JAPAN AND CHINA

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A.J. Pendleton, in his book "East, West and the Race" (Aylmer Press, 1932), wrote:

"It is often said that the success of an industrial nation depends upon its trade with other countries. The same principle applies to Japan. Her trade is largely with China, and the economic policy of Japan is determined by her requirements as an industrial nation. Improved trade relations will be mutually beneficial.

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Japan watches the progress of events in China at the moment with the gravest concern, for she is conscious that one way or the other her interests are bound to be affected in the most vital manner.

Japan's policy in China is dictated by her requirements as an industrial nation. Deprived by nature of the more important of the raw materials for her factories, she has to depend for these essentials of her economic life upon China, especially Manchuria, while China's teeming millions provide her with a great market for the products of her mills. Self-interest alone, if not anything else, commands Japan to cultivate China's friendship and wish well for her struggles to set her house in order.

Japan Sympathetic with Nationalist Movement

It was, therefore, only natural that the rise and progress of the nationalist movement was watched by the Japanese people with a great deal of interest and sympathy, for the awakening of a nationalistic spirit is the first essential for China's reorganization. Its lamented leader, the late Dr. Sun Yatsen, lived several
years in Japan off and on during his eventful career, making a large number of warm friends and admirers. While recognizing his shortcomings as a practical statesman, we always had faith in him as an honest and straightforward man of lofty principles. So when the Nationalist army started from Canton on its spectacular march toward the Yangtze Valley two years ago, and particularly when in its initial stage of success it displayed a degree of discipline and efficiency unprecedented in the military history of China, the hopes of the liberal minded people in Japan rose high. We thought that a real start had for the first time been made in good earnest for the reunification of the country.

This hopeful view was voiced in the press throughout the country. And what is more remarkable, the Government then in office evinced a marked partiality to the Nationalist forces. So much so, indeed, that, notwithstanding the deplorable excesses committed by the Nationalist forces at Hankow and Kiukiang in January, 1927, the Japanese Government consistently refused to take any strong measures of armed protection for its nationals at any of the important points on the Yangtze. The result was the unfortunate incident at Nanking on March 24, 1927, when the Japanese Consulate was looted by the Nationalist troops under
officers, and the members of the Consular staff and their family subjected to indescribable indignities. The houses of the Japanese residents in the city were also looted, and many of them were wounded.

A Turning Point

This marked a turning point in the sentiments of the Japanese people toward the Nationalist army. Successes seemed to have turned the heads of its officers and men, and owing also to the accession of a large number of ill-disciplined units after it reached the Yangtze, it was now evident that no longer any reliance could be placed upon the assurances of the Nationalist army concerning the protection of foreign life and property in China.

So when the Nationalist army began its march upon Peking last year, the newly appointed Tanaka Cabinet sent a few thousand troops to Shantung where about 20,000 Japanese reside at various points along the railway in which we retain an important interest. The Chinese pretend that this prevented the Nationalists from going to Peking last year. But the truth is that the Nationalist army was then short of ammunition and short of funds, and was not in any case prepared to push its way northward. So the despatch of the Japanese troops provided them with
an opportune and welcome excuse for turning back upon Nanking. This fact is very well known in the Far East.

Tsinan Incident

When the Nationalist army obtained the required supply of arms and ammunition from a certain foreign source this Spring, it at once resumed its march upon Peking. And the Japanese Government again took precautionary measures. The unfortunate clash at Tsinan occurred in this way. The first detachment of our troops, about 2,000 carried by the railway in successive batches, had reached Tsinan by March 1. They hastily threw up barricades to defend a portion of the foreign quarter, where all Japanese residents were gathered together. On the night of May 2, at the request of the Nationalist Commander-in-chief, Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, and on the strength of his assurances, these defense works were removed, and those living outside the defended area went back to their homes. This clearly indicates a sincere readiness on the part of the Japanese commander to cooperate with the Nationalist generals in the preservation of order. But the following morning at 9:30 o'clock, a Japanese store outside the foreign quarter was looted by Chinese soldiers, who fired on the Japanese troops.
sent to the rescue. This started a general mix-up, resulting in the massacre of fourteen Japanese residents, including women, in a most barbarous manner, besides the looting of 131 Japanese houses and infliction of indescribable insults upon a number of Japanese men and women in the sight of mocking crowds. In order to avoid the repetition of such deplorable incidents, the Japanese commander notified the Chinese military authorities of both the South and North to withdraw all their troops beyond the limits of twenty Chinese li (about seven miles) from Tsiran and from either side of the Shantung railway. There are now practically no Chinese soldiers in the area within these lines.

