-winged organization, this group sought to revise the Japanese history in a much more nationalistic and self-glorifying view. This controversial group compiled their own textbook, *The New History Textbook*, in 2001. The new textbook caught immediate attention in both China and South Korea due to the content: this textbook watered down and even deleted significant historical events from the past. Its goals were to emphasize what its founders perceived a correct history through a positive view on Japan’s past.

³² Nicholas D. Kristof, “Japan Bars Censorship of Atrocities in Texts,” *The New York Times*, 30 Aug. 1997

³³ Schneider, Claudia. *The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective*. N.p.: SAGE, 2008.109. Web. <<http://ann.sagepub.com/content/617/1/107>>.

As assumed, widespread protest against the textbook erupted in China, North and South Korea. What many Chinese may not know is the fact that large amounts of Japanese also protested against *The New History Textbook*. At the end of 2000, many Japanese historians and history educators expressed discomfort on the content of *The New History Textbook*. Their discontent was targeted towards the textbooks representation of Japan's founding myths as historical facts but also on the characterization of the wars launched by Japan as wars to liberate Asia.³⁴ Some progressive Japanese citizens groups lobbied local school boards to protest against the selection of *The New History Textbook*.

Actions taking by intellectuals and Japanese citizens were largely successful in defining the debate: in 2005 *The New History Textbook* was only adopted among 0.02% of the schools in Japan. This means that if, for example, there were two hundred million middle school students in 2005, only four thousands students actually were taught history under this textbook³⁵. However, different reactions towards the textbook took place, and continue to take place in China. In 2001 China Radio International announced that the nation was "strongly indignant about and dissatisfied with the new Japanese history textbook for the year 2002 compiled by right-wing Japanese scholars"³⁶. When the Ministry approved the same textbook's 2005 revision again promoted violent popular anti-Japanese demonstrations in

³⁴ Masalski, Kathleen W. "Examining the Japanese History Textbook Controversies." *National Clearinghouse for United States-Japan Studies*. Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, Nov. 2001. Web. <<http://www.indiana.edu/~japan/Digests/textbook.html>>.

³⁵ Kenichi, Matsumoto. 日・中・韓のナショナリズム. Tokyo: 第三文明社, 2006. N. 75-77. Print.

³⁶ Masalski, Kathleen W. "Examining the Japanese History Textbook Controversies." *National Clearinghouse for United States-Japan Studies*. Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, Nov. 2001. Web. <<http://www.indiana.edu/~japan/Digests/textbook.html>>.

many Chinese cities, which did embarrass CCP's pre-Olympic posturing. Although the presses continued to report that the new textbook was rejected in most districts and that surveys continue to prove that "not a single municipal government run or state run junior high school in the country adopted *The New History Textbook*"³⁷, most Chinese citizens did not perceive this because the CCP continues to reference and lambast the right-winged texts. The events on the approval of *The New History Textbook* led to large misunderstandings in the Chinese community regarding the textbook approval system in Japan. Unlike China where state-issued textbooks are the approval system, the Japanese government has "much less power [...]vis-à-vis the MOE/MEXT (Ministry of Education) than its counterparts in neighboring countries consider to be."³⁸ However, it is also true that there remains a government screening process. But unlike in China, the local boards in Japan do have democratic decisions and hold a final call on the choices of the textbooks at their schools. Thus there seems to be a lack of knowledge on the Japanese system by the Chinese community, which contributes to the growing anti-Japanese sentiments in the Chinese public.

Henceforth, this chapter will give examples from the unpopular right-winged representation of historical events on which the Chinese communities refer to as Japan's main views. Because the portrayal of history between the right-winged Japanese and the Chinese side, this also continues to foster anti-Japanese sentiments and contribute to unstable Sino-Japanese relations. But as mentioned above, *The*

³⁷ "Only 0.03% of junior high students to use disputed textbooks", Kyodo News, 16 Aug. 2001

³⁸ Schneider, Claudia. *The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective*. N.p.: SAGE, 2008.109. Web. <<http://ann.sagepub.com/content/617/1/107>>.

New History Textbook was rejected by the majority of the population in Japan and does not give a fair assessment to all Japanese citizens' views on history. The case studies will compare and contrast the right-winged views to the Chinese views of history and further refer to the more popular view of the Japanese society, information that is not well-documented and known in mainstream Chinese society.

Case 1: The Nanjing Massacre

Unfortunately the events in Nanjing are not covered in *The New History Textbook*, but rather a short note is written at the end of a chapter.

"Note*at this time, many Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded by Japanese troops (the Nanking Incident). Documentary evidence has raised doubts about the actual number of victims claimed by the incident. The debate continues even today."³⁹

The Chinese sides are especially angered and continue to demonstrate against the view of the Nanjing Massacre by the right wing conservatives of Japan. To first start off with, the right wings claim that 300,000 could not be a legitimate number of casualties because in 1937 only 200,000 Chinese people lived in Nanjing. The right wings state that proof is to be found in a document sent to the Japanese embassy by the International Nanjing Committee (composed by foreigners in Nanjing), writing that the population of Nanjing in 1937 was 200,000 people. They continue to argue that by the time the Japanese advanced in Nanjing, many citizens with some wealth had already fled the city and the remaining people were the ones who had no money and had no means to leave the city. The right wings pursue their

³⁹ Prepared and translated by Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform from *Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho* (2005 version) published by Fusosha, Tokyo©

argument by claiming that although it may have been possible that the remaining 100,000 people (of the 300,000 claimed by the Chinese) were the Chinese army, if 300,000 were the actual number of the victims, all 200,000 citizens still had to have remained in Nanjing. Furthermore if it was true that the Japanese army did kill 300,000 people, this also meant that the army would have left no living being in Nanjing. But because later in 1938 same international committee wrote to the Japanese embassy and stated the population of Nanjing rose to 250,000 after the Japanese invasion, 300,000 were not a legitimate number of victims⁴⁰. By playing the number game, the right wing conservatives of Japan assert the real moral significance of the Nanjing atrocity.

Furthermore the right wings continue to present a revisionist interpretation of the Nanjing incident by questioning the legitimacy of the texts and photos presented by the Chinese media, historians and authors. An example is brought up by the right wings on the book “The Rape of Nanking” which written by Chinese-American author Alice Chan in 1997. As the book hit the market it became a best seller in the US, selling 500,000 copies, and brought much attention to this historical incident in the West. The right wings of Japan claim that Chan writes in her book that 300,000 to 400,000 were brutally murdered and 80,000 Chinese women were raped during the six-week period, further on writing Japan’s plans to take over the world, and that the Japanese Emperor planned the attack on Nanjing. The right-wingers in Japan were fast to criticize her remarks. They again claim that there are no historical proofs of such incidents and that Chan had made up much of the

⁴⁰ Suzuki, Toshiyuki. いま嫌いな国中国 [The Country We Hate: China]. Japan: 星雲社, 2005. Print.

content of her book. To further claim their point, the right wings also brought attention to the usage of photos in her book. One particular photo in Chan's book consisted of several dead bodies by the riverbank; the picture was intended to provide proof of the mass murder of Chinese citizens in Nanjing by the Japanese soldiers. But right wings argue that investigators found out that this particular picture was photographed by a Japanese soldier cameraman, Murase Morio, and in fact hid the truth of the actual event. Right wings stated that the book trimmed the rest of the photo and only zoomed in the dead bodies in order to claim the brutal murders of the Nanjing citizens and that the original photo proved the truth that in fact the dead bodies were Chinese soldiers who were killed during a battle against the Japanese soldiers, and were not Nanjing citizens- thus, the picture could not serve its initial purpose.

While the above-mentioned arguments by the right wing conservatives are questionable, it is true that most Japanese people avoid talking about the Nanjing Massacre. However, before the "Nanjing Massacre" was deleted in *The New History Textbook*, the Supreme Court in Japan ruled that it was unconstitutional for the Ministry of Education to omit in describing the Nanjing Massacre and the sexual violence in Ienaga's version of the textbook, meaning that even before the existence of *The New History Textbook*, the Nanjing Massacre already appeared in many Japanese history textbooks. The Nanjing Massacre is also recognized by the Japanese judicial system as well, and although Japanese people may hesitate to speak on this topic, this is the reason why most history textbooks do include atrocities in Nanjing. On the official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, it is stated that "the

government of Japan believes that it cannot deny the entrance of the Japanese Army into Nanjing in 1937, the killing of a large number of noncombatants, looting, and other acts occurred.”⁴¹

Within the eight textbooks available today, all except the *New History Textbook* mention the word “Nanjing Incident”, “Nanjing Massacre” or “Nanjing Massacre Incident” to describe the past atrocities in Nanjing. In Tokyo Shoseki’s textbook, adopted by over 50% of Japanese junior high schools, the Nanjing Massacre reads as the flowing:

“The Japanese military occupied the capital of Nanjing in the same year [1937]. In its process, [the military] killed a massive number of Chinese, including women in children”⁴².