Precautionary Measure for Manchuria

Now such having unfortunately been our repeated experiences with the Nationalist army, when shortly afterward it became plain that a last fight between the Peking and Nanking armies was imminent in the plains of the metropolitan province, the Japanese Government was faced with the necessity of taking adequate steps for the protection of its nationals and the vast interests they possess in Manchuria. For this purpose, it issued a warning to the commanders of the two confronting armies to the effect that, if
the Northern (Marshal Chang's) army retreated to Manchuria in a disorderly manner pursued by the Southern troops, both the pursued and pursuers would be disarmed by Japanese troops at Shanhaikwan. In order to enforce her declaration, Japan concentrated a military force of about 7,000 men in the Japanese town at Mukden. This warning had the desired effect. Marshal Chang Tsolin, though at first naturally resentful, had the wisdom to accept the inevitable and withdrew his army into Manchuria in good order, the Southern army being thereby enabled to enter Peking without any serious opposition. Thus without moving a single soldier outside the limits of the Japanese area of control and without shedding a drop of blood, Japan succeeded by her timely action in saving not only her nationals but the whole Manchurian population from the horrors of war.

This was a timely and necessary measure of precaution on the part of Japan, the wisdom and propriety of which cannot be called in question by any fair-minded observer conversant with the realities of the situation. It is, therefore, no small surprise to me to find an intelligent Chinese of Dr. C. C. Wu's standing trying to misconstrue it into an attempt on our part to establish a protectorate over Manchuria. In view of this fact, it seems well to present to you a brief sketch
of what Japan is doing in that part of China and what sort of position Japan occupies there in virtue of treaty stipulations.

**Japan's Position and Activities in Manchuria**

Japan, to start with, owns and operates a system of railways with a total mileage of about 700 miles, besides exercising indirect control over nearly 500 miles of Chinese lines serving as feeders. Along the 700 mile railway under direct Japanese control, there have sprung up thirteen prosperous cities, with municipal buildings, hotels, hospitals, educational institutions of various grades (including two universities), well-built streets and every other modern equipment. In many of these towns there have grown up a number of useful industries, especially bean oil mills, pottery and earthenware factories, collieries, iron works, glass factories, flour-mills, beet-sugar mills, and so forth. These enterprises are mostly undertaken by the South Manchuria Railway Company, whose shares are partly owned by the Imperial Government and partly by private individuals, and which operates all the Japanese lines in Manchuria. The total Japanese investments in Manchuria are estimated at two billion yen.

Apart from the railway and industrial enterprises,
the South Manchuria Railway Company maintains splendidly equipped research institutes and experimental stations. By these means it has made very valuable contributions to the economic development of whole Manchuria. To cite a few illustrations, the improvement of the bean seeds has resulted in the increase of that valuable crop by 10 to 20 percent, while the oil content of the bean has been increased by more than ten percent. Another striking success achieved by Japanese experts is the crossing of the native Mongolian sheep with the Merino, the result of which now makes it possible to increase the wool production in Mongolia and Manchuria by 400 percent. Furthermore expert chemical researches have resulted in the introduction of new industries, such, for instance, as the beet-sugar industry, the manufacture of glass, the manufacture of porcelain and earthen ware, and various products from the bean and bean cake. You may be interested to know some of the last mentioned articles. They are soy and various sauces, soups, breakfast-foods, condensed milk, casein, cheese, salad material, crackers, macaroni, flour, confectionery, glycerin, enamels, varnishes, butter and lard substitutes, edible oils, salad oils, water-proofing material, linoleum, paints, soap, celluloid, rubber substitutes, printing ink, lighting and lubricating oils, and even explosives.
The territory controlled by Japan under treaty sanction, is of considerable extent in length. But you will be surprised when I tell you that the total area of the so-called railway zone is very small, being a little over 100 square miles. Apart from this, Japan exercises administrative control over the Leased Territory of Kwantung, a small peninsula containing only 1,300 square miles. In these two areas Japan has the right of stationing an army of 15,000 men altogether, but in point of fact only one half that number is ordinarily stationed. This small military garrison, cooperating with a small force of police, maintains perfect peace and order in that bandit infested country, so that, apart from the leading foreign concessions like Shanghai, Manchuria is the most orderly and prosperous part of China. This fact is appreciated by nobody more effectively than by the Chinese. The population of the Japanese controlled area (1,400 square miles), which was 384,000 in 1905, increased by 1927 to 1,093,000 of which the Chinese numbered 894,000. With 780 people to the square mile, it is one of the most densely populated districts on the face of the earth.