In Nihon Shoseki’s textbook, the book specified the estimate of the casualties during the atrocities by writing “In late December [1937], the Japanese military captured the capital Nanjing. [The military] killed as many as 200,000 prisoners of war and civilians, and the atrocities and looting were not brought to an end; therefore, [Japan’s capture of Nanjing] received fierce international condemnation”⁴³.

According to a survey conducted in 2007 on 221 Japanese college students from around the country, 79.2% of the students answered “yes” to the question “[Do you think] the Nanjing Massacre took place?” Only 6.8% of the students answered “no,” exemplifying that in fact the right wing, revisionist views do not

⁴¹ *Historical Issues Q&A*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Jan. 2006. Web. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq16.html>.

⁴² Kasahara, Tokushi. *Reconciling Narratives of the Nanjing Massacre in Japanese and Chinese Textbooks*. Tsuru Bunka University, n.d. Web. <www.usip.org/files/file/kasahara.pdf>.

⁴³ Ibid.

represent the majority of the Japanese nation: “as the survey found, many Japanese believe that the Nanjing Massacre occurred”⁴⁴. Furthermore, most history and other dictionaries do carry out words relating to the Nanjing Massacre. For example in the most popular dictionary *Kojien* by Iwanami Shoten, the Nanjing Massacre is defined as the following: “ the Japanese military slaughtered massive number of surrendered soldiers, prisoners of war, and ordinary citizens inside and around Nanjing castle; moreover, they committed crimes such as arson, looting, and rape, when Nanjing was captured in 1937 in the Sino-Japanese War.”⁴⁵

On April 14th 2005, demonstrations in Beijing took place when the Chinese population became enraged about Japan’s tendentious right winged textbook. This protest became a legal protest march where the police herded the protestors into groups and even encouraged discourse that would normally be against the law in China. However, this demonstration raised question against the government among some Chinese citizens. “I think the movement has been heavily manipulated... The sentiment against Japan is real, but the government has co-opted it for its own purposes.” said Yu Jie, a critic of the government who has written extensively on China-Japan relations. Mr. Sun, a participant from the demonstration stated that while they do believe that Japan has forgotten the past atrocities, he feels that his government is “playing tricks” on the population and controlling the anti-Japanese

⁴⁴ Kasahara, Tokushi. *Reconciling Narratives of the Nanjing Massacre in Japanese and Chinese Textbooks*. Tsuru Bunka University, n.d. Web. <www.usip.org/files/file/kasahara.pdf>.

⁴⁵ “Nanjing Massacre.” *Kojien*. 2010.

sentiments for their benefit⁴⁶. Although the Chinese population continues to be angered about the right wing textbooks, it seems that there are growing suspicion towards the CCP within the nation.

Case 2: Comfort Women

The right wing state that there were no such women as the comfort women, but rather these women were regular prostitutes just like in the current times. While it was true that comfort stations did exist, they claimed that these were regular brothels and did not contain workers who were forced by the Japanese military to engage in sexual acts. The right wings claimed that articles written by Asahi Newspaper of Japan led to such misunderstandings on the “truth” of the comfort women.

The existence of the comfort women was first presented in 1973 by Senda Natsuhiko’s “Comfort Women” and in 1983 in “My War Time Crimes: Documents on Forced Abductions of Koreans” by Yoshida Kiyomasa. In Yoshida’s book, he wrote on a personal experience in which he carried out a military order in 1943 where he abducted a Korean woman and forced her to become a comfort woman. In 1991 Asahi Newspaper reported four times on this issue, and wrote articles about an interview with a self-proclaimed comfort woman from South Korea. These books and articles, which wrote on the comfort women, angered the right wings. Later the right wings claimed that the South Korean newspaper’s interview with the self-proclaimed comfort woman disproved Aasahi’s articles. Right wings argued that in

⁴⁶ Kahn, Joseph. "China Is Pushing and Scripting Anti-Japanese Protests." *The New York Times* 15 Apr. 2005: 1+. Web.
<<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/15/international/asia/15china.html?pagewanted=1&r=2>>.

the interview the women stated that she was neither abducted nor forced into prostitution: but rather her mother sold her into a brothel in 1936 at the age of 14 due to poverty. The interview stated that after working at the first brothel for three years she was released but then moved on to another brothel in Northern China where 300 Japanese soldiers were stationed, where right wings claim that Asahi had misinterpreted that this was the comfort station made by the Japanese military⁴⁷. According to the right wings her personal stories did not prove the existence of the comfort women but rather was just a typical story about prostitution in impoverished times.

While the right wings targeted on the technicality of the issue, Asahi continued to claim Japanese military involvement with the comfort women. In 1992, Asahi published an article stating that they found proof of the military's involvement. Due to these reports Prime Minister Miyazawa apologized on this incident while he visited South Korea. The articles and apologies seemed to made this uncertain existence accepted truth, and later the topic on comfort women were to be written in the Japanese history textbooks.

But as stated before, modern textbooks such as *The New History Textbook* still fail to mention the comfort women because they state that the claims are unsubstantiated. The author of "My War Time Crimes: Documents on Forced Abductions of Koreans" Yoshida was later interviewed and investigated both by the Japanese and the South Korean media. When a South Korean journalist visited the island in which Yoshida claimed to have abducted the women, the local citizens

⁴⁷ Suzuki, Toshiyuki. いま嫌いな国中国 [*The Country We Hate: China*]. Japan: 星雲社, 2005. Print.

denied such an act. Later a Japanese University professor conducted an on-the-spot investigation and proved that Yoshida's book was in fact fictional. After many investigations done by the media, Yoshida later stated, his book in fact "was a creation." The right wing's pressures were successful in disproving one of the many books issued on the topic of comfort women.

In the past trials, Japanese Supreme Court have dismissed all cases on the comfort women; it is said that these women in fact were prostitutes, and not sex slaves, who sold themselves due to poverty and debt, but still remained to have the right to refuse their clients. It seems that there only remains "voices" and personal experiences of self-claimed women but no real evidence⁴⁸. The right wings seem to use the Supreme Courts decisions to back up their theory on the non-existence of the comfort women.

Differently than the Nanjing Massacre case, the right wings and the conservatives deny the existence of the comfort women. But the conservative thoughts again do not represent the perspective of the majority of Japan. Since 1997 "all of the textbooks approved by the MOE (Ministry of Education) include references to "comfort women""⁴⁹. As recent as April of 2007 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a policy statement on the issue of comfort women:

"The Government of Japan had been conducting a thorough fact-finding study on the issue known as "comfort women" since December 1991 and announced its results in July 1992 and in August 1993. Public documents found as a result of such study are now open to the public at the Cabinet Secretariat. On the occasion of the announcement of the findings in 1993, then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono released a statement and

⁴⁸ Suzuki, Toshiyuki. いま嫌いな国中国 [The Country We Hate: China]. Japan: 星雲社, 2005. Print.

⁴⁹ Masalski, Kathleen W. "Examining the Japanese History Textbook Controversies." *National Clearinghouse for United States-Japan Studies*. Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, Nov. 2001. Web. <<http://www.indiana.edu/~japan/Digests/textbook.html>>.

expressed in it sincere apologies and remorse, recognizing this issue was, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, a grave affront to the honor and dignity of a large number of women. The Government of Japan has since expressed its sincere apologies and remorse to the former "comfort women" on many occasions. Recognizing that the issue known as "comfort women" was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of a large number of women, the Government of Japan, together with the people of Japan, seriously discussed what could be done for expressing their sincere apologies and remorse to the former "comfort women."