When I was in Manchuria some weeks ago, I found the cities of Dairen and Port Arthur full of prominent
Chinese refugees, among whom, consulting official records, I recognized two former Manchu princes, one ex-Premier, four ex-Cabinet Ministers, three ex-Tuchans, two ex-Provincial Governors, and twenty generals of various armies. Even the notoriously anti-Japanese war lord of Kirin had sent down his No. 1 wife and family for safe keeping. The interesting thing about these notables was that they hailed from all parts of China, even from the provinces south of the Yangtze.

Population, Rice, and Trade

Another important consequence of the peace and order reigning in Manchuria owing to the presence of Japan there, is the extraordinary rush of immigrants during the past few years from North China, especially Shantung, where constant disturbances and increasing extortions, in addition to famines, have started a general trek into the peaceful and rich provinces of Manchuria. In 1926, their number was about half a million, but last year it increased to over a million. If this movement continues, as is very likely, the population of Manchuria (25,000,000 now) will be doubled in fifteen years. That means an enormous economic development in whole Manchuria in the near future, with tempting openings for financial
operations and industrial undertakings on a large scale.

Another movement of considerable importance that is taking place in Manchuria, is the increasing production of rice. The Koreans first introduced it there nearly two centuries ago. The use of new seeds acclimatized in Hokkaido, the northernmost group of the Japanese islands, has recently given a fresh impetus to the cultivation of rice in Manchuria. Last year, 5,000,000 bushels of rice were exported to Japan. There being now nearly a million Koreans in various parts of Manchuria and because also their Chinese neighbours are coming more and more to engage in the cultivation of this cereal, Japan’s food problem will probably be solved in Manchuria.

Such in brief is the work of development Japan is conducting in Manchuria. The twenty years of Japan’s presence in Manchuria has witnessed a wonderful development in every way. This has been in no sphere more marked than in that of commerce. The foreign trade of Manchuria, which before the advent of Japan used chiefly to centre at Newchwang, amounted only to 16 million taels in 1903. In 1927 the total figure for Manchuria was 647½ million yen, chiefly passing through Dairen, which now ranks as the second port of foreign trade in China, being next to Shanghai. Manchuria with only 6 percent of China’s total population con-
tributes over 30 percent of her foreign trade.

Now with this background of basic facts in your mind you will be in a position easily to judge whether Japan was justified to take the military measure of protection which I have already described. In discussions of this kind, we get nowhere when we ignore, as too many Chinese writers do, the realities of the situation and concentrate ourselves upon mere generalities and abstract theories.