As a result of the recognition of the comfort women, the Asian Women's Fund (AWF) was established in 1995 to extend atonement from the Japanese people to the former comfort women. The Japanese Government has provided necessary assistance for the AWF by paying the total operation cost and also assisting on fund-raising events to fund more activities in order to attain its goals. By the end of 2002, the AMW completed their atonement projects, giving medical welfare support and handing apology letters to every former comfort women, in the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and in Taiwan. In the year 2005 the AWF successfully raised approximately 4.8 billion yen.⁵⁰ Furthermore In 2001 former Prime Minister Juichiro Koizumi wrote a letter to former comfort women and expressed his sincere apologies. The following was the letter written:

Letter from Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the former comfort women

The Year of 2001

Dear Madam,

On the occasion that the Asian Women's Fund, in cooperation with the Government and the people of Japan, offers atonement from the Japanese people to the former wartime comfort women, I wish to express my feelings as well.

The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women.

As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

⁵⁰ RECENT POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN ON THE ISSUE KNOWN AS "COMFORT WOMEN". Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Apr. 2007. Web. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/policy.html>>.

We must not evade the weight of the past, nor should we evade our responsibilities for the future.

I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its past history and accurately convey it to future generations.

Furthermore, Japan also should take an active part in dealing with violence and other forms of injustice to the honor and dignity of women.

Finally, I pray from the bottom of my heart that each of you will find peace for the rest of your lives.

Respectfully yours,
Junichiro Koizumi
Prime Minister of Japan⁵¹

Although the mainstream Chinese society may not know, Japan has recognized and apologized on the issue of comfort women multiple times. The Japanese government has undergone research to acknowledge the existence of the comfort women since the early 90s, and established organization such as the AWF in order to take full responsibility on the issue. Although it is also true that the Japanese Supreme Court has yet to rule in favor of representing plaintiffs and their families by denying the posture of government responsibility, the Japanese Government continues to fund organizations such as the AWF to express their apologies and remorse. However, because the CCP only references and presents the right wing textbooks that fail to mention on the issue of comfort women, Chinese society fails to acknowledge the Japanese Government's accomplishments and continues to believe that Japan does not recognize the existence of comfort women.

Case 3: Unit 731

Like the case of the comfort women, Unit 731 is not mentioned in *The New History Textbook*: the right wing continues to claim that there is no historical evidence on this case. Although there has historically been a debate in the Japanese

⁵¹ Letter from Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the former comfort women (translation). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2001. Web. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/pmletter.html>>.

Government, “in 2002 Tokyo courts have finally acknowledged that Unit 731 did take part in the germ warfare”. Wartime veterans have been vocal on this case since even prior to its recognition in 2002. In 1997 former imperial Japanese Army police officer Yutaka Mio “told the Tokyo District Court on Oct. 1 that the army conducted germ warfare experiments on innocent Chinese civilians.”⁵² In 2006 Toyo Ishii gave a testimony to the Japanese government regarding the atrocities of Unit 731. Toyo Ishii was a young nurse who was stationed at a nearby army medical school during the war. She stated, although not knowing the truth at that time, she often encountered Japanese doctors conducting research on pickled human remains. In 1945 when the Americans approached, her colleagues ordered her to get rid of the body parts and hastily buried the human remains. She says that she even saw dogs run off with human bones in their mouths⁵³.

On February 21st 2011, two diggers began investigating on the site Ms. Ishii claimed to bury the human remains. At around the same time, the Japanese government began to excavate a former medical school in Tokyo where secrets of Unit 731 may be found. Unlike the cases of Nanjing Massacre and the comfort women, Unit 731 has yet to be fully confronted by Japanese society. However the Japanese government has slowly and steadily been working hard on investigating the truth. But Chinese citizens have failed to recognize Japan’s actions.

In 2005, when *the Ministry of Education approved The New History Textbook*, the Chinese journalists interviewed a famous historian and university professor

⁵² "War veteran gives Unit 731 testimony." *The Japan Times* 1 Oct. 1997. Web. <<http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn19971001a1.html>>.

⁵³ "Digging up Japan's past. Deafening silence." *The Economist* 26 Feb. 2011: 48.

Kenichi Matsumoto. The Chinese journalists stated that Japan is moving backwards considering the recognition of history. But Matsumoto's reply shocked the Chinese journalists- it was true that only 0.02% of the schools in Japan adopted *The New History Textbook*. "That little?" answered back the Chinese journalist⁵⁴, proving that there seems to be a misunderstanding in the Chinese community. Because thousands of Chinese citizens demonstrated against *The New History Textbook*, many continue to believe that Japan celebrates the approval of the textbook while holding anti-Chinese demonstrations. However this is the not case in Japan: as seen in the cases of Nanjing Massacre, comfort women and Unit 731, Japan has steadily been recognizing the past atrocities committed in the past, and rejecting the historical revisionists who would argue otherwise. The right wing textbooks and views only represent a small minority of the Japanese people, but the CCP fails to give fair assessment of the variety of narratives of history presented in Japan. This in turn contributes to the growth of anti-Japanese sentiments while legitimizing the CCP rule.

⁵⁴ Kenichi, Matsumoto. 日・中・韓のナショナリズム. Tokyo: 第三文明社, 2006. 78.

Conclusion

In conclusion, over recent years the Sino-Japanese relationship has continued to maintain its historical instability. This thesis presented evidence that pointed to two fundamental causes behind the current tensions: the first being China's Patriotic Education Campaign, and the second being Chinese Communist Party's continuing and singular reference to right wing Japanese historical narratives and views, which they present as representative of the Japanese people.

Since the Tiananmen Square incident, the CCP has become increasingly aware and afraid of democratic movements. In order to reassert power and legitimize Party rule once again, the CCP needed to divert attention away from its failings on domestic issues. In pursuit of this goal, the CCP focused on international issues, specifically issues between Japan and China. Because anti-Japanese sentiments had existed historically, the CCP knew that by attacking Japan on historical issues, and by playing off anti-Japanese sentiments, it could increase CCP 'patriotism.' Furthermore, anti-Japanese sentiments have continued to grow because majority of the Chinese population are unaware of the various historical narratives presented in Japan. Anti-Japanese demonstrations within China are often targeted against right-winged history textbooks or views, but these unpopular textbooks are not issued by the state nor do they represent the popular or mainstream views of Japanese society. However to use anti-Japanese sentiments for their benefit, the CCP continues to only refer to right wing views and their textbooks.

History has proven that anti-Japanese sentiments are not a new topic in Chinese society: anti-Japanese demonstrations occurred as early as 1915. Since then, Sino-Japanese relations have been stagnant; after the advent of Mao's Cultural Revolution,

relations between the two countries seemed to warm up. But after the Tiananmen incidents, the CCP found that anti-Japanese sentiments remained engrained in society, and could be exploited as an essential tool to gain popular support. The warming-up of Sino-Japanese relations ended when the CCP established a new educational system.

As two power-holders of East Asia, Sino-Japanese relations must stabilize; positive changes within the Sino-Japanese relationship in fact will bring mutual benefits both economically and politically. However the Chinese Communist Party continue to challenge the Japanese government. History shows that Japanese militarism committed inhumane atrocities in the past. To face the truth, political parties, government officials and individuals of Japan persists to work hard to acknowledge and apologize for the past acts. However, CCP's fear of democratic movements and loss of Party rule continues to sustain anti-Japanese sentiments, preventing friendlier international relations between Japan and China.

If the CCP continues to shift focus towards international issues in hopes of concealing domestic conflicts, this will inevitably result in people's suspicion towards the government. Legitimizing party rule should be achieved not through patriotism and anti-Japanese sentiments, but by acceptable domestic policies, freedom of speech and human rights. It must address the concerns of the people head on, and not try to distract them by using wedge issues. It seems that over time, the Chinese population has grown ever more frustrated over the CCP rule, but because the people lack a democratic and liberalist civil structure by which to express this discontent, the government supported anti-Japanese demonstrations are the only choice for the citizens to express their frustrations. Repressing of the people will perhaps lead to large demonstrations and uproar of the

citizens against the Party rule in the near time future. By taking away freedom, the CCP may be setting the stage for another large-scale demonstration like the Tiananmen demonstrations. If violence and suppression is used once again against these citizen-organized demonstrations, the CCP may be committing the same error as it did before. If such a cyclical cycle between the citizen and the state is established, the people of China will never obtain fair domestic policies, freedom of speech or human rights. Before engaging in international issues such as the Sino-Japanese relations, China must focus on domestic issue in order to strengthen the civil society. Until China changes the educational system and gives fair portrayal of the different narratives presented in the Japanese society, Sino-Japanese relations will continue to face challenges.

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