U. S. in Nicaragua—an Analogy

In this connection, it may be interesting to refresh your memory by quoting a remarkable statement of policy which one of America's foremost jurists and statesmen, I mean Mr. Charles E. Hughes, recently made at Princeton in relation to Nicaragua. He said:

"We are there [Nicaragua] simply to aid them in obtaining free elections in order that they may have a sovereign and independent government. I mention that merely because I speak in a spirit of entire frankness. Now what is the real difficulty? The difficulty, if there is any, in any one of the American republics, is not any external aggression. It is an internal difficulty, if it exists at all. From time to time there arises a situation most deplorable and regrettable in which sovereignty is not at work, in
which for a time in certain areas there is no govern-
ment at all, in which for a time and within a certain
limited sphere there is no possibility of performing
the functions of sovereignty and independence. Those
are conditions that create the difficulty with which
government breaks down and American citizens are
in danger of their lives. Are we to stand by and
see them killed, because a government in circumstances
which it cannot control and for which it may not be
responsible can no longer afford reasonable protection?
I am not speaking of sporadic acts of violence, or of
the rising of mobs, or of those distressing incidents
which may occur in any country however well ad-
ministered. I am speaking of the occasions where
government itself is unable to function for a time
because of difficulties which confront it and which it
is impossible for it to surmount. Now it is a principle
of international law that in such a case a government
is fully justified in taking action—I would call it
interposition of a temporary character—for the purpose
of protecting the lives and property of its nationals.”
That is what your ex-Secretary of State, than
whom a more judicious and well-balanced lawyer and
statesman it is difficult to find in any country, has
said about the right of the United States to protect
the life and property of its citizens in a Latin-American
republic. Now with the transposition of certain proper nouns, his remarks, as you may have noticed, apply exactly to Japan's case in China. If the United States is justified to take a course of action, which he calls interposition but which is practically the same as intervention, for the protection of its nationals in Nicaragua, you will agree with me when I say that Japan is justified a hundred times over to resort to similar action for the protection of her nationals numbering over a million (200,000 Japanese and 900,000 Koreans) and her vast interests in Manchuria.

China's Weakness and Duplicity

Dr. C. C. Wu further says that Japan's interests in Manchuria are economic, thereby maintaining that they are only economic and nothing else. This is an amazing statement for a Chinese statesman to make in view of the well-known historical facts which are responsible for Japan's presence in Manchuria. It was China's weakness and her statesmen's dishonesty which permitted Russia not only to build railways in Manchuria but to occupy the whole territory down to Port Arthur. Manchuria was all but a Russian province. Russia was not satisfied with Manchuria; she was reaching out her hands to the Korean peninsula. Japan could no longer stand still, for her
acquiescence would have meant the surrender of her existence as an independent nation. So Japan single-handed took up the challenge, and by tremendous efforts saved herself and China from the clutches of the Northern Colossus. In view of China's proved helplessness to guard her territory against hostile aggression, Japan inevitably had to shoulder the whole responsibility for looking after external danger. That is why Japan went to Manchuria and why she still finds it necessary to stay there for her national defense, until China convinces us of her capability and her determination to hold that territory against all comers.

Chinese may tell you, as Dr. C. C. Wu naively told his audience recently at Seattle, that saving a neighbour's land from depredation by highwaymen does not give you the right to erect a fence on his ground for the protection of your property. But that is exactly what China agreed to let Japan do in Manchuria by the treaty signed at Peking immediately after our war with Russia, the terms of which were since extended to ninety-nine years. Then again what would you think of your neighbour, if after you had ejected the dangerous interlopers from his ground at the cost of precious blood and treasure, you discovered that he had all the while been in secret collusion with them with the purpose of getting
hold of your own property? That, Ladies and Gentlemen, was exactly what China did to us while we were engaged in our life and death struggle with Russia. China was then in secret alliance with our enemy against us. This ignominious treaty of alliance with Russia expressly directed against us, China had to produce at the time of the Washington conference. It was lucky for China that the existence of this treaty was not known to us at the time of our war with Russia, for if we had known it, it might have made some slight difference in the status of Manchuria, if not of some other parts of China as well.

To sum up, our position in Manchuria is essentially a defensive one. Apart from the treaty sanction, we cannot light-heartedly abandon our vital trust there so long as there exists possible danger of external aggression and so long as China continues feeble in defence and dubious in intention. If China wants to make our interests in Manchuria exclusively economic she has the remedy in her own hands; she has to prove her ability and determination to keep that country safe from any hostile designs. On this point there is no diversity of opinion among us irrespective of class or party. I have spoken frankly without any reservation, in the hope that there might be no room for misunderstanding with regard to our intentions about Manchuria